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FEBRUARY 1984

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DNA-TR-81-133

CONCEPT FOR OPER.~TIONS IN A

I\JUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT

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H. W. Oliver R. H. Smi ley CNA 001-8t-C-0062 G. L. Theroux

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---..., -"-II. K!!,\" lI.'OROS (C-._ "'" "' ........ _. II , ... ,,, ... .....,. _ id_.jh' I1jf MC."''''''''' .... ,) Nuclear Batt!efielC Offensive t:sc of Nuclear Weapons

~~ ". · .

Nucl ear £nvlror.ment Cetens rye US.€ of Nuclear Weapons Operational Environment Surv! 'lab I! I Cparatlonel Fundam.'1nta I s Functional A'trj?;' S

Close COlrbat Cc:IT.baT Power

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ThIs paper provIdes a concspt fer the cond'..!ccof mi I i tery operatIons '='1 US Army forces in a nuclear env ironmenT; sai's f rri-h issues impacting tre !mple-mentaticn of the liS Army's operatior:cl CCf1Cti j for tr,e condL:ct· cf t~e Air-Land Sa-rtle. ft consicers .. ad r ght I ng at CCl~)S ''In:j below In a nucl'2:ar en-

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vi ronrr.<3rtj influences a r .{"", ccnstra i r.ts ext"l:'.?r::f:~ ~a corps, 'o<Ih i Ie recc,!nized. are rot expllcitiy ~ddr3ssed. The con~ept /'" '3C; ua I I " appi iCC!ble in lrac- I an tive nuc!ear en" ! rorment '~'herern nuclenr use ... ·as rOT cccuried, but

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20. ABSTRACT (Continued)

Is possible or irrmlnen+; it can be expanded to Incillde operations Ir a com­bined conventloral-nuclear-chemical envirorrent.

There are two basic elements of a I~ucleer batt!efleld environment which must be understood and ~stered by US forces; the effective employme~t of nuclear weapons in both offensive and defensive operatTors; the increased vulnerabil­Ity cf forces and the resultant requlreroont for Implementation of p.xtraordi­nary survlvabi I Ity and reconstitution measures •

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Section

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

APPENDIX

PURPOSE ••••• " •• " ••• " • " •••• " • " • " " ••• " • " " • ., • " " " oil ••••• " " • " " • " " ..... " .3

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT··· ••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••• 4 a. Areas of Strategic Concern •••••••••••.••••••.••.••••••••••••. 4 b. Threat Doctrine •••••••••..••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••. 4 c. US Counter to the Threat ••••••.•••••••••••••••.•••••.•••••••• 5 d. Nuclear Environment •••••••••••••• " •••••••••••••••••••••••• c •• 5

LIMITATIO~~S .......................................................... 8

OPERATIONAL FUNDAMENTALS··.·· •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 a. General •••.••• _ •••.••••.••••••••••.• ~ .••.••.•...••...•••..••• 8 b • c. d.

Principles of War ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••.••••••. 9 Basic Tenets ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••• 12 Imperatives of Modern Combat ••••.•••••••••••.•••.••••••••••. 15

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT··········· •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•• 18 a. Offense ........................ of ............. III ................... @ b. Defense .................................................................... .w SURVIVABILITy ......................................................... 38

FUt~CTIO~lAL AREAS .................... ' ............................... 43 a. General ....................................................... 43 b. Close Combat •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 44 c. Comn~nd and Control •.•••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 44 d • e. f • g. h. i . j.

Ai r Support ........................................................ 4~ F1 re Support •••••• " ........................................... ./4'6) Air Defense •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ Cornntun 1 c a ti on s ...................... " .............................. 46 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare •••••••••••.•.••••••.•••• 47 Engineer and Mine Warfare ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••• 48 Combat Service Support •••••••••••••.•• ~ •••••.••••••••••••••• 48

BRIEFING SCRIPT AND VISUALS ......... , .......................... A-l

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1. PURPOSE

a. To provide a concept for the conduct of military operations by US Army forces in a nuclear environment.

• COUNTER THE THREAT

• INCREASED COMBAT POWER

• WARflGHTING AT CORP~ AND BELOW

• APPLICABLE TO OTHER ENVIRONMENTS

b. The doctrine of likely adversaries emphasizes the use of nuclear wea-

pons when and where needed to assure success. To counter this threat, US Army

forces must prepare now with app~oprfate doctrine, materiel, force structures,

tactics and training directed toward a demonstrated capability to conduct suc­

cessful military operations in a nuclear environment.

c. Nuclear weapons prv'fde the Army a significant force multiplier and

increased warfighting capability when their use and effects are properly inte­

grated and synchronized with the maneuver of forces.

d. Accordingly, this concept for operations in a nuclear environment sets

forth issues impacting the implementation of the US Army's operational concept

for the CMdtr:t of the AirLand B'lttle. Specifically. it considers warfighting

at corps and below in a nuclear environment; 1nfluences and constraints exter-

nal to corps, while recognized, are not explicitly addressed •

3

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e. This concept is equally applicable in an inactive nuclear environment

wherein nuclear use has not occurre1, but is possible or imminent. Further,

it can be expanded to include operations in a combined conventional-n~clear-

chemical er.vironment.

2. OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

• AREAS OF STRATEGIC CONCERN

• THREAT

SOViET MODEL

- DOCTRIHE

- IWCLEJ.R EliPLOYME1H

• us COtlHTER TO THE THREAT

AIRLAAO BATTLE CCfiCEPT

- CORPS 36 AHO DIVISION ~

- AIR AND GROUND PARTNERSHIP

a. The areas of greatest strategi c concern to the United States are

Europe. Southwest Asia and N.0rtheast I~Sia •• The applicatf on of th i:; concept

requires consideration of the geography, tupography and cl ~mate in these

areas.

b. The operational art, tactics, organizations and equipment of enemy

forces to be encountered 1n the strategic areas of concern are patterned after

the forces of the Soviet Union. Soviet doctrine emphasizes the principles of

mass and maneuver and seeks vi ctory through the rel entl ess prosecuti on of

offensive operations. Surprise, shock and rapid exploitat1on of the effects

of nuclear weapons are a1so basic to Soviet doctrine. Soviet d."'c1arations

indicate that nuclear weapons will be used not o~ly to assure s~cceS5 on the

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I l battlefield. but also to preempt US use. Massive concentration of nuclear and

conventional firepower on key military targets is a strong element of Soviet

doctrine. High priority targets are 'nuclear delivery unfts, command posts,

ground combat forces, air bases •• upport units and military bases. Soviet

forces are postured and trained to exploit nuclear attacks by rapid, G ~p.

multiple thrusts to destroy r:,":·.,ining forces and se1ze territory.

The US counter to the threat represented by the Sov1 et model i s i~mbod-

1

c.

fed in the Amy's op~rational concept for the :onduct of th!.., Af[Land Battle.

Through the 19905. the Army's portion of the AirLand Battle concept will be

executed by formations organized. manned and equipped with systems and

materiel resulting from Ann~' 86, Corps 86 and Div1510n 86 studies. The Air

Force is an equal partner in the AfrLand Battle. Th1s partnership arrangement

becomes even more important and demanding in a nuclear environme~t. Air sup­

port of ground forces I operati ons and thorough 1,)' synchroni zed t ~ r and ground

act1on~ throughout the 1epth of the battlefield are crucial;..u the success of

this corcept.

• NUCLEAR BATTLEfiELD ENV!ROItUEHT

•

.;., OVERVIEW

EFFECTIVE EMPLOYt.!!:'H

- - OfFENSE

-- DEfENSE

VULNERABILITY

- PROTECTION

- RECONSTITUTION

d. Military operations in a nuclear environment are characterized by vio-

lence, stress, confusion and aesterity. The intensity and violence of combat,

5

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combined with instantaneous mass casualties and large equipment losses, create

a psychological effect requiring uncommon dls(:lpline and leadership to over­

come. The face of the battlefield changes in seconds or minutes as additional

obstacles are created and terrain is physicaT;ly altered. Lines of contact

lose continuity. thereby creating a noncontfgu~us battlefield. Essential sup­

plies are limited and resupply delayed for 1®l'T9' periods. Reconstitution 1s

accomplished, at least initially, from residtliilT assets. The situation con-

fronting the commander 1s further aggravated Dy the disruption or even the

temporary loss of command and control communkations at the time when most

needed to regroup the force, seize the fnftiatl~ and continue operations •

There are two bas~: elements of this environmer.t 'f-ihich must be understood and

mastered by US forces: first, the effective e~loyment of nuclear weapons in

both offensive and defensive operations; and s~cond. the increased vul ner­

abf11 ty of forces and the resultant requi remel'lt for impl ementatf on of extra­

ordi nary sLlrvi vabil fty and reconsti tution meaSUT':!:!i.

Nuclear weapons are

~sed several ways in

the offense:

• SUSHlTUTE fOR flff! CtlSPlE1tE1IT\n~A1IE!J\'U ------------------..... --~ ..... -------• CIlEAn. GAPS ---• HOLD EIiOO IN Pl~C£ ------

-----.. PROTECT F\Jlm.::i ~

, tI . DEstROYSIPH FORCES

• ECCi>iIMY OF fORCE

• 'flZ.5ERVES

$I CREATE EXPLOIT ATiOH OP"ORTUNITIES -PLACE ENEMY AT RISK Tf;imUGHGUT AREA OF INFLUENCE

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• DES TROY ASSAUl T fORCES NlD ;:Ollol·OIl ECl1flONS

• --~~suiQ!,OR~l LOClmel SUPPORt 'It: - _,_~_, __ e ..... _. _____ __

Similarly, nuclear weapons • CREATE OBnAClU M'D CAnALIZE !1WU.ElRt.Q ,....---------_._-

are used several ways in • allJNT OR STOP PEHETA~I!MS

• ~OtfTROL TU1lAt1f ~-----,

• PEmO'f FORtetlH P[/jEfIlAT1I.ltu I - •

the defense:

• ECOfjOIllY OF fORCE 7'

• CR~E OEFE!l1!VE OPPORTUIl1!!E~

• PROTECT FORCES DURING COIJlflERATTACKS

• HIGHt Y FLEXIBLE IlBERY£!, r

P1.ACE ENEIIY AT RIUl TIlROUGIfOUT AREA Of IHFlUE~CE ]

Nuclear weapons give the commander the ability to hold the enemy at risk

throughor:" his al"ea of influence. Depending on deception. surprise. target

acq~1sition and user boldness, nuclear weapons can thange the course of the

--------------------------___ ~denl.y and decisively in favor o,fJhe u31ng forc~.

Positfve measures must be taken to reduce the effects of enemy weapons and to

maf nta f n a cohesive fi ghti n9 force. Pre-stri ice act i (' r,s offer ti1e be:;, t pay­

off; the less vulnerable and more survivable a unit, the less effort required

to restore mission capability. SUl'vivabi1ity in any battlefield envir-onment

is achieved by the combined applicatfon of scu~d protective measures a~d oper­

ational practices that reduces a force's vulnerability to detection, attack if

detected and destruction if attacked, Conterr.porary survivability measures and

practices are expanded in a nuclear environment to emphasize greater force

dispersion and frequent and rapid movement. Rapid and effective post-strike

reconstitution of combat power is essential in both the defense and offense •

Cormnanders must insure that combined anns teams are task organized to

facilitate rapid reconstitution of combat power '1nd insure un;flterruptea

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perfonnance of critical functions and tasks. n'iOSP. action~ taken immediately

aft~r ene~ use of nuclear weapons are key to ?~eventing hfs exp1oitdtion and

additional loss of friendly forces.

In the final analysis, success accrues to the ct!mbdtant most efficient in the]

employment of n:Jclea,' weapon!; and most cap~ble ·af maintaining or reconstitut­

fng an effective ~fghting force to exploit the ~ffects of nuclear use -- not

once but time after time.

3. LIMITATIONS

a. This concept is limHed to the Army's responsibilities at corps and

below for using nuclear- we~pons to obtain the ma~irttlJm operational and tactica1

advantage while limiting the damage the enemy ca~inflict on friendly forces.

b. Whfle it is recognized that chemical :w.r:::apons may be used by either

sfde, this concept does not sped fical1y address the offensive and defensive

consideratic~s concerning thefr employment.

4. OP£RATImlAL FUWjAMENTALS

• P!!:UC!!'LES OF IIfAR

• BASte TC.NETS

• IMPERATIVES OF );1Q'JER!'I COMBAT

a.. Gener;.;). The:;e fund3melltals prescrite ~h:: g<:nera1 wi;Y in~".iC;1 opera-

B

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They are intentionally broad enough to describe operations in most anticipated

circumstances and, therefore, allow freedo~ for operational and tactical vari-

ations that are appropriate to specific situations. The principles of war and

the application of those principles are the foundation of US Ar~ doctrine.

b. Principles of War. A principie, by definition, is bt'oad and basic.

The principles of war are valid for the entire spectrum of combat intensity.

to include the nuc1ear environment, They continue to provide the umbrella

under which all echelons of command and military formations must operate if

they are to be successful.

• OFFENSIVE

• MANEUVER

• "ASS

• OBJECTIVE

• ECOUOHY OF FORCE

• UNITY OF CO_AND

• SURPRISE

• SECURiTY

• SllAPllCITY

VAllO FOR ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT INTENS1TY

(1) Only offensive action!. achieve decisive r€5ul~ they permit the L ---- . commander to exploit the initiative and impose his will on the enemy. The

planning and execution of offensive operations are based on the integration of

maneuver and firepower; eff~cti\fe battlefield use af nuclear weapons greatly -----------------~------~ances t~e flexibility Qf th!! combination. The destructive power of nucle­

ar weapons permits the rapid alteration of force ratios at critical times and

-----------------------P~ thus creating addi ti onal opportuniti eS to resume the attack. The

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ability of a commander to recognize these opportunities and tJ capitalize on

them is fundamental to this principle.

(2) Maneuver places H,e enemy in a pa::.ition of disadvantage t!'H'ough

the dynamic appli cati on of combat power. The ',i,!'it: of nucl ear weapons permits

the concentration of combat power in a manner'~ gain the advantages of sur­

prise, posture and momentum necessary to enabie small forces to defeat larger )

ones.

(3) Mass concentrates combat power at'tle decisive time and place to

the IIJ3ximum pennftted by the conflict situation, Nucl ear weapons can create

the effect of mass rapidly. To achieve the sam:::: effect by conventional means)

woul d requi re the concentrati on of combat powo" over a much 1 on gel'" period.

thus increasing :the vulnerability of forces socancentrated.

(4) Every military operation must be directed towards a clearly

defined. decisive and attainable objective. The use of nuclear weapons facil-~-------------------------------

itates the at~;n,ent ~ military objectiviSt e.g •• the control of ter-

rain, the destruction of enemy forces. the dentd of enemy objectives and the

destruct; on of hi s cohesiveness and wi 11 to continue to f1 ght •

(5) Economy of force allocates minimui'l essential combat pc-weI'" to

secondary efforts. The use of nuclear weapons}f3r:Jits exploitation by si'?lal1er

forces and allows secondary efforts to be aCCOr':1l.fi;;11ed more economically.

(6) Vnf1:j; of ccmand obtains unity of effort by the integrated and

synchronized actions of all forces tOflard a COf1~mon objective, under one

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responsible commander, regardless of the batUefield environment. Sutlordinate

formatf ons conduct operat; ons wi thi n the i nterl~. of the commander, thus i nsur­

ing unity of effort even in the absence of C3 ..

(7) Surprise 1s achieved by striking the enemy at a time and place

and ina manner for which he is unpt'ep3reCL The use of nucl ear weapons

achieves surprise. A rapid tempo of t:;perat~ans ~- characterized by speed,

momentum and deception -- is required to ~x?iofft the advantage of surprise.

(8) Secur1!y denies the en~ che cp~nrt~'itJ to aco~ire an unexpect-

ed advantage and preserves the fightin:. stren;r';rl of the Force. ~.~gressive

timely a"d effectfve countermeasures and pre:vtnts j)remature coacentrclti on of

/forces. It is particularly important to oritnt thi! 1ntelH:wnce collection

systal toward 1dentffy1 09 wcakn~sses i!': th.f enemy I s stock.pflc-to-target

sequence, e.g., nuclear decision process, nuclecT release procedures and stor---- ----- ----- '---------------!9.e and assembly operati OQS __ 'p~ i rt a m.lC 1 ear en vi ronment-i~s-f::-u-rth~r

enhanced by dispersion, f!)Qbilfty and maneuver. ~~ax1'mum use is made of cover, - ------------concealment, rapid and frequent ~':Ovement and suppression to ninimize the

effectiveness of enelllY target acq!.:isition. In il~rticu1ar. operations security

lWst prevent disclosure of planned nuclear Ug~' to prec1ude preemption. At

times, less than optir.lal force seciJrity and ;>ro~3!ction may be necessary due to

calculated risks inherent in bold and dec;siven:ilitary operations.

(9) Simplici!t if:iplies pr0paration of 'tr;comp1icated and easi1y under-

stood plans and issuance of c1e~r and comi Sf.'! orders to insure prompt

execution in accordance with the intent o~ the commander. In a nuclear

11

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The principles of war coni:inue to provide the umbrella under which all eche-

10ns of coomand and mil itary organizations -- from teams and squads to eche-

10ns above corp s :!rust. operate if they are to be successful on the modern

battleffel d.

c. Basic Tenets. At both the operational and tactical levels. th~ gener­

ation of combat power requires the conversion of the potentfal capabf11ty

represented by trained forces. resources and oppcrtunity into reality through

purposeful and coordinated combat actions. Superior combat power is generated

thrOUgh a commander's skillful integration of the elements of maneuver,

firepower, protection and intelligent leadership. The use of nuclear weapons

may. on occasion, be the predo."lIinant expression of combat power. However,

effective maneuver is stfll vital for achieving local combat superiority. The

side posseSSing materiel superiority overall may choose freely between attri-

tio" and maneuver, but the side whose resources are inferior overall c~n only -------prevail by successful ~~neuver. Combat by maneuver mu~t be fought in accor--- --- - ....... --------dance with the basfc tenets of the Airland Battle. summarized by four words __

• INITIATIVE

• o.Eflll.

• AWI:t. • SI'IiCHRO~IIATWIli -

1Z

(1) ·,it1ative. Modern warflre deMl'lds decentral1 zatton, prompt

action and a high degree of individual initiatil'<J1!. Commanders engender initi­

ative in subordinates by avoiding oversupervii$lon, by establishing policies

within which staffs can take action during trt!'ir absence, and by instilling

self-confidence in sUbordinate commanders by permitting them appropriate latf­

tude wfthin the scope of their responsfbl11ti:f':s. In a nuclear environment,

semi.1ndependent operations by close combat fem,tes, under mission-type orders,.

are the rule rather than the eycep: 'on. Further, it will frequently be neces­

sary to decentraHlt:' the (' d-ol of fire SUPPlI.rt. combat support and combat

service support units by at':· "ling them to clQs£' combat elements. The loss of

command and control coo'llTlu.lk,tions may preclu:m- transmission and recefpt of

specific orders or df.'ect'on. In such an everii!: -- the risle of which is more

likely in a nuclear em,irorrment -- the command~ deduces the action required,

based on his knowl edge of the sitl.latf on and thi intent of hi S cOImIander, and

acts on his own initiative. Even when the com~und and control systems permit

the fnterchange of ess~ntfal orders and infOr.ifiltion. cOIl'IlIanders must place

greater reliance upon the initiative, integr'ity. cour~ge and professional

ability of their subordinates ff operations an~ battles are to be waged suc­

cessfully.

(2) Oepth. Battles are fought througlout the depth of the battle­

field. The concept of fighting 1n depth - dl:;tance - must be so fngra~ned

tr.at its application is autorr.atic. It is crllcia11 that forces are dispersed to

minimize the presentation of remunerative tarfets susceptible to attack by

nuclear weapons of the enemy; this creates the ~quir~ment for the dS5ignment

of 1 arger geograp!'!ical areaz of responsibil tty. ;ncreased potency of com-

bat power, the corresponding vulnerability the enemy. rethmdant and

13

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simplified control measures and enhanced mobility (horizontally and

vertically) pennit close combat forces to operate effectiveiy in these larger

areas ~ provide frequent opportunities for exploiting maneuver.

(3) Agility: Superior combat power ffi significant only when gener­

ated agafnst opposing forces at a critical time and place. The generation of

superior corr~at power through maneuver requires the avoidance of enemy

strength and the attacK of his vulnerabilities. The degree of combat power

attained reflects the commander's imaginative planning, leadership and ability

to stay abreast of critical events as they occur and hi s ability to tr.·{e

necessar .. !ction faster than the enemy. This must be done repeatedly so that

every t>.:: the eriemy begins to counter ene action another upsets his pla:ls.

This wil1 lead to fn~ffectfve, uncoordinated and piecemeal enemy responses and

eventually to hfs defeat. The agiH ty to generate dec1 sfve combat power -­

repetitively -- also requires flexibility in effecting tas~ organizations for

close combat, fire support, combat support and combat serVl;e support. It is

axiomatiC that the factors of mission, enemy, terrain (and weather effects on

terrain), available resources and time drive task organiz~tion and reorgan1za-

tion • In a nuclear envfronment, it is a1:;o axicm-atic that forces must be

composed to accomplish a variety of combat tasks -- without w.ajor changes in

task organization.

(4) Synchronization. The eff~ctlve a~plication of combat power

requires harrr.onious unity of effort throughout all echelons and within each

eChelon of the force. This synchronization is a basic f'Jnction of comffiand.

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and is particularly significant in deriving full advantage from maneuvar and

firepower in a nuclear environment. Repetitive generation of superior combat

power to capitalize unhestitatingly on battlefield opportunities requires the

sKillful integration and coordination of air and land forces throughout the

depth of the battlefield -~ towal'd a common goal.

d. Imperatives of Modern Combat. Understanding and application of the

imperatfves of modern combat take on added dimensions in a nuclear environ­

ment. Preparedness is fundamental to re~lization of the imperatives ~f modern

comba t. Preparedness !,)ennits survi va 1 and permits exp 1 aita t 1 on of opportun­

ities created by the employment of nuclear weapons. Such preparedness is

es-sentfal as there will be no transitional period to al10w for additionJl

preparations.

• UNITY OF EFFORT

• MOVE FAST, STRIKE HARD, F!H1SH RAP'Ol Y

• ENEMY IEAKJiESSES

• ItAIM EFFORT

• SUSTAllmi~ TIfE Fl~HT

• TERRA!" AND !fEATHER

• PROTECTION

PREPAREDNESS IS ESSENTIAL - -

NO TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

(l) Victory in modern warfare is made possib1e through the: complete

unfty of effort provided by thoroughly coordinated and synchronized actions by

ground and air forces, bringing to bear and J.:eeping in oper.:ltlon every element

capable of sustaining and contributing to the projection of superior combat

15

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power. Individual and collective unit} off effort requires mutual trust,

confidence, loyalty. pride, motivation, espn:t. discipline and a common under-

standing of unit missions and capabi1H:t€'$~ These human factors must be

developed through leadership and training 5:lili that individuals and units are

technically and psychologically prepared f~l~ the nuclear environment. Well

trained and well led units rnaintain thehr orientation and momentum. They

operate efficiently in limited visibility c~nditions. as well as daylight, in

an intense nuclear. chemical or electr01l1C warfare environment, in all types

of weather and over prolc~ged perfods of Urn!'. .

(2) Contemporary operations and b:ct.t:Jes envisioned by the AirLand

Battle Concept extend over greater distances (Em! for longer periods of contin­

uous combat than military operati ons of the lra~;t. In a nucl ear envi ronment,

however, Itlong perf ods of continuous combat" :.i!:l1e actually sustained series of

short and violent engagements by close COllIDB~1: forces manned and equipped to

move fast, strike hard and fi n1 511 ra}!ldly agaiiilSt enemy weaknesses -- time and

time again.

(3) Nuclear weapons must be viewed ,'5 an extension of .naneuver, not

just as an el ement of fi re support. In many '(jrlstances, enemy weaknesses wi 11

either not be apparent or wi1l be too distant to be successfully exploited by

available maneuver forces. In sljch cases, "Wai{<rleSSes" are created by nuclear ..... fires which can be then exploited by availablt m.3neuver forces and additional -----------------------------~----~------------------fi re support. --­remain such

-------After an, places of strength in the enemy's arr(1Y of forces ----only until nuclear strikes i',re delivered against them. -

I dent; fi ed, di stant enerry weaknesses or vu;h2rabil ; ti es ue exp 1 oited by -ground and air delivered fires nuclear, !lOTnuclear or combinations there.Qf

16

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-- to the extent permitted by available resources and to the degree sought by

the objectives of dday, tienial. disruption or destruction. These interre-

1 ated actions are synchronized to ~upport attai nment of a common mil Hary

objective.

(4) The principles of mass and economy of force demand designating

and sustaining a main effort. In a nuclear e-I'Ivironment, sustaining the main

effort involves the continuing application of combat power to exploit oppor­

tunities in any area of the battleffeld. Nuclear weapons not only weight the

main effort but also create opportunities for success 1n other areas. When

such oppcrtun1ties develop. ti1ey are expleited immediately by redirecting

forces, fires and logistiCS. The violence, stress and confusion characteris­

t;c of a nuclear environment serve to divert attention from sUHaining the

momenu!m of the battle. ~xtraordinary discipline and leadership are required

to overcome these d1 stracti ons and to rnai ntaln the focus on the mi ss; on at

hand. Commanders must continually assess hU:11I6f'1 abilities and limitations as

th~ plan and fight successive battles.

(5) The effects of terra1n and weather·, are important in the applica­

tion of the elements of combat power. In a iThuclear environment, both affect

the efficient and effective employrr.~nt of ill:\Jclear weapons and may have a

greater '. nfluence on maneuver act; ons •

(6) Protection involves preservation of the fighting strength of the

force until optimal combat power can be appL;,,::d at the right time and place.

This is accomplished by asguring security a.md surv'ivabflity. keeping troops

healthy anti equipment ready. af1d sustaining dii'$ciplilie and morale.

17

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5. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

a. Offense. The offensive is the dO'';isive fom of war. the commander's

only means of attaining a positive goal and of defeating an enemy. Decisive

offensive actions win battles and ure characterized by initiative. improvisa­

tion and aggressiveness; deep. bold attacKs throughout the depth of the bat­

tlefield; agility, as expressed in the flexible application of combat power to

avoid enemy strengths and to unhesitatingly exploit his weaknesses; and syn­

chronization of all resources in si~ultaneous and sequential battles designed

to totally disrupt and dislocate the enemy's system for combat. The basic

tenets arl~; the fmperat)ves of ondern warfare take on added importance in

a nuclear environment wherein nuclear weapons are used to assure success in

offensive operations. However, it must be recognized that a nuclear environ­

ment increases the risks of attaLk1ng forces and requires continuous

application of superior security and survivability means.

• THREAT

• ATIRlBU"IES

• PREPARATlOIi

• BASIC FOR~

el) Soviet style operations are characte.ril.ed by the relentless and

violent prosecution of offensive actions; defense is an anathema to Soviet

military strategy. However. Soviet doctrinere:cognizes that temporary defen­

sive operations may be required in those sectC';·~ of the battlefield '",here

offensive actions are i!1itially unsuccessful. in such cases, Soviet doctrine

for defens 1 'Ie oper i1t1 cns features the empl o)~ent of security forces. ma in

18

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defensive forces and reserve forces. Secmiii:!.¥, forces occupy an area forward

of the mai n defenses and seek to engage 'itim: enemy at the 1 onges t poss i b 1 e

range, causing premature deployment of assauTItr forces. Conventional. nuclear

and chemical fires are concentrated in suttte:n and devastating barrages to

destroy att~cking forces, M1 nes and barrlffTS: are used --- in conjunction with ---SECCiUTY ZONE

MAIN DEFENSE BELT

~;,,"~N!'L} SECOND DEFENSE BELT

} THIRD or;FENSE BEL T

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maneuver forces to canalize attacking forces '(into killing zones, Main defen-~ -------------------------------------~--------------------~----

she forces are deployed in depth, nonnally i'n belts of mutually supporting

strongpoints • Combat power is focused on attriti ,.g and destroyfng the

attacker well forward and canalizing him into areas \~here he is vulnerable to

destruction by counterattack. r~assed arti11e!'}~f. airpower, mines and barriers,

and maneuver forces are used to support main: defer,:ie forces. Reserves are

positioned to b1ock, counterattack or reinfor..1B maln defense force:>. Strong

antitan~k reserves are committed to destroy .ar:":lored formations dnd to support

tank heavy counterattack forces.

19

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Defensi ve doctri ne notwithstandi ng. the Sov; ets cons f der a meeti I'Ig engagement

as the more likely event in a nuclear envirot:tm:!rtt. The Soviet Dictionary of

Basfc Military Terms defines meeting engagememt as "A clash between opposing

sides when they are simultaneously striving t@ fulfill assigned missions by

means of offensive actions • • •• A meeti 19 'lmgagement f s characteri zed by

obscur1 ty of the s i tuati on and by abrupt change'S in it. • • by rap; d cilanges

in march, approact, :ilarch and combat fonnations~" The Soviets recognize and

attempt to exploft (as must US forces) certain characteristics of a meeting

er:gagement: lack of detailed intelligence. rapid situational changes,

development of aett ons on a wi de front anG prii;bab 1 e exposed f1 anks of c-ieh

opponent. Successful operati ons re'4ui re speedy £:xtemporaneous pl anni ng due to

limited time, continUQU5 effort to seize and re~bin the initiative, deploy~ent

into combat frem the march column at high and ~edir9ctio~ of cQmbat

effort as required.

20

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(2) Soviet operational art anc tactics present ample opportunities to

seize the initiative a.,d destroy enemy forces -- the primary reasons for

conducting offensive opeations. Offensive operations may also be conducted

to control terra~n, gain information, deceive or divert the enemy or both,

d~~r1ve the enemy of critic:.tl resources, and fix or contain the enemy in a

specific location. Therefore, it is important to understand offensive oper­

ations in a nuclear environment-- specifically, the use of nlxlear weapons to

enhance the ability to gain and retain the initiative in the pursuit of these

missions and to survive while doing so.

• INITIATIVE AND DECEHT!',' !..IZA TION

~ IlfrfG~ATIO'" r;.;: MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

,. I,HACI'. «EAKNESS AHO EXPLOIT SUCCESS

ATTRIBUTES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATiONS • MULTIPlE ATTACKS

• ATIACK DEEP

• IMPROMPTU PLANNING

W!THIH THE ENEMY'S DECISION CYCLE

(a) The attacker has freedom of action; he determines the objec-

t1ve. direction and time of attack. US ArmY forces' advantage, as compared to

the enemy, accrues from greeter unit initiative and decentralizati0n of m1s-

s10n execution. It is particularly essentia1 to operate well fn~ide tile

enemy's decision mald~g process; i.e., Jlakp. decisions and act more quickly

than the enemy. This capability is enhanced by the proper application of

nuclear weapons in space and time. Surprise, decept1o~, ,exibility. creatfon

and eJtploitation of ene:riY weaknesses and superiorHy in combat readiness

generate local superiority. Tr.e StlCCe5S of the attack ultimately cepends on

21

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the soeed of maneuver and the application of 'iH;l"epower. Rapid maneuver and

coordinated application of firepoPit:r at the de.::::isive place and tirr;e c;1srupt

the enemy's plans ""'0 decrease the effectivene;.;;:;: of his count~rmeasures. If

an opportunity foi'" success deve10ps in an area @ther than orfginal1y pli:nned,

it is explJfte-d immediat~ly; fires are shH;:~!d ailQ maneuver forces are

orf ented to take advan';age of the new opportu1Hy. The development of new

opportunities for success in more than one arm! is accomplished by attacking

the enemy at several points simultaneously. :~(;h opportunities are further

enhanced by conducting !hes~ attacks against ew.iny weaknesses at gaps, flanks

and boundaries. limited c10sc combat forces illl"e compensated by the use of

nuclear weapons. The combination of multiple at~:acks and rapidly changing the

weight Fcvided to the attacks confuses ~nd deC!:1ve5 the enemy as to the main

effort and causes him to conduct fneffecti:llfE! counteractions. Proper

employment of nuclear weapons to create gaps <11y, to di srupt or destroy

rcserv<!s and to di sru!>t key C3 resources g~nerates opportunities for

exploitation by newly des; gnated mi:.'fn attacks. Intensive E',j wil 1 be employed

to further di srupt C3 systems, thus d.::hyi 09 tru: ~:nemy commander's assessment

of the 51 tuati on and hi s reconsti tut1 on :reasures,,,

'e TI1!lIiG

C8JECTlYl:S

PREPARATION FC~ OffENSIVE OPEft~TlONS e Il'HELUGENCE

• SCHEME OF MANEUVER

.., RESOURCE ALLuCATIOfi

.. CONTROL WEASURES

CONCEALMENT AND DECE~nG~J

22

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{b} The attacking commander may be able to select either a hasty

or del iberate attack. If the enemy can be surpri sed. an attack is 1 aunched

without delay and without extensive preparation; surprise is used to ofCset

the less than optimal employment of combat power. If the enemy has eql'c(l or

greater combat power, the attack preparation ~st be more extensive so optimal

combat power can be applied from the onset. Either type of attack requires a

clearly defined objective and timely intel Hgence. both on the enemy and

friendly forces. After t~e :n; 5510n, objectives and scheme of maneuver have

been selected, available maneuver forces, fire support, intelligence means and

combat support and combat service support are all ocated to be respons; ve to

/the level of the forces cor.ducting the attack. A main attack and one or more

support; ng attacks are designated. Nu~l ear Iooeapons are used as an economy of ----- --force measure, allowing additional maneuver for~s~t~o~pa~r~t~i~c~i~p~ate in the main -.- .,,---------------effort. They are also used to control terrain when physical occupation is not

'---:-------r desirable. ReserVes, inversely proportional in size to the knowledge of the

~enemy. (extensive knowledge, small reserve; little knowledge, large reserve),

nuclear weapons and other fire support are the commander's means of

influencing actions during the attack.. Ai . ile forces can be maneuvered

quickly throughout the depth of the battl efiel d. Nuclear weapons and attack

helicopters Lre especially effectfve against enemy counterattacks. Air foree-

-- . ---- -----------------------r~sources are used to gain local air superiodty, provide intelligence infor-

,---~----__o:_

~ttack targets in depth, provide supDor~nst counterattacks and to

the use of nuclear weapons. Ail preparation for attack. must

!lsua1 a~l(j eleCtron~ concealment are regui~. A sudden

flurry of activity or a significant increaSe in the number or temiJo of mes-

sages would tip off the enemy.

23

(3) Offensive operations are designed ,j) destroy the cohesiveness of

the enemy I s system of war and hi s will to corttll-..Ie the fi ght. The depth of

attacKS is limited only by r'2sources available ~.\J;d the capability to support,

reinforce or link up with the attacking fOr.':2. While limited objective

attacKS may be requi red at times, commanders mwt. recognize or create oppor-

tunities for bold. deep thrusts well beh111d tile enemy's forward elements.

Id2ally. brigades orient on second echelon,vJments. divisions on second

echelon dhisions and cO"ps on follow-on armies;_ Nuclear weapons are used to >

create opportunities fo,' these deep attaCKS, (!;:'. an economy of force to hold

{lan'< forces in place, to protect exposdi:1 flanks, >

to destroy en~my

strongpoints and pockets of bypassed fonnatiolU and to destroy. disrupt and -------~lay follow-on forces. They are used to weigl"\; the main effort. to sustain

the fight and as highly flexible reserves. Vulrerabi1ity is reduced by speed ~-------

of actlon, widening initial gaps androlling up the flanks, rapid exploitation

and orientation on fol low-on forces. Attackir.:;; forces r!'.ass rapidly for the

attack, move fast and strike hard and redisper~ to prec1ude presentation of

remunerative targets -- time and time again.

The ~ forms.2f- maneuver are the envpl o~ ~ i Dcl udes double enveloprr.-ent

ann turning movement}. the frontal attack and pmetra3on. Regardless of the

basic form employed in the nuclear environrnL~t. maneuver advantages are

achieved and maintained only by repeated improrotu planning and e)fecution in

the briefest of periods. Impromptu plann~ng ts necessitated by "he rapidity

with which opportunities for exploitation can b";ft~~nerated. the rapidity with

whi en expl 01 tat; on of opportuni ti es must be ex.l:::'U ted by c1 o~e combat forcEs.

and the rapidity with which the attacki ng force~s must red; sperse -- all driven

by the need to operate within the enemy's decistm cycle.

24

..... ... ..

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The organization for combat depends on the mission, enemy situation, terrain,

visibility and distance to the objective. Semi-fndependent task forces -----:----:---:-=--~-advancing on multiple avenues of approach, with a clear understanding of the -------=-commander~f-s~1n-t~e-n~t-.-a-re--t~h~e~b-e-s~t--o-r-gan1zations for combat on the nuclear bat-

t 1 e fie 1 d. Ad v a nci Tlg with g:r:e:a:t:e:r ~W:i;:. d~t~h:-;t~h-:a:n -;de:p~t:-;h;--:a:11" :::OW:;:S;-;d~fr;:;;-;;;p:Ae'''rs'''''a''''lf--105..-;;;e'';:tween" -------units and enables closing and interlocking ",ore quickly with the enemy. These

forces mass rapidly to close with the enemy where they are less vvlneral>le to

nuclear attack, attack aggressively and then red1sperse on multiple routes to

continue the exploitation. The forces adv~nc1ng on multiple axes need freedom

of movement in width so they can bypass I\atural and manmade obstacles and

pockets of resistance. e.g., a maneuver brigade might need a 15-20 kilometer

width. CSS assets are dispersed and essential commodities are positioned well

forward. Attacki n9 forces and supporti 09 artl11 ery are prov1 ded 1 "creased

loads of almlUnftion and POl. In the attack, the emphasis on combat engineer

support is the mobility mission; therefore, combat engineers are located with

the forward elements of the attacking forces. The loss of communications

during an attack is a verj real possibility and, if not overcome, could res:.s1t

in failure to achieve desired objectives. Accordingly, (11ternative means of

maintaining synchronization r!lJst be developed and implemented when required.

These control measures must permit the ~~intenance of attack momentum and pro­

vide for the attacking c~~~nder's positive control of nuclear fires •

(a) The envelopment strikes the tne~j on an ex~osed flanK or at

another point of weakness in his forward defense. avoids his main strength ar.d

attacks toward an objective in the rear. A secondary attack fixes the enemy

in place while the l1".ain attack cuts across his routes of escape. The enemy is

thus forced to fight on t'ilfO fronts and is sublect to destruction in place.

25

, ;

/

,/

t:: ... $ .. ,~ " •. F :->:::'4 ' .. i1'.p i' • .. ~ .oW". .. \ .-.*!" ...... " .... !W .. .. '", .f ."'!fii_4 .. i .. =:.z .... ' .. _Q .... := .. ~: ... "~" ~ Ji .. )I_~ .. ;;~~!# : ... :: ...... ~~ ... ~ ....... f! .. _ .. a _ • .? .... ...... ;p ...... '\'" ... ~.iF}~Q4 •• , .... :.: ..... ~: .. *:,,<i'!'.~

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Nuclear weapons r.re used to create opportunities for an envelopment, to

destroy the isolated ener:j forces and to prevent counterattacks agai nst the

vulnej'able flanks of the enveloping force. The use of nuclear weapons also

increases the element of surprise and can deceive the enemy into thinking the

secondary fixing attack f s actually the main attack.

(b) e frontal att.:tck sikes the enem'J all along the front .

It is used as a main attack against a widely deoloyed threat or as a secondary

attack. Nuc1?ar weapons are used on the er€~'s main forces to create gaps

for- rapid exploitation and against reserve or follow-on forces to preclude

en~!Yl counterattack. Infntratfol1 on the nuc1ear battlefield is espeCially

effective due to the island-like nature of the b~ttlefield. Small groups move

through the gaps between enemy forces and a<:sE~'b1e in the enemy's rear. Such

a technique enhances surprise and decreases nu:;~ear vulnerability; it requites

boldness and initiative •

26

• 'C '

!

", ,

~-.-.--:III

C ~ ..tl~

fRONTAL ATTACK

(c) In the penetration, the main attack passes rapidly through

the prfncipal defensive forces of the enemy. The goal is to destroy the

continuity of the force. divide it and defeat it in detail. Its success

requires superior combat power at the point of penetration. Nuclear weapons

are used to reduce the effective enemy strength at the planned breaching

27

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e "

· "-" · .. .. .'.' " . -!' .. ;.. ...... :~ ... , "0 , ..... "0 ....... · .' .. ~.-: .

.' " .' , .

...... 7-'. ' . , ..... * ........ ..... .. ....... . " . . . 'e'

, '

;

'-. J 0('4 ....,'.l(4V~.-0l'.<".' ... '<!"4l! <!'a:'Wf'ct; .... '" "!! I> ~ae~ ... t( !-",~=tt"\"""'''''f.''''\'''''4 .. ' ... iF''$.' ... ..,.i+:~!'. >. f!f\ ........ F ..... 'C.., ..... ~ .. '. ~ .. .. '"' ...... "... .. .. ,.4o .... ill .. .. c~. ..• ." ,to .oil> .... ... ." ... ... ...... • ..... ~ ~ ~ "I ... +: ~ .e .. 0; ~ .... ". .... .. .. •• ~ ' ............. " • ~ -:

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point, against enemy flank. forces to insure they do not moye to block. the gap

or dttack. the flanks of the penetration. and against the reserves or other

forces in the enemy's rear area which must be precluded from

counterattacking_ Follow-on forces widen the gap. roll up the flanks of the

mafn effort and exploit opportunities created by the penetration.

In summary, nuclear weapons are used in the offense as a substitute for and a

complement to maneuver forces: to create gaps in hard defenses; to hold enemy

forces in place, to control terrain, to protect exposed flanks by destruction

of forces and creation of obstacles, to destroy bypassed enemy forces, as an

economy of force, as reserves, and to create opportunities for exploitation by

relatively smaller close combat forces •

b. Defense. There are inherent weaknesses assc~d with Soviet style

offensive operations which provide numerous opportunities for ex~loitation by --------------- -------------~------------~-------: aggressive offensive actions, e.g., centraltzed control of op~rations

------- -- ~~-------------------(especially nuclear operations), adherence to es~ablished timetables, e~

lonment of forces and the requi rement to concen tra te and mass forces. How-e

ever, even in light of these weaknesses, it w111 be necessary for US forces to

conduct defensive operations for limited periods to prep";-'e for deliberate

offensive operations, permit concentration of forces in other areas of the

battlefield, gain time, contro"' terrc~n. deny enemy deep objectives, or pennit

consolidation and reorganization of forces.

(l) Defensive operations, in oenel'al t0f'ffiS. retain or contro1 tcr-

rain, deny the enell'flj access to dn ared ~nd attt'i I.e: attacking forces. However,

23

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defensive operations do not win campaigns and battles; the defense. therefore,

is a temporary expedient. Such opl!rations are char·:lcterized by delaying arod

disrupting the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield. seizing the

initiative and exploiting opportunities for offensive actions, flexibility in

planning and use of maneuver and firepower. and coordination and synchroniza­

tion of all combat power in violent and aggressive exploitation of enemy vul­

nerabilities. Nuclear weapons are significant force Iillltfpliers and, as such,

assfst in both the creation of opportunities for offensive actions and the

subsequent successful conduct of those actions.

• THREAT

• O'/ERYIEW

• DEEP DAntE AREA

• COVERING fORCE AREA

• MAIN SAntE AREA

• REAR AREA

(2) Offensi ve acti ons must prevail -- even durl ng the defense -- to

overcome Soviet style offensive operations, characterized by numerical

superiority, mobility and firepower to achi~ve and maintain momentum, through

the conduct of meeting engagements. attaCKS against defending forces and

pursuit operations.

Meeting engagements with the enemy may o(;cur under widely differing circum-

stances and environments: at the beginnIng of a war, at the outset of any

attack vmen opposing forces are not in in~ tial contact, after penetration of

enemy's defensive lines in expectation of meeting reserve elements, during

pur~uit operations, and during counterattacKS •

29

,.

.

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The essential aims of Soviet offensive operations are to destroy enemy forces

and seize important terrain. Also basic to t~e attack of a defending force is

the rapid buildup c~ required forces, the ~thelonment of forces, the massing

jOO-KM --_

of forces and fires, the use of nuclear and r.chemical weapons and continuous

attack under all conditions of weather and visibility. Assault echelons

attacK both to destroy the opPosing enemy for.res that survi'led initial fires

and to create favorable conditions for fol1:e,.;-on fJrces (e.g., operational

maneuver groups 'or second echelon formations) 10 exploit.

Pursuit operations feature swift and deep movenent, with short lateral deploy-

ment of small forces to strike the enemy's mo!,t vu1nerable areas. Pursuit is

characterized by a high rate of advance, maintenance of the momentum and the

intense and relentiess application of combat a::::tions.

(3) Defensive operations are conductiCd throughout the depth of the

battlefield, using all available combat power. AirLand forces fight a untfied

and synchronized battle in four areas of '.:h! battlefield: the deep battle

30

..

•

..

I

. I

, , . . ~ ....

lr"------- AREA - - - OF - ~ -IffFlUENCE_

1 ..,.., ~ .... DEEP BATTLE AREA HilM)

I.e .J» COVERI!\!G FORCE A:!lEA (CF A)

r::).. ;;>.. ~ f()

X X X MAIN BATTlE A.!i!.' rll1lMl X X I

j .....

REA;:R;~~: = - XXJ(-

area - that area beyond the covering force extending to the forward extent of

the area of influence, the covering force ~rea. the main battle area, and the

rear area. While combat actions may be undel1'l<ldj in two or more of these areas

at the sarre time .. they are always conducte;~ as one integrated and coordi nated

battle.

(4) Combat actions in the deep battte area (DBA) are designed to sup---------------- -----

port the conrnander's overall scheme of manelltver by destruction, disruption and

del ay of enemy forces. The; r goal is to 1@ft"'Ipnt the enemy from concentra~g

overwhe1ming combat power at the point am time of his choice by severely ----- ------delaying and disruoting planned c10sure t~~e~ of follow-on elements, thereby

kreatfng opportunities for successful ilT.'WeUVer action against assault -echelons •

. ere are several categories of high pr1oritr;,~, t-lrgets in the deep battle area,

the destruction of which substantially red;JCi~$. the enemy's capability to mass

31

I

..

.... -.....

, -

. '

--- ",-,--' -----,,-------,,---'--'-- ~~~~~-----------------

. . ': .'

.. !,. ~¥ ... .'.4.' .. ,/":,.'..:4}. ~.~~ .!I.W .. , .. J .• "! .. r.y . .' ~ LP... fl.:'.:": ..... f!~.'\". iii.. ., •• .t:'!":.t:.h~'f!.~.t\ . .'.:e:J':'.t ;:.~ :.,ye .. ; ... *Ji(}S~ii!:.u.}2.:A

1 -.. u - .. M. - - IIflU£IO!:E ----1

J. NUCLEAR DELIVERY ! ~'BTRY) • NUCLEAR SUPPORT UNITS

• CP$(""OIV)

DEEP BATTLE AREA

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -

t. FRONT AIR ASSETS

• MAtIEINER UNITS (BN (+»

• LOGlmCS FORMA nONS

A : _ I tAHU AliA

t _.---t--II IItUUUIlfAt -------... -

overwhelmi n9 cvmbat power. The use of nuclear weapons to destroy nuc1 ear

delivery units of battery size and larger and associated support elements pays

hfgh diVidends. Single 'auf,chers are of interest and warr;\nt high priority

attack by conventional r~ans when located. The enemy's propensity for cen·

tralized control dictates that division and higher command and control facili­

ties l"eceive priority for attack. The commander must also be concerned about

the enemy's abi:1ty to attack from the air, either with fixed or rotary wing

aft'craft; therefore, front air assets are essenti al targets for both the ai r

and ground components. There are a number of natural choke poi nts at which

queues of forces will be formed, presenting excellent opportunities ~r ::::>

destruction of relatively large fonnations; nuc:.!ear weapons al2£ an c.xcellent ------ ~--=-=---------

means of crea~ queues in ~her selected lo~ns. M~eu'lcr units arel

alNays lucrative targets; their attack by nuclear weapons in the DBA is gen-<------------ ----

el",l1y restricted to battalions and larger units. Additionally. the enemy ---support fonnations offer an array of soft targets, the d~struction of which '--------------"'~

disrupts establfshed timetables and the ability to mass ,::·)mbat pO'I'!'er. These

categories of targets are always fligh priority, to be at:lcked by any av~il·

able resource; the proD2bi1ity of their destruction is significantly increased

when attacked by nuclear weapons.

32

~.:, .... . ' :......

"~4./

:~ ·l<fIf"

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...::. 'I" .: :.- ' ..... , " " -:-: ~ · . t 1* .. OJ!

' .. ' , . ' .. .... -~'" ..... --'., ,. , .

' .. ~ ~ '.' . , .. . :."" · "

...•. · " .. '.­, .. ,"

ii "":.: .... . " .. -. J-'

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· .. ~P ~ •

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, .... '\. ... · .' ....... · ..

f't J ... fIt. .... ",. .. "'".1 .. - ~ .. "" jill .. ..*"' .. - _fA .. - .. ... .. .. .... ~ .. ~.. • ~.. • .. ~ , ~ ~ ~... .. _ p ~ • ... ...... • _ • • .. .. •

J

•

The means available to conduct combat operations in the OBA are lfmited.

requiring a joint effort by both air and 1and forces. Tactical air reconnais­

sance and other intelligence col1ecti0n means focus on high priority areas and

units in the OBA while also maintaining a curnnt intelligence picture of

enemy forces throughout the area of interest. r~ost attacks in the DBA are

made by tactical air and ground launched :>jstems. Battlefield air interdic­

tion plays a maj;,,' role in the deli~ery of both conventional and nuclear muni­

tions in the DBA, but ~t must be carefully ~rchestrate(j to assure unity of

effort wi th the commander's overall scheme of maneuver for the defense •

Accordi ngly. comb~t acti ons f n the deep battl e area are pl anned and coordi­

nated by the battle coordination team at corps.

(5) COI.lbat operations in the covering force area (CFA) are designed

to gain and maintain contact with attacking enemy forces, to develop the bat­

tlefield situation and to defeat or delay the enefTIY's assault echelons. While

major battles may be fought in the CFA, the primary goal of covering forces is -'~'---to cause the enemy to prematurely d1sclose.l!!s main effort. Such premature

conc·'ntration of. forces.-.p.l:.QYides excell~ targets~ attack by ground ~d

----------air dAJivered nuclear weapons immediately responsive to tha commander. Within

'--

33

• DEVELOP $ITUf;TION

\II \II OELA': ENEMY

\II • IDENTIfY MAIN EFFORT

• NUCLEAR USE

.}~ \II • MANEUVER

~ III ., FiRE SUPPORT ~ [1 .. \II DIY C;'s

I · · CAI(AlIZE

.. DEEP BATTLE CONTINUES

\. • MBA MID RA ADJUSTMENTS

)

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~~ ~~p~.,. .. > .. $is~, P..'9. ' ..... '!'.9f'.7( '/f''..'. t'!.t~ jJ~ 9. ).<'.J3J:''ff·:j~'''. '. ~i: .. , .. a;.;~e3,4:i~.f.O: •. '!i~3:'5.·'5·.1J.~~f! .. l.c .. t . .9: .. ~.;~~~._; .. ~~t~~J' .. ~~I • • .. • ,. • .. .. .. .. .. ~ • , • • _ 4 ~ ~. • I

t~e coveri~l_ force area, nuclear targe~ are generall¥ limited

forces, fire support means and d1visiollal comman_d 2nd control - -,"::"::'!-..!---'--~'--:;"--'--

Other potential uses of nuclear weapons in the CFA include

to maneuver J faCi1it~

creation of

obstacles to canalize el12ITtf forces into preferred~eas and to allow disen---------------------~----- ~ __ ga~e~~Lelements of the cove~e. Generally speaking, howe"ef, the

nature of coveri r.g force operati ons offers fe... other opportuniti es for the

effective employment of nuclear weapons.

While the covering force is fighting the :l?:r.:.emy's assault echelons. combat

operations against follow-on and support fo'!"ces continue in the deep battle

area. POSitioning of forces in the main batt!~ and tear areas is adjusted to

accommoci;tte:a developments 1:1 the covering forc~ batt,le.

(6) Combat operations are conducted '~?t the ~ain battle area (MBA) to

control or repel enemy penetr~ticri'>, to des,t'.!;'"oy enemy forces and to create

opportunities to regain the initiative and att~:k. Soviet doctrine for attack

of defendi og' forCl~s entail s the c..gncentrati OD and mass j 09 c.f rihti VQly 1 arge

format~ons in a !mall geographic area, ther:'!'by subjecting these forces to -------------- ----------------------destruction by maneuver and firepower. The~ an abundance of targetc- in

----------------------------the t~BA suitable for attack by nuc1ear weapon'$;; those of primary intf:rest are

~elJver units Qf ~any size and larger, conr.:"'otrated fj re support means and

regimental and higher command and control f&ci~l'ties.

The range of defensive options available in ::;;,:; ~·~BA fa115 within a continuum

bounded by static and dynamic actions. The:1:t.atic end of the continuum is

more orient~d toward control I)f terrain and rej i;';$ heavily on firepower. The

34

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,. I"

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,"

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,.._'e;_ ...... _._ ......... • ",~ ... ", .......... ~ ...... ~ ....... _ • _ ~ ...... ..

I----AIIf .... Of .-lIIn\l(IICI __ _

1

1 our 6Anlf AI, A ~I I ~--1--J : MAIN BATTLE AREA ~~

~II-~-~

, -'_,~_., .. -:ARIUt(.(.'* __ _ -.-- -111--

lit CONTINUUM OF STATIC AllO DYNAMIC

• • STRONG ('DINTS

• -M08ILE RESERVES

• NUCLEAR USE

• .AGAINST PEHETRAT10H

III .FLANK PROTECTION

• .CmITROL TERRAIN

~ •• RESERVES

l 4) .ECONOMY OF FORCE

III DEEP BATTLE COHmlUES

- RA ADJU$TWIJH1

dynamf c focuses !'!!lIre on the enemy and depends on both maneuver and fi repower

to destroy en€"my forcu. Optfmum operational art applies the actions of the

continm1lj} e.s ~pr:tcprL)te to deci sively defeatl:l:r>ge fonnations.

D~re generally characterized by a cl)?tOfnation of ter~d

strongpoints and highly mobfla reserves. Air <]nd ground delivered fire SUI)-

~---------------------------------------------port -- convent1(;ilal. nuclear and chemical -- is. used as the decisive me~ns ;:;0

destroy enemy forces before they reach the main battl e area. Enemy artil ~ -units concentrate in the matI! effurt, assault echelons mass to conduct break­--~~~~~~~--~ ~ouQ.h operations and regimenta-I and division ,:ommand posts locate well for­

I warn to orchestrate the att<ek. These are '"cutiv. t"r,ets for attack by an~ ) '~. b~r.ser't exceli.nt opportunities for the ~he employment of

~ nuclear weapons. S~Q1nts are the most s'".:atic clements of the defense. '- ...---"'

Strongpoints are organized throughout the dep:''1 of che i~BA. Their size and

disposition are highly dependent 0.1 the nature of the terrain and topography.

opposing forces and their individual mission or ;:;wrpose. T'tey are organized,

with minimum essential force5, to be mutually :,upporting and reinforced by

fire support means. Protect i on and ,surpri se i~re enhanced by concealment,

35

.' ',. '.:

:. 'f · · · " · · · · ·

•• h' • · ·

r · ;... p · , .. · · ," r: ~ ., · . :.. ;:>hysical preparation and timely occupation. ~ S:,l'ongpoints are used to delay

~ · - the enemy. to control and canalize him intI) area; where he may be neu~l'zed #

· · · or destro e ortunities for agg~ssive counterattacks. ." · ... ~ .... \t

The decisive component of the oVErall defense is-:! hlyhly mobile, hard hitting ,. --- '- ..,..- ---

'J

'" ',: reserve to conduct s~oil i 09 attacks and to cO~t:terattack enemy forces at a ------ --"

.' ~

decisive place and time. Nuclear weapons and o'tl.~r fires create opportunities , --- --- .-

· ..t

" .. . : "

l~ · " .' .' J' ... · . · · " ,

"

L~ '" · · · , · ·

" · , · .1

· / 36 .

:..1

~..,-,..-~ ~~''''''.''.rr:..--";;r'''·F'''''''''-'7I'''rr''r;--·~·""r'7'7''7:-=---:W~~ ... ' .. ill .... ~~.-:c: .......... ,. ...... ~> ... IfF. 0' .. J& .. r.::'- .. ., .. ~ _ r:" ...... ~ r ... " $4_ .. "t\ .. :.;. ';"...... ~~ ........ ~ '"'_ "'- "" ... ~" '"'_."~ -... "c ~ .... , II. '- ... " __ ..., ..... _ .. ~ .. , _ .. _ • ... _ _.. __. ~ ... ~ -. • H ~ ~ -

:, .. :: .. ""~' :::i ~ .....

' . .. .. .. ,- .. ...... '. ~, .... : ...... .. "' .... -~ ...

· .... • • 0

.~:~ 0;r: ... -,.

~ .-' .. ill(

• 4 •• _

.:-;, .: .;, · '.(' .....

i

--" -" _e. 0.­-, ,­-. ........... , ........ , ... "!';

M ..... 'i ......

...... '

.:-~ .. /' ....... -, .. " ...... _ .. -~

for the counterattack in u number of ways. They blunt or stop the penetra-

ti on, sea] the tla;e- af ---- th~ation, i~o1ate assault echelons and create

~e peRetpati9A tArough ----which maneuver forces counterat~ta-c~k~.---C-o~-

attack against inherent enemY weaknesses, e.g., an exposed f1ank, always

-------"'~-=------::~--afford the best opportunity for success. During the actual ~rattack, ..---- ---

nuclear weapons, and other fire su~~ort means, are used to destroy massed for-"- ----.::::::::..

~w1thin the penetrati.2,n, protect f1aolcs~ counter-attack by de:;truc­

tion of enemy forces or by creation of obstacies, :i~stroy bypassed formations, --. --=-create opportunities for further exploitatio~ denl the enemy use of critical

.... aceas and provid!-a highly flexible reserve. When used as an economy of force

measure, they create sufficiently large reserves to decisively defeat the

ene;'lff and allows smaller maneuver forces to defeat larger combat formations •

~uring the MBA battle, combat operations in the deep battle a~ea concentrate

on follow-on and support forces sustaining the enemy's main attack. Forces in

the rear area react to developments in the ~BA by red; recti on of pri ority of

support and concurrently plan for defense of the rear area.

{7} The rear area (RA) is an equal component of the overall defensive

1-----uu - - - OF - - - IIInuuct_

1 -1

1 cuP BAfTU M[A IIllIAJ

~I----~----~--~~ 1 I I

IArn£ AIIEA

I-------~--ll

REAR AREA J '--_------ x,, -----------

37

• THREAT

• • smGLE AGENTS .-• • DIVISION FORMAT!ONS

DEFEHLHHG FORCES

• • HIGHLY MOBilE REACTiONARY FORCES

• ~ liUctEP,R I'JEAPCNS - -f:iRHEADS AND LIs

.,

•

I.

...

..

battle. The threat to the RA ranges from single agents. saboteur's and terror-

ists to airborne. airmobile and amphibious forces as large as divisions.

While the comwoander must sustain his main defensive effort, he cannot ignore

these threats to his rear area. Airmobile forces. attack helicopters and air

cavalry units. close air support and mechanized forces are particularly well-

suited for rear area combat operations. f1hile limited, there may dlso be

OPPoi"tunities to use low yield nuclear weapons to eliminate large massed]

formations in the rear, particularly within airheads and landing zones estab-

lfshed by enemy forces.

In sunwnary. nuclear weapons are used in the defense: to destroy assault ,- ---------forces and follow-on echelons before they penetrate the main battle arecl; to ------------------------

destroy or disrupt logistics support formations, to create obstacles and cana-...;,0 . ____

~~~~--~nemy forces into preferred areas, to ~p a penetration, to

destroy en~forces in the pe~, to~control terrain, as an economy of

force, to create o~portunfti~s for ~ to protect forces d~!ing "

counterattacks, and asj]jghly flexible reser~es. '--------

6. SURVIVABILITY

• RISK

• OPERATIOf(S SECUR!TY

• conCEALMEnT

• SHIELOlHG

• IiHERlGClifliG

a. Risk is inherent in war and is involved In e'if:t'y mission. It is com-

roor. to both action and inaction, but inaction does: not win batties. Risks are

a 1 so re'! a ted to ga; n; norma l1y. grea ter ga i 11$ requi re tak i 1'19 grea ter ri sk s.

38

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In a nuclear environment. the magnitude of both risks and gains are r.tUltf­

plied, and the consequences of mistakes are significantly greHe r • Tne

destructive power of nuclear weapons requires particular attention to ~a:ures

that reduce vuinerabilities. It must be recognized that measures to reduce

vul nerabi 11 ty to one fonn of attack may 1 ncrease vul nerabl1I ty to other forms

of attack and may detract from the overall effectiveness of the force.

may reduce vulnerabf11ty from nuclear attacks. but it increases

vulnerability to inffltration and possible defeat in detail • Hob 11 ity.

maneuvers and other measures are effective in reducing

vul nerabfl i ty •

b. Survivability in :lny battlefield environment results from the combfned

application of sound protective measures and operational practices that

reduces a force's vulnerability: to detection. to attack if detected, and to

destructi on if attacked. !n a nud ear envf ronment. suni vabil i tj' measures and

practices take on added importance ~nd become equal par~ners with the fnterre-

latcd principles, basic ten~ts and other imperatives of contemporary war-

The specific application of protective measures is dictated by the mis-

of each organization and the threat to the organization •

c. The enemy has a sophisticated intelligence system that includes

resources to monitor communications. locatE! emitters, control agents located

deep in rear areas a!1d see the battlefield from overhead. The enemy's

intelligence gathering resources are' similar to those of the United States.

Countermeasures to the enemy intelligence conecction effort are derived from

the four :r.ain parts of OPSEC -- deception, information secu"ity. physical

security. and signal security. All ate interrelated and conSidered simulta-

neousiy for each operation.

39

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(1) Ceception measures prevent the er;emy from obtaining operational

information and are used to deceive and confuse the ene~' about friendly oper­

ations, e.g., del1berately con':~ying false operational data, feints, and decoy

~osit1ons reinforced by dummy message traffic.

(2) Information s(':,ity measures prevent the disclosure of infor­

mation through written, verbal or graphical communications, e.g., convey

infonnation to subordinate commar:ds on1y as needed and use multiple level

codes.

(3) Physical security measures limit or deny enemy access to facili­

ties. areas, equi pment, documents and personnel by us i n9 guards. bard ers and

anti,·1ntrusion devices.

(4) Signal security (SIGSEC) protects operational information by

using communications security (COMSEC) and electronic security (ElSEC) tech­

niques. COMSEC includes using only authorized codes, digital burst and fre-

quency hopping, secure voice equipment, listening silence and pnper radio­

telephone procedures. ElSEC protects noncommunications emitters by actions

[

such as proper raciar positioning. ante!"lna masking and cuing operation with

pas~ive devices, e.g •• using sound or flash to cue AN/TPQ-37 radar. Active

measures include jammin9 and attack with anti radiation munitions.

d. Other countenneasures i ne1 ude prevent-; on of signatures, profil es and

patterns. Signatures derive from physical presence; profiles derive from unit

activity; and patterns derive fro.1'Iooing thi ngs the same way each and every

tirr!e. An examplt! COlmter;neaS:.Jre for each includes conceal unique it2!T!S of

40

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equipment. minimize personnel and vehicul~" activity and position artillery in

villages vice forward edge of treelines •

e. It will neither be possible nor ·msiir-·abie to attain a degree of dis­

persion that is directly proportional tv t!te· threat yie1ds and numbers of

nuclear weapons. Formations too di spersfl.ij hwi te defeat in detail. Other

lfmitfng factors which impact dispers1onltm:n.tde the assigned mi:s"ion of the

force, control of suborcii nate fonnations.lre;~lrmsiveness of the 1<' , I <',tics sys­

tem, weather. terrain and weather effects mn terrain, mobflity Of ~he force,

fatld the amount of intellfgence and combat .inrJJ"'mation available or. ,he nature

and disposition of enemy forces. Thus. th£r1'"!: is no mathematical "rule of

thumb" that is universally applicable to dfs~lPsion. The degree of dispersion

possible is that which permits mission acco~li:shment while not subjecting the

force to an unacceptable risk. Consideration of physical s~paratlon distances

-- in isolation -- is meaningless.

f. In many instances, the same measu'/'[ei; that provide security against

detection also providE': a degree of protection against attack, or minimize the

effects of befng attacked. Terrain shieldi~9 not only minimizes the risks of

detection, but al so reduces the extent and d.egree of weapons effects. Any

cover, to include na.tllra1 vegetation, reduc.es thermal radiation significantly

and may even diminish the intensity of nuormf" radiation. Natural and man-

rrtade terrain featuf"es modify blast waves.; mes!? features. particularly on

revef"se slopes, diminish the intensity of tnt: shock front. Standard protec-

ticn practices, e.g., digging in. foxholes overhead cover and buttoning

up armored vehicles, attontudte an nuclear $.

41

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g. It is also possible to provide ~h',abi1ity against nuclear attack.

at least to forward elements of close cIDTIilat forces, by closing with the

enemy. Commanders are ad vi sed to employ dU9ress ive maneuver and offensl'le

actions that contribute both to the object~~ of the overall operation and to

overall force survivability. These are oG,'t; accomplished by infiltrating at

multiple points, conducting spoiling attacks; and otherwise interlocking with

the enemy.

h. Regardless of measures taker! to'Srhaflce force survivabil ity, some

close combat forces will suffer severe losseb 'lfl the modern battlefield. The

nuclear environment does not allow the luxu~y of long ~ersonnel and materiel

pi pelf nes and withdrawal and rehabfl f ta ti on TF units; therefore, reorgani za­

tion, reconstitution and restoration will beaD:ompl1shed, at least initially,

from residual assets •

SURVIVABILITY EFFORTS

RISK

• OPEfiATIOHS SECURITY

• COi.CEAUilEHT

• SHIEUlltG

elltEBlOCKING

RECONSTITUTION ErE,tZ\T)

42

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In addition to the active and passive measu' ~s to physically reduce vulnera-

bflHy. training and prudent task organization assist 1n maintaining or

rapidly regenerating combat power. Psychological preparation and cross

trc,ning in individual technical skills faciiitate uninterrupted performance

of critical control functions and key combat tasks. Further, close comb.:.t

forces not only must be composed of combi lied arlS el ements, they must a15J

contain c;ufffcient support forces to simp1 i fy tt~e reconstitution of teams,

crews ti'\,J units.

In the final analysis, the more survivable and the better prepared the unit is

to absorb an attack supported with nuclear fires, the less effort required to

rr.a1ntain and regenerate combat power.

7. FUNCTIONAL AREAS.

a. It is fundamental to the success of contemporary campaigns and battles

that all AlrLand forces are employed in a coordinated, integrated and synchro­

nized manner to attain overall objectives, particularly in a nuclear environ­

ment, The air forces;j ground forces are equal partners in the projection

of combat power.

• CLOSE COIolBAT

• COMMAHD AND CONTROL

• AIR SUPPORT

• FIRE SUPPORT

• AIR OEFEN$E

• CQI6IUNICAT1C~jS

• INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

• ENGINEER rum t#.lNE WARFARE

• COVell. T SERVICE SUPPORT

L~3

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b. Close Combat. Ciose combat element!t; are nomally ombfned arms teamS

J (CATs) which include infantry. armor, arttifl11ery and combat engineers as

appropriate to mission and operational envllr:onment, with external support

provided on an as needed basis. In a nuclear anvironment, CATs ~Jst have the

ag1Hty to generate decf sfve Combdt power -- nepetitively -- to accompl i sh a

variety of tasks and missfons without the neet! to effect major changes in task

organizations. Such teams must be capable of sEmi-independent operations for

prolonged perf ods without extens he externan support; thi s requi res a hi gh

degree of self-sufficiency. In short. the ffLt11 spectrwn of combat, combat

support and combat service support personnel, ski 11 and capabl1 i ties must be

intrinsic to the CAT. Al1 elements of the CP<lT must be able to traverse large

areas of the battlefield rapidly. Each elemert" must have sufficient mobility

and command a,d c~ntre i means to operate as a ,jearn in di spersed areas, rapf dly

mass at critical times and places arid redisp£l~$e before the enemy can react.

Each semi-independent CAT must be capable of mmEuver'ing in concert with other

CATs, whf 1e separated from each other by an ':t1:terval large enough to provide

unit security from the effects of nuclear weqfons. Within CATs, subordinate

elements must be' dispersed and organized to be self-sufficient to the maximum

extent possible. Each CAT must have complem:.ntary capabilities to provide

force security, e.g., ground and air intel1igem~ gathering means, concealment

and deception means, and antipersonnel, antiiarmor and antiaircraft fires.

Effective employment of these diver~e assets :n a synchronized manner requires

combined anns teams to organize and traitl in p:t.t:ce as they will fight in war.

c. Command and Control. Command and con','rol cansi sts of the organi za-

tions, proces')es, procedures and facilities that enable the coordination,

integration and synchronization of widely spre::,'ri and varied elements of combat

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power toward a common goal -- decisfvedefe~t of the enemy. The exigencies of

modern combat dictate that the command and ~ontrol system be relia~le, secure,

fast and durable in a wide range of poss1Me battlefield environments. Elec­

tronic wi!'rfare, the threat of chemical warlal"e and the destructive power of

nucl ear weapons, the vul nerabil ity of cornmllR1l:fcati ons to el ectromagnet1 c pul se

and the increased dispersion of forces in ,il nuclear environment impose added

burdens on the maintenance of continuous \tOffimand and control. Simple al'l1

effective measures must be developed to aU(f;* the contfnuity of operations in

an environment where command and control ~':ld communications are frequently

interrupted or even lost for prolonged perliID(ti;;. Secu rHj and surv f vabil i ty of

command and control are achieved through a ·t:'ambfnation of redundancy. conceal-

ment, frequent displacement, reduction of.p:~.;s;ical and electronic signatures,

dispersion. discipline, deception, mobilfty vid hardening.

d. Air Support. Afr support of the A1rJ.(}nd Battle conSists of counte:rair

and interdiction operations, offensive air ,SlIt9POi't and tactical afrlift opera-

t10ns during all possible battlefield envir;Qflm~nts. Offensive air support is

air operations conducted in direct support ground operations and consists

of tactical afr reconnaissance, battleffeH! air interdiction and close air

support. Tactical air reconnaissance inten;lgence information must be dissem­

inated rapidly to appropriate command leveJ:~". Battlefield air interdiction

and close air support are conducted against (ffl'emy ground targets which at'e -in

a position to directly affect friendly oper.:adons. Offensive air support

conventional, nuclear and chemical -- requtf'tS joint afr and ground pla~'ning

and coordination at corps, division anti brigade. Kp.sponsiveness and

timeliness of nuclear and chemical fire SUPfJ,,;;rt must be comparable to that of

(anventional support •

45

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e. £:.!.re Support. The fire support system must be capable c" delivering

timely and responsive conventional, nuclear anti chemical fires to destroy,

neutral; ze or suppress enemy targets by means of close support. cO\Jnterfi res

and interdiction operations. It must be closely linked with the ·_,)rnmander's

intel11gence, surveillance and target acquisition (ISTA) means. Fire support

assets are high priority Soviet targets. Accordingly, security and surviv­

ab •. 1ty measures must bE taken to assure their- availability in requisite num­

bers. Examples of such measures include ciispersion, reduction of signatures,

frequert displacement, use of hide positions, cover and concealment, commonal-

ity of equipment, proliferation, deception, operations security. disciplfne

and mob; 11 ty.

f. Air Defense. Ai r defenses must restrict enemy <1i rpower and ground-

launched missiles from impeding combat operations through:;ut the depth of the

battlefield in all possible battlefield environments. This must be a fully

coordinated and integrated effort between air and ground componE nts. The

joint air defense system must be capable of detecting and destroyin~ enemy

airpower prior to launch, providing early warning of imminent attacks, and

detecting and destroying enemy airpower and ground-launched missiles while in

flight. ?assive air defense, hardening, dispersing and concealing potential

turgets make them more difficult to locate and destroy. Active air defense,

gl"ound-based f1 repower, el ectrf;;c warfare and a1 rborne pl atforms neutral ize

or destroy enemy airpower and ground-launched missiles prior to launch or in

f1 ; ght •

g. CommIJr'lications. Communications provide the means by which the COrll-

l1~a;jder exercises command and control of organic and :1ttached forc(;;s and coor-

dinates the er-ployment of supporting land, sea and air forces. Commanders ar-e

46

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requi red to communicate speedily and efftcHently in all battl efi el d en ... i ron-

ments wi th subordf nate e 1 emen ';5, adj acent commands. supporting fo rees, and

hi gher headquarters. Means for transmHttrrg 1 nformati on and orders range from

the time-tested radio, wire and messenger sy.;tems to high-speed data links ard

manpack satellite communications terminal!"... Communications survivabflity is

enhanced by redundancy of numbers and types of systems, discipline, operations

security. communications security, harderJng. electronic countermetisures,

reduction of s{gnatures. deception, and cc"binations of both electronic and

nonelectronic means.

h. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare::.. The inte" fgence and electronic

warfare system must provide the commander tl'r!ely and reliable combat informa­

tion drd intelligence about the enemy and the area of operation. It must

include sunivable reconnaissance. survefl1arce and target acquisition syst~ms

and organi;,::ations to determine movement, ctharacter, di sposition, type and

intention of enemy forces. The electronicf;urfare element of this functional

area must include the capabilities to Gftect, identify, locate, report,

df srupt, deceive and exploit enemy el ectrm;agnetfc systems. The commander

must be aware of enefTty forces in his ar.at, of interest, have det<1i1ed and

timely knowledge of both ene~J and friendly ~orces throughout the depth of the

~battlefi€ld frcm the fonotard limits of thei1~ea of influence through the rear

area, and be knowledgeable of the terrain lnd weather in all of these areas •

Timely reporting of the enemy's imminent u~e of nuclear weapons is of partic-

It

l ular importance to insure adequate survivabiiTity measures are in effect.

1 s equally important to perml t the most effa;tiv~ and effic; ent er:1?loyment of

nuclear weapons.

47

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1. Engi neer and t~i ne Warfare. Comb~ El'l'gi neers contr1 bute to combat

power by performing mobility. countermobi11ty and survivabflity missions in

both offens i ve and defens ive opera ti ons. Mob..:!..'!! tty mi S5 f ons inc', u:1e breacl}i n9

enemy minefields and obst~les, improving existing routes or bul1ding new ones -- ---" and providing bridge and raft support for ciro~$ing major water obstacles. --------------------

Terrain alt:eration in a nuclear environment win exacerbate an already diffi-

~----Cult mobility mission. Countermobility effort:::. limit the maneuver of ene!!),Y

forces and enhance the effectiveness of our ffires. Atomic demolfticn muni--~~ns and other nuclear weapons provide time'.w and effective means for the

accomplishment of this m1ssion. Engineers impi"':,ve the survivability of the .-friendly force by hardeni ng command and contr'~l facl1 iti es and other key

facilities. The destructive power of nuclear w.re.pons s1gnificantly increases

the difficulty of these survivability tasKs •

j. Combat Serif; ce Support. Combat serv1of: support is the 1 Hel i ne of

AirLand forces. It 1ncl~des the provision of su~lies, maintenance, services.

energy, medical, transportation and personnel aiilTIinfstration support. "Rou­

tine" comb;,t ser:ice support in a nuclear env:konment is an invitation for

disaster. Combat service support must be echelf.l1ed organizationally through­

out the force structure and geographically thro~ghout the area of operations.

to include maximum use of small, specially tailol""':d teams to accomplish multi­

ple combat service support functions well forwarG •

Measures must be taken to assure availability of essential commodities, where

and when needed. during periods characterized by ·~xtreme violence, stress and

confusion. Close combat forces must maintain ~ssentia1 commodities at or

above authorized levels, especially when starth.:.l nevi operations or battles.

48

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Caches of essential commodities must be positioned throughout the main battle

area, and perhaps the covering force area, whare they are immediately avail­

able to the combined arms teams. These caches must be replenished, abandoned

or destroyed as the situation dictates and new ones established to support the

!cheme of maneuver. IIpush packages" of essentL,l consumables must be

delivered to deployed forces on a routine and scheduled basis. Aerial deliv­

ery may be the only means available to accomplish this mission. Resupply must

take place during the hours of darkness and periods of reduced visibflity.

Medical triage. treatment and evacuation of c~sualties must be accomplished on

a large scale. Reconstitution of both combined arms and combat service sup­

port capabilities must be accomplished rapidly to maintain effective fighting

forces.

...

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APPENDIX

BRIEFING: CONCEPT FOR OPERATIONS

IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT

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( ) THIS IS A DECISION BRIEFING, AT THE END OF THIS PRESENTATION, YOU WILL BE ASKED TO APPROVE THE CONCEPT FOR OPERA­TIONS IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT,

VU-G~APH 2 OFF

VtI-GRADr; 3 ON

THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENTATION AND THE BROAD OUTLINE OF THE WRITTEN CONCEPT ARE M) DEPICTED ON nns VISUAL. I WILL ELABORATE ON EACH OF THESE SUBJECT AREAS DIJR H~S THE COURSE OF MY PRESENTA­TION. I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE FROM THE OUTSET THAT THIS IS NOT A RADICALLY NEW CONCEPT. RATHER, IT EXPANDS UPON TRADoe PAMPHLET ----525-5, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE AND CORPS

-OPERAtIONS, AND IMPLEMENTS DRAFT Hl 100-5, OPERATIONS, FOR A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT.

VU-GRAPH 3 OFF

VU-GRAPH 4 ON

IT'S PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE A CONCEDT FOR THE CONLJ~T OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BY U.S. ARMY FOR.CES IN A mJCLEAR ENVIRONf-iENT. SUCH A

CONCEPT IS NECESSARY FOR A NUMPEP OF REASONS. FIRST I THE

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PURPOSE

TO PROVIDE A Cm~CEPT FOR THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS BY US ARMY

fORCES IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT.

• COUNTE.R THE THREAT

• mCREASED COMBAT POWER

e WAftFlGHTING AT CORPS Arm BELOW

., APPLICABLE TO OTHER ENVIRONMENTS

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DOCTRINE OF LIKELY ADVERSARIES EMPHASIZES THE IJSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHF.N AND WHERE NEEDED TO ASSURE SUCCESS. TO COIJNTER THIS T:lREAT, U,S, ARMY FORCES MUST PREPARE NOW \-lITH APPROPRIATE DOCTRINE, MATERIEL, FORCE STRUCTURES, TACTICS AND TRAINING DIRECTED TOWARD A DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, SECOND, NUCI EAR ~JEAPONS PRQvt-nE T4E ARMY A SIGNIFICANT FORCE MULTIPLIER AND INCREASED WARFIGHTIMG CAPABIL­ITY WHEN THE IR USE AND EFFECTS ARE PROPERLY I NTEGPATED AND SYN­CHRONIZED 14m THE MANEUVER OF FORCES. THIRD, VPECIFICALLY

ADDRESSED WARFIGHTING AT CORPS MW BELOvJ IN AN ACTIVE NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT: INFLUENCES AND CONSTRAINTS EXTERNAL TO CORPS ARE NOT EXPLICITLY ADDRESSED, FURTHER, THE CONCEPT IS EDUALLY APPLICABLE IN AN INACTIVE NUCLEAR EtNIRONMENT HHEREIN NUCLEAR USE HAS NOT OCCURRED, RUT IS POSSIBLE OR_I~M.1N~NT, LASTLY, IT CAN BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE OPERATIONS IN A COMBINED CONVENTIONAL­NUCLEAR-CHEMICAL ENVIRONMEN1,

VII-GRAPH 4 OFF

VIJ-GRAPH 5 ON

THE AREAS OF GREATEST STRATEGIC CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES ARE EUROPE, SOUTHWEST ASIA AND NORTHEAST ASIA. THE OPERATIONAL ART; TACTICS, ORGANIZATIONS AND EOUIPMENT OF ENEMY FORCES TO BE ENCOUNTERED IN THESE AREAS ARE PATTERNE~ AFTER THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET DOCTRINE EMPHASIZES THE PRINCIPLES OF r~ASS

AND MANEUVER Min SEEKS VICTORY THROUGH THE RELENTLESS f)ROSECUTION

A-7

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OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

• AREAS Of STRATEGIC CONCERN

., THREAT

SOVI ET MODEL

DOCTRINE

... t~UClF.AR EMPLOYMENT

.. IJ~ COUNTER TO fUE THR~AT

- AIRLAND BATTLE CONCEPT

- CORPS 86 AND DIVISION 86

AIR AND GROUND PARTNERSHIP

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OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. SURPRISE, SHOCK AND RAPI,) EXPLOITATION

OF THE EFFECTS O~ ~'IJCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BAS IC TE~ETS OF SQvIET

DOCTRINE. DECLARATIONS INI)ICATE THAT NUCLEAR HEAPONS HILL RF:

USED NOT ONLY TO ASSURE SIJCCESS ON THE BATTLEF IELD, RIIT A.LSO TO

PREEMPT U. S. USE. HIGH P~ lOR ITY TARGETS ARE NUCLEAR DELI VERY

UNITS, COMMAND POSTS, GROmm COMBAT FORC~S, AIR BASES, SIIPPORT

UNITS AND MILITARY BASES. SOVIET FORCES ARE POSTURED AND TRAINED

TO EXPLOIT NUCLt:AR ATTACKS BY RAPID, DEEP I MULTIPLE THRUSTS TO

DESTROY REMAINING FORCES AND SEIZE TE~RITORY.

THE U.S. COUNTER TO THIS THREAT IS EMBonIED IN THE ARMY'S OPERA­

TIONAL CONCEPT FOR lHE CONDUCT OF THE AIRLAND BATTLE. THROUCiH

THE 1990s, THE AR~f'S PORTION OF THE AIRlANn BATTLE CONCEPT WILL

BE EXECUTED BY FORMATIONS ORGAN I ZED, MANt-JEn AND EOIJ I PDED WITH

SYSTEMS AND MATERIEL RESlIlTING FROM ARfW 86, CORPS 86 AND DIVI­

SION 86 STUDIES. AI~ SUPPORT o~ hROUfIlD FORCE'S OPERATrrws MID

THOROUGHLY SYNCHRONIZED AIR AND GROUND ACTIONS THROUGHOUT THE

DEPTH OF THE BATTLEFIELD ARE CRIICIAL TI) THE SIJCCESS OF THIS CON­

CEPT.

VU-GRAPH 5 OFF

VU-GRAP~I 6 DN

OPERATIONS IN A tWCLEAR D!VIRONMf' ~1T i~PE CHAR.~CTERIZED 8Y VIO­

LENCE, STRESS, CONFL,SION AND AUSTEi~HY, THE INTENSITY AND VIO­

LENCE OF COMRAT, COMBINED vJITH rNSTMHM~EOIjS MASS CASUALTIES ANn

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LARGE Er~IPMENT LOSSES, CREATE A PSYCHOLOGICAL R~~PONSE REOUIRING

EXTRAORDINARY iJISCIPLINE ANn Lf~DERSHIP. THE FACE OF THE

BATTLEFIELD CHANGES IN SECONDS AS ADDITIOMAL OBSTACLES ARE

CREATED AND TERRAIN IS PHYSICALLY ALTERED. LINES OF CONTACT LOSE

CONTINUITY. ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES ARE LIMITEn AND RESUPPLY DELAYED

FOR LONG PERIODS, RECONSTITUTION IS ACCOMPLISHED, AT LEAST INI-

T I ALL Y, FROM RES I DUAL ASSETS. THE SITUATION CONFRONTI NG THE

COMMANDER IS FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY THE DISRUPTION OR EVEN THE

TEMPORARY LOSS OF COMMAND AND CONTRDL COMMUNICATIONS AT THE TIME

\.tHEN MOST NEEDED TO REGROUP THE FORCE, SEIZE THE INITIATIVE AND

CONTINUE OPERATIONS.

THERE ARE HiD BASIC ELEMENTS OF THIS ENVIRONMENT WHICH MUST BE

UNDERSTOOD AND MASTERED BY U.S. FORCES. FIRST, THE EFFECTIVE

EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN BOTH OFFENSIVE AND utFENSIVE

OPERAT! ONS. SECOND, THE INCREASED VULNERAB IUTY OF FORCES AND

THE RESULTANT REOUIREMENT FOR IMPlH1ENTATION OF EXTRAORDINARY

SURVIVABILITY AND RECONSTITUTION MEASURES.

VU-G~APH 6QFF

VU-GRAPH 7 ON

THIS VISUAL DEPICTS THE VARIOUS USES NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OFFEN­

SIVE OPERATIONS - MORE DETAILED p,PPtICATION HILL BE DISCUSSED

LATER IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. (P,~USE)

A-ll

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT-OFFENSE

• •

" ECONOYY Of fORCE

tit RESERVES

• CREATE EXPLOITATION OPPORTUNITIES

PLACE ENEMY AT RISK THROUGHOUT AREA OF INfLUENCE

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SIMILARLY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED IN THE DEFENSE AS SHOWN

HERE. NIJCLEAR WEAPONS GIVE THE COMMANDER THE ABILITY TO HOLD THE

ENEMY AT RISK THROUGHOUT· HIS AREA OF INFLUENCE. DEPENDING ON

DEC~PTION, SURPRISE, TARGET ACOUISITION AND USER BOLDNESS,

NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN CHANGE THE COURSE OF THE RATTLE SUDDE~LY AND

DECISIVELY IN FAVOR OF !J,S. FORCES.

VU-GRAPH 8 OFF

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HOWEVER, POSITIVE MEASURES ~UST BE TAKEN TO REDUCE THE EFF~CTS OF ENEMY WEAPONS AND TO MA,INTAIN A COHESIVE FIGHTING FORCE, PRE­

STRIKE ACTIONS OFFER THE BEST PAY-OFF. THE LESS VULNERftBLE AND

MORE SURVIVABLE A IINIT, THE LESS EFFORT REQUIRED TO RESTORE MIS­

SION CAPABILITY. CONTEMPORARY SURVIVABILITY MEASURES AND PRAC­

TICES ARE EXPANDED IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT TO EMPHASIZE GREATER

FORCE DISPERSION AND FREQUENT AND RAPID r.iQVH'ENT. R/~PID MID

EFFECTIVE POST -STRIKE RECONSTITUTION OF COMBAT POHER IS ES3EHTIAL

IN BOTH THE OFFEN~'E AND DEFENSE. THOSE ACTIONS TAKEN H1r1EDIATELY

AFTER ENEMY USE OF NUCLEAR \4EAPONS A.RE KEY TO PREVENTI ~;G HIS EXPLOITATION AND ADDITIONAL LOSS OF FRIENDLY FORCES.

A-13

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•

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT-DEFENSE

'. . ' ~ ;: ." .. " '", . ~,. >~.'

DESTROY ASSALIL T FORCES A.NQ fOllol·miECHElOHi . .,

OES ~ ij,OY OR OISR~t'T ~OGI.$TI~S ~~r~~~.n<; .. , .... " , : • • CREATE OBStAClU~~D CANAL'lE EtI£MYfORCES

• CON1ROlTERRAIN;' , PESTRO¥. fontEtlN PE'4ETRATIONS' i ' , tCfJ~W~W

.., CREATE OFFENSIVE OPPORTUNITIES

• PROTECT fORCES OURING COUNTERATTACKS

• HIGHL Y FLEXIBLE RESERVES

PLACE ENEMY AT RISK THROl!GHOUT AREA Of INfLUENCE

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IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, SIJCCESS ACDIDES TO THE COr'1BATANT MOST

EFFICIENT IN THE E~PLOYMENT OF NIJCUEfiR WE,APONS AND MOST CAPABLE

OF MAINTAINING OR RECONSTITUTING AND EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE TO

EXPLOIT THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR USE -, NOT ONCE BUT TIME AFTER

TIME •

VIJ-GRAPH 9'F

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THIS CONCEPT IS LI~!TED TO THE ARMY'S RESPOrSIBILITIES AT CORPS

AND BEUYti FOR USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS T0 OBTAIN "1AXIMUM OPERATIONAL

AND TACTICAL ADVM:TAGE WHILE lIMITImG DAMtGE THE ENEMY CAN

INFLICT ON FRIENDLY FORCES. WHILE IT TIS RECOGnZED THAT Cr1EMICAL

WEAPONS MAY BE USED BY' EITHER SLHL THIS CONCEPT DOES NOT

SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE OFFENSIVE Am. DEFENSJVE CONSIDERATIONS

CONCERNING THEIR EMPLOYMENT,

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THESE FUNDAMENTJlI.S PRESCRIBED THE GENEral ~~AY IN WHICH OPERATIONS

AND BATTLES ARE CONDllCTED AT CORPS AND BELOW I N A NIJCLEAR

ENVIRONMENT. THEY ARE INTENT IO~iALLY BROAD ENOUGH TO OESeR I BE

OPERATIONS IN r~OST ANTICIPATED CIRCUrSTMKES AND AU_OW F~EEDO~'

FOR OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL Vt\R!ATl

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• PRINCIPLES OF WAR

«I BASIC TENETS

G IMPERATIVES OF MODERN COMBAT

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SITUATIONS. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR tHD THE APPLICATION OF THOSE

PRINCIPLES ARE THE FOUNDATION OF U.S. DOCTRINE •

VU -GRAPH 11 ;JPF

VU -GRAPH 121N

THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR ARE VALID FOR HE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF COMBAT

INTENSITY, TO INCLUDE THE NUCLEAR ENViRONMENT. THEY CONTINUE TO

PROVIDE THE U~mRELLA UNDER WHICH AliI ECHELONS OF COMMAND AND

MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS -- FROM TEAf1SmD SQUADS TO ECHELONS ABOVE

CORPS -- MUST OPERATE IF THEY ARE TO SUCCESSFUL ON THE MODERN

BATTLEFIELD.

VU -GRAPH 12 OZF

VII-GRAPH 13 Oi

A COUPLE OF EXAMPLES WILL SERVE TO SHT;l THE APPLICATION OF THESE

PRINCIPLES IN THE NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT. (PAUSE)

VU-GRAPH 13 or~

VU-GRAPH 140l

AT BOTH THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL L[Vt:LS I THE GENERATION OF

COMBAT POWER REQUIRES THE CONVERSION THE POTENTIAL CAPARILITY

A-19

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PRINCIPLES OF WAR

• OFFENSIVE

.. MANEUVER

• MASS

.. OBJECTIVE

• ECONOMY OF FORCE

• tmlTY OF COMMAND

CD SURPRISE

• SECURITY

• SIMPLICITY

VALID FOR ENTiRE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT INTENSITY

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PRINCIPLES OF WAR

e ~ CONCENTRATES COMBAT POWER AT THE DECISIVE TIME AND PLACE TO THE

MAXIMUM PERMITTED BY THE CONFLICT SITUATION. NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN

CREATE THE EFfECT OF MASS RAPIDLY.

• ECONOMY OF FORCE ALLOCATES MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COMBAT POWER TO SECONDARY

EFfORTS. HIE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PERMITS EXPLOITATION BY SMALLER FORCES

AND ALLOWS SECONDARY EFFORTS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED MORE ECONOMICALLY.

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REPRESENTED BY TRAINED FORCES,' RESOIJRCES AND OPPORTUNITY INTO

REALITY THROUGH PURPOSEFll AND COORDINATED COMBAT ACTIONS. THESE

COMBAT ACTIONS MUST BE FOUGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC TENETS

OF THE AIRLAND BATTLE.

MODERN ~/ARFARE DEMANDS DECENTRALIZATION, PROMPT ACTION AND A HIGH

DEGREE OF INDiVIDUAL INITIATIVE, I~l A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT, SEMI­

IND;::PENDENT OPERATIONS BY CLOSE COMBAT FORCES, UNDER MISSION-TYPE

ORDERS, ARE THE R~JLE RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION. FURTHER, IT WILL

f FREQUENTLY BE NECESSARY TI) DECENTRAL IZE CONTROL OF FI RE SUPPORT,

~ COMBAT SUPPO~T AND COMBAT S~RVICE SUPPORT UNITS BY ATTACHING THEM V . ~ TO CLOSE CON BAT ELL1ENTS. ';'~':E LOSS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL COM-

MUNICATIONS MAY PRECLUDE TRANSMISSIm~ AND RECEIPT OF SPECIFIC J U ORDERS OR DIRECTION. IN SUCH AN EVENT - THE RISK OF WHICH IS

-11 MORE LIKELY IN A .NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT - THE CCMMANDER DEDUCES THE

. it ACTION REQUIRED BASED ON HIS KNO~ILEDGE OF THE SITUATION AND THE

'1 INTENT OF HIS COMMANDER, AND ACTS ON HIS CWN INITIATIVE, EVEN ~

J WHEN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS PERMIT THE INTERCHANGE OF

ESSENTIAL ORDERS AND INFORMATION, CO~1M.ANDERS MUST PLACE GREATER

RELIANCE UPON THE INITIATIVEI INTEGRITY, COURAGE AND PROFESSIONAL

ABILITY OF THEIR SUBORDINATES IF OPERATIONS AND BATTLES ARE TO BE WAGED SUCESSFULLY •

THE CONCEPT OF FIGHTING IN DEPTH MUST BE SO INGRAINED THAT ITS

APPLICATION IS AUTOMATIC. IT IS CRUCIAL THAT FORCES ARE

DISPERSED TO MINIMIZE THE PRESENTf'TIOf! OF REMUiiERATIVE TARGETS

SUSCEPTIBLE TO ATTt~CK BY THE ENEMY'S NUCLEAR HEAPONS. THIS

A-23

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CREATES THE REOUIREMENT FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF LARGER GEOGRAPHICAL

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. THE INCREA.SED POTE'lCY OF CCr-1BAT PO~JER,

THE CORRESPONDING VULNERABILITY OF THE ENEMY, REDUNDA~T AND SIM­

PLIFIED CONTROL MEASURES AND ENHANCED MOBILITY PERMIT CLOSE

COMBAT FORCES TO OPERATE I N THESE LARGER AREAS ~ND PROVI DE FRE­

OUENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BOLD AND DECISIVE ATTACKS DEEP INTO ENEMV

TERRITORY,

THE GENERATION OF SUPERIOR cor1BAT pmiER THROfjGH ~ANEUVER REOIJIRES

THE AVOIDANCE OF ENEMY STRENGTH AND THE ATTA,O( OF HIS VIJLNERAB IL­

ITIES AND, ONCE GENERATED, MUST BE APPLIED AT A CRITICl~L TIME AND

PLACE. THE DEGREE OF COMBAT POWER ATTAiNED REFLECTS THE

COMMANDER'S IMAGINATIVE PLANNING, LEADERSHIP AND A9IL!TY TO STAY

,ABREAST OF CRITICAL EVENTS AS THEY OCCUR AND HIS ABILITY TO TAKE

ACTION FASTER THAN THE ENEMY. THIS ~'UST BE DONE REPEATEDLY SO

THAT EVERY TIME THE ENEMY BEGINS TO COUNTER ONE ACTION ANOTHER

UPSETS HIS PLANS. THIS WILL LEAD TO INEFFECTIVE, UNCOORDINATED

AND PIECEMEAL ENEMY RESPONSES AND EVENTUALLY TO HIS DEFEAT. THE

AGILITY TO GENERATE DECISIVE Cor~BAT pmJER -- REPETITIVELY -­

REQUIRES FLEXIBILITY IN EFFECTING TASK ORGANIZATIONS FOR CLOSE

COMBAT, FIRE SUPPORT I COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUP­

PORT. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT METT At'm AVAILASLE RESOURCES DRIVE

TASK ORGANIZATION AND REORGArJIZATION. IN A ~iUCLEAR elVIRONl1ENT f

IT IS ALSO AXIOMATIC THAT FORCES MUST RECOMPOSED TO ACCOMPLISH A

VARIETY OF COMBAT TASl<S -,- \,/IiHOUT ~AJOR CHA~'GES INTt:S~ ORGANI­

zATIoN.

A-24

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THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF Cm1BATi PO~JER REOllIRES HARMONIOUS

UN ITY OF EFFORT THROUGHOUT ALL ECHElt:jJ'S AND WITH I N EACH ECHELON

OF THE FORCE. THIS SYNCHRONIZATION ITS A BASIC FUNCTION OF COM­

MAND, AND IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT IN DERIVING FULL ADVANTAGE

FROM MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER IN A NIJClfl',R ENVIRON~ENT. REPETITIVE

GENERATION OF SUPERIOR COMBAT POWER, 1m CAPITALIZE UNHESITATINGLY

ON BATTLEFIELD OPPORTUNITIES, REQUIRES THE SKILLFUL INTEGRATION

AND COORDINATION OF AIR AND lAND FOf{[ES THHOUGHOUT THE DEPTH OF

THE BATTLEFIELD -- ALL ORIENTED TOWARE A COMMON GOAL.

IN SUM, SUPER I OR C0i1BAT POWER IS GEN5I'iHED THROUGH A COMMANDER'S

SKIllFUL INTEGRATION OF MANEUVER, REPmIER, PROTECTION AND

I NTEll I GENT lEADERSH I P. THE IJSE OF NIlCLEAR WEAPONS MAY, ON OCCA-

S ION, BE THE PREDOM I NANT EXPRESS ION COMBAT POWER. HOWEVfR,

EFFECTIVE MANEUVER IS STILL VITAL mR ACHIEVING LOCAL COMBAT

SUPERIORITY. THE SInE POSSESSING MAnERIEL SUPERIORITY OVERAll

MAY CHOOSE FREELY BEHJEEN ATTR IT I ON (ND MANEUVER I BUT THE S I DE

WHOSE RESOURCES ARE INFERIOR CAN OfLY PREVAIL BY SUCCESSFUL

MANEIJVER.

VU-GRAPH 14 OH-

VU -GRAPH 15 OJ

UNDERSTANDI NG AND APPL IeATIGN OF THE U'PERATIVES OF MGIJf:RN COi"8AT

TAKE ON ADDED DIMENSIONS IN A NUCLEAR 81ViRONMENT,

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IMPERATIVES OF MODERN COMBAT

• UNITY Of EffORT

e MOVE fAST, STRIKE HARDa fiNISH RAPIDLY

., ENEMY WEAKNESSES

• MAIN EFFORT

• SUSTAiNING THE fIGHT

• TERRAIN AND WEATHER

• PROTECTION

PREPAREDNESS IS ESSENT!AL - -

NO TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

15

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VI CTORY I N MODERN WARFARE IS MADE POSS I ALE THROUGH CQr1PLETE UN TTY

OF EFFORT PROVI DED BY THORO!!GHL Y COORD I rJATED AND SnJCHRON IZED

ACTIONS RY GROUND AND AIR FORCES, RRfNGIrlG TO BEAR MID KEEPING IN

OPERATION EVERY ELEMENT CAPABLE OF SUSTAINIrlG ,t\ND CONTRIBUTING TO

THE PROJECTI ON OF SUPER IOR COMBAT POWER. IN~ I V I DUAL AND COLLEC­

TlV~ UNITY OF EFFORT REnllfRES MUTUAL TRI!SL CONFIDENCE, LOYALTY,

PHIDE, MOTIVATION, ESPRIT, DISCIPI..UlE A,rm A CO~IMON UNDERSTf\NDING

a= UNIT MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES. THESE HU~AN FACTORS MUST BE

DEVELOPED THROUGH LEADERSHIP AND TRAINIMG SO THAT INnrvIOUALS AND

UNITS ARE TECHNICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY PREPARED FOR THE

NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT,

CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONS AND BATTLES ENVISIONED BY THE I\IRLAND

CONCEPT EXTEND OVER GREATER DISTANCES AND FOR LONGER PERIODS OF

CONTINUOUS COMBAT THAN MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE PAST. IN A

NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT, THEY ARE ACTUALLY SUSTAINED SERI~S OF SHORT

AND VIOLENT ENGAGE;'~NTS BY CLOSE CQt4BAT FORCES MANNED AND

EQUIPPED TO MOVE FAST, STRIKE HARD AND FINISH RAPIDLY AGAINST

ENEMY wEAKNESSES - lLM~_A.~Jl~illE_ .. AJi~ IN.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE VIEWED AS AN EXTENSION OF MANEUVER, NOT

JUST AS AN ELEMENT OF FIRE SUPPORT. FOR EXAi'PLE, EnEMY I,IEAK­NESSES M.AY EITHER NOT HE APPARENT OR 1'1/"YBE TOO DISTANT TO BE

SUCCESSr=ULLY EXPLOITED BY AVAILABLE ~1ANE!JVER FORCES. IN SUCH

CASES, tI~JEAKi·jESSEStI ARE CRE,!. TEn BY nUCLEAR F I RES ANT) THEN

EXPLOITED BY r~A~EUVER MiD A,DDITIQrML FIRE SUPPORT, IDENTIFIED,

DISTANT ENEMY 'iJEAKNESSES OR \/1 f! ~'EO I'd)} fi r. : r~s f. RE Y ',1 L. i ,j f \ ,I-'l. 1. 1 '- ! j 1. ~ ,~"\ \ -tVi'l r. f'f:T\ BV - ,\t-'L-U 1 ! ,_L' ,I

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GRamm AND AIR DELIVERED FIRES -- NUlliEAR AND NONNUCLEAR -- TO

THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY AVA II_ABLE RESDURCES AND Tf) THE DEGREE

SOUGHT RY THE OBJECTIVES OF OElAYn DENIAL, rISRUPTION OR

DESTRUCTION.

THE PR I NC i PLES OF t1ASS AND ECONOMY OF FORCE DEMAND DES! GNA TI NG

AND SUSTAINING A MAIN EFFORT. IN A NHCL.EAP. ENVIRONi1ENT, SUSTAIN­

ING THE MAIN EFFORT INVOLVES THE CONTTWING APPLICATION OF CnMBAT

PuWER TO EXPLOIT OPPORTUNITIES IN AWf AREA OF THE Rf\TTLEFIELD.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT ONLY WE I GHT THE iN E;FORT BUT ALSO ePIATE

OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS IN OTHER APiAS. ~IHEN StiCH OPPORTmlI­

TIES DEVELOP, THEY ARE EXPLOITED JN~lEDrATELY BY ~EDIRECTING

FORCES. FIRES AND LOGISTICS. THE VTOl.DKE, STRESS AND CONFUSION

CHARACTERSTIC OF A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMEUT SERVE TO nIvERT ATTENTION

FROM SUSTA I N r NG THE FIGHT. SUPER IOR DISC I PL HJE AND LEADERSH I P

ARE REQUIRED TO OVERCOME THESE DISTRAUIONS AND TO MAINTA!N THE

FOCIJS ON THE MISSION AT HANn. COMMANDEHS MUST CONTINUALLY ASSESS

HW1AN ABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS AS THEY PLAN MID FIGHT SUCCESSIVE

BATTLES.

THE EFFECTS OF TERRA r N AND WEATHER ALWAYS IMPORTANT IN THE

APPL ICATION OF Cor<1BAJ Pm-JER. IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT I BOTH

AFFECT THE E1=F I C I ENT AND EFf'ECTIVE Er'1P1oyrtl ENT .:- NUCLEAR vJEAPONS

AND MAY HAVE A MUCH GREATER INFLUENCE

prOTECTION INVOLVES PRESERVATro~ OF rAn to r I I U"" T I f'I n.,.. T tv' ~ I f' (\ 1,1? 'T f\ 1\, 'E R " ... ru!'.U: U!~ I iL \):~! 11 IfiL I.-lJf ':.1M r-Ur'l Uii1

A-28

r: I GHTI NG STREfIGTH OF THE

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AND PLACE. THIS IS ACCOMPLISHED BY ASSIJRING SECURITY AND SURVIV-

ABILITY, KEEPING TROOPS HEALTHY AND EQUIPMENT RE~DY, AND

SUSTAINP1G DISCIPLINE AND MORALE,

PREPAREDNESS IS ~UNDAMENTAL TO REALIZATION OF THE IMPERATIVES OF MODERN COMBAT. PREPAREDNESS PERMITS SURVIVAL AND PERMITS EXPLOr­

TATU)N OF OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY THE EMPLOYMENT OF tllJCLEAR WEA­

PONS. SIJCH PREPAREDNESS IS ESSENTIAL AS THERE WILL PE NO TRANSI­

TIONAL PERIOD TO ALLOVI FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL ~EASURES.

VU-GRAPH 15 OFF

VU-GRAPH 16 ON

THE OFFENSIVE IS THE DECISIVE FORM OF WAR, THE COMMANDl.R'S ONL(

MEANS OF ATTAIN.ING A POSITIVE GOAL AND OF DEFEATING ANY ENEMY •

DECISIVE OFFENSIVE ~CTIONS WIN BATTLES. THEY ARE CHARACTERIZED

BY INITIATIVE, IMPROVISATION AND AGGRESSIVENESS; BY DEEP, BOLD

ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE DEPTH OF THE BATTLEFIELD; RY FLEXIAI_E

APPLICATION OF COMBAT POWER TO AVOID ENEMY STRENGTHS AND TO UNHESITATINGLY EXPLOIT HIS WEAKNESSES: AND BY SYNCHRr~IZATION O~

ALL RESOURCES IN SIMULTANEOUS AND SECUENTIAL BATTLES DESIGNED TO

TOTALLY DISRUPT AND DISLOCATE THE El':EMY'S SYSTEM FOR CO'<1BAT. r WILL DISCUSS THE SUBJECT ft,REAS SHC;>jN HERE AS THEY PEKTAIN TO

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

VU-GRAPH 16 OFF

A-29

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SOVIET -STYLE OPERA1: :JNS ARE -CHAR~JER IZE!) hY THE RELENTLESS M1D

VIOLENT PROSECUTION CC OFFENSIVE ~CTIONS; DEFENSE IS AN ANATHEMA

TO SOVIeT MILITARY STR'~.TEGY. ~OWE'~[R, SOVIET DOCTRINE RECOGNIZES

THAT TEMPORARY DEFENSiVE OPERATlm:f~S MAY BE RE()UIRED IN. THOSE

SECTORS (F THE BATTLEF IElD WHERE ;JFF[NS I VE AC~ IONS ARE I N IT I ALL Y

UNSUCCESSFUL. I N SUCH CASES # S'aVIET DOCTR I ~E f=OR DEFENS IVE

OPERATIONS FEATURES THE EMPLOYMEf~lf OF 3ECURITY FORCr:S, MAIN

DEFENS IVE FORCES AND RESERVE Fe'RCES .•

SECURITY FORCES OCCuoy A.N AREA FOR~~.~\RD OF THE MAIN DEFENSES AND

SEEK TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY AT THE LO~oEST POSSIBLE RANGE, CAUSING

PREMATURE DEPLOYMENT OF ASSAULT FORCES I C(lNVE~T IONAl, NIICLEAR

'AND CHEMICAL FIRES ARE CONCENTRATED TO DESTROY ATTACKING FORCES

AND MINES AND BARRIERS ARE IJSED CONJUNCTION WITH MANEUVER

FORCES TO CANALIZE ATTACKING UNITS r.~TO KILLING ZONES •

MA IN DEi-DIS IVE FORCES ARE DEPLOYED Hi! DEPTH, NORMALLY I N BELTS OF

MUTUALLY SUPPORTING STRONGPOINTS. COMBAT POWER IS f=OCUSED ON

ATTRITING AND DESTROYING THE ATTACKEi WELL FORWARD AND CANALIZING

HIM INTO AREAS WHERE HE IS VULNERABL~ TO DESTRUCTION BY COUNTER­

ATTACK. NUCLEAR ANn CHEMICAL WEAHDNS, MASSED ARTILLERY, t.IR­

POWER, MINES AND BARRIERS AND ~ANEUVER FORCES ARE USED TO SUPPORT

MAIN DEFENSE FORCES.

A-31

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A-32

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RESERVES GENERALLY OCCUpy THE DEEiPER DEFENS IVE BELTS AND ARE

POSITIONED TO BLOCK, REINFORCE FOFl:l*ARD BELTS AND COUNTERATTACK.

STRONG ANTITANI( RESERVES ARE COMMIITED TO DESTROY ARMORED FORMA­

TIONS ANn TO SUPPORT TANK HEAVY COUWTERATTACK FORCES.

VU -GRAPH 11 OFF

VIJ-hQAPH IE ON

DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE NOTWITHSTANDING, THE SOVIETS CONSIDER A r'lEET­

ING ENGAGEMENT AS THE MORE LIKELY EV:[NT IN A NIJCLEAR ENVIRONMENT,

WHICH THEY DEFINE AS A "CLASH BETWEEN OPPOSING SIDES HHEN THEY

ARE SII'1ULTANEOUSLY STRIVING TO FIILFtlL ASSIGNED MISSIONS BY MEANS

OF OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. II THE SOVIElS RECOGNIZE AND ATTEMPT TO

EXPLOIT (AS MOST /J.S. FORCES) CE~TAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF A

MEETING ENGAGEMENT. THESE INCLUDE LACK OF DETAILED INTELLIGENCE,

RAPID SITUATIONAL CHANGES, DEVELOPM[fjif OF ACTIONS ON A WIDE FRONT

AND PROBABLE EXPOSED FLANKS. Sli![CESSFUL OPERATIONS REQUIRE

SPEEDY EXTEt1PORANEOUS PLANN ING I COWfINUOlJS EFFORT TO SE IZE AND

RETAiN THE INITIATIVE, DEPLOYMENT INTO COMBAT FROM THE MARCH

COLUMN AND REDIRECTION OF COMBAT EFFvRT AS REQUIRED.

VU -GRAPH 18 OFF

VU -GRAPH 1.9] ON

A-33

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MEETING ENGAGEMENT

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ATTRIBUTES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

~.'

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to.) V1

.. INITIATIVE AND DECENTRALIZATION

.. INTEGRATION OF MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

• ATTACK WEAKNESS AND E"{PLOIT SUCCESS

• MULTIPLE ATTACKS

• ATTACK DEEP

• IMPROMPTU PlANtJING

WITHIN THE ENEMY'S DECISION CYCLE

19

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SOVIET OPERATIONAL ART ANn TAClIICS PRESENT AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES

FOR II,S. FORCES TO SEIZE THE I1nTIl~TTVE AND TO DESTROY HIS COHE­

SIVENESS AND WILL TO CONTINUE H! FIlGtH -- THE PRIr1ARY REASONS FOR

CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE OPER{lTIONS. InT IS IMPORTANT n, UNDERSTAND

THE IJSE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN 11£ PURSU IT OF THESE t<1 I =~ IONS AND

TO SURVIVE WHILE nOING SO,

U,S. ARMY FORCE'S ADVANTAGE, AS mJ'~?ARED Tn THE ENEMY, ACCRUES

FROM GREATER INITIATIVE AND nECENmFf1tIZATIOf'J OF MISSION EXECII­

TION, THE SUCCE.SS OF ATTACKS ULTH11JELY D~PENDS ON THF SPEED OF

~lANEUVER AND THE APPLICATION OF F'KfttPmIER. RAPID t1/-NEIJVER AND I

COORDINATED APPLICATION OF FIREpm~tR iH THE flECISIVE lIME AND

PLACE DISRUPT THE ENEr~y's PLANS AND !JECP-EASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

HIS COUNTERMEASURES, SURPRISE, DECIFTIO~!, FLEXIBILITY, CREATION

AND EXPLO ITAT I ON OF ENEMY HEAKNESSfS AND SIJPER lOR lTY I N COMBAT

READINESS GENERATE SUPERIOR COMBATfHitJER. IF Mf OPPORTUNITY FOR

SUCCESS DEVELOPS IN AN AREA OTHER UAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED, IT IS

EXPLOITED IMMEDIATELY; FIRES ARE SKFTED AND CLOSE COMBAT FORC~S

ARE ORIENTtD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE NEW OPPORTUNITY. THE

DEVELOP~'ENT OF SIJCH OPPORTUN IT IES IS ACCOMPL ISHED BY S IMUL -

TANEOUSLY ATTACKING SEVERAL ENEMY \;JEf\KNESSES. LH1ITED CLOSE

COMBAT FORCES ARE COMPENSATED BY THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE

COMBINATION OF ~1ULTIPLE ATTACKS AND FU\PlnLY CHANGING THE vJEIGHT

PROVI DED TO THE ATTACKS cmWlISES AND DECE 1V(S THE ENEMY A,S TO THE

MA IN EFFORT !\ND CAUSES H Ir1 TO CIND!lCT I NEFFECTI VE COUNTER­

ACTIONS, PROPER EMPLOY:1ENT o~ NUmtflR vlEAPONS TO CREATE GAPS

RAP I DL Y, TO DISRUPT OR DESTROY RES:!RVES AND TO 0 I SRIjPT KEY C 3

A-35

,. ..:-: ..... . ' " .....

" . . . , '.

RESOURCES ~ENERATES OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION BY NEWLY

DESIGNATED MAIN ATTACKS. INTENSIVE ELECTRO~IC WARFARE IS

EMPLOYED TO FURTHER DISRUPT C3 SYSTEMS, THUS DELAYING THE ENEMY

COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION ANT) HIS RECONSTITUTION

MEASURES,

THE DEPTH OF ATTACKS IS LIMITED ONLY BY RESOURCES AVAILABLE AND

THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT, REINFORCE OR LINK ~p WITH ATTACKING

FORCES. WHILE LIMITED OBJECTIVE ATTACKS MAY BE REQUIRED AT

TIMeS, COMMANDERS MUST RECOGNIZE OR CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR

BOLD. DEEP THRUSTS WELL T1EHIND THE ENEMY'S FORvJARD ELEMENTS.

I OEALLY , BRIGADES ORIENT ON SECOND ECHELON REGIMENTS, DIVISIONS

ON SECOND ECHELON DIVISIONS AND CORPS ON FOLLOW-ON ARMIES.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THESE DEEP

ATTACKS, AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE TO HOLD FLANK FORCES IN ~LACE,' TO

PROTECT EXPOSED FLANKS, TO DESTROY ENEMY STRONGPOINTS AND POCKETS

OF BY-PASSED FORMATIONS AND TO DESTROY I DISRUPT ANn DELAY FOLLOVI­

ON FORCES, THE OPERATIONS MANEUVER GROUPS ARE AU~AYS HIGH

PR lOR ITY TARGETS. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ALSO USED TO HE I GH THE

MAIN EFFORT, TO SUSTAIN THE FIGHT AND AS HIGHLY FLEXIBLE

RESERVES. VULNERAB I L TTY DUR I NG DEEP THR.USTS IS REDUCED BY SPEED

OF ACT ION, W I DEN I NG GAPS AND ROLL I NG UP FLANKS, RAP I D

EXPLOITATION AND ORIENTATION ON FOLLOW-ON FORCES. ATTACKING

FORCES MASS RAP I DL y, MOVE FAST AND STR r KE HARD AND RED r SPERSE

QUICKL Y TO PREClIJDE PRESENTATION OF REMUNERATIVE TARGETS -- TIME'

AND TIME AGAIN.

A-37

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i . J i" ..

" .. ~

IMPROMPTU PLANNING IS NECESSITATED flY THE RAPIDITY ~lrTH HHICH

OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION CAN BE GENERATED: THE RAPIDITY

\4ITH HH ICH EXPLD ITA TI ON OF OPPORTUN IT IES MUST BE EXECUTED RY

CLOSE COMBAT FORCES; AND THE RAPIDITY \4ITH WHICH TH=: ATT~,CKING

FORCES MUST REDISPERSE -- ALL DRIVEN BY THE NEEn TO OPERATE WELL

INSIDE THE ENEMY'S DECISION CYCLE. THAT IS, MAKE DECISIONS AND

ACT MORE RAPIDLY THAN THE ENEMY. THIS CAPABILITY IS ENHANCED BY

THE PROPER APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SPACE WITH TIME.

VU-GRAPH 19 OFF

VU-GRAPH 20 ON

THE ATTACKER HAS FREEDOM OF ACTION; HE DETERMINES THE OBJECTIVE,

DIRECTION AND TIME OF ATTACI(, THE ATTACKING COMMANDER MAY BE

ABLE TO SELECT EITHER A HASTY UR DELIBERATE ATTACK. IF THE ENEMY

CAN BE SUR?RISED, AN ATTI\C< IS LAIINCHED WITHOIIT DELAY AND WITHOUT

EXTENSIVE PREPARATION: SURPRISE IS USED TO OFFSET THE LESS THAfl

OPTIMAL EMPLOYr~ENT OF COMBAT pm~ER. IF THE ENEMY HAS EOI1AL OR

GREATER COMBAT PCWER, THE ATTACK PREPARATION MUST BE MORE EXTEN­

SIVE SO OPTIMAL COMBAT POWER CAN BE APPLIED FROM THE ONSET.

EITHER TYPE OF ATTACK REQUIRES A CLEA~LY DEFINED OBJECTIVE AllO

TIMELY INTELLIGENCE, BOTH ON THE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY FORCES.

A-3e

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PREPARATION FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ;.;

.. TIMING

• OBJECTIVES

6) INTELLIGENCE

• SCHEME Of MANEYVER

• RESOURCE ALLOCATION

• CONTROL MEASURES

CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION

20

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... , .. ,." ,',

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A MAIN ATTACK AND ONE OR MORE SUPPORTING ATiACKS ARE DESIGNATED.

ADVANCING ON MULTIPLE AVENUES OF APPROACH, AND IN GREATER WIDTH

THAN DEPTH, ALLOwS D ISDERSAL BETWEEN UNITS ANI) ENABLES etOS I NG

AND INTERLOCK ING MORE QU I CKL Y ~~ ITH THE ENEMY. THE FORCES

ADVANCING ON MULTIPLE AXES NEED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN WIDTH~SO THEY CAN BYPASS NATURAL AND MANMADE OBSTACLES AND POCI(ETS OF

RESISTANCE.

AFTER THE MISS ION I OBJECTIVES AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER HAVE REEN

SELECTED, AVA ILABLE MA,NEUVER FORCES, FIRE SUPPOR T, INTELLI GENCE

MEANS AND COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT ARE ALLOCATED

TO AE RESPONSIVE TO THE COMMANDER CONDUCTING THE ATTACK. THE

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT DEPENDS ON THE MISSION, ENE~Y SITUATION,

TERRAIN, VISIBILITY AND DISTANCE TO THE OBJECTIVE, SEMI-INDEPEN­

DENT TASK FO~CES ADVANCING ON Ml~TIPLE AVENUES OF APPROACH, WITH A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMANDEff'S!NTEN"f, ARE THE BEST

ORGArIIZATIONS FOR COMBAT ON THE NIJCLEAR BATTLEFIELD •... AIRMOBILE

FORCES CAN BE MANEUVERED OIJICKl Y THROUGHOUT THE DEPTH OF THE

BATTLEF IElD AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ATTACK HEL ICOPTERS ARE. ES­

PECIALLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST ENEMY COUNTERATTAC~S. NUCLEAR WEAPON~

ARE ALSO IJSED AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE MEASURE, ALLOWING ADDITIONAL

MANEUVER FORCES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MAIN EFFORT. THEY ARE USED

TO CONTROL TERRAIN yJHEN PHYSICAL OC~JIPATION IS NOT DESIR.ABLE.

AIR RESOURCES ARE USED TO GAIN '_OCAl AIR SUPERIORITY, PROVIDE

INTELLIGENCE INFOR~ATION, ATTACK TARGETS IN DEPTH, PROVIDE

SliPPORT AGA I NST COUNTERATTACKS AND TO FURTHER EXPLO IT THE USE OF

NUCLEAR HEAPONS. COMBAT ENGH!EERS ARE LOCATED ItiITH THE FORWARD

A-40

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·· .. ,i:#~~~~~~~~~;J~,;~~~f-;. ~;K'_";~'-' .' __ "c,. ii~--, <~C, ' ,>"",~~;:~ ... ~.,."~.-"

COMl'1AND .. AND _ C6NTRO~~::·,COMMJfNJCALiPN$~.TlV.RJNG~~_Art%CK_.· '"-~',~::~:::;!r~"~ ::~ :-~~;~~~,:,~ -- -. ·:f%E~~~~~-::-~~,~;fd~: :~~~~~;~- - .:;~~.~~~~~~~'~>~:'::~~'0::.:J'~_. -~:;i~~-~ '-~'::"-~-:}¥$fF;:~ ~~-.~:~; ," .

REAL POSS IRl IL lTY ANn, Nor'-OVERCOME I - COULD -RESIJLT IN ',.

'FAILURE TO ACHIEVE DESIRED OBJECTIVES. ACCORDINGLY, ALTERNATlVE

MEANS OF MAINTAINING SYNCHRONIZATION MUST BE DEVELOPED ANn IMPLE­

MENTED WHEN REQU IRED. THESE CONTROL J1EASURES MUST PERM IT THE

MAINTENANCE OF ATTACK MO~ENTU~ AND PROVIDE FOR THE COMMANDER'S

. POSITIVE CONTROL OF, NUCLEAR FIRES.

Ale PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK MUST S'iE CONCEALED AND THE ENEr1Y

DECEIVED AS TO FUTlffiE ACTIONS. BOTH VISUAL AND ELECTRONIC CON­

CE&~~ENTARE REQUIRED, A ~'.lDDEN FLUftRY OF ACTIVITY OR A SIGNIFI ...

JARl:;~JNeREASE I N THE NUMBER OR TEMP·!r~ OF MESSAGES WOULD TI P OFF

ENVELOPMENT ,~~TO INCLUDE

THE FRONTAL ATTACK I\tlD

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A-43

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THE PENETRATION. REGARDLESS OF THE BASIC FORM EMPLOYED IN THE NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT, MANEUVER ADVANTAGES ARE ACHIEVED AND MAINTAINED ONLY BY REPEATED IMPROMPTU PLANNING AND EXECUTION IN THE BRIEFEST OF PERIODS.

VU-GRAPH 21 ON (IHIH_.flIE)

THE ENVELOPMENT STR IKES THE ENEMY ON AN EXPOSED FLANK OR AT ANOTHER POINT OF WEAKNESS IN HIS FORWARD DEFENSE, AVOIDS HIS MAIN STRENGTH AND ATTACKS TOWARD AN OBJECTIVE IN THE REAR, SECONDARY ATTACKS FIX THE ENEMY IN PLACE WHILE THE MAIN ATTACK CUTS ACROSS HIS ROUTES OF ESCAPE. THE ENEMY IS THUS FORCED TO FIGHT ON TWO FRONTS AND IS SUBJECT TO DESTRUCTION IN PLACE. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR AN ENVELOPMENT, TO DESTROY THE ISOLATED ENEMY FORCES AND TO PREVENT COUNTERATTACKS AGAINST THE VIILNERABLE FLANKS OF THE ENVELOPING FORCE. THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO INCREASES THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE AND COULD DECEIVE THE ENEMY INTO THINKING THE SECONDARY FIXiNG ATTACK IS ACTUALLY THE MAIN ATTACK.

VU-GRAPH 21 OFF

VU-GRAPH 22 ON (WIlliELl£)

THE FRONTAL ATTACK STRIKES THE ENEMY ALL ALONG THE FRONT. IT CAN BE USED AS A MAIN ATTACK AGAINST A WIDELY DEPLOYED THREAT OR AS A SECONDARY ATTACK. NUCLEAR \~EAPO~jS ARE USED ON THE D!EMY is MA I N

A-44

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A-46

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FORCES TO CREATE GAPS FOR RAPID EXPLOITATION AND AGAINST RESERVE

OR FOLLOW-ON FORCES TO PRECLUnE ENEMY COUNTERATTACK,

INFILTRATION IN A NUCLEAR E~VIRONMENT CAN BE ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE

DUE TO THE ISLAND-LIKE NATURE OF THE BATTLEFIELD. SMALL GROUPS

OF CLOSE COMBAT FORCES CAN MOVE THROUGH THE GAPS 9ETHEEN ENEMY

FORCES AND ASSEMBLE IN THE ENEMY'S REAR TO ATTACK DECISIVE

OBJECT IYES, SUCH A TECHN WUE ENHANCES SIJRPR I SE AND DECREASES

NIJCLEAR VULNERABILITY. IT REQUIRES BOLDNESS AND INITIATIVE.

VU-GRAPH 22 O~F

VU-GP.APH 23 ON (WITH FLIP)

IN THE PENETRATION, THE MAIN ATTACK PASSES RAPIDLY THROUGH THE -PRINCIPAL DEFENSIVE FORCES OF THE ENEMY. THE GOAL IS TO DESTROY

THE CONTINUITY OF THE FORCE, DIVIDE IT AND DEFEAT IT IN DETAIL.

ITS SUCCESS REQUIRES SUPERIOR COMBAT POWER AT THE POINT OF

PENETRATION. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED TO REDUCE THE EFFECTIVE

ENEMY STRENGTH AT THE PLANNED BREACHING POINT; AGAINST ENEMY

FLANK FORCES TO I NSURE THEY DO NOT r10VE TO BLOCK THE GAP OR

ATTACK THE FLANKS OF THE PENETRATION; AND AGAINST RESERVES OR

OTHER FORCES IN THE ENE~W(S REAR AREA WHICH MUST BE PRECLUDED

FROM COUNTERATTACK I NG. FR I ENDL Y RESERVES AND FOLLOW-ON FORCES

WIDEN THE GAP, RO'-L UP THE FLANKS OF THE MAIN EFFORT MIO EXPLOIT

OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY THE PENETRATION.

VU-GRAPH 23 OFF

A-47

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A-48

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A-49

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IN SUM, THE OFFENSIVE IS THE DECISIVE FORM OF HAR; BOLD, DECISIVE

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS WITH BATTLES, NIJCLEAR WEAPONS MAY BE USED IN A

. NUMBER OF WAYS TO ASSURE SlICCESS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, (PAUSE)

VU-GRAPH 24 OFF

THERE ARE INHERENT WEAKNESSES ASSOCIATED WITH SOYIET-STYLE OPERA­

TIONS y/HICH PROVIDE NIJMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION RY

AGGRESSIVE OFFENSIVE ACTIONS, TO INCLUDE CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF

OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS; ADHERENCE TO ESTAB­

L ISHED T H1ETABLES, ECHELONMENT OF FORCES AND THE REOU I REr~ENT TO

CONCENTRATE AND MASS FORCES.

VU-GRAPH 25 ON

HOWEVER, EVEN IN LIGHT OF THESE vlEAKNESSES, IT WILL BE NECESSARY

FOR I1,S. FORCES TO CONDUCT DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS FOR LIMITED

PERIODS TO PR::PARE FOR DELIBERATE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS; PERMIT

CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN OTHER AREAS OF THE BATTLEFIELD; GAIN

TIME; CONTROL TERRAIN: DENY ENEMY DEEP OBJECTIVES; OR PERr1IT

CONSOLIDATION AND REORGANIZATION OF FORCES, I WILL ADDRESS THESE

GENERAL AREAS IN THE DISCUSSION OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

VIJ-GRAPH 25 OFF

A-50

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT-OFFENSE :~ ~.

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SUBSTITVT~.fO~~~Q CQMr~~M~NJiJ~.~~N~YVER,;: • . CRgATf (lAPr» ,'/~: .. y: :5; . '~.:

• HOLD ENEMY IN PI..ACE.:· .'. . '.

CONTROL.

'\ .. ':.1 ~. ?':~ J.:~,},~.J ·~~·t;' ::~:~ :~"~~;.,:':'::>:~~'" .>.'

DES'rROY ENEMY FORCES . '.~< •..

... ECONOMY OF FORCE

• RESERVES ,If/j

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$ CREATE EXPLOITATION OPPORTUtdlTlES .,~

.~ . PLACE ENEMY AT RISK THROUGHOUT AREA OF INfLUENCE

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N

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

• THREAT

• OVERVIEW

• DEEP BATTLE AREA

• COVERING FORCE AREA

• MAIN BATTLE AREA

• REAR AREI\

:.. ••••••• , ~.'. -- • 1:!: .J' ~ -J ,.111·~ ~ ••. ,. ~ "., '. ·t'" ., -. , ".I!J ., , , r, -I" ," f" .• ~l. " ... r.·.·.·. '..J w' :,. .................. ~ ... .............. r" • •. >.~ .~ ... , ... ,,- ,"",.'"" .-' ~

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OFFENS IVE ACT IONS MUST PREVA IL -- EVEN DUR ING THE DE~EriSE -- TO

OVERCOME SOVIET~STYLE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, WHICH ARE CHARACTER­

IZED BY NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY, MOBILITY Arm FIREPowER TO .ACHIEVE

AND MAINTAIN MOMENTUM. SOVIET OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS MAY BE C~TE­

GORIZEn AS MEETING ENGAGEMENTS, ATTACKS OF A DEFENDING ENEMY AND

PURSUIT OPERATIONS. I WILL DISCUSS ONLY THE FIRST TWO CATEGORIES.

VU-GRAPH 26 ON

THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT, PREVIOUSLY DIS­

CIJSSED, AS THE OFFENS IVE ACT iON MOST LIKELY TO OCCUR,

PARTICULARLY IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT. THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

MAY, HOWEVER, OCCUR UNDER WIDELY DIFFERING CIRCUMSTANCES AND

. ENVIRONMENTS: AT THE BEGINNING OF A WAR; AT THE OIlTSET OF ANY

ATTACK WHEN OPPOSING FORCES ARE NOT IN INITIAL CONTACT: AFTER

PENETRATION OF ENEMY'S DEFENSIVE LINES IN ExoECTATION OF MEETING

RESERVE ELEMENTS; DURING PURSUIT OPERATIONS; AND DURING COUNTER­

ATTACKS.

VU-GRAPH 26 OFF

VU -GRft,~H 27 ON

THE ESSENTIAL AIMS OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS ARE TO DESTROY

ENEMY FORCES AND SEIZE IMPORTANT TERRAIN. THESE A.IMS ARE ALSO

BASIC TO THE ATTACK OF A DEFENDING FORCE, WHICH FEATURES THE

RAPID BUILD UP OF REQUIRED FORCES; ECHELmiMENT OF r=ORCES; r~ASSING

A-53

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ATTACK ECHELONMENT

IO-15KM 115-30KMI30-120KM I 120 - 300KM 300t KM ..

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OF FORCES AND FIRES; USE OF NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS; AND

CONTINUOUS ATTAC~ UNDER ALL CONDITIONS OF WEATHER AND VISIRILITY,

ASSAULT ECHELONS ATTACK 80TH TO DESTROY THE OPPOSING ENEMY FORCES

THAT SURVIVED INITIAL FIRES AND TO CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS

FOR FOLLOW-ON FORCES SUCH AS THE OPERATIONAL MANEUVE~ GROUPS TO

EXPLOIT,

VIJ -GRAPH 27 OFF

VU-GRAPH 28 ON

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ARE CONT)IICTED THROUGHOUT THE DEPTH OF THE

BATTLEFIELD USING ALL AVAILARLE COMBAT POWER. AIRLAND FORCES

FIGHT A UNIFIED AND SYNCHRONIZED BATTLE IN FOUR AREAS OF THE

BATTLEFIELD; THE DEEf) RATTLE A.REA - THAT AREA BEYOND FRIENDLY

FORCES TO THE FORWARn EXTENT OF THE AREA OF !NFLUENCE; THE COVER­

ING FORCE AREA: THE MAIN BATTLE AREA: AND THE REAR AREA, WHILE

COMBAT ACTIONS MAY BE UNDERWAY IN TWO OR MORE OF THESE AREAS AT

THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE ALWAYS CONDUCTED AS ONE INTEGRATED AND

COORDINATED BATTLE •

THE DEFENSE IS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT, DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS DO

NOT WIN CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES. THEREFORE, THEY ARE CHARACTERIZED

BY DELAYING AND DISRUPTING THE ENEMY THROUGHOUT THE DEPTH OF THE

BATTLEFIELD: SEIZING THE INITIATIVE AND EXPLOITING OPPORTUNITIES

FOR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS; FLEXIBILITY IN P!..ANNING AND USE OF MA­

NEUVER AND FIREPOWER; AND COORDINATION AND SYNC~RONIZATION OF ALL

A-56

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OVERVIEW

1 -AREA---OF---INfLUENCE_ 1

\ X X X ----

DEEP BATTLE AREA (DBA)

COVERING fORCE AREA {Cf A}

MAIN BATTLE AREA (MBA) x X

-' -, XX.J ~ -- ----REAR AREA (RA)

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COMBAT POWER IN VIOLENT ANn AGGRESSIVE EXPLOITATION 01= ENEMY

VUL~ERABILITIES. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SIGNIFICANT FORCE MULTI-

PLIERS AND ASSIST IN BOTH THE CREATION OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AND THE SUBSE~UENT SUCCESSFUL CONDUCT OF TH0SE

ACTIONS.

VU-GRAPH 28 OFF

VIJ-GRAPH 29 ON

COMBAT ACTIONS IN THE DEEP BATTLE AREA ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT

THE C(h"'MANDER'S OVERALL SCHEME OF MANEUVER BY DESTRUCTION,

DISRUPTION AND DELAY OF ENEMY FORCES. THEIR GOAL IS TO PREVENT

THE ENEMY FROM CONCENTRATING OVERWHELMING. COMBAT POWER AT THE

POINT AND TIME OF HIS CHOICE BY SE\~RELY DELAYING AND DISRUPTING

PLANNED CLOSURE TIMES OF FOLLOW-ON ELEMENTS, THEREBY CREATING

OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESSFUL ACTION AGAINST ASSAULT ECHELONS.

THIS VISUAL DEPICTS SEVERAL CATEGORIES 01= HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS

IN THE DEEP BATTLE AREA, THE DESTRUCTiON OF WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY

REDUCES THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO MASS OVERWHELMING COMBAT

POWER. THESE CATEGORIES OF TARGETS ARE ALWAYS HIGH PRIORITY. TO

BE ATTACKED BY ANY AVAILABLE RESOURC~; THE PROBABILITY OF THEIR

DESTRUCTION IS SIGNIFICANTLY !NCREAS~J WHEN ATTACKED BY NU~LEAR

WEAPONS.

A-58

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):» I

U1 \0

DEEP BATTLE AREA

_r-AREA - - - OF - - -INFLUENCE - 1 OEEr BA TTU AREA (CBAI

- _ ... - - -- - - - -- - - - -- -......- - --COVERltiG FORCE AREA (efA)

: . .AlII I .. OAm ... EA I '"'" :

t------"'''--'=='''''-.~ JIll. " ....... .

RUR AilU IfUil

------------X X X -----------.....

• NUCLEAR DELIVERY (:::"BTRY)

• NUCLEAR SUPPORT UNITS

• CPs (~DlV)

.. FRONT AIR ASSETS

• MANEUVER UNITS (BN ( +) )

• LOGISTICS fORMATIONS

29

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THE MEANS AVAILABLE TO CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE DEEP BATTLE AREA ARE LIMITED, REOIJIRING A JOINT EFFORT BY BOTH AIR AND GROUND FORCES. TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISANCE AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE COLLECT I ON MEANS FOCIJS ON HIGH PR lOR ITY AREAS AND UN ITS I N THE DEEP BATTLE AREA WHILE ALSO MAINTAINING A CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PICTURE OF ENEMY ~ORCES THROllGH THE AREA OF INTEREST. ~1OST

ATTACKS IN THIS AREA ARE MADE BY TACTICAL AIR /;;iD GROUND-LAUNCHED SYSTEMS. BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION PLAYS A MAJOR ROLE, BUT IT MUST BE CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED TO ASSURE UNITY OF EFFORT WITH THE COMMANDER'S OVERALL SCHEME OF MANEUVER FOR THE DEFENSE. ACCORDINGLY, COMBAT ACTIONS IN THE DEEP BATTLE AREA ARE PLANNED AND COORDINATED BY THE BATTLE COORDINATION TEAM AT CORPS.

VU-GRAPH 29 OFF

VU-GRAPH 30 ON

COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THC COVERING FORCE AREA ARE DESIGNED TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ATTACKING ENEMY FORCESt TO DEVELOP THE BATTLEFIELD SITUATION AND TO DEFEAT OR DELAY THE ENEMY'S ASSAULT ECHELONS. WHILE MAJOR BATTLES MAY BE FOUGHT IN ':HE COVERING FORCE AREA, THE PRIMARY GOAL IS TO CAUSE THE ENEMY TO PREMATURELY DISCLOSE HIS MAIN EFFORT. SUCH PREi1ATURE CONCENTRATION OF FORCf:S PROVIDES EXCELLENT TARGETS FOR ATTACK BY GROUND A~D AIR DELIVERED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE TO THE COM~ANDER. WITHIN THE COVERING FORCE AREA, NUCLEAR TARGETS ARE GENERALLY LIMITED TO MANEUVER FORCES, FIRE SUPPORT MEANS AND DIVISr

A-60

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r- -AREA- --OF---IXFlUENCE_ 1

) DEEP BAtTLE ~REA (OBAI

---------------.--.--COVERING fORCE AREA (CfA,

MAIN BATTLE AREA (1II8A) x X

--------xx-------->--------------4 RlAR AREA (RA)

-----"--------- X X X -- -'

• DEVELOP SITUATION

• • DELAY ENEMY

• • IDENTIFY MAIN EFFORT

• NUCLEAR USE

• • MANEUVER

• • FIRE SUPPORT

• • DlV CPs

• • CANALIZE

• DEEP BATTLE CONTINUES

• MBA AND RA ADJUSTMENTS

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CONTROL FACILITIES. OTHER POTENTIAL USES ()l: ~JUCLEAR HEAPONS

INCLlJDE CREATION OF OBSTACLES TO CANAL rZE EMIrw FORCES INTO

PREFERRED AREAS AND TO ALLOW DISENGAGEMENT OF t~£AVILY COMf1ITTED

FORCE.

WHILE THE COVERING FORCE IS FIGHTING THE ENEMY'S ASSAULT

ECHELONS, COMBAT OPERATIONS AGAINST FOllOH-ON AnD SUPPORT FORCES

CONTINUE IN THE DEEP RATTLE AREA AND PREPARATfON OF THE MAIN

BATTLE AND REAR AREAS IS AOJ!JSTED TO Accor1MODATE DEVELOPMENTS IN

TI1E COVERING FORCE BATTLE.

VU-GRAPH 30 OFF

VU-GRAPH 31 ON

COMBAT OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IN THE MAIN RATTLE AREA TO

CONTROL OR REPEL ENEMY PENETRATIONS, TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES AND

TO CREATE OPPORTIJNITIES TO ATTACK AND REGAIN THE INITIATIVE.

THERE IS AN ABUNDANCE OF TARGETS SUIT.~RLE FOR 'l~TTACK BY NIJCLEAR

WEAPONS: THOSE OF PRIMARY INTEREST ARE MANEUVER ITS OF COMPANY­

SIZE AND lARGER, CONCENTRATED FIRE SUPPORT MEM{) AND REGIMENTAL

AND HIGHER COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES.

THE RANGE OF OPTIONS l:,AT ARE AVAILABLE IN THE i"lIA Ft\lLS WITHIN A

CONTINUUM OF BOTH STATIC AND DYNAMIC ACTIONS. '~HE STATIC END OF

THE CONTIrJUUM IS MORE ORIENTED TOHARn CONTROL OF TERRA IN AND

RELIES HEAVILY ON FIREPOWER. THE DYNAMIC FOmS[S MORE ON THE

A-62

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E~EMY AND DEPENDS ON BOTH MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES. OPTIMUM OPERATIONAL ART COMRINES THESE ACTIONS AS APPROPRIATE TO DECISIVELY DEFEAT LARGE FORMATIONS.

DEFENSES ARE GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED BY A COMBINATION OF TERRAIN­ORIENTED STRONGPOINTS AND HIGHLY MOBILE RESERVES, AIR AND GROUND-DELIVERED FIRE SUPPORT -- CONVENTIONAL, NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL -- IS IJSED AS THE DECISIVE ~EANS TO DESTROY ENEMY FORCES BEFORE THEY REACH THE MAIN BATTLE AREA.

VU-GRAPH 31 OFF

VI f -GRAPH 32 ON

STRONGPOINTS ARE ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE DEPTH OF THE MBA. THEIR SIZE AND DISPOSITION ARE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN AND TOPOGRAPHY, OPPOSING FORCES AND THEIR MISSION OR PURPOSE. THEY ARE ORGANIZED WITH MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCES TO BE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING AND REINFORCED RY FIRE SUPPORT MEANS. PROTECTION AND SURPRISE ARE ENHANCED BY CONCEALMENT, PHYSICAL PREPARATION AND TIMELY OCCUPATION. STRONGPOINTS ARE USED TO DELAY THE ENEMY, TO CONTROL AND CANALIZE HIM INTO AREAS WHERE HE MAY BE NEUTRALIZED OR DESTROYED AND TO CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR AGGRESSIVE COIINTERATTACKS.

VU-GRAPH 32 OFF

A-64

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VU-GRAPH 33 ON OHJH£lIP)

THE DECISIVE COMPONENT OF THE OVERALL DEFENSE IS A HIGHLY MORILE,

~ARD HITTING RESERVE TO CONDUCT SPOILING ATTACKS AND TO COUNTER-

ATTACK ENE",Y FORCES AT A DECISIVE TIME AND PLACE. (PAIISE)

VU-GRAPH 33 OFF

VII-GRAPH 34 ON

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND OTHER FIRES, CREATE OPPURTUNITIES FOR THE

COUNTERATTACK IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. THEY BLlJm OR STOP THE PEN­

ETRATION, SEAL THE BASE OF THE PENETRATION AID ISOLATE ASSAULT

ECHELONS. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ALSO USED TO CREATE GAPS IN THE

PENETRATION THROUGH WHICH MANEUVER FORCES COUNTERATTACK,

HOWEVER, AS A GENERAL RULE COUNTERATTACK AGAn~SJ I NHERENT ENEMY

WEAKNESSES SUCH AS AN EXPOSED FLANK OFFERS tH£ BEST OPPORTIJN ITY

FOR SIJCCESS. DURING THE ACTUAL COIJNTERATTACK NttllCLEAR WEAPONS, AND

OTHER FIRE SUPPORT MEANS, ARE USED TO DESTRO~ MASSED FORMATIONS

WITHIN THE PENETRATION: PROTECT FLANKS FROIt COUNTERATTACK BY

DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY FORCES OR BY CREATION OF iilBSTACLES; DESTROY

BY-PASSED FORMATIONS: CREATE FURTHER OPPORTtJiiUTIES FOR EXPLOI­

TATIoN: AND DENY THE ENEiW USE OF CRITICAL ARE~S. NUCLEAR i~Ei\PONS

ARE ALSO USED AS HIGHLY FLEX I RLE ~ESERVES I ASAJ}' ECONOMY OF FORCE

MEAS!JRE TO CREATE SUFFICIENT:"Y LARGE RESER¥'tS TO DECISIVELY

DEFEAT THE ENEMY AND TO PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY THAT ALLOWS

SMALLER MANEUVER FORCES TO DEFEAT LARGER [01'1B/\T FORMATIONS •

A-66

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A-67

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r--- AREA - - - OF - - - INFl.UENCE --- 1

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BATflE AREA (IIBA) Jt X

l --xx Ill: All AIlEA IRAI

.... -----. X X X ---.... -.-.------.----

• CONTINUUM OF STATIC AND DYNAMIC

• • STRONG p(JnHS

• .MOBILE RESERVES

• NUCLEAR USE

CD .AGAINST PENETRATION

s eFLANK PROTECTION

.. -CONTROL TERRAIN

8 8RESERVES

• 8ECONOMY OF FORCE

., DEEP BATTLE CONTINUES

• RA ADJUSTMENTS

y

34

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OUR ING THE MBA BATTLE, COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE fiBEP BATTLE AREA

CONCENTRATE ON FOLLOW-ON AND SUPPORT FORCES SlliSTAINING THE

ENEMY'S MAIN ATTACK. FORCES IN THE REAR ,'~REA REACT TO

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MBA BY REDIRECTING PRIORITY ((IF SllPPORT AND

CONCIJRRENTLY PLANNING FOR THE DEFENSf: OF THE REAR .AREA.

VU-GRAPH 34 OFF

VIJ-GRAPH 35 ON

THE REAR AREA IS AN EQUAL COMPO~IENT OF THE OVE;~All Dr:FENS IVE

BATTLE. THE THREAT TO T~E REAR AREA RANGES FROM :£INGLE AGENTS i

SABOTE'JRS AND TERRORISTS TO AIRBORNE, AIRMOBILE!P;ND AMPHIBIOUS

FORCES AS LARGE AS DIVISIONS, -HHILE THE COMMAND5f MIIST SIJSTAIN

HIS MAIN DEFENSIVE EFFORT, HE CANNOT IGNORE THESE THREATS TO HIS

REAR AREA. AIRMOBILE FORCES, ATTACK HELICOPTERS ~lD AIR CAVALRY

UNITS, CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND MECHANIZED FORCES A~Jf PARTICULARLY

WELL-SUITED FOR REAR AREA'COMBAT OPERATIONS. TH8~E MAY ALSO BE

OPPORTUNITIES TO USE LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ELIMINATE

MASSED FORMATIONS IN THE REAR, PARTICULARLY WITHIJ AIRHEADS AND

LANDING ZONES ESTABLISHED BY ENEMY FORCES.

VU-GRAPH 35 OFF

VU-GRAPH 36 ON

A-70

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r

• THREAT

•• SINGLE AGENTS .. • • DIVISION FORMATIONS

• DEFENDING FORCES

•• HIGHLY MOBILE REACTIONARY FORCES

•• NUCLEAR WEAPONS - -AIRHEADS AND LZs

35

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT-DEFENSE

.. _ cO~JnokT~R.R.~.I~ .,{Y;;Ifr1tT~:I~(;~<;.{, .. :;~·:~;if'··;f·>;·,t·i:t>:'0c\r,,'.~,."'l% _iPESTRO'l fontEflH PENE.TRATlOMS"~:i'Z>\<C(·' " -:'i . . . i., \' ., .".~ ........ ' ... , .... , .. ,

•. ,.', ECONOMY Of FORCE ;: ",

• CREATE OffENSIVE OPPORTUNITIES

• PROTECT FORCES DURING COUNTERATTACKS

• HIGUL Y FLEXIBLE RESERVES

PLACE ENEMY AT RISK TUROUGIIOUT AREA OF INfLUENCE

,

36

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c)Oj;t4j.si Q}( t<}Z.'. 'F(U):c)t¥):',tR 'f.s .. ;}. ~.,e:9.Q:S.f.;. D ·yt.P«?y'.£";:;" <.s.. //.J, -'-, J ,0:;:;9.:;.:'-' 29 .?-',9!-'.5'.f,,;;.~':,'. ~·'2) .".t

IN SUM, DEFENSE IS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT, ~FENSIVE ACTIONS MUST

PREVAIL - EVEN DUR ING THE DEFENSE - TO MRCOME SOVIET -STYLE

OPERATIONS. NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAY BE USED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS TO

ASSURE SIJCCESS.

VU-GRAPH 36 OFF

VU-GRAPH 37 ON

. IN A NlICLEAR ENVIRONMENT, SURVIVABILITY MEMI1RES AND PRACTICES

TAKE ON ADDED IMPORTANCE ANn BECOME En~ P~RTNERS TO THE

I NTERRELA TED PR I NC I PLES , BAS I.C TENETS AND Ir1PERAT I YES OF

CONTEMPORARY WARFARE. THE SPEC IFIC APPL ICJ.VJ11t:ml OF PROTECTIVE

MEASURES IS DICTATED BY THE MISSION OF EACH OR&tl:HZATION AND THE

THREAT TO THE ORGANIZATION. FURTHER, IT MUST HE RECOGNIZED THAT

RISK IS INHERENT IN WAR AND IS INVOLVED IN EVERY MISSION. IT IS

COMMON TO BOTH ACTION AND INACTION, BUT INACTItDN DOES NOT HIN

BATTLES, RISKS ARE ALSO. RELATED TO GA IN, NORMALLY', GREATER GA I NS

REQUIRE TA.KING GREATER RISKS. AT TIMES, LESS T~XN OPTIMAL FORCE

SECURITY AND PROTECTION MAY BE NECESSARY DUE TO CALCULATED RISKS

INHERENT IN BOLD AND DECISIVE MILITARY OPERATIO~,§.

SURVIVABILITY IN ANY BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT~~SULTS FROM THE

COMBINED APPLICATION OF SOUND PROTECTIVE MEASURIT AND OPERATIONAL

PRACTICES THAT REDUCES VULNERABILITY TO DETECTIGrJ I TO .ATTACK IF

DETECTED AND TO DESTRUCTION IF ATTACKED, HO~JfVER I IT MUST BE

RECOGN IZED THAT ~'EASURES TO REDUCE VULNERAB I L rTY TO ONE FORM OF

A-73

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A-74

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I ATTACK MAY INCREASE VULNERABILITY TO OTHER FORMS OF ATTACK AND

MAY DETRACT FROM THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCE. FOR

EXAMPLE, DISPERSION MAY REDUCE VULNERABILITY FROM NUCLEAR

ATTACKS, BUT IT INCREASES VULNERABILITY TO INFILTRATION AND

POSSIBLE DEFEAT IN DETAIL. MOBILITY, OFFENSIVE MM!EUVERS AND

OTHER MEASURES ARE EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING VULNERABILITY.

AGGRESSIVE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING KEEPS THE COMMANDER INFORMED OF

THE ENEMY, PERMITS TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE COU~TERMEASURES AND

PREVENTS PREMATURE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES. IT IS PARTIC~'_ARLY

IMPORT~NT TO OR lENT THE INTELl I GENCE SYSTEM TOWARD I DENTIFY I NG

WEAKNESSES IN THE ENEMY'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE-TO-TARGET SEQUENCE.

THE ENEMY HAS A SOPHISTICATED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM THAT INCLUnI:S

RESOURCES TO MONITOR COMMUNICATIONS, LOCATE EMITTERS, CONTROL

AGENTS LOCATED DEEP IN REAR AREAS AND SEE THE BATTLEF IELD FROM

"

• · · · .. .. J ".

-'-· . ...

'. OVERHEAD. COUNTERMEASURES TO THE ENEMY I NT ELL I GENCE COLLECT ION ,

:-EFFORT ARE DERIVED FROM THE FOUR ~AIN PARTS OF OPERATIONS •

SECURITY; DECEPTION, INFORMATION SECURITY, PHYSICAL SECURITY AND

SIGNAL SECURITY. IN PARTICULAR, OPERATIONS SECURITY MUST PREVENT

DISCLOSURE OF PLANNED NUCLEAR USE TO PRECLUDE PREEMPTION.

OTHER COUNTERMEAURES INCLUDE CONCEALMENT OF SIGNATURES, PROFILES

AND PATTERNS. SIGNATURES DERIVE FROM PHYSICAL PRESENCE, PROFILES

DERIVE FROM UNIT ACTIVITY AND PATTERNS DERIVE FROM DOING THINGS

THE SAME WAY EACH AND EVERY TIME.

A-75

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IT WILL NEITHER BE POSSIBLE NOR DESIRABLE TO tifrf,AIN A DEGREE OF

DISPERSION THAT IS DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO T~. THREAT NUMBERS

AND YIELDS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FORMATIONS TOc) lHSPERSED INVITE

DEFEAT IN DETAIL. THERE IS NO MATHEMATICAL lIRlflJI OF THUMB" THAT

IS IJNJ.VERSALLY APPLICABLE TO DISPERSION. THE DEGREE OF DIS­

PERSION POSSIBLE IS THAT WHICH PERMITS MISSIQf.' ACCOMPLISHMENT

WHILE NOT SUBJECTING THE FORCE TO UNACCEPTABLE !rISK. CONSIDER­

ATION OF PHYSICAL SEPARATION DISTANCES - IN ISOLATION - IS

MEANINGLESS.

IN MANY INSTANCES, THE SAME MEASURES THAT rmOVIDE SECURITY

AGAINST DETECTION ALSO PROVIDE A DEGREE OF PRffECTION AGAINST

ATTACK, OR MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF BEING AI17:~CKED. TERRAIN

SHIELDING NOT ONLY MINIMIZES THE RISKS OF DEtECTION, BUT ALSO

REDUCES THE EXTENT AND DEGREE OF \~EAPONS EFFECTS., ANY COVER, TO

INCLUDE NATURAL VEGETATION, REDUCES THERMAL R~HATION SIGNIFI­

CANTLY AND MAY EVEN DIMINISH THE INTENSITY OF NlliLEAR RADIATION.

NATURAL AND MANMAn!: TERRAIN FEATURES MODIFY BLAST WAVES AND I

PARTICULARLY ON REVE~St SLOPES, DIMINISH THE 'INTENSITY OF THE

SHOCK FRONT. STArWARD PROTECTION PRACTICES suer AS DIGGING IN,

FOXHOLES ~ 1 TH OVERHEAD COVER AND BUTTONING UP /m~'ORED VEHICLES

ATTENUATE ALL 11IJCLEAR EFFECTS.

IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE SURVIVABILITY AGAINST NUCLEAR

ATTACK, AT LEAST TO FORWARD ELEMENTS OF CLOSE mMBAT FORCES, BY

CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY, COMMANDERS ARE ADVISED ;rrj EMPLOY AGGRES­

S I VE MANEUVER Arm OFFENS I VE ACT IONS THAT CONTR ElUTE BOTH TO THE

A-76

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. OBJECTIVE OF THE OVERALL OPERATION AND TO O'l(BWALL FORCE SIJRVIV-

,

· • .. -« .. " · '.

• I

ABILITY. THESE ARE BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY INFItifRATNG AT MULTIPLE

POINTS, CONDUCTING SPOILING ATTACKS AND f)Tf:tElRl'~JISE INTJ:RLOCKING

'0/ ITH THE ENEMY. '. '>

•

YU-GRAPH 37 OFF

VU-GRAPH 38 ON

REGARDLESS OF MEASIJRES TAKEN TO ENHANCE FO:~[E SURVIVABILITY I

CLOSE COMBAT FORCES CANNOT OPERATE WITH TOT~L IMPUNITY ON THE

MODERN BATTL~FIELD. IN PARTICULAR, THE NUCLEAW ENVIRONMENT DOES

NOT ALLOW THE LUXURY OF LONG PE:1S0NNEL AND MAJE~IEL PIPELINES AND

WITHDRAWAL AND REHABILITATION OF UNITS. REOfR~~NIZATION, RECON­

STITUTION AND RESTORATION WILL BE ACCOMPL ISHHa ... AT LEAST INITI­

ALLY, FROM RESIDUAL ASSETS. IN ADDITIONT@ THE ACTIVE AND

PASSIVE MEASURES TO PHYSICALLY REDUCE VULNERAB:HL.HY, TRAINING AND

PRUDENT TASK ORGANIZATION ASSIST IN MAINTAINMliJi, OR REGENERATING

COMBAT POWER. PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION AND (CROSS TRAINING IN

INDIVIDUAL TECHNICAL SKILLS FACILITATE UNINTER~~PTED PERFORMANCE

OF CRITICAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND KEY COMBAT TASKS. FURTHER,

CLOSE COMBAT FORCES NOT ONLY MUST BE COMPOSE])) OF COMB INED ARMS

ELEMENTS, THEY MUST ALSO CONTAIN SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FORCES TO

SIMPLIFY THE RECONSTITUTION OF TEAMS, CREWS AmID UNITS. IN THE

FINAL ANALYSIS, THE MORE SURVIVABLE AND THE BEfTER PREPARED THE

UNIT IS TO ABSORB A NUCLEAR ATTACK, THE LESS EFFORT REQUIRED TO

MAINTAIN AND REGENERATE C0i1BAT PO~IER.

A-77

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SURVIVABILITY EFFORTS

•

SURVIVABILITY

• RISK

• OPERATIONS SECURITY

,. CONCEALMENT

• DISPERSION

• SHIELDI~:G

• INTERLOCKING

I . ~ • RECONSTITUTION EFFORTS

38

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VU-GRAPH 38 OFF

VtJ-GRAPH 39 0N

IT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SUCCESS OF CONTEMPOR,'ffiY OPERATIONS AND

TACTICS THAT ALL A IRLAND FORCES ARE EMPLOYED UN A COORDI NATED I

INTEGRATED AND SYNCHRONIZED MANNER TO ATTA:lf~' OVERALL OBJEC-

/ TIVES. AIR FORCES ARE AN EQUAL PARTNER, AS '~lE THE FUNCTIONAL

AREAS OF GROUND COMBAT POWER. THE FOREGOING Mif BRIEF OUTLINr: OF

THE REQU IREMENTS FOR EACH OF THE FIJNCT rONAL ;fI~EAS PROVI DES At!

UMBRELLA AND SETS THE STAGE FOR PROPONENTS TID DEVELOP DETA I NED

DOCiRINE, TACTICS AND PROCEDURES FOR OPERATE[NS IN A NUCLEAR

ENVIRONMENT. F9R REASONS OF TIr1E, I WILL DISCIJ~:; ONLY TWO OF THE

FUNCTIONAL AREAS - CLOSE Cor~BAT AND COMBAT SERVilCE SUPPORT I

VU-GRAPH 39 OFF

VU-GRAPH 40 ON

CLOSE COMBAT ELeMENTS ARE NORMALLY COMBINED /~Rr"S TEAMS WHICH

INCLUII INFANTRY, ARMOR, ARTILLERY AND COMBAT EmINEERS A3 !\PPRO­

PR lATE TO MISS ION AND OPE RAT rONAL ENVI RONMENf], \fHTH :XTERNAL

SUPPORT PROVIDED ON AN AS-NEEDED BASIS. INA NUCLEAR ENVIRON­

MENT, COMBINED ARMS TEA...,S MUST HAVE THE AGILIlY: TO REPETITIVELY

GENERATE DECISIVE COMBAT PQWER TO ACCOMPLISH fA VARIETY OF TASKS

AND MISSIONS WITHOUT THE NEED TO tFFECT MAJOH CHANGES IN TA:\K

ORGANIZATION, THESE TEAMS ~lUST BE CAPABLE OF SEI11-INDEPENDENT

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FUNCTIONAL AREAS

• CLOSE COMBAT

... COMMAtm AND CONTROL

• AIR SUPPORT

• FIRE SUPPORT

• AIR DEFENSE

• COMMUNICATIONS

• INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

., ENGINEER AND MINE WARfARE

., COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

39

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CLOSE COMBAT

• COMBINED ARMS TEAMS

• RELATIVELY STABLE TASK ORGANIZATION

• SEMI·INDEPENDENT OPERATll,:!S

• SELF·SUFFICIENT

• HIGhLY MOBILE

• SIMPLE, REDUNDANT COMMAND AND CONTROL

• DISPERSION

., PROTECTION

ORGANIZE AND TRAIN IN PEACE AS THEY WILL FIGHT IN WAR

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OPERATIONS FOR PROLONGED PER IODS WITHOUT EXTENS I'lE EXTERNAL SUP­

PORT; THIS REOUIRES A HIGH DEGRE~ OF SELF-SUFFICI8~'Y. IN SHORT,

THE FULL SPECTRUM OF COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT AND (COMBAT SERVICE

SUPPORT PERSONNEL, SKILLS AND CAPA.AILITIES MUSTMf INTRINSIC TO

THE COMB I NED ARMS TEAMS. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COf1mrNED ARMS TEAM

MUST BE ABLE TO TRAVERSE LAR GE AREAS OF THE BATTLEF I ELD kAP I DL Y

TO TAKE ON NEW MISSIONS. THEY t111ST HAVE SUFFICIENT MOBILITY AND

COMMAND AND CONTROL MEANS TO OPERATE AS A TE;\ft\ IN 0 I SPERSED

AREAS, RAPIDLY MASS AT CRITICAL TIMES AND PLACES AND REDISPERSE

BEFORE THE ENEMY CAN REACT. DISPERSION MUST PRO,ITDE A DEGREE OF

SEPARATION BETWEEN COMBINED ARMS TEAMS AND WlnmN TEP,MS. THE

COMBINED ARMS TEAMS MUST HAVE COMPLEMENTARY CAPAB'ILITIES TO PRO-

VI DE PROTECTION AND SECUR ITY. THESE INCLUDE GilOUND AND AIR

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MEANS. CONCEAU~ENT AND IfCEPTION MEANS

AND ANTI-PERSONNEL, ANTI-ARMOR AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT flRES. PERHAPS

MOST IMPORTANT, EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THESE DIVEFSE ASSETS IN A

SYNCHRONIZED MANNER REQUIRES THAT COMBINED ARMS fEAt1S ORGANIZE

AND TRAIN IN PEACE AS THEY WILL FIGHT IN WAR.

VU-GRAPh 40 OFF

VU:-GRAPH 41 ON

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IS THE LIFE-LINE OF AIRLMD FORCES. IT

INCLUDES THE PROVISION OF· SUPPLIES, MAINTENMfE, SERVICES,

ENERGY, MEDICAL, TRANSPORTATION AND PERSONNEL ADMftISTRATION SUP­

PORT, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MUST BE ECHELONED OrGANIZATIONALLY

A-82

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COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

• ECHELONED ORGANIZATIONALLY AND GEOGRAPHICALLY

• SMALL, SPECIALLY TAILORED TEAMS - MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS

" ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ABOVE AUTHORIZED LEVELS

• CACHES Of ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES

• PUSH PACKAGES

• AERIAL DELIVERY

• TIMEL Y TREATMENT OF MASS CASUAL TIES

• RAPID RECONSTITUTION

"ROUTINE, BUS:NESS AS USUAL" COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT IN A NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT IS AN INVITATWN FOR DISASTER.

41

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THROUGHOUT THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND GEOGRAPHICALLY THROUGHOUT THE

AREA OF OPERATIONS, TO I NCLUDE ~AX IMUM USE OF S~'ALL, SPEC I ALL Y

TAILORED TEAMS TO AccnMPLISH MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS WELL ~ORWARD •

MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO ASSURE AVAILABILITY OF ESSENTIAL

COMMOOITIES WHERE AND WHEN NEEDED DURING PERIODS CHARACTERIZED BY

EXTRE~ VIOLENCE, STRESS AND CONFUS ION. CLOSE COt<iBAT ~ORCES I1IJST

MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES AT OR ABovE AUTHORIZED LEVELS,

ESPEC IALLY WHEN STARTING NEW OPERATIONS OR BATTL::S. CACHES OF

ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES MUST BE POSITIONED THROUGHOIIT THE MAIN

BATTLE AREA, AND PERHAPS THE COVERING FORCE AREAL WHERE THEY ARE

IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO THE COMBINED ARMS TEAMS. THESE CACHES

MUST BE REPLEN I SHED I ABANDONED OR DESTROYED AS THE S I TUAT I ON

DICTATES AND NEW ONES ESTABLISHED TO SUPPORT THE SCHEME OF

MANEUVER. 1/: JSH PACKAr,ES" OF ESSE NT I AL CONSUt~ABLES MUST BE

DELIVERED TO DEPLOYED FORCES ON A ROUTINE AND SCHEDULED PASIS.

AERIAL DELIVERY MAY BE THE ONLY MEANS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH

THIS MISSION. RESUPPLY MlJST TAKE PLACE DURP~G THE HOURS OF

DARKNESS ,~ND PERIODS OF REDUCED VISIBILITY,

MEDICAL TRIAGE, TREATMENT AND EVACUATION OF CASUALTIES MUST BE

ACCOMPLISHED RAPIDLY AND ON A LARGE SCALE. RECONSTITUTION OF

BOTH COMBINED ARMS ANO COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT tAPABIL!TIES MUST

BE ACCOMPLISHED RAPIDLY TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE FIEHTING FORCES.

A-84

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IN SUM, "ROIJTI~E, BUSINESS AS USUAL" COMBAT SERVICE SuoPORT IN A

NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT IS AN PNITAT ION TO DISASTER.

VU-GRAPH 41 OFF

VU-GRAPH 42 ON

BY WAY OF SUMMft,RY, THIS CONCEPT PRESCRIBES THE GENERAL WAY IN

WHICH CORPS AND BELOW CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR

ENVIRONMENT. IT ADDRESSES THE EFFECT lVE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR.

WEAPONS AND, EQUALLY IMPORTANT, THE NEED FOR STR INGENT

SIJRVIVAB ILITY AND RECONSTITUT ION MEASIJRES. IT IS COMPLEMENTARY

TO AND SUPPORTIVE OF CURRENT AND EVOLVING OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS.

IT PROVIDES THE UMBRELLA FOR PROPONENTS TO DEVELOP SUPPORTING

DOCTRINE, MATERIEL, FORCE STRUCTURES, TACTICS AND TRAINING

DIRECTED TOWARD A DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT SUCCESSFUL

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT. THE CONCEPT

ACKNOWLEDGES DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THE FAl.E OF THE BATTLEFIELD:

HOWEVER, THESE CHANGES CREATE OPPORTUN 1 TIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF

SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS IN DEPTH. SIJCH SUCCESS IS DEPENDENT ON

RAPID RECOGNITION OF THESE OPPORTUNITIES .GND THE TIMELY

APPLICATION OF FIRE AND MANEUVER FORCES. THE U.S. ARMY WITH ITS

GREATER DECENTRALIZATION OF CONTROL AND UNIT INITIATIVE IS BETTER

ABLE THAN SOVIET STYLE FORCES TO SUCCEED IN THIS ENVIRONMENT,

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»0 , CQ 0'1

SUMMARY

• NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT - VIOLENCE, STRESS, CONFUSION, OPPORTUNITY

• TWO ELEMENTS TO UNDERSTAND AND MASTER

EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SURVIVABILITY AND RECONSTITUTION

• THIS CONCEPT

- PRESCRIBES GENERAL WAY CORPS AND BELOW FIGHT

COMPLEMENTARY TO AND SUPPORTIVE OF OTHER CONCEPTS

PROVIDES UMBRELLA FOR PROPONENTS TO DEVELOP

DOCTRINE

MATERIEL

FORCE STRUCTURES

TACTICS

TRAINING

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VIJ-GRAPH 42 OFF

( ) THIS CONCLUDES MY PRESENTATIOtJ"WE /I,SK THAT YOU • APPROVE THIS CONCEPT FOR PRESENTATION TO ( ),

• -----

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OISTR1BUTIQ;1 LIST

DEPARTMENT OF OEFeNSE

Armed Forces Staff College ATTN: Library

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Atomic En!!rgy

ATTN: Mil Appl, W. Kahn ATTN: Executive Assistant

Coa~ander-in-Chief, Atlantic ATTN; J7 ATTN; J5

DI!fense Intelligence Agency ATTN: RTS-2C, Tech Svcs 1 Spt ATTN: or ,1

Oefense Nuclear Agency ATTN: WO

4 cy ATTN: TITL

Defense Tech Info Ctr 12 cy ATTN: 00

Field Coamand Defense Nuclear Agency, Oet Lawrence Livermore National Lab

ATTN: Ft-l

Field COIIIII4nd Defense Nuclear Agency, Det Z Los Alamos Nation.l lab/OST

ATTN: 1'IS-635. FC-Z

DNA PACOM llasion Office ATTN; J.8artlett

Field COIl111and Defense Nuclear Agency

ATTN: FCTX( 3 cy ATTN: FCPI?:

Program AnalySiS & (valuation ATTN: Strategh:Prog"UlS ATTN; Regional Progra.s ATTN: General ,~r~:se Programs

Un! ted States Centra I COIII'II"'_! ATTN; CCJl-X, LTC Bn:->;neyel'

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Deputy Chief of Staff for Ops & Plans ATTN; OAMQ./lC. ~uc Chem Oil'

Deputy U,lder Secretary of the Anny ATTN: /I!:r .. lester. "Operations Rsch

US Army Chemical School ATTN: ATZH-C:1-CS

US Army C~~b Arms, Combat Oev Actvy Z cy ATTN: ATZL-CAO-LN

Dist-l

DEPARTMENT OF THE ~P.MY"(Continued)

US Army ~uclear 1 Chemical Agency ATTN: Library

US Army Training and Doctrine Cornd ATTN: ATOO-NCO ATTN: ATCO~~N

OE?ARTMENT OF THE ~AVY

Hi 11 Postgraduate School ATTN; Code 1424, Library

Naval War College ATTN: 12 ATTN: Ctr for War Gaming

DE?ARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Air ~niversjty library ATTN: AUL-LSE

Pacific Air Forces 2 cy ATTN: XPXN, Maj Golohugh

Strategic Air Command ATTN: OOllf

DEPARTMENT OF DEFE~SE CONTRACTORS

CAcr, Inc. Federal ATTN: A. 8erry

JAYCOR ATTN: E. Almquist ATTN:" F. Sullivan

2 c1 ATTN: II. 01 her 2 cy ATTN: R. Smiley 2 cyATTN: G. Tlteroux

JAYCOR ATTN: S.Brutker

~=an Sciences C~I'P ATTN: E. Conrad

Kaman Tempo ATTN: OASIAC

Kaman Tempo ATTN: OASIAC

PaCIfIc-Sierra Rese~rch Corp ATTN: H. BrOde, Chairman SAGE

R&D Associates ATTN: A. Oe'o'eri11

R&O Associate!. ATTN: P. Haas

Ti tan Systems, Inc 2 '1 ATTN: C. Alba

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