Textual Pragmatics in Early Chinese Madhyamaka

Textual Pragmatics in Early Chinese Madhyamaka

Hans-Rudolf Kantor

Philosophy East and West, Volume 64, Number 3, July 2014, pp. 759-784(Article)

Published by University of Hawai'i PressDOI: 10.1353/pew.2014.0053

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Philosophy East & West Volume 64, Number 3 July 2014 759–784 759© 2014 by University of Hawai‘i Press

TEXTUAL PRAGMATICS IN EARLY CHINESE MADHYAMAKA

Hans-Rudolf KantorGraduate Institute of East Asian Humanities, Huafan University, [email protected]

Introduction

From the Buddhist point of view, philosophical insight is an indispensable part of our realization of our liberation from suffering, and therefore such insight always has a soteriological goal. This philosophical insight is essentially the discerning of a false-ness that pervades our relationship to our worlds and shapes the way we exist in them. Buddhists claim that we are not aware of such falseness on the conventional level, that it is just this that is the source of our suffering. This lack of awareness en-tails our clinging to the unreal as if it were real, which gives rise to our “inversion(s).”1 Shaped by our non-awareness, our clinging, and our inversions, the way we exist in our worlds inevitably leads to a life of suffering. The Buddhist soteriological goal, then, is to be aware of this clinging to falseness and to detach ourselves from it, which requires a form of philosophical contemplation that deconstructs our inver-sions.

Many Chinese Buddhist masters therefore tend to deny any evidence of truth beyond such deconstruction.2 Rather, we realize truth in a salvific process that con-sists in the detection and refutation of all the false views and inversions that shape our conventional way of existing; the complete transparency of this falseness amounts to our ultimate realization of truth. Hence, some Chinese Buddhist masters stress the interdependence of truth and falseness, regarding the two as correlative opposites denying each other. Others discussing the relationship of truth and falseness develop varying concepts of inseparability and indivisibility.3 Sanlun 三論 Master Jizang 吉藏 (549–623) explains the concept of inseparability in a well-known simile: “You can-not find water beyond waves, nor waves beyond water; nor can you find falseness beyond truth, or truth beyond falseness.”4 This concept of truth clearly entails the Buddhist conjunction of philosophy and soteriology and also the ambivalence of a falseness that “inversely” points back toward the truth. Thus, philosophical inquiries composed by the Chinese Mādhyamika tend to focus on the nature of falseness rather than that of absolute truth.

In the exegetical tradition of the early Madhyamaka works translated by Kumārajīva (344–413), then, Chinese authors composed treatises and commentaries that combined philosophy and soteriology and that stressed detachment from falsity and a “deconstruction of inversions” (po daoxiang 破倒想) on the level of linguistic pragmatics.5 The Buddhist thinkers of this tradition believe that our attachments and clinging are rooted in the linguistic way upon which we rely when disclosing

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the world we inhabit. That is, our relationship to our worlds involves a falseness shaped by our acts of linguistic reference and the reifications resulting from it. Hence, these Buddhist writers try to undermine our habitual clinging to non-realness by means of a textual pragmatics. These texts often employ a rhetoric built upon ambiguity and paradox in order to deconstruct the fixed or invariant meanings of words.

This article, therefore, will analyze the philosophical significance and soterio-logical relevance of these linguistic strategies and textual pragmatics, which are so deeply rooted in the soteriological framework of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism. The following sections do this by looking at the concept of “emptiness” (kong 空) and the “two truths” (erdi 二諦) in the early Madhyamaka texts translated by Kumārajīva, including the Zhong lun 中論 and the Dazhidu lun 大智度論.6 The discussion will focus on the rhetorical function of contradiction and ambiguity. The concluding sec-tion looks closely at an example of ambiguity drawn from a text composed by the Chinese Kumārajīva disciple Seng Zhao 僧肇 (374–414).

Philosophical Significance of Linguistic-Textual Pragmatics in Mahāyāna Soteriology

Salvation in Buddhism means liberation from our suffering by transforming the way we exist in our worlds. Such transformation depends on having an insight into the conditions of the change we constantly experience in our daily life. The various Bud-dhist schools in China proposed different views of this issue; however, all of them stressed the importance of a practice of self-cultivation rooted in an insight into Mahāyāna “emptiness” (kong 空). Like all parts of our existence, the agent and the object of that transformation are subject to unceasing change and dependent upon certain conditions. According to the philosophical view expressed by the early Mahāyāna sūtras and Madhyamaka scriptures, this refers back to an emptiness that denies the independent and permanent existence of particular things. In other words, without emptiness neither change nor transformation in our world is conceivable. Since liberation via transformation requires our insight into the fundamental condi-tions of all change, the Mahāyāna Buddhists hold to a concept of wisdom dependent upon our full awareness of emptiness.

This notion of “wisdom” follows from an understanding of “emptiness” that also involves the experience of the limits of thought and linguistic expression. For without that experience, not-clinging to linguistic reifications could hardly be fully realized. The term “emptiness” covers a spectrum of different but mutually related meanings. Most importantly, this term combines a positive and a negative significance. Emp-tiness sustains patterns of interdependence and yet nullifies the realness of the par-ticular links by means of which these patterns are featured. It accounts for the lack of any inherent or independent existence of particular things and, in this sense, refers to that which grounds these things’ interdependent arising. Therefore, emptiness is not at all the same as non-existence, but rather has the fundamental, sustaining or “posi-tive” significance of “true emptiness” (zhenkong 真空), the “real mark of all dharma(s)”

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(zhufashixiang 諸法實相), the “nature of all dharma(s)” (faxing 法性), and the “root of non-abidingness / devoid of abidingness and roots” (wuzhuben 無住本).7

Thus, emptiness sustains things’ interdependent arising, while denying that any of these things abides in an intrinsic nature. Viewed from the perspective of the im-permanence or unceasing “changing” of our existence, emptiness implies the ab-sence of abiding characteristics. Like the impermanent things of our worlds, all signs, the realm of their representations and referents, and our own understanding are sub-ject to a constant and irreversible changing in or through time. For Buddhists, this absence of abiding characteristics denies any realness in the things referred to by names. Conversely, “non-realness” originates from the inevitable reifications rooted in our linguistic reference to a world that is unceasingly changing and devoid of any sense of stasis. In other words, the universalizing and reifying tendencies of our lan-guage construct or construe a false equalization and identity of things, nullifying the temporality of particulars.

Another important Madhyamaka argument against the realness of things desig-nated by names is based on an insight into the correlative dependencies (xiangdai 相待) constituting all linguistic expression(s). Like up and down, Buddhist terms such as suffering and liberation, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, ignorance and wisdom, sen-tient beings and Buddha, or the profane and sacred are just correlative opposites, exclusively referring to each other via mutual negation and thus mutually implying one another. Neither one could be independently sustained. Either one, if sepa-rated from the other, lacks a core of reality. Neither of them is real; both of them are empty. If they were not empty but real, they would not be constituted as oppo-sites via such a correlative dependency. As stated by the early Chinese Mādhyamika Seng Zhao, this means that names are not in conformity with realness, and things designated by names are not real; moreover, all things interdependently arising are in the same way unreal and empty, just as are those constituted via correlative dependency.8

This non-genuineness or falseness of all linguistic expressions even applies to the term “emptiness,” which means that “true emptiness” is ultimately inexpressible.9 True emptiness is both inexpressible and irreducible, as it is not correlatively depen-dent upon an opposite non-emptiness. By virtue of its fundamental or positive sig-nificance, it rather sustains all kinds of correlative opposites and interdependencies implying non-realness. Yet Buddhists must resort to the false expression “emptiness” when disclosing the realm of liberation and non-clinging. Similarly, we cannot avoid using names to denote things “meant to be real” when disclosing the world we in-habit. But again, any part of our existential habitat to which we may point by means of linguistic expressions must involve falseness. Moreover, as in the case of true emp-tiness, we cannot point to that falseness in a genuine way, as we would then fall prey to just the same reifying tendencies that give rise to all non-genuineness on the linguistic level.10 All this indicates that true emptiness is inseparable from a non- realness or falseness that pervades our existence. Most importantly, it is a falseness that is persistent because, like a blind spot, it is constantly concealed on the conven-tional level of our awareness and language.


Again, true emptiness excludes inherent existence yet does not equal non- existence. It is inseparable from a falseness that, though pervading our existence, evades the conventional level of our awareness. True emptiness is inexpressible, yet the understanding of it does not completely dismiss the illusory realm of linguistic expression. Furthermore, this understanding embraces both a positive and negative side, culminating in the full and genuine awareness of persisting non-genuineness. In order to realize true emptiness and fully enact this ultimate level of our awareness, the two opposite yet mutually complementary connotations must equally be taken into account. Our understanding must perform a change of aspects, and for this we need the linguistic-textual pragmatics developed by the Chinese traditions.

The term “change of aspects” is borrowed from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical In-vestigations and is illustrated via the well-known drawing of the duck-head/rabbit-head image. However, unlike Wittgenstein, who stresses the significance of choice in our “perceiving” of either of the two possible images, I would like to suggest that the drawing gives us two images simultaneously so that we may see the “dynamic” rela-tionship of non-exclusion between these two aspects. This is what it means, after all, to “see the ambiguity” of the drawing. Similarly, the “change of aspects” in our under-standing of emptiness involves a certain dynamics: to fully understand emptiness via the nullification of all reifications is to reveal its sustaining significance and vice versa, which means the nullifying turns into the sustaining aspect and vice versa. To realize this is to have an insight into the “inseparability of truth and falseness,” because the persistent non-realness pervading the way we conventionally exist rests upon a true emptiness that sustains things’ interdependent arising in our illusory worlds.

The Inseparability of Truth and Falseness

In this section I will explore the Mahāyāna ambivalence regarding linguistic expres-sion(s), and the inseparability of truth and falseness according to the Madhyamaka understanding of the two truths. Most of the Chinese Mahāyāna scriptures do not refer to the ultimate meaning of emptiness by means of apodictic statements, nor do they provide any sense of certainty concerning its definite content. Instead, they un-fold the strategies by means of which the practitioner may achieve a proper under-standing. In this context, philosophical issues dealing with language and linguistic pragmatics play an important role. The Mahāyāna view of language seems to be ambivalent: on the one hand, linguistic expression(s) constantly construe reifications entailing unwholesome consequences if regarded as real (inversions); on the other hand, transformation according to the Buddha’s teaching requires and relies upon a language that unfolds the soteriological function of this teaching. The ambivalence of language is correlated with a bipolarity implicit in the falseness of linguistic expression(s).

Like the toxic power of poison, which may become the healing power of medi-cine, the non-genuineness of linguistic expression(s) is ambiguous. It might be de-ceptive or instructive, and the way we use language determines whether its falseness has a harmful or healing effect on us. There is, on the one side, falseness in our ordi-


nary language, which, like a blind spot, evades our conventional awareness and is constantly veiled. It is deceptive as it misleads us into clinging to the unreal, which has harmful effects. On the other hand, falseness may reveal itself on the ultimate level due to the textual pragmatics and linguistic strategies used as “skillful means” in the Chinese Madhyamaka scriptures. Completely transparent, it may dissociate our understanding from all reifications and unreal constructions, thus giving us an insight into the true emptiness of all things. In this sense, falseness embodies a posi-tive or instructive significance. To achieve ultimate truth is to reveal all conventional falseness by means of the instructiveness of this falseness, which means that the real-ization of the ultimate relies upon the conventional, as stated by Nāgārjuna.11

The interaction between the Buddha and all sentient beings described by the early and middle period Mahāyāna sūtras seems to exemplify this; the Buddha plays the role of a savior for those unaware of their delusions by devising “skillful means” consisting of simulations and modifications of “the ultimate meaning” of his teach-ing.12 Particularly, the Lotus Sūtra emphasizes that the way the awakened appears in front of the non-awakened does not embody his true nature and that neither of his teachings can be taken literally, while his words and actions are trustworthy and not deceptive.13 Scriptures such as the Lotus, Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, and other sūtras present the Buddha as a salutary figure in sentient beings’ delusory worlds, one who skill-fully masters, uses, and deals with such non-realness to support and guide the non-awakened beings on their path to a complete awareness of persisting falseness and their liberation from it.

The “conventional truths” account for the skillful means devised in response to the needs of deluded beings, while the true meaning — only modified and appropri-ated to this particular mode of teaching — is called ultimate truth. However, like a medicine, these skillful means fulfill their purpose only if the whole context of using and abandoning them is correctly and fully understood. This means that the conven-tional is not really identical with the ultimate truth, and yet the two are inseparable. The usage of skillful means restricts the devaluation of “non-realness” as well as the devaluation of other negative sides of our existence.

The Dazhidu lun, for example, stresses that there is no medicine without sickness and vice versa; the two are mutually referential. Similarly, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and other sūtras state that delusions embody wisdom. Consequently, to understand the positive significance of true emptiness and to discern an indestructible core that sustains realness in our existence is genuinely to see the pervasive falseness and ever-changing illusions as an inverse instructiveness, which, though constantly present, does not really reach beyond the soteriological perspective in our understanding.14 Though ultimately unreal, the conventional may function as an instructive sign and thus have only a provisional truth-value. Only in view of this limitedness can we call this “conventional truth.”15 However, it does not become provisionally true until its limitedness is made completely transparent; that is, like all heretical views, it must finally be deconstructed, as is demonstrated by Nāgārjuna’s refutations of the Abhid-harma Buddhists’ Small Vehicle in his Middle Stanzas and Vigrahavyāvartanī (Hui-zheng lun 回諍論).


Though our realization of the ambiguity of falseness culminates in an insight into the “inseparability of truth and falseness,” our ability to differentiate between the two is also important.16 The Madhyamaka view of the two truths implies, as we know, that the conventional and the ultimate, though not completely identical, are inseparable. But though the two are equally empty, only the ultimate realizing of this emptiness can fully reveal its inseparability from falseness, while the conventional, as long as it is unaware of its emptiness, projects a realm of truth separated from falseness. The crucial point is that such separation reifies the notion of truth and thus veils falseness; in other words, it is an “inversion” that confuses falseness with truth.

For our epistemic-propositional reference to the ultimate inevitably veils the emptiness of its referent and hence does not reach beyond reifications and concep-tualizations on the conventional level. Our non-awareness of emptiness prevents us from “truly” identifying the conventional, causing us to confuse it with the ulti-mate. However, the conventional must be identified, that is, distinguished from what it is not. We must constantly differentiate between the conventional and the ulti-mate in our understanding of emptiness, in order to avoid falling prey to our unceas-ing reifications.17 The differentiation of these “two truths” is necessary, as Nāgārjuna emphasizes, but the problem is to make this differentiation without producing reifi-cations.

To differentiate between the two truths, then, is to rest upon the conventional while remaining aware of its emptiness, since this differentiation of the two is already the awareness of their inseparability. This is a differentiation performed only on the epistemic-doctrinal level of our understanding. It does not really reach beyond the level of linguistic expression and thus cannot be taken literally, and yet provisionally it points to the inevitable falseness in our linguistic way of understanding true empti-ness. That is, though necessary for such an understanding, this differentiation does not really “embody” or “feature” the nature of true emptiness itself; the two truths cannot account for the inconsistency of the nature of reality.18 According to the Sanlun master Jizang, the conventional and ultimate, equally empty, are just “provisional/false designations correlatively dependent” (xiangdai er jiacheng 相待而假稱).19 He explains that denying the ultimate in view of its emptiness is equivalent to nullifying the conventional; conversely, affirming the conventional requires ascertaining its correlative opposite, which is the ultimate. Using these two terms in a proper way — that is, in accordance with emptiness — implies denying their realness yet seeing the “provisional” necessity of this differentiation for our understanding.

In this way, our understanding of true emptiness achieves or rather “performs” the insight into the inseparability of truth and falseness, which means the realiza-tion of the genuine or full awareness of persisting non-genuineness. This is like the dreamer’s realizing that all things dreamt — but not this dreaming and realizing — are neither true nor real. Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597), the principal founder of the Chinese Tiantai school, uses just this simile in one of his major works, called Great Calming and Contemplation (Mohe zhiguan 摩訶止観) to describe the Mahāyāna notion of “awakening” as a state in which the world of dreams has not completely dis-appeared. Similarly, the Kumārajīva disciple Seng Zhao explains: “The sage utilizes


all kinds of change without changing; he undergoes uncountable delusions and constantly passes through unaffected.”20 Awareness or awakening, though detached from all deceptive influences, does not extend beyond the realm of illusiveness. Such realizing, inseparable from dreaming, is similar to the state in which we, while still fully aware of the illusiveness of the optical illusion we see, do not completely nul-lify the presence of that falseness. Also, virtual or fictional worlds, as for example those presented in movies or plays, are based on a non-realness that, though realized by both the spectator and the actor, is persistent. Realness and non-realness seem to become interfused — they are distinguishable yet inseparable, which is an indispens-able condition for our understanding of these worlds.

The inseparability of realness and non-realness in our understanding of empti-ness conforms to the relationship of the two truths. This relationship is not really a contradiction, as it does not implicate the identity of the two truths, nor does the op-position between the conventional and ultimate account for the inconsistency of the nature of reality in any ontological or metaphysical sense, according to the Chinese sources. The non-realness of the conventional is neither identical with nor separate from the realness of the ultimate or true emptiness.21 In order to truly understand emptiness, the Madhyamaka sources stress the importance of both differentiating between the two and realizing their inseparability. This excludes identity; the rela-tionship between the two truths is not that of a contradiction, one which would sig-nify the inconsistency of the nature of reality.

The Nullification of Linguistic Reifications via Contradiction

Yet, on the semantic level, the expression “emptiness” does imply a contradiction. The Zhong lun, trying to trigger our proper understanding, hints at this: “If there is a dharma that is not empty, then there is the dharma of emptiness, too. In fact there is no dharma that is not empty; how, then, is it possible that there is the dharma of emptiness?”22 The correlative opposite of non-emptiness, the term “emptiness,” fails to express the meaning in question and does not account for a proper understanding. The true nature of emptiness, which sustains interdependencies and correlative op-positions like emptiness and non-emptiness, simply defies our conceptualization. “True emptiness” (zhenkong 真空), once again, is irreducible and inexpressible. If taken literally, this term is contradictory, inconsistent, and self-falsifying.

Hence, when attempting to explicate our full understanding, we cannot avoid the contradiction “the emptiness of emptiness” (kongkong 空空) and thus must deny the realness of what is signified by the expression “emptiness.”23 Though the Zhong lun and the Dazhidu lun stress the importance of understanding the “emptiness of emptiness,” like all other linguistic expressions this one, too, fails to catch or feature the true nature of “emptiness.” The Dazhidu lun, commenting on one of the longer versions of the Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras, unfolds the eighteen aspects that our under-standing of emptiness must embrace; the “emptiness of emptiness” is only one of these interdependent links, no one of which can express a true understanding of emptiness apart from the others.


The whole passage demonstrates that any linguistic signifier we may use to expli-cate the genuine understanding of emptiness must present its self-falsification via contradiction in order to nullify all linguistic expressions, or to fully realize the inex-pressibility of true emptiness. Such a contradiction is built into the term “emptiness,” thus highlighting the persistent falseness of all linguistic expression(s). For emptiness denies the realness of all referents of the intentional acts that are our perceptions, thinking, and language; and this denial also includes the referent “emptiness.” It is just a “provisional/false designation,” as the Zhong lun states, and hence its status as truth is merely conventional.24 Conventional truths obviously manifest the ambiva-lence of falseness as they cannot be understood literally or be taken as ultimately true, though they are indispensable. They may embody the instructiveness and heu-ristic value of falseness, inversely pointing back to truth, or may account for a limited and provisional value of truth if revealed as ultimately untrue.

The conventional and contradictory term “emptiness” embodies this ambiva-lence.25 On the one hand, if understood literally, it seems to imply an ontological claim referring to the ultimate nature of reality. However, this understanding con-fuses the provisional/conventional with the ultimate and thus does not properly dif-ferentiate between the two truths. On the other hand, the contradiction implicit in this term hinders us in our literal understanding of this term. In this way, it highlights or hints at all conventional falseness, which also demonstrates that the ontological implication of ultimate truth is neither linguistically specifiable nor conceivable. In other words, our ontological reasoning and linguistic specifying with regard to the ultimate nature of reality inevitably lead us to a contradiction intrinsically linked to the semantic level of the expression “emptiness” — and this ultimately highlights a falseness inseparably bound up with all of our linguistic expressions. To experience the limits of thought via the semantic contradiction of this expression is to become aware of the inevitable falseness of our conventional language.

Only with this awareness can all conventional falseness become completely transparent — no longer a blind spot. For such an awareness of falseness neither clings to any of the reifications arising from our epistemic-propositional modes of reference nor entirely dismisses the conventional.26 The genuine awareness of such falseness, in also seeing that it is inseparable from the conventional level, performs the under-standing of true emptiness via the semantic contradiction of the expression (of ) “emptiness.”27

Presenting the self-falsification of the conventional term “emptiness,” this con-tradiction cannot be confused with the meaning of ultimate truth, and yet the realiza-tion of ultimate truth does not reach beyond the transparency of all conventional falseness. This inseparability of the two truths is, again, not a contradiction. Hence, viewed from the perspective of the Zhong lun, the Dazhidu lun, and the Chinese exegetical tradition represented by Seng Zhao, Jizang, Zhiyi, and Chengguan 澄觀, the semantic contradiction of the term “emptiness” cannot be understood as a “true contradiction that implies an ontological or metaphysical signification.” This, however, is the position taken in Jay Garfield’s and Graham Priest’s reading of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamādhyamaka-kārikā, following one of the modern theories of


logic, called para-consistent logic, according to which certain contradictions are true or coherent. Its metaphysical signification, called di-aletheism, accounts for the inconsistency of the nature of reality.28 Such an approach may perhaps fit Nāgārjuna’s thought, as expressed in the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts, which lies be-yond the scope of this article.29 If the thesis of paraconsistent logic really applies to the Madhyamaka views prevalent in the Indo-Tibetan tradition, Kumārajīva’s ver-sion as well as most of the Chinese commentaries would mark a major departure from the Indo-Tibetan tradition. However, within the scope of the present article, these two traditions cannot really be compared, nor can an analysis of the transmis-sion of Madhyamaka thought from India to China (and its consequent transformation) be undertaken.

Yet this contradiction plays a significant role as a “rhetorical means” in the lin-guistic pragmatics of the Chinese Madhyamaka soteriology, which aims at the ulti-mate dissociation of our understanding from the deceptive and reifying influences implicit in our conventional language. Like a self-referential paradox, the term “emp-tiness” also applies to itself, denying what it signifies (“emptiness of emptiness”), and this may highlight the persisting falseness that our conventional language and its epistemic-propositional references constantly produce and veil. As a “performative contradiction,” it may entail the realization of the previously mentioned “negative” significance of emptiness that nullifies all reifying tendencies of our linguistic expres-sion(s) and culminates in silence.

Pingala’s commentary to Nāgārjuna’s Middle Stanzas — extant only in the Chi-nese Zhong lun translated by Kumārajīva—explains that Nāgārjuna composed his work with the intention of clarifying the correct understanding of emptiness, which consists in the “skill of extinguishing discursive fiction” (shanyu mie xilun 善滅諸戲論) and the “non-clinging to words” (buzhuoyan 不著言). The text of the Chinese Zhong lun commences with the unfolding of the nullifying significance of emptiness. Enumerating the “eight negations” (babu 八不), the first stanza of this scripture an-nounces that the interdependent arising of things, embodying emptiness, is “neither producing nor extinguishing, neither permanence nor discontinuity, neither coming nor leaving, neither identity nor separation.”30 The “skill of extinguishing discursive fiction” — the negative or nullifying aspect of our understanding — culminates in an awareness of emptiness that detaches us from the reifying tendencies of those linguis-tic expressions upon which we yet rely when trying to signify this sense of true emp-tiness. The contradiction implicit in these signifiers performs a strategic function in the domain of linguistic pragmatics, one that entails deconstruction and silence. “Emptiness” is that signifier that best serves this function, this purpose, for it is in itself a “performative contradiction.”

The Rhetoric of Ambiguity and Change of Aspects in Our Understanding of Emptiness

However, the full and genuine understanding of true emptiness must also perform a change of aspects, turning the negative into the positive side and vice versa. The


positive connotation of emptiness, as we have seen, is “inconceivable” and “inex-pressible,” as it cannot be conceived of as being correlatively dependent upon some-thing that is not empty; it is that which sustains those correlative opposites. This ability to sustain is referred to as the “real mark of all dharmas,” “dharma-nature,” or “true suchness” and the “sacred.”

Yet all these “positive” terms imply a mode of language that must mirror the ambiguity of falseness in our linguistic expression(s), otherwise our understanding would fall prey to the unwholesome “clinging to words and reifications.” In this par-ticular context, the rhetoric of ambiguity is fundamental to the linguistic pragmatics developed in Chinese Madhyamaka soteriology. It triggers the change of aspects as a turn from the nullifying to the sustaining aspect of our understanding of true emp-tiness. The Dazhidu lun provides an example of the dynamics of this rhetoric of ambiguity:

There is no sacred beyond the profane; nor is there medicine without sickness. Therefore the sūtra says: “There is no sacred separated from the profane; the real nature of the pro-fane is the sacred.” Again, the sacred person does not grasp at any mark, nor does he/she cling to them; therefore, the sacred dharma is true and genuine; whereas the profane person grasps at and clings to them; hence the profane dharma is illusory. . . . Viewed from the realm of the profane, there is clinging to dharma(s) and discrimination: “This is the sacred dharma, and that is the profane dharma.” Viewed from the realm of the sacred, there are no things to be discriminated. In order to remove sickness from sentient beings, we just say that “this is unreal and that is real.”31

Like sickness and healing, the sacred and profane are interdependent concepts construed via mutual negation; this implies a distinction that qualifies the two as correlative opposites. However, this also means that the two are equally empty and non-real and therefore not really or ultimately distinct. In other words, it is just their non-realness and emptiness that is the “real nature” of the illusory profane, consist-ing as it does of false distinctions like the “sacred and profane.” The Dazhidu lun understands this “real nature” (shixing 實性) as the genuine sacred, which cannot be confused with what is opposed to and correlatively dependent upon the profane. Like true emptiness, the genuine sacred sustains correlative dependencies but cannot be conceived of or explained in terms of this. Here, then, the expression “sacred” (sheng 聖) is being used in an ambiguous way and performs the change of aspects. There is, on the one hand, a sacred opposed to and correlatively dependent upon the deceptive profane and, on the other, a sacred that reveals both its inseparability from non-realness and its emptiness that sustains the profane. The second sacred can be called “genuine” insofar as it truly reveals what it is, while the first, non-genuine sacred conceals the fact that it actually is the illusory and deceptive profane.

The ambiguous rhetoric of this passage unfolds the two meanings of the “sacred” and expresses the difference between the two truths. Like the ultimate, which does not really dismiss the conventional yet realizes its emptiness, the second meaning reveals that the ultimate falseness and emptiness of this name “sacred” is the very nature of the profane/conventional. The second “sacred,” then, is like “emptiness,” a


contradictory signifier nullifying the meaning of the first “sacred” (= the correlative opposite of the profane). However, apart from this nullifying significance, the am-biguous “sacred” that reveals the “real nature of the profane” points to the sustaining significance of true emptiness. In this way, the ambiguous rhetoric of the sacred per-forms a change of aspects, that is, completes the transformation or “turn” from its nullifying to its sustaining significance. The nullifying does not exclude the sustaining significance; the two are complementary in our understanding of true emptiness. The rhetoric of contradiction and ambiguity, performed with regard to the term “sacred” on this level of linguistic pragmatics, manifests the whole dynamics of alternation between the negative and positive that our understanding of true emptiness requires.

On the level of linguistic pragmatics, the rhetoric of the two expressions “empti-ness” and “sacred” has two distinguishable functions. Only the negative expression “emptiness” really embodies the contradiction that entails the nullification of all lin-guistic expressions, while the comparatively positive “sacred,” by means of its ambi-guity, highlights the sustaining significance of emptiness as the “real nature of the profane.” Our full understanding of true emptiness thus entails both the positive and negative, that is, the sustaining and nullifying aspects of this meaning, and thus re-quires the rhetoric of contradiction-and-ambiguity. Viewed from the level of semantic theory or logic, contradiction and ambiguity do not seem to be related in expressions such as “emptiness” and “sacred.” However, in terms of the linguistic pragmatics that is indispensable to our understanding of true emptiness, the intrinsic relationship between the two is evident.

The ambiguous and contradictory term “root of non-abidingness / devoid of abidingness and roots” (wuzhuben 無住本) in the Kumārajīva version of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra may illustrate such an intrinsic relationship on the pragmatic level.32 Things interdependently arising are empty of inherent existence, and thus are sustained by an emptiness or “non-abidingness” (wuzhu 無住), which could be called their “root” (youben 有本), since this sustaining emptiness is not identical to non-existence. However, this “root” just means “non-abidingness” or “being devoid of any feasible ground” (wuzhuwuben 無住無本), and thus it is not a “root” in the literal sense of this term. The term “root,” like “emptiness” and “sacred,” is a self-contradictory signifier used to deny linguistic reifications, and also an ambiguous term evoking the dynamics of the nullifying-and-sustaining aspects. The commen-taries of the Chinese Tiantai masters point to the ambiguity as well as contradictori-ness of this expression.33 Our understanding must therefore encompass the alternation between the sustaining and nullifying sides, a dynamic triggered on the pragmatic level by the rhetoric of contradiction and ambiguity.

Now we may also reconsider the question as to what extent the sustaining sig-nificance of emptiness can be explicated in ontological terms.34 Emptiness, again, ultimately nullifies the realness of all things in our worlds, including the sacred and profane or the ultimate and conventional. To realize emptiness is to be completely aware of this falseness. The only positive significance for us of this emptiness that sustains our profane and illusory world may be its soteriological meaning, its “in-verse instructiveness,” which is inseparably bound up with illusoriness. The Dazhidu


lun uses the ambiguous “sacred” to hint at this. Any attempt to clarify it in purely ontological terms entails the self-falsification and contradiction of the term “empti-ness,” thus nullifying all linguistic expressions.

The linguistic pragmatics of many Chinese Mahāyāna texts correlates with the Madhyamaka view of ontological indeterminacy. Though not completely non- existent, none of the things in our worlds is intrinsically or really the thing it appears to be. Ontological indeterminacy just means that the non-realness of those things does not equal complete non-existence, since the way each of us exists as an un-enlightened and suffering being proves the existential relevance of that falseness. To ascertain the ontological status of non-realness, we must use a rhetoric or linguistic pragmatics that inevitably contravenes the univocal and conventional separation of truth and falseness. Realizing the soteriological primacy of detachment and libera-tion, then, according to the Buddhist teaching, we employ such a linguistic prag-matics to undermine the reifications and apodictic ontological interpretations that inevitably arise from discussions about the ultimate nature of reality. Again, this does not mean completely dismissing our ontological reasoning but rather being aware of its limits, for the realization of truth in the soteriological sense entails a genuine awareness of and full detachment from falseness.

That is to say, our realizing of the “inseparability of truth and falseness” per-formed on the level of linguistic pragmatics conjoins the soteriological practice of detachment from falseness (liberation) with the philosophical insight into true empti-ness. Many texts from the tradition of Chinese Mahāyāna Buddhism display a com-positional characteristic shaped by this conjunction. The next section focuses on an example of ambiguity, one drawn from a text that was particularly influential in this tradition.

Ontological Indeterminacy and Ambiguity in the Zhao lun

The rhetoric of ambiguity in treatises composed by the influential Kumārajīva disci-ple Seng Zhao can hardly be ignored.35 Paul Swanson’s study is the first of the West-ern academic works that explicitly hint at this peculiar feature of the Zhao lun 肇論. However, Swanson seems to regard the ambiguity in Seng Zhao’s appropriation of the two truths as a lack of clarity, which has caused confusion in later Chinese Bud-dhist debates that expand on this subject. In his treatise Buzhenkong lun 不真空論, Seng Zhao resorts to the Daoist antonyms you 有 and wu 無 to discuss the relation-ship between the two truths. Swanson points to the ambiguous character of these terms in the Zhao lun, and translates them as “existence and non-being” on the one hand and “being and non-existence” on the other. He also states that the Tiantai master Zhiyi tries to clarify such vagueness by means of replacing these antonyms with the Chinese Buddhist terms jia 假 and kong 空, which he translates as “conven-tional existence” and “emptiness” and which also correlate with the meaning of the two truths in the Tiantai teaching.36 Moreover, in posing the “middle” as a third as-pect of truth in addition to the conventional and the ultimate, Zhiyi develops the famous Tiantai concepts of the “threefold truth” (sandi 三諦) and the “threefold con-


templation” (sanguan 三觀), which stress the mutual complementariness in the rela-tionship between the two truths.

Swanson accurately describes the ambiguity in Seng Zhao’s appropriation of the two truths, and Seng Zhao seems, in this way, to anticipate the aspect of mutual complementariness present in interpretations by later masters such as Zhiyi and Jizang. However, Swanson’s conclusion that Seng Zhao’s ambiguous description of the you-wu antonyms represents a vague and immature understanding of the two truths, one that has caused confusion and has finally been replaced by the Tiantai concept of the threefold truth, is questionable. Many influential Buddhist thinkers, including Zhiyi, Jizang, Fazang 法藏, and Chengguan, adopt and develop Seng Zhao’s interpretation of this polarity, emphasizing its necessarily ambiguous charac-ter. “Ambiguous” rhetoric is common in many of the Chinese Buddhist treatises, and it does not at all indicate their authors’ immature understanding of Buddhist doc-trines.

The rhetoric of ambiguity is obvious in the Chinese title of Seng Zhao’s treatise Buzhenkong 不真空 — “Emptiness of the Unreal” but also “Unreal Emptiness” — which seems to be intended. That is, things linguistically referred to are empty of realness, and therefore there is no real emptiness that could be designated as such; there is only the emptiness of the unreal. Indeed, to realize the meaning of true emptiness we would need to see that the two meanings (or two readings) of this title must imply each other. The Huayan master Chengguan points to the necessary ambiguity in/of this title, stressing that true emptiness is inseparable from non-realness: “Only the meaning(s) of ‘unreal emptiness / emptiness of the unreal’ (buzhenkongyi 不真空義) manifest(s) the meaning of emptiness in nature.”37 Moreover, this ambiguous title, as well as Seng Zhao’s entire treatise, suggests that the sage or awakened person dwells in an existential habitat that is illusory, just like that of all other sentient beings. Since the awakened one is constantly aware of this, he is not affected by it. Instead he real-izes the ambivalence of falseness, and is highly skilled in utilizing this illusoriness to respond to and transform other deluded beings who are striving for Buddhist salvation.

For all sentient beings including the Buddha, the illusoriness of their worlds con-sists in a multitude of distinct yet impermanent forms arising and perishing. Both birth — the image of arising or the beginning of our existence — and death — the im-age of perishing or the cessation of our existence — are illusions, yet the existential relevance of such non-realness cannot be denied. By virtue of these illusions we must experience our existence as impermanent and thus as sorrowful, though the discontinuity of our existence is as illusory as its permanence. The impermanence of all things in sentient beings’ worlds does not imply the discontinuity of their exis-tence.38 As many Mahāyāna sources point out, no “thing” that really exists can arise from a preceding non-existence, nor can it perish or completely disappear into non-existence. Things’ arising and perishing is rather like a sequence of illusory appari-tions unceasingly changing within a continuing flux of illusions.39 On the one hand there is the impermanence of unreal apparitions, from which we cannot escape; on the other hand, there is the continuity of our existence devoid of any real mark of


beginning and ceasing, which yet consists of this unceasing flux of unreal appari-tions.40 The awakened one, realizing this, adjusts himself (and responds) to the unceasing change of unreal apparitions.41 Again, while the impermanence and illu-soriness of our existence cannot be denied, neither can its (apparent) continuity.

As the Buddhist path to liberation or salvation involves a process of cultivation and transformation, Chinese Buddhist thinkers often stress the soteriological signifi-cance of this polarity: “Despite emptiness there is no discontinuity; yet continuity does not equal permanence; in this sense, neither [the fruits of ] the harmful nor [those of the] blissful disappear completely.”42 Without this insight into the imperma-nence and continuity of our existence, neither the change of things nor our transfor-mation into an awakened being is conceivable.

In Chinese Buddhism there is also a tendency to explain the complementary re-lationship between the two truths by means of this polarity. For example, the Sanlun master Jizang points out that “owing to the conventional we realize continuity; on account of the ultimate we are aware of impermanence.”43 Insight into the continuity of our existence appeals to the conventional side, which does not extend beyond the unceasing flux of ever-changing images and reifications devoid of realness. At the same time, this insight must be balanced by the awareness of the impermanent and illusory side of our existence; the latter is based on our realization of the emptiness of the ultimate, of “ultimate emptiness” (bijing kong 畢竟空). But this also means the reverse: our awareness of ultimate emptiness must be complemented by our realiza-tion of the continuity of our existence due to the conventional. According to this in-sight, then, the inseparability of continuity from conventional falseness and that of impermanence from ultimate emptiness are mutually complementary. This bipolar yet complementary relationship between impermanence and continuity makes clear the temporal aspect of the inseparability of truth and falseness, which allows for the proper understanding of our transformation, our “becoming a Buddha” (chengfo 成佛).

Seng Zhao thus endorses the insight that truth and falseness are ultimately in-separable. He particularly stresses that this becomes evident if we scrutinize the complementary relationship between the two truths. In a way that is analogous to Jizang’s exposition on the polarity and mutuality between impermanence and conti-nuity, Seng Zhao appeals to the Daoist and Xuanxue 玄學 you-wu binary — translated as “existent and non-existent” — to hint at the complementary relationship between the two truths. However, unlike Jizang, Seng Zhao deliberately lays out the ambigu-ous meaning of this binary in order to point to the ontological indeterminacy implied by the inseparability of truth and falseness. Seng Zhao says:

Truly corresponding to things and passing through smoothly means that none of these things appears to be obstructive. Neither going beyond conventional falseness nor be-yond ultimate truth implies that things’ nature does not [really] change. Their nature does not change because there is [illusory] existence, though nothing [really] exists. None of these things appears to be obstructive because nothing [really] exists, though there is [il-lusory] existence. As nothing [really] exists, though there is [illusory] existence it is called not existent. As there is [illusory] existence, though nothing [really] exists, it is called not


non-existent. This does not mean that there are no things, but rather that things are not real things. If things are not real things, what could be referred to as a thing? . . . Therefore, the Sūtra of the Shining Wisdom says: “Ultimate truth means non-achievement; whereas conventional truth implies achievements. Achievements are the false [= inverse] signs of non-achievement; whereas non-achievement is the true name of [those] achievements.” The true name does not imply [real] existence in spite of this truth; whereas the false signs do not imply [complete] non-existence in spite of this falseness. Therefore, the truth we talk about does not [really] exist, whereas the falseness we talk about is not [completely] non-existent. The two as cases we talk about are not the same, though the two as princi-ples are not different [= separate]. Therefore, the Sutra of the Great Wisdom says: “Are the ultimate and the conventional truth separated? No, there is no separation.” This sūtra only differentiates between the ultimate elaborating on what is not existent and the conven-tional expanding on what is not non-existent. How is it possible that this duality of truth can be projected upon [real] things? However, it is coherent to consider all things as not existent, as well as it is coherent to consider them as not non-existent. As it is coherent to consider things as not existent, we can say that they do not [really] exist, though they [illusorily] exist. As it is coherent to consider things as not non-existent, we can say that they are not [completely] non-existent, though they do not [really] exist. Though they do not [really] exist, they are not [completely] non-existent; this does not mean that “not existing” amounts to nothingness. Though they [illusorily] exist, they do not [really] exist; this does not mean that such existence amounts to real existence. Their existence is not real, and their non-existence is not devoid of traces. However, existence and non- existence are opposite designations, though their implications must converge. . . . If we scrutinize this linguistic exposition about existence and non-existence, how is it possible that this is only a contradictory speech? . . . The speech about existence just means that we borrow that term to elucidate that it is not [completely] non-existent;44 we utilize the [expression] non-existence to point out that it is not [real] existence. Though we deal with a single subject matter, we indicate it with two designations.45

The Chinese character you 有 generally means both being-present and existing as well as having. Seng Zhao understands existing as being-present. However, this involves an ambiguity, for it can mean both existing in terms of being-present as illusion and existing in terms of being-present as something real. Hence, you could mean both “really existent” and “illusorily existing.” The expression “illusory exis-tence” implies the presence of unreal things, which, again, means that these things do not really exist. However, the expression “illusory existence” does not really rep-resent a contradiction, since illusory views about our existence, as for example inver-sions, may affect or even shape this existence, and thus it cannot be denied that they may be an effective part of it. Due to their existential relevance to our life, the onto-logical status of such delusions and falseness must be acknowledged. The Tiantai Buddhist practice of repentance, for example, makes the practitioner aware of those delusions that have shaped his life.

Again, any distinctive “thing” in our existential habitat to which we refer by means of names and linguistic expressions is considered as a reification, inversion, or unreal construction; such a thing is only illusorily existent or present. In order to indicate this thing as an illusory form of existence we must deny the you, changing


it into its opposite form wu — non-existence — which again could mean both “not [really] existing” and “[completely] non-existent.” Things linguistically referred to are reifications or unreal constructions and thus are not really existent, though their mode of illusory presence cannot be denied in the sense of being “completely non-existent.” The affirmative you — “[illusorily] existing” — and the negative wu — “not [really] existing” — are therefore mutually inclusive, and so Seng Zhao combines these two opposite expressions and states that this is not a real contradiction.

Of course, it is also possible to take the Chinese you-wu as mutually exclusive opposites: being “really existent” and “completely non-existent.”46 However, the two terms are not “really” total opposites but correlative opposites, like high-low, visible-hidden, right-left, here-there, et cetera, for each term depends for its meaning on its opposite, its own negation: “up” only has a meaning in relation to “down,” et cetera. That is, without its opposite neither term or idea can be taken as independently real; due to their interdependence, they become in effect unreal constructions, and you-wu is the “type” of all such relative-opposite constructions or correlative opposites according to Seng Zhao. The section following the previous quotation from the Zhao lun explicitly discusses this point:

Therefore, the Zhong lun explains: No “here and there” inheres in things; however, only humans hold that here is [really] here, and there is [really] there. But from the standpoint of “there,” “here” is “there,” and “there” is “here.” “Here and there” cannot be deter-mined just by one single name, whereas the deluded person believes in their apodictic certainty. Though “here and there” do not originally exist, from the outset the deluded view is not non-existent. Realizing that “here and there” do not exist, what kind of thing could exist? Therefore, we know all things are unreal and always false/provisional signs.47

As the conventional understanding of this polarity of “really existent” and “com-pletely non-existent” is as unreal as “here and there,” we ultimately see the empti-ness of the two opposites, which Seng Zhao expresses as “neither existent nor non-existent” and alternatively expounds as the “ultimate truth.”48 The negation of “existent” means emptiness and the negation of “non-existent” means “emptiness of emptiness”; combined together, the two accomplish the ultimate or true meaning of emptiness. Again, Seng Zhao immediately adds the explanation that this does not nullify all things; it just expresses an ontological indeterminacy or ambiguity, imply-ing that the real and the false sides of our existence are ultimately indivisible.

There are, of course, other possibilities in Chinese language for univocally ex-pressing “illusory existence,” for example the Chinese jiayou 假有 (false/provisional existence), huanyou 幻有 (illusory existence), or siyou 似有 (seeming to exist). How-ever, “illusory existence” sounds as paradoxical as “existent yet non-existent” or “ex-istence without the mark of existence.”49 Seng Zhao utilizes the paradoxical mode of linguistic articulation to point out that the ontological indeterminacy of something that is not really but only illusorily present still implies a type of existence, one that is devoid of a core sustaining reality, and hence one that cannot be linguistically re-ferred to without involving falseness. Neither the univocal expression “existence” nor its opposite “non-existence” would be an appropriate term for this, since they are


unreal constructions on the conventional level. The type of existence Seng Zhao talks about can neither be exclusively affirmed nor exclusively denied by means of univocal expressions; thus, he chooses the paradoxical mode of articulation that, eventually, does not really represent a contradiction but is rather an ambiguous type of linguistic expression that may best expose this ontological indeterminacy.

Conclusion and Further Prospects

Other Chinese Buddhist masters adopting a Madhyamaka point of view generally also adopt the ambiguous rhetoric used in Seng Zhao’s exposition of the ontologi-cal indeterminacy of the interdependent arising of things. The most prominent of these masters are Zhiyi, Jizang, Fazang, and Chengguan. They not only adopt an ambiguous rhetoric but also continue to develop it.50 The Tiantai and Sanlun schools distinguish between different levels of emptiness, and such Tiantai concepts as the “dharma-realm,” the “threefold truth,” and the “threefold contemplation” are con-strued in a way that not only justifies but also requires an ambiguous strategy for their linguistic exposition.51 Both Zhiyi, the famous Tiantai master, and Chengguan, the fourth Huayan patriarch in the later Tang dynasty, discuss emptiness and existence with the same sort of ambiguity that we have seen in Seng Zhao’s exposition of exis-tence and non-existence. Chengguan most explicitly points to this ambiguity:

Emptiness and existence each imply two meanings: the two meanings of emptiness are discussed in terms of “emptiness” and “non-emptiness”; the two meanings of existence are discussed in terms of “existence” and “non-existence.” Emptiness is discussed in terms of emptiness, because emptiness nullifies [inherent] existence. Referred to as non-emptiness, it implies that there is no [real] mark of emptiness; hence, it does not defy existence. Existence is discussed in terms of existence, since existence nullifies emptiness [understood as complete non-existence]. Referred to as non-existence, it implies detach-ment from any mark of existence; hence, it does not defy emptiness.52

Chengguan’s discussion of the relationship between emptiness and existence is similar to Seng Zhao’s exposition of non-existence and existence. In one sense, emp-tiness and existence contradict each other; in another, they include each other. We may say that each side overstates what the other side fails to accentuate, as long as both sides are considered as univocal expressions excluding each other. However, considered as opposites nullifying each other, the two also exclusively refer to one another. In this way they perform the functions of both mutual restriction and com-plementation. The restrictive function of mutually nullifying the reification of the opposite is linguistically indicated by means of mutual negation, which poses both sides as necessary without ascertaining the exclusive realness of either one. For Chengguan and others, this also means that the entire “relationship” expressed or exemplified by a mutual nullification that equally restricts both sides of the opposi-tion is that of “the middle,” which seems to suggest an understanding of truth beyond the opposites. Consequently Chengguan says: “The meaning of the middle way is neither that of emptiness nor that of existence.”53


However, in the Tiantai teaching of Zhiyi the ultimate step consists in realizing that the two sides are indivisible and equally relevant; mutual restriction is regarded as mutual complementation. The ultimate meaning of the “middle” here is just the dynamics or reciprocity between the nullifying “emptiness” and the reifying “false/provisional,” which is not an understanding of truth beyond two opposites. Most importantly, the middle understood as this reciprocal relationship is both emptiness and the provisional as opposite modes that nevertheless include each other. This means that “emptiness, the provisional, and the middle” not only include but also dynamically embody or reveal each other, and this is called the “threefold contem-plation”: each of the three dynamically embodies and simultaneously reveals all three of them. The “threefold truth” embracing the “conventional,” the “ultimate,” and the “primary truth of the middle way” correlates with this “threefold contempla-tion” and also requires the rhetorical means of ambiguity to feature such dynamics on the level of a linguistic pragmatics.

For Tiantai Buddhists, this doctrine accounts for the heuristics unfolded in both the “contemplation of mental activity” ( guanxin 觀心) deconstructing our inversions and the interpretive exegesis of the “Buddha’s word” (Foyan 佛言, Skt. Buddha-vācana) transmitted by the sūtra texts. Rooted in this heuristics of deconstruction and interpretive understanding, silence and speech in the Buddha’s teaching no longer appear as “rivals,” as the Tiantai master Zhiyi says. He also holds that the specific understanding of one particular Buddhist text must also embody the universal under-standing of all the others. In this sense, the threefold contemplation fully or perfectly accomplished unfolds an intertextual hermeneutics with regard to all Buddhist scrip-tures, which also correlates with the concept of the maximum efficacy of the accom-plished practitioner’s salvific actions in the face of radical contingency. This is like our seeing all things in each single one thing that we see, called “one instant of awareness involving three-thousand worlds” (yinian sanqian 一念三千).

Furthermore, in his commentarial exegesis on the Lotus Sūtra, Zhiyi resorts to the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the word-class of Chinese characters to linguisti-cally “feature” the dynamics at work (or at play) between the three links in the skillful performance of the threefold contemplation. On the other hand, the Huayan masters appeal to the semantic ambiguity of Chinese characters to exemplify the bipolar falseness in/of linguistic expressions.54

Notes

In the following notes the abbreviation “T” refers to Taishō Shinshū daizōkyō 大正新修大藏經, ed. Takakuso Junjirō 高楠順次 and Watanabe Kaigyoku 渡邊海旭 (Tokyo: Issaikyō Kankō Kai, 1924–1934).

1 – See, for example, the “four inversions” (sidiandao 四顛倒) in the Dazhidu lun: “Four types of inversions are prevalent in the worldly realm of ordinary sentient beings: the inversion of pureness amidst the sphere of non-pureness, the inver-


sion of bliss amidst the sphere of suffering, the inversion of permanence amidst the sphere of impermanence, the inversion of a self amidst the sphere of non-self” (T 25, no. 1509, p. 285, c25–27).

2 – This has led to a common method of reasoning prevalent among the indigenous Chinese Buddhist schools, such as the Sanlun, Tiantai, and Huayan, who refer to this method in different ways: “revealing truth via deconstructing falseness” ( poxie xianzheng 破邪顯正), “deconstructing and setting up are nondual” ( poli bu er 破立不二), and “manifesting the principle via picking up the delusions” (jianqing xianli 揀情顯理).

3 – Most explicitly, the famous sixth-century Buddhist master Huiyuan 慧遠 (523–592) expresses this in his dictum “truth and falseness are interdependent” (zhenwang xiangyi 真妄相依). Similarly, Huayan masters such as Fazang (643–712) and Chengguan (738–839) use the expression “inseparability/conjunction of truth and falseness” (zhenwang hehe 真妄和合); this also occurs in Hui-yuan’s work and that of the later Tiantai masters, who stress the “indivisibility of the nature of all dharma and ignorance” (wuming ji faxing 無明即法性). A more dualistic pattern of truth and falseness is stressed in Yogācāra scriptures such as Asaṅga’s Mahāyāna-saṅgraha-śāstra.

4 – See Jizang’s commentary on the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra (T 37, no. 1744, p. 83, c20; p. 84, a3).

5 – See, for example, the chapter Po Fa Bian 破法遍 (Universal deconstruction of Dharmas), in Zhiyi’s Tiantai classic Mohe zhiguan 摩訶止觀 (Great calming and contemplation).

6 – The Chinese Zhong lun is Kumārajīva’s translation of Nāgārjuna’s (circa a.d. 150) Mūlamādhyamaka-kārikā transmitted together with Pingala’s (third cen-tury) commentary. The Chinese tradition considered the Zhong lun as a unitary and homogeneous text. Together with the Dazhidu lun (Mahāprajñāpārami-topadeśa) — a commentary on one of the large Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras also translated by Kumārajīva — the Zhong lun belongs to those early Madhyamaka sources only known and transmitted in the Chinese tradition. These two texts were fundamental for the development of the Chinese Sanlun, Tiantai, Huayan, and Chan schools.

7 – Chapter 24 of the Zhong lun expresses the fundamental significance of empti-ness: “Since there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharma(s) [interdependently arising] can completely be unfolded” (T 30, no. 1564, p. 33, a22). Similarly, the chapter “Sentient Beings” in the Kumārajīva version of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra states: “All dharma(s) are set up owing to [the root of ] non-abidingness” (T 14, no. 475, p. 547, c22). This means that things’ interdependent arising is sustained by an emptiness denying that any of these things abides in an in-trinsic nature; all of them are empty of inherent existence. Rooted in “non-abidingness” or “emptiness,” these things are apparitions lacking a core that


sustains reality; yet their non-realness does not really amount to complete non-existence. In this sense, “emptiness or non-abidingness” is like a “root” sustain-ing all apparitions, though it is certainly not a root that itself abides in an intrinsic nature, as it denies such abidingness. The Chinese term “root of non-abidingness” is ambiguous; it could be understood as both “having a root” (youben 有本) and “devoid of roots” (wuben 無本), according to Zhiyi’s Tiantai interpretation, which lays out the ambiguity of the sustaining and nullifying significance of emptiness.

8 – See Seng Zhao’s dictum: “names do not conform to realness” and “realness is not in conformity with names” (mingshi wudang 名實無當) (T 45, no. 1858, p. 152, c23).

9 – The term “true emptiness” (zhenkong 真空) occasionally occurs in the Dazhidu lun, and is frequently used by the two Huayan masters Fazang and Chengguan in compound expressions such as “illusory existence and true emptiness” (zhenkong huanyou 真空幻有) (T 36, no. 1736, p. 243, b16).

10 – Chapter 23 of the Zhong lun, “Contemplating Inversions,” particularly elabo-rates on this issue; due to the inherent falseness of our conventional language, we cannot really point to our inversions by means of it.

11 – Chapter 24 of the Zhong lun says: “If we do not rely on the conventional truth, we cannot realize the ultimate; without realizing the ultimate, we cannot ac-complish nirvāṇa” (T 30, no. 1564, p. 33, a2–3).

12 – For the Buddha’s simulations, see chapter 16 of this sūtra called “The Lifetime of the Tathāgata”:

Thus, since I became Buddha, a long time has passed; in a lifetime of innumerable countless eons, I constantly stayed here and never realized extinction. . . . Even now, though I will not really enter extinction, I announce: “I will take the path of extinction.” By using such skillful means, the Tathāgatas teach and transform sentient beings. (T 09, no. 262, p. 42, c19; p. 43, a6)

See also chapter 2, “Skillful Means,” in the Lotus Sūtra:

The master of all saints, knowing the deepest wishes and needs of gods and humans, as well as the diverse kinds of beings of all worlds, further uses the differing skillful means to reveal the ultimate meaning.

Zhiyi, the Tiantai master, comments on this:

This is the mark of the perfect teaching indicating distinction and indivisibility between the two truths. (T 09, no. 262, p. 8, b15–c14; T 46, no. 1911, p. 28, b12–15)

13 – See chapter 2 of this sūtra:

Shariputra, you must believe in the Buddha’s sayings; his words are not deceptive. Shariputra, appropriated to [the capabilities of ignorant beings], Buddhas of all kinds unfold the dharma, while the ultimate purpose is too difficult to understand. Therefore, I use uncountable skillful means, all kinds of contingent circumstances, parables,


speeches and performances to unfold the dharma. This dharma cannot [really] be under-stood by means of deliberation and discrimination; only the manifold Buddhas can [fully] realize it. (T 09, no. 262, p. 7, a15–b3)

14 – In the chapter in the Lotus Sūtra titled “The Lifetime of the Tathāgata,” the Bud-dha pronounces in a world of impermanence and unceasing change his perma-nent presence and invariability: “I attained buddhahood a far distance of ages ago; in a lifetime of innumerable countless eons, I permanently stayed here and never changed” (T 9, no. 262, 42, c19–20). Also, the chapter “The Nature of the Tathāgata” in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra stresses that the permanence of Buddha-nature and the impermanence of worldly things are not really con-tradictory. The Tathāgata’s permanent presence in the realm of impermanent beings could be interpreted as an inverse form of instructiveness (inverse in-structiveness). Suffering that is deeply rooted in our experiences of imperma-nence inversely points back to liberation; this means that the function of inverse instructiveness is permanently bound up with the unceasing change or imper-manence of our existence. Mahāyāna scriptures in Chinese use the binary or oppositional phrase “impermanence yet continuity” (buchang buduan 不常不斷) to denote this indestructible core of “inverse instructiveness” in/of our exis-tence.

15 – This conforms to Brook Ziporyn’s explanation according to which the conven-tional is “locally coherent, but globally incoherent.” See “The Deluded Mind as World and Truth,” in Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, ed. William Edelglass and Jay Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press 2009), p. 238.

16 – “The conjunction of truth and falseness” (zhenwanghehe 真妄和合) is related to a variety of Mahāyāna doctrines including Madhyamaka, Tathāgatagarbha, and Yogācāra ideas and is inseparable from the concept of salvific transformation in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Though this expression seems to be shaped by the Chinese Dilun masters (sixth century) and adopted by the Sanlun, Huayan, and later Tiantai masters, it could also be understood in a more general sense that goes beyond its specific textual frames, as its meaning seems to have played a crucial role in all the Mahāyāna teachings dealing with the issue of transforma-tion and “becoming a Buddha” (chengfo 成佛). The Chinese expression literally translated as “conjunction” often implies the meaning of “inseparability.” The Tiantai masters in particular point to this.

17 – See chapter 24 in the Zhong lun: “If a person does not understand [how] to dif-ferentiate between the two truths, he/she does not understand the true meaning of the profound Buddha-dharma” (T 30, no. 1564, p. 32, c18–19).

18 – Based on the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest have developed the opposite view, one that postulates “true contradictions at the limits of thought” that have or imply a metaphysical or ontological significance. Garfield and Priest thus take the Madhymaka notion of the two truths, though coherent in terms of rationality, as indicating an inconsistency regarding the


nature of reality; this is called “di-aleithism.” Such an ontological interpretation of “true contradictions” subsumes the Madhyamaka concept under one of the modern views of logic called “para-consistent logic.” For a more detailed dis-cussion, see the following section on the relevance of contradictions in the Chinese Zhong lun.

19 – This at least would be the view of Chinese masters such as Seng Zhao, Zhiyi, and Jizang, who extensively discuss the relationship between the conventional and ultimate in their works. For example, Jizang states in the first chapter of his Dasheng xuanlun 大乘玄論 (Subtle treatise on the Great Vehicle): “The two truths are an explanatory device universally valid for all doctrines linguisti-cally expressed. They are provisional/false designations based on correlative dependency. . . . The two truths are only the doctrinal gateways, but do not re-ally relate to the ultimate realm and principle itself” (T 45, no. 1853, p. 15, a14–17).

20 – See Zhao lun, in T 45, no. 1858, p. 153, a1–2.

21 – The Huayan Fajie xuanjing 華嚴法界玄鏡 (Subtle contemplation of the Dharma- realm according to the Garland Sutra), ascribed to the Chinese Huayan master Dushun 杜順, points to this. The text explains that “distinctive form” (conven-tional falseness), though inseparable from “true emptiness,” is not identical with it:

Distinctive form is not [identical with] emptiness, since it is [just inseparable from] emp-tiness. Why is it so? As the [illusory] marks of blue and yellow color are not [identical to] the principle of true emptiness itself, we say that they are not emptiness. However, blue or yellow are devoid of any [intrinsic] core, which implies that they are nothing but emptiness; therefore, we say that they are emptiness. As denying any [intrinsic] core sustaining blue and yellow, emptiness is not blue and yellow itself, therefore we say that [their non-realness] is not [true] emptiness [itself ]. (T 45, no. 1883, p. 673, b26–29)

This is an example of differentiating between the conventional and ultimate and realizing their inseparability. The subsequent passage of this text, further, refutes an understanding that conjoins difference and identity of emptiness and form; in other words, that passage denies the possibility of “true contradictions.”

22 – See the Zhong lun, T 30, no. 1564, p. 18, c7–8.

23 – See, for example, Pingala’s commentary to chapter 24 in the Zhong lun where he proposes that “emptiness should again be emptied,” in order to understand emptiness (T 30, no. 1564, p. 33, a20–21). See also the Dazhidu lun, T 25, no. 1509, p. 288, a1–9:

What is the difference between “emptiness” and “emptiness of emptiness[?]” . . . Empti-ness deconstructs all dharmas to such an extent that there is only emptiness. After the complete deconstruction of all dharma(s), even emptiness must be abandoned; there-fore [the] emptiness of emptiness is necessary. . . . It is like taking a medicine that can eliminate sickness; after the elimination of sickness, this medicine must be excreted as well, otherwise it causes illness again.


24 – See Zhong lun, T 30, no. 1564, p. 30, b23. The Sanskrit term is prajñapti, and according to Kumārajīva the Chinese translation is jiaming 假名. Unlike the Sanskrit, the Chinese term jia implies the two meanings of “false” and “borrow-ing.” Based on this, the Tiantai masters point to the “poison/medicine ambigu-ity of falseness”: falseness concealed is deceptive and harmful, and falseness revealed as a skillful means or the conventional can be salutary; see also Magli-ola, speaking of prajñapti and of Derrida on Plato’s pharmakon as poison/cure. Nāgārjuna’s Kārikā just uses prajñapti, but in Kumārajīva’s translation, the Zhong lun, the Chinese jiaming obviously embodies the semantic relationship between the two meanings of “borrowing” and “false.”

25 – The Zhong lun, in chapters 1 and 24, points to the deceptive and harmful im-plications of the term “emptiness”: “Those of the lower capabilities do not mas-ter the ability to contemplate emptiness properly and thus may harm themselves, just like those who are not skilled in using magic spells and thus do not under-stand how to catch the poisonous viper” (T 30, no. 1564, p. 33, a8–9).

26 – Again, according to the Dazhidu lun, the linguistic unfolding of the eighteen links in our understanding of emptiness makes possible or rather brings us to “enact” this awareness, which both rests upon and detaches from the conven-tional.

27 – See chapter 29 in the Dazhidu lun on how our understanding of true emptiness implies an inseparability from falseness: “When explicating the real mark of all dharma(s) [= emptiness], Subuthi does not annihilate provisional/false names” (T 25, no. 1509, p. 452, a15–16).

28 – The “true contradiction” of dialetheism is based on the subsequent argument: in view of its emptiness, ultimate truth must be denied, which, paradoxically, is an ultimate truth concerning the fundamental nature of reality; moreover, this contradiction is said to imply an ontological or metaphysical significance, as the two truths account for the inconsistency of the nature of reality.

29 – Yasuo Deguchi, Jay L. Garfield, and Graham Priest, “The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West 57, no. 2 (2008): 395–402. Also see Jay L. Garfield, Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 86–109. See the logician Graham Priest’s explanation of the ontological implications of this contradiction: “Nāgārjuna’s enterprise is one of fundamental ontology, and the conclusion he comes to is that fundamental ontology is impossible. But that is a fundamental ontological conclusion — and that is a paradox” (Graham Priest, Beyond the Limits of Thought [New York: Oxford University Press, 2002], and Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005]). For a critical discussion of Garfield’s and Priest’s interpretation, see Tom J. F. Tillemans, “How do Mādhyamikas Think? Notes on Jay Garfield, Graham Priest, and Paraconsistency,” in Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy, ed. Mario D’Amato, Jay


Garfied, and Tom J. F. Tillemans (New York: Oxford University Press 2009), pp. 83–101.

30 – T 30, no. 1564, p. 1, b14.

31 – See the Dazhidu lun, T 25, no. 1509, p. 294, c10–22.

32 – The passage in this sūtra says: “All dharmas are set up owing to the root of non-abidingness.”

33 – See Zhiyi’s extensive commentary on the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, explaining that the Chinese “root of non-abidingness / devoid of abidingness and roots” (wuzhuben 無住本) could be understood in terms of both “devoid of roots” (wuben 無本) and “having a root” (youben 有本) (18th vol. of Taishō shinshū daizōkyō, p. 651, c16 –p. 652, a7).

34 – This is the major question that the Chinese philosopher Mou Zongsan (1909–1985) discusses in his work Foxing yu Bole 佛性與般若 (Buddha-nature and prajñā). For a critical review, see my article “Ontological Indeterminacy and Its Soteriological Relevance: An Assessment of Mou Zongsan’s (1909–1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi’s Tiantai Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West 56, no. 1 (2006): 16–69. See also the special forum on Mou Zongsan, featuring different authors, in the Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38, no. 2 (2011).

35 – Parts of this section will be in my article “Contradiction and Ambiguity in Chi-nese Buddhism,” forthcoming in Huafan xuebao 華梵學報 43, no. 2, (Taibei: Huafan University), pp. 357– 406.

36 – The subsequent discussion refers to the ambiguous Chinese jia 假 as “false/provisional” instead of using Swanson’s translation “conventional existence.” The Chinese jia is ambiguous and implies the meaning of “to borrow from” and “false, non-genuine.”

37 – See Chengguan’s commentary on the Garland Sūtra, in T 36, no. 1736, p. 239, b23–c1.

38 – See the initial phrase of the first chapter of the Zhong lun, which explains that “neither arising nor perishing, neither permanence nor discontinuity” is a nec-essary feature of things’ interdependent arising that embodies emptiness (T 30, no. 1564, p. 1, b1).

39 – See the Chinese Buddhist expression huanhua 幻化 in Seng Zhao’s Zhao lun, which refers to the level of conventional existence and which is a compound of the characters for illusion and change.

40 – The “eight negations” corresponding to the emptiness of things interdepen-dently arising make up the initial verse of the first chapter of the Mūlamādhyamaka-kārikā (according to the Kumārajīva translation) and express this thought: “neither arising nor perishing, neither permanence nor discontinuity, neither unity nor separation, neither coming nor leaving.”


41 – See the previously quoted passage from the Zhao lun: “The sage utilizes all kinds of change without changing; he undergoes uncountable delusions and constantly passes through unaffected” (T 45, no. 1858, p. 153, a1–2).

42 – This is a quotation from the Dazhidu lun, which can also be found in the Kumārajīva translation of the Mūlamādhyamaka-kārikā and is frequently quoted by Zhiyi, Jizang, Fazang, Chengguan, and other masters (T 25, no. 1509, p. 64, c9–10).

43 – See Jizang’s Sanlun xuanyi 三論玄義 (Profound meaning of the Three Treatises) (T 45, no. 1852, p. 11, c13–14).

44 – This could be also translated as: “The speech about existence just refers to false/provisional existence to elucidate that it is not [completely] non-existent.”

45 – See the Zhao lun, Buzhenkong lun 不真空論:

「誠以即物順通，故物莫之逆。即偽即真，故性莫之易。性莫之易，故雖無而有。物莫之逆，故雖有而無。雖有而無，所謂非有。雖無而有，所謂非無。如此，則非無物也，物非真物。物非真物，故於何而可物？ …… 故放光云：第一真諦，無成無得。世俗諦故，便有成有得。夫有得即是無得之偽號。無得即是有得之真名。真名故，雖真而非有。偽號故，雖偽而非無。是以言真未嘗有，言偽未嘗無。二言未始一，二理未始殊。故經云：真諦俗諦謂有異耶？答曰無異也。此經直辯真諦以明非有，俗諦以明非無。豈以諦二而二於物哉？然則萬物果有其所以不有，有其所以不無。有其所以不有，故雖有而非有。有其所以不無，故雖無而非無。雖無而非無，無者不絕虛。雖有而非有，有者非真有。若有不即真，無不夷跡。然則有無稱異，其致一也。…… 尋此有無之言，豈直反論而已哉。…… 言有，是為假有以明非無。借無以辨非有。此事一稱二。」(T 45, no. 1858, p. 152, b3–c14)

46 – Swanson tries to point to this ambiguity through his translation “conventional existence / non-being,” which corresponds to my “illusorily existing / not really existing”; and his “being /annihilation,” corresponds to my “really existent / completely non-existent.” Swanson’s translation recognizes this ambiguous structure; however, he does not explicitly explain that for Seng Zhao so-called “conventional existence” means illusion or falseness, and that this ambiguity is necessary for pointing to the inseparability of truth and illusion. Swanson writes: “This vague and imprecise use of you and wu, and the habit of discussing the two truths in this context, was a bad habit which afflicted the Chinese discus-sion of this issue for centuries.” See P. Swanson, Foundations of T’ien-t’ai Phi-losophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism (Nagoya: Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture 1989), p. 35.

47 – See the Zhao lun quoting the Zhong lun (T 45, no. 1858, p. 152, c23–28).

48 – See Zhao lun, T 45, no. 1858, p. 152, a29–b1.

49 – See Zhiyi’s Mohe zhiguan, T 46, p. 55, a24; Chengguan’s commentary on the Huayan Sūtra, T 35, no. 1735, p. 604, c3; and Jizang’s commentary on the Lotus Sūtra, T 34, no. 1720, p. 448, b22–c1.


50 – See, for example, Zhiyi (T 33, no. 1716, p. 682, c2–9; T 46, no. 1911, p. 55, c11–13); Jizang (T 45, no. 1853, p. 18, c17–26; T 45, no. 1854, p. 83, b18–20; T 45, no. 1854, p. 110, c1–2); Fazang (T 45, no. 1877, p. 647, c14–18); Cheng-guan (T 36, no. 1736, p. 544, a3–12).

51 – See Zhiyi, Mohe zhiguan, T 46, no. 1911, p. 54, c18–23, and Fahua xuanyi 法華玄義, T 33, no. 1716, p. 682, c2–9.

52 – See Chengguan’s commentary on the text ascribed to Dushun, Huayan Fajie xuanjing 華嚴法界玄鏡 (T 45, no. 1883, p. 675, a5–9).

53 – See Chengguan’s commentary on the Huayan Sūtra (T 35, no. 1735, p. 604, c3–4).

54 – See my “Contradiction and Ambiguity in Chinese Buddhism”; here, I discuss and compare in greater detail the rhetoric of ambiguity in and according to the Tiantai and Huayan teachings.

Textual Pragmatics in Early Chinese Madhyamaka

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