THAILAND?! Special Lecture 2: Edmund Malesky, Ph.D. IRGN 463.

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THAILAND?! THAILAND?! Special Special Lecture 2: Lecture 2: Edmund Malesky, Edmund Malesky, Ph.D. Ph.D. IRGN 463 IRGN 463

Transcript of THAILAND?! Special Lecture 2: Edmund Malesky, Ph.D. IRGN 463.

Page 1: THAILAND?! Special Lecture 2: Edmund Malesky, Ph.D. IRGN 463.

THAILAND?!THAILAND?!

Special Special Lecture 2:Lecture 2:

Edmund Malesky, Edmund Malesky, Ph.D.Ph.D.

IRGN 463IRGN 463

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Anti-Government protestors have blockaded the Thai Parliament for six weeks?

Now, the situation has escalated. The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)

blocked lawmakers in the Parliament all day. The Prime Minister, Somchai Wongsawat ,

was forced to flee by jumping over a fence, while other lawmakers were left inside forover five hours.

Riot police have been called in Over 400 people have been injured. How did the situation get to this point?

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Since 1932, Thailand has 18 coups, 18 different Constitutions, and 33 different Prime Ministers.

Military has intervened in Thai politics historically when they sensed political crisis or to fill power vacuums.

The King’s role has not been incidental, on occasion, the King or minions of the King had signaled tacit approval of overthrow.

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The seeds of this crisis can be found in 1996. Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, the Thai Parliament approved

a 99-member Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA). The CDA begin working on the amendments in early 1997. There were major fault lines among voters over the

constitutions, as evidenced by widespread green (for) and yellow (against) shirts in the street.

The Asian Financial Crisis demonstrated the issues inherent in Thailand’s old constitution, as the fragmented government could not adequately respond to the crisis.

Thus, by August 1996, the “People’s Constitution” was drafted and widely supported by the citizenry.

Many of the provisions would be seen as dangerousto incumbent politicians, but an up or down vote wasrequired. Politicians could not pick it apart.

Thus, it passed the National Assembly by a vote of 518-16(17 abstentions).

King affixed his signature on October 11, 1997.

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Superintendent Institutions include: the Electoral Commission (EC), the National Human Rights Commission, National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC), and a Constitutional Court ( Hicken, 1997).

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Nearly everyone of the changes to the Thai Constitution had the effect of consolidating leadership. In fact, this was by design.

Matt Shugart likes to say, the 1997 Constitution was an example of “Be careful what you wish for.”

Effective Number of Parties 1986-20071986-1996 2001 2005

Average Local ENP

3.2 2.7 2.0

National ENP 7.2 3.8 2.6

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Former police offer turned telecommunication tycoon, Thaksin was head of a minor party (Palang Tham).

Under the new constitution, he founded a new party Thai Rak Thai he was able to consolidate power.

With a power base in the rural, northern provinces, Thai Rak Thai swept to victory in the 2001 elections.

TRT won 248 seats and held a decisive majority in the National Assembly.

In 2005, he called a snap election toward of dissent in his party.

He won another landslide victory winning 374/500 seats.

From this power base, Thaksin moved toconsolidate more power by stacking the Constitutional Court, Electoral Commission, and Corruption Commission.

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Vote-buying in Thailand has a long history, and it was not unusual for TRT to engage in the practice.

Members of TRT were accused of corruption in the construction of the Suvarnabhumi airport.

Thaksin replaced a number of top military and police leaders with those close to him.

The most visible issue occurred when Shinn Corp, the telecommunications monopoly built by Thaksin and still owned by his family to Singapore’s Temasek. The sale netted the family $2 Billion in tax free profit.

The corruption commission ruled that the sale was legal, but the sale left a bad taste in the mouth of many. The tax code had recently been re-written in a manner that

excluded the sale. The sale went against previous Thaksin pledge of selling valuable

state assets to foreigners. Critics cried that Thaksin was merely abusing power to enrich

himself.

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After the controversial sale in January 2006, anti-Thaksin protests grew in Bangkok.

Then, a former Thaksin supporter, Sondi Limthongkul, accused Thaksin of: Restricting press freedom Being complicit in the destruction of the

Erawan Shrine. Academics, students, and middle-class

began to protest in the streets with Sondhi at the forefront

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Thaksin countered by dissolving Parliament on February 24 and calling for new elections. New elections were scheduled for April 2.

Opposition parties refused to participate. The Nation noted that the election "fails to

take into consideration a major fallacy of the concept [of democracy], particularly in a less-developed democracy like ours, in which the impoverished, poorly informed masses are easily manipulated by people of his ilk. And Thaksin's manipulation has been well documented.."

Dissent grew, even within TRT, but there were no defections from the party.

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TRT wins handily, winning 462 votes. But there were 10 non-voters for every 16 voters. A 1997 Constitutional Rule stipulated that by-elections needed to be

called in districts where uncontested candidates failed to win 20% of the vote.

Thus by-elections were set for April 26th (40 Districts) and April 29th (13 districts).

Upset with the process, the Democratic Party (the main opposition party) and the People’s Alliance for Democracy, an organization representing an amalgam of intellectuals and middle-class refused to participate.

The unrest was embarrassing for the Thailand, and the King (or minions, notably Prem Tinsulanond of the Privy Council) of the King put pressure on Thaksin to rectify the situation. Some argue that the King Bhumibol had nothing to do with this.

Thus, Thaksin resigned on April 4th, announced he was going on vacation. Thaksin notably did not give up his Chairmanship of the Party

Thaksin’s resignation was dicey. First,he announced that he would continue on ascaretaker PM until the results of the by-elections.

But later, after a visit with the King, he rescinded and delegated the caretaker positionto Chidchai Wannasathit.

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While Thaksin was away, the Constitutional Court in a landmark decision ruled (8-6) that the election was illegal.

The official decision was based on the awkward position of voting booths (see above)Highly interventionist role of Election Commission in “cleaning up” political order (spoiled ballots, high ordering of rerun elections, yellow vs. red cards) People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) petitioned to suspend results due to violation of voters privacy rightsConstitutional Court declared results invalid and pressured EC to resignCommissioners jailed, and Cabinet held new elections in October 2006

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While Thaksin was in New York for a UN meeting on September 20, troops from the Thaicom satellite receiving station and Channel 11.

It turned out they were from 1st and 3rd Army Regions, the Internal Security Operations Command, the Special Warfare Centre and Army units in Nakhon Ratchasima and Prachin Buri provinces and sections of the Navy.

Coup leaders, led by Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, called themselves theCouncil for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarch (CDRM).

They arrested former TRT members, disbandedthe party, and begin re-writing the constitution.

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Head of StateThe King

Executive PowerPrime Minister

Legislative Power Judiciary

The winning party or

The coalition government

House of Representatives House of Senate

Independent of The legislative and

Executive power

Head of Government

Prime Minister

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Head of StateThe King

Executive PowerAppointed

Prime MinisterLegislative Power Judiciary

Military Junta

Head of GovernmentAppointed

Prime Minister

Appointed CabinetJunta

AppointedMPs

Junta Appointed

Senator

Independent of the Executive and

Legislative power

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Thaksin remained exiled, alternating between London, where his daughter lives, and China.

While there, he purchased the Manchester City football team.

He and his wife both feared arrestupon their return.

On New Year’s 2007 a bomb wentoff in Central Bangok. Thaksin denied involvement.

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After a year of unsteady rule, the military released their revised constitution.

In many ways, it sought to undue some of the loopholes that Thaksin had exploited.

Also was much more favorable to pre-Thaksin regional elites.

New Rules included:

An amnesty on military involved in the coup An eight-year term limit for Prime Ministers A lower threshold for no confidence vote (1/5) Senate now comprised of 76 appointees and 74 elected

from an unelected panel of judges. A revised electoral system (less majoritarian) for lower

house.

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TRT, reconstituted as the People’s Power Party, won handily. In fact, the new electoral system actually favored it somewhat.

On January 29, 2008, PPP won the election.

Former Bangkok Governor, Samak Sundaravej was elected Prime Minister.

Seat summary s-nom s-list total …Party198+ 34 =232 …People Power Party132+ 33 =165 …Democrat Party018+ 07 =025 …Pua Paendin033+ 04 =037 …Chatthai Party007+ 00 =007 …Matchima Thipataya Party008+ 01 =009 …Ruam Jai Thai Chat Pattana Party004+ 01 =005 …Pracharaj Party

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Samak survived a no-confidence vote submitted by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (282-162) on June 18, 2008.

He was undone by a cooking show. His role on a show “Cooking and Complaining” violated Article

267 of the Thai Constitution. The Constitutional Court ruled that Samak must resign

effective immediately. The cooking show is a red herring, the

Constitutional Court also forced the resignations of several other PPP membersin June. Its deputy leader Yongyut Tiyapairat, was banned

from politics for 5 years for vote buying. Chiya Sasomsub was removed from office

by another supreme court, for illegally concealing his wife's assets.

The Constitutional Court ruled on 8 July that Noppadon and the entire cabinet violated the charter by failing to ask parliamentary approval for a Cambodia deal.

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According to law, Samak could be appointed Prime Minister, because he already resigned from the cooking show.

PPP chose not to nominate him, but instead nominated Thaksin’s brother-in-law, Somchai Wongsawat.

PAD continued to protest and blockaded parliamentary buildings. Their issues: They fear Somchai is just a puppet that unelected

Thaksin can control behind the scenes. They would like to see Thaksin prosecuted for

corruption. His wife was already arrested but released on bail.

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Because of the blockade, Somchai has been working at the old airport.

Yesterday, he gave a policy speech at the National Assembly, but PAD would not allow parliamentarians to exit.

Eventually, a decision was called to bring-in riot police and army.

But PAD was highly organized and has managed to hold-off police through barriers in the central square.

At present, the Thai government is in a stand-still.

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Thaksin is still popular in countryside. He or his organization can be expected to win in any freely contest election.

PAD knows this, so their main goal is actually somewhat anti-democratic, holding off a freely elected leader.

The PAD compromise is a 70-30 solution, whereby 70% of Thai legislators are appointed by the unelected group of judges, as the senate currently is.

Thus, Thai citizens have fundamental decisions to make about the nature of their government and their inclination toward democracy.

Tourism and FDI are down this year, as outsiders watch the current events.

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I. Early presence Portuguese control of Melaka and Spice

islands (1511-1641) Dutch commercial activities in Java and outer

islands Spanish conquest and occupation of northern

and central Philippines

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Consolidation of Dutch Indies British annexation of Burma Formation of the Malay Federation by

the British Consolidation of French Indochina Expulsion of the Spanish and

American colonization of the Philippines

Siam independence tolerated by British and French

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Portuguese lost Melaka and Spice Islands to the Dutch East India Company (VOC)

Dutch ‘empire’ was commercial (not) political based in Jakarta and scattered forts/factories

Control over Java was incomplete until well into 18th century

Acquired the rest of Indonesia in late 19th century

Independence of Aceh and Bali was lost only in early 20th century CE

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British annexations in Burma began in 1826

Independent kingdom of Burma did not disappear until 1885

British ruled Burma as part of British India

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Acquisitions of the British East India Company: Penang (1786), Singapore (1819), & Melaka (1824)

British advisers began to be appointed at the Malay rulers’ courts from 1874 onwards

Formation of the first Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sambilan, Pahang) in 1896 and included Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Johore by 1914

Control of British North Borneo Company over Sabah

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Formation of united Vietnam in 1802 (control over both Red River and Mekong river deltas)

Piecemeal French conquest of Vietnam (1859-1885) Formation of Cochin-china (1859-67) Transformation of north and central Vietnam

as protectorates Formation of Cambodian protectorate Rule over Laos (early 20th century)

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Spanish colonization (1565-1898) Philippine Revolution (1896-1898) Philippine-American War (1899-19?) American colonization (1901-1935) Commonwealth period (1935-1941)

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Lack of reciprocity; Europe did not have anything that SEA needed; Europe sought SEA products, esp. spices and control of trade routes Portuguese held Melaka to feed off profitable trading

routes Dutch sought monopoly of spice trade from Sulawesi

and Moluccas (so-called Spice Islands) Spaniards fed off the profitable China-Mexico galleon

trade with Manila as trans-shipment point English country traders sought products to sell to

China and remedy BOT deficits (i.e. the outflow of British silver into Chinese coffers)

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Production in the colonies of a limited number but vast quantities of tropical consumption goods (spices, food and mild drugs) and primary industrial inputs (tin, rubber, palm oil)

Consumption in the colonies of industrial products

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Territorial consolidation; 6 states by 1920 (Siam, French Indochina, British Malaya, British Burma, Dutch Indies, Philippines)

Increasingly centralized and bureaucratized states with increased capacities in revenue extraction and law enforcement; with room for local collaborators

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Demography: increase in population Ecology/economy: increased extraction of

natural resources (mines, logging, plantation agriculture, mono-culture)

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Unity or diversity? Persistence or innovation? Originality or dependence Micro-dynamism or macro-systemism? History from below: Great or little

tradition?

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SEA heterogeneity is cliché Without some unity, rationale for

studying the region as distinct entity disappears

Banal conclusion: unity in diversity! Differing unities: regional identity based

on Western colonialism or ecological integrity or culinary commonality or politico-cultural unity (patron-client relations)?

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Originality attributes causal primacy to internal events

Easier to think of long-run continuity and attribute short-run changes to external factors than to imagine externally dependent continuity or purely original change

Euro-centrism favors external factors since it reflects the self-regarding vigor of Western penetration of a region with enduring cultural power

Proposed solution: the West was decisive in shaping contemporary SEA, esp. its states and political economy

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Historicism combines continuity with originality

Modernism combines change and dependence

SEA seen as ‘a table with many coats of varnish’ (remains a table nonetheless; the indigenous substrata supposedly survived foreign superstructures) or a SEA fundamentally transformed by Western colonialism?

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Micro-dynamism is a standpoint that meshes perceptions of change and originality

Sees SEAsians transforming themselves and their environs in original ways

This standpoint emphasizes local adaptation of foreign influences to create syncretic cultures (e.g. folk Catholicism in the Philippines or Hindi-Javanese in Bali); SEAsians are not ‘passive receptors’

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SEA changes occurred in response to the workings of capitalist world system

Standpoint upheld both by narrower Wallerstein-ian system to the wider and older world system of A.G. Frank

Class differentiation and conflict (e.g. Malayan emergency and other insurgencies

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As theater of US imperialist wars (60s-70s) and continuing capitalist development, SEA fits the macro model of continuing dependence

As victors in the war against the US and as ASEAN, SEA corroborates the contrary micro model of autonomous change

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Imbalance of historiography in favor of kings, courts, elites (great tradition)

Lack of scholarship on the history of under-classes

Interest sparked only by Vietnam war; studies of peasant rebellions; avoidance protest or violent confrontation?