Texas and the Bracero Program

8/9/2019 Texas and the Bracero Program

1/15

Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942-1947Author(s): Otey M. ScruggsSource: Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Aug., 1963), pp. 251-264Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4492180.

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2/15

e x a s

n d

t h

Brace ro

Pr og r am

1942 1947

OTEY

M.

SCRUGGS

This

paper,

read

at

the Los

Angeles

meeting

of

the

Pacific

Coast

Branch,

is

by

an

assistant

professor

in

the

University

of

California,

Santa

Barbara.

OF

THE

291,420

BRACEROS

contract

farm

la-

borers

from

Mexico)

entering

the United

States

in

1961,

117,368

went

to Texas. That

was more

than

to

any

other

state.

This

propor-

tion, however,

has

not

always

existed.

For the

first

five

years

of

the

bracero

program-from

the

signing

of the

United

States-Mexico

executive

agreement

on

farm

labor

on

August

4,

1942,

to

the

end

of 1947,when the wartime

farm

labor supply program

was

terminated

-none of

the

220,000

Mexican farm

workers

imported

went

to

Texas.

The

efforts

of Texas

farmers

to obtain

labor and

the

Mexican

govern-

ment's ambivalent attitude toward

the

problem

are

a

neglected

chap-

ter

in

the

history

of a

program

that

has

become

an

enduring part

of American

agriculture

and

an

important

link

in the chain

of United

States-Mexico

relations.'

The

agreement

of

August

4,

1942,

grew

out

of the

fear

of

both

southwestern

growers

and the

United

States

government

that

there

would

be

an

insufficient

supply

of

labor to

harvest

the

crops

during

the

war. It

placed

the

administration

of

the

bracero

program

in

the

hands

of the

Department

of

Agriculture

and

guaranteed

that

the

immigrants

would

have

at

least

minimum

working

and

living

condi-

tions.

Many

farmers,

however,

greeted

the

undertaking

with

undis-

guised

hostility.

They

had

hoped

for

a

program

modeled

after the

one

developed

during

World War

I.

In

that

program,

the United

States,

after

relaxing

its restrictions

on

the

admission

of

contract

laborers,

had left

operations largely

in the hands of the farmers,and

1

W.

Carl

Holley,

Office of

Farm Labor

Service,

U.S.

Department

of

Labor,

to

the

author,

Oct.

16,

1962;

Wayne

D.

Rasmussen,

A

History

of

the

Emergency

Farm

Labor

Supply

Program,

1943-47

(Washington,

D.C.,

1951),

199,

226.

251

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3/15

252

PACIFIC

HISTORICAL

REVIEWV

Mexico,

involved

in

more

pressing

domestic

problems,

had

played

an even

more

passive

role.

Moreover,

the

growers

disliked

intensely

the guaranties in the agreement, especially the provision of an hourly

minimum

of 30

cents,

correctly fearing

that

the

safeguards

were

part

of

an

effort to

bring

all

farm

labor,

domestic

as

well

as

foreign,

within

the orbit

of

existing

federal

labor

legislation.

For

these

reasons,

only

a handful

of

growers-none

from

Texas-participated

in the

program

in

1942.2

In

the

spring

of

1943,

two

significant

developments

led

growers

near

El

Paso,

who had

long

had

easy

access

to

large

supplies

of

labor

from Mexico, to attempt to circumvent the agreement. First, on April

26,

1943,

the two

governments exchanged

notes

on a new

agreement

which

replaced

the old.

Instead of

liberalizing

the

terms of

employ-

ment,

as

farmers would have

liked,

the

new accord

tightened

them

slightly

to

meet some of the Mexican

government's

objections

to the

program's

operation

in

1942.

Then,

three

days

later,

Public

Law

45,

in

which

Congress

for

the

first

time

gave

its

approval

to

the

program,

was

entered

on

the statute books.

During

the bill's

progress

through

Congress, large farm groups led by the powerful American Farm

Bureau

Federation

had worked

hard

to

tailor

the

program

to

the

farmers'

specifications.

In

conference,

Section

5

(g)

was

added,

giving

the

commissioner

of

immigration

authority

to lift

the

statutory

limi-

tations on

the

entry

of

farm labor

from

Western

Hemisphere

coun-

tries when he deemed

it

essential to

the war

effort.

The

farmers'

desire for

an

"open

border,"

such

as had

existed

during

World War

I,

appeared

to

have been

realized. Workers

entering

under

P.L. 45

regulations

would not

be

protected by

the

wage

and

working

condi-

tion

provisions

of the

agreement

of

April,

1943,

nor would

super-

vision be

by

the War

Food

Administration,

which had

superseded

the

Department

of

Agriculture

in

charge

of

all

farm

labor

programs.

However,

since

Section 5

(g)

was

contrary

to the

spirit

if not the letter

of

the

bilateral

agreement

which had

just

been

concluded,

any

at-

tempt

to

proceed

under

this section of the

law would lead to

a

crisis

if

the

Mexican

government

adhered

to its oft-stated

position

that

workers

would

be

allowed to

emigrate

only

in

accordance

with

the

agreement.a

2

See

the

author's

"The

First

Mexican

Farm Labor

Program,"

Arizona and the

West,

II

(Winter,

1960),

319-326;

"The Evolution of the

Mexican

Farm Labor

Agreement

of

1942,"

Agricultural

History,

XXXIV

(July,

1960),

140-149;

"The

Bracero

Program

under the

Farm

Security

Administration,

1942-1943,"

Labor

History,

III

(Spring, 1962),

149-168.

SScruggs,

"The

Bracero

Program

under the

Farm

Security

Administration,"

160

f.



4/15

Texas and the Bracero

253

The

crisis

was not

long

in

coming.

Border

farmers,

angered

at

being

denied

direct

access to

labor

in

Mexico,

had

been

appealing

to the Immigration Service since the initial agreement of August,

1942,

to

"let

down

the

bars"

on

the

entry

of labor

from

Mexico.

Their

appeals

had

become

more

insistent as

hundreds

of

workers

poured

into

Mexican

border

towns

hoping

to

be

contracted under

the

agreement.

These

pressures

eventually

proved

too

strong

for

the

immigration

authorities. On

May

11,

1943,

the

commissioner of

im-

migration

issued

regulations

under Section

5

(g)

of P.L.

45

authoriz-

ing

his

subordinates to

supply

laborers

at the

border

with cards

permitting them to enter for one year. Shortly afterward, the Immi-

gration

Service's

El

Paso office informed the

head

of

the local water

users'

association of

the

regulations,

and the

rush

was

on.

Jubilant

farmers,

harried

by

fears

of

insufficient labor to

meet

spring

needs,

rushed

across the

border

to

recruit the

necessary

workers.

Meanwhile,

Mexicans from

Ciudad

Juarez,

who had

permits

to cross to

the Ameri-

can

town

opposite

to

shop

and

to

work

on certain

nonagricultural

jobs,

promptly

applied

for

identification

cards

under

the

May

11

regulations.

Others without

cards crossed at nearby unguarded

points.

Before the

border

was

closed

at El

Paso three

days

later,

2,040

workers had

been

distributed to

farmers on both

sides of

the

Texas-

New

Mexico line.'

The

Mexican

government's

reaction to

the

El

Paso

episode

was

what the

State

Department

had

anticipated.

Under fire from the start

from

powerful

groups

in

Mexico

hostile

to

any

form of

labor

emigra-

tion,

the

government

quickly

made known

its

intention

of

abrogating

the

agreement

of

April

26,

1943,

unless

all farm

labor

emigration

from

Mexico

was

placed

under

its

provisions.

On

May

28,

following

a

series

of

conferences

in

Washington

at which

some of the

partici-

pants bluntly

advocated

disregarding

Mexico's

wishes,

the State

Department

announced that

Section

5

(g)

of

P.L.

45

did not

apply

to

Mexico.

However,

to

avoid the

immediate

problem

of

having

to

transport

the

workers

back

to

their

homes,

the

Mexican

government

allowed those

to

whom

cards

had

been

issued

to remain

one

year."

Section 5

(g)

of P.L.

45

and

the

subsequent

regulations

issued under

4

American

Consul at

Ciudad

Judirez

to American

Embassy (Mexico

City),

May

12,

18,

1943,

Files

of

the

Department

of

State

(hereafter

referred

to

as

S.D.);

El

Paso

Times,

Feb.

5,

1944.

5

Memo.

of

conversation,

Division

of

American

Republics,

May

12,

1943;

memo.,

Divi-

sion

of

American

Republics,

May

28,

1943;

Department

of State

to

American

Embassy,

May

28, 1943,

S.D.



5/15

254

PACIFIC HISTORICAL

REVIEW

it

were,

in

fact,

parts

of a

concerted

effort

by

farmers,

emboldened

by

fears

of labor

shortage,

to

undermine

the United States-Mexico

farm labor agreement. As AmbassadorGeorge S. Messersmith wrote

Secretary

of State Hull

from

Mexico

City

in

the

midst of

the

uproar:

In

other

words,

in

spite

of

the hue

and

cry

from

some

of

the

border

states

about

their

need,

they

have

not

requested

any

certification

of

workers

or that

area.

This is an indication

to

you

that some of

the

states

are not

interested n

getting

workers

under

the

agreements

but

are more

interested

in

trying

to break down

the

agreements

so

as

to

get

workers

under

arrangements

which

are

quite

impossible."

The

movement

across

the border

under

P.L. 45

temporarily

less-

ened

the

demand for farm

labor

in

the

upper

Rio

Grande

Valley.

But

Mexico's

unyielding

attitude must

have

convinced

most

growers

that in

order

to

obtain

labor

from

Mexico

they

would

have either

to

accept

the

bilateral

agreement

or take

their

chances

with

"wet-

backs,"

illegal

entrants from

Mexico.

Texas

farmers

did

not

get

around to

requesting

labor under

the

agreement until late in the summer of 1943, a year after the original

notes

were

signed. By

then, however,

the

Texas

farmers'

problem

of

obtaining

labor

from

Mexico

had

become

complicated

by

the

injec-

tion of

an

issue that

was

ultimately

to

prevent

the

dispatch

of workers.

In

June,

1943,

under

prompting

from

its consuls

in

Texas,

the Mexi-

can

government

had

announced that it

would not authorize

braceros

for Texas

"because of the

number

of cases

of

extreme,

intolerable

racial

discrimination."

Though

the

pronouncement

came as some-

thing

of a

surprise,

a

discerning

observer

could

have

detected

the

straws in

the

wind.'

Mexicans

on

both

sides of

the

border

had

long

been sensitive

to

discrimination

against

Latins

in

the

United

States. Texas

particularly

aroused

their

indignation,

for there

discrimination

against

Mexicans

was more

overt than

elsewhere in

the

country.

But

the

war,

in

which

Mexican-Americans

were

required

to

give

their

services,

led to

in-

creased

demands

among

Mexicans

in

the

state for

decent treatment.

Moreover,

by

the

spring

of

1943,

the

American

government,

through

the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs

(OCIAA),

had

become

sufficiently

concerned

about

the

effect

discrimination

was

having

on

its

Good

Neighbor

policy

to

underwrite

a

program

*

George

S.

Messersmith

to

Cordell

Hull,

May

24,

1943,

S.D.

SCarey

McWilliams,

North From Mexico

(Philadelphia

and New

York,

1949),

270.



6/15

Texas and

the Bracero

255

of

education

on the

problems

of

the

Spanish-speaking

in

the South-

west.

Aware of the need to take action to improve a situation made more

acute

by

acts of

discrimination

against

Mexican-Americans

in

uni-

form and

visiting

Mexican

dignitaries,

Governor

Coke

Stevenson

had

induced

the

Texas

legislature

to

pass

the so-called

"Caucasian

Race"

resolution,

which

he had

approved

on

May

6,

1943.

The reso-

lution

affirmed the

right

of

all

Caucasians

within

the

state

to

equal

treatment in

public

places

of

business and

amusement

and denounced

those

who

denied

such

privileges

with

"violating

the

good neighbor

policy of our state." Doubtless, this manifesto of good intentions

added

to

the

surprise

that

greeted

the Mexican

announcement

that

braceros

would not

be

allowed to

go

to

Texas.'

With the

cotton

harvest fast

approaching,

many

Texas

farmers,

now

reconciled

to

obtaining

Mexican

nationals under

the

agreement,

became

alarmed

that the ban

would leave them

without an

adequate

labor

supply.

It thus

became

necessary

to

get

the

state

off

the Mexican

"blacklist."

To

do so

the

Texas

Farm

Bureau

hired

Cullen W.

Briggs,

a

Texas judge, who brought the matter to the attention of the Ameri-

can consul

general

in

Ciudad

Juirez.

Accompanied

by

representatives

of the

Ambassador of

Mexico

and of

the

OCIAA,

the consul

called

on

Governor

Stevenson

and

explained

that

steps

would

have to be

taken

to

satisfy

Mexico's

complaints

before

labor

would

be made

available.

Thereupon,

on

June

25,

1943,

the

governor

issued a

proc-

lamation,

which

though

more

specific,

in

that it

pointed

to the need

for closer

cooperation

between

Mexico

and

Texas,

was

essentially

a

reaffirmation

of the

"Caucasian

Race"

resolution.

He

then

departed

on a

"good

will"

tour of

Mexico,

where he

gave

assurances

that

upon

his return home he

would take

steps

to assure

Mexicans fair treat-

ment."o

Before

issuing

his

proclamation,

the

governor

on

June

12

had

drafted

a

formal letter

to

Mexican

Foreign

Minister

Ezequiel

Padilla.

After

pointing

to

the

need for

several thousand workers for the

coming

cotton harvest

and

expressing

the wish that

it

might

be met

under

the

agreement,

he

acknowledged

the

existence of discrimina-

tion and listed the

steps already

or about to be taken to eliminate it.

8

Ibid.,

259-263,

269-270;

Nellie

Ward

Kingrea, History

of

the

First

Ten

Years

of

the

Texas Good

Neighbor

Commission

(Fort

Worth,

1954),

30-31.

9

Kingrea,

op.

cit.,

27.

0o

bid.,

32-34.



7/15

256

PACIFIC

HISTORICAL REVIEW

He

promised

to

order

state law

enforcement

officials

to

deal

severely

with

those

found

discriminating

against

Mexicans

and

to

consider

the appointment of a commission to handle complaints of ill-

treatment.

In

his

reply

of

July

20,

1943,

Sefior

Padilla

expressed

the

view

that

the

governor's

program

of action

was

unequal

to

the

magni-

tude

of

the

problem.

Effective

action,

he

suggested,

would

include

"laws,

wholesome

propaganda,

and

penalties.""

The

contents

of the

interchange

were

published

in the

press

of

both

countries

on

July

28,

and

the next

day

a

copy

of

the

governor's

instructions

to the

appropriate

enforcement

agencies

was

likewise

made public. The governor further notified the Mexican government

that

the

following

week

he would announce

the

appointment

of a

commission to

study

and take action to end acts

of

prejudice

against

Mexicans.12

In

the

meantime,

the

United

States

government

was

also

hopefully

making

efforts

that would

result

in

the

dispatch

of braceros

to

Texas.

On

July

22,

1943,

following appeals

from the

Texas

congressional

delegation,

it

approved

and

prepared

to send on

to the

Mexican

gov-

ernment a request for 5,000 Mexican nationals for Nueces and San

Patricio

counties

in

the

coastal

bend

of

Texas.

The

State

Department

continued

to

press

for

the

removal of the

ban,

which

would

be

neces-

sary

before the

official

request

for

5,000

workers

could be

transmitted.

These

efforts

appeared

to have been

successful

when,

on

August

6,

1943,

the

Foreign

Office

informed

the

State

Department

that

in view

of Governor

Stevenson's

evident desire to

help

solve

the

"thorny

problem

of

discrimination,"

Mexico

would entertain a

request

for

5,000

workers

as

soon as

the

governor

announced

publicly

the

crea-

tion

of his

proposed

commission to

deal with

questions involving

discrimination

against

Mexicans.

Mexican

leaders,

still

in

doubt

about the wisdom

of the

move,

suggested

that

braceros

going

to Texas

either be

selected from

those

already

in

the

United States

or be re-

cruited

in

Mexico

City

for

the

"southern"

states,

but with the

under-

standing

that

they

would

go

to Texas."

n

Coke

R.

Stevenson-Ezequiel

Padilla,

"The Good

Neighbor

Policy

and

Mexicans

in

Texas,"

Vol.

XVII

(1943)

of

Mexico:

National

and International

Problems

Series,

7-13,

17-22.

12

Memo. of

conversation,

Department

of State

and

American

Embassy,

July

28,

1943,

S.D.

'1

Hull to

Messersmith,

July

22,

1943;

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

Aug.

6,

1943, S.D.;

Philip

Bruton,

Office

of Labor to

Marvin

Jones,

Administrator,

War Food



8/15

Texas and

the

Bracero

257

This

unenthusiastic

endorsement

of the

venture

was

prophetic;

no

farm

laborers

went

to

Texas under the

agreement

in

1943.

The

governor did not grant the Good Neighbor Commission of Texas

authority

to

organize

until

September

4, 1943,

when

he learned

that

federal

funds would

be

forthcoming through

the

OCIAA

to

support

it.

Whether

a

formal

request

for

labor

was

ever made to

the

Foreign

Office is

not

known.

In

all

likelihood it was not.

In

any

event,

it

would not have

affected the

outcome,

for

by

this time

the

Mexican

government

had

concluded

the

time

inopportune

to

approve

such

a

request."

From the start the Mexican government was anxiously concerned

about the

repercussions

of the

contract labor

programs

on Mexican

politics.

President

Manuel

Avila

Camacho

had consented to

the

undertaking

as

part

of

Mexico's

contribution

to allied

victory

in

the

war. The

program

was

also

part

of

an

effort to cement closer ties

with

the

United

States,

and

thereby

strengthen

the

president's

pro-

gram

to

hasten

Mexico's

economic

development.

But in

allowing

workers

to

emigrate,

the

government

opened

itself

to the

criticism

of

powerful

and

vocal elements within the country. Labor leaders

were

disturbed

by

the

president's

middle-of-the-road

policy

for eco-

nomic

growth

which

courted

business

as

well

as labor

support.

Agrarians

were

uneasy

over

the

slowdown

in the

government's

land

distribution

programs

and

over

the

wartime

inflation.

Large

com-

mercial

farmers in

the

north

opposed any

program

that

might

add

to

their

problems

of

obtaining

needed labor.

There

were nationalists

of all

hues,

from

those like

the

sinarquistas,

who

were

averse to almost

any

form

of

cooperation

with

the

United

States,

to those who believed

that Mexican

manpower

should

remain

at home

to

help

in

the

eco-

nomic

development

of

Mexico.

Mindful

of

the

large

reservoir

of

anti-American

feeling

throughout

the

Republic,

these

groups

could

be

expected

to

point

to

any

evidence of

difficulty

in

the

operation

of

the

emigration

programs

in

an

effort

to embarrass

the

government.

The

exigencies

of

internal

politics

were

often as

compelling

as

con-

cern for

the

braceros'

welfare in

dictating

Mexico's course

of

action

on

problems

arising

out of

sending

labor

to the United

States."'

4dministration,

July

22,

1943,

in General

Correspondence

Record

Group

224,

National

4rchives,

Washington,

D.C.

14

Kingrea,

op.

cit.,

34.

15

Howard F.

Cline,

The United

States and Mexico

(Cambridge,

Mass.,

1953),

261-

82;

Donald M.

Dozer,

Are We Good

Neighbors?

(Gainesville,

Fla.,

1959),

233,

235-236;

stephen

S.

Goodspeed,

"The Role of

the Chief Executive In Mexico:

Policies,

Powers



9/15

258

PACIFIC

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Under these

circumstances,

nothing

exercised

the

government

more than

the

reports

of

discrimination

against

braceros

in

the

United States that continued to drift back to Mexico. Indeed, the

Mexican

public

was

apt

to

regard

nearly

all of

the difficulties

as

some

form of

discrimination.

The

most serious

instances of

ill-

treatment involved

workers

recruited

under

the

railroad labor

agree-

ment

of

April

29,

1943,

an accord similar

in most

respects

to

the

earlier

farm labor

agreements.

The

protest

of

a

group

of

braceros

employed

on the

Santa Fe

line

near

Fullerton,

California,

early

in

July,

1943,

against

being paid

wages

lower

than those

paid

American

workers threatened to agitate the political waters in Mexico. Acting

quickly

to

forestall

any

cries of

discrimination,

the

government

tem-

porarily

suspended

recruitment under

the

railroad

labor

agreement.

After

protracted negotiations,

a

settlement

was

concluded

in favor

of the

workers."

A

month after

the

Santa Fe

"incident,"

Mexican nationals

working

on

railroads

in

central

Texas

complained

of

discrimination

in two

towns,

and the

Mexican

government

was

forced to

request

their

im-

mediate removal to areas where discrimination was not likely to

occur.

This

and

other

instances

of

discrimination

against

Mexicans

in

Texas

prompted

a

member of

the Mexican

legislature,

a

former

consular

official

in

that

state,

to

urge

adoption

of

a resolution

setting

up

a

committee to

meet

with Governor

Stevenson

and to

investigate

conditions.

In

the

face

of

these

developments,

the

government

chose

to

say

nothing

more

about

sending

farm

labor

to Texas

in

1943,

and

the

State

Department,

aware

of

the

government's

predicament,

did

not further

press

the

issue.

Texas

growers

finished

the season

with

student

volunteers,

a

handful

of

prisoners

of

war,

the traditional

but

much

reduced

Mexican-American

migratory

labor

force,

and

an

in-

creasing

number

of

wetbacks."

The Mexican

government

continued to vacillate

in

1944.

Indeed,

in

spite

of

domestic

opposition,

President

Avila

Camacho

and

For-

eign

Minister

Padilla

were anxious

to

have

farm

workers

go

to

Texas.

They

feared

that

persistent

refusal

to

send them would not

only

and

Administration"

(unpublished dissertation, University

of

California, Berkeley,

1947),

332-350;

Messersmith

to

Hull,

Aug.

11, 1943;

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

May

18, 1944,

S.D.

16

Messersmith

to

Hull,

Oct.

29,

1943;

Department

of State to American

Embassy,

April

22,

1944,

S.D.

17

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

Sept.

15,

1943, S.D.;

McWilliams,

North

From

Mexico,

271.



10/15

Texas and the Bracero

259

antagonize

the

United

States,

but

might

undermine

the

steps

already

taken

by

Governor

Stevenson

to

wipe

out

discrimination.

Thus,

the

government announced on December 26, 1943, that braceros would

be

allowed

to

go

to

Texas

in

1944.

However,

when Ambassador

Messersmith

approached

the

foreign

minister

several

weeks

later,

Padilla

stated

that

while

he

was

personally

sympathetic

to

permitting

workers

to

go

to certain

counties,

he could not

defy

public

opinion

by

allowing

them to

emigrate."

In the

meantime,

Governor

Stevenson

was

being pressured

to

have

the ban

removed.

The

workers who entered

under Section

5

(g)

of

P.L. 45 were due to be repatriated by May 15, 1944, and El Paso

County

growers

were

anxious

either

to

contract

them

under

the

agreement

or

to

import

others

under

its

terms to

replace

them. To-

gether

with

state

officials,

they

devised

a

plan

that

would

give

El

Paso

County

preferred

treatment.

Officials

of two

El

Paso

farm

groups,

accompanied by

a

representative

of

the

OCIAA,

would

journey

to

Mexico

City

to

urge

that

contract

labor

be

allowed

to

go

to Texas

counties

with

records

of

favorable

treatment of

Mexicans,

the

first

so selected

to

be El

Paso

County.

The

plan was believed to have the

two-fold

advantage

of

demonstrating

to Mexico

that

discrimination

was not

inevitable

and

of

stimulating

counties

with

poor

records to

reform

conditions. The

deputation

arrived in the

Mexican

capital

in

mid-March

and

conferred with

officials

of the

American

embassy.

Although

Ambassador

Messersmith

did not wish to

jeopardize

the

two labor

emigration

programs "by

an

inopportune

insistence

on

a

point

which is

politically

impossible

in

Mexico at the

present

time,"

he

again

took

up

the

matter

with

the

foreign

minister

and

received

Padilla's

promise

to authorize

labor for

El

Paso

County

upon

receipt

of

a

formal

request."

The

request

was made

on

April

25,

1944,

and

though

the

period

of

critical

need for

labor

was cited

as

of

May,

the

month

passed

without

further

word from

Mexico.

Nor

apparently

was

any

promise

made

at

a

three-day

conference on

border

problems

in

Mexico

City

beginning May

29.

The

meeting

was called

by

Mexico

primarily

to

I

Messersmith to

Hull,

July

20, 1943;

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

March

7,

15,

1944,

S.D.;

El

Paso

Times,

Dec.

27,

1943.

Interestingly,

Padilla

resigned

his

post

a

year

later

to

launch his

campaign

for

the

presidency,

a

campaign

which he

lost

in

part,

it is

commonly

believed,

because

of

his

well-known

friendship

for

the

U.S.

See Robert F.

Scott,

Mexican Government in

Transition

(Urbana,

Ill.,

1959),

215;

also

Austin

F.

MacDonald,

Latin American Politics and

Government,

2d.

ed.

(New

York,

1954),

251.

SAmerican

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

March

15,

1944,

S.D.



11/15

260

PACIFIC HISTORICAL

REVIEW

consider

ways

of

coping

with the

mounting

volume

of

unlawful

emigration,

both those

who

crossed unnoticed

and those

who

used

Form 5-C cards to leave to perform farm work in the United States.

The

Mexican

delegation

also

stressed its

government's

growing

con-

cern

over

the

several

hundred

P.L.

45

workers not

yet

returned

and

its desire

that

they

be

repatriated

without

further

delay

in

accord-

ance

with the

original

understanding.

Despite

the

insistence of

the

American

delegation

that

the United

States

was

reluctant

to

see

Texas

stripped

of

labor,

the

Mexicans remained noncommittal

about

labor

for

El

Paso

County.

However,

the

informal

agreement

of

June

2, 1944, pledged the United States to strengthen its border force, to

cease

issuing

Form

5-C

cards to

farm

workers,

and

to

repatriate

all

those

in

the

country

contrary

to

the

expressed

wishes of

Mexico."

United States

border

authorities

acted

quickly

to

meet

these com-

mitments,

speedily

returning

the

remaining

P.L. 45

entrants and

embarking

on

a

campaign

to round

up

and

deport

wetbacks

in

south

Texas.

This

evidence of

American

willingness

to

cooperate

was

prob-

ably

a

major

factor in

the

Mexican

government's

decision of

June

16

to authorize the recruitment of between two and four thousand

braceros for

El

Paso

County,

provided

Governor

Stevenson

publicly

reaffirmed

his

intention

to

combat

discrimination.

There

followed

a month in

which

assurances

were

once

again given by

the

governor

regarding

discrimination

and

by

the

United

States

that the

contrac-

tees'

interests would

be

amply

protected.

Then

followed

still another

month

of

silence from

Mexico."

While the

Mexican

government

continued

its

hedging,

instances

of

discrimination

continued

to

reach

the

Mexican

public.

In

August,

1944,

the

Comite'

Mexicano

contra

el

Rdsismo

was

formed,

and its

publication,

Fraternidad,

ran

a

column,

"Texas,

Buen

Vecino?"

("Texas,

Good

Neighbor?"),

in

which

were

listed

acts,

names,

and

places

of

discrimination.

The

Inter-American Bar

Association,

meet-

ing

in

Mexico

City

the

same

month,

discussed

the

issue

of

discrimina-

tion

as

an

obstacle

to

better

hemisphere

relations.

Significantly,

the

foreign

office

notified

the

American

embassy

near

the

end

of

August

that

it

had

again

changed

its

mind,

believing

that

it

could

not

accede

to the

request

for labor for El Paso

County

and

still

expect

the

emi-

-0

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

June

6,

1944,

S.D.

1

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

June

16,

1944,

July

18, 1944;

memo.

of

conversation,

American

Embassy

and

Department

of

State,

June

29,

1944,

S.D.



12/15

Texas

and

the Bracero

261

gration

programs

to

continue

functioning

smoothly.

"This,"

said

the

embassy,

in

informing

Washington

of the

decision,

"is

the

long

and the short of it. It is useless to again raise the question .... " The

note

of

finality

was

significant,

for the

attempt

to obtain

labor

for

El

Paso

County

marked the last

concerted

effort

by

the

United States

during

the

history

of

the

Emergency

Farm

Labor

Supply

program

to

induce

Mexico to

lift the ban

on

labor

to Texas.

The

United

States had

concluded

that to

persist

in

the

matter

would

only

jeop-

ardize

existing

labor

programs

and

mar

efforts

at

closer

cooperation

between

the two

countries."

Pressure in Texas to have the ban removed abated after 1944. This

was

partly

due to

previous

failures,

but

it

was also

due to

develop-

ments

only indirectly

related

to

the

ban. In

January,

1945,

the

Texas

State

Extension

Service,

with the

cooperation

of

the Good

Neighbor

Commission,

inaugurated

a

program

to make

greater

use

of resident

workers

by

improving

on-farm

housing

and

educating

local

com-

munities

in

the need

for better

treatment

of

Mexican-Americans who

followed the

crops.

Moreover,

when the

war

ended,

greater

numbers

of Mexican-Americansreturned to the fields."

The

most

significant

accretion, however,

came

through

illegal

entry

from

Mexico.

In

May,

1944,

Mexican

officials

had contended

that there were

25,000

wetbacks

in

American border

areas,

most

of

them in

Texas.

Early

in

1947,

they

placed

the

number at

100,000.

At

least half of

this

number

was believed to

be in

the

lower

Rio

Grande

Valley

of

Texas.

Because

they

were

in

the

country

unlaw-

fully,

hence

subject

to

immediate

deportation

in

the event

of

arrest,

these

unfortunates were

forced

to work

for

painfully

low

wages

and

to

accept

miserably

poor living

conditions."

By

1947,

the

mounting

volume

of

unlawful

migration

over-

shadowed all other

border

problems.

As

in

1944,

officials of the

two

governments

met

in

Mexico

City

to

consider

ways

of

solving

the

problem,

and

out of

their

discussions

came two

agreements

on

March

10,

1947.

The

principal

accord

permitted

wetbacks to be

returned

to

Mexico and

issued

contracts

enabling

them to

re-enter the

United

22McWilliams,

North

From

Mexico, 263-264; American Embassy to Department of

State,

Aug.

29, 1944,

S.D.

23

Pauline R.

Kibbe,

Latin

Americans

in Texas

(Albuquerque, 1946),

182-190.

2'

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

June

6,

1944,

S.D.;

U.S.

Stat.,

80

Cong.,

1

sess.

(1947),

Vol.

LXI,

Part

4,

pp.

4098.



13/15

262

PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

States

legally

as farm

workers.

The

other

extended

the

terms of

the

accord to workers

picked

up

in

Texas."

The officialreasonsfor the separateagreement pertaining to Texas

are

set forth

in the

document. It declared

that

Mexico remained

"firm

in

its

determination not to

permit,

under

the

protection

of

existing

conventions,

persons

of

Mexican

nationality

to

be

con-

tracted to

work

in

States of the United

States

where

there

may

exist

discrimination

against

Mexicans.

.

.

."

Hence,

the

agreement

"was

not

to constitute

a

precedent

and

was

only

to

be

temporary."

Mexico,

it

said,

in

effect,

was

making

the concession

in

appreciation

"of

the

repeated proofs of friendship and of good will" displayed by the

Texas

government

in

attacking

the

problem

of discrimination.

Finally,

the Texas

agreement

pointed

out,

with

reference

to the

wetbacks,

that

Mexico

was "confronted with

a factual situation

which

was

not

created

by

the Government of

Mexico,

but which it is

desirable

to

solve

in

benefit

to the

Mexican workers.""

The Mexican

government's

motives were several.

It wanted

to lend

as

much

support

and

encouragement

as it

could to the

Texas

authori-

ties in combatting discrimination. It wanted to provide greater pro-

tection

for

the

workers.

Prompted

by

a real

concern

for the workers'

welfare,

it was

also

motivated

by

political

considerations.

An Ameri-

can

embassy

official

reported

that

during

the discussions

some

of

the

Mexican

delegates

admitted

as

much. In other

words,

"confronted

with

a

factual

situation,"

the

government

was

compelled

to

present

to

the Mexican

people

evidence of

its

concern

to

improve

the

lot

of

the

workers,

the

greatest

number of whom were

in

southern

Texas.

At the

same

time,

it

wished to

make

clear that it was not

abandoning

its

position

on

the

discrimination

issue,

although

in

fact it

was

taking

the

first

concrete

step

toward

doing

so. The

Texas

agreement

was

intended

to

emphasize

to

interested

parties

in both

countries,

but

especially

in

Mexico,

that the Mexican

government,

with

respect

to

farm labor

emigration,

continued to

regard

Texas

in

a different

light

from the

other

border

states."

These accords

supplemented

but did

not

replace

the

agreement

of

April

26,

1943.

Thus,

the contract

subsequently

drafted

by

the

Mexican

government

was similar but not identical to the bracero

contract.

It

included

guarantees

of minimum

working

and

living

2

American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

Feb.

7,

1947,

S.D.;

U.S. Stat.,

80

Cong.,

1

sess.

(1947),

Vol.

LXI,

Part

4,

pp.

4097-4100,

4106-4107.

"

US.

Stat.,

80

Cong.,

1

sess.

(1947),

Vol.

LXI,

Part

4,

pp.

4106-4107.

*American

Embassy

to

Department

of

State,

Feb.

7,

1947,

S.D.



14/15

Texas

and the

Bracero

263

conditions.

But

instead

of

being

enforced

by

an

agency

of

the

United

States,

it

was

to be

policed

by

a commission

on labor

emigration

set

up by Mexico. The parties to the contract were to have recourse to

American

courts,

and,

in

the

final

analysis,

the

Mexican

government

could

deny

workers to

offending employers."

The

contract

was

even

less

palatable

to the

growers

than the bra-

cero

contract had been

five

years

earlier. With the

war

over,

they

were

more than

ever

convinced of the

superfluity

of

worker

guaran-

tees.

Consequently,

the

majority,

especially

in the lower Rio Grande

Valley,

chose

to

ignore

the

new

management,

and

many

of those who

had their workers "legalized" failed to comply with the terms of the

contract. As a

result,

following

a

dispute

with

the El Paso Cotton

Growers

Association

over

wage

rates,

the

Mexican

government

on

October 15, 1947, abrogated the Texas

agreement."

In

the

years

after

1947,

due

largely

to the

continuous

influx of

wetbacks,

Mexico

gradually

removed

its

ban on the

emigration

of

braceros to Texas.

As

early

as

1943,

the

availability

of

illegal

entrants

had

made

it

unnecessary

for

the

farmers

of

southern Texas

to

worry

unduly about the ban on braceros. As long as they could obtain

wetbacks,

they

could

ignore

braceros,

whose

use

required

the farmers'

acquiescence

in

conditions of

employment

which

they

detested.

However,

Mexico's

policy

of

using

the

braceros

as a

lever

to

force

Texas

to take

steps

to

end

discrimination

against

Mexicans was

not

devoid

of results.

More

than

any

other

factor,

it

was

responsible

for

the creation

of

the

Good

Neighbor

Commission,

which in

1947

be-

came

a

permanent

agency

of

the

Texas

government.

Moreover,

the

publicity attending

Mexico's

stand,

and

the

work of

the

Good

Neigh-

bor

Commission,

helped

bring

out into the

open

a

problem long

in

need of

searching

examination.

Mexico's

approach

to the

question

of

sending

labor

to

Texas

in

the

years

from

1942

to

1947

well

illustrates

its

approach

to the

larger

question

of

farm labor

emigration

over

the

years.

That

approach

has

been

dictated

by

a

host

of

economic,

political,

and

humanitarian

considerations.

The

relative

importance

that

Mexican

leaders have

attached

to each at

any

given

time

has

determined

their

course

of

action. Indeed, if Mexico's

program

of economic diversification, be-

s

Otey

M.

Scruggs,

"The

United

States,

Mexico,

and

the

Wetbacks,1942-1947,"

acific

Historical

Review,

XXX

(May,

1961),

160.

a For

a

more

detailed

description

of the

Texas

agreement

in

operation,

see

ibid.,

161-162.



15/15

264

PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

gun

in

earnest

under

President

Avila

Camacho,

were

to

keep

pace

with

its

rapidly increasing population,

which

is

unlikely

for some

time to come, they would probably act quickly to end the bracero

undertaking.

American

farmers would

then have to look

elsewhere

for sources of

labor.

Texas and the Bracero Program

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