Technical Note - TN 009: 2015 Technical Note - TN 009: 2015 Issued date: 09 March 2015 Effective...

Technical Note - TN 009: 2015

© State of NSW through Transport for NSW of 1

For queries regarding this document [email protected]

www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au

Technical Note - TN 009: 2015 Issued date: 09 March 2015

Effective date: 09 March 2015

Subject: Withdrawal of ESI 0021 Provision of Technical Maintenance Plans by External Organisations

This technical note is issued by the Asset Standards Authority as a notification to remove from

use RailCorp document ESI 0021 Provision of Technical Maintenance Plans by External

Organisations, Version 2.1.

ESI 0021 is a legacy document and shall be used for reference purposes only. ASA standard

T MU AM 01003 ST Development of Technical Maintenance Plans, Version 1.0 supersedes this

document.

Authorisation:

Technical content prepared by

Checked and approved by

Interdisciplinary coordination checked by

Authorised for release

Signature

Name Rana Roy Angelo Koutsoukos Toby Horstead Graham Bradshaw

Position Asset Reliability Specialist

Manager Asset Stewardship

Principal Manager Network and Asset Strategy

Principal Manager Network Standards and Services

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.asa.transport.nsw.gov.au/

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PROVISION OF TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE PLANS BY

EXTERNAL ORGANISATIONS

ESI 0021

Engineering Standard Integrated Support

Engi

neer

ing

Stan

dard

Version 2.1

Issued January 2011

Owner: Manager, Integrated Support Unit

Approved Mahesh Gidwani Authorised Jim Modrouvanos by: Manager by: General Manager

Engineering Services Chief Engineers Division

Disclaimer This document was prepared for use on the RailCorp Network only. RailCorp makes no warranties, express or implied, that compliance with the contents of this document shall be sufficient to ensure safe systems or work or operation. It is the document user’s sole responsibility to ensure that thecopy of the document it is viewing is the current version of the document as in use by RailCorp. RailCorp accepts no liability whatsoever in relation to the use of this document by any party, and RailCorp excludes any liability which arises in any manner by the use of this document. Copyright The information in this document is protected by Copyright and no part of this document may be reproduced, altered,stored or transmitted by any person without the prior consent of RailCorp.

UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Page 1 of 31

RailCorp Engineering Standard — Integrated Support Provision of Technical Maintenance Plans by External Organisations ESI 0021

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Version Date Summary of change 1.0 September 2007 First issue 2.0 August 2010 Application of TMA 400 format. Technical review with

updated document references 2.1 January 2011 Integrated Support Unit officer renamed as acceptance

review officer. Removal of RailCorp design reviewer role and responsibility

Summary of changes from previous version

Summary of change Section

© RailCorp Page 2 of 31 Issued January 2011 UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED Version 2.1

e 3 of 31 rsion 2.1

PagVe

© RailCorp Issued January 2011 UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED


Contents

1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................4

2 Scope........................................................................................................................................4

3 Terms used in this document ................................................................................................4

4 References...............................................................................................................................5

5 Roles and responsibilities......................................................................................................5

6 Provision of TMPs – high level process ...............................................................................6

6.1 MRA and TMP development process .......................................................................................7

6.1.1 Claim of similarity.......................................................................................................7

6.1.2 RailCorp assessment of need for MRA .....................................................................7

6.1.3 MRA based TMP .......................................................................................................8

6.1.4 TMP based on RailCorp TMP....................................................................................8

6.2 MRA and TMP review process .................................................................................................9

6.2.1 Independent process and technical review ...............................................................9

6.2.2 Design review ............................................................................................................9

6.3 TMP acceptance and authorisation process...........................................................................10

6.3.1 TMP acceptance review ..........................................................................................10

6.3.2 TMP authorisation....................................................................................................10

7 Documentation ......................................................................................................................10

Appendix A TMP Review and Authorisation Form..................................................................11

1 Project identification.............................................................................................................11

2 Verification of completing analysis and documentation ..................................................11

3 Verification of review completion and certification...........................................................12

4 RailCorp acceptance review and authorisation.................................................................12

Appendix B Typical RailCorp MRA Approach .........................................................................14

1 Process steps........................................................................................................................14

1.1 Identify system / equipment ....................................................................................................14

1.2 Nominate Analysis Team ........................................................................................................14

1.3 Conduct FMECA and RCM Analysis ......................................................................................14

1.4 Review FMECA and RCM Analysis ........................................................................................14

1.5 Package Valid Maintenance Tasks.........................................................................................14

1.6 Prepare Technical Maintenance Plan .....................................................................................14

2 Sample documentation.........................................................................................................14

2.1 Design FMECA report .............................................................................................................15

2.2 MRA report..............................................................................................................................23

2.2.1 TMP service schedule .............................................................................................28

2.2.2 TMP service schedule frequency matrix..................................................................30

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1 IntroductionThis document outlines the process requirements for the provision of Technical Maintenance Plans (TMP) by organisations external to RailCorp.

This process applies to:

• Design coordination • Design of systems • Equipment

where this authority has been delegated to organisations external to rail.

The process also applies to the supply of ‘off the shelf’ systems where the authority to procure them has been delegated to organisations external to RailCorp.

2 Scope This document covers:

• the requirements for developing, certifying and authorising TMPs whether they require the application of Maintenance Requirements Analysis (MRA) or are to be based on existing RailCorp TMPs

• an overview of Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) • an overview of Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) • Task Packaging techniques.

Note: These techniques are described in detail in RailCorp AM 9995 PM Maintenance Requirements Analysis Manual.

This document does not cover:

• the provision of directions as to whether or not a TMP is deliverable • other obligations applicable to the supplier.

3 Terms used in this document Analysis Team the external provider’s team responsible for the analysis, led by a qualified FMECA and RCM Process Facilitator and comprising a group of people with the skill set required for conducting the maintenance requirements analysis.

Authorising officer the RailCorp Chief Engineer for the discipline (or equivalent) who authorises a TMP for field application within RailCorp.

Design FMECA FMECA conducted at design stage. It provides an assessment of component criticality and opportunities to design out failure modes.

Design reviews TMP development review, generally conducted at the project’s Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews. RailCorp review by staff with MRA process competency and staff with appropriate discipline competencies, or as designated by the authorising officer.

FMECA Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis.

FMECA and RCM process facilitator an appropriately qualified analysis team leader who can apply MRA techniques.


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Independent MRA process reviewer an appropriately qualified and experienced person who reviews and certifies the MRA process followed by the analysis team.

MRA a process for the development of preventive maintenance programs by the application of Design FMECA/FMECA and Reliability-Centred Maintenance (RCM) techniques.

Mimir RailCorp proprietary MRA software incorporating Design FMECA / FMECA and RCM techniques.

MRA Detailed Report report produced by the Mimir software.

RCM maintenance based on the inherent reliability of equipment in its operating context, directed at achieving the required levels of safety and reliability at the minimum life-cycle cost.

Task packaging the aggregation of individual valid maintenance tasks into logical packages to form service schedules

TMP maintenance policy that includes service schedules and service schedule frequencies

4 References AM 9995 PM Maintenance Requirements Analysis Manual

5 Roles and responsibilities The following roles and responsibilities are applicable throughout the processes outlined below.

Role Responsibility

Acceptance review officer Conducts RailCorp acceptance review of the MRA and the completed TMP

Authorising officer Authorisation of the TMP for implementation

External Provider’s analysis team

Conducting FMECA and RCM analysis under the guidance of a process facilitator

FMECA and RCM process facilitator

Leads the external provider’s analysis team

Independent MRA process reviewer

Reviews and certifies that the TMP analysis process satisfies the requirements laid down in the Maintenance Requirements Analysis Manual or equivalent established industry practice for MRA

Independent technical reviewer Technical verification and certification that the MRA and TMP comply with the user requirements, standards and RailCorp practice


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6 Provision of TMPs – high level process


Figure 1

An MRA shall be conducted as part of the design process if the designs, systems and equipment are either new or the result of a modified configuration. If the equipment is to be purchased and no design changes are intended, the basis for using an existing TMP shall be established.

The process outlined above is an iterative process. The number of iterations will depend on the proposed design, system or equipment.

TMP reviews shall coincide with the design, system and equipment reviews in accordance with RailCorp Engineering Design Management Procedures (EPD series) or as directed by the authorising officer.

Unless agreed to by RailCorp the first MRA and TMP review should be completed at the System Concept Review (SCR).

Note: The Design FMECA part of the MRA shall start at the earliest possible point within the design cycle to provide an opportunity to design out failure modes.


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6.1 MRA and TMP development process


Figure 2

6.1.1 Claim of similarity Steps 2.1 and 2.2 above.

MRA is generally required for all proposed designs, systems and equipment unless there is a claim of similarity to an existing design. The basis for such claims shall be provided.

RailCorp assesses the need for MRA.

6.1.2 RailCorp assessment of need for MRA Step 2.3 above.

MRA may not be required if the contractor can demonstrate to RailCorp’s satisfaction that:

• the proposed design, system and equipment is physically similar to RailCorp design, system and equipment and will operate under similar conditions

• the proposed design, system and equipment has an existing maintenance strategy and does not need review

• given RailCorp is satisfied with the performance of the existing system and equipment there is no advantage to RailCorp to undertake an MRA

• there is no advantage in further design out of failure modes • there are no maintenance tasks which can be more appropriately managed by

designing them out

MRA for part of the design, system and equipment may be required at RailCorp’s discretion.


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6.1.3 MRA based TMP Step 2.4 above.

A Design FMECA is required when new system or equipment is being designed.

If MRA is required it will include a FMECA and RCM analysis for failure modes and maintenance tasks which cannot be designed out. The MRA shall be conducted in accordance with RailCorp Maintenance Requirements Analysis Manual AM 9995 PM or equivalent established industry practice for MRA.

The proposed MRA practice should be agreed with RailCorp before commencing the MRA.

If a design, system or equipment is not in service with RailCorp but has a maintenance practice well established in industry, the supplier may propose a lesser degree of rigour for the FMECA / RCM. In this case, the basis for the claim shall be provided and the degree of rigour proposed shall demonstrate that:

• The inherent functional performance of the system and equipment can be maintained under the RailCorp operating and maintenance environment.

• There is no advantage in further design out of failure modes. • There are no maintenance tasks which can be more appropriately managed by

designing them out.

RailCorp will assess the claim and determine whether the degree of rigour proposed is appropriate.

6.1.4 TMP based on RailCorp TMP Step 2.5 above.

If the RailCorp assessment determines that an MRA is not required, the supplier will develop the TMP for the similar design, system or equipment based on the RailCorp TMP. The supplier shall clearly document the TMP and its basis and provide the documentation to RailCorp for review.


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6.2 MRA and TMP review process


Figure 3

6.2.1 Independent process and technical review Step 3.1 above

The external provider shall arrange for:

• an independent review of the MRA process outlined in the analysis and certification of its adequacy (unless using the RailCorp TMP as the basis)

• independent verification of the technical integrity of the proposed TMP and certification of its compliance with standards and RailCorp practice.

The independent reviewers’ competence and expertise shall be presented to RailCorp before the reviewer is appointed and before the reviews begin.

Note: The independent technical review should be conducted by a range of experts to cover all technical requirements subject to verification and certification.

6.2.2 Design review Step 3.2 above

MRA and TMP reviews are conducted as part of the ‘Design Reviews’ process in accordance with EPD 0013 Technical reviews located in the RailCorp Engineering Procedures.

RailCorp participates in the review of designs, systems and equipment, as indicated in SPA 280 Acceptance of engineering design, with appropriate levels of integrated support and discipline technical staff.


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6.3 TMP acceptance and authorisation process


Figure 4

6.3.1 TMP acceptance review Step 4.1 above

RailCorp conducts an acceptance review of the TMP in order to:

• Assess the MRA process followed and the independent process review • Confirm evidence of completion of technical reviews, design reviews and

certifications • Ensure that all supporting documentation has been provided

6.3.2 TMP authorisation Step 4.2 above

A RailCorp authorising officer authorises the TMP following:

• a satisfactory acceptance review (see 6.3.1 above) • a satisfactory technical review • the satisfactory outcome of the design reviews • the determination that the TMP is not in conflict with RailCorp’s safety, reliability

and cost objectives.

Note: Following the completion of authorisation the TMP is published and implemented. This process is covered in a separate document.

7 Documentation Each of the process steps outlined in Section 6 above shall be controlled and tracked using form EDISG 11B (see Appendix A). This tracking shall be repeated for all iterations.

The completed forms and all supporting documentation shall be made available to RailCorp and the final versions of the documents provided to RailCorp before the TMP acceptance review.


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Appendix A TMP Review and Authorisation Form The TMP Review and Authorisation Form EDISG 11B shall be used for tracking the analysis, review and certification of the TMP development. A new form shall be completed for each iteration to record the process, including all reworks.

A cover document identifying the iteration stage, and the scope of the analysis and technical review to which the form relates shall be submitted with the form.

The form is divided into the following four sections.

1 Project identification The Equipment Group Identifier (EGI) (referred to in this form as the Technical Maintenance Code (TMC)) identifies the equipment relevant to the TMP. The design, system and equipment shall be mapped to the relevant TMC identifiers. RailCorp will provide the identifier at the beginning of the TMP process, when requested by the supplier.

New equipment types might result in the need for a number of iterations in this process as the design baseline develops.

The design, system and equipment description is a brief summary of the equipment which is the subject of the TMP.

The project number or identification and the project name are a RailCorp identifier and description provided by RailCorp.

2 Verification of completing analysis and documentation This part of the form provides:

• a checklist for the facilitator • verification of completed work by the analysis team • a list of supporting documentation available for review • a list of documentation subject to independent review.

The form:

• requires the inclusion of team members’ and independent reviewers’ c.v.s and their proposed roles.

• records whether a TMP is to be based in full or in part on an MRA, or on an existing RailCorp TMP, and when these processes have been completed

• records that the supporting ‘Similarity Assessment Documentation’ and the MRA documentation have been provided

• records (if the TMP is not based on an MRA) that documentation has been provided to demonstrate how the TMP has been based on the RailCorp TMP.

Depending on the iteration stage, the analysis might not have progressed beyond the FMECA into the RCM stage. However, in later iterations following completion of the RCM stage or the development of a RailCorp based TMP, the form records the completion and provision of service schedules and a TMP service schedule frequency matrix together with the TMP report summarising the entire process and outcomes.

Additional documentation, if required, shall be recorded – with a description of the documentation – on this form.


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3 Verification of review completion and certification This part of the form provides the certification sign-off by the independent reviewers and identifies the supporting review reports.

• The independent MRA process review analysis and findings shall be documented in an MRA process review report.

• The independent technical review analysis and findings shall be documented in an MRA / TMP technical review report.

• An MRA process review certification is not required if an MRA is not required.

A lead technical reviewer provides the certification sign-off if a design, system and equipment requires more than one independent technical reviewer. An attachment identifying the lead technical reviewer shall be provided to show certification sign-off by each of the independent technical reviewers. All the reviewers’ analyses and findings shall be compiled into one MRA / TMP process review report.

Independent review (Section 6.2.1 step 3.1 above) is required for each iteration in the development of the design, system and equipment.

Form EDISG 11B, with this section completed, and all supporting documentation shall be provided to RailCorp in readiness for each design review. The specific design review shall be clearly marked in the review and certification section of the form.

4 RailCorp acceptance review and authorisation This part of the form will be completed only at the end of the process.

The RailCorp’s acceptance review officer’s signature confirms that RailCorp has completed a TMP acceptance review (Section 6.3.1 step 4.1 above).

The RailCorp authorising officer signs off the TMP when satisfied that it is suitable for implementation.

Either the acceptance review officer or the authorising officer can reject the TMP at this stage and refer it back to the supplier for amendment.


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TMP Independent Certification and Authorisation Form (EDISG 11B) Project Identification

Technical Maintenance Code (TMC)

Design, System and Equipment Description

Project Number or Identification

Project Name:

Verification Checklist Analysis & Documentation Complete

Aspects To Be Checked And Verified

Required Completed Signature / Date

Supporting Documents

CV’s of Team members & Independent Reviewers

YES NO YES NO

_____________

Facilitator Signature

Printed Name

___/____/_____

________________

Team member roles with CV’s and Independent Reviewers’ CV’s

Maintenance Requirements Analysis.

YES NO YES NO Similarity assessment & Detailed MRA Documentation

Other Basis for TMP. YES NO YES NO Similarity assessment & TMP basis document.

Service Schedules. YES NO YES NO Service Schedules.

Technical Maintenance Plan. YES NO YES NO TMP Service Schedule Frequency Matrix / TMP Report.

Other supporting documentation. YES NO YES NO (As applicable)

Review & Certification

Independent Review of MRA process followed by Analysis Team and Certification that the analysis satisfies the requirements laid down in the Maintenance Requirements Analysis Manual or equivalent established Industry practice for MRA.

Required

YES NO

Satisfactory

YES NO

________________ Signature

_

Printed Name

____/____/_____

_______________

Supporting Document

MRA Process Review Report

Independent Technical Verification and Certification that the MRA / TMP complies with the user requirements, relevant standards and RailCorp practice.

Satisfactory

YES NO ________________ Signature

Printed Name

____/____/_____

________________

Supporting Document

MRA/TMP Technical Review Report

The TMP has been independently certified in accordance with RailCorp policies and procedures, has satisfied the requirements of the acceptance review.

TMP Acceptance Review Completed

Signature _____________________ Date ____/____/_____

Printed Name _____________________ Acceptance Review Officer

The TMP is authorised for implementation.

Authorised for Use

Signature Date ____/____/_____ Printed Name

Authorising Officer,__________________

________________________ _________________________


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Appendix B Typical RailCorp MRA Approach (Example Only)

1 Process steps

1.1 Identify system / equipment The MRA starts with the identification of the system and / or equipment to be analysed, the establishment of analysis boundaries and the collection of system operating and failure data. This stage also includes the gathering of configuration documentation, including drawings, specifications and manuals.

1.2 Nominate Analysis Team A suitable analysis team is assembled with a mix of engineering and field maintenance experience relevant to the equipment.

1.3 Conduct FMECA and RCM Analysis The analysis team, led by a process facilitator conducts the FMECA and RCM analysis.

For functional items the analysis is conducted in accordance with AM 9995 PM.

1.4 Review FMECA and RCM Analysis The FMECA and RCM analysis is reviewed in accordance with the requirements laid down in AM 9995 PM. The MRA Report is reviewed to ensure that the Failure Effects, the Criticality groupings (Evident / Safety / Environmental / Operational) and the failure severity assessment are consistent with the failure mode being assessed, and that no reasonably foreseeable failure modes have been overlooked.

1.5 Package Valid Maintenance Tasks The valid maintenance tasks are packaged into service schedules in accordance with the procedures in AM 9995 PM taking into account the type of equipment, the existing staff competencies and the available maintenance windows.

1.6 Prepare Technical Maintenance Plan The Technical Maintenance Plan is prepared identifying which items are to be maintained, what maintenance tasks are to be performed and when and where the maintenance tasks are to be performed. A supplementary report outlining the analysis conducted; the findings and the rationale behind the recommendations accompanies the Technical Maintenance Plan.

2 Sample documentation The following figures provide samples of key documents produced during the TMP development, namely the Design FMECA report, MRA report, TMP Service Schedule and TMP Service Schedule Frequency Matrix.

Note: These samples are included only to illustrate the logic, level of detail and format expected.


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2.1 Design FMECA report


The following examples illustrate the Design FMECA report using an Overhead Wiring System report.

Part A lists the parts which make up the equipment or system, sorted by the part criticality. The ‘part criticality’ relates to the relative probability of failure modes and their consequences. The aim is to determine which parts’ failure modes are critical enough to be considered for redesign to reduce that criticality.

The “part criticality” is drawn from the Design FMECA (see Part B of the report).

Note: The logic of the Part B report format where there is a visible link between the equipment function, the functional failure and the failure mode at part level. The equipment is broken down to a part level that allows the root cause of the functional failure to be clearly identified.

The severity class indicates the worst potential consequence for the failure of the part by the identified failure mode. The effect of the failure locally and the system effect of the failure are described. They assist in the determination of the criticality assessment. The criticality may be either qualitative or quantitative as outlined in AM 9995 PM.

The failure mode criticality for that part is listed at the right of the failure mode record. These are summed for each part to give the “part criticality” in the Part A report.

Note: The compensating provision at this stage of the MRA is focussed on discerning between design, operation and maintenance tasks.


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Design FMECA Report (Part A) Overhead Wiring

Part Name Part Criticality (Desc)

Post type (epoxy) insulator (452/10) Post type (epoxy) insulator mounting arrangement (76/59) Cantilever pivot bracket (both upper or lower) (364/18) Catenary suspension envelope (98/4 or 98/5) Catenary suspension envelope's 19mm diameter pivot pin (120/14) Contact clamp assembly (61/2) attachment to contact wire Vertical support attachment plate (to cantilever jib) Pull-off arm (954/52* Single contact) Vertical support (611/60) Top strut outer tube attachment / adjustment plate (to cantilever jib) Pull-off arm (955/3* & 955/4* 2 required for twin contact system) Cantilever pivot bracket 19mm stainless steel pivot pin (upper or lower) (120/14) Top strut outer tube (611/58) Cantilever jib adustment / attachment 16mm stainless steel pivot pin (top & bottom) (511/52) Catenary support inner tube (611/59) Contact clamp assembly (61/2) attachment to arm Catenary suspension envelope's 16mm shackle assembly (66/8) Catenary suspension envelope's twin connecting link (410/2) Cantilever jib (611/62) Pull-off attachment - outer tube (611/61) Pull-off attachment - inner tube (611/63) Pull-off arm, 16mm (contact stagger adjustment) pin (511/67) Pull-off arm 16mm stainless steel pivot /attachment pin (511/32) (attaches the pull-off arm to the pull-off attachment' s inner tube) Catenary suspension envelope's pivot argt

0.056

5.0E-03

3.0E-03

2.0E-03

2.0E-03

2.0E-03

2.0E-03

2.0E-03

2.0E-03

2.0E-03

2.0E-03

1.5E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

1.0E-03

5.0E-04


17/04/2007 03:17PM Overhead Wiring Page 1 of 1


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Design FMECA Report (Part B) Overhead Wiring

Equipment Function

Function Failure Failure Mode FMEA Remarks Critical Remarks E S E O

EP 08 11 78 00 Chatswood RES Tunnel Cantilever Arrangement Operating Band = N/A

Normal / Hidden

47 Post type (epoxy) insulator mounting arrangement (76/59) drops (slips down) due to lindaptor cleat becoming N N N Y loose. (Normal operation)

Severity Class Category 2 - Critical If the top attachment broke, the cantilever Redundancy has been provided by 4 bolts, arrangement would collapse almost when 2 bolts could keep it in place. immediately. If the bottom attachment broke, the top attachment may be able to support the cantilever short term but complete collapse would be eventuate.

Function: 01) To support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures.

Functional Failure: A) Does not support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures.

Local Effect: The cantilever cant maintain the required height & alignment of the OHW with only one effective attachment to the stanchion. (Possibility of cantilever dropping completely off due to over loaded second attachment) OHW will foul the vehicle envelope.

System Effect: Damage to pantograph, train and OHW. Failure Detection: nil Comp Provision: Design Task Effectiveness % 0

3 Qualitative(A): Fail Mode Ratio: (α)

0.20

Criticality: 1.0E-03

Quantitative (B): Op Time (Years) Fail Effect Prob (β) Cond Fail Rate Funct Fail Rate Design Fail Rate (p.a.)

0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0



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Equipment Function


Chatswood RES Tunnel Cantilever Arrangement EP 08 11 78 00 Operating Band = N/A 19 Post type (epoxy) insulator (452/10) leaks excessive current due to contamination of surface (rain cannot N N N Y

wash insulators clean). (Normal operation) Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal

02) To maintain the specified electrical isolation from the tunnel, bridge and structures. Function: A) Does not maintain the specified electrical isolation from the tunnel, bridge and structures. Functional Failure:

Local Effect: Insulation failure. Extremely small possibility of leaky insulators causing structure to become alive if not spark gapped. In this case work on adjacent isolated OHW is a possible hazard.

System Effect: Over current protection will trip. Line blockage. nil Maintenance Failure Detection: Comp Provision: Task Effectiveness % 90

3 Qualitative(A): Fail Mode Ratio:(α) Criticality:

0.50 0.05

Quantitative (B): Op Time (Years) Cond Fail Rate Funct Fail Rate Fail Effect Prob (β) Design Fail Rate (p.a.)

0.00 0.00 00 0 0.00 0

10 Cantilever pivot bracket (both upper or lower) (364/18) breaks due to wear / corrosion (Normal operation) N N N Y Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal

These are hot dip galvanised and extremely If the top attachment broke, the cantilever unlikely to corrode. Residual risk of arrangement would collapse almost degradation of galvanising and corrosion may immediately. If the bottom attachment broke, be managed by maintenance / condition the top attachment may be able to support the monitoring. cantilever short term but complete collapse

would be eventuate. Function: 01) To support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while

maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures. Functional Failure: A) Does not support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while

maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures. Local Effect: The cantilever cant maintain the required height & alignment of the OHW with only one effective

attachment to the stanchion. (Possibility of cantilever dropping completely off due to over loaded second attachment) OHW will foul the vehicle envelope.

System Effect: Damage to pantograph, train and OHW. Failure Detection: nil Comp Provision: Design Task Effectiveness % 0 3 Qualitative(A): (α) Criticality: Fail Mode Ratio:

0.40 1.0E-03


0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0


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Equipment Function


EP 08 11 78 00 Chatswood RES Tunnel Cantilever Arrangement Operating Band = N/A 11 Post type (epoxy) insulator mounting arrangement (76/59) breaks due to threaded brass inserts pull out N N N Y

under load (over tightened during installation) (Normal operation) Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal

Relatively new technology. The long term tensile / torsional strength of the epoxy insulators has not been demonstrated in service, although testing has shown them to have a safety factor >3.




System Effect: Damage to pantograph, train and OHW. Failure Detection: nil Comp Provision: Design Task Effectiveness % 0

(α) Criticality: 3 Qualitative(A): Fail Mode Ratio: 0.15 1.0E-03


0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0

13 Cantilever pivot bracket 19mm stainless steel pivot pin (upper or lower) (120/14) drops out due to detached N N N Y humpback (split) pin. (Normal operation)

Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal Highly unlikely failure mode if the humpback (split) pin is installed properly.



Local Effect: The cantilever cant maintain the required height & alignment of the OHW with only one effective attachment to the stanchion.

System Effect: (Possibility of cantilever dropping completely off due to over loaded second attachment) OHW will foul the vehicle envelope. Damage to pantograph, train and OHW.

Failure Detection: nil Comp Provision: Nil Task Effectiveness % 0 3 Qualitative(A): (α) Criticality: Fail Mode Ratio:

0.50 1.0E-03


0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0


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Equipment Function


EP 08 11 78 00 Chatswood RES Tunnel Cantilever Arrangement Operating Band = N/A 15 Vertical support (611/60) detaches / breaks due to corrosion of galvanised steel. (Normal operation) N N N Y

Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal These are hot dip galvanised and extremely unlikely to corrode. Residual risk of degradation of galvanising and corrosion may be managed by maintenance / condition monitoring.



Local Effect: Cantilever drops and fouls the vehicle envelope. System Effect: Possibility OHW will collapse onto the track. Damage to pantograph, train and OHW. Failure Detection: nil Comp Provision: Design Task Effectiveness %

(α)3 Qualitative(A): Fail Mode Ratio: Criticality:

0.50 1.0E-03


0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0

16 Vertical support (611/60) detaches / breaks due to worn tongue. (Normal operation) N N N Y

Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal Maintenance provision - Examine for wear.




System Effect: The OHW will collapse onto the track. Failure Detection: nil Comp Provision: Maintenance Task Effectiveness % 90 3 Qualitative(A): (α) Criticality: Fail Mode Ratio:

0.50 1.0E-03


0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0


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Equipment Function


Chatswood RES Tunnel Cantilever Arrangement EP 08 11 78 00 Operating Band = N/A 21 Top strut outer tube (611/58) bends / breaks due to corrosion. (Normal operation) N N N Y

Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal These are hot dip galvanised and extremely unlikely to corrode. Residual risk of degradation of galvanising and corrosion may be managed by maintenance / condition monitoring but with low examination success, esp with internal / hidden degradation.

01) To support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while Function: maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures. A) Does not support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while Functional Failure: maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures.

Local Effect: The catenary will not be supported at that location. OHW will foul the vehicle envelope. System Effect: Damage to pantograph, train and OHW.

nil Design Failure Detection: Comp Provision: Task Effectiveness % 80 3 Qualitative(A): Fail Mode Ratio:(α) Criticality:

1.00 1.0E-03

Quantitative (B): Op Time (Years) Cond Fail Rate Funct Fail Rate Fail Effect Prob (β) Design Fail Rate (p.a.)

0.00 0.00 00 0 0.00 0

22 Cantilever jib (611/62) bends / breaks due to corrosion. (Normal operation) N N N Y

Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal These are hot dip galvanised and extremely unlikely to corrode. Residual risk of degradation of galvanising and corrosion may be managed by maintenance / condition monitoring but with low examination success, esp with internal / hidden degradation.



Local Effect: The catenary will not be supported at that location. OHW will foul the vehicle envelope. System Effect: Damage to pantograph, train and OHW. Failure Detection: nil Comp Provision: Design Task Effectiveness % 0

(α)3 Qualitative(A): Fail Mode Ratio: Criticality:

1.00 1.0E-03


0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0


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Equipment Function


Chatswood RES Tunnel Cantilever Arrangement EP 08 11 78 00 Operating Band = N/A 23 Vertical support attachment plate (to cantilever jib) detaches due to fractured weld. (Normal operation) N N N Y

Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal The reliability of the weld is dependent on the quality of the weld.

01) To support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while Function: maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures. A) Does not support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while Functional Failure: maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures.

Local Effect: The top arm of the cantilever will not be vertically supported and thus the catenary will not be supported at that location. OHW will foul the vehicle envelope.

System Effect: Damage to pantograph, train and OHW. Task Effectiveness nil Commissioning Test Failure Detection: Comp Provision: % 0

3 Qualitative(A): Fail Mode Ratio:(α) Criticality:

1.00 1.0E-03

Quantitative (B): Op Time (Years) Cond Fail Rate Funct Fail Rate Design Fail Rate (p. Fail Effect Prob (β) a.)

0.00 0.00 000 0.00 0

24 Top strut outer tube attachment / adjustment plate (to cantilever jib) detaches due to fractured weld. (Normal operation)

N N

Severity Class Category 3 - Marginal The reliability of the weld is dependent on the quality of the weld.

01) To support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures.

Function:

A) Does not support the catenary weight, radial and wind loads and register the contact radial and wind loads, while maintaining a minimum 150mm clearance from all structures.

Functional Failure:

Local Effect: The top arm of the cantilever will not be vertically supported and thus the catenary will not be supported at that location. OHW will foul the vehicle envelope.

System Effect: Damage to pantograph, train and OHW. Task Effectiveness nil Commissioning Test Failure Detection: Comp Provision:

3 Qualitative(A):

N

%

Y

0

1.00 Fail Mode Ratio:(α) Criticality:

1.0E-03


0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0


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2.2 MRA report Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) analysis follows the process of design FMECA. The RCM compensating measures are detailed along with their relationship to the FMECA and documented in the MRA report. The report has a similar structure to the design FMECA.

The following example from the signalling system illustrates the MRA report, consisting of the FMECA and the corresponding compensating measures developed through RCM. Typically, the design FMECA and the FMECA linking to the RCM in the MRA report are one and the same. Note also that both design FMECA and FMECA / RCM may need to be refined as the baseline configuration changes with the design development.

The ordering of the part / failure modes in the report is first by operational categories then by criticality (i.e., hidden, safety, environmental and operating).

Each part / failure mode has a compensating measure. If maintenance-specific tasks are identified, the detail description and the interval of each task is determined and documented in the MRA report. The decision basis for each compensating measure is also documented for each of the part / failure mode entries.

The FMECA in the MRA report, as for the design FMECA, has a unique identifier for each part / failure mode which carries through into the service schedule tasks. This provides a traceable link to the basis of the task.


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System Description Equipment Cod e Equipment Descriptio

Fundiun De:s-.:riptiuo

Func tional Failure O escription Critica lity I P1·opost>d Task I Optima l Interval/

F ollu.-. ;'11ode Failure Effe<t Tas kAu.-.lyh Corn~c tive Actiou Sc h t"dnled l ut.:-1·y01J De<lsloo Bost<

02) T o be capable o f m oving the switc h rnils o \ ·er the full operating trnve l given the a pplication of 3.Sk.."'I force front the throw bar.

A) Switch rnils n o t capable of m oving through the full opernling trnvel g iven the application of 3.SkN force fron1 the thro\v bar.

1 63 Anti-roll bracket (catch point) The cntch point switch rnit ·would bind on the stock rnil foot. TI1e clutch Y N Y N Y Examine the catch point nnti Optimal O skid plate would slip when the force required to drive the switch rail exceeded the roll bracket skid plate for cont11mlmHerl hy roArl rlirr 01· ron111e !\erring of the clutch (3.5kN to 4 .5kN). T he motor c i,.cuir wotllrl ncc11mnlMion of 1·onrl <fo·r or Signal C ,-ew !ipill11ge ofprorlncr from mlhng rem:riin energi !\erl frw I O ~econrl~ before timing out. T he ~witch rnil~ \\·0111<1 ptorlnct ~pillage from 1·oll ing stock not complete the stroke. Detection and lockmg wou ld not be achieved stock. Dete.ction and due to normal operational resulting in p oints failu re . Locking. degrndation. Remove any accumulation.

Report spi llage.

1 8 1 Flangeway deanmce Back of wheel flange may co111e into contact with the back of the open YN Y NY Examine the back o f the Optimal 0 Addressing: the effect of a closed up switch rail causing impact on detection and other components. switch rails in the open munber of possible root due to (black boxed). position for evidence of wheel causes.

contact (nabbing or brightly polished surfaces). Detailed

Examination Where wheel contact is e vident check the open switch minimum flangeway clearance is in accordance with maintenance procedures. Dctcnnine the cnnse of nny loss of clcnmnce nnd repair ns required. R e· set the locked position of the switch rni l if required. Repo11 any C ivi l issues to the Civil Team Manager for attention.

97 R11ildmir l>t:(lt Tlic: switd1 rail wvuh.l biud vu tht: rail d1C1ir. The: dutd1 would l>liµ whc:u Y N Y N Y Ex<11ui11c: 1l1c: l>t:<ariu~ rail Oµti1ual 0 cv11t<1mi11atc:U by road dirt tbt: fvrct: 1c:quirt:d tv Urive: 1l1t: :switd1 rnil:s c:.xct:t:Uc:U tlic: tvrquc: :sc:Hiu)ol vf drnir:s for <11.:cumulativu of due to normal operational the dutch (3.5kN 10 4 .5kN). The motor circuit would remain energised road din. Signal C rew degradation. for 10 seconds before timing out. The switch rails would not complete the

stroke. Detection and locking would not be achieved resulting in points Ren1ove any accumulation of Detection and failure. road din. Locking

Thursd01y. 15 M01rch 2007 1:42:09 PM



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Syste m D escription F.quipmcnt C ode F.quipmcnt Dcscl'iptio

F unction D esci-iption F unction al F nihn·e Description

C l'iti<'a lity I P r opos Nl T a sk I O p t ima l Tntrl'val/ Failure :\fode Failure Effect T a skAualy h Cor rective Actiou S C" h ecluled l utierval Decision Basis

98 Re:til c.:hair ~t:cH Tht: s\viu.:h rail woul<l biud 011 lht: .-ail c.:hair. Tht: fric.:liou d utc.:h would ~lip Y N Y N Y Examiut: tht: bt:ariug rail 0µ1i111al 0 Task is of llluiLt:d contaminated by spillage of when the force required to drive the switch rails exceeded the torque chairs for evidence of spillage effecth·eness due to product from rolling stock setting of the clutch (3.5kN to 4.5kN). The motor circuit would remain o f product fron1 rolling stock S igna l Crew random failure behaviour. <lnc to foihu·c to correctly c ncr gisc<l for I 0 sccon<ls b efor e timing out _ The switch ra ils wonl<l not <loors maintain rolling stock doors. complete the s troke . Detection and locking ·would not be achieved Detection and

resulting in points failure . Clean co11tamina1ed rail c hair Locking seats. Report any spilla~e .

99 Rail chair seat T he switch rail would bind on the rail chair. The friction clutch would slip Y Y NY Examine the bearing rail O ptimal O Task is of limited contaminated by spillage of w h en the force required to drive the switch rails exceeded the torque ch airs for evidence of spillage effectiveness due to product from rolliu~ stock settin~ o f the clutch (3.5kN to 4 .5kN). The motor circuit would remain o f product fron1 overloade d I Si~ua l Crew random failure behaviour. due to failure to colTectly energised for 10 seconds before timing out. The switch ra ils \Vould not 1n is loaded rolling. stock. manage rolling stock loading complete the stroke. Detection and locking would not be achieved Derection and anct 11nlo11cting. resulting in points foilnre. Clean cmu mninFttcci rnil c hair T .ocking

seats. Report an y spillage.

122 Rail chair seat The switch rails are not held clear o f the A and B rail chai rs by the switch Y N Y N N N N Y Redesign the switch rollers Optimal O Weekly or fortnightly \\IOnl rol lers as in tenrle<l . The S'-Vi tc h rails ctrng on the rnil chairs. n ,e friction confignrarion to a llow the lnhrication o f the A a net R

du e to d esign failure of switch clutch would slip w hen the force required to drive the switch rai ls switc h rai l to clear the A and Asset Manager .-ail chairs: ~hould not be 1·0Ue r configuration . exceeded the torque setting of the clutch (3.5kN to 4.5kN) . The motor B rail chairs. necessa1y and does not

circuit would remain energised for l 0 seconds before timing o ut. The Redesign delive r the required switch rails would not com plete the stroke. Detection and locking would Ren-ofit ne\.v design. reliabili ty. not be achieved resulting in points failure.

Rail chair seat The switch rail would bind on the rail chair. The friction clutch would slip Y N Y N Y Lubricate the loaded rail chair Optimal 0 Although switch rollers wont wh en tht: force required to <lrivt: the switd1 rails exc eeded lhe torque sea ls. have been filled. switch due to nonnal operational setting of the clutch (3.5kN to 4 .5kN). The motor circuit would rema in Signal Crew ra ils tend to tide on the A consumption of lubricant . energised for 10 seconds before timing out. The switch rails would not and B chairs.

complete the s troke. De tection Hn<l locking wonl<l n ot he nchicvc<l Detection Ftnct resulting. in points failure . Locking

Thursd:iy, 15 M:irch 2007 Page 57 of160



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S yst em D escription Equi1>meut C ode Equi1>me ut D esc .-i1>tio

Func tion De~ct"iption

Functionnl Fnilure D esc.-iption C rltlrallty I P l'Ot> OSecl T nsk I O J>tlmnl Iut<'rvnl/

F ailnrf' ~Vloclf> Faihu-P E ffpcf T!l.sk Au!l.I ~·t s Cor recfive AC' tlon SC'h edule d I u te r v!1l

100 Stock rail gauge face The switch rai l would drift from its set position. When 1he drift exceeded Y N Y N Y Examine the stock rail gauge Optimal 323 .-ail head overflow 3 .2mm. the switch rail would not comple1e it s. movement. The friction face for rail head ove1 flow due to nonual opcrt'ltional clutch would s lip w hen the force required to drive the switch rails greater than l nun adjacent to S ignal C rew <legrn<lntion exceerlerl 1h e 1on1tte ~etring of the clutch (3_5kN to 4.5kN) _ T h e motor the ~v1 tch 1·ai: I

circuit would remnin energised for l O seconds before tin1ing: out. Detection and Derecrion and locking would nm be achieved resulting in points failure. Repon ro Civil for removal of Locking

overflow if required.

105 $\.vitch rail The $Witch rail may not move or complete its. n1oven1ent . The fric tion Y N Y N N N N N N.S.M. O ptimal 0 Random failure mode. No crippled o r bent clutch would sltp when the force reqmred to drive the swttch rai ls eff"ec tive task. due to nbnonnnl opernrionnl exceeded rhc rorquc setting of the clnrch (3.5kN ro 4.5kN). T he motor Replace switch rn il. loading. circuit would re main energised for I O seconds before timing our.

Detection and locking would not be achieved result ing in points failure.

102 Switch rail The switch rni l would not complete its movement. The friction clutch Y N Y N N N N N Implement nction for the Optinml 0 Random foilurc . Failure obstructed by foreign nmtcria l wou ld slip when the force required to drive the switch rnils exceeded the control of rubbish entering the mode cnnnot be m nnng:cd due to failure to manage torque setting of the clutch (3.5kN to 4.:5kN). The motor circuit would rnil coll'idor. Infrastnicmre Maint by point mnchine rubbish in 1he rail corridor. remain energised for 10 seconds before timing ou1. Detection and locking Eng maintenance.

wou ld not be achieved resulting in points failure. Procedure

106 Sv.•iti.:h ntil Tht: switd1 rnil wuulU nut i.:umµlt:tt: its muvt:mt:ul. Tltt: frii.: tiuu duti.:h Y N Y N N N N N I.mµlt:mt:ul s tra lt:1".it:s tu O µtimal 0 This failu rt: mudt: is ob$tructed by fore-ig.n materia l \vou ld $lip ·when the force requfred to d rive th e $Witch raih exceeded the prevent tre$pa$$e r$ ente-ring random. Sabotage b y due to faihu·e to prevent torque setting of the clutch (3 .SkN to 4.SkN). The motor circuit '\vould the rail con-idoc I.nfra$trucn1re ?vlaint t re$pas.s.er$ can not be trespassers 111 the ratl cotndor rematn energised for I 0 seconds befo1·e timmg out D etection and lockrng Eng managed by routine

wou ld not be nchicvc.d resulting: in points fni lnre . mnintcnnnce. Procedure

IO.l Switch rail The ~witch rni l won lei not complete it ~ mov ement. T he friction c lutch Y N Y NNN N Implement act ion to en~nre Optinrn I 0 H.anrlom fai lure . Fai lu re obst111cted by foreign mnterio t wou ld slip when the force required to dti ve the switch rnils exceeded the tha t all d isciplines remove m ode cnnnot be m nnoged due to failure to remove torque setting of the clutch (3.5kN to 4.5kN). The motor circuit would maintenance materials on Infrnstnicnire Mnint by point machine redundam matetial after remain energised for 10 seconds before timing out. Detec tion and locking completion of maimenance Eng maintenance. mnintenance work. wou ld not be achieved resulting in points fai lure. activities.

Procedure

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Syst em D esc ription Equipme nt C ode Equipment D escriptio

F unc tio n D escriptio n

.Func tional .Failure U e.sc1·it>tio n Cdlkalil~ I P 1·op ust>d Task I 0 1>liurnl lu lt-n·~•U

Fai1urt Mod t" Failurt E fft<'f T a s k A ualyis Co1..-edive A d io u Sch ed u l t-d l ut t>1·v:1l D t<'is io u Basis

101 Switd1rai l Tht: switd1 n1il woukl uot f,;Vmµlc:te its movemeut. The ft-i<.: tivu dul(,;'h Y N Y N Y E.xamim: the tun1out I cetlch Oµtiurnl 0 Oµµo .-tuuisti1,; lask \Vi th obst ructed by foreign m aterial would slip when the force required to drive the switch rails exceeded the poinl for buildup ofballasl or low success rate. due to nonnal migrntion of torque sell ing: of the clutch (3 .5kN to 4 .5kN). The motor circuit would foreign 1na1e1ial 1ha1 could Signal C rew ballast to the switch lcx:ation. remain energised for 10 seconds before timing out. Detection aud locking obstruct 1he switch rail.

woul<l nol Uc: <t<.:hic:ve tl n:suhiu~ iu µoiuts failure:. Detectio n aU1.l Remove auy Uuilduµ of Lockin)l ballast and forei~n 111a1erial.

158 Switch rail The switch rail would not complete its movement. The fric1ion clutch Y N Y N N N N N Check the switch rail path Optimal 0 Evenl driven inspection obs1n.1c1ed by foreign material would slip when the force required to drive the switch rai l exceeded the and switch p lates for grinding required. due to rail griudiug: through the torque sett ing of the clutch (3 . .5kN to 4 .SkN). The motor circuit would s lag: aud <ld.nis. Sigmtl Engineer turnout. remain energised for 10 seconds before liming out. Deteclion and locking

would 1101 be achieved resn h ing in poims failure. Remove any gtinding slag and Post Rail Grinding debris. Reinstatement

104 Switch rail The switd1 rail would not complete its movement. The friction clutch Y N Y N N N N N Examine the nunout for Optimal - 1.889139 This is au opportunistic obstn1cted by foreigu material would slip "vbeu the force required to drive the switch rai ls exceeded the build up o f ballast or tOreign task with a low probability due to unstable ballast. torque setting of the clutch (3 .5kN to 4.5kN). The motor circuit would m aterial that could obstruct Signal Cre"v of success. exceedence of track geometry remain energised tor 10 seconds before 1iming out Detection and locking. the switch r ail causing. ex.;essive operation al would not be achieved result ing in points failure. Detection and dynamics. Remove any buildup of Locking.

ballast and foreign materials.

109 Switch rail I .stock rail The switch rail may not u1ove or complete i ts movement. The friction Y N Y N Y Examine the n1rnout for Optimal 89.15 154 This is the task that misaligned clutch would s lip w he.n the- force re.qu ired to d rive the switch rails e.vidence of the points initiates the Exceedent due to exceedence of track exceeded the torque settin.)} of the clutch (3.5kN to 4.5kN). The motor pumplll.)} (5 or more bays of Sip,nal C rew Tri.)}.)}.ered Examina1ion. geom etry parameters causing c i1·cuit "vould remain energised for 10 seconds before tin1i.ng out. d isco loured ballast). Examine excessive operational dynamics. Detection and locking would not be achieved result ing in points failure. the bearers. ties and Detailed

f<t:>tr:uiu)rili;; for iule)ll"ily. Examiuatiou

Report pumping. points and im:ffe<.:tive Ue<treri;; . tit:s or fastt:11iu~i;; to Civil for reµetir or 1eplacernem.

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RailCorp Engineering Standard — Integrated Support Provision of Technical Maintenance Plans by External Organisations

2.2.1 TMP service schedule This example illustrates the TMP service schedule format typically used within RailCorp. Suppliers shall follow this format for TMP service schedules provided to RailCorp.

The title block identifies the equipment by description and by Equipment Group Identifier (EGI), for example SC07370100. The TMP service schedule level SS01, SS02 etc relates to each EGI and runs from the most frequent to the least frequent TMP service schedule.

Below the title block is the version date, version number and a unique standard job number. The standard job number will be provided by RailCorp.

The preparation action block lists the preparation tasks needed to perform the maintenance tasks (actions). Reference for the basis of these tasks or for more detail shall be included where relevant. Competencies required and equipment required to perform the TMP service schedule shall also be listed in this block.

The maintenance action block details the individual maintenance tasks (actions). TMP service schedules package the tasks of common frequency and those requiring common competency for the equipment being managed.

It is common practice to group tasks by parts within each TMP service schedule, for example ‘Points Assembly and Operating Mechanism’ is focused on the part of the equipment that interacts with the track.

Each task shall include the corresponding reference identifier (Mimir ref) from the MRA to link the task back to the basis for it being selected.

Maintenance tasks are typically lube / service, condition monitoring actions, failure finding actions, functional checks or hard time renewal / replacement. Required corrective actions shall also be nominated with each task.

The reinstatement action block details the tasks (actions) required to place the equipment back in service and to follow up the management of defects that are found.


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SIGNALLING TECHNICAL MAINTENANCE PLANS POINTS CLAW LOCK ELECTRIC DRIVE

SERVICE SCHEDULE SC 07 37 01 00 SS-01 Detection and Locking

Revision Date: 26-Oct-2006, Ver: 3.3 Std Job No. S07351

PREPARATION ACTION REFERENCE 1 Set Up Fixed Worksite (On Track) HAZAN Ref. Id. SP 184 2 Advise signaller before commencing work. 3 Ensure the utilisation of safety clothing, footwear and other protective equipment. 4 Lubricants and oils are to be used in a controlled manner. Where applicable, rags, drop

sheets and sealable containers etc must be used to prevent spillage. 5 Ensure that if Nyloc nuts are loosened or removed, they are renewed. 6 Ensure that if split pins are removed, they are renewed.

Mimir Ref

101, 19,

104, 22

MAINTENANCE ACTION Points Assembly and Operating Mechanism

REFERENCE

7 Examine the turnout / catchpoint for build up of ballast or foreign material that could obstruct the switch rail, throw bar, drop lug, coupling bar, coupling bar bracket, operating bar, detection rods, back drive cranks and back operating bar (if fitted). Remove any build up of ballast and foreign material.

No Reference

97, 98, 99

8 Examine the bearing rail chairs for accumulation of road dirt or product spillage from overloaded / misloaded rolling stock or defective rolling stock doors. Clean contaminated rail chair seats. Report spillage.

No Reference

96 9 Lubricate the bearing rail chair seats. SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 6.4 , Appendix A

163 10 Examine the catch point anti-roll bracket skid plate for accumulation of road dirt or product spillage from rolling stock. Remove any accumulation. Report spillage.

No Reference

162 11 Lubricate the catch point anti-roll bracket skid plate. SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 6.4 , Appendix A

59 60

12 Examine for loose or broken rail chair to tie fasteners. Report loose or broken rail chair to tie fasteners to Civil for renewal of fastenings / ties.

No Reference

63, 170

13 Examine for loose or broken stock rail to rail chair / rail brace fasteners (switch studs). Report loose or broken fasteners to Civil for retensioning or replacement.

No Reference

117 14 Tangential Points - Examine the claw pin retaining bracket for evidence of loose set screw or failed bracket. If loose, renew spring washer and retension retaining bracket set screw. Replace retaining bracket if required.

SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 1

165 15 Conventional Points - Examine the claw pin retaining split pin to ensure that it is fitted correctly and not excessively worn. Replace worn split pin if required.

Signalling Engineering Instruction 02/12

100 16 Examine the stock rail gauge face for rail head overflow adjacent to the switch rail. Report to Civil for removal of overflow if required.

SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 1

Mimir Ref

Adjustment 145 17 Examine of the claw lock locking and lock mechanism to ensure that there is no evidence of

damage or degradation that could prevent the switch rail from locking and maintaining its locked position. If required, repair / replace damaged components.

SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 7.1

180 18 Check the position of the claw tail relative to the operating bar notch in the normal and reverse locked positions. Ensure the position is within tolerance in accordance with maintenance procedures. Determine the cause of any error and adjust / repair as required.

SC 07 37 00 04 EQ Clauses 2.0 & 3.0

131 140

19 Check the detection settings for loss of adjustment. Determine the cause of any loss of adjustment and repair as required. Adjust detection as required.

SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 5

Clause 10.1.2 111 138 139

20 Insert a 4.8 mm gauge between the switch rail and stock rail. Ensure that the claw does not lock and the operating bar does not complete its stroke. If the claw does complete its stroke, examine the claw, locking bracket, operating bar locking faces and claw pin for evidence of excessive wear. Repair or replace as required. Adjust the claw lock assembly as required in accordance with maintenance procedures.

SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 2.1

Schedule of tasks continued next page. (...Continued)

Mimir Ref REINSTATEMENT ACTION REFERENCE 142 21 Check that all throw bar and operating rod linkage fasteners have been retensioned after

adjustment and lock nuts are locked. Retension loose lock nuts and fasteners. 141 22 Check that all detector rod fasteners have been retension after adjustment and lock nuts are

locked. Retension loose detector rod fasteners and lock nuts. 143 23 Check that the claw bracket to switch rail fasteners have been tightened after adjustment.

Retension loose claw bracket to switch rail fasteners. 159 24 Tangential Points - Check that the claw pin retaining bracket setscrew has been correctly

retensioned if loosened during maintenance activities. 52 25 Check that the throw bar guards (covers / hoods) and detector rod guards (covers / hoods)

are securely fitted. Fit and fasten the throw bar guards (covers / hoods) and detector rod guards (covers / hoods) if required.

152 26 Check that the Falcon 4 lock is fitted and locked after maintenance. 150 27 Check that the Fortress / SL lock is fitted and locked after maintenance.

28 Under power, operate points normal and reverse and ensure that detection and locking is achieved.

SC 07 37 00 02 EQ Clause 2.1 (Caution)

29 Reset the Technician Terminal fault log if points are operated by computer interlocking. Reset the PLCs if fitted.

30 For any environmental information, refer to environmental procedures or Greenline (9782-1173)

31 Approved rodenticides must be used in accordance with manufacturer's instructions. 32 Record all defects / adjustments and raise corrective work orders. 33 Advise signaller that maintenance action is complete. 34 Dispose of all components, batteries, soiled rags, papers, etc appropriately. 35 Pack Up Worksite. HAZAN Ref. Id. SP 308


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2.2.2 TMP service schedule frequency matrix Each equipment group is required to have a TMP service schedule frequency matrix. The equipment is identified by a TMC number and the name of the equipment as shown in the example. This number, which is based on the EGI, is provided by RailCorp.

The TMP service schedule frequency matrix is required to list all the TMP service schedules for the equipment group, together with their frequency, and other information as detailed below.

For each TMP service schedule, the supplier lists the manufacturer’s name and reference for the equipment.

The frequency is expressed in terms of the period between TMP service schedules. The fields “Op Count” and “Op Freq” are required only where the frequency of service schedule is based on the number of times the equipment is operated.

Each TMP service schedules is identified by its unique standard job number. This is included as shown in the example under the field ‘Standard’.

Publication (notes and references) provides a summary of the service schedule level (for example, SS01, SS02), a one line description of the service schedule and any relevant references.


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POINTS CLAW LOCK ELECTRIC DRIVE

Signal Technical Maintenance Plan

TMC Name Manufacturer On System Maintenance Publication 1 2 3 4 Name Reference Standard Period Latitude Op.Count Op.Lat. Reference Notes

SC07 30 00 00 POINTS SC07 37 00 00 POINTS CLAW LOCK SC07 37 01 00 POINTS CLAW LOCK ELECTRIC DRIVE

S07xxx 30D 7D SS01 – Detection and Locking S07xxx 3M 7D SS02 - Detailed Examination S07xxx 2Y 2M SS03 - Slow Degradation

Examination S07xxx 2Y 2M SS04 - Mechanical Locking S07xxx 4Y 3M SS05 - Insulation Test S07xxx 2Y 2M SS06 - Asset Management


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Technical Note - TN 009: 2015 Technical Note - TN 009: 2015 Issued date: 09 March 2015 Effective...

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Transcript of Technical Note - TN 009: 2015 Technical Note - TN 009: 2015 Issued date: 09 March 2015 Effective...