Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis

8/20/2019 Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/technical-guidance-for-hazard-analysis 1/193

Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis

Eme r g e n c y P l an n i n g f o r

Extremely Hazardous Substances

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Federal Emergency Management AgencyU.S. Department of Transportation

December 1987



Preface

This guide was developed by the U.S. Environ

mental Protection Agency in conjunction with theFederal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA) and the Department of Transportation(DOT) .

In November 1985, as part of its National Strategy for Toxic Air Pollutants, EPA published the

Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program(CEPP) Interim Guidance and invited public review and comment. The Interim Guidance contained information on how to organize planning

committees, write a plan, and conduct a haz

ards analysis on a site-specific basis. In April1986, EPA began collaborating with FEMA and

other Federal agency members of the National

Response Team (NRT) in the revision of FEMA’swidely-distributed Planning Guide and Checklist

for Hazardous Materials Contingency Plans(popularly known as “FEMA-10”). In October

1986, during the time that a revised FEMA-10

was being prepared, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)

was enacted. Title Ill of SARA is also known asthe Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Section 303 of SARA required the

NRT to publish guidance to assist local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) with the de

velopment and implementation of comprehensive hazardous materials emergency responseplans. The Federal agencies revising FEMA-10

prepared a document that included guidance formeeting the SARA Title Ill planning requirements.

The NRT published this document as the Hazard

ous Materials Emergen cy Plan ning Guid e

(NRT-1) on March 17, 1987.

This current guide supplements NRT-1 by pro

viding technical assistance to LEPCs to assessthe lethal hazards related to potential airbornereleases of extremely hazardous substances

(EHSs) as designated under Section 302 of TitleIll of SARA. Future revisions of this guidance

(scheduled for publication in 1988) will considerflammables, corrosives, explosives, and otherhazards. Anyone using this guide also needs to

acquire and use NRT-1.

12/87 i

There are many definitions of “hazards analy

sis. ” In an effort to develop and maintain consistency among Federal guidance documents,

this guide adopts the approach to communitylevel hazards analysis adopted by 14 Federalagencies in NRT-1. NRT-1 defines “hazardsanalysis” as a three step process: hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analy

sis, and provides general descriptions and specific procedures for each. This guide provides atechnical discussion of, and specific procedures

for, a method that can be employed in conducting a hazards analysis that will allow planners toconsider the potential risks in their local commu

nities.

Although the use of this guide is not mandatory,

it does have many advantages, some of whichare the following:

l It enables local planners to conduct a hazards analysis, which is an essential step in

the planning process, and thereby assists local planners in meeting planning require

ments of SARA Title Ill;

l It will facilitate community awareness of the

potential risks of chemical releases whilehelping the community to plan for, respond

to, and reduce those risks.

l It is consistent with NRT-1 mandated underSARA and approved by 14 Federal agencies:

l It is consistent with training programs (e.g.

contingency planning) that are being conducted by the Emergency Management Insti

tute in Emmitsburg, Maryland:

l It can be used by software developers whowant their products to be consistent with the

planning requirements of Title Ill of SARA:and

It will promote consistency among local

emergency plans.

Techniques presented in this guide and NRT-1

will also be helpful to LEPCs during the annualreview and updating of their plans, as required

by SARA Title Ill.



Table of Contents

PAGE

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1 .1 Purpose of this Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.2 Emergency Planning: the National Response Team Planning Guide . . . . . . . . 1-1

1.3 Beginning to Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

1.4 Hazards Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

A. Hazards identification . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

B. Vulnerability analysis

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

C. Risk analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

1.5 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1l- 5

1.5.1 EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

1.5.2 Other Public and Private Sector Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1l-5

1.5.3 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986

(Title Ill of SARA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1l-6

A. Identifying the Extremely Hazardous Substances that Trigger the Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1- 6

B. Planning Structure and Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

C. Other Title Ill Information for Planners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Contents of this Guide

1-8

2. HAZARDS ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Hazards Identification

2-1

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.1.1 Identification of Hazardous Chemicals

2-2

2.1.2 Procedures for Hazards Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

. . .2.1.3 Summary of Useful Information Resulting from Hazards Identification 2-6



Table of Contents (Continued)

PAGE

2.2 Vulnerability Analysis for Airborne Extremely Hazardous Substances . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.2.1 General Description of Estimation of Vulnerable Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

2.2.2 Variables in Estimating Size of Vulnerable Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 9

A. Quantity and Rate of Release to Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

B. Meteorological Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

C. Surrounding Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

D. Levels of Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

2.2.3 The Relationship of Estimated Vulnerable Zones to Actual Releases . . . 2-13

2.2.4 Application of Estimated Vulnerable Zones to Hazards Analysis for

Extremely Hazardous Substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-17

2.2.5 Evacuation Considerations for Airborne Releases of Extremely

Hazardous Substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-18

2.3 Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

2.3.1 Overall Approach to Risk Analysis: Ranking of Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-21

2.3.2 Types of Information Required for Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22

2.3.3 Limiting the Collection of Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-25

2.3.4 Assembly of the Information Obtained from the Hazards Analysis . . . . . 2-25

2.3.5 Relative Ranking of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-28

3. STEP-BY-STEP PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING A HAZARDS ANALYSIS OF

EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.1 Initial Screening to Set Priorities Among Sites . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.1.1 Hazards Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.1.2 Estimate Vulnerable Zones for Screening Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3- 2

A. Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

B. Liquids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3

C. Solids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Worked Examples for Initial Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

3.1.3 Risk Analysis for Initial Screening of Reporting Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7



Table of Contents (Continued)

PAGE

3.2 Reevaluation: Planning for Facilities by Priority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

3.2.1 Hazards Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

3.2.2 Reevaluation of the Vulnerable Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

A. Gases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

B. Liquids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

C. Solids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3- 8

3.2.3 Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

4. USING THE RESULTS OF A HAZARDS ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - l

4.1 What the Plan Must Contain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - l

4.2 Planning Information Provided by the Hazards Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

4.3 Case Studies from Hazards Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

4.4 Plan Reviews in the Context of Local Resource Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 -7

4.5 Use of Computerized Systems in Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

APPENDICES

APPENDIX B: THE CRITERIA USED TO IDENTIFY EXTREMELY

APPENDIX G: EQUATIONS USED FOR THE ESTIMATION OF VULNERABLE

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

GLOSSARY OF TERMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-4

HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

APPENDIX C: THE LIST OF EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES . . . . . . . . . . C-1

APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON LEVELS OF CONCERN . . . . . . . . . . D-1

APPENDIX E: SAMPLE PROFILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

APPENDIX F: FIRE AND REACTIVITY HAZARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

ZONES ....................................................... ........................ G-1



List of Exhibits

PAGE

EXHIBITS

1-1 Overview of Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

1-2 Title Ill Information from Facilities Provided in Support of Plan Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

1-3 Title Ill Planning Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

2-1 Types of Facilities Where Certain Extremely Hazardous Substances

Might Be Found in Quantities Greater than Their TPQs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2- 5

2-2 Information from Hazards Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

2-3 The Movement Downwind of a Plume of Airborne Extremely Hazardous

Substances Following an Accidental Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

2-4 Vulnerability Zones for a Hypothetical Community Resulting from

Airborne Releases of Chemicals A and B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

2-5 Vulnerable Zones along a Transportation Route When Airborne Releases

of Chemicals A and B Occur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

2-6 The Effect of Different Assumptions on the Calculation of the Size

of the Estimated Vulnerable Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14

2-7 Vulnerable Zones for Five Facilities in a Hypothetical Community . . . . . . . . 2-15

2-8 Plume Development and Movement During a Hypothetical Accidental

Release . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-16

2-9 Factors Affecting Vulnerable Zone Estimations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-19

2- 10 Summaries of Some Accidents that Occurred in 1980-81 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-24

2-11 Steps in Hazards Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-26

2-12 Example Hazards Analysis Matrix for a Hypothetical Community . . . . . . . . . 2-29

2-13 Example Qualitative Definitions of Probability of Occurrence . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-31

Example Definitions of Severity of Consequences to People . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-31

2-14 Risk Analysis Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-32

3-1 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantity of Release and Level of Concern.

Rural, F Air Stability, Low Wind Speed. For Quantities of Release Up to

500 Pounds/Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11



List of Exhibits

PAGE

3-2 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantities of Release and Level ofConcern. Urban, F Air Stability, Low Wind Speed. For Quantities ofRelease Up to 500 Pounds/Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13

3-3 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantity of Release and Level ofConcern. Rural, D Air Stability, 12 Miles Per Hour Wind Speed. ForQuantities of Release Up to 500 Pound/Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-15

3-4 Vulnerable Zone Distances for Quantity of Release and Level ofConcern. Urban, D Air Stability, 12 Miles Per Hour Wind Speed. ForQuantities of Release Up to 500 Pounds/Minute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17

4-1 Example Hazards Matrix for Planning Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

B-1 Criteria to Identify Extremely Hazardous Substances that MayPresent Severe Health Hazards to Humans Exposed Duringa Chemical Accident or Other Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3

B-2 Criteria to Identify Other Hazardous Substances Produced inLarge Quantities that May Present Severe Health Hazards toHumans Exposed During a Chemical Accident or Other Emergency . . . . . B-5

B-3 Other Extremely Hazardous Substances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-6

C-1 List of Extremely Hazardous Substances and Data for Hazards

Analysis (Alphabetical Order) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-2

C-2 List of Extremely Hazardous Substances and Data for Hazards Analysis (CAS # Order) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-11

D-1 Emergency Response Planning Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-7

D-2 (Alphabetical) Published Toxicity Guidelines for Extremely HazardousSubstances that could be used for the Level of Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-9

D-3 (CAS #) Published Toxicity Guidelines for Extremely HazardousSubstances that could be used for the Level of Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-18

G-1 Formulas Recommended by Briggs (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-6

J-1 Sample Event Tree Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-5

J-2 Example Fault Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J-7



1. Introduction and Overview

1.1 Purpose of This Guide

The purpose of this guide is to help local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) conductsite-specific hazards analyses for airborne releases of extremely hazardous substances(EHSs) as required by Title Ill of the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986(SARA), also known as the Emergency Planningand Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) .

Although these substances may also threatenproperty and the environment, this guide is primarily concerned with lethal effects of airbornesubstances on humans. An expanded version ofthis document which will also address hazardssuch as flammability, explosivity, corrosivity,and reactivity, is planned. The hazards analysisguidance in this present document will help toidentify potential problems and serve as thefoundation for planning and prevention effortswith emphasis on EHSs. (See Section 1.3 for adefinition and brief description of “hazardsanalysis. ” See Section 1.5.3 for a description of

“extremely hazardous substance. “)

This document represents a joint effort by theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA), theFederal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA), and the Department of Transportation(DOT) to provide coordinated and coherenttechnical guidance. Although this guide can beuseful to all community and industry planners, itis intended especially for LEPCs established un

der the provisions of SARA. The three steps ofhazards analysis--hazards identification, vulnerability analysis, and risk analysis--provide a decision-making process for the LEPCs to followas they undertake the development of comprehensive emergency plans mandated by SARA Title Ill. This chapter includes a description of:the relationship of this guide to general planningguidance, a general description of hazardsanalysis, the legislative and programmatic background for this technical guidance, and an overview of the remaining chapters.

1.2 Emergency Planning;the National Response Team Planning Guide

Title Ill of SARA requires each LEPC to prepare a Hazardous Materials Emergency

comprehensive emergency plan by October 17, Planning Guide

1988. For general assistance in preparing a WH-562A

comprehensive eme rg en cy pl an , planners 401 M Street, S.W.

should consult the Hazardous Materials Emer- Washington, DC 20460gencv Planning Guide (NRT-1) prepared by the LEPCs should obtain, read, and understandNational Response Team (NRT). NRT-1 is a NRT-1 before using this technical guide.statutory requirement under SARA and was published on March 17, 1987. It is available free of Exhibit l-l illustrates the various activities thatcharge from: are part of the emergency planning process.

1-1



Exhibit l-l

Overview of Planning Process*

12/87 1-2



NRT-1 offers general guidance on how to accomplish all of these planning activities. Th ispresent document offers specific technical guidante for conducting a hazards analysis for theairborne release of EHSs, as well as a general

consideration of other hazardous substances.The shaded box in Exhibit l-l indicates wherethe material in this technical guide fits into theoverall planning process described in NRT-1,

1.3 Beginning to Plan

Before actually developing a plan, the LEPCshould: review existing plans, review existing re

sponse capabilities, and conduct a hazards

analysis.

Information from existing plans will prove helpfulin the development of an emergency plan under

Title Ill. Existing plans may have been prepared

by individual facilities, by communities, by theState, or by the Regional Response Team (RRT)of the Federal government. The plans can bereevaluated and information in them can be tai

lored to present needs.

NRT-1 and Appendix I of this guide include lists

of questions that LEPCs can use to identify what

prevention and response capabilities are presentat facilities, among transporters, and within localcommunities.

LEPCs should conduct a hazards analysis of allfacilities reporting that they have EHSs in quanti

ties greater than the threshold planning quantity

(TPQ). This hazards analysis should help planners identify what additional response capabili

ties are needed. This analysis serves as the basis for development or revision of the emer

gency response plans that are mandatory underTitle Ill of SARA.

1.4 Hazards Analysis

Hazards Identification

Chemical Identity

Location

Quantity

Nature of

the Hazard

Vulnerability Analysis

Vulnerable Zone

Human Populations

Critical Facilities

Environment

Risk Analysis

Likelihood of a

Release Occurring

Severity of the

Consequences

A hazards analysis’ is a necessary step in com- community. This guide follows the definition of

prehensive emergency planning for a commu- “hazards analysis” used in NRT-1 and focuses

nity. Comprehensive planning depends upon aprincipally on hazards analysis for airborne re-

clear understanding of what hazards exist and leases of EHSs.

what risk they pose for various members of the

Hazards analysis as presented in this guidance is intended for use in emergency response planning for EHSs. Its purpose and the meaning of its terminology are different from the purpose and terms used in “risk assessment” asdefined by NAS. Because local communities will be conducting hazards analyses (as described in this guide) andrisk assessments under different sections of SARA, a discussion of risk assessment can be found in NAS Press,1 9 8 3, R i s k A s s e s sm en t i n t h e F e d e r a l Go ve r nmen t : Man a g i n g t h e P r o c e s s . Washington D.C. 191 pp.

1 2 / 8 7 1-3

1



The hazards analysis described in this guide is a

3-step decision-making process to identify thepotential hazards facing a community with re

spect to accidental releases of EHSs. All three

steps should be followed even though the levelof detail will vary from site to site. The hazards

analysis is designed to consider all potential

acute health hazards within the planning districtand to identify which hazards are of high priority

and should be addressed in the emergency re

sponse planning process. The Title Ill emer

gency response plan must address all EHSs that

are reported to the State Emergency Response

Commission (SERC), but other substances including EHSs below their TPQs may also be in

cluded. Depending upon the size and nature of

a planning district, the hazards analysis may becomplex or relatively easy. LEPCs that have access to the necessary experts might want to

conduct a detailed quantitative hazards analysis.Such a complete analysis of all hazards may notalways be feasible or practical, however, given

resource and time constraints in individual planning districts.

General information and an approach to under

standing the three components of hazardsanalysis as it is applied to the EHSs are dis

cussed in Chapter 2. A brief overview is pre

sented below.

A. Hazards identif icat ion typically provides spe

cific information on situations that have the po

tential for causing injury to life or damage toproperty and the environment due to a hazard

ous materials spill or release. A hazards identification includes information about:

Chemical identities:

The location of facilities that use, pro

duce, process, or store hazardous

materials:

The type and design of chemical con

tainer or vessel:

The quantity of material that could be

involved in an airborne release: andThe nature of the hazard (e.g., air

borne toxic vapors or mists which are

the primary focus of this guide; also

other hazards such as fire, explosion,

large quantities stored or processed,handling conditions) most likely to accompany hazardous materials spills or

releases.

B. Vulnerability analysis identifies areas in the

community that may be affected or exposed, individuals in the community who may be subjectto injury or death from certain specific hazardous materials, and what facilities, property, orenvironment may be susceptible to damageshould a hazardous materials release occur. Acomprehensive vulnerability analysis provides in

formation on:The extent of the vulnerable zones

(i.e., an estimation of the area that

may be affected in a significant way as

a result of a spill or release of a knownquantity of a specific chemical underdefined conditions) ;

The population, in terms of numbers,density, and types of individuals (e.g.,facility employees: neighborhood resi

dents: people in hospitals, schools,nursing homes, prisons, day care centers) that could be within a vulnerable

zone:

The private and public property (e.g.,critical facilities, homes, schools, hos

pitals, businesses, offices) that maybe damaged, including essential sup

por t sys tems (e .g . , water , food ,power, communication, medical) andtransportation facilities and corridors;

and

The environment that may be affected,and the impact of a release on sensitive natural areas and endangered spe

cies.

Chapter 2 discusses vulnerability analysis with a

special emphasis on human populations.

C. Risk analysis is an assessment by the community of the likelihood (probability) of an accidental release of a hazardous material and the

actual consequences that might occur, basedon the estimated vulnerable zones. The risk

analysis is a judgement of probability and sever

ity of consequences based on the history of previous incidents, local experience, and the best

12187 1-4



available current technological information. Itprovides an estimation of:

The likelihood (probability) of an accidental release based on the history ofcurrent conditions and controls at thefacility, consideration of any unusual

environmental conditions (e.g., areasin flood plains), or the possibility of si

multaneous emergency incidents(e.g., flooding or fire hazards resultingin the release of hazardous materials);

Severity of consequences of human in

jury that may occur (acute, delayed,and/or chronic health effects), the

number o f poss ib le injuries and

deaths, and the associated high-riskgroups:

This section briefly describes EPA’s original

Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program(CEPP), other recent public and private sectorprograms, and EPCRA.

1.5.1 EPA’s Chemical Emergency Prepared

ness Program

For the past several years, EPA has pursued an

active voluntary program to enhance preparedness and response capabilities for incidents involving the airborne release of EHSs. In June

1985, EPA announced a two-part National Strategy for Toxic Air Pollutants. The first part, established under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act,

deals with routine releases of hazardous air pollutants. The second part was the developmentof the CEPP, designed to address, on a voluntary basis, accidental airborne releases ofacutely toxic chemicals. Since its inception,

CEPP has had two goals: to increase community awareness of chemical hazards and to en

hance State and local emergency planning fordealing with chemical accidents. These goalsand initial activities influenced the legislative ac

tion that led to the enactment of Title Ill of SARA,where many CEPP objectives are addressed(see Section 1.5.3).

Severity of consequences on criticalfacilities (e.g., hospitals, fire stations,

police departments, communicationcenters);

Severity of consequences of damageto property (temporary, repairable,permanent); and

Severity of consequences of damageto the environment (recoverable, permanent) .

To have an accurate view of the potential problems in a district, the LEPC would need to address all of the steps in hazards analysis outlined

above. Each of the three steps should be followed even if extensive information is not avail

able for each site. The process anticipates thatlocal judgement will be necessary.

1.5.2 Other Public and Private Sector Pro

g r a m s

Awareness of the 1984 Bhopal, India tragedy

and less catastrophic incidents in the UnitedStates has led many State and local govern

ments to improve their preparedness and response capabilities for chemical emergencies.They developed emergency plans for chemicalaccidents, enacted right-to-know legislation toprovide citizens access to information aboutchemicals in their community, and organizedhazardous materials planning councils and re

sponse teams.

In the private sector, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) has developed and implemented the Community Awareness andEmergency Response (CAER) program. TheCAER program encourages chemical plant managers to contact community leaders and assistthem in preparing for possible incidents involvinghazardous materials, including those involvingairborne toxics. CAER industry participants canprovide information about chemicals and chemi

cal processes that exist within the community(an important source for the "hazards identification” phase of a hazards analysis); professional

1.5 Background

12/87 l - 5



expertise to help communities develop emer

gency plans; equipment and personnel to assistlocal officials during emergency notification andresponse operations: and specific assistance intraining responders and exercising emergency

plans.

1.5.3 Emergency Planning and CommunityRight-to-Know Act of 1986 (Title Ill of

SARA)

On October 17, 1986, SARA became law. TitleIll of SARA contains numerous requirements for

Federal, State, and local governments as well asprivate industry in the areas of emergency planning, community right-to-know, hazardousemissions reporting, and emergency notifica

tion. These requirements build upon the originalCEPP (elements of which are now mandatory),numerous existing State and local programs

aimed at community right-to-know and preparedness, and the CMA CAER program.

The objectives of Title Ill are to improve localchemical emergency response capabilities (primarily through improved emergency planning

and notification) and to provide citizens and local governments access to information aboutchemicals in their localities.

Title Ill addresses planning by: (1) identifyingthe EHSs that trigger the planning process: (2)requiring facilities to identify themselves if they

have quantities of EHSs exceeding the TPQs; (3)requiring the establishment of a State and localplanning structure and process (including specif

ics on committee membership); (4) requiring facilities to make information available to local

planners: and (5) specifying the minimum contents of local emergency plans. This guidanceincludes information about all of these topics.

(See NRT-1 for an additional discussion of plancontents and guidance for planning). Exhibit 1-2

summarizes the types of information that will beavailable as a result of compliance with Title Ill,and indicates how local planners can use the in

formation. Planners should not only be aware ofFederal, but also of State and local requirements that apply to emergency planning.

A. Identifying the Extremely Hazardous

Substances that Trigger the Planning

Process.

Title Ill required EPA to publish a list of EHSs andTPQs for each of those substances. EPA fulfilledthis requirement in a rule published on April 22,

1987 (Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 77, pp.13378-13410). The list of EHSs included the402 chemicals found in the CEPP Interim Guid

ance List of Acutely Toxic Chemicals2 and fouradditional chemicals added as a result of newinformation. Four chemicals have been removed from the list and 36 others are proposedfor delisting as they do not meet the acute lethality criteria. (See Appendix C for the list of

EHSs and Appendix B for an explanation of thecriteria used in identifying these chemicals.)

B. Planning Structure and Process.

Sections 301-303 of Title Ill include the followingrequired steps:

State Governors appointed SERCs by April 17, 1987. SERCs identified localemergency planning districts (LEPDs)by July 17, 1987 and appointed members of the LEPC by August 17, 1987.

SERCs are to coordinate and supervisethe work of the LEPCs, and review allemergency plans to ensure that all thelocal plans for any one State are coordinated.

Facilities had to notify SERCs by May

17, 1987 if they have any listed EHS(s)that exceed the designated TPQ. The

TPQ is a specific quantity assigned toeach of the EHSs. If a facility has pre

sent at any time an EHS in an amountgreater than the TPQ, the facility mustidentify itself to the SERC. The SERCnotifies the LEPC to include the facility,if appropriate, in its comprehensive

emergency plan. SERCs can specifyother facilities to be included in the

emergency plan.

2 Title II1 of SARA replaces the term “acutely toxic chemical” with “extremely hazardous substance”.

12/87

1-6



-Exhibit 1-2

TITLE III INFORMATION FROM FACILITIES PROVIDED

IN SUPPORT OF PLAN DEVELOPMENT

Information Generated by How LEPC Can Use

Title Ill Compliance Title Ill Authority the Information

Facilities subject to Title Ill planning requirements(including those designated by the Governor or SERC)

Additional facilities near subject facilities (such as hospitals,natural gas facilities, etc.)

Transportation routes

Major chemical hazards (chemical name, properties,location, and quantity)

Facility and community response methods, procedures,and personnel

Facility and community emergency coordinators

Release detection and notification procedures

Methods for determining release occurence andpopulation affected

Facility equipment and emergency facilities; personsresponsible for such equipment and facilities

Evacuation plans

Training programs

Exercise methods and schedules

Section 302; Notice from Governor/SERC

Sections 302 (b) (2) ; 303 (c) (1)

Sections 303(c) (1) ; 303(d) (3)

Section 303 (d) (3) for extremely

hazardous substances used, produced, stored

Section 311 MSDSs for chemicals

manufactured or imported

Section 312 inventories for chemicals manufactured or imported

Sections 303(c) (2); 303(d) (3)

Sections 303 (c) (3) ; 303 (d) (1)

Sections 303(c) (4) ; 303 (d) (3)

Sections 303 (c) (5) ; 303 (d) (3)

Sections 303 (c) (6) ; 303 (d) (3)

Sections 303(c) (7) ; 303(d) (3)

Sections 303 (c) (8) ; 303(d) (3)

Sections 303(c) (9); 303(d) (3)

Hazards analysis -- Hazardsidentification

Hazards analysis -- Vulnerabilityanalysis



Response functions (see pp. 49ffof NRT Planning Guide)

Assistance in preparing and

implementing the plan (see p. 11of NRT Planning Guide)

Initial notification; Warning system(see pp. 50, 53 respectively ofNRT Planning Guide)

Hazards analysis -- Vulnerabilityanalysis and risk analysis

Resource management

Evacuation planning

Resource management

Testing and updating



iii. Facilities must provide the following in

formation to the LEPC: the name of a

facility representative (by September17, 1987) to serve as facility emergency coordinator and assist the LEPCin the planning process; information re

quested by the LEPC that is necessary

for developing and implementing theemergency plan (see Section303(d) (3) of Title Ill of SARA); and anychanges at the facility that could affectemergency planning. (Facility compli

ance with this SARA requirement willmake available much information that

should prove helpful for hazards analysis and annual plan revisions.)

iv. LEPCs must prepare comprehensiveemergency plans for all facilities sub

ject to the regulations by October 17,

1988.V.

Transporters of EHSs do not have to

notify SERCs under Section 302. Section 327 of Title Ill of SARA states thatTitle Ill does not apply to any substance

or chemical being transported, includ-

The components of a hazards analysis are dis

cussed in more detail in the next chapter of thisguide. The discussion in Chapter 2 is as simplified and direct as possible, given the complexityof hazards analysis. Additional technical material

is in the appendices. Chapter 3 provides a de

tai led step-by-step procedure for hazardsanalysis of the EHSs at the local level. Guidancefor incorporating results of a hazards analysisinto the overall planning process is found in

Chapter 4.

Several appendices have been included in this

guide. Appendix A contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms and a glossary of technical

terms. (Users of this guide should regularly consult Appendix A for help in understanding the

terms used). Appendix B describes EPA’s criteria for identifying EHSs. Appendix C contains thelist of EHSs designated by Title Ill of SARA bothalphabetically and by Chemical Abstract Service

ing transportation by pipeline, exceptas provided in Section 304. Section304 requires notification of releases ofEHSs and Comprehensive Environ

mental Response, Compensation andLiability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) hazard

ous substances from facilities, pipe

lines, motor vehicles, rolling stock andaircraft. Barges and other vessels areexempted from Section 304 reporting.

The Title III planning structure for receiving information and formulating plans is displayed in Ex

hibit 1-3.

C. Other Title III Information for Planners.

This guide does not include a detailed descrip

tion of Sections 304, 311, 312, and 313 of Title

Ill. Details of these sections may be found in

Appendix A of NRT-1. What is important for users of this guide to know is that facilities comply

ing with these sections of Title Ill will provide in

formation to LEPCs that may prove useful forhazards analysis and emergency plan develop

ment and revision.

(CAS) number. This appendix also provides information on important physical properties of

each substance and the levels of concern (LOC)which are required to estimate vulnerable zones. Appendix D provides information and calcula

tions concerning exposure levels of EHSs andthe basis for the LOC. Appendix E is a samplechemical profile of one of the EHSs (acrolein). Appendix F contains descriptions of fire and reactivity hazards. Appendix G contains more

technical information for estimating and

reevaluating vulnerable zones. As a warning to

planners to avoid automatically establishing

evacuation distances from the estimated vulnerable zones, Appendix H includes a discussion ofissues to be considered for evacuation. Appendix I supplements Chapters 3 and 4 with a proce

dure for gathering important information to

evaluate sites for contingency planning. Ap

pendix J details other methods for evaluating

hazards and supplements Chapters 2 and 3.

1.6 Contents of this Guide

12/87

l - 8



Exhibit l-3

Title III Planning Steps

l - 9



Appendix K provides an evaluation guide for the

use of computerized systems that could be ofassistance in emergency response planning. Appendix L is an annotated bibliography of pertinent references. Appendix M lists the EPA Regional preparedness contacts and coordinatorsas well as FEMA Regional contacts.

12/87 I - 1 0



2. Hazards Analysis: An Overview

This chapter provides an overview of hazardsanalysis as it relates to emergency planning forextremely hazardous substances (EHSs) underTitle III of the Superfund Amendments andReauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). The approch to hazards analysis presented here is notmandatory but it will assist localities in meeting

the planning requirements of SARA Title Ill. As inChapter 1 this chapter follows the same generalformat and supports the principles presented inNRT-1. It represents a relatively simple yet effective means of evaluating potential hazards re

sulting from the accidental release of an EHS.

The three basic components in the hazards

analysis discussed here are (1) hazards identification, (2) vulnerability analysis, and (3) riskanalysis.

The step-by-step process planners should follow in conducting a hazards analysis is outlined

in Exhibit 2-1 1 (pp. 2-26 and 2-27) and described in detail in Chapter 3. The overview inthis chapter should be carefully read and understood before attempting an actual hazardsanalysis as outlined in Chapter 3. The information in Appendices I and J should also be reviewed.

2.1 Hazards Identification

Risk Analysis

Likelihood of aRelease Occurring

Severity of theConsequences

Hazards identification, the first step in hazards This information can be used by emergencyanalysis, is the process of collecting information planners, as well as by fire/rescue services, poon: lice departments, and environmental protection

l The types and quantities of hazardous departments as they prepare for, respond to,

materials in a community; and recover from emergencies involving hazard

ous materials. Section 2.1 .1 discusses thel The location of facilities that use, pro-

types of hazards that chemicals may pose to theduce, process, or store hazardous mate-

community. Section 2.1.2 discusses sources of rials;

data for hazards identification and proceduresl Conditions of manufacture, storage, proc- that planners may use in gathering data. Infor

essing, and use: mation derived from hazards identification willl Transportation routes used for transport- subsequently be used in vulnerability analysis

ing hazardous materials: and (described in Section 2.2) and risk analysis (de

l Potential hazards associated with spills or scribed in Section 2.3).

releases.

2 - l



2.1.1 Identification of Hazardous Chemicals

Hazards are situations that have the potential forcausing injury to life and/or damage to propertyand the environment. Chemicals may be poten

tially hazardous because of their toxicity orphysical/chemical properties such as flammability and reactivity. Comprehensive planning forhazardous materials emergencies should en

compass all hazards capable of causing loss oflife, injury or damage to health, or damage to

property or the environment. The guidance inthis document focuses on the single hazard ofacute toxicity, specifically acute lethality to individuals as a result of airborne releases of EHSs.


Chemicals with high acute lethality have the potential for causing death in unprotected populations after relatively short exposure periods at

low doses. On the basis of toxicity criteria (discussed in Appendix B), EPA identified a list ofchemicals with high acute toxicity (listed in Appendix C) from the more than 60,000 chemicals

in commerce. This is the list of EHSs requiredby Title Ill of SARA. Because airborne releasesof acutely lethal substances, while infrequent,

can be catastrophic, Title Ill requires consideration of these EHSs in emergency plans.

Al though al l of the listed substances are ex

tremely toxic, the hazards presented by a spillwill also vary depending on the physical and

chemical properties of the substance spilled andthe conditions under which the substance is handled (e.g., elevated temperatures and pressures) . Some substances are highly volatile andthus likely to become airborne, while others arenon-powdered solids that are unlikely to become airborne. The potential to become airborne was considered in the determination ofthe threshold planning quantity (TPQ) for ‘EHSs.

A summary of publicly available information onthe listed substances is presented in the EPAChemical Profiles issued in December 1985 as

part of the Chemical Emergency PreparednessProgram (CEPP) Interim Guidance. The profilefor each chemical includes synonyms as well asinformation on recommended exposure limits,physical/chemical characteristics, fire and explosion hazards and fire fighting procedures, re

activity, health hazards, use, and precautions.Profiles for each EHS are available. The profiles

are currently being updated and supplementedwith additional information, including emergency

medical treatment guidance and informationabout personal protective equipment whichshould be used by emergency response teams.The revised profiles should be available byspring 1988. See Appendix E for a revised sam

ple chemical profile.

Other Hazards

In addition to acute lethality, substances maycause other types of toxic effects in people exposed to them (e.g., long-term or short-termillness, damage to skin or eyes). Criteria for theidentification of chemicals (other than those that

are acutely lethal) that cause serious health effects from short-term exposures are being developed on a priority basis. When such criteriaare established, they will be used in expanding

the list of EHSs. At that time, guidance will beprovided to address planning for chemicals thatcause these other toxic effects. It should benoted that even substances that are relativelyless toxic may pose a hazard if they become airborne in large quantities.

Hazards other than toxicity (e.g., fire, explosion,

and reactivity) that may be associated with bothEHSs and other substances should be consid

ered in emergency preparedness and responseplanning and are discussed briefly in Appendix F.In many cases, emergency response agencies

such as fire departments may have already addressed these types of hazards. Hazards otherthan toxicity will be considered in future revisionsto the list of EHSs.

2.1.2 Procedures for Hazards Identification

Hazards identification begins with the identifica

tion of the facilities that have EHSs in the community. Mandatory reporting by facilities, underTitle Ill, will now identify those facilities that possess one or more of the EHSs in excess of its

TPQ . In addition, because considerable information on the properties, amounts, and condi

tions of use of EHSs is needed to prepare reliable emergency plans, Title Ill specifically

states: “the owner or operator of the facilityshall promptly provide information to such committees necessary for developing and imple

menting the emergency plan” (Section

303 (d) (3) ). Supplemental information on thequantity and location of hazardous chemicals will

2-212/87



become available in March of 1988, fulfilling requirements under Sections 311 and 312, Title Illof SARA. Facility inspections will remain important information-gathering activities for local

planners, as well as for safety and emergencyresponse personnel who must establish accidentprevention programs and pre-emergency plans.Other information available from the site may include facility hazard assessments, facility safetyaudits, spill prevention and control countermeasures (SPCC), and probability-based risk assessments (PRAs) . Although hazards identification should also include identification of transportation routes through the community forEHSs, this information will not be reported underTitle Ill of SARA.

This section will discuss how to obtain information on EHSs and the types of facilities that areengaged in manufacturing , processing, storing,handling, selling, and transporting EHSs. This

section also briefly discusses sources of information on other hazardous substances.


EHSs present in quantities above their TPQ willbe identified for the Local Emergency Planning

Committee (LEPC) by the reporting facilities.However, EHSs in quantities below the TPQcould also present a hazard to the communityunder certain circumstances and the LEPCs maywish to include them in their hazards analysis.

As noted in Section 1.5.3, Title Ill of SARA includes the following provisions concerning EHSs:

If a facility has one or more chemicalsfrom the current list of EHSs in quantities

exceeding its TPQ, it must report this factto the State emergency response com

mission (SERC).

The committee can obtain from the facilityinformation on what chemicals are present and in what amounts. The facility

emergency coordinator will be the primarysource of infor mation . The specific

chemical identity of an EHS may sometimes be withheld as a trade secret. Evenwhen the chemical identity is held confi

dential, however, certain information onthe specific chemical is important for subsequent steps in hazards analysis and willbe provided by the facility.

The following points should be discussed with facility representatives to obtain information forhazards identification:

Chemical identity, including chemicalname and Chemical Abstract Service(CAS) number for substances not claimed

as trade secret;

Quantities of EHSs normally present, including:

(1) Total quantity of each EHS at the facility. The quantity of chemical canvary from day to day depending onoperations. Planners should determine the amount that is typically onhand on any given day. This information is necessary to assess the potential impact should an accident involving this quantity occur.

(2)

Maximum quantity that could be present in each storage or processing

location. Facilities may use the samechemical in many different locationsand have the capacity to store morethan what is typically on hand. Planners need to determine the maximumquantity, even though the facility mayrarely have this much on-site. Hazards associated with the maximumquantity may be much different thanthe hazards associated with the typical quantity. These differences need

to be addressed by planners.

(3) Configuration of storage, includingthe maximum potential quantity in a

single storage or processing vessel.Some facilities handle. quantities ofchemicals in isolated storage vesselswhile others may have two or more

interconnected vessels to al lo wgreater flexibility in the use of storage

capacity. It is possible that an accident involving one vessel will involve

the inventory in another if they are in

terconnected. The maximum potential quantity in a single vessel or

group of interconnected vessels mustbe known to estimate the impact ofan accidental release (see “vulnerability analysis” in Section 2.2).

2-3



l If the chemical identity is held confidential,

information about certain properties of thesubstance will be provided by the facilityto allow a hazards analysis to proceed, including:

(1) Physical state. At ambient conditions

(room temperature and atmosphericpressure) is the chemical a gas, liquid, or solid? If solid, is it powdered(with less than 100 micron particle

size), in solution, or molten?

(2)

Approximate vapor pressure (in millimeters of mercury or atmospheres),if the substance is a liquid or is asolid handled in molten form. For theliquid, the vapor pressure at handlingtemperature should be obtained,

while the vapor pressure at the melting point should be obtained for the

molten solid.

(3)

Approximate level of concern (LOC)(the concentrat ion of EHS in airabove which there may be serious ir

reversible health effects or death asa result of a single exposure for a

relatively short period of time). Theapproximate concentration in air that

equals the LOC in grams per cubicmeter is needed in the vulnerable

zone analysis (see Appendices C and

D) .

Th e approximate values provided shouldbe sufficiently close so as not to signifi

cantly alter the size of the estimatedzones (see Section 2.2).

Conditions under which the chemicals are

processed, handled, or stored, including:

(1) Temperature. Facilities may keepcertain substances at temperatures

other than ambient depending ontheir use.

(2) Pressure. Some substances must bestored under pressure (e.g., lique

fied gases).(3) Other unique features of the handling

systems employed to manufacture,process, store, use or otherwise handle the substance at the facility. Thisinformat ion is useful for the r isk

analysis portion of the hazards analy

sis. See Appendix J for more information. Note that some of this infor

mation might be held as trade secretby the facility. Planners should work

closely with facility representatives toobtain information necessary foremergency plan development.

Exhibit 2-1 presents several chemicals from thelist of EHSs and some types of facilities otherthan chemical plants where these chemicalsmight be present in quantities exceeding theTPQ. Some of the EHSs in the exhibit might befound in other types of facilities in smaller quantities (e.g., chemicals in laboratories).

Hazardous materials, including EHSs, are alsotransported through, by, or over communities byhighway vehicles, rail cars, watercraft, and aircraft virtually 24 hours a day. Shipments may

range from less than a pound to thousands ofpounds of material. Because transporters arenot required to report under SARA Sections 302and 303, identification of routes through a community over which EHSs are transported will bemore difficult than the identification of fixed fa

cilities. Nevertheless, transportation routes and

transported chemicals should be identified if

possible.

The experience gained through Department ofTransportation (DOT) pilot planning projectsdemonstrates that identification of transportation

hazards for emergency planning can be done bygathering information directly at the communitylevel (see Hazardous Materials Transoortation: ASvnthesis of Lessons Learned from the DOTDemonstration Project) . Usefull information maybe collected with assistance from representatives of trucking. rail, air freight, and shippingindustries. Facility representatives may be ableto provide data on the shipping and transfer ofEHSs, although this approach will identify only

those transported materials destined for local facilities. The following points could be discussedwith facility representatives:

l Frequency of shipments (daily, weekly, ir

regular schedule) ;

l Form of shipment (tank truck, tank car,

drums, boxes, carboys in trucks or vans,

pipelines, barges) ;

12/87 2-4



Exhibit 2-l

Types of Faclities where Certian Extremely Hazardous Substances Might beFound in Quantities Greater than their TPQs

Etremely Hazardous Substance (TPQs in parentheses)

Ammonia Chlorine Sulfuric Acid Phosgene AldicarbType of Facility (100 Ibs) (100 Ibs) (500 Ibs) (10 Ibs) (100 lbs/

10,000 Ibs)

Blueprinting Facilities X X

Frozen Food Processing

Processing Plants/

Plumbing, Heating, and Air

Bulk Storage Facilities X X

Farms X X

Faci l i t ies X

Pesticide Distributors X

Formulators X X X X

Conditioning Companies X

Pulp and Paper Plants X X

Retail Stores X

Swimming Pools X

Warehouses X X X

Water Treatment Facilities X X

*TPQ for Al dicarb i s 100 pounds for f ine pow ders or solut ions, 10.000 pounds oth erw ise.

12187 2-5



Quantity of shipments (tons; gallons;number of drums, tanks, vats or carboys); and

Transportation routes through the community (highways, railroads, pipelines).

The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act

(HMTA) establishes DOT as the responsibleagency for guidance on routing controls. Proposed Changes in routes should be made in accordance with the Guidelines for Applving Crite

ria to Designate Routes for Transporting Harzardous Materials, DOT FHWA 1980.

Other Hazardous Materials

Planners can apply the toxicity criteria used byEPA for the list of EHSs (see Appendix B) to determine whether other chemicals at facilities inthe area qualify as EHSs even though they arenot listed as such under the Federal regulations.Planners may also want to obtain information ontransportation of other hazardous materials, asdescribed above for EHSs. The discussion pointslisted in the previous section on EHSs could alsobe raised with facility representatives and transportation industry representatives with referenceto other hazardous substances.

Hazardous materials can be found throughoutmost communities in several types of sites andfacilities. Besides obvious sites and facilities(e.g., flammable liquid storage tanks, gasoline

stations, chemical supply companies), hazardous materials are likely to be found at otherplaces, see Exhibit 2-1 (e.g., dry cleaners, autobody shops, hospitals, and construction sites).

Information on hazards other than toxicity associated with the chemicals on the list of EHSsmay be obtained from the EPA Chemical Profiles. Flammability and reactivity data on manyother chemicals are available in the Fire Proteqtion Guide on Hazardous Materials developed bythe National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) .The Hazardous Materials Table (49 CFR 172),

developed by DOT, classifies hazardous materials in transportation by the type of hazards theypresent. (See also the DOT Hazardous MaterialsTable in the Proposed Rule of November 6,1987, Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 215, pp.

42787-42931.) Planners might Want to use

those chemicals listed by the NFPA with thehighest flammability and reactivity ratings, andthose listed by DOT in certain hazard classes, asa starting point for identification of these typesof hazards in the community. The United Nationspublication, Recommendations on the Transportof Dangerous Goods, is also a useful source of

information. Another source of information onmany chemicals is the Coast Guard’s ChemicalHazards Response Information System (CHRIS)hazardous chemical data base.

2.1.3 Summary of Useful Information Result

ing from Hazards Identification

At the conclusion of the hazards identificationstep of hazards analysis, planners should havethe following information:

A list of EHSs present at facilities in the

district in quantities exceeding the TPQ;the properties of these EHSs: and where,in what quantity, and under what conditions they are used, produced, processed, or stored. Mixtures of chemicalswill be reported if the portion of EHSs in themixture is equal to or greater than onepercent and more than the TPQ.

Information on chemicals claimed as tradesecret, including physical state, approximate vapor pressure of liquids and moltensolids, and approximate LOC as defined inthis guidance.

Routes used for transportation of EHSsthrough the planning district.

In addition, although it is not presently requiredto meet the statutory requirements for emergency plan development under Title Ill of SARA,planners may obtain the following informationduring hazards identification if necessary for developing and implementing an emergency plan:

l A list of EHSs present in quantities lessthan the TPQ and where, in what quantity,and under what conditions they are used,

produced, processed, or stored.l Hazards besides airborne toxicity posed

by the EHSs in the community.

l Chemicals other than those listed thatmeet the acute lethality criteria.

12/87

2-6



l A list of other hazardous chemicals and

where, in what quantity, and under whatconditions they are used, produced, processed, or stored; and the type of hazard

they pose.

l Routes used for transportation of otherhazardous materials through the community.

Exhibit 2-2 summarizes the types and sourcesof information obtained during hazards identifi

cation.

2.2 Vulnerability Analysis for Airborne Hazardous Substances

Vulnerability analysis is the second part of the

three-part hazards analysis. This section outlines a process that can be used in performing avulnerability analysis for facilities that have

chemicals on the Section 302 list of extremelyhazardous substances (EHSs) and transporta

tion routes used for transporting these substances to and from the f ixed faci l i t ies orthrough the communities. (The facilities and

transportation routes should be identified as described in Section 2.1).

The vulnerability analysis will provide information

that will be helpful in fulfilling planning require

ments under Title Ill of SARA. This information

includes:

An estimation of the vulnerable zone foreach EHS reported and the conditions and

assumptions that were used to estimate

each vulnerable zone:

l The population, in terms of numbers and

types (e.g., neighborhood residents: highdensity transient populations such asworkers and spectators in auditoriums or

stadiums; sensitive populations in hospi

tals, schools, nursing homes, and daycare centers) that could be expected tobe within the vulnerable zones: and

l Essential service facilities such as hospitals, police and fire stations, emergencyresponse centers, and communication facilities,

Although this guide is primarily concerned withthe impact of EHSs on the surrounding humanpopulation, planners may also choose to consider as part of their vulnerability analysis the private and public property (e.g., homes, schools,

hospitals, businesses, offices) that may be affected, including essential support systems

(e.g. water, food, power, medical), as well assensitive environments (e.g., drinking water

supplies, food crops, or animal habitats). Consideration of property and sensitive environ

ments may be particularly important for chemical releases that pose hazards other than thoseassociated with acute toxicity. Planners can re

fer to community emergency services (e.g., fire

departments, police departments, hospitals) forassistance in obtaining information about thepopulation and essential services within the vul

nerable zone.

2.2.1 General Description of Estimation of

Vulnerable Zones

For purposes of this guidance, a vulnerable zoneis an estimated geographical area that may besubject to concentrations of an airborne EHS at

12/87 2-7



Exh ib it 2-2

INFORMATION FROM HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

Essential Information

Facilities in community with

EHSs in quantities exceedingthe TPQ

identity of EHSs in community

Quantity of EHSs present

Transportation routes for EHSs

Other Useful information

identity and location of other

acutely toxic chemicals

l Information on hazards other than

toxicity of EHSs

l Information on other hazardoussubstances, including:

Identity

Location

Quantity

HazardsTransportation routes

Source of Information

Facilities must report to SERCinformation will be made available

to LEPC’s

Facility emergency coordinator

Facility emergency coordinator

Facility emergency coordinator,

representative of transportationindustries

Information to be provided now under

Section 303 (d) (3) and in thefuture under Sections 311, 312,and 313 of SARA: facility

emergency coordinators

EPA Chemical Profiles; facility

emergency coordinators

Information to be provided now underSection 303 (d) (3) and in thefuture under Sections 311, 312, and 313of SARA: community sources

Representatives of transportation

industries and facilities receiving shipments of chemicals

12/87 2-8



levels that could cause irreversible acute healtheffects or death to human populations within thearea following an accidental release. Vulnerablezones are based on estimates of the quantity ofan EHS released to air, the rate of release to air,airborne dispersion, and the airborne concentration that could cause irreversible health effects

or death. Release and dispersion methodologies are not precise and provide only estimatesof the actual distances and areas that may beaffected by an accidental release. Many methods are available to evaluate both releases andairborne dispersion. They vary in their assumptions and therefore the results obtained maydiffer. The dispersion models selected for this

guidance are described in Appendix G.

At the time of an accidental release, with thewind generally moving in one direction, the area

affected by a release is the area downwind only.Because the wind direction at the time of an actual accidental release cannot be predicted,planners must consider all possible wind directions and subsequent plume paths. (A plume isthe cloud formation of airborne chemical that results from a release (Exhibit 2-3).) Consequently, the estimated vulnerable zones are circles with the potential release site located at thecenter (Exhibit 2-4). Because it is not possibleto predict the exact location of a transportation

accident, the estimated vulnerable zone for potential releases associated with transportation of

an EHS is a “moving circle” or corridor (Exhibit2-5).

The size of an estimated vulnerable zone depends upon the distance the airborne chemicaltravels before it disperses and is diluted in theair to a concentration below a “level of concern”(see subsection D below) for acute health effects or death. This distance depends on several variable factors.

2.2.2 Variables in Estimating Size of Vulner

able Zones

Many of the variables are very complex and it isbeyond the scope of this document to discussthem all in detail. In addition many do not havea significant impact on the size of estimated vul

nerable zones given the imprecise nature ofthese assumptions. The major factors affectingthe size of a vulnerable zone for emergency

planning are described below.

A. Quantity and Rate of Release to Air

Not all of a released chemical will necessarilybecome airborne. The quantity that actually becomes airborne and the rate at which it be

comes airborne depend upon:

l Total quantity released or spilled:

l Physical state (solid, liquid, gas); and

l Conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure)under which the chemical is stored or han

dled.

Gases typically become airborne more readilythan liquids. Liquids or molten solids generallybecome airborne by evaporation. The rate atwhich they become airborne (rate of volatilization) depends on their vapor pressure, molecular weight, handling temperature, the surfacearea of the spill (pool size), and the wind speedat the time of the spill. A spilled liquid with a

higher vapor pressure will become airborne(through evaporation) more rapidly than aspilled liquid with a low vapor pressure at thesame temperature. Also, a liquid will evaporatefaster if the surface area or pool size of the spillis increased, if the liquid has a higher than ambient temperature, and if it is exposed to greaterwind speeds. Molten solids will volatilize much

faster than those in solid state. Solids as powders are likely to become airborne only if propelled into the air by force (e.g., by an explosionor the loss of air filtration in a pneumatic convey

ing system). Solids that are not powdered areless likely to become airborne.

The size of an estimated vulnerable zone is proportional to the quantity and rate of release.Smaller release volumes based on similar assumptions will yield lower release rates which willreduce the size of the estimated vulnerable

zone.

The application of these variables in the vulnerable zone estimate will be discussed later in thischapter and also in Chapter 3. For more infor

mation on the calculations and derivations related to these variables, see Appendix G.

B. Meteorological Conditions

Among the many meteorological factors, windspeed and atmospheric stability have the greatest effect on the size of estimated vulnerable

zones.. Increased w ind speed and the

12/87 2-9



Exhibit 2-3

The Movement Downwind of a Plume of an Airborne

Extremely Hazardous Substance Following

an Accidental Release.

12/87 2-10



Exhibit 2-4

Vulnerable Zones for Community Planning

Resulting from Airborne Releases of Chemicals A and B

12/87 2 -11



Exhibit 2-5

Vulnerable Zones along a Transportation Route

When Airborne Releases of Chemicals C and D Occur

12/87 2 - 12



accompanying decreased atmospheric stabilitywill result in greater airborne dispersion (and dilution) of a chemical, and a resultant decreasein the size of the estimated vulnerable zone.

Additional information on these meteorologicalvariables is presented in Appendix G.

C. Surrounding Topography

The topography of the area surrounding a potential release site will affect the size of the estimated vulnerable zones.

The principal topographical factors are naturalobstructions such as hills and mountains, and

man-made structures such as high-rise buildings. Natural formations and surface conditionsare always site-specific and therefore beyond

the scope of this guidance. If significant naturalbarriers exist within estimated vulnerable zones,

appropriate technical support should be solicited

from local, State, or EPA Regional meteorologists or experts in the private sector including

the facility. On the other hand, general method

ologies do exist for describing the dispersion ofchemical substances in urban areas containinghigh buildings and in flat, rural areas. The meth

odology for estimating vulnerable zones in urbanand rural areas is discussed later in this chapter

and is presented in Chapter 3.

D. Levels of Concern

A level of concern (LOC), for purposes of this

document, is defined as the concentration of anEHS in air above which there may be serious ir

reversible health effects or death as a result of asingle exposure for a relatively short period of

time.

There is at present no precise measure of anLOC for the chemicals listed as EHSs. Variousorganizations over the past several years have

been developing acute exposure guidelines for alimited number of hazardous chemicals; themethodology, however, is still under development. The preliminary guidelines and the pro

gress to date are described in detail in AppendixD. Until more precise measures are developed,surrogate or estimated measures of the LOChave been identified for the listed EHSs. Localofficials may choose values for the LOC differentfrom those estimated in this guidance, depending upon their requirements, the specific characteristics of the planning district or site, and the

level of protection deemed appropriate. Extreme caution and prudence should be exercised when choosing an LOC.

For the purposes of this guidance, an LOC hasbeen estimated by using one-tenth of the "Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health” (IDLH)

level published by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or one-tenthof an approximation of the IDLH from animal toxicity data. Other exposure guidelines that may

be used to estimate LOC include the “ThresholdLimit Value” (TLV) published by the AmericanConference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), guidelines developed by the National Research Council (NRC) of the National

Academy of Sciences (NAS), and Emergency

Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) underdevelopment by a consortium of chemical companies. These values are discussed and listed

in Appendix D. The use of LOC in the vulnerablezone estimate is discussed later in this chapter

and in Chapter 3.

2.2.3 The Relationship of Estimated Vulner

able Zones to Actual Releases

The estimated vulnerable zones are shown ascircles with different radii in Exhibits 2-6 and 2-7

to illustrate how changing conditions or assumptions can influence the vulnerable zone estimate. At the time of an accidental release, onlysome portion of the estimated vulnerable zonewill actually be involved. The specific area covered by the plume will be determined principallyby wind direction and the degree of dispersion of

the plume. The area through which the plumemoves is generally referred to as a plume “footprint.” Exhibit 2-8 shows the plume footprint forthe release of a sample chemical substance.Note that the actual concentration of the airborne chemical tends to decrease as it moves

further downwind from the release site becauseof continual mixing and dilution (dispersion) ofthe chemical with air. Note also that the plumemovement is affected by the speed of the wind.

Although a footprint represents the area enveloped by a plume, it is not possible to predictwith any high degree of accuracy the wind direction and wind speed. Therefore the direction and

shape which the plume may take at the time ofan accidental release is not known in advance.

2-1312/87



Exhi bit 2-6

The Effect of Different Assumptions on the Calculationof the Radius of Estimated Vulnerable Zones

12/87 2-14



Exhibit 2-7

12/87 2-15



Exhibit 2-8

Plume Development and Movement duringa Hypothetical Accidental Release



Further, both wind speed and direction maychange during the course of the release. Because of this, it is suggested that planners use acircle for fixed sites or a corridor for transportation routes when estimating vulnerable zones.

2.2.4 Application of Estimated Vulnerable

Zones to Hazards Analysis for Extremely Hazardous Substances

This section provides an overview of how vulner

able zones can be estimated as part of a hazards analysis. To estimate the zone, specificvalues must be assigned to each of the variables

discussed in the previous sections. Values maybe obtained from the reporting facilities, fromtechniques contained in this document, or other

sources recommended in this guide. In several

instances, this guide provides liquid factorswhich replace a series of calculations. These

factors are intended to make the process of estimating the vulnerable zones much easier forlocal emergency planning committees (LEPCs) .

The step-by-step hazards analysis described inChapter 3 of this guidance is divided into two

major phases. The first phase involves a

screening of all reporting facilities to set priori

ties among facilities so that more detailed haz

ards analysis can be conducted for those facilities that pose the greatest risk should a releaseoccur. The first phase employs assumptions for

a credible worst case scenario. The second

phase involves the reevaluation of the facilitiesby priority. During this phase the LEPCs have

the opportunity to reevaluate the assumptionsused in the screening phase on a case by casebasis using data that may be unique to a particu

lar site.

Estimating Vulnerable Zones for Initial

Screening

Because of time and resource limitations, localplanners may not be able to evaluate all report

ing facilities at the same time or to the sameextent. Thus planners should set an order of priority among potential hazards for all facilities

that have reported the presence of one or moreEHSs in excess of the TPQ. One way to do this

is to estimate a vulnerable zone radius using assumptions for a credible worst case scenario.Values that reflect these assumptions are assigned to all the variables discussed in Section2.2.2. In this way, all facilities and substancesare similarly evaluated to establish a relative

measure of potential hazard for purposes of

prioritization.

The initial estimated screening zones are basedon the following credible worst case assump

tions.

Quantity released: maximum quantity thatcould be released from largest vessel orinterconnected vessels.

Rate of release to air: total quantity ofgas, solid as a powder, or solid in solution

is assumed to be released in 10 minutes;for liquids and molten solids, the rate is

based on the rate of evaporation (rate ofvoltization). As explained in Appendix G

this guidance simplifies the calculation ofthe rate of evaporation with a liquid factorwhich approximates. a series of calcula

tions. This number is called liquid factor

ambient (LFA), liquid factor boiling (LFB),or liquid factor molten (LFM) depending

on the handling conditions of the EHS.

Temperature: not applicable to gases orsolids as powders or in solution; for liq

uids, dependent on whether they are used

at ambient temperature or near their boiling points: for molten solids, at their melt

ing point.

Meteorological conditions: wind speed of1.5 meters per second (3.4 miles perhour) ; F atmospheric stability.

Topographic conditions: flat, level, unob

structed terrain: use of the dispersion

model for rural areas.

LOC: one-tenth of the (NIOSH) published(IDLH) value or one-tenth of its approxi

mation. * (See Appendix D for a discus

sion of LOC.)

* Provided it is not exceeded by the ACGIH TLV. In this case, the TLV is used.

2-1712/87



As a result, the only information necessary to utmost care and prudence. Although someestimate the vulnerable zone for initial screening changes in estimated or assumed values mayis: increase the size of the estimated vulnerable

Chemical identity:

Maximum potential quantity in a single

vessel or interconnected vessels (ob

tained from the facility);

Location of vessel and facility (obtained

from the facility);

LOC (found in Appendix C); and

In instances of confidentiality claims, the

approximate LOC as defined in this guid

ance, physical state, and approximate va por pressure of a liquid or molten solid

(obtained from the facility).

Planners can use the estimated zone, togetherwith an initial consideration of population and essential service facilities within this zone and any

readily available information on the likelihood ofa release to establish an order of priority amongthe facilities. The considerations of population

and critical services are discussed in Section 2.3

of this chapter.

Reevaluation of the Estimated Zones

Once the prioritization of facilities is completed,

the LEPCs should begin a systematic reevaluation of those facilities which initially appear torepresent the greatest potential hazards. This

will require careful review of the considerations

presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and AppendicesG and I in this document, consultation with facility officials, and perhaps the aid of experts in the

appropriate technical areas. After careful evalu

ation of new data, planners may wish to alter

certain values and assumptions such as:

Quantity likely to be released (use infor

mation from facility);

Likely rate of release to air (obtain infor

mation from facility or other sources);

Meteorological conditions (obtain informa

tion from facility, local, State, or regional

experts, or other sources);

Topographical considerations (e.g., urban

versus rural landscape); and

Values used for the LOC.

zone, in many instances the zone will be re

duced by such changes. Exhibit 2-9 provides asummary table of how the principal variables affect the estimated zone. For example, discus

sions with a facility representative may indicatethat in one particular operation, vessels arerarely filled to maximum capacity or that equip

ment is engineered or designed to minimize orcontain accidental releases. Chemicals may besubjected to higher temperatures or pressuresthan was originally assumed. Meteorologicaldata may show that the worst-case conditionsprevail for only a small percentage of the time or

that they prevail for a large percentage of thetime. The use of one-tenth of the IDLH or anapproximation of this value as the LOC may or

may not be considered overly protective for lo

cal circumstances. Local planners may favorthe use of another value as an appropriateguideline for an LOC.

Decisions to alter the values or assumptions that

affect the size of the estimated vulnerable zone

involve a consideration of acceptable risk andare a matter of judgement at the local level.There is no guidance available that can providevalues that would ensure no risk or that can provide an acceptable balance between risk and theappropriate level of planning for each district.This decision rests with local officials.

It is possible that reevaluation of the screening

zones may lead to the estimation of several vulnerable zones as shown in Exhibit 2-7. Planners

must then carefully consider the populations and

essential services at risk, both within and outsidethese zones and reach conclusions on the leveland type of planning they believe is necessary.

Section 2.3 provides information on analyzingthe risk associated with releases of EHSs topopulations and essential services facilitieswithin the planning district.

2.2.5 Evacuation Considerations for Airborne

Releases of Extremely Hazardous Sub

stances

Decisions about whether or not to evacuate aswell as about evacuation distances are incident-

Reevaluation of the screening zones based onspecific and must be made at the time of an ac

“credible worst case” assumptions used for

screening purposes should be performed with

12/87 2-18



EXHIBIT 2- 9

FACTORS AFFECTING VULNERABLE ZONE ESTIMATIONS

IF IT WILL CAUSE RESULTING IN

the quantity on sitethat might be involved inan accident is reduced

the time period ofrelease of a givenquantity increases

the release source pointis above ground level

the terrain consideredis rough (uneven andmountainous) instead of

flat

the area is urban,containing high buildingsand other man-made

structures

a higher valuefor LOC is chosen

a lower value forLOC is chosen

a reduction in the smaller estimated zones

total airborne quantityand the quantity releasedper minute

a reduction in the smaller estimated zones

airborne quantity

released per minute

an increase in dispersion smaller estimated zones

(mixing and diluting of the (possibly)chemical in air)

an increase in dispersion smaller estimated zones(mixing and diluting of

the chemical in the air)

an increase in dispersion smaller estimated zones(mixing and diluting ofthe chemical in the air)

a reduction in the geographical smaller estimated zonesarea with airborne concentrations

above the LOC

an increase in the geographical larger estimated zonesarea with airborne concentrationsabove the LOC

2 - 1 9



tual release. An estimated vulnerable zoneshould not automaticallv be used as the basis forevacuation during an incident response, For example, the following variable factors are alwayspart of an evacuation decision: wind speed anddirection, temperature, humidity, air dispersionconditions, and time of day. In addition, the vulnerable zone is described as a circle or a corridor surrounding the possible incident site andprovides no information on the breadth of a potential plume. An evacuation zone is typically a

pathway through which a plume might movefrom the point of release. The vulnerable zoneis helpful because it identifies an area aboutwhich evacuation decisions might need to bemade, but the evacuation zone will always depend on other factors.

Evacuation during incidents involving the airborne release of acutely toxic chemicals is

sometimes , but by no means always ,necessary. Release of airborne toxics can occur

and move downwind so rapidly that there wouldbe no time to evacuate residents. For short-term releases, the most prudent course of action for the protection of the nearby residents

would often be to remain indoors with the doorsand windows closed and the heating and air conditioning systems shut off. An airborne cloud will

frequently move quickly past. Vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and sick, may suffermore injury by being evacuated than by staying

inside and putting simple countermeasures intoeffect. If the releases occur over an hour ormore, or if there is a fire that cannot be readily

controlled within a short time, then evacuationmay be a sensible alternative.

The disadvantages of evacuation in incidents involving airborne releases of EHSs are numerous.Two have already been alluded to, namely thatevents occur so rapidly that there may be notime to evacuate and that vulnerable populationswould sustain fewer adverse effects by remaining inside until the toxic cloud has passed.Slight changes in wind velocity and directioncould be very important if evacuation were begun during a release of airborne toxic chemicals:differences in temperature between air layerscould also cause the toxic cloud to disperse inways that would be hard to predict. It would bedifficult to estimate how long a community wouldbe exposed to a toxic cloud.

The estimated vulnerable zone for a potentialairborne release of a specific quantity of EHSrepresents the area surrounding the potential release site within which vulnerable populations

and facilities might be affected. It does not reflect the time frame of the impact of an accident. It also does not mean that just beyond the

zone boundary residents are safe. The manyassumptions made in the calculations for thevulnerable zones and the fact that no safe levelsfor any of the chemicals on the list of EHSs havebeen established for the general population,make it inappropriate to base evacuation solelyon these estimates. If the estimated vulnerablezone is greater than planners can cope with, thecommunity should work closely with the facilityto discuss the possibility of reducing the risk ofexposure. This could be achieved by reducinginventories, establishing controls or alarms tomake sure no release occurs, and by installingearly warning systems. A more detailed discussion of evacuation is given in Appendix H.

12/87 2-20



2.3 Risk Analysis

Risk analysis is the third part of the hazardsanalysis process. Risk analysis can provide arelative measure of the likelihood and severity of

various possible hazardous events and enablethe emergency plan to focus on the greatest potential risks. Risk analysis requires certain information collected during the first two steps of thehazards analysis (hazards identification and vul

nerability analysis), as well as other informationspecific to the facility or the local area. The appropriate level of detail and scope of the riskanalysis must be determined based on the localsituation and the resources available. This guideis meant primarily to assist local emergency

planning committees (LEPCs) in carrying out arelatively quick and inexpensive risk analysis.

LEPCs with access to the necessary resourcesmay wish to conduct a detailed quantitative risk

analysis. However, a risk analysis of this type isbeyond the scope of the guidance presentedhere and it is recommended that committeesseek other guidance and expert advice for con

ducting quantitative risk assessments. A quantitative risk assessment is not deemed essential

to performing a hazards analysis suitable foremergency response planning in most cases.The real value of risk analysis derives from the

fact that it gives planners an ability to put eachpotential situation into perspective (in terms of

the probability that it will occur and the resultingeffects it will have) and results in emergencyplans that will address the most likely and most

severe potential hazards.

2.3.1 Overall Approach to Risk Analysis:

Ranking of Hazards

Because available safeguards such as contain

ment, controlled flow, and proper venting maygreatly reduce the opportunity for, or extent of,exposure, the mere presence of a hazardouschemical is insufficient to identify the level of riskinvolved. Whenever a hazard exists, however,there is always some risk, however small itmight be.

Risk analysis includes an estimate of the probability or likelihood that an event will occur. Risk

can be characterized in qualitative terms ashigh, medium, or low, or in quantitative termsusing numerical estimates and statistical calcu

lations. For practical purposes, a risk analysismay be based on a subjective, common-sense

evaluation. Few people live in daily fear of beingstruck by a meteorite. They know that, althoughthe risk exists, it is very small because the prob

ability is low. A busy street corner, known to bethe site of frequent auto accidents, could be

considered to present a high risk of accidents.Citizens know that the likelihood of being struckby an automobile is much greater and requires

safeguards (e.g., looking both ways before

crossing a street). In both of these situations,

the evaluation of the probability of a future incident is based on knowledge of the frequencywith which that incident has occurred in the

past. Historical records of past events can,therefore, be put into practical use in risk analy

sis.

12/87 2-21



Both probability and consequences are extremely important in evaluating risk. A high risksituation can be the result of a high probabilitywith severe consequences (e.g., irreversiblehealth effects or death due to an airborne toxicchemical, a fire or explosion with injuries or fa

talities) , whereas moderate risk situations can

be a result of either high probability with mildconsequences or low probability with more severe consequences. Diminishing the likelihood

of an accident or minimizing the consequenceswill reduce risk overall.

A relative ranking of hazards for the purposes ofcommunity emergency planning does not require extensive mathematical evaluations, application of statistics, or extensive support fromexperts. Application of readily available information and common sense, when combined withsite-specific evaluations such as the vulnerability analysis, will complete much of the risk analysis process. Because it is based on the knowl

edge, experience, local considerations, and thepriorities of the people in the planning district orcommunity involved, there is no universal rightanswer in risk analysis.

2.3.2 Types of Information Required for Risk

Analysis

Much of the information concerning sources ofhazard, populations, and essential services sub

ject to damage should have been assembled

during the screening portion of the hazards identification and vulnerability analysis. Risk analysiswill also require information on facility and com

munity plans and safeguards, existing local response capabilities in place, and an historical record of past incidents and their outcomes.

Planners who have used the screening methodology to estimate vulnerable zones as describedin Section 2.2 of this chapter and in Chapter 3

will then need additional information about priority facilities for which they will develop plans first.The process described in this section is itera

tive: (1) Planners gather additional informationabout high priority facilities first; (2) Plannersthen reevaluate and rank the risks associatedwith highest priority sites (and make emergencyplans accordingly); (3) Planners then return tothe original list of facilities that were assigned alower priority during the screening and repeatthe process until all reporting facilities have been

reevaluated. Following the reevaluation of all fa

cilities, appropriate emergency plans should bedeveloped.

Facility Information

Facilities are an important source of information

about risk. They are required under Title Ill ofSARA to provide both chemical inventory and release information to LEPCs. Information requiredunder Section 304 about spills or releases thathave occurred will be useful for this phase ofhazards analysis. Certain State and local governments have additional community-right-toknow regulations and spill reporting requirements with which facilities must also comply.Thus industries can and should be approachedwith questions regarding the hazards and safeguards present at their facilities. Interaction with

facilities should be based on cooperation, re

spect for trade secrets and other confidentialbusiness information, and recognition of the industry as a member of the community. Facilities should be aware of the importance of certain information (e.g., the results of a facility riskassessment) and should cooperate in providingas much pertinent information as possible. Specific types of information concerning extremelyhazardous substances (EHSs) that LEPCs may

want to request from facilities include:

Anticipated adverse health effects of asubstance and their degree of severity:

Safeguards in place on-site:Recommendations made by facilities forcommunity safeguards:

Prevention approaches used for past

events in which adverse health effectswere prevented, and details of the events:

Lessons learned from past events in whichadverse health effects occurred, and details of the events:

Hazards evaluations conducted by the facility (e.g., HAZOP; see Appendix J).

In addition to the information and recommendations which they will provide, facilities may bewilling to contribute resources to assist in emergency response management including:

l Assistance in planning and response byfacility technical experts:

12/87 2-22



Copies of facility emergency responseplans and spill prevention control and

countermeasures (SPCC) plans (see Appendix I);

Assistance in cleanup and recycl ing ofspilled materials: and

Training and safe handling instructions.

Community Plan and Safeguard Information

Many communities will already have in place oneor more emergency response plans developedto address a variety of hazards. Such plans mayrequire revision to include recent new regulations and perhaps may be incomplete in addressing acutely toxic airborne releases, but willprovide a valuable starting point for additionalplanning. Specific types of plans which may already exist include:

Local multi-hazard emergency operationsplans (EOPs) (developed under FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA)guidance);

Emergency plans for transportation-related hazards (developed under Department of Transportation (DOT) guidance);

Community Awareness and EmergencyResponse (CAER) plans (developed bythe Chemical Manufacturers Association

(CMA) ); and

The SPCC plans of individual facilities.

Historical Accident Records

There are two benefits to the review of historicalrecords of hazardous materials incidents in riskanalysis. First, an analysis of the sites and materials involved in prior accidents will indicatehazards that may represent significant risks. Although no two accidents will be identical, certainsituations, if unaltered, can precipitate othermore severe incidents. A second benefit is thedevelopment of an ability to recognize and assess potential risks which would not be apparent

to an untrained evaluator. The development ofan appreciation for what could happen can beachieved through a review of what has happened in the past. To assist in increasing the

overall awareness of the nature and complexityof hazardous incidents, Exhibit 2-10 includesbrief summaries of some accidents that oc

curred during 1980 and 1981 throughout theworld. The Acute Hazardous Events Data Base

prepared for the EPA Office of Toxic Substances(December 1985) has information on the chemicals involved in accidents that posed high risksto human health. The historical record of localhazardous incidents may be more valuable inidentifying possible hazards in each district. Facility compliance with Section 304 of Title Ill of

SARA will provide this type of information in thefuture.

An historical record of local hazardous materialsincidents should include information from the following organizations:

l Fire department and rescue squad:

l Police department:

l Public health department:

l Local hospitals and physicians:

l Local chemical cleanup and spill response

companies;l Universities (chemistry, chemical engi

neering, and science laboratory safetypersonnel);

l Local industry: and

News media (print and broadcast).

When accumulating records of past incidents,information concerning the responsible partieswill not be essential to the risk analysis process.Many of the information sources listed abovemay be more willing to provide the needed data(e.g., date, time, location, material, extent of

incident, injuries sustained, remedial actionstaken, safeguards implemented) if they are assured that blame will not be assigned in the

process.

Changing Factors Affecting Future Incidents

The historical record of incidents will containvaluable information. However, to properly apply such data to the risk analysis process requires that any changes which have occurred betaken into account. For example, the assem

bled historical record may contain several acci

dents involving the release of hazardous materials at a particular site. If the engineering controls, containment facilities or processes usedare altered over time, the results of the riskanalysis may be substantially different from whatthe historical record might predict. Any evaluation of past accidents must take into accountany changes in the following:

12/872-23



Exhi bit 2-10

SUMMARIES OF SOME ACCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED IN 1980-81



Surrounding populations and critical facili

ties;

Transportation routes: and

Engineering control methods.

2.3.3 Limiting the Collection of Information

The preceding section contains some generalguidance concerning the types of information required for a risk analysis and where to obtain

such data. Appendix I contains suggestions formore detailed questions and concerns whichmay be raised during discussions to collect theneeded information. These are all tools for usein determining what information to collect: noneof them, however, will be wholly adequate for

emergency planning needs. Community-specific checklists will have to be developed for use

in collecting information since each locality and

community has different needs, requirements,and points of emphasis.

The suggested approach for using the tools inthis guide to aid in the development of such a

community-specific checklist is to:

1)

Review Appendix I for the types of information that appear to be needed.

2)

Highlight and amend the suggestions in

Appendix I to reflect the specific needs ofyour local.community or planning district.

3) Develop a detailed checklist of information

needed based on the amended (tailored)version of Appendix I and the types of information outlined in the prior section ofthis guidance.

4)

Set a priority for each item of information

based on perceived need, effort involved,and available resources.

5)

Request the needed information and as

semble it. (This process will be described

in the next section.)

It is very important to recognize when enoughinformation has been collected. A cursory re

view of Appendix I, which is by no means a complete set of discussion points, will demonstratethe volume of information that can be collected

for the risk analysis. Collection of data on all

possible interactions of elements would be extremely time consuming. The complexity of the

analysis and the effort required to perform it willdepend directly on the volume of data collected.

The focus of the information collection should beon developing a relative measure of the likelihood and severity of possible hazardous events.This goal does not demand an exhaustive collection of data. Reviewing data as they are col

lected will greatly assist in identifying informationthat is essential as opposed to that which is peripheral to the risk analysis process. If in doubt,base decisions on whether the information:

l Has the potential for altering the relative

ranking of the hazard to the community:and

l Directly involves identification of a hazard,determination of likelihood of an incident,

assessment of outcome of an accident, or

identification of the safeguards needed or

available to reduce the magnitude of the

damage.

Anything outside these categories can be considered of secondary importance and should becollected only if resources allow. Such limitations, when properly applied to the entire information collection process (i.e., prioritization of

the checklist before data is collected) can benefit the risk analysis by eliminating unnecessary

types of information (e.g., details concerningdamage from the least likely events) before ef

fort is expended on its collection and analysis.

2.3.4 Assembly of the Information Obtained

from the Hazards Analysis

Data that are systematically assembled as theybecome available during the three major stepsof the hazards analysis can be easily evaluated

as the risk analysis progresses and can be usedto identify missing data as well as information

that is complete. As has been discussed earlierin this chapter, a hazards analysis is first performed during the screening of reporting facili

ties using “credible worst case assumptions” forestablishing priorities among facilities. The hazards analysis of each facility is then reevaluated

according to priority based on a careful reassessment of the assumptions used in thescreening process. A list of these steps is

shown in Exhibit 2-11.

Information obtained during both the screeningprocess and the reevaluation process can bestored in a hazards analysis matrix. The hazards

12/87

2-25



EXH IB IT 2 -11

STEPS IN HAZARDS ANALYSIS

INITIAL SCREENING

1. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

A. List facilities that have reported EHSs in the community in excess of the threshold planning quantity TPQ

B. Contact each facility on the list for information on the EHSs present

i. Chemical identities

ii. Quantities and location of chemicals present

iii. Properties of the chemicals if identity is trade secret

iv. Conditions under which chemicals are used, produced, processed, or stored

C. Obtain information on transportation routes of EHSs, if possible

D. Obtain information on hazardous materials, facilities, and transportation routes (otherthan for those with EHSs above the TPQ) listed by SERCs (optional)

2. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

A. Estimate vulnerable zone for screening using credible worst case assumptions

i. Determine rate of release to air using information from the facility concerning quantity

likely to be released from a vessel or interconnected vessels and fixed assumptions

about time of release

ii. Use LOC from Appendix C

iii. Determine zone using Exhibit 3-l and fixed conditions

B. Identify characteristics of human population (e.g., number, concentration, general

health) within estimated vulnerable zone

C. Identify critical facilities within estimated vulnerable zone

3. RISK ANALYSIS

A. Collect information obtained in hazards identification and vulnerability analysis

B. Make rough estimate of risks posed by each based on readily available information onthe likelihood of a release and severity of consequences

C. Identify those facilities with higher priority due to the estimated risks they pose

12/87 2-26



PLANNING FOR FACILITIES BY PRIORITY

4. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

A. Contact each facility on the list and other expert sources for additional information onthe EHSs present and what conditions might be present during a release

i. Reevaluate estimate of quantity likely to be present

ii. Reevaluate estimate of rate of release

iii. Consider typical weather and wind conditions

B. Obtain additional information on typical transportation conditions, if possible

5. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

A. Reestimate vulnerable zone using reevaluated assumptions gathered from conversationswith the facility and other expert sources

B. Identify characteristics of human population within estimated vulnerable zone

C. Identify critical facilities within estimated vulnerable zone

6. RISK ANALYSIS

A. Collect all information obtained in hazards identification and vulnerability analysis into atable

B. Obtain additional information on community and facility safeguards, response

capabilities, and accident records

C. Make judgment of probability of release and severity of consequences

D. Organize all information (from A, B, and C) in a matrix format

E. Rank risks

F. Develop, or revise emergency plans for higher priority facilities

INTEGRATING HAZARDS ANALYSIS INTO THE PLAN.

See Exhibit 4-1 Emergency Planning Information Section.

12/87 2-27



Exhibit 2-13

EXAMPLE QUALITATIVE DEFINITIONS OF

PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE



zoning

Providing a basic for requesting additional

In general, the events with likelihood-consequence rankings of high-high, high-medium,medium-high, and medium-medium will requiresome additional attention and possible mitigatingmeasures. However, other less likely scenarios

may also have serious consequences and be ofhigh concern to a particular community and

would warrant the focus of emergency planning.This initial approach to ranking hazards can enable the best use of the available planning resources.

The planning and decision-making situations in

which risk analysis information may prove valuable include:

summarizes routing requirements at theFederal, State, and local levels consistentwith the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA) of 1975);

emergency response resources (e.g . , firedepartment vehicles equipped for hazardous materials incidents); and

l Developing new training materials or selecting available materials.

The application of the results of a risk analysis tothe emergency planning process will be described in detail in Chapter 4.

Development of a comprehensive local emergency plan;

Updating of facility emergency response

plans:

Planning major transportation routes for

hazardous chemicals (it should be em phasized that the Federal Highway Admini

stration publication FHWA-IP-80-15,

Guidelines for Applying Criteria to Desig nate Routes for Transporting Hazardous

Materials, should be used. This document

The summary description of the components ofhazards analysis presented in this chapter and Appendices I and J will provide a sound basis for

understanding the next chapter of this guidance.

Chapter 3 leads planners step by step through ahazards analysis, beginning with the initialscreening of reporting facilities to establish priorities, and followed by a subsequent reevaluation of the estimated vulnerable zones and hazards analysis by priority of potential hazard.

1 2 / 8 7 2-33



3. Step-by-Step Procedures for Conducting a

Hazards Analysis of Extremely Hazardous Substances

Introduction

C h a p t e r 2 p r o v i d e d a n o v e r v i e w o f t h eunderlying concepts and application of the threemajor steps in conducting a hazards analysis ofextremely hazardous substances (EHSs) . Thesesteps are hazards identification, vulnerabilityanalysis, and risk assessment.

This chapter provides procedures that can beused in a stepwise fashion to actually conduct ahazards analysis for a specific EHS as reportedby a facility under Title Ill of the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthor ization Act of 1986

(SARA). This chapter contains only minimal

information on the background and concepts ofthe hazards analysis. Effective use of these

procedures requires that all information

presented in Chapter 2 and Appendices I and J

be reviewed and understood.

General Overview

Because of t ime and resource l imi tat ions,planners will l ikely not be able to analyze

3.1.1 Hazards Identification

The hazards identification for initial screening isbased primarily on those facilities in the planningdistrict that have reported EHSs in excess of theTPQs under Section 302, Title Ill of SARA.Identification of hazards from EHSs present in

amounts lower than the TPQ and from otherhazardous substances may be undertaken but is

not mandatory under this Act.

Step 1. Prepare a list of all facilities in theplanning district that have reported EHSsunder Section 302 of Title Ill. Include anyadditional facilities specified by the Stateemergency response commission (SERC).

Step 2. Prepare a list of all EHSs at each facilitythat exceed the TPQs. Chemical identity

hazards and plan in detail for all facilitiesimmediately. Resources s h o u l d b econcentrated first on those situations thatpresent the greatest potential risk should anaccident occur. To accomplish this, the hazardsanalysis is separated into two phases. The firstphase is the initial screening of all facilitiesreporting EHSs on their premises in excess oftheir threshold planning quantities (TPQs). Theinitial screening is perform ed to esta bli shpriorities among reporting facilities using

credible worst case assumptions. The secondphase represents a reassessment by order ofpriority of the potential hazards posed by thereporting facilities. This is accomp lished

through the reevaluation of the assumptionsused for the initial screening. Both the initialscreening and the reevaluation phases utilize thethree basic steps of a hazards analysis: hazardsidentification, vulnerability analysis, and risk

analysis.

should include chemical name and Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) registry number. Although it is not required under Title Ill ofSARA, a list of EHSs below the TPQ couldalso be considered for hazards analysis.This information can be obtained from thefacility representative.

Step 3. Using chemical name or CAS number,find ambient physical state of substance in Appendix C.

Step 4. Obtain from the facility representativeinformation concerning the total quantitypresent, the average daily quantity, andmaximum quantity in a single vessel or groupof interconnected vessels for each EHS thatexceeds the TPQ.

3.1 Initial Screening to Set Priorities Among Sites

3-1



(If the EHS is a solid, these two steps (3 and 4) guidance and close approximations of theshould establish the quantity of solid in each of following properties for each EHS:the following forms: powdered (less than 100 i. Physical state at ambient conditionsmicrons particle diameter), molten (liquid), or in

ii. For liquids: the vapor pressure atsolution .) ambient conditions and boiling point

Step 5. Obtain from the facility representative temperatureadditional information on liquids, solids, and iii. For molten solids: the melting pointmixtures or solutions: temperature and vapor pressure at the

i. For liquids: temperature of liquid in melting point temperature

each vessel and whether or not the Approximation should be sufficiently close sovesse l i s loca ted in a d iked area . as not to significantly affect the size of theInformation provided on temperature estimated zones.

may be spec i f i c o r may be s ta ted Step 7. If the local emergency planning

generally as ambient or above/below committee (LEPC) deems it necessary, ambient. For purposes of this guidance, obtain information in steps 1 through 6 for l iquids at ambient or below ambient other EHSs that are present in quantities thattemperature are evaluated at ambient, do not exceed the TPQ.and those at temperatures greater thanambient are evaluated at their boiling

(NOTE: This step is not mandatory under Title Ill

temperature. of SARA, but EHSs could pose a hazard to thecommunity in quantities less than the TPQ.)

ii. For molten solids: whether or not eachvessel is in a diked area. Solid materials Step 8 . Organize and record essent ialother than those in powdered or molten information and data. A discussion on theform, or in solution, may be considered assemb ly of in fo rm at io n is prov ided inas low priority for hazards analysis. Section 2.3.4.

iii. For mixtures, solutions, or solids as

powders: concentration of each EHS in a 3.1.2 Estimate Vulnerable Zones for

mixture or solution, or fraction of a solid Screening Purposes

with particle size less than 100 microns,For screening purposes, the vulnerable zone is

on a weight percent basis. The hazardsan estimate of the area potentially affected by

analysis will be conducted using only thequantity of EHS present in the mixture or the release of an EHS using a set of fixed

solution, or the quantity of solid with assumptions about the release and airborneparticle size less than 100 microns. (For dispersion of the substance.

example, 10,000 pounds of a solution of Step 1. For each EHS, use the maximumacrylamide in water at a concentration of quantity of material in a vessel or group of 30 percent by weight represents 3,000 interconnected vessels. pounds of acry lamide fo r hazards

analysis.) For an EHS that is not in a mixture, solution,or partially powdered solid, this quantity is

(NOTE: for the purposes of this guidance, the the max imum quan t i t y t ha t cou ld bestate (solid, liquid, gas) of the EHS is assumed released (QS). Use this value and proceedto be that for which it is listed at ambient to Step 3. To determine QS for an EHS in aconditions in Appendix C. The specific handling mixture or solution, or as a powder, proceedcondition may place the EHS in a different state to Step 2.

than listed, e.g., liquid handled as a gas. If the Step 2. For each EHS in a mixture, solution, or

EHS is handled at other than ambient conditions, tha t i s par t ia l l y powdered or mo l ten ,the calculations should reflect the ambient state, determine the QS of EHS by multiplying theas explained in this guide.) maximum quantity of mixture, solution, or

solid in a single vessel or interconnectedStep 6. If facilities make confidentiality claims vessels by the concentration and/or portion

for chemical identity, obtain from the facility that is molten or powdered as follows:representative close approximations of the QS (Ibs)level of concern (LOC) as defined in this

3-2



= Total Quantity of Mixture, Solution,

or Solid (Ibs) x Concentration

and/or portion molten or powdered

(wt%) /100

Example: A facility has 1000 pounds of a

50 percent by weight solution of ammoniain water. The quantity of ammonia that

could be released is:

QS = 1000 pounds x 50/100

= 500 pounds

Step 3. Determine the rate (in pounds perminute) of release of the EHS to air. Notethat the calculation of the rate at which asubstance becomes airborne is dependentupon its physical state and the temperatureof the liquid or molten solid at the time ofrelease. If the physical state at ambienttemperature is a gas, continue as describedbelow in Section A. If the physical state isliquid, proceed to Section B. For soiids,refer to Section C. Once the rate of release(QR) is determined for each substance,p r o c e e d t o s t e p 4 t o d e t e r m i n e t h evulnerable zone for each facility.

A. Gases

A-1 . Determine the rate of release to air(QR) by dividing the maximum quantity ofEHS that could be released from a vessel orgroup of interconnected vessels (QS) by 10:

QR (Ibs/min) = QS (Ibs)/lO minutes

Example: 2000 pounds (QS) of chlorine isstored in a single 1 ton container.

The rate of release to air (QR) is:

QR = 2000 Ibs/lO minutes

QR = 200 Ibs per minute.

B. Liquids

B-1. If the liquid is handled only at or belowambient conditions, use the Liquid Factor Amb ie nt (L FA) fro m the l is t of EHSs in

Appendix C (see Exhibit C-1 and C-2). Ifthe liquid is handled at temperatures greaterthan ambient, use the Liquid Factor Boiling(LFB) from the list in Appendix C. If thechemical identity is claimed confidential andthe facility representative has provided aclose approximation of the vapor pressureand boiling point at the handling temperaturefor the confidential liquid, use Appendix G tocalculate an LFA or LFB.

3 - 3

B-2. If the area surrounding the vessel(s) isnot diked, go directly to B-6. If the area isdiked, determine the area bounded by thedike in square feet (ft2).

B-3. To determine if using the diked area is

appropriate, estimate the area of the poolthat might be formed by the spilled liquid ifthe area were not diked as follows:

Area of Pool (ft2 ) = QS (Ibs) x 0.49

B-4. Compare this area to the diked area.If the estimated area of the pool is smallerthan the diked area, go to B-6 and do notuse the diked area. If the diked area issmaller, continue to B-5.

Example: 10,000 pounds of acrolein isstored in a tank in a diked area of 1600

square feet. The pool area is derived as

follows:

Area of Pool = 10,000 x 0.49

= 4900 ft2

Since the diked area (1600 ft2) is less thanthe calculated area of the pool (4900 ft2),use the diked area for further calculations.

B-5. Determine the Rate of Release to air(QR) for a liquid spilled in a diked area usingthe following formula:

QR (Ibs/min) = LFA or LFB x Diked

Area (ft2) x 2.8

(NOTE: the factors 2.8 and 1.4 in B-5 andB-6, respectively, take into account the lowwind speed of 1.5 m/set (3.4 miles/hour);see Appendix G.)

Example: 50,000 pounds of pure, hotacrolein is spilled in a diked area of 1600square feet. Using the liquid factor boiling

(LFB) of 0.02, the rate of release to air

(QR) is:

QR = 0.02 x 1600 ft2 x 2.8

QR = 90 Ibs/min

B-6. Determine the Rate of Release to air(QR) for a liquid spilled in an undiked areausing this formula:

QR (Ibs/min) = QS (Ibs) x LFA or

LFB x 1.4

Example: 50,000 pounds of pure, hotacrolein is spilled in an undiked area.



Using the liquid factor boiling (LFB) of0.02, the rate of release to air (QR) is:

QR = 50,000 Ibs x 0.02 x 1.4

QR = 1400 Ibs/min

C. Solids

C-1. If the solid is powdered (particles lessthan 100 microns in diameter) or in solution,go to C-2.

If the solid is molten, go to C-3.

If the solid is not powdered, not in solution,nor molten, defer hazards analysis of thischemical and begin with another chemical atthis facility, or proceed to another facility.Solids other than in powdered, molten, ordissolved form are less likely to become

airborne.

C-2. It is assumed that the maximumquantity of a solid that might be released(QS) is the quantity finely powdered or insolution. The QR of a powder or solution ofa solid is QS divided by 10 or:

QR (Ibs/min) = QS (Ibs)/lO minutes

C-3. For molten solids, find the LiquidFactor Molten (LFM) from the list of EHSs in

Appendix C (see Exhibit C-1 or C-2). If noLFM is available on the list, consult with

facility personnel to obtain the necessarydata to calculate the LFM as described in

Appendix G. For molten solids claimedconfidential, obtain a close approximation ofthe vapor p ressure and mel t ing po in ttemperature from the facility representativeand calculate an LFM using the formulae in Appendix G.

C-4. If the area around the vessel(s)holding the molten sol id is not diked,

proceed to C-6. If the area around thevessel(s) is diked, determine if it isappropr ia te to use the d iked area bycomparing it to the l iquid pool area asdescribed in steps B-3 to B-5.

C-5. Determine the QR for a moltenmaterial in a diked area as follows:

QR (Ib/min) = LFM x Diked Area

(f t2) x 2.8

C-6. Determine the QR for a moltenmaterial in an undiked area as follows:

QR (Ib/min) = quantity actually

molten (Ibs) x LFM x 1.4

Step 4. Select the LOC for the chemical from

the list of EHSs in Appendix C (see ExhibitC-1 or C-2). In instances of confidentialityclaims, obtain this v a l u e o r closeapproximation from the reporting facility.

Step 5. Estimate the distance (radius) of thescreening zone using Exhibit 3-1 as follows:

i. Locate across the top of the table theLOC value that most closelyapproximates the LOC for the EHS inquestion. If the LOC value falls halfwaybetween two values on the table, use thevalue on the table that is smaller (to theleft).

ii.

Locate the value in the left hand columnthat most closely approximates thecalculated QR (Ibs/min) . If the calculatedOR is halfway between two values on thetable, use the value which is larger (loweron the table).

i i i Read across and down to the distance

given in tenths of a mile. This value is thecalculated radius of a circleencompassing the potential release siteand represents the size (in tenths of amile) of the estimated vulnerable zone forthe initial screening of reporting facilities.

Example: The LOC for nitrobenzeneis 0.10 grams per cubic meter andthe estimated rate of release to air(QR) is 15 pounds per minute. Theradius of the estimated vulnerablezone is 0.4 miles.

Step 6. Using a local map of appropriate scale,draw a circle to scale around the potentialrelease site with the potential release site asthe center and the estimated vulnerablezone distance as the radius. This representsthe estimated vulnerable zone for initialscreening of reporting facilities.

Step 7. Identify populations and essential servicefacilities that are located within the estimatedvulnerable zone.

Step 8. Record essential data. A discussion ofthe assembly of information and an exampleformat are provided in Section 2.3.4.

3-4



I

I

Worked Examples for Initial Screening

Example 1. Gas Release (Chlorine) An 800 pound tank of chlorine, which is normally

a gas, is stored at a water treatment plant. Noothe r tanks are nearby and it is notinterconnected to any other storage vesselscontaining chlorine. For screening purposes, itis assumed that the total quantity in the tank can

be released, and the release will take place overa ten minute period. Therefore,

OR = QS/lO

QR = 800 pounds/l0 minutes = 80

pounds per minute.

The LOC for chlorine is 0.0073 grams per cubicmeter (g/m 3) ( f rom Exhibi t C-1 or C-2 in

Appendix C) .

Locate the LOC listed along the top row ofExhibit 3-1. The LOC of chlorine falls between

two values on the table: the lower value is used

(i.e., LOC = 0.005 g/m 3). Locate the OR (80pounds per minute) in the left hand column.Read across from QR = 80 and down front LOC =0.005 to the distance. The estimated vulnerablezone has a radius of greater than 10 miles from

the chlorine storage tank.

Example 2. Gas Release (Ammonia)

A tank truck contains 3.000 pounds of ammonia.

For screening purposes it is assumed that theent ire 3,000 pounds is released during aten-minute period following an accident: the

airborne quantity released per minute (QR) iscalculated as follows:

QR = 3,000 pounds110 minutes =

300 pounds per minute

The LOC for ammonia (from Exhibit C-1 or C-2

in Appendix C) is 0.035 g/m3.

Locate the LOC in the top row of Exhibit 3-l.

Locate the QR, 300 pounds per minute, in theleft-hand column. Using Exhibit 3-1 and reading

across from 300 pounds per minute and down

from 0.035 g/m3 to the intersection of the rowand column, the radius of the vulnerable zone or

the distance over which the concentration ofammonia may reach the LOC is estimated to be

7.6 miles.

Example 3. Pure Liquid at Elevated Temperature, Undiked Area

Pure methyl isocyanate is handled in an undiked

1000 pound reactor in a pesticide plant. Thechemical is handled at warm temperatures

(39°C). The LFB from Exhibit C-1 is 0.02. Thequantity released to air per minute is calculated

as follows:

QR = QS (Ibs) x LFB x 1.4

QR = 1000 pounds x 0.02 x 1.4 = 28

pounds per minute

The LOC for methyl isocyanate is 0.0047 g/m3

(see Exhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C).

Using Exhibit 3-l the radius of the vulnerable

zone is estimated. Locate the LOC in the top

row. The LOC of methyl isocyanate falls

between two values. Use the lower value,

0.0035 g/m3 . Locate the QR, 28 pounds perminute, in the left hand column. The QR falls

between two values. Use the higher value, 30pounds per minute. Read across from the rate

of release of 30 pounds per minute and downfrom the LOC of 0.0035 g/m 3 to f ind the

distance. The vulnerable zone distance is

estimated to be 7.6 miles.

3-5



(Note that for methyl isocyanate, there is a large fraction of the chemical would become aposs ib i l i ty that a runaway polymerization solid and stay in the reactor while the remainderreaction could produce very high temperatures would be quickly released to the atmosphere asand pressures in the reactor. In this case, a a gas.)

Example 4. Liquid at Ambient Temperature in

Acrolein in a 50 percent solution by weight, atambient temperature, is stored in an undiked50,000 pound tank. The LFA from Exhibit C-l is0.007. The airborne quantity released per unittime to air is calculated as follows:

OS = 50,000 pounds x 50/100

QS = 25,000 pounds

QR = 25,000 pounds x 0.007 x 1.4

QR = 245 pounds per minuteThe LOC for acrolein is 0.0011 g/m 3 (seeExhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C) . The distance

Mixture or Solution in an Undiked Area

over which the concentration of acrolein in airmay reach the LOC is estimated from Exhibit3-1. Read across from 250 pounds per minute,and down from the LOC of 0.0007 to thedistance. The vulner able zone radius isestimated to be greater than 10 miles. (10miles is the maximum radius that can beestimated by this method.)

Locate the LOC in the top row. The closestvalue lower than 0.0011 is 0.001. Locate the QR

in the left hand column. The closest valuehigher than 245 pounds per minute is 250.

Example 5. Liquid in Diked Area

About 50,000 pounds of pure, hot acrolein isstored in a reactor. Since the liquid is hot, theLFB from Exhibit C-1, 0.02, is used in thecalculation of the quantity released. The areaaround the reactor is diked and it is 40 feetsquare (1,600 ft2).

Check th is aga ins t the a rea o f the poo lgenerated by the reactor contents:

Area of pool = QS x 0.49 = 50,000 x

0.49 = 24,500 ft2

Since the diked area is smaller the OR is:

QR (Ibslmin) = LFB x diked area

(ft2) x 2.8

QR = 0.02 x 1600 x 2.8 = 90

pounds per minute

Using Exhibit 3-1 locate the LOC of 0.0011 g/m3

for acrolein in the top row. The closest valuelower than 0.0011 is 0.001. Locate the release

rate of 90 pounds per minute in the left handcolumn. Read across from 90 pounds per

minute and down from 0.001 g/m3 to find thedistance. The distance over which the airborneconcentration of acrolein could exceed the LOC(i.e., the radius of the estimated vulnerablezone) is estimated to be greater than 10 miles.

Example 6. Finely Powdered Solid

A site has 10,000 pounds of acrylamide stored The rate of release to air is:

in a large bin. About 20 percent of it has aparticle size less than 100 microns. The QR = OS/l0 minutes = 2,000/10

maximum quantity that could be released (QS)= 200 Ibs per minute

is: The LOC for acrylamide is 0.11 g/m 3 (see

OS = 10,000 Ibs x 20/100 = 2,000

Exhibit C-1 or C-2 in Appendix C). Exhibit 3-1 isused to determine the distance over which the

Ibs.

3 -6



concentration of acrylamide in air may reach the across from the OR of 200 pounds per minuteLOC . Locate the LOC in the top row. The and down from the LQC of 0.1 g/m 3, theclosest value lower than 0.11 is 0.1 g/m 3 . distance is estimated to be 2.1 miles.Locate the QR in the left hand column. Reading

3.1.3 Risk Analysis for Initial Screening ofReporting Facilities

For purposes of initial screening, the riskanalysis is limited to a very rough estimate of thelikelihood or probability of an incident and theseverity of consequences to humans.

Step 1. Evaluate populations at risk in theestimated vulnerable zone. This shouldinclude estimated number of individuals,types of populat ions such as elder ly,children, infirm, incarcerated, residents, and

transients such as daily workers, audiences,and spectators.

Step 2. Evaluate critical facilities at risk in theestimated vulnerable zone. This shouldinclude hospi ta ls or other heal th care

facilities, fire and police stations, otheremergency response facilities, andcommunications facilities.

Step 3. Establish a relative ranking system forthe potential consequences posed byhazards from reporting facilities. This maybe qualitative such as high, medium, or low,or may be a simple numerical system. Forfurther information, see Section 2.3.1.

Step 4. If available, use known historicalinformation about incidents in the area,estimate the likelihood of a release.

(NOTE: for most hazards, the probability ofoccurrence will be assumed to be the same.)

Step 5. Record the judgements made in steps 3and 4.

3.2 Reevaluation; Planning for Facilities by Priority

The reevaluation process provides the

opportunity to analyze further the potentialhazards of reporting facilities by order of priority.This effort is characterized by the stepwise

reevaluation of certain of the credible worst caseassumptions used to estimate vulnerable zonesduring the initial screening process. It is

important to emphasize that changes in

assumptions resulting in a reduction in size ofthe zone should be considered with extreme

care and p rudence . Less conservativeassumptions will decrease the estimated zone.In the event of a release under less favorableconditions, a greater area and perhaps a greater

population may be affected.

3.2.1 Hazards ldentification

Step 1. Review the priority list of reportingfac i l i t ies deve loped dur ing the in i t ia lscreening process and, starting with thehighest priority facilities, begin reevaluation

of assumptions that were used to estimate

the credible worst case vulnerable zones.Step 2. List potential hazards other than those

associated with acute lethality. (This step isnot mandatory.)

3.2.2 Reevaluation of the Vulnerable Zones

step 1. Reevaluate the assumptions used toestimate the quantity of EHS likely to bereleased from a vessel or vessels. Plannersshould seek advice from appropriate expertsincluding representatives of the facility.Estimates by the facility or other sources of

the total quantity of EHS that could bereleased from a vessel and supportingrationale should be reviewed carefully.These may include revised estimates of thequantity of a liquid likely to be spilled basedon actual quantities present or processedand the capabilities to mitigate a release.

step 2. Reevaluate the assumptions used toestimate the rate at which the EHS becomes

3-7



have calculations or data on the actualamount of substance that could be releasedwhen solids are molten, in solution, inpowdered form, or vaporized. If there is noway for powders or solutions to becomeairborne due to explosions or problems withpneumatic systems, re le as e of thesubstance beyond the boundaries of thefacility is not likely. This information shouldbe included in the risk analysis (below).Similarly, molten solids may “freeze” uponcontact with air at ambient temperatures andmay not evaporate, or conditions may differfrom those used to calculate the LFM.Obtain appropriate input f rom fac i l i tyrepresentatives and calculate a new LFM oruse other data from the facility or othersources to estimate the rate at which thesolid becomes airborne. As for liquids, the

rate at which a molten solid evaporates fromthe pool depends upon the wind speed atthe time of release. Consult Appendix G tocalculate a factor to account for wind in thecalculation of the rate of release to air of amolten solid.

Once more realistic site-specific informationh a s b e e n c o l l e c t e d a n d r e e v a l u a t e dregarding the release rate to air of gases,liquids, and solids, be sure to record thenew data and the justification for changes.Then proceed to the next step (Step 3) inthe reevaluation of the vulnerable zones.

Step 3. Determine if the area around the facilityis predominately rural or urban, as follows:

If more than 50% of the land within a mile(1.6 km) radius is used as:

1. Heavy industrial (large chemical, othermanufacturing facilities, 3 - 5 s t o r ybuildings, flat roofs, grass and treesextremely rare), or

2. Light to moderate industrial (rail yards,truck depots, warehouses, industrialparks , minor fabr ica t ion , l -3 s torybuildings, flat roofs, limited grass and

trees), or3. Commercial (of f ice and apartments,

hotels, 10 story heights, flat roofs, limitedgrass and trees), or

4. Compact residential (single and somemultiple family dwellings closely spaced,2 story or less, alleys, pitched or flatroofs, limited lawns and few oldestablished shade trees, no driveways),

then the area should be classified as urban.Otherwise use rural condit ions. Selectappropriate tables for use under Step 4.Guidance may be sought from appropriateexperts.

Step 4. Consider the principal meteorologicalconditions of wind speed and atmosphericstability. Consult local, State, or regionalsources for in format ion on f requencydistributions of wind speed, direction, andatmospheric stability.

This guidance provides tables for fourdifferent conditions (NOTE: Exhibits forChapter 3 are at the end of the Chapter):

a. The worst case condi t ions of ruraltopography, moderately stableatmospheric conditions (F stability) andlow wind speed of 1.5 meters persecond (3.4 mph) (Exhibit 3-1);

b.

Urban area, low wind speed of 1.5meters per second (3.4 mph), andmoderately stable atmosphericcondit ions (F stabil i ty) predominate(Exhibit 3-2) ;

c . Rural area, moderate wind speed of 5.2meters per second (about 12 mph), andless stable atmospheric conditions (Dstability) (Exhibit 3-3); and

d. Urban area, moderate wind speed of 5.2meters per second (about 12 mph), andless stable atmospheric conditions (Dstability) (Exhibit 3-4).

Step 5. Evaluate the effect of varying windspeed and atmospheric stability on theestimated vulnerable zone by using Exhibits3-3 and 3-4 (wind speed of 5.2 meters persecond (12 mph) and D stability). Foreva luat ion o f o ther w ind speeds andstabilities, refer to instructions in AppendixG. Decide to retain or change values forwind speed and stability and record finaldecision. If values for the assumptions usedare not found in this guidance, consultexperts including representatives of thefacility.

Step 6. Consider the value of the LOC used toestimate the vulnerable zone during theinitial screening process. The one-tenth ofthe National Institute for Occupational Safetyand Health (NIOSH) Immediately Dangerousto Life or Health (IDLH) value or itsapproximation represents a credible worstcase exposure level. Other exposureguidelines may be obtained from Appendix

3-9



D, from the facility in question, or fromappropriate experts.

step 7. Evaluate the effect of changing thevalue of the LOC on the estimated zone andits impact on the risk analysis. After carefulconsideration of the impact on the riskanalysis, retain or change the value of theLOC and record it.

Step 8. Using all revised data and assumptions,estimate new vulnerable zones and decidewhether to utilize the reevaluated zones inthe risk analysis process. This may be aniterative process.

3.2.3 Risk Analysis

The r i sk ana lys is per fo rmed dur ing thereevaluation process includes an assessment of

the likelihood as well as the severity of anaccidental release. This relative risk analysis isqualitative in nature, although LEPCs have theopt ion to develop a relat ive ranking on anumerical basis.

step 1. Based on information obtained fromChapter 2 and Appendices I and J of thisguide, the facility representative, historicalrecords, and appropriate experts, carefullyevaluate the likelihood (probability) that anaccidental release of a particular EHS willoccur and not be contained or mitigated.

Step 2. Assign a high, medium, or low ranking

for the probability in Step 1 and record thedecision as discussed in Section 2.3.

Step 3. Using the reevaluated vulnerable zones,again evaluate populations at risk. Thisshould include an estimated number ofindividuals, as well as types of populationssuch as elderly, chi ldren, inf i rm, andincarcerated. The evaluation should also

consider transient populations (e.g., dailyworkers, audiences, and spectators),

Step 4. Evaluate critical facilities at risk withinthe reevaluated zone. This should includehospitals or other health care facilities, firean d po li ce stations, other emergencyresponse facilities, and communicationsfacilities.

Step 5. Based on Steps 3 and 4, establish arelative ranking system, for the severity ofconsequences to humans associated withpoten t ia l hazards posed by repor t ingfacilities. This may be simply qualitative

(high, medium, low) as discussed in Section2.3, or it may be a simple numericalsystem.

Step 6. Using Steps 2 and 5, establish anoverall relative risk for each facility, andrecord the relative rankings of facilities (seeSection 2.3.1). This completes the hazardsanalysis as presented in this guidancedocument, This information can also beused for the development of site-specificrelease scenarios for training exercises andfor refining response plans.

3-10



4. Using the Results of a Hazards Analysis

As noted in Chapter 1, hazards analysis is a necessary first step in developing a comprehensiveemergency plan; it is a decision-making proc

ess that helps planners screen and decide whichfacilities to plan for. After local planners havecompleted a hazards identification, vulnerabilityanalysis, and risk analysis, they should developappropriate response procedures and organizeall this material into an emergency responseplan. This information can also be used for thedevelopment of site-specific release scenariosfor training exercises and for refining response

plans. This chapter summarizes the plan contents required by Title Ill of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),

lists the information provided by by a hazardsanalysis, briefly discusses three case studies forplanning purposes, and describes how computers can be helpful to the planning process.Planners should use the National ResponseTeam’s Hazardous Materials Energency PlanningGuide (NRT-1) guidance document and the information generated by using this guidance todevelop emergency plans for their district.

4.1 What the Plan Must Contain

Title Ill of SARA requires each emergency plan toinclude at least each of the following:

(1) Identification of facilities within the localemergency planning district (LEPD) subjectto the Title Ill requirements: identification ofroutes likely to be used for the transportation of substances on the list of extremelyhazardous substances (EHSs) ; and identification of additional facilities contributingor subjected to additional risk due to theirproximity to facilities subject to Title Ill ofSARA, such as hospitals or natural gas facilities.

(2) Methods and procedures to be followed byfacility owners and operators and localemergency and medical personnel to respond to any releases of EHSs.

(3) Designation of a community emergency

coordinator and facility emergency coordinators, who shall make determinationsnecessary to implement the plan.

(4) Procedures providing reliable, effective,and timely notification by the emergencycoordinators and the community emergency coordinator to persons designated

in the emergency plan, and to the public,that a release has occurred.

(5) Methods for determining the occurrence ofa release, and the area or population likelyto be affected by such release.

(6)

A description of facilities in the communitysubject to Title Ill requirements and emergency equipment at each facility in thecommunity.

(7) Evacuation plans, including provisions for aprecautionary evacuation and alternativetraffic routes.

(8) Training programs, including schedules fortraining of local emergency response andmedical personnel.

(9) Methods and schedules for exercising theemergency plan.

The information gathered in the hazards analysis

will be useful in fulfilling several of these requirements, in part icular ( l) , (4), (5) and (6).NRT-1 (page 38, Planning Element G) discussesthe integration of the hazards analysis into emergency planning, and should be used as a complement to this guide. NRT-1 discusses approaches to the planning process, whether acommunity chooses to develop a multi-hazard

12/87

4 - l



emergency operations plan (EOP) or incorporate hazardous materials plan. Sample formats forhazardous materials planning into an existing emergency plans are outlined and planning ele-EOP, or to develop or revise a single-hazard ments are discussed in detail.

4.2 Planning Information Provided by the Hazards Analysis

As a result of the hazards analysis, the followingtypes of information concerning EHSs should beavailable during the initial stages of the planning

process :

l Location

(1) What facilities have EHSs

(2) What transportation routes have EHSs

(1)

The maximum quantity likely to be released at a facility

(2) The maximum quantity likely to be trans

ported at one time per transportation vehi

cle

l Potential risks

(1) Likelihood of release

(2) Consequences of release

l Other hazards to consider

(1)

Whether the material is flammable

(2)

Whether water can be used on it

(3) Reactivity with other materials present toform other hazardous substances and/or

to release heat

(4) Likelihood of damage to property

(5) Likelihood of damage to the environment

l Emergency response information

(1) Size of the vulnerable zone in case of arelease

(2) How many people are likely to be withinthe vulnerable zones

(3) Sensitive populations within the vulnerable

zones

(4) Essential service facilities within the vul

nerable zones

(5)

What emergency medical proceduresshould be followed

(6) What specialized equipment emergencymedical response personnel or local hospitals need to treat victims of exposureand whether they have such equipment

(7) Type of protective gear (clothing andequipment) needed by emergency response personnel

- Is it available at the facility?

- Is it available to emergency responders?

(8) What sampling and monitoring devicescan be used to determine concentration

levels

- Are such devices available?

(9)

Containment/cleanup procedures

(10) What materials are needed for contain

ment, neutralization, and cleanup

- Are these materials available?

12/87

4-2



4.3 Case Studies from Hazards Analysis

To illustrate the planning process, and the use ofhazards analysis in this process, the same hypo

thetical releases of chlorine, ammonia, andmethyl isocyanate as described in Chapter 2(Exhibit 2-12) and Chapter 3 are used as examples. Exhibit 4-1 presents relevant data on thethree example chemicals and considerationsthat the planning committee needs to address.This information can be used in the planning

process to ensure that all needs can be accommodated should an emergency arise.

In each of the case studies, a release of a hazardous substance is possible and both the re

sponsible party and local government must beprepared to handle the resulting hazards and associated problems. In order to respond in an

effective and safe manner, local emergency responders (and private sector managers in thecases of fixed facilities such as the water treat

ment plant and the pesticide manufacturingplant portrayed in these case studies) must worktogether to create a comprehensive hazardousmaterials emergency plan. In order to be effective, the plan must be tested and updated atleast annually and more often as needed if con

ditions change after establishment of the plan.

In each of the case studies, planners must firstconsider the safety of people within the estimated vulnerable zones. Not only must plan

ners address evacuation but also in-place sheltering, as vapor clouds may move into populated areas too quickly to allow for a safe evacu

ation. Adequate warning systems must be inplace to notify the public of a release. Persons

who will require protection from hazardous releases include: a) people located in ‘the immediate area of the release (plant employees in the

case studies involving chlorine and methylisocyanate, and motorists in the case of an an

hydrous ammonia tank truck accident), b) people in areas threatened by hazards resultingfrom the released materials, and c) emergencyresponders. (Appendix H presents a detaileddiscussion on evacuation and in-place sheltering, including decision-making, planning, con

ducting an evacuation, sheltering of evacuees,and re-entry.)

A second planning consideration is hazard control and containment operations. Procedures forcontrolling and containing a hazardous releasemust be established and identified within theplan and exercised regularly. In each of thecase studies, the hazardous material has multiple hazards associated with it. (Chlorine is poisonous, corrosive, and can act as an oxidizer;anhydrous ammonia is corrosive and can be fatal if inhaled: and methyl isocyanate is poisonous and extremely flammable.) Multiple hazardsrequire special expertise in control and contain

ment procedures. Regarding incidents where local government and private industry are both in

volved in remedial actions (such as the cases ofthe water treatment plant and the pesticideplant), planners must set forth provisions for cooperation between the two groups to ensure thatresponse actions are coordinated and that direction and control are centralized.

Another key planning consideration is that ofemergency medical care. Provisions must bemade for on-scene emergency medical care(establishment of a triage area may be neces

sary)t

transport of victims to hospitals, andemergency room treatment. In order for thisemergency care system to function properly,the hazardous materials plan should establish

procedures coordinating the activities of the local emergency medical services (e.g., fire/rescue department, rescue squad, ambulanceservice) and local hospital(s) to ensure that victims are treated quickly and effectively.

Specialized medical supplies to treat exposures

to certain chemicals should be identified duringthe planning process so that adequate and current supplies will be available.

Planners must address several other areas ofcommunity response as well. These include incident command; communications: search andrescue: detection, monitoring, sampling andanalysis: damage assessment: cleanup: decontamination: and cost recovery. The hazardous

12/87 4-3



materials plan must address each of these areasof community response by delegating specificresponsibilities to appropriate agencies of the local government. The plan also should includeassistance available from regional, State, andFederal agencies as well as private industry andvolunteer organizations.

In addition to addressing emergency procedures, the hazardous materials plan must alsoaddress what equipment is needed to containand control hazardous materials spills and fires.The plan must identify the equipment, its location, how to get it to the incident scene, and howto use it safely and effectively. The most important specialized equipment that will be needed isprotective gear for the emergency responders.This includes fully encapsulated chemical protective suits, thermal protection, and positivepressure self-contained breathing apparatus. In

terms of equipment needed to stop a leak, specialized plugging and/or patching devices arelikely to be needed, unless the opening in the

Title Ill requires each planning committee “toevaluate the resources necessary to develop,implement and exercise the emergency plan”and to “make recommendations with respect to

additional resources that may be required andthe means for providing such additional resources.”

The NRT believes that it would be very useful tohave these resource evaluations and recommendations available for the Regional ResponseTeams (RRTs) at the time of the plan reviews.Many of the suggested plan changes may berather modest and are not likely to require theexpenditure of significant local emergency planning committee (LEPC) resources. Other

changes may be more difficult to accomplishand may require substantially more resourcesthan are available to the LEPC. RRT commentsmay be more useful if the RRTs can formulatethem in a way that takes into consideration theLEPC’s resource base. RRTs may wish to identify those suggestions for improvement thatcould be made with available resources andthose that might require additional resources.

4.4 Plan Reviews in the Context of Local Resource Needs

damaged tank is too large to seal off. In order

to keep track of hazardous material concentration levels, specialized monitoring devices will

be needed. Monitoring is extremely important in

the case of methyl isocyanate due to its vapors

being odorless (but still highly dangerous) in lowconcentrations. Specialized cleanup and neu

tralizing materials (e.g., soda ash, caustic soda,activated carbon, diatomaceous earth) likely will

be needed as well. Containment equipmentalso must be available at the accident scene.

Materials (e.g., soil, sand) and heavy equipment (e.g., bul ldozers, back hoes, dump

trucks) likely will be used to construct dikes to

contain spilled material or contaminated runofffrom vapor knockdown and fire suppression op

erations. The heavy equipment also will beneeded following the incident to remove con

taminated soils and pavement. Lack of informa

tion concerning these specialized resourcescould make response efforts for a hazardous

materials release unnecessarily difficult.

LEPCs may include their resource requirementsin a separate section of their plans, provide information in a separate report or present requirements in a formal request for additional re

sources submitted to the cognizant State emergency response commission (SERC) . Regardless of the method used, RRTs would be interested in information on:

the personnel resources required by theLEPC in the preparation of the plan, including man-months of effort, and technicalexpertise provided and the additional resources that the LEPC would like to haveavailable to revise and strengthen thisplan:

the financial resources required to developthe plan and the financial resources thatthe LEPC would like to have available in thefuture:

the personnel and financial resources thatwould be required to exercise the plan, asproposed by the LEPC in the section on ex

ercises: and

1 2 / 8 7 4-7



the means by which the LEPC generated lieves that the necessary additional re-the resources necessary to develop the sources could be secured.plan and the means by which the LEPC be

4.5 Use of Computerized Systems in Planning

Computerized systems have many applicationsthat would be useful to the LEPC as it incorporates hazards analysis information into a com

prehensive emergency plan. They could beused for:

l Listing the facilities and the major transportation routes that handle or carry hazard

ous substances through the planning district and for storing and reporting chemicaland hazards analysis information. This

could facilitate data management associated with hazards identification.

l Modelling the release of chemicals and es

timating vulnerable zones (vulnerabil i ty

analysis). The system’s capabilities could

be restricted to the simplified methods outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 or could include amore sophisticated analysis. A furtherlevel of sophistication which considers me

teorological, topographical, and other site-specific release scenario variables couldalso be developed according to the level of

detail the local planning committee considers appropriate.

l Identifying the regulatory requirements ofTitle Ill as they relate to chemical emergency preparedness.

In addition, computerized systems could beused to provide emergency management andresponse information. Appendix K provides anevaluation guide in the form of a checklist forhazardous chemical inventory, planning, and re

sponse computerized systems. This checklistwas developed to assist local emergency planning groups in evaluating and selecting com

puter systems and software that will have capabilities relevant to their environmental manage

ment and planning needs.

1 2 / 8 7 4-8



AAR/BOE

ACGIH

AlChE

AIHA

ATSDR

BLEVE

CAER

CAS

CEPP

CERCLA

CHLOREP

CHRIS

CMA

DOD

DOT

EEC

EEG

EEGL

EHS

EOP

EPA

ERPG

FDA

FEMA

FIFRA

FMEA

FMECA

FTA

HAZOP

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACRONYMS

Association of American Railroads/Bureau of Explosives

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

American Institute of Chemical Engineers

American Industrial Hygiene Association

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

Community Awareness and Emergency Response (a CMA program)

Chemical Abstract Service

Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (EPA)

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of1980 (“Superfund”)

Chlorine Emergency Plan (developed by the Chlorine Institute)

Chemical Hazard Response Information System

Chemical Manufacturers Association

Department of Defense

Department of Transportation

European Economic Community

Emergency Exposure Guideline (developed by Dow Chemical)

Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (developed by the NRC)

Extremely Hazardous Substance

Emergency Operation Plan

Environmental Protection Agency

Emergency Response Planning Guideline

Food and Drug Administration

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis

Hazard and Operability Study

A - l



HMTA Hazardous Materials Transportation Act

IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health

LC50 Median Lethal Concentration

LCLO Lethal Concentration Low

LD50 Median Lethal Dose

LDLO Lethal Dose Low

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee

LEPD Local Emergency Planning District

LFA Liquid Factor Ambient

LFB Liquid Factor Boiling

LFM Liquid Factor Molten

LOC Level of Concern

MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet

NAS National Academy of Sciences

NCP National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NRC National Response Center or National Research Council

NRT National Response Team

NRT-1 Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide, prepared by the NationalResponse Team

NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

OPP Office of Pesticide Programs (EPA)

OSC On-Scene Coordinator

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSWER Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (EPA)

PEL Permissible Exposure Limit

PMN Premanufacture Notice

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

QR Rate of Release of EHS to Air

QS Maximum Quantity of Chemical that Could Be Released

RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

REL Recommended Exposure Limits

RQ Reportable Quantity

RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration (DOT)

A-2



RRT Regional Response Team

RTECS Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances

SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986

SERC State Emergency Response Commission

SPCC Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures (Plan)

SPEGL Short-term Public Exposure Guidance Level (developed by the NRC)

Title III Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (Part of theSuperfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986)

TLVs* Threshold Limit Value

TWA Time Weighted Average

TPQ Threshold Planning Quantity

TSCA Toxic Substances Control Act

USCG United States Coast Guard

USGS United States Geological Survey

VP Vapor Pressure

VSD Virtually Safe Dose

Vz Vulnerable Zone

WB World Bank

*TLVs is a registered trademark

A-3



GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Accident Site

The location of an unexpected occurrence, failure, or loss, either at a facility or along atransportation route, resulting in a release of hazardous materials: an incident site.

AcuteSevere but of short duration. Acute health effects are those that occur immediately afterexposure to hazardous chemicals.

Acutely Toxic Chemicals

Chemicals that can cause severe short- and long-term health effects after a single, briefexposure (short duration). These chemicals (when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed through theskin) can cause damage to living tissue, impairment of the central nervous system, severe

illness, or, in extreme cases, death.

Airborne Release

Release of any chemical into the air.

Ambient

Surrounding. Ambient temperatures are temperatures of the surrounding area (e.g., air orwater).

By-Product

Material, other than the principal product, that is produced or generated as a consequence of

an industrial process.

Chemical Process

A particular method of manufacturing or making a chemical, usually involving a number of

steps or operations.

Chronic

Of long duration or having frequent recurrence. Chronic health effects are those that become

apparent or continue for some time after exposure to hazardous chemicals.

Combustion Product

Material produced or generated during the burning or oxidation of a material,

Command Post

Facility located at a safe distance upwind from an accident site, where the on-scenecoordinator, responders, and technical representatives can make response decisions, deploy

manpower and equipment, maintain liaison with media, and handle communications.

Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) Program

Program developed by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), to assist chemical

plant managers in taking the initiative in cooperating with local communities to developintegrated (community/industry) plans for responding to releases of hazardous materials.

Contingency Plan

A document to identify and catalog the elements required to respond to an emergency, todefine responsibilities and specific tasks, and to serve as a response guide.

Critical Facilities

Facilities essential to emergency response, such as fire stations, police stations, hospitals,

and communication centers.

Decomposition Product

Material produced or generated as a result of the physical or chemical degradation of a parentmaterial.

A - 4



Dike

A barrier such as a low wall or embankment designed to prevent a spill from spreading or

flooding.

Disposal

The removal of waste material to a site or facility that is specifically designed and permitted to

receive such wastes.

Emergency

A situation created by an accidental release or spill of hazardous chemicals which poses athreat to the safety of workers, residents, the environment, or property.

Evacuation

Removal of residents and other persons from an area of danger.

Exercise

A simulated accident or release set up to test emergency response methods and for use as atraining tool.

Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHSs)

A list of chemicals identified by EPA on the basis of toxicity, and listed under Title Ill of SARA.These chemicals are listed in Appendix C. The list is subject to revision.

Facility

Defined for Section 302 of Title Ill of SARA as all buildings, equipment, structures, and other

stationary items which are located on a single site or on contiguous or adjacent sites andwhich are owned or operated by the same person (or by any person which controls, is

controlled by, or under common control with, such person). For purposes of emergencyrelease notification, the term includes motor vehicles, rolling stock, and aircraft.

Facility Emergency Coordinator

Facility representative for each facility with an extremely hazardous substance (EHS) in aquantity exceeding its threshold planning quantity (TPQ), who participates in the emergency

planning process.

Fenceline

Outermost perimeter of a facility property.

Hazard

Any situation that has the potential for causing damage to life, property, and/or theenvironment.

Hazardous Chemical

Any chemical which is a physical hazard or a health hazard as defined under OSHA 29 CFR

1910.1201.

Hazardous Material

Any substance or material in a quantity or form which may be harmful to humans, animals,crops, water systems, or other elements of the environment if accidentally released.

Hazardous materials include: explosives, gases (compressed, liquefied, or dissolved),flammable and combustible liquids, flammable solids or substances, oxidizing substances,poisonous and infectious substances, radioactive materials, and corrosives.

Hazardous Substances (Superfund)

Substances designated as hazardous under CERCLA (also known as Superfund); CERCLAincorporates substances listed under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, RCRA, and TSCASection 7.

A - 5



Hazards Analysis

The procedure for identifying potential sources of a hazardous materials release, determiningthe vulnerability of an area to a hazardous materials release, and comparing hazards todetermine risks to a community.

Hazards Identification

Provides information on which facilities have extremely hazardous substances (EHSs), whatthose chemicals are, and how much there is at each facility. Also provides information on howthe chemicals are stored and whether they are used at high temperatures, Mandatory facilityreporting under Title Ill will provide most of the information needed for a hazards identification,

Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH)

The maximum level to which a healthy worker can be exposed for 30 minutes and escapewithout suffering irreversible health effects or escape-impairing symptoms,

Lethal

Causing or capable of causing death.

Lethal Concentration Low (LCLO)

The lowest concentration of a chemical at which some test animals died following inhalationexposure.

Lethal Dose Low (LDLO)

The lowest dose of chemical at which some test animals died following exposure.

Level of Concern (LOC)

The concentration of an extremely hazardous substance (EHS) in the air above which theremay be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a

relatively short period of time.

Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)

A committee appointed by the State emergency response commission (SERC), as required byTitle Ill of SARA, to formulate a comprehensive emergency plan for its district.

Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)

A compilation of information required under the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard on theidentity of hazardous chemicals, health and physical hazards, exposure limits, andprecautions. Section 311 of Title Ill of SARA requires facilities to submit MSDSs under certain

conditions.

Median Lethal Concentration (LC50)

Concentration level at which 50 percent of the test animals died when exposed by inhalationI

for a specified time period.

Median Lethal Dose (LDSO)

Dose at which 50 percent of test animals died following exposure. Dose is usually given inmilligrams per kilogram of body weight of the test animal.

Morbidity

Ability to cause illness or disease.

National Response Center

A communications center for activities related to response actions: it is located at CoastGaurd headquarters in Washington, DC. The National Response Center receives and relays

notices of discharges or releases to the appropriate On-Scene Coordinator, disseminates

On-Scene Coordinator and Regional Response Team (RRT) reports to the National ResponseTeam (NRT) when appropriate, and provides facilities for the NRT to use in coordinating anational response action when required. The toll-free number (800-424-8802, or

202-426-2675 or 202-267-2675 in the Washington, DC area) can be reached 24 hours a day

for reporting actual or potential pollution incidents.

A - 6



On-Scene Coordinator

The pre-designated local, State, or Federal official responsible for the coordination of ahazardous materials response action, as outlined in the pertinent Emergency Response Plan.

Plume

Effluent cloud resulting from a continuous source release.

Radius of the Vulnerable Zone

The maximum distance from the point of release of a hazardous substance at which the

airborne concentration could reach the level of concern (LOC) under specified weatherconditions.

Reportable Quantity (RQ)The quantity of a hazardous substance that triggers reporting under CERCLA; if a substance isreleased in a quantity that exceeds its RQ, the release must be reported to the National

Response Center (NRC), as well as to the State emergency response commission (SERC) andthe community emergency coordinator for areas likely to be affected by the release.

Response

The efforts to minimize the risks created in an emergency by protecting the people, the

environment, and property, and the efforts to return the scene to normal pre-emergencyconditions.

Risk

A measure of the probability that damage to life, property, and/or the environment will occur ifa hazard manifests itself: this measure includes the severity of anticipated consequences to

people.

Risk Analysis

Assessment of the probable damage that may be caused to the community by a hazardoussubstance release.

Special Populations

Groups of people that may be more susceptible than the general population (due to

preexisting health conditions (e.g., asthmatics) or age (e.g., infants and the elderly)) to thetoxic effects of an accidental release.

Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures (SPCC) Plan

Plan covering the release of hazardous substances as defined under authority of the Clean

Water Act.

Stability Classes, Atmospheric

Pasquill stability classes (ranging from “A” to “F”) are meteorological categories ofatmospheric conditions. Pasquill stability class A represents unstable conditions under which

there are strong sunlight, clear skies, and high levels of turbulence in the atmosphere,conditions that promote rapid mixing and dispersal of airborne contaminants. At the otherextreme, class F represents light, steady winds, fairly clear nighttime skies, and low levels ofturbulence. Airborne contaminants mix and disperse far more slowly with air under these

conditions, and may travel further downwind at hazardous concentrations than in other cases.Stability class D, midway between A and F, is used for neutral conditions, applicable to heavyovercast, daytime or nighttime.

State Emergency Response Commission (SERC)Commission appointed by each State governor according to the requirements of Title Ill of

SARA: duties of the commission include designating emergency planning districts, appointinglocal emergency planning committees (LEPCs), supervising and coordinating the activities of

planning committees, reviewing emergency plans, receiving chemical release notifications, and

establishing procedures for receiving and processing requests from the public for information.

A - 7



Storage

Methods of keeping raw materials, finished goods, or products while awaiting use, shipment,or consumption.

Threshold Planning Quantity (TPQ)

A quantity designated for each chemical on the list of extremely hazardous substances (EHSs)

that triggers notification by facilities of the State emergency response commission (SERC) thatsuch facilities are subject to emergency planning under Title Ill of SARA.

Toxic Chemical Release Form

Information form required to be submitted by facilities that manufacture, process, or use (inquantities above a specified amount) chemicals listed in Section 313 of Title Ill of SARA.

Toxic Cloud

Airborne mass of gases, vapors, fumes, or aerosols of toxic materials.

Toxicity

The ability of a substance to cause damage to living tissue, impairment of the central nervous

system, severe illness, or death when ingested, inhaled, or absorbed by the skin.

ToxicologyThe study of the adverse effects of chemical agents on biological systems.

Transfer

Loading and unloading of chemicals between transport vehicles and storage vessels, andsending chemicals via pipes between storage vessels and process reactors.

Transport Mode

Method of transportation: highway: rail (trains); water (ships/barges); pipelines: air (planes).

Vapor Dispersion

The movement of vapor clouds or plumes in air due to wind, gravity spreading, and mixing.

Vulnerability Analysis

Assessment of elements in the community that are subject to damage should a hazardousmaterials release occur; includes gathering information on the extent of the vulnerable zone,conditions that influence the zone, size and type of the population within the zone, private and

public property that might be damaged, and the environment that might be affected.

Vulnerable Zone

An area over which the airborne concentration of a chemical involved in an accidental releasecould reach the level of concern (LOC).

A - 8



APPENDIX B

THE CRITERIA USED TO IDENTIFY

EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

B.1 BASIS FOR THE CRITERIA

Introduction. In an effort to direct communityplanning efforts to those chemicals that, because of their inherent toxicity, are most likely tocause severe toxic effects in humans who areexposed to them due to an accidental release,EPA has specified toxicity criteria that can beused to screen chemical information sourcesand to identify acutely toxic chemicals. Thesecriteria were used to identify the chemicals onthe list of extremely hazardous substances(EHSs) required by Title Ill. While the criteriafocus on animal lethality data, EPA is also concerned about a wide array of human toxic orclinical effects other than death (e.g., lungedema, liver or kidney damage, reproductiveand developmental toxicity, neurological disorders, cardiac effects, dermal irritation and cor

rosion, and ocular damage). Such effects maybe considered if suitable data are available whenthe list of EHSs is revised.

Use of Animal Data. In defining criteria, EPA

had to identify the health effects of concern andthe data to be used. EPA elected to use animalacute toxicity data derived from controlled experiments to infer potential for acute toxic effects in humans. EPA has assumed that humans and animals (mammals) are similar, onthe average, in intrinsic susceptibility to toxicchemicals and that animal data can be used assurrogates for human data. This assumption isone of the basic premises of modern toxicology

and is an important component in the regulationof toxic chemicals. An additional benefit of using animal data is that there exists a large data

base that is accessible to the public and government agencies such as EPA. Because humanpopulations are diverse (e.g., individuals differ

in age, health, and genetic background) and individuals are expected to vary considerably intheir sensitivity to chemical substances, EPA assumed that humans are at least as sensitive toeach toxic chemical as the most sensitive animal

species tested.

Type of Toxicity Data Used. Complete toxicological information on all potential concernsabout the consequences of an acute chemicalexposure is not available on all chemicals. EPAinitially focused on lethality, not only becauseEPA wishes to avoid accidents resulting in human death, but also because lethality data arethe most available and commonly reported information provided from animal toxicity testing.EPA determined that the most appropriate animal test data to use as surrogates for humanacute toxicity are those data from animal acutetoxicity tests expressed as the median lethal

concentration (LC50) when the substance hasbeen administered by inhalation (via the lungs),or the median lethal dose (LD50) when the substance has been administered orally (via themouth) or dermally (via the skin). These datarepresent dose levels or concentrations of achemical that are expected to result in the deathof 50 percent of the test animals. Exposure toEHSs released during an accident is expectedprimarily to involve chemicals that are airborne.Thus, the inhalation route of human exposure isof primary concern during or following an accident. However, it should be borne in mind that

humans could be exposed to an EHS by any orall of these routes after its accidental release. Inusing data on oral and dermal acute lethality,EPA was not specifically concerned with theseroutes of exposure in humans, but rather withidentifying compounds with inherent high potential for acute toxicity.

Use of LDLO and LCLO Data. Even with theamount of animal data that is available, there exist chemicals for which there are no standardacute toxicity test data. In those cases wheretoxicity testing has not determined an LD50 or

LC50 value, EPA selected an alternative measure of acute toxicity: the lowest dose or concentration at which some animals died following ex

posure (LDLO or LCLO). EPA used LDLO orLCLO values in those instances where there areno median toxicity values available for a chemi

cal. Data from these tests may be more Variable than those provided from median lethalitytests, but for the purposes of screening large



numbers of chemicals it was deemed necessaryto provide a second level screening tool in preference to missing potentially toxic chemicals notadequately tested. However, it is expected thatthere are chemicals that may be acutely toxic,

but for which there are no toxicity test data available in the public literature. It is expected thatplanners may obtain data that are not availablein the open literature from firms manufacturingchemicals. By knowing whether chemical firmsand other facilities have any chemicals that areon the list of EHSs or that meet the criteria, planners should be able to identify all potentiallyacute toxicants used in their community,

B.2 THE CRITERIA

Criteria Values Adopted. EPA adopted the criteria shown in Exhibit B-l to identify EHSs thatmay present severe health hazards to humansexposed to them during an accident or otheremergency. The specific values chosen areconsistent with toxicity values judged by the scientific community as indicative of potential foracute toxicity. The values shown in Exhibit B-lare lower than those for highly toxic chemicals inthe health hazard definitions mandated by OSHAin its Hazard Communication Standard (FR Vol.48, No. 248, p. 53346).

A chemical was identified as an EHS if animaltest data with a value less than or equal to thatstated for the LD50 or LC50 criteria for any oneof three exposure routes were found. A chemical without LD50 or LC50 test data was evaluated using the alternate LDLO or LCLO criteria.EPA has prepared a list of chemicals that meetthese criteria: these chemicals are included onthe list of EHSs under Title Ill of SARA.

EPA Criteria Compared with European Eco

nomic Community/World Bank Criteria. Thescreening criteria selected by EPA were consistent with internationally accepted criteria usedby both the European Economic Community(EEC) and the World Bank (WB). EPA’s criteriarecognized precedents set by these two organizations; however, in a conservative effort toavoid missing or excluding any potentially toxicchemicals, EPA modified the basic toxic sub

stances criteria used by these organizations inthree ways:

1. Lethality data are not limited to data on

rats, but include data on the most sensi

tive mammalian species tested:

2. Data from tests with inhalation exposure

time up to 8 hours is accepted instead of

data from 4-hour exposure tests only:

and

3. LDLO and LCLO data are used when

LD50 or LC50 data are not available.

The criteria were designed to take maximum advantage of the kinds of animal data available forscreening and to limit the potential for overlooking chemicals that may be potentially acutely

toxic. The criteria should maximize the potentialfor planners to identify toxic chemicals.

8.3 APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA

RTECS Data Base. The screening criteria canbe applied to any experimental data or database on chemical substances that includesacute animal toxicity data. EPA applied the criteria to a specific toxicity data repository, Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances(RTECS), maintained by the National Institute for

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). TheRTECS data base was used as the source of toxicity data for identifying acutely toxic chemicalsbecause it has the largest computerized set ofacute toxicity information available, with information on more than 79,000 chemicals. RTECS isdesigned to be a single-source document forbasic toxicity information and other data. It iswidely accepted and used as a toxicity datasource, as indicated by the fact that some organizations (e.g., health agencies and chemicalcompanies) include RTECS numbers as a toxicity reference on the lists of chemicals in their

files. While RTECS is not formally peer reviewed, the data presented are from scientificliterature that has been edited by the scientificcommunity before publication. In addition, theRTECS Editorial Review Board is responsible forreviewing a limited number of citations to remove ambiguities or errors. Them are limita

tions associated with the use of the RTECS database, but for the purposes of screening acute

12/87

B-2



Exhibit B-I

Criteria to Identify Extremely Hazardous Substances that

May Present Severe Health Hazards to Humans

Exposed During a Chemical Accident or Other Emergency

Route ofa

Exposure Acute Toxicity Measureb

Value

Inhalation Median Lethal Concentration Less than or equal to 0.5 milliin Air (LC50) grams per liter of air for

exposure time of 8 hours or less

Dermal Median Lethal Dose (LD50)

Less than or equal to 50milligrams per kilogram of body weight

Oral Median Lethal Dose (LD50) Less than or equal to 25milligrams per kilogram of body weight

aThe route by which the test animals absorbed the chemical, i.e., bybreathing it in air (inhalation), by absorbing it through the skin

(dermal), or by ingestion (oral).b LC50: The concentration of the chemical in air at which 50 percent ofthe test animals died. LD50: The dose that killed 50 percent of the testanimals. In the absence of LC50 or LD50 data, LCLO or LDLO data shouldbe used. LCLO: Lethal Concentration Low, the lowest concentration in airat which any test animals died. LDLO: Lethal Dose Low, the lowest doseat which any test animals died.

12/87

B - 3



toxicity data, RTECS provides a large and easilysearchable data file. It is important to emphasize that the purpose of the criteria was to pro

vide a screening tool for the initial identificationof chemicals that may be acutely toxic to humans. Additional information on the toxicity of

specific chemicals may be available from the facility emergency coordinator.

TSCA Inventory, Active Pesticide Ingredients,

and PMN Chemicals. EPA selected only those

chemical substances in current production byreferring to the 1977 Toxic Substances Control

Act (TSCA) Inventory and the current EPA list of

active pesticide ingredients. The TSCA Inventory is a list of chemical substances in production at the time the Inventory was compiled.

Chemical substances entering commerce since1977 through the Premanufacturing Notice

(PMN) review process under Section 5 of TSCAwere screened for acute toxicity data and compared to the criteria for possible inclusion on the

list.

Radioactive materials, chemical substances inresearch and development stages, and thosemanufactured, processed, or distributed in commerce for use as food, food additives, drugs, orcosmetics are not listed in the TSCA Inventory

and, hence, were not considered. If researchchemicals that meet the criteria are producedfor commercial use under TSCA or for pesticide

use under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), EPA will identify

such chemicals through its PMN review programand pesticide registration program and list themunder future rulemakings.

8.4 OTHER EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUB

STANCES

Chemicals that do not meet the criteria for acutetoxicity discussed in the previous section are not

necessarily safe. In fact, some are toxic to humans and may pose threats to the community if

accidents occur. EPA identified and included onthe list of EHSs some of these chemicals usingcriteria based on the following factors: large vol

ume production, acute lethality values, andknown risk, as indicated by the fact that some ofthe chemicals have caused death and injury inaccidents.

Candidates for listing were identified from thehigh-production capacity chemicals listed in the

SRI International publication, 1985 Directory ofChemical Producers, United States of America,pp. 388-389, or from the World Bank List GroupB: Other Toxic Substances. The toxicity criteriashown in Exhibit B-2 were used to aid in decidingwhich chemicals to list. In addition to high-pro

duction chemicals meeting these criteria, several other slightly less toxic chemicals werelisted because of their known hazards: for example, several of them have caused death or injury

in accidents. Exhibit B-3 lists these otherchemicals included on the list of EHSs.

12/87 B - 4



Exhibit B-2

Criteria to Identify Other Hazardous Substances Produced in Large

Quantities that May Present Severe Health Hazards to Humans

Exposed During a Chemical Accident or Other Emergency

R o u t e o fE x p o s u r e

a A c u t e T o x i c i t y M e a s u r eb

Value

Inhalation Median Lethal Concentration Less than or equal to 2 milliin Air (LC50) grams per liter of air for

exposure time of 8 hours or less

Dermal Median Lethal Dose (LD50)

Less than or equal to 400milligrams per kilogram of body weight

Oral Median Lethal Dose (LD50) Less than or equal to 200milligrams per kilogram of body weight

aThe route by which the test animals absorbed the chemical, i.e., bybreathing it in air (inhalation), by absorbing it through the skin

(dermal), or by ingestion (oral).b LC50: The concentration of the chemical in air at which 50 percent of

the test animals died. LD50: The dose that killed 50 percent of the testanimals. In the absence of LEO or LD50 data, LCLO or LDLO data shouldbe used. LCLO: Lethal Concentration Low, the lowest concentration in airat which any test animals died. LDLO: Lethal Dose Low, the lowest doseat which any test animals died.

12/81

B - 5



Exhibit B-3

Other Extremely Hazardous Substances

Chemicals on the following list were judged to be extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) on the

basis of high production capacity and the criteria summarized in Exhibit B-2 or knownhazards (see Section 8.4).

Name CAS Number

Acrylamide 79-06-1

Acrylonitrile 107-13-1

Adiponitrile 111-69-3

Ammonia 7664-41-7 Aniline 62-53-3Bromine 7726-95-6Carbon disulfide 75-15-0Chloroform 67-66-3

Cyclohexylamine 108-91-8

Epichlorohydrin 106-89-8

Ethylene oxide 75-21-8

Formaldehyde 50-00-0

Hydrogen chloride (gas only) 7647-01-0

* Hydrogen peroxide 7722-84-1

Hydrogen sulfide 7783-06-4Hydroquinone 123-31-9

Methyl bromide 74-83-9

Nitrobenzene 98-95-3

Phosgene 75-44-5

Propylene oxide 75-56-9

Sulfur dioxide 7446-09-5

Tetramethyl lead 75-74-1

Vinyl acetate monomer 108-05-4

* Concentration greater than 52 percent.

12/87 B - 6



APPENDIX C

THE LIST OF EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

EPA identified chemicals that meet the criteria ent physical state, molecular weight, boil-for extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) dis- ing point, vapor pressure, level of concerncussed in Section B.2. In addition, other chemi- (LOC), and liquid factors,

cals were identified as EHSs as described inSection B.4. The chemicals are listed by their l Exhibit C-2: Same list as that in Exhibit

common names and also by their Chemical Ab- C-1, in CAS number order.

stract Service (CAS) numbers. While a chemicalmay be known by several different names, the Note that the value for the LOC given in these

CAS number provides a unique and unambigu- Exhibits is one tenth the Immediately Dangerous

ous identification. The list of EHSs is presented to Life and Health (IDLH) level or an estimation

in the following forms: of that level for chemicals which do not have aspecific IDLH assigned to them. Refer to Appen-

Exhibit C-1 : List of common names, in al- dix D for a more detailed discussion of the LOCphabetical order, with CAS number, ambi- and other values that planners may wish to use.

C - l



APPENDIX D

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON LEVELS OF CONCERN

D. 1 INTRODUCTION

Levels of concern (LOCs), for purposes of thisdocument, are defined as the concentrations ofan extremely hazardous substance (EHS) in airabove which there may be serious irreversiblehealth effects or death as a result of a singleexposure for a relatively short period of time.

There is at present no precise measure of LOCsfor the chemicals listed as EHSs. Various or

ganizations have been developing for the pastseveral years acute exposure guidelines for alimited number of hazardous chemicals: themethodology, however, is still in the develop

mental stages. Certain of the guidelines underdevelopment and the progress to date are described in detail below. Until more precise

measures are developed, surrogate or estimated measures of LOCs have been identifiedfor the listed EHSs. Local officials may choosevalues for LOCs different from those estimatedin this guidance, depending upon their requirements and the specific characteristics of theplanning district or site and the level of protection deemed appropriate.

For the purposes of this guidance, the LOC has

been estimated by using one-tenth of the “Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health” (IDLH)level published by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or an approximation of the IDLH from animal toxicity data(See Appendix B). Other exposure guidelines

that may be used to estimate LOC include the“Threshold Limit Values” (TLVs1), published bythe American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), guidelines developed by the National Research Council (NRC) of

the National Academy of Sciences, (NAS), andEmergency Response Planning Guidelines

(ERPGs) under development by a consortium ofchemical companies. Descriptions of the development and uses of these exposure guidelineswill be given in the following sections.

TLVs is a registered trademark.

LOCs may be given in units of parts per million(ppm), milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3),milligrams per liter (mg/L), or grams per liter

(g/L).

The equations for determining LOC in this guidance use the units grams per cubic meter,(g/m3), so any other units, such as ppm, mustbe converted to g/m3. Levels given in parts permillion can be converted to grams per cubic meter (g/m3) as follows:

where MW is the substance’s molecular weight.

For example, chlorine has an LOC (0.1 IDLH) of2.5 ppm and a molecular weight of about 71 g/mole. Thus, the LOC in grams per cubic meter

is:

LOC given in mi l l igrams per cubic meter(mg/m3) can be converted to g/m3 as follows:

LOC (in g/m3) = LOC (in mg/m3)/1000

LOC given in grams per liter (g/L) can be converted to g/m3 as follows:

LOC (in g/m3) = LOC (in g/L) x 1000

LOC given in milligrams per liter (mg/L) isequivalent to LOC in g/m3:

LOC (in g/m3) = LOC (In mg/L)

D.2 LEVEL OF CONCERN BASED ON

ONE-TENTH IDLH OR ONE-TENTH THE

ESTIMATED IDLH

About ten years ago, NIOSH developed IDLH lev

els for approximately 390 chemicals from theOccupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) Z-1 and Z-2 lists. These are lists of

toxic and hazardous substances to which

12/87 D - l

1



employee exposure must be limited as requiredby the Code of Federal Regulations 29, Chapter17, Part 1910. IDLHs were developed exclusivelyfor respirator selection in the workplace. Thedefinition of IDLH provided in 30 CFR 11.3 (the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, PL

91-596) is: "Immediately dangerous to life orhealth means conditions that pose an immediatethreat to life or health or conditions that pose animmediate threat of severe exposure to con

taminants, such as radioactive materials, which

are likely to have an adverse cumulative or delayed effect on health.” The IDLH concentrationrepresents the maximum concentration of a substance in air from which healthy male workers

can escape without loss of life or irreversiblehealth effects under conditions of a maximum30-minute exposure time. Practically, IDLH’sare concentrations above which a highly reliable

breathing apparatus is required with provisionsfor escape.

The methodology in developing IDLHs takes intoaccount immediate reactions that could prevent

escape without injury, such as severe eye irritation or lung edema. The procedure used to derive IDLH’s from data from mammalian toxicity

studies is outlined below:

1. Where acute exposure data are available

(30 minute to 4 hour exposures), the low est exposure concentration causing death

or irreversible health effects in any species

is used as the IDLH concentration. These

data are often reported as lethal concen

tration, low (LCLO).

2. Chronic exposure data are generally not

considered in developing IDLH levels for

the following reason: “Chronic exposure

data may have no relevance to the acute

effects and should be used in determining

the IDLH concentration only upon compe

tent toxicological judgment.” (NIOSH

19782),

See Section D.7 for all references in Appendix D.

3. Where there are no toxicity data to derivean IDLH concentration, 500 times the Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) shall beused as the IDLH level.

EPA recognizes that the IDLH was not designedas a measure of the exposure level required to

protect general populations. First, the IDLH isbased upon the response of a healthy, maleworker population and does not take into account exposure of more sensitive individualssuch as the elderly, children, or people with various health problems. Second, the IDLH is basedupon a maximum 30-minute exposure period,which may not be realistic for accidental airborne releases. IDLH values have been developed for about one-fourth of the EHSs on the

list. The IDLH may not indicate the concentration that could result in serious but reversible in

jury. Based on these conditions, one- tenth the

IDLH level or an estimation of this value for substances that do not have a published IDLH, hasbeen selected as one approximation of an LOC

available for planning purposes. These IDLH values have been developed with human acute toxicity as the principal consideration and representexposure concentrations that are one to two or

ders of magnitude below the median lethal concentration (LC50) or the median lethal dose

(LD50) levels reported for mammalian speciesunder experimental conditions. IDLHs were estimated from acute animal toxicity test data for

substances without IDLH values. In these in

stances, the concentration used is determinedfrom LC50, LCLO, LD50, or LDLO data. Inhala

tion data were used, if available, in preferenceto other data, and median lethality data werepreferred to other types. The following equa

tions show how these data are converted to airconcentrations comparable to the IDLH level:

(1) estimated IDLH = LC50 x 0.1;

(2) estimated IDLH = LCLO

(3) estimated IDLH = LD50 x 0.01

(4) estimated IDLH = LDLO x 0.1

12/87 D - 2

2



D.3 LEVELS OF CONCERN BASED ON

THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES (TLVs3)

ACGIH publishes an annual list of three types ofworkplace exposure limits for several hundred

compounds. ACGIH has published three TLVsas guidelines since 1941: Threshold limit value-

Time-weighted average (TLV-TWA), TLV-Shortterm exposure limit (TLV-STEL), and TLV-Ceiling (TLV-C).

1. The TLV-TWA is def ined as the t imeweighted average concentration limit for anormal eight hour workday and 40 hours

per week, to which nearly all workers maybe repeatedly exposed, day after day,

without adverse effect.

2 . The TLV-STEL i s a 15 -m inu te t ime-

weighted average concentration for a normal eight-hour workday and forty-hour

workweek. All workers should be able to

withstand up to four exposures per day ofconcentrations as high as the TLV-STELwith no ill effects if the TLV-TWA is not alsoexceeded. TLV-STELs are applied to sup

plement the TLV-TWA when there are recognized acute effects from a substancewhose toxic effects are primarily of achronic nature.

3.

The TLV-C is the airborne concentration

that shou ld not be exceeded in theworkplace under any circumstances. Ceiling limits may supplement other limits orstand alone. In many cases, ACGIH couldnot find sufficient toxicological data to derive TLV-STELs or TLV-Cs for chemicals

which had already been assigned a TLVTWA. In these instances, the ACGIH recommends that five times the TLV-TWA be

used in place of the TLV-C and that short-term exposures not exceed 3 times- theTLV-TWA for more than a total of 30 min

utes during the day.

TLVs are based primarily on acute toxicity data(LC5Os and LD50s) and irritation data (irritationof the cornea and respiratory tract). Irritationeffects that are considered range from barely

TLVs is a registered trademark.

detectable to irreversible, in laboratory animalsand human subjects documented in industrial ex

posures. Only some TLVs consider neurotoxicand mutagenic effects. Although TLVs are derived for the protection of healthy male workers,they occasionally consider special impacts on

workers with chronic respiratory problems,TLVs do not consider reproductive effects (ACGIH 1966). ACGIH advises against using or applying the TLV levels outside the workplace.


NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

SHORT-TERM EXPOSURE LEVELS

For the last forty years, the NRC’s Committee onToxicology has submitted emergency exposureguidelines for chemicals of concern to the De

partment of Defense (DOD) (NRC 1986), Theseguidelines are used in planning for sudden contamination of air during military and space op

erations; specifically, they are used to chooseprotective equipment and response plans after

non-routine but predictable occurrences suchas line breaks, spills, and fires. These guidelines are for peak levels of exposure consideredacceptable for rare situations, but are not to beapplied in instances of repeated exposure.

An Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (EEGL)is defined as a concentration of a substance in

air (gas, vapor, or aerosol) judged by DOD to beacceptable for the performance of specific tasksby military personnel during emergency conditions lasting 1-24 hours. Exposure to an EEGL isnot considered safe, but acceptable during

tasks which are necessary to prevent greaterrisks, such as fire or explosion. Exposures atthe EEGLs may produce transient central nervous system effects and eye or respiratory irritation, but nothing serious enough to prevent

proper responses to emergency conditions.

Since the 1940’s, the NRC has developed EEGLsfor 41 chemicals, 15 of which are listed in Section 302 of Title Ill of SARA as EHSs. Althoughacute toxicity is the primary basis for selectingEEGLs, long term effects from a single acute exposure are also evaluated for developmental,reproductive (in both sexes), carcinogenic,neurotoxic, respiratory and other organ-related

12/87 D - 3

3



effects. The effect determined to be the mostseriously debilitating, work-limiting, or sensitiveis selected as the basis for deriving the EEGL.This concentration is intended to be sufficientlylow to protect against other toxic effects thatmay occur at higher concentrations. Factorssuch as age of the exposed population, length ofexposure, and susceptibility or sensitivity of theexposed population are also considered in determining EEGLs.

Safety factors are used in developing EEGLs toreflect the nature and quality of the data. Safety

factors for single exposures may differ fromthose used in chronic studies. In the absence ofbetter information, a safety factor of 10 is sug

gested for EEGLs (i.e., the reported toxicityvalue should be divided by 10) if only animaldata are available and extrapolation from ani

mals to humans is necessary for acute, short-term effects (NRC 1986). The safety factor of10 takes into account the possibility that someindividuals might be more sensitive than the animal species tested. A factor of 10 is also suggested if the likely route of human exposure differs from the route reported experimentally(NRC 1986) (e.g., if oral data are reported andinhalation is the most likely exposure route forhumans).

As noted by NRC (1986, p. 7), development ofan EEGL for different durations of exposure usu

ally begins with the shortest exposure anticipated - i.e., 10-15 minutes - and works up tothe longest, such as 24 hours. Under the simplest framework, Haber’s law is assumed to operate, with the product of concentration (C) andtime (t) as a constant (k) for all the short periods used (Ct=k) (Casarett and Doull 1986). If Ctis 30 and t is 10, then C is 3; if Ct is 30 and t is30, then C is 1. If detoxification or recovery oc

curs and data are available on 24-hour exposures, this is taken into account in modifying Ct.In some instances, the Ct concept will be inappropriate, as for materials such as ammonia that

can be more toxic with high concentrations overshort periods. Each material is considered inrelation to the applicability of Haber’s law.

Generally, EEGLs have been developed for ex

posure to single substances, although emergency exposures often involve complex mixtures

of substances and, thus, present the possibility

of toxic effects resulting from several substances. In the absence of other information,guidance levels for complex mixtures can be developed from EEGLs by assuming as a first approximation that the toxic effects are additive.When the chemical under evaluation for development of an EEGL is an animal or human car

cinogen, a separate qualitative risk assessmentis undertaken in recognition of the fact that evenlimited exposure to such an agent can theoretically increase the risk of cancer. The risk assessment is performed with the aim of providing

an estimate of the acute exposure that would notlead to an excess risk of cancer greater than 1 in10,000 exposed persons. The following mathe

matical approach, taken directly from NRC(1986, pp. 26-27), is applicable for EEGL cornputations for carcinogens:

1.

If there has been computed an exposurelevel d (usually in ppm in air), which after alifetime of exposure is estimated to pro

duce some "acceptable” level of excessrisk of cancer -- say, 1x10

-6 -- this hasbeen called a “virtually safe dose” (VSD).Computation of the dose d, if not alreadydone by a regulatory agency, will be computed by the Committee on Toxicology inaccordance with generally accepted procedures used by the major regulatoryagencies, i.e., using the multistage no-threshold model for carcinogenesis and

the appropriate body weight/surface areaadjustments when extrapolating from ananimal species to humans.

2. If carcinogenic effect is assumed to be alinear function of the total (cumulative)

dose, then for a single 1-day human exposure an acceptable dose (to yield thesame total lifetime exposure) would be dtimes 25,600 (there being approximately25,600 days in an average lifetime); the al

lowable 1-day (24-h) dose rate would be

d x 25,600

3. Because of uncertainties about which ofseveral stages in the carcinogenic processa material may operate in, and because ofthe likely low age of military persons, it canbe shown from data of Crump and Howe(1984) that the maximal additional risk that

12/87

D - 4



these considerations contribute is a factorof 2.8. As a conservative approach, theacceptable dose is divided by 2.8, i.e.,

d x 25,6002.8

If a lifetime excess risk, R, is establishedby DOD (for example, at 1x10-4, as hasbeen suggested by the International Council on Radiation Protection for nuclearpower plant workers), then the appropriateextent of risk at the EEGL would be

(In the example given here, the level of riskat d was no more than 1x10-6.) If R is

1 x10-4, then R/risk at d = 10-4 /10-6 = 100(NRC 1986).

4. If a further element of conservatism is required (for example, where animal dataneed to be extrapolated to estimate humanrisk), an additional safety factor can beused as a divisor.

The NRC’s Committee on Toxicology has also

developed special public exposure guidelinesupon request from Department of Defense. TheShort-term Public Exposure Guidance Level(SPEGL) is defined as an acceptable ceiling concentration for a single, unpredicted short-term

exposure to the public. The exposure period isusually calculated to be one hour or less andnever more than 24 hours. SPEGLs are generally set at 0.1 to 0.5 times the EEGL. A safetyfactor of 2 is often used to take into account ef

fects on sensitive subpopulations, such as children, the aged, and people with debilitating diseases. A safety factor of 10 may be used totake into account the effects of an exposure onfetuses and newborns. Effects on the reproductive capacity of both men and women are alsoconsidered. Five SPEGLs (for hydrazine,dimethylhydrazine, monomethyl hydrazine, ni

trogen dioxide, and hydrogen chloride) havebeen developed by the NRC: all five chemicals

are on the list of EHSs.


EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

GUIDELINES

A consortium of twenty-five chemical firms hasdeveloped a uniform protocol for community ex

posure guidelines based upon the NRC/NASguidelines, EEGLs, and SPEGLs. The AmericanIndustrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) is providing technical review. These guidelines are notintended for repeated exposures and their adoption and use by individual companies is intended

to be voluntary.

The consortium members have identified 100chemicals of concern: for fifteen chemicals,draft Emergency Response Planning Guidelines(ERPGs) have been developed. None of theseas yet is available for review. Briefly, the recom

mended procedure for developing ERPGs is asfollows:

1) Companies should use a multi-disciplinaryteam, including members from the toxico

logical, medical, and industrial hygienefields, to collect and review data and draftERPG documentation. The protocol rec

ommends identifying producers and usersof the material and requesting unpublished

data on human health effects. Literaturesearches of computer databases are also

recommended.

2)

Acute toxic ity data, as wel l as possiblelong-term effects from a single acute exposure, including carcinogenicity,neurotoxicity, and reproductive and developmental effects are considered. Adjust

ments may be made, based upon informed judgment, for the increased sus

ceptibility of sensitive subgroups in thepopulation. ERPGs for carcinogens maybe derived using the carcinogenicity riskassessment methodology for acute expo

sures employed by the NRC (1986).

3) The protocol specifies that three concentration levels are needed for each chemi

12/87 D - 5



cal. The ERPG-1 is defined as the “maximum airborne concentration below which itis believed that nearly all individuals couldbe exposed for up to one hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly

defined objectionable odor.” The ERPG-2is the concentration below which it is believed that “nearly all individuals” would

come to no permanent harm after a one-hour exposure period. The ERPG-3 is the“maximum concentration belowwhich...nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without.. lifethreatening health effects.” (See Exhibit

D-1)

4) After the ERPG Task Force reviews and ed

its the documentation, the guidelines and

their rationales are reviewed by a Toxicology Committee within the AIHA. The committee is comprised of experts from government, industry, and academia.

5) When they are approved, the guidelines

and their documentation are filed at the AIHA headquarters in Akron and will beavailable to the public upon request.

D.6 OSHA PERMISSIBLE EXPOSURE LIMITS

AND NIOSH RECOMMENDED EXPOSURE

LIMITS

OSHA Permissable Exposure Limits (PELs) areworkplace exposure standards listed in 29 CFR1910, Subpart Z, General Industry Standards for

Toxic and Hazardous Chemicals.

Most of the PELs listed in 29 CFR 1910 werebased on ACGIH TLVs, about 450 of which OSHAadopted in 1971 as interim standards under section 6(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health

Act . Between 1972 and 1984, OSHA promulgated 9 permanent major health standards regu

lating worker exposure to 21 toxic chemicals ormixtures. These standards, besides establishingPELs for these chemicals or mixtures, also provided guidance on exposure monitoring, regu

lated areas, methods of compliance, respiratoryprotection, protective clothing, and hazard com

munication.

Chemicals and substances listed in Subpart Zwere divided into 3 tables. PELs for chemicalson the first table are usually 8-hour time-weighted average (TWA) concentrations, not tobe exceeded in an 8-hour workday. For chemicals on the second table, ceiling concentrations

and maximum peak concentrations were given inaddition to 8-hour TWA concentrations. Themaximum peak concentrations have associatedwith them exposure durations (e.g. five minutemaximum peak concentration in any 2 hour period). These concentrations should never exceed the maximum peak, and should fall between the ceiling and the maximum peak concentration for the duration indicated. The thirdtable provided 8-hour TWA concentrations formineral dusts.

The majority of OSHA PELs were adopted fromthe ACGIH TLVs available in 1971. PELs are enforceable by law, whereas the ACGIH TLVs arerecommendations. It should be noted that therehave been no revisions of the PELs since theiradoption, although the corresponding ACGIHTLVs may have been revised.

For chemicals which NIOSH has published recommendations, the NIOSH recommended exposure limits (RELs) are found in the Pocket Guide

to Chemical Hazards. RELs are 8- or 10- hourTWA concentrations and/or ceiling concentrations.

D.7 GUIDELINES AVAILABLE FOR

EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES

As local planning committees may consider theuse of one tenth of the IDLH inappropriate fortheir specific situation, Exhibits D-2 and D-3 listthe guidelines that have been discussed in thisappendix that are available for each chemical onthe List of Extremely Hazardous Substances.Planners may wish to use these values, butshould do so only after discussion of the poten

tial implications with qualified technical personnel.

12/87

D - 6



D. 8 REFERENCES

Crump, KS. and R.S. Howe. 1984. The mul

tistage model with a time-dependent dose pat- American Conference of Governmental Indus- tern: applications to carcinogenic risk assess-

trial Hygienists. 1986. Threshold Limit Values ment. Risk Analysis 4: 163-176.

and Biological Exposure Indices for 1986-87.

Cincinnati, Ohio.

Casarett and Doull. 1986. Toxicology. Edited

by C.D. Klassen, M.O. Amdur, and J. Doull.

New York, Macmillan Publishing.

12/87

D - 7



Exhibit D-l

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines

Adapted from Organization Resources Counselors, 1987.

12/87 D - 8



NIOSH. 1978. National Institute for Occupa

tional Safety and Health. The Standards Com

pletion Program Draft Technical Standards

Analysis and Decision Logics. NIOSH Library,

Cincinnati, Ohio. Copy courtesy of Dr. Howard

Ludwig, NIOSH.

NIOSH. 1985. National Institute for Occupa

tional Safety and Health. Pocket Guide to

Chemical Hazards. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, DHEW (NIOSH)

Publication No. 78-210.

NRC. 1979. The National Research Council.

Criteria for Short-term Exposures to Air Pollut

ants. November 1979.

NRC. 1986, National Research Council, Com

mittee on Toxicology. Criteria and Methods for

Preparing Emergency Exposure Guidance Level

(EEGL), Short-Term Public Emergency Guid

ance Level (SPEGL), and Continuous Exposure

Guidance Level (CEGL) Documents. Washing

ton, D.C.: National Academy Press.

Organization Resources Counselors. 1987.

Memorandum to ORC Occupational Safety and

Health Group from Darrell K. Mattheis and

Rebecca L. Daiss, update on Emergency Re

sponse Planning Guidelines (ERPG) Task

Force.. July 20, 1987.

Swank, M.G., Branson, D.R., Rampy, L.W.

1986. The Dow Program to Develop Emer

gency Exposure Guideline Concentrations

(EEGs), February 12, 1986.

12/87 D - 9



APPENDIX E

SAMPLE PROFILE AND EMERGENCY FIRST AID TREATMENT

EPA has prepared chemical profiles of the ex- and, in some cases, an emergency first aidtremely hazardous substances (EHSs) listed in treatment guide, are available in hard copy or onExhibits C-1 and C-2. Emergency first aid treat- IBM compatible floppy disks. This appendix pro

ment guides are also available for a number of vides, as an example, the profile and emer-

EHSs. A chemical profile for each substance gency first aid treatment guide for acrolein.

12/87 E - l



EPA Chemical Profile

CHEMICAL IDENTITY ACROLEIN

CAS Registry Number: 107-02-8

Page 1 of 4

Date: October 31, 1985 Revision: November 30, 1987


Synonyms: Acraldehyde; Acrylaldehyde; Acrylic Aldehyde; Ally1 Aldehyde;

Aqualin; Aqualine; Ethylene Aldehyde; Magnacide H; NSC 8819; Propenal;

2-Propenal; Prop-2-en-l-al; 2-Propen-l-one

Chemical Formula: C3H40

Molecular Weight: 56.06

SECTION I -- REGULATORY INFORMATION

CERCLA (SARA) 1986:

Toxicity Value Used for Listing Under Section 302: LC50 inhalation

(mouse) 0.15 mg/liter/6 hours (*NIOSH/RTECS 1985)

TPQ: 500 (pounds)

RQ: 1 (pounds)

Section 313 Listed (Yes or No): Yes

SECTION II -- PHYSICAL/CHEMICAL CHARACTERISTICS

Physical State: Liquid

Boiling Point: 126F, 52.5C (*Merck 1983)

Specific Gravity (H20-1): 0.8389 at 20C; 0.8621 at 0C (*Merck 1983)

Vapor Pressure (mmHg): 210 at 68F, 20C; 135.71 at 50F, 10C (*Weed

Science Society of America 1974)

Melting Point: -126F, -88C (*Merck 1983)

Vapor Density (AIR-l): 1.94 (*Encyc Occupat Health and Safety 1983)

Evaporation Rate (Butyl acetate-l): Not Found

12/87 E - 2




Page 2 of 4

ACROLEIN

SECTION II -- PHYSICAL/CHEMICAL CHARACTERISTICS (continued)

Solubility in Water: Soluble in 2-3 parts water (*Merck 1983)

Appearance and Odor: Colorless or yellowish liquid with extremely sharp,

disagreeable, acrid, irritating odor (*Sax 1979, *CHRIS 1980)

SECTION III -- HEALTH HAZARD DATA

OSHA PEL: TWA 0.1 ppm ( 0.25 mg/m3) (NIOSH 1987, p. 44)

ACGIH TLV: TWA 0.1 ppm (0.25 mg/m3); STEL 0.3 ppm (0.8 mg/m3) (ACGIH

1986-87, p. 9)

IDLH: 5 ppm (NIOSH 1987, p. 44)

Other Limits Recommended: EEGL 0.05 ppm (60 minutes) (NRC 1984a, pp. 27-34)

Routes of Entry:

Inhalation: Yes (*NIOSH/RTECS 1985)

Skin: Yes (*NIOSH/RTECS 1985)

Ingestion: Yes (*Gosselin 1984)

Health Hazards (Acute, Delayed, and Chronic): Extremely toxic; probable

oral human lethal dose is S-50 mg/kg, between 7 drops and one teaspoon for

a 70 kg (150 lb.) person (*Gosselin 1984). Inhalation of air containing 10

ppm of acrolein may be fatal in a few minutes (*NRC 1981). Death from

cardiac failure accompanied by hyperemia and hemorrhage of the lungs and

degeneration of the bronchial epithelium is possible. Acrolein causes

acute respiratory and eye irritation; severe gastrointestinal distress with

slowly developing pulmonary edema (lungs fill up with fluid); and skin

irritation (Gosselin 1984, p. 11-186).

Medical Conditions Generally Aggravated by Exposure: Not Found

SECTION IV -- FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA

Flash Point (Method Used): -15F, -26C (CC); less than OF, -18C (OC)

(*NFPA 1978)

Flammable Limits:

LEL: 2.8% (*NFPA 1978)

UEL: 31% (*NFPA 1978)

Extinguishing Methods: Dry chemical, alcohol foam, or carbon dioxide.

Water may be ineffective, but can be used to keep containers cool (*NFPA

1978).

12/87

E - 3




Page 3 of 4

ACROLEIN

SECTION IV -- FIRE AND -EXPLOSION HAZARD DATA (continued)

Special Fire Fighting Procedures: In advanced or massive fires, fire

fighting should be done from safe distance or from protected location. Use

dry chemical, alcohol foam, or carbon dioxide. Water may be ineffective,

but should be used to keep fire-exposed containers cool. If a leak or

spill has not ignited, use water spray to disperse vapors. If it is

necessary to stop a leak, use water spray to protect men attempting to do

so. Water spray may be used to flush spills away from exposures and to

dilute spills to nonflammable mixtures (*NFPA 1978). Withdraw immediately

in case of rising sound from venting safety device or any discoloration of

tank due to fire. Isolate for l/2 mile in all directions if tank car or

truck is involved in fire (DOT 1987, Guide 30).

Unusual Fire and Explosion Hazards: Under fire conditions, polymerization may occur. If inside a container, violent rupture of the container may

take place (*NFPA 1978).

NFPA Flammability Rating: 3

SECTION V -- REACTIVITY DATA

Stability:

Unstable: Yes (*Merck 1983)

Stable:

Conditions to Avoid: Exposure to alkalis or strong acids (*Encyc

Occupat Safety and Health 1983) or to oxygen (*NFPA 1978).

Incompatibility (Materials to Avoid): Alkalis or strong acids act as

catalysts, causing a condensation reaction and liberating energy. Reaction

may be very rapid and violent (*Encyc Occupat Health and Safety 1983).

Readily converted by oxygen to hazardous peroxides and acids (*NFPA 1978).

Hazardous Decomposition or Byproducts: When heated to decomposition, it

emits highly toxic fumes (*Sax 1975).

Hazardous Polymerization: May Occur: Yes (*NFPA 1978)

May Not Occur:

Conditions to Avoid: Elevated temperatures, such as fire conditions.

(Polymerization inside container could cause violent rupture of

container under fire conditions.) (*NFPA 1978)

12/87

E-4




Page 4 of 4

ACROLEIN

SECTION VI -- USE INFORMATION

Acrolein is used in manufacture of colloidal forms of metals; making

plastics, perfumes: as a warning agent in methyl chloride refrigerant; and

has been used in military poison gas mixtures (*Merck 1983). It is also

used as an intermediate in the production of glycerine, methionine, acrylic

acid, and esters (*SRI). Acrolein is also an intermediate for glycerol,

polyurethane, polyester resins, and pharmaceuticals (*Hawley 1981).

Additionally, acrolein is used as an aquatic herbicide, biocide, slimicide

(*Farm Chemicals Handbook 1984) and molluscicide (*Kearney and Kaufman 1975).

SECTION VII -- PRECAUTIONS FOR SAFE HANDLING AND USE

(Steps to be Taken in Case Material is Released or Spilled)

When handling acrolein, no skin surface should be exposed (*NFPA 1978).

Remove all ignition sources. Ventilate area of spill or leak. For large

quantities, cover with sodium bisulfite, add small amount of water and mix.

Then, after 1 hour, flush with large amounts of water and wash site with

soap solution. Liquid should not be allowed to enter confined space, such

as sewer, because of possibility of explosion. Take up spill for disposal

by absorbing it in vermiculite, dry sand, or earth and disposing in a

secured landfill or combustion chamber (*NIOSH 1981).

SECTION VIII -- PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT FOR EMERGENGY SITUATIONS

For emergency situations, wear a positive pressure, pressure-demand, full

facepiece self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or pressure-demand

supplied air respirator with escape SCBA and a fully-encapsulating, chemical

resistant suit. See the introduction and comment section at the beginning

of the profiles for additional information.

Suit Material Performance (based on EPA/USCG "Guidelines", 1987)

(Chemical Resistance/Amount of Data):

Butyl: Good/Limited

Butyl/Neoprene: Poor/Many

CPE: Poor/Many

Nitrile: Poor/Many

Viton: Poor/Many

Viton/Chlorobutyl: Good/Limited

SECTION IX -- EMERGENGY TREATMENT INFORMATION

See Emergency First Aid Treatment Guide

E-5



Emergency First Aid Treatment Guide

for

ACROLEIN

(107-02-8)

This guide should not be construed to authorize emergency personnel to

perform the procedures or activities indicated or implied. Care of persons

exposed to toxic chemicals must be directed by a physician or other competent

authority.

Substances Characteristics:

Pure Form - Colorless or slightly yellow liquid.

Odor - Extremely sharp.

Commercial Forms - 92 to 99% pure liquid.

Uses - Chemical intermediate, manufacture of plastics, perfumes, paper, colloidal

forms of metals; component of military poison gas mixture, liquid fuel,

antimicrobial agent, aquatic pesticide; warning agent in methyl chloride

refrigerant.

Materials to Avoid - Strong acid, alkali, caustic soda, oxidizers, oxygen (except

for use in emergency life support).

Other Names - Acquinite, acraldehyde, acrylaldehyde, acrylic aldehyde, ally1

aldehyde, ethylene aldehyde, Magnacide H, 2-Propenal.

Personal Protective Equipment: See Chemical Profile Section VIII.

Emergency Life-Support Equipment and Supplies That May Be Required:

Compressed oxygen, forced-oxygen mask, soap, water, milk, activated charcoal,

saline cathartic or sorbitol.

Signs and Symptoms of Acute Acrolein Exposure:

Warning: Acrolein is highly irritating to skin and mucous membranes. Caution is

advised.

Signs and symptoms of acute exposure to acrolein may be severe and include

shortness of breath, tightness of chest, pulmonary edema, and coma. Lacrimation

(tearing), nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea may occur. Acrolein will irritate or

burn the skin and mucous membranes. Eye contact may cause irritation, swelling,

discharge and/or cornea1 injury.

12/87 E - 6



ACROLEIN

Emergency Life-Support Procedures:

Acute exposure to acrolein may require decontamination and life support for the

victims. Emergency personnel should wear protective clothing appropriate to the

type and degree of contamination. Air-purifying or supplied-air respiratory

equipment should also be worn, as necessary. Rescue vehicles should carry

supplies such as plastic sheeting and disposable plastic bags to assist in

preventing spread of contamination.

Inhalation Exposure:

1.

Move victims to fresh air. Emergency personnel should avoid self-exposure

to acrolein.

2.

Evaluate vital signs including pulse and respiratory rate and note any

trauma. If no pulse is detected, provide CPR. If not breathing, provide

artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other

respiratory support.

3.

Obtain authorization and/or further instructions from the local hospital for

administration of an antidote or performance of other invasive procedures.

4.

RUSH to a health care facility.

Dermal/Eye Exposure:

1.

Remove victims from exposure. Emergency personnel should avoid self-

exposure to acrolein.

2.



artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or

other respiratory support.

3. Remove contaminated clothing as soon as possible (and place in plastic

bag).

4.

If eye exposure has occurred, eyes must be flushed with lukewarm water for

at least 15 minutes.

5.

Wash exposed skin areas THOROUGHLY with soap and water.

6.



7.


12/87

E-7



ACROLEIN

Ingestion Exposure:

1.



artificial respiration. If breathing is labored, administer oxygen or other

respiratory support.

2.



3.

Give the victims water or milk: children up to 1 year old, 125 mL (4 oz

or l/2 cup); children 1 to 12 years old, 200 mL (6 oz or 3/4 cup); adults,

250 mL (8 oz or 1 cup). Water or milk should not be given if victims are

not conscious and alert.

4.

Activated charcoal may be administered if victims are conscious and alert.

Use 15 to 30 gm (l/2 to 1 oz) for children, 50 to 100 gm (l-3/4 to 3-l/2 oz)

for adults, with 125 to 250 mL (l/2 to 1 cup) of water.

5.

Promote excretion by administering a saline cathartic or sorbitol to

conscious and alert victims. Children require 15 to 30 gm (l/2 to 1 oz)

of cathartic; 50 to 100 gm (l-3/4 to 3-l/2 oz) is recommended for adults.

6.


E-8



APPENDIX F

FIRE AND REACTIVITY HAZARDS

Congress mandated in Title Ill of SARA that localemergency planning committees (LEPCs) focusinitially on acute toxicity hazards related to ex

tremely hazardous substances (EHSs). Otherhazards may warrant consideration in emergency preparedness and response planning.This appendix is a brief discussion of fire and reactivity hazards.

Fire Hazards. Flammable materials, particularlythose that will ignite at a relatively low tempera

ture (i.e., that have low flash points), clearlymay be a hazard to communities. There areseveral major types of fires that may be associ

ated with hazardous material discharges, withthe type of fire being a function not only of the

characteristics and properties of the spilled substance but the circumstances surrounding the

accident. The types are:

l Flame Jets. Tanks, cylinders, andpipelines which contain gases under

pressure (i.e., compressed gases orliquefied gases) may discharge gasesat a high speed if they are somehow

punctured or broken during an acci

dent. If the gas is flammable and encounters an ignition source, a flame jet

of considerable length (possibly hundreds of feet) may form from a hole

less than a foot in diameter.

l BLEVEs. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVEs) are among

the most feared events when tanks ofhazardous materials are exposed tofire or physical damage or other eventsthat cause excessive pressures within

the tank. A BLEVE could occur whenflames impinge upon the vapor space

(unwetted internal surface) of the tankwhere there is no liquid to absorb heat. As the vap or spa ce is he at ed , th e

pressure inside the tank (even afterthe relief valve opens) becomes sogreat that it eventually vents itself

through the weakest area of the tank. As the pressure inside is increasing,

the flames weaken the structural integ

rity of the tank, thus creating the conditions for venting. This sudden vent

ing of pressure and vaporization ofproduct involves the violent rupture ofthe container, with rocketing fragments. If the container stored a flammable liquid or gas, a large rising fireball will form, the size of which will vary

with the amount of hazardous material

present.

Vapor or Dust Cloud Fires and Explo

sions. Vapors evolved from a pool ofvolatile liquid or gases venting from apunctured or otherwise damaged container, if not ignited immediately, will

form a plume or cloud of gas or vaporthat moves in the downwind direction.If this cloud or plume contacts an igni

tion source, a wall of flame may flashback towards the source of the gas orvapor, sometimes with explosive force.

Similarly, fires may flash through air

borne clouds of combustible dusts.

Dusts may explode under some conditions (e.g., grain elevator explosions).

Liquid Pool Fires. A liquid pool fire is

a fire involving a quantity of liquid fuel

such as gasoline spilled on the surfaceof the land or water. An added compli

cation is that the liquid fuel, dependingon terrain, may flow downslope fromthe accident site and into sewers,

drains, surfa ce wate rs, and othercatchments.

Flammable Solid Fires. A “flammablesolid” may cause fires through friction

or retained heat from manufacturing or

processing. It can be ignited readilyand when ignited burns vigorously andpersistently. Included in this class are

spontaneously combustible(pyrophoric) and water-reactive mate

rials. Fires involving these materialspresent a difficult challenge to firefighters, particularly when water cannot be

used.

12/87

F-1



Reactivity Hazards. Some of the more commonand/or dangerous types of reactions, and howthey may alter the outcome of an accidental release, are outlined below:

l Reactions with Water or Moist Air.

Some substances generate heat whenmixed with water. Some strong acidsmay evolve large amounts of fumeswhen in contact with water or moisturein the air. These fumes, which mayconsist of a mixture of fine droplets ofacid in air and acid vapors, are usuallyhighly irritating, corrosive, and heavierthan air. Other materials may ignite,evolve flammable gases, or otherwisereact violently when in contact withwater. Knowledge of the reactivity ofany substance with water is especially

important when water is present in thespill area. Uninformed firefighters canworsen a situation by applying water tothe water-reactive chemicals.

l Reactions with Combustible Organic

Materials. Strong oxidizing or reducingagents have the common characteristic of being able to decompose organicmaterials and react with a variety of inorganic materials while generatingheat, flammable gases, and possiblytoxic gases. If the heat generated is

sufficient to ignite a combustible material or a flammable gas (when confined), either a fire or explosion may

occur.

l Polymerization Reactions. Many plastics are manufactured by means of apolymerization reaction in which molecules are linked together into longchains. Some of the chemicals capable of polymerizing have a strong tendency to do so even under normal ambient conditions and are especiallyprone to polymerize if heated above a

certain temperature or i f contaminated. Once polymerization starts, achain reaction may occur that develops high pressures and temperatureswithin containers and can lead to pos

sible rupture of the container and discharge of f lammable and/or toxicgases if safety and control systemsmalfunction or are lacking.

l Decomposition Reactions. Somechemical molecules are unstable and

can break apart in a runaway reactiononce the process is initiated. Variouscontaminants or heat may start a reaction. Containers may rupture or ventvarious flammable and/or toxic gases.

Decomposition and polymerization reactions are hazardous only if they become uncontrolled and start a chainreaction that cannot be stopped withavailable equipment, materials, orsafety systems.

l Corrosivity. The process by which a

chemical gradually eats away or dissolves another material is referred toas corrosion. It represents yet anothertype of chemical reactivity that mustbe considered in assessing the hazards of any given material. The word“corrosive” is also used descriptivelyto indicate that a substance may causechemical burns of the skin, eyes, orother bodily tissues.

l Other Reactivity Hazards. In additionto the types of reactions discussedabove, hazards can result from the following situations:

The combination of various chemi

cals may produce new chemicals

with hazards quite different and

possibly more severe than those

associated with the original mate

rials.

Some combinations may result in

spontaneous fires: spontaneous

explosions: formation of sub

stances which will ignite or ex

plode if shocked, heated or sub jected to fr iction: generation of

toxic gases, liquids, or solids; or

generation of flammable gases,

liquids, or solids.

12/87

F - 2



APPENDIX G

EQUATIONS USED FOR THE ESTIMATION OF VULNERABLE ZONES

G. 1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 3 presents a tabular method for estimation of the radius of the vulnerable zone (VZ) forreleases of gases, liquids, and solids. This appendix contains the equations used to derive the tablesfound in Chapter 3. Section G.2 discusses the derivation of the release rate term of the vulnerablezone calculation. For liquids, a liquid factor including many of the variables that affect rate of evapora

tion is used for the estimate: this factor is also described in Section G.2.

Section G.3 discusses the derivation of the relationship between downwind distance, as a function of

rate of release, and level of concern (LOC) as presented in Exhibits 3-1 to 3-4 in Chapter 3.

The calculations are based on applications of the dispersion model described in the Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, Public Health Service Publication No. 999-AP-26, 1970 (popularly

known as Turner’s Workbook). Estimates of dispersion distribution parameters are those of Briggs,

based on McElroy and Pooler’s experiments, given in the Handbook of Atmospheric Diffusion, Department of Energy Publication No. DOE/TIC-11223, 1982.

The following assumptions are made concerning the circumstances of the credible worst case release(these assumptions are designed to be conservative and represent adverse conditions for screening

purposes) :

Rural flat terrain with no obstacles (e.g., hills) that would interfere with the downwind movement of the plumes (obstacles would increase the dispersion capability of the plume);

Ground level release (releases from elevated sources tend to disperse more readily than

ground level releases);

F Stability and 1.5 meters per second (3.4 miles per hour) wind speed, representing stableair and low wind speed (the VZ calculated under these conditions is larger than that calcu

lated under conditions usually considered typical); and

Continuous release (consistent with a catastrophic loss) rather than a brief “puff.”

The following assumptions are made concerning the substance released:

There is no phase change and the plume is at ambient temperature (phase changes andtemperature changes would cause variations in dispersion and evaporation (volatilization)

rates).

The substance released is neutrally buoyant in air. Dense gases are treated the same way as

neutrally buoyant gases in this analysis. (The behavior of a dense gas is different, but for thecalculations presented in this appendix, the concentrations along the centerline of the plume

are considered. These concentrations are comparable for dense gases and neutrally buoy

ant gases); A Gaussian distribution of the plume’s spread, in both horizontal and vertical planes, wasassumed in the dispersion estimates:

Gases are released over a ten minute period:

Liquids are instantaneously spilled from containment onto a flat, level surface forming a

0.033 ft (1 cm) deep pool and are allowed to evaporate at ambient or boiling conditions:

Solids in powder form (<100 microns particle size) behave like gases and are also released inten minutes:

12/87 G-1



Solids in solution are assumed to behave as a finely dispersed aerosol and are released inten minutes:

Solids in molten form are assumed to behave as liquids. The quantity molten is assumed tolose containment instantaneously, forming a 0.033 ft (1 cm) deep pool on a flat, level surface

and volatilizing at its melting point temperature: and

Solids in “brick” form (i.e., not powdered, in solution, vaporized, or molten) are not likely tobe released.

G.2 ESTIMATION OF AIRBORNE QUANTITY RELEASED FOR LIQUIDS

The rate of release of a chemical is needed for calculation of the radius of the VZ. It is dependent onthe quantity of chemical released, the nature of the release scenario (i.e., pool of liquid, release of

pressure relief valve, etc.), and the properties of the chemical released. For spilled pools of chemicals, the rate of release is usually taken to be the evaporation rate (rate of volatilization). Using the

assumptions presented above, the following equation is used to calculate the rate of release to air forliquids (in Ibs/min) :

(1) QR = (60 sec/min x MW x K x A x VP x (929cm2/ft2, (Clement 1981)

R x (T1+273) x (760 mm Hg/atm) x 454 g/lb

where: QR = Rate of release to air (Ibs/min);

MW = Molecular weight (g/g mole);

K = Gas phase mass transfer coefficient (cm/sec);

A = Surface area of spilled material (ft2);

VP = Vapor pressure of material at temperature T1 (mm Hg);

R = 82.05 atm cm3/g mole K; and

T1 = Temperature at which the chemical is stored (0C).

The equation for the evaporation rate (rate of volatilization) can be rewritten as follows:

(2) QR= 0.162 x MW x K x A x VP

R (T1+273)

K can be estimated based on a known value for a reference compound as follows:

(3) K = Kref x (MWref /MW) 1/3 (Clement 1981)

Using water as the reference compound:

(4) K K water =0.25 x (u)0.78 (Mackay and Matsugo 1973)ref

where: u = Windspeed (m/sec)

12/87 G-2



Combining Equations 3 and 4:

(5) K = 0.25 (u)078

x (18/MW)1/3

Combining equations for QR and K yields the following equations:

0.162 x 0.25 x (u)0.78

x (18)1/3

x MW2/3

x Ax VP(6) QR =

R x (T1 + 273)

0.106 x (u) 0,78 x MW2/ 3x Ax VP(7) QR =

R x (T1 + 273)

Calculation of the surface area (A) of the spilled material is carried out as described in the following

sections.

G.2.1 CALCULATION OF SURFACE AREAS OF POOLS OF SPILLED LIQUIDS

For diked areas, the surface area is assumed to be the area inside the dike (unless the surface area ofthe spill is smaller than the diked area). If the area is not diked, the following assumptions are used to

calculate the surface area of the spill:

Density = 62.4 Ib/ft3 (i.e., all liquids are assumed to have the same density as water)

Depth of pool is 0.033 ft (I cm)

The surface area of the spilled liquid (ft2) is:

QS (Ibs)(8) A =

62.4 lb/f 3 x 0.033ft

= 0.49 x QS

where: QS = Quantity spilled (Ibs); and

A = Surface area (ft2).

Substituting for A in Equation 7, the quantity released to air per minute (QR) can be estimated asfollows:

0.106 x (u)0.78

x MW2/3

x 0.49 x QS x VP

(9) QR =

82.05 x (T1 + 273)

12/87

G-3



G. 2.2 LIQUID FACTORS

Equation (9) may be simplified by separating all the chemical specific parameters, such as vaporpressure and molecular weight, and the temperature into a “liquid factor.” The “liquid factor” therefore includes all the terms of Equation (9), except the quantity spilled (QS) and the wind speed term.For ambient temperatures, VP is the vapor pressure measured at T1 (ambient temperature). Theliquid factor at ambient conditions (LFA) is calculated as:

0.106 x MW2/ 3x 0.49 x VP(10) LFA =

82.05 x (T1 + 273)

For a liquid at its boiling temperature, VP is assumed to be 760 mm Hg at T1, the normal boiling pointof the liquid. The liquid factor at the boiling point (LFB) is calculated as:

0.106 x MW2 / 3x 0.49 x 760(11) LFB =

82.05 x (Boiling point + 273)

For a solid at its melting point, VP is the vapor pressure measured at T1 (melting point). The liquidfactor at the melting point (LFM) is calculated as:

0.106 x MW2/3x 0.49 x VP melting

(12) LFM =82.05 x (melting point + 273)

The liquid factor multiplied by the quantity spilled and the wind speed term (u0.78) gives the airborne

quantity release rate:

(13) QR = QS xu

0.78

x (LFA, LFB, or LFM)

For diked areas:

(LFA, LFB, or LFM) x Diked Area (ft2) x u0.78

(14) QR =0.49

Liquid factors for listed substances that are liquid at ambient conditions, or solid with potential forhandling at molten state, are listed in Appendix C.

G.3 ESTIMATION OF A VULNERABLE ZONE

The following equation, based on Turner’s Workbook, was used to derive the vulnerable zone radius.The concentration downwind of a release is given by:

(Turner 1970, Equation 3.4)

12/87 G-4



for a ground level release with no effective plume rise where:

C = Airborne concentration, gm/m3

QR = Rate of release to air, gm/sec

= 3.141

= dispersion deviation, horizontal (y), and vertical (z)

u = windspeed, m/sec

This equation represents the steady state concentration at some distance downwind and is applicable

for release ranging from 10 minutes to one hour.

QR (g/sec)

3.141 x u x c

0.318 x QR (g/sec)

u x c

QR (Ib/min) = QR (g/sec) x (60 sec/min x 1 lb/454 g)

QR (Ib/min) = 0.132 x (QR g/sec)

QR (g/sec) = (QR g/sec) / 0.132

0.318 x QR (Ibs/min)

0.312 x u x C

2.41 x QR (Ib/min)(17) u x c

As downwind distance increases, the product increases. For practical use to be made of the

diffusion formula, numerical values of the diffusion coefficients must be determined. Todeal with the resulting wide variations in turbulent properties, meteorologists have introduced stabilityclasses into which atmospheric conditions are classified. Briggs (1973) used McElroy and Pooler’s

G-1. To use these equations to determine distances, it will be necessary to use trial and error methods or a computer. For the development of this guidance, both rural (open country) and urban conditions for F atmospheric stability (the most stable class used for this guidance) and D atmosphericstability (neutral class assumed for overcast conditions during day or night, regardless of wind speed)

were used.

12/87 G-5



EXHIBIT G -1

FORMULAS RECOMMENDED BY BRIGGS (1973)

Pasquill

Stability

Type

Open-Country Conditions

0.22d(1+0.0001d)-1/20.20d

0.16d(1+0.0001d)-1/2 0.12d

0.11d(1+0.0001d)-1/2 0.08d(1+0.0002d)-1/2

0.08d(1+0.0001d)-1/2 0.06d(1+0.0015d)-1/2

0.06d(1+0.0001d)-1/2 0.03d(1+0.0003d)-1

0.04d(1+0.0001d)-1/2 0.016d(1+0.0003d)-1

Urban Conditions

A-B 0.32d(1+0.0004d)-1/2 0.24d(l+0.001d)1/2

C 0.22d(l+0.0004d)-1/2 0.20d

D 0.16d(l+0.0004d)-1/2 0.14d(1+0.0003d)-1/2

E-F 0.11d(1+0.0004d)-1/2 0.08d(l+0.00015d)-1/2

NOTE : d = dow nw ind d i s t ance.

12/87 G-6



G.4 REFERENCES

Briggs, G.A. 1973. Diffusion Estimation for Small Emissions. ATDL Contribution File No. 79. Atmospheric Turbulence and Diffusion Laboratory.

Clement Associates Inc. 1981. Mathematical Models for Estimating Workplace Concentration Levels:

A Literature Review, EPA Contract 88-01-6065. Prepared for ETD/EPA.

Hanna, F.R., Briggs, G.A. and Hosker, R.P. 1982. Handbook of Atmospheric Diffusion, Department ofEnergy Publication No. DOE/TIC-11223.

Mackay, Douglas and Matsugo, Ronald S., “Evaporation Rates of Liquid Hydrocarbon Spills on Landand Water.” The Canadian Journal of Chemical Engineering, Vol. 51, August, 1973.

McElroy, J.L. and Pooler, F. 1968. St. Louis Dispersion Study Report AP-53. U.S. Public Health

Service, National Air Pollution Control Administration.

Turner, B. 1970. Workbook of Atmospher ic Dispersion Estimates. Public Health Service Publication

No. 999-AP-26.

12/87 G-7



provide definitive guidance on estimating evacuation zone.Decision about whether or not to evacuate

APPENDIX H

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EVACUATION

OR IN-PLACE SHELTERING

An accidental release of hazardous materialssometimes necessitates evacuation of peoplefrom certain areas to prevent injury or death.These areas can include those directly affectedby toxic fumes and gases or fire and those areasthat may be potentially affected during the

course of the incident (e.g., through wind shift,a change in site conditions). Evacuation is acomplex undertaking. Rather than attempting toprovide specific step-by-step guidance for eachpossible scenario, we will discuss in this appendix general considerations that should be ad

dressed in advance by the local emergencyplanning committee (LEPC). Specifically, this

appendix will discuss: deciding whether evacuation is appropriate and necessary (Section

H.1); steps in conducting an evacuation (Section H.2); and in-place sheltering as an alterna

tive to evacuation (Section H.3).

H.1 MAKING A DECISION ON EVACUATION

The first evacuation consideration, determiningwhether an evacuation is necessary, involves a

comprehensive effort to identify and considerboth the nature of and circumstances surrounding the released hazardous material and its ef

fect on people. No safe exposure levels have

been established for the extremely hazardoussubstances (EHSs) and therefore it is not possible to calculate evacuation distances using the

methods outlined in this guidance. Section H. 1.1discusses how hazardous conditions and inher

ent properties of the released materials affectevacuation decisions. Section H. 1.2 discusseshow life safety factors affect the decision onwhether or not to order an evacuation.

The Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s)Emergency Response Guidebook provides initialisolation and evacuation distances for transportation incidents. The evacuation distances given

in the guidebook are preceded by the followingadvice: “The [initial isolation/evacuation] tableis useful only for the first twenty to thirty minutes

of an incident.. . . There are several good rea

sons for suggesting that the use of the table be

limited specifically to the initial phase of a no-fire spill incident during transport. The best calculations for these tables are not reliable for

long vapor travel times or distances. At their

best they are estimates for a cool, overcastnight with gentle and shifting winds moving a

non-reactive, neutrally-buoyant vapor.” TheDOT Emergency Response Guidebook is intended to help first responders to make informed judgments during the initial phases of a

hazardous materials transportation incident.

LEPCs are cautioned not to use it as a substitutefor a specific plan for responses to hazardous

materials incidents.

H. 1.1 Hazardous Conditions Affecting

Evacuation Decisions

Numerous factors affect the spread of hazardous substances into the area surrounding a leaking/burning container or containment vessel.Evacuation decision-makers must carefully con

sider each of these factors in order to determinethe conditions created by the release, the areas

that have been or will be affected, and thehealth effects on people. The factors that affectevacuation include amount of released mate

rial(s), physical and chemical properties of thereleased material(s), health hazards, dispersionpattern, atmospheric conditions, dispersion medium, rate of release, and potential duration ofrelease. Each of these factors is explained be

low.



To begin with, it is necessary to know the material’s physical and chemical properties, including :

Physical State - solid, liquid, or gas:

Odor, color, visibility;

Flammability: flashpoint, ignition tempera

ture, flammable limits;

Specific Gravity: whether material sinks or

floats on water:

Vapor Density: whether vapors rise or re

main near ground level;

Solubility: whether material readily mixes

with water;

Reactivity: whether material reacts with air,

water, or other materials:

Crucial Temperatures: boiling point, freezing point.

It is also necessary to know the health effects

resulting from a short-term exposure:

l Acute or chronic hazards:

l Respiratory hazards:

l Skin and eye hazards: and

Ingestion hazards.

Another consideration is the dispersion patternof the released hazardous material, for example:

l Does the release follow the contours of the

ground?

l Is it a plume (vapor cloud from a point

source) ?

l Does the release have a circular dispersionpattern (dispersing in all directions)?

Atmospheric conditions must also be addressed

when determining the appropriate evacuation response to a hazardous material release. Atmospheric conditions that may affect the movementof material and evacuation procedures include:

l Wind (speed and direction);

l Temperature:

l Moisture (precipitation, humidity);

l Air dispersion conditions (inversion or normal); and

l Time of day (daylight or darkness).

Other considerations important in making evacu

ation decisions include:

Whether the hazardous material is beingreleased into air, land, and/or water and its

concentration in air or water:

Size and potential duration of the release:and

Rate of release of the material, as well asthe projected rate (the rate of release maychange during the incident).

H.1.2 LIFE SAFETY FACTORS TO CONSIDER

IN PLANNING AN EVACUATION

Life safety factors to consider when planning an

evacuation include the number and types ofpeople that require evacuation and the re

sources needed to conduct a safe and effectiveevacuation. Whether the people are actually located in an area that contains hazards or arelocated in an area that is only threatened by hazards is a critical component of evacuation planning .

Populations in a Hazardous Area

When considering people who are actually located within a hazardous area, the LEPC mustaddress whether responsible authorities shouldorder people to remain indoors, rescue individuals from the area, or order a general evacuation. The “remain indoors” option should beconsidered when the hazards are too great to

risk exposure of evacuees. (See Section H.3 forfurther discussion of in-place sheltering.) It maybe necessary to rescue people from the hazard

ous area, but this would involve supplying protective equipment for evacuees to ensure theirsafety. The third option is to order a general

evacuation. In this case people must evacuateby means of private transportation or by transportation provided by local or State government,

a private sector company, or volunteer groups.

Populations in a Threatened Area

For an area that is only threatened by a hazardous release, it should be determined whether

12/87

H - 2



potential evacuees can be evacuated beforehazards reach the area. To safely evacuate thearea, a significant amount of lead time may berequired. Depending on the hazards and theirmovement (as described above), evacuationassistance personnel may not have much leadtime.

Identifying People to be Evacuated

Numerous factors must be considered to ensurethat an evacuation is conducted in a safe andeffective manner, including how many peoplewill be involved, where they are located, theirdegree of mobility, and whether there are anycommunication barriers to address. Potentialevacuees may be found in many different locations:

Residences

Educational institutions

Medical institutions

Health care facilities

Child care facilties

Correctional facilities

Offices

Commercial establishments

Manufacturing/industrial/research facilities

Government facilities

Places of public assembly

Parks and other recreational areas

Sporting arenas/stadiums

Roadways

In addition to the above considerations, theLEPC must determine what persons will requirespecial assistance in evacuating the area and

whether there exist any barriers to communication between evacuees and evacuation assistance personnel. Special consideration shouldbe given to:

l Persons lacking private transportation

l The elderly

l Children

Handicapped persons

The infirm

Prisoners

Non-English speaking persons

Resources Needed

To accomplish a safe and effective evacuation,the LEPC must provide for appropriate and sufficient resources, including personnel, vehicles,and equipment appropriate for emergency situations.

Among the agencies that would likely supply personnel during an evacuation operation are theRed Cross, police department, fire department,and emergency medical service agencies.

In addition to personnel, specially equipped vehicles may have to be put in service, including:

Lift-equipped buses and taxi cabs forhandicapped persons:

Ambulances for infi rm and handicapped

persons: and

Vehicles for transporting persons lackingprivate transportation.

Making prior arrangements to ensure the availability of these vehicles in times of emergencywill result in a more timely and effective evacuation.

The type of equipment that will be necessaryduring an evacuation includes:

Protective gear for evacuation assistance

personnel (e.g., masks to protect thelungs, protective covering for the skin and

eyes);

Protective gear for evacuees who mayhave to be taken through an area of heavychemical concentration:

Communication equipment (e.g. portableand mobile radios, mobile public addresssystems, bull horns); and

Evacuation tags (a tag or marker attachedto a door to indicate that the occupantshave been notified) for buildings that have

been evacuated.

H.2 CONDUCTING AN EVACUATION

Should it be decided that an area is to be evacuated, the evacuation must be conducted in a

12 / 87 H - 3



well-coordinated, thorough, and safe manner.Evacuation involves a number of steps, whichinclude assigning tasks to evacuation assistancepersonnel, informing potential evacuees, providing transportation as necessary, providing emergency medical care as necessary, providing securi ty for evacuated areas, and sheltering

evacuees as necessary.

H.2.1 Evacuation Tasks

The first step is to assign tasks to evacuationassistance personnel. These tasks include information concerning:

The specific area to evacuate

Protective gear to be worn

Instructions to be given to evacuees

Transportation of evacuees who are without private transportation

Assistance to special populations

Shelter locations

Security for evacuated areas

Traffic and pedestrian control

Communication procedures

The progress of the evacuation efforts must bemonitored by those in charge who should also

provide continuous direction to evacuation assistance personnel.

H.2.2 Evacuation Warning and Instruction

The second step in an evacuation is to informpeople that they must evacuate and to providethem with accurate instructions. This procedurecan be accomplished in several ways:

l Door-to-Door . Requires significant man

power; is a slow process but is very thorough.

l Public Address System (from a mobile unitor within a building). Requires less manpower than a door-to-door evacuation andis quicker to accomplish but is not as thor

ough.

l Combination of Door-to-Door and Public Address System. For some sections of anarea door-to-door noti f icat ion may be

12 / 87

H - 4

more expeditious, whereas in other areasevacuation instructions given via a publicaddress system may be adequate and lesstime consuming.

The potential evacuees might also be alerted tothe emergency by means of an alerting and

warning system that prompts them to tune in totheir radios for instructions from the EmergencyBroadcast System or a similar broadcast system.

H.2.3 Movement of Evacuees

The third step in an evacuation is to providemovement assistance to evacuees. Movementassistance includes:

Arranging transportation for evacuees whoare without private transportation:

Arranging for movement of the infirm andhandicapped:

Traffic control:

Encouraging evacuees to move along in anexpeditious manner.

Buses and/or vans will be needed for transportation of large groups of evacuees. Evacuatingthe infirm and handicapped will involve lift-equipped buses, vans, and/or ambulances.Traffic control involves restricting access of vehicles into the evacuated area and facilitatingspeedy vehicular movement out of the evacu

ation area.

H.2.4 Emergency Medical Care for Evacuees

Should evacuees become exposed to hazardsduring an evacuation, emergency medical caremust be provided. If a hazardous vapor cloudwere to move suddenly upon a large group ofpeople being evacuated, numerous casualtieswould be possible. For this reason, it is advantageous to have emergency medical service(basic and advanced life support) units standingby in case they are needed.

H.2.5 Security in Evacuated Areas

Once an area is evacuated, law enforcementpersonnel must guard the area to prevent looting and other unauthorized actions. Security

forces operating in or around an evacuated areamust be dressed in appropriate chemical pro

tective gear.



H.2.6 Sheltering of Evacuees

The final step in the evacuation process is toprovide shelter to the evacuees. Merely advising people to evacuate an area is inadequate.Providing shelter for them in a safe and comfortable building is of great importance, particularly

at night or during inclement weather. In order toeffectively serve the needs of evacuees, a shelter should have the following facilities, services,and characteristics:

One qualified person to serve as ShelterManager -- usually a Red Cross or localgovernment representative

Sufficient space to avoid overcrowding

Restroom facilities

Shower facilities

Specialized facilities for the handicapped

Chairs, tables, and other furniture

Adequate lighting, temperature control,

ventilation, and uncontaminated water

Telephone system and/or two-way radio

Food and refreshments

Adeq ua te sa fe ty fe atur es to meet fi re ,building, and health requirements

Medical surveillance and care

Care for the young, elderly, and handi

capped

Information available for evacuees concerning the emergency

Sufficient parking near the shelter

Shelters should be identified and managementand operational procedures should be established as part of a preparedness plan. Whenselecting shelters, locations must be chosen

that are in areas beyond current and projectedareas of hazard contamination. To ensure thatevacuees are continuously sheltered in safe areas, the following actions are necessary:

l Collect and evaluate data on the spread ofhazards toward shelters.

l Establish and maintain communicationswith shelters.

l Make provisions for the monitoring of haz

ards in and around each shelter and evaluate the resulting data.

l Advise shelter managers when shelters willhave to be evacuated because of approaching hazards.

Should shelters have to be evacuated, alternatelocations must be identified and shelter coordinators notified.

To ensure the health and safety of evacuees atshelters, provisions should be made for evacueemedical surveillance and care. This is especiallyimportant for evacuees who may have been exposed to hazardous materials vapors. Ideally,each shelter should have medical professionalsassigned to care for evacuees. They must be

alert to symptoms caused by hazardous materials and be responsible for treating victims or

calling for emergency medical assistance.Evacuees showing symptoms should be separated from those unaffected. The medical pro

fessional can also assist evacuees who needprescription medicines.

H.2.7 Re-entry into Evacuated Areas

Before making the decision to authorize re

entry, data collected by the monitoring crewsmust be verified and the advice of health offi

cials considered.

Once the decision to authorize re-entry hasbeen made, re-entry operations must be coordinated. These operations may be looked uponas an evacuation in reverse, as many of the

same steps must be undertaken. Re-entry operations involve:

Notifying people that they can return toevacuated areas.

Providing evacuees with special information or instructions.

Coordinating transportation for evacueeswho require it.

Providing traffic control and security in areas being re-entered.

Advising people to report lingering vaporsor other hazards to emergency services.

Advising people to seek medical treatmentfor unusual symptoms that may be attribut

able to the hazardous materials release.

12/87

H - 5



H.3 IN-PLACE SHELTERING

Evacuation decisions are of necessity very incident-specific and the use of judgment will be

necessary. If the release occurs over an extended period of time, or if there is a fire thatcannot be controlled within a short time, then

evacuation may be the sensible option. Evacuation during incidents involving the airborne re

lease of EHSs is sometimes, but by no meansalways, necessary. Airborne toxicants can bereleased and move downwind so rapidly thatthere would be no time to evacuate residents.For short-term releases, often the most prudentcourse of action for the protection of the nearby

residents would be to remain inside with thedoors and windows closed and the heating andair conditioning systems shut off. An airbornecloud will frequently move past quickly. Vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and sick,

may sustain more injury during evacuation, thanthey would by staying inside and putting simplecountermeasures into effect.

There are other disadvantages associated withevacuation during incidents involving airbornereleases of EHSs. Changes in wind velocity anddirection are difficult to predict and could bevery important if evacuation were undertakenduring a release. Differences in temperature

between air layers could also cause the toxiccloud to disperse in ways that would be hard topredict. These factors and others make it diffi

cult to estimate how long the community wouldbe exposed to a toxic cloud. Also, no safe exposure or concentration levels have been established for the general population with regard toreleases of chemicals included on the list ofEHSs.

In-place sheltering, therefore, may be a sensible course of action, when the risks associatedwith an evacuation are outweighed by the benefits of in-place sheltering. In order for this protection measure to be effective, the affectedpopulation must be advised to follow the guide

lines listed below:

Close all doors to the outside and closeand lock all windows. (Windows seal better when locked). Seal gaps under doorways and windows with wet towels andthose around doorways and windows withduct tape or similar thick tape.

Building superintendents should set all ventilation systems to 100 percent recirculation so that no outside air is drawn into thestructure. Where this is not possible, ventilation systems should be turned off.

Turn off all heating systems and air conditioners.

Seal any gaps around window type air-conditioners, bathroom exhaust fan grilles,range vents, dryer vents, etc. with tapeand plastic sheeting, wax paper, or alumi

num wrap.Turn off and cover all exhaust fans in kitchens, bathrooms, and other spaces.

Close all fireplace dampers.

Close as many internal doors as possible inhomes or other buildings.

If an outdoor explosion is possible, closedrapes, curtains, and shades over win

dows. Stay away from windows to preventpotential injury from flying glass.

If you suspect that the gas or vapor hasentered the structure you are in, hold a wetcloth over your nose and mouth.

Tune in to the Emergency Broadcast System channel on the radio or television forinformation concerning the hazardous materials incident and in-place sheltering.

It should be understood that following the aboveguidelines will increase the effectiveness of in-place sheltering as a protective action. Following these guidelines does not ensure that this

type of protective action will indeed be effective.

12/87 H - 6



APPENDIX I

INFORMATION COLLECTION TO EVALUATE SITES

FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING

1.1 OVERVIEW

This appendix presents a process for collectinginformation that will be needed to assess thehazards posed by particular sites and to developcommunity emergency plans. The National Response Team’s Hazardous Materials EmergencyPlanning Guide (NRT-1) should be consultedwhen preparing such plans. The process focuses on an examination of the sites that use,produce, process, or store extremely hazardoussubstances (EHSs). The types of information tobe collected include descriptions of the chemi

cals present, ongoing measures for the controlof potential releases, and the available responseresources and capabilities at the site and withinthe community, including existing emergencyplans. Initial requests for information should bemade in a way that promotes continued cooperation between the personnel at the sites andthe community planners. The informationshould be sought in a way that encourages facilities to participate actively in the planning process along with local government and other community groups. Title Ill of the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986

(SARA) requires facilities to assist local planning committees by supplying information anddesignating an emergency planning coordinator(see Chapter 1). The Chemical Manufacturers

Association (CMA) has published A Manager’sGuide to Title Ill that suggests ways for participants in the Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER) program to cooperatewith local planning committees.

Many sites will already have safety and contingency plans in response to regulatory require

ments or as part of normal operating procedures. The community should learn what the facility is doing to identify and deal with the possi

ble release of acutely toxic chemicals. The plantsite may have identified community impacts resulting from accidental chemical releases andhave taken measures to reduce risks. The planners can then identify what additional steps andresources, such as personnel, training , and

12/87 I -1

equipment, might be needed at the facility or in

the community.

The information collection process is outlined

here as a series of discussion points, which arepresented as examples of the types of information that a community may want to use to assesspotential hazards. A community planning committee may use some, all, or none of these discussion points. Depending on the community’sinitial perception of potential risks, the discussion points can be tailored by the committee tomeet specific local needs. Some of thesepoints will be rather simple and direct, such as

those used to determine what EHSs are locatedat a site, and their quantity. Other points shouldgenerate additional discussion, for example,whether any EHSs are handled or stored nearother chemicals that are flammable, explosive,or reactive. If such a situation does exist, subsequent discussions should be designed to: (1)identify these chemicals, (2) determine how thefacility isolates the chemical of concern (e.g.,the chemical of concern is stored in fire-proofcontainers, or the adjacent flammable, explosive, or reactive chemical is stored under conditions to prevent leakage or explosion), and (3)

what additional precautions are taken to ensurethat a release will not affect the surroundingcommunity.

Planners should always be aware that:

The specific identity of an EHS may sometimes be withheld as a trade secret. In theabsence of specific chemical identity, how

ever, important information such as thephysical state and the levels of concern(LOCs), as defined in this document,should be provided.

The information-gathering effort should notbe adversarial but rather an attempt by allconcerned to cooperate in describing andsolving a potential problem facing the entire community:

Facilities may be sensitive concerning whatthey consider proprietary business information:



Asking a particular question does not imply

that there is a definite problem, but rathershows a desire to identify and address potential problems: and

Title Ill of SARA requires facilities to provideinformation to planners that will enablehazards analysis.

1.2 ORGANIZATION

The suggested discussion points for gatheringand analyzing information for a hazard assess

ment are presented in four sections:

Site activities and management programs:

l Site location information;

Site measures for managing and control

ling chemical releases; and

Site interface with community responseand preparedness programs.

Information obtained from these discussion

points and the information sources discussed inChapter 2 will assist the planners in assessingsite-specific hazards and should be considered

along with the factors used for assessing chemical releases outlined in Chapter 2 and detailed in Appendix H. Even if the sites have safety andcontingency plans in place, the community plan

ners should not neglect the procedures suggested in Chapters 2 and 3, as they will enablethe community to assess hazards posed by different sites and to develop contingency plans inorder of priority.

The discussion points outlined here are far rang

ing. Not all of them will be necessary to elicitinformation required for site-specific assess

ment. However, most will need to be discussedfor the final phase of this program, the formula

tion of emergency plans. For this reason theyare included here. Planners may select those

points that best suit their needs for each phase

of the process.

The first section outlines the points of information that the community planners will want to obtain about the type and quantity of chemicals

used, produced, processed, or stored and toevaluate the appropriateness and timeliness of

any planning that may already have been done

at the site. If little emergency preparednesswork has been done, the planners need to knowthe site’s chemical handling and processing activities, related management programs, and capabil i ty for responding to chemical releaseemergencies.

Next, the planners will want to find out about

those physical, topographic, meteorological,and demographic factors that, although externalto the facility itself, have an important bearing onhow to prepare for an emergency involving a release from the facility. The facility may alreadyhave assembled this kind of information as partof its internal planning process.

Most companies, for reasons of plant and employee safety, community concern, regulatoryrequirements, or as a matter of corporate pol

icy, have analyzed the potential on-site and off-site impact of a chemical release. Plans for pro

moting on-site safety, emergency plans, andliquid spill and hazardous waste release preven

tion plans may already have been developed asa result of standard industrial practice or regula

tory requirements. If such plans are available,they can be a valuable starting point for the

larger task facing the planners, that is, developing an up-to-date comprehensive community

emergency plan, in addition to the initial task ofranking the site-specific hazards.

The final step for the community planners is thatof developing, or updating, the communityemergency plan. NRT-1 should be consulted forthis step. Based on emergency planning efforts

that may already have been undertaken at thesite, as well as on the planners’ assessment ofthe site’s activities and management programs,

the planners can assess the adequacy of thesite’s emergency plans and those of the community. A solid foundation will now exist uponwhich future cooperative planning and updating

can occur.

1.3 SITE ACTIVITIES AND MANAGEMENT

PROGRAMS

This section contains example discussion pointsthat will assist planners in collecting basic infor

mation about the site’s processes and relatedmanagement programs. With this information

and using the procedures outlined in Chapter 2and 3, the planners can assess a site’s potential



hazards as well as evaluate its emergency response resources and capabilities. This information will also be useful in developing a com

munity emergency plan. The planners first needinformation about the hazardous materials thatexist at the site and then about how these mate

rials are handled and managed.

1 .

Chemicals of Concern That Could Be Released:

Chemicals used, produced, processed,

or stored that meet the criteria (see Ap

pendix B) or are on EPA’s EHS list (see

Appendix C), whether or not they ex

ceed the threshold planning quantities

(TPQs). (The specific chemical identity

of an EHS may sometimes be withheld

as a trade secret. In the absence of the

specific identity, however, important in

formation such as the physical state and

the LOC, as defined in this document,

should be obtained.)

Chemicals that could result from reac

tion, combustion, or decomposition of

chemicals at the site.

High temperature, high pressure proc

essing and storage of chemicals.

2 .

Shipping and Transfer of EHSs:

l Frequency of shipments (daily, weekly,

irregular schedule).

l Quantity of shipments (tons, gallons,

number of drums, tanks, and vats).

l Form of shipment (e.g., tank truck, rail

car, drums, boxes, carboys, pipelines,

barges).

l Transportation routes through the com

munity (roads, railroads, pipelines).

l Unloading systems:

o pumping versus gravity feed sys

tems, and

o underground versus aboveground

pipelines.

l Unloading procedures:

o monitoring by plant personnel, and

o remote monitoring by tank level

gauges, alarms, automatic cut-off

valves, and similar means.

3.

Storage Conditions:

Quantities normally stored in above-

ground tanks and underground tanks.

Drum storage areas (indoors and out

doors).

Storage of gas cylinders.

Use and operation of secondary spill-

containment systems.

Techniques used for the separation of

incompatible chemicals.

Special systems used for the storage of

reactive, flammable, and exp losi ve

chemicals.

4. Handling Procedures for EHSs:

Special safety systems used in connec

tion with high temperature or high pres

sure operations.

Secondary equipment containment sys

tems for reactor and other processes.

Pumping versus gravity-feed systems.

Materials handling by automatic systems

versus manual systems.

Use of alarm systems for tank levelgauging, temperature and pressure

sensing.

Redundancy for critical process (i.e.,

availability of back-up equipment in

case of failure, or automatic system

shut-down after a system failure).

Frequency of inspection and testing of

critical process equipment, alarm sys

tems and similar equipment.

5. Site Management Characteristics:

l Hours of operation and production rates

during different shifts (planning needs

may d i f fe r be tween day and n igh t

shifts),

l Degree of around-the-clock coverage

by trained, responsible, and fully author

ized technical and management staff.

12/87

I -3



Plant security (e.g., fencing, guards on

duty, remote sensing by TV monitors,

alarm connections to local police and

fire departments).

Plant wastewater and stormwater drain

age: direct discharges to local surface

water versus discharge to on-site or off-

site treatment plants.

Site emissions to the air covered by Fed

eral and State environmental regula

tions.

Hazardous and non-hazardous solid

wastes generated, treated, stored, or

disposed on-si te. Wastes transported

off-site.

6.

Site Process Design and General Operations:

Listing and description of relevant site

processes for synthesis, manufacture,

formulation, repackaging, distribution,

and handling of EHSs.

Design and construction specifications

covering such aspects as handling tem

perature and pressure, and materials’

compatibility.

Process design to consider safety devices, alarms, and back-up systems to

ensure the integrity of the process and

to protect the facility during normal and

unusual conditions of operation.

Programs for managing changes in the

design or operation of process equip

ment and changes in chemical compo

nent amounts, concentrations, or types.

Preventive maintenance programs for

facilities and equipment critical to safe

process operation.

Maintenance training and implementa

tion that addresses the potential for pre

venting or controlling the release of

EHSG.

Description of “best engineering prac

t ice” and “state-of-the-art” process

design, construction, operation, and

12/87

I - 4

maintenance for similar facilities within

the industry.

1.4 SITE LOCATION INFORMATION

These example discussion points allow the com

munity planners to describe the vulnerable zonein greater detail and to assess the adequacy ofboth site and community preparedness programs.

1. Significant Physical, Topographic, and Me

teorological Features:

Distance to site fenceline or boundaries

from Chemical storage and process ar

eas.

Transportation access/egress including

surface, air, and water routes.

Terrain characteristics of importance

such as mountains, hills, canyons, val

leys, and plains.

Meteorological features, including pro

files of wind speed and direction, pre

cipitation, and temperature.

Distance to nearest surface-water body,

including drainage ditches and other

conduits, and flood plains.

2. Site Demographic Characteristics:

Distance to nearby populations such as

communities, subdivisions, commercial

or industrial sites, and transportation

corridors.

Distance to public facilities such as

schools, hospitals, parks, playgrounds

and stadiums.

Numbers of people within vulnerable

zone distances and a characterization of

how those numbers can fluctuate hourly,

daily, and seasonally.

Value of property and commercial goods

located within potential vulnerable zone.

1.5 SITE MEASURES FOR MANAGING AND

CONTROLLING CHEMICAL RELEASES

This section contains example discussion pointsto help the community understand those actions



already taken by a facility to identify hazardoussituations and to describe the potential effectson people, property, and the environment. Theplanners should identify the control measuressite management has put in place to control releases of EHSs, their by-products and decom

position products, or other chemicals that meetthe criteria. Facilities are defined under Section302 of Title Ill of SARA (see glossary).

1 . Site, Community, and Environmental Im

pacts of Potential Emergencies:

Site analyses or models to predict loca

tion, intensity, and duration of hazards

related to chemical releases.

Community, State, or Federal activities

or studies that the site has integrated

with their own release modeling efforts.

Past experiences or incidents at the site.

Past experiences with similar chemicals

and processes.

Past facility and transportation incidents

in the community involving hazardous

materials. Relationship of past response

efforts to possible future needs. Note

that transporters are not required to

keep historical records.

Activities or studies by trade groups,professional societies, or academia that

could be of value.

2. Control and Response Plans in Operation,under Development, or on File:

l Spill Prevention Control and Counter

measures (SPCC) Plan covering the re

lease of hazardous substances as de

fined under authority of the Clean Water

Act.

l General site safety plan covering routineand non-routine operations, mainte

nance, emergencies, training, and in

spections.

l Site emergency response and prepared

ness plans.

l Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act of 1976 (RCRA) Part B Emergency

Response Plan covering site and com

munity response procedures and contin

gencies for release to the environment

of hazardous wastes as required by the

regulations under RCRA in 1976 and as

amended in 1980 and 1984.

l Site and corporate policies for develop

ing, implementing, and updating all such

plans.

3. Equipment Available On-Site for Emer

gency Response:

Basis for having such equipment on-

site.

Description of “good practice” and

“state-of-the-art” equipment for similar

facilities within and chemicals handled

by the industry.

Fire-fighting systems (fire hydrants,

sprinklers, extinguishers, chemical fire

retardants, protective clothing).

Fogging or misting systems for vapor re

lease control.

Neutralization materials for acids or

caustics.

Dedicated dump tanks, absorbers,

scrubbers, or flares for liquid/vapor re

lease control.

Absorban ts , foams , and sp ec ial ized

Chemical agents for containing and con

trolling releases.

Emergency power systems in case of

power outage.

Containment booms for surface-water

spills.

4. Leak and Spill Detection Systems:

l Basis for installation of these systems.

l Description of “good practice” and

“state-of-the-art” systems for similarchemicals handled by the industry.

l Gas detection monitors or explosimeters

for determining sources and severity of

leaks.

l Oil spill detection devices for nearby

sewers or drains to surface-water bod

ies.

12/87

I - 5



Wind direction indicators for determining

the direction of released chemical aero

sols or vapors.

Chemical spill detection systems for cor

rosives, organics, and other volatilizable

liquid spills.

Degree to which such systems are re

motely monitored and can initiate an

automatic response.

Activation sensors for rupture disks and

relief valves.

Sensors to detect overfilling of tanks and

initiate automatic response.

Site Emergency Response Procedures:

Chain of command for leak or spill notification within the plant (24-hour notifica

tion system).

Employee evacuation plan.

Response procedures for operations and

staff personnel.

6. Community Notification Procedures:

Criteria for notifying the community of a

release.

Procedures for notification, such assounding alarms and contacting commu

nity officials, local police and fire depart

ments, nearby populations, and the me

dia.

Ongoing education of citizens and work

ers to inform them of the exact meaning

of notification alarms.

7. Outside Emergency Response Resources:

Contracts with local cleanup contractors.

Ar rangemen ts wi th local ho sp ita ls or

other medical facilities.

Mutual aid agreement with other local in

dustries.

8. Training and Preparedness:

Frequency of employee training in emer

gency response procedures.

Extent of emergency response training

(training sessions, emergency drills, in

volvement of local police and fire depart

ments in emergency training and drills,

which employees receive training).

Frequency of updating of contingency

p lans ( regu la r bas is o r on ly a f te r

changes in plant operating procedures).

Inspection of emergency equipment

(frequency and extent).

Description of “good practice” and

“state-of-the-art” practices for similar

facilities within the industry.

I.6 SITE INTERACTIONS WITH COMMUNITYRESPONSE AND PREPAREDNESS

PROGRAMS

These discussion points help the community

evaluate its emergency response resources andcapabilities and those of the facilities. They are

designed to identify planning activities, resources used, and response capabilities established within the community. Information will berequired from a Variety of local emergency response agencies and government agencies.These discussion points may need to be ad

dressed only once for the entire community.This information will be used directly to developthe community emergency plan and will assistthe planners in evaluating what emergency response resources may be needed in addition tothose already in place or planned by the facility

or community.

1. Planning Documents and Activities:

Existing community hazardous chemicalemergency plans.

Current status of community emergencyplan or planning process for EHSs or otherhazardous chemical emergencies.

Status of technical reference library orother information systems for responseprocedures for chemicals.

Structure and authority of existing community planning and coordination body (e.g.,

12/87 I - 6



task force, advisory board, interagencycommittee) to plan for and deal with emergencies.

Status of previous surveys or assessmentsof potential risks to the community from facility or transportation accidents involvinghazardous chemicals.

Status of any existing assessments of prevention and response capabilities within the

community’s own local emergency response network.

Frequency of training seminars, exercises,

or mock accidents performed by the community in conjunction with local industry orother organizations.

Integrat ion of any exist ing hazardouschemical plans into any existing communitycontingency plans for other emergencies.

2. Planning Review and Update:

Community personnel and programs forperiodic analysis, review, and update ofthe community contingency plan.

Corporate and on-site facility officials designated to maintain and update the sitecontingency plan and to interact with the

local emergency planning group.

Corporate and facility policies in this regard.

3 Training and Preparedness:

Capacity and level of expertise of the community’s emergency medical facilities,equipment, and personnel.

Arrangements for assistance from or mu

tual aid agreements with other jurisdictions

or organizations (e.g., other communities,counties, or States; industry; military installations; Federal facilities; response or

ganizations ).

Availability of any specific chemical or toxicological expertise in the community -

either in industry, colleges and universities, or on a consultant basis.

Availability of equipment and materials onthe local level to respond to emergencies. Accessibili ty of equipment, materials, andmanpower in emergency situations.

Completeness of a list of important resources and their availability for speedy response activities: wreck clearing, transfer,transport, cleanup, disposal, analyticalsampling laboratories, and detoxifyingagents.

Training and equipment available to the lo

cal emergency services (f i re, police,medical).

Proximity of specialized industry response

teams (e.g.) CHLOREP, AAR/BOE), State/Federal response teams, or contractor response teams available to the community.

Average time for them to arrive on thescene.

Definition of community emergency transportation network.

Designation of specific evacuation routes;public awareness of evacuation routes.

Designation of specific access routes designated for emergency response and services personnel to reach facilities or accident sites.

Other procedures for protecting citizensduring emergencies (e.g., remain indoors,wear gas masks).

4. Community, State, and Federal Agencies andOther Organizations that Can Contribute to orShould Have a Role in the Contingency Planning

Process :

Fire Department.

Police/Sheriff/Highway Patrol.

Emergency Medical/Paramedic Servicesassociated with local hospitals or fire or police departments.

Emergency Management Agency/Civil De

fense.

Public Health Agency.

Environmental Agency..

12/87 I - 7



Red Cross.

Other local community resources such astransportation department, public housing,communications.

5. Communications:

A list of specific community points of contact and a description of what their dutiesand responsibilities are in an emergency.

Agencies involved, areas of responsibil ity

(e.g., emergency response, evacuation,emergency shelter, medical/health care,food distribution, control of access to accident site, public/media liaison, liaison withFederal and State responders, locating and

manning the command center), the name

of the contact, position, 24-hour telephonenumber, and the chain of command.

Status of the emergency communicationsnetwork in the community to alert the public, keep the public informed with up-todate information, and provide communica

tions between the command center, theaccident site, and off-scene support.

Components available for the communications network (e.g., special radio frequency, network channel, siren, dedicatedphone lines, computer hook-up).

Status of community source list with thename, position, and phone number of acontact person for technical informationassistance. This can be Federal, State, industry associations, and local professional

groups.

I - 8



APPEND iX J

METHODS FOR EVALUATING HAZARDS USED BY FACILITIES

J.1 INTRODUCTION

Many facilities will have undertaken detailed

analyses of their plant operations. This appendixdescribes three procedures which they mayhave used to evaluate hazards in everyday operating procedures. They are Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Event Tree Analysis, andFault Tree Analysis. Some community plannersmay wish to use these methods or at least befamiliar with them. It may be possible for planners to use such studies if they are available forthe facilities of concern. The prodcures discussed below, as well as others, are describedin detail in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Pro

cedures prepared by Battelle Columbus Division

for the Center for Chemical Plant Safety of the American Inst i tute of Chemical Engineers(AIChE). These methods for risk analysis arehighly complex and the methodologies employed are under continual development by ex

perts in the field. It is therefore suggested thatplanners intending to use these methodologiesseek appropriate technical support.

J.2 HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY

A HAZOP is a technique commonly used bychemical process facilities to identify hazardsand difficulties that prevent efficient operation.There are two versions of the technique, onewhich deals with “deviations” and the other with"disturbances.” “Deviations” are caused by

malfunction or maloperation of a specific production system. ‘Disturbances” include prob

lems caused by influences outside the specifiedsystem, including other activities and the environment.

The first version of HAZOP to be developed and

the most widely known was aimed at deviationsand is called a “Guide Word” HAZOP. Each element of the process is evaluated separately.The purpose of the element is specified andnotational deviations are generated by associating this purpose of the element with distinctivewords or phrases called “guide words.” Theseguide words are “no” or “not," “more,” “less,”

“as well as," " part of,” "reverse,” and “otherthan” which, broadly speaking, cover all possible types of deviation.

For each notational deviation, a determinationmust be made whether this is a possible situation (e.g., no flow or reverse flow in a transferline that should have forward flow). If this ispossible, the conditions in which that situationmight occur and the possible hazardous consequences must be identified. The guide wordsare applied to all materials and all operating parameters (e.g., flow, temperature, pressure).The guide words are applied not only to the

equipment, but also to the operating procedures. All phases of operation (e.g., startup,normal operation, shutdown, backwash) mustalso be included. As would be expected, thisapproach can be time-consuming and the timetaken can vary from several days for a smallproduction unit, to several months for a complexfacility.

The second version of HAZOP studies is called a“creative checklist” HAZOP. This version has

been developed as a complement to the guideword HAZOP to cover “disturbances." It is ofparticular value in two situations. These are to

enable a HAZOP study to be carried out veryearly in the design process, even before the detailed design necessary for a “guide word”HAZOP is available; and to cover hazards whichmay be caused by interactions between unitswhich could be perfectly safe if built in isolation,but may be capable of adverse interactions.This second method uses a checklist of knownmajor hazards and nuisances. The checklist

would contain words such as “fire,” “explosion," “toxicity,” “corrosion,” ”dust,” and“smell.” The checklist is initially applied toevery material likely to be present; raw materi

als, intermediates, f inished products, by-products and effluents. This establishes qualitatively whether hazards and nuisances exist andalso provides a quantitative data base of the numerical intensities of different hazards. Thus

“fire” would result in not only a note that a material is flammable but numerical measurementssuch as a “flash point” and “flammable limits.”



An y missing da ta are pi np ointe d an d tim el y 3. Track what the actors will do under the cur-

steps taken to collect such data. rent conditions: and

The Second method continues with the association of the same checklist with each item of

equipment. The materials present in such

equipment, together with the inventories, are

known as the “materials hazards.” As theanalysis proceeds, the potential for all majorhazards including interactions between units orthe unit and its environment are identified. The

flow of hazards can be in both directions. Forexample, the environment may pose hazards to

the unit (e.g., flooding and earthquakes), which

would have to be considered in the siting, de

sign, and layout of the unit. Although less wellknown than the guide word HAZOP, the creativechecklist HAZOP has been found to be a quick

and valuable complementary approach.

While local emergency planners will not possessthe resources or need to perform a HAZOP on

all facilities in the community, the concept ofanalyzing deviations from normal performance

could be the best way to analyze the most hazardous elements found in the community. Forexample, if a shipping error caused a volume ofa hazardous chemical to be delivered to a local

facility that exceeded the capacity of the chemi

cal material loading area, where would the excess material be placed? If part of a train storedon the local rail siding caught fire, is there suffi

cient space available to segregate the chlorinetank cars that are often kept there?

J.3 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS

Event tree analysis is a systematic approach that

focuses primarily on a chain of events or occurrences. While the possible outcome of some

events may be intuitive, complex situations mustbe broken down into a series of sequential

events.

The steps in event tree analysis are:

1.

Identify the actors in an emergency (e.g., hazardous materials, response personnel);

2. Identify the conditions present;

12/87

J-2

4. Visualize the effect of the activities on the

outcome of the event.

The following example analysis from Analysis of

Hazardous Materials emergencies for Emergency Program Managers: Student ManualFEMA SM-110 (see Appendix L) visualizes the

potential outcome of a leaking vessel (in thiscase a drum) of flammable liquid engulfed in afire. In this situation, the actors and their activi

ties include:

l Burning fuel is heating the drum:

l Drum is absorbing heat from the burning

fuel and heating the contents; and

l Contents of drum are absorbing heat fromthe drum.

The complex activities of the emergency are divided into sequential events in which the burningfuel generates heat, causing the drum contentsto change physical state (liquid to gas). Thisexpansion of the contents will raise the pressure

in the drum and stress the drum components.

The possible activities of the drum can then beevaluated. Possibilities include:

l

The flat drum head will begin to round outas the internal pressure continues to rise:

l The weld between the drum head and thedrum wall will begin to yield: and

l The drum head will separate from the drumwall.

When the drum head breaks away from the sidewall, activities of the contents could include:

l As the pressure is relieved through thebreach in the drum, the heated contents

will expand and flow through the breach.

l Drum contents will escape to the atmosphere, creating a new actor -- vaporized

flammable contents.

l Escaping contents will produce a propulsive effect on the drum, propelling it like a

rocket.



If the drum is still surrounded by the burning fuel, the vaporized contents will ignite,

forming a fireball and escalating the problem.

When the drum is open, possible activities of thedrum and contents include:

The drum, propelled by the escaping contents, may fly along a trajectory that is de

pendent upon where the drum was heated.Obstructions may change the direction or

distance of travel.

l The released contents may fall along theflight path of the drum, leaving a trail ofburning material along the ground.

The third step in event tree analysis visualizesthe sequential interrelationship of the actors.Each event is broken down and placed in logical

sequence to make the possible points of intervention readily apparent. In this way, the appli

cation of event tree analysis provides a detailedunderstanding of the mechanical, chemical, andthermal interactions that affect the behavior ofactors in an emergency.

Four general factors that affect the behavior ofhazardous materials in an emergency are:

l Inherent properties and quantity of the hazardous material:

l

Built-in characteristics of the container;

l Natural laws of physics and chemistry; and

l Environment, including the physical surroundings (terrain) and the conditions

(weather).

These factors and their interrelationships canprovide a basis for visualizing what will happen inan emergency involving hazardous materials.

For most events involving hazardous materials,the scenario begins with a container (e.g., tank,

pipe, drum, cylinder, bag) that under normalconditions holds a hazardous material. The

event begins when the container is disturbed or

stressed in some way. When the stress ex

ceeds the capacity of the container, a breach ofthe container’s integrity occurs and some typeof release will occur. The escaping matter and/or energy will follow the patterns governed by

the natural laws of physics and chemistry to dis

perse into the surrounding environment. As thematerial comes in contact with vulnerable elements in the environment, the duration and intensity of the exposure influences the type ofevent that results. These basic elements of hazardous events are combined to form a model for

the behavior of hazardous materials.

Stress Stage of the Behavior Model

Stress is an applied force or system of forcesthat tends to strain or deform a container and

may trigger a change in the condition of the contents. There are three basic forms of stress:thermal, mechanical, and chemical. Thermal

stress results from the effects of extreme temperature changes which may be caused by fire,sparks, friction, electricity, radiative transfer, or

extremes of cold or heat.

Mechanical stress is caused by an object whichphysically contacts the container. The object

may puncture, gouge, bend, break, tear or splitthe container. A chemical stress is caused by achemical action such as acids corroding the

container, pressure generated by decomposition, polymerization, or runaway reactions.

Breach Stage of the Behavior Model

If the container is stressed beyond its structural

limits, it will open or breach. Different containers breach in different ways:

Disintegration, which is the total loss of integrity (e.g., a glass jar shattering).

Attachments open up (e.g., a pressure relief device malfunctions).

Punctures from external sources.

A split, tear or crack of a container (e.g.,torn bags or boxes, or split or cracked

drums).

Release Stage of the Behavior Model

Once the container is breached, the materialcan escape to the environment. There are four

types of release:

l Violent rupture causes runaway cracking ofclosed containers and Boiling Liquid Ex

12/87

J-3



panding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), and occurs in less than one second.

Rapid release through pressure relief devices, damaged valves, punctures, or broken piping will take several seconds to sev

eral minutes.

A spill or leak, which is a non-violent flow

through opening in fittings, splits or tears,and punctures may take minutes to days.

Detonation is an explosive chemical reaction which occurs in less than 1 /100th of a

second. Examples are military munitions,dynamite, and organic peroxides.

Dispersal Stage of the Behavior Model

Once the hazardous material is released into thesurrounding environment, the event is likely to

escalate in intensity. The properties and characteristics of the material, in combination with

the laws of physics and chemistry, will determine the pattern of the distribution of matter and

energy. The forms that the matter or energymay take include: fragments, powder, dust,

schrapnel, liqu id, vapo r, vaporizing liquid,

gases, infared rays, and shock waves. Factors

that will affect the movement of materials include temperature differentials, density with respect to water and air, wind speed and direc

tion, and gravity. The dispersion path that is fol

lowed may be linear, radial, random, or couldfollow the contour, upward or outward. The dis

persion pattern may be in the form of a cloud,cone, plume, stream, or irregular deposits.

Dispersion patterns will also depend on the

physical form of the material (i.e., gas, liquid, orsolid). Gases escaping under pressure (e.g.,

leaks from a cylinder) form a cloud or plume. Ifenclosed, the cloud will fill the available space: if

not enclosed, it may be carried by the wind as aplume. If the vapor’s density is greater than air,

the material may settle into depressions or travel

along the ground as a plume.

Liquids may flow along the ground as a stream

while simultaneously vaporizing and acting as agas (stream with plume) or may be absorbed

into the ground or onto clothing worn at thescene (irregular deposits). Solids may scatter

(irregular deposits), form dust clouds that are

carried by the wind (plume), or stick to surfaces(irregular deposits).

Exposure Stage of the Behavior Model

As the hazardous material moves away from the

point of release, exposure to the surrounding

environment may occur through a variety ofpathways including: ingestion, physical contact,and inhalation. Duration of the exposure andConcentration of the material are particularly im

portant aspects of the exposure event.

Damage Stage of the Behavior Model

Damage due to the exposure to the hazardousmaterial includes aspects of the susceptibility of

the environment or population. Such susceptibility will differ markedly depending on the time

of day, season of the year, age of the popula

tion, and ability of the population to escape orotherwise mitigate the event.

The types of damage which may occur include:thermal (heat and cold), radioactive, asphyxiation, toxic or poison, corrosive or chemical,disease (viral or bacterial), and physical or mechanical.

Damage can be expressed in terms of: fatali

ties, injuries, property destruction, critical system disruption, and environmental disruption.

As shown in Exhib it J-1, event tree ana lysistraces each event, as it occurs or does not occur, and each safety or control equipment or

procedure to identify the possible outcome.Note that several paths through the event treecan have similar or identical outcomes. It is important to trace all possible events through all

paths that can affect the outcome. In addition toidentifying the possible outcomes and their relative severity, an event tree can visually repre

sent the potential importance of possible equipment or procedures in mitigating the severity ofdamage. In the example in Exhibit J-1, if both

hazardous events occur and procedure A fails,the control procedure B is completely ineffective

in altering the outcome or severity of damage.

5.4 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS

Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an analytical technique used to determine the means by which an

12/87 J-4



Exhibit J-l

Sample Event Tree Analysis

12/87 J-5



unwanted event, such as a release of toxic materials, could possibly occur. The technique,which in structure is similar to the event analysistechnique, involves the development of faulttree diagrams which i l lustrate the “chain of

events” required for a particular event to occur.

Fault tree analysis reverses the normal sequence of events and places the undesirable

event under study (i.e., head event) at the topof the diagram. The incident is assumed to have

occurred and sub-events which represent the

means by which this event could occur are in

serted below. Sub-events which are interrelated (i.e., dependent incidents), in that theymust both occur before the subsequent eventcan occur, are related by a logical “and.” Sub-events which are unrelated in that the occur

rence of any one sub-event would cause thesubsequent event, are connected with a logical

"o r . ” For example, in the analysis of the overflow of a storage tank that is being filled withgasoline, in which the storage tank has a high-

level alarm, the associated fault tree might be

constructed as in Exhibit J-2. The head event is

that the tank overflows.

The fault tree technique only considers those ac

tions which must occur for the head event to occur, and therefore isolates the events of impor

tance from the many possible events. In the example, in order for the tank to overfill, theremust be an increase in the tank level of the flam

mable liquid (gasoline) (sub-event 1) and nocorrective action taken before overfilling (subevent 2).

Since both sub-event 1 and sub-event 2 mustoccur before the head event occurs, the two

events are connected to the head event by an“and” (i.e., sub-event 1 and sub-event 2 must

occur to have the head event occur).

The fault tree analysis continues down the treeand breaks each of the sub-events into theircomponents in a similar manner (i.e., if no corrective action occurs, there must be a high levelalarm failure or an operator failure).

Sub-event 2 would then be divided into:

Sub-event 2.1. High Level Alarm Fails

Sub-event 2.2. Operator Fails

12/87 J-6

The analysis continues until the sub-events cannot be practically subdivided further. The determination of this point is left to the judgement ofthe analyst. Exhibit J-2 illustrates an example ofthe beginning of a simple fault tree: however,

this event might need to be subdivided further toreach the practical limits of the analysis.

As the number of sub-events increases due tosystem complexity, the fault tree can becomevery complex. The analyst can limit the effort

involved by carefully selecting the scope of thehead event and by limiting the level of detailconsidered in the analysis.

Fault tree analysis is useful for describing the interrelationship of events or components of asystem which must “fail” for an accident to occur. Since only the negative actions (i.e., fail

ures), and only those actions related to the actual head event are considered, the technique isoften an efficient means of analyzing complex

scenarios or systems.

J.5 FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS, AND

CRITICALITY ANALYSIS

As described in the AlChE document, Guidelines

for Hazard Evaluation Procedure, FailureModes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)

and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)identify and tabulate equipment and system fail

ure modes and the potential effects on the system or plant for each failure mode. The failuremode is a description of how equipment fails(e.g., open, closed, on, off, or leaks). The ef

fect is the accident or system response resultingfrom the failure. The FMECA also includes acriticality ranking for each failure mode. Single

failure modes that result in or contribute to amajor accident are identified; however, FMECAis not efficient for identifying combinations ofequipment failures that lead to accidents.

FMECA may be used to supplement more detailed hazard assessments such as HAZOP or

Fault Tree Analysis. Results of this type ofanalysis include worst-case estimates of theconsequences of single failures and a relativeranking of equipment failures based on estimates of failure probability and/or hazard sever

ity.



Exhib it J-2

Example Fault Tree

12/87 J-7



APPENDIX K

EVALUATION GUIDE FOR AVAILABLE COMPUTER

APPLICATIONS ADDRESSING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

PURPOSE OF THIS CHECKLIST

This appendix contains a checklist of criteria developed to help local emergency planning committees (LEPCs), or other groups consideringpurchasing software, to identify computerizedapplications to assist in emergency responseplanning as outlined in the chapters of this document. The checklist identifies many of the waysthat software applications can be of assistance.The priorities and needs of the local planningdistrict will dictate which criteria are to be con

sidered and may require development of addi

tional criteria.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION USED TO

DEVELOP THE CHECKLIST

The checklist criteria were developed from information in the National Response Team’s Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide

(NRT-1) and this technical guidance document.NRT-1 was designed to help local communitiesrespond to potential incidents involving hazard

ous materials. This guidance document supplements NRT-1 by identifying the facility and trans

portation route information necessary for hazards analysis and emergency planning, providingguidelines for determining vulnerable zones, andoutlining the process for analyzing risks.

Understanding the planning processes describedin these documents and how the information be

ing assembled will be used is a prerequisite fordetermining which computer application will best

address the specific set of needs involved.

STRUCTURE OF THE CHECKLIST

Section 1. Provides a checklist for evaluatingthe computer hardware (equipment) and ad

ditional software (programs) required to operate the system. The flexibility and ease ofuse of the system and the availability oftraining and other types of vendor supportare also addressed.

The next sections of the checklist are based onthe structure of this Guidance Document, andinclude:

Section 2. Hazards Identification (assemblingfacility, transportation route, and chemical

data);

Section 3. Vulnerability Analysis (modeling ofreleases);

Section 4. Risk Analysis (ranking of hazards);and

Section 5. Emergency Response Planning (assembling hazards identification, vulnerabilityanalysis, and risk analysis information).

Section 6. Regulatory Requirements. This section describes a few of the ways that a software application can explain the requirements under Title Ill and assist in compliancewith requirements, such as tracking dead

lines and responding to requests for information.

NOTE: This checklist highlights some impor

tant user costs to be considered, however thetotal system cost is difficult to represent. Somesoftware applications may require the purchaseof specialized hardware or additional softwarefrom other manufacturers. Vendors may in

clude fees for tailoring of the software application to meet a user’s needs in the original price.Training, manuals, technical support services,additional data entry, software updates, and ad

ditional copies of the software may be includedor may need to be purchased separately.

1 National Response Team. Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide. NRT-1 (March 1987).

12/87 K - l



In addition to the initial purchase costs of the ap

plication, the long-term investment required toinstall, maintain, and operate the full workingsystem must be considered. Such costs will include: assembling the required data: validatingand entering the data: training new personnel;

purchasing updated software: and correctingand amending the data as changes occur.

These costs will apply to some extent to any application purchased. Assistance in estimatingsome of these costs may be available from dataprocessing professionals within the State gov

ernment or from computer-oriented firms located within the district.

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR EVALUATING

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING SOFT

WARE APPLICATIONS

The suggested procedure for LEPCs to use thechecklist is as follows:

1. Identify the local district’s need to manage

emergency response planning information

under NRT-1 and this Guidance Document.Understanding how the information is to be

used in the planning process is an essen

tial first step to focusing the evaluation on

the needs.

2. Select the criteria on the checklist which

most closely represent the local district’sneeds and priorities for emergency re

sponse planning. It is not expected that allcriteria listed will apply.

3. Develop any additional criteria required to

address local needs and priorities (e.g.,

consistency with the type of computerequipment that is already available).

4. Rank the criteria according to levels of im

portance (e.g., must be met, would bevaluable, can be delayed).

5. Identify vendors and their emergency response software from the available literature, advertising, and other sources. Aninitial list of commercial software applications will be made available through the Environmental Protect ion Agency (EPA)emergency preparedness coordinator ineach EPA regional office.

6. Request information from the vendors(e.g., sales literature, demonstration software, cost information, and current users

of the application who can be contacted asreferences).

7. Review the information and complete a

checklist for each software application.

6. Contact vendors to request any additionalinformation and to clarify data on the applications which seem best suited to the

need.

CAUTIONS: An evaluation include the specific priorities and needs of the individual juris

diction.

Any comparison of the cost of computer applications requires the assessment of many factorsin addition to the purchase price identified by the

vendor. (See NOTE on previous page for a detailed discussion of costs.)

Computer systems are continually being modi

fied and refined. The results of the evaluationwill become out-of-date and should be repeated

if the purchase of a system is delayed.

1 2 /8 7

K-2



CRITERIA FOR THE REVIEW OF COMMERCIALLY AVAILABLE

SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING

Computer System Requirements (Hardware, Software, Support, Etc.)Objective: Provide a basis to evaluate the functional capabilities, design limitations, and opera

tional requirements of the system, and to evaluate the vendor’s ability and willingness to supportthe system.

Criteria Explanation/Examples

1. Demonstrations of the software

application are available?

2. Documentation of the software

is available for review?

3.

Software application is available

for a trial evaluation?

4. Vendor is willing to modify the

application?

5. Software is compatible with

hardware that is already available

or hardware that can be easily

obtained?

6. Computer system hardware memory

can be expanded to meet the

anticipated needs?

7. Requires additional software to

be purchased from other companies

to function?

8. Sold as modular components which

are priced separately?

9.

Total system cost is consistent with

budget capabilities of user?

Either a professional sales demo or

current user demo may be available.

User’s manuals and other explanatory

material from the vendor.

30-day free trial may be available

from the vendor.

The application may require changes

by the vendor to allow specific community

needs to be addressed.

Microcomputer; monitor: graphics board:

modem: phone line: math co-processor:

data storage space: digitizer:

printer or plotter.

Hardware can accept additional memory

required to load the software

and modify the largest data file needed.

Operating system: printer interface:

graphics package.

Modules may be selected and

assembled to meet specificrequirements (NOTE: the software may

require purchasing several modules

to function properly.)

Costs of hardware, software, training,

and data input may be hidden.

K-312/87



Computer System Requirements (Continued)


10. Limits hardware and data access by

unauthorized users?

11. User friendly and requires a

minimal amount of user training?

12. Vendor provides additional training

which may be required?

13. Allows data that was entered

by the system vendor to be

updated by the user?

14. Allows new types of data to be

entered by the user which were

not included in the vendor’s

application?

15. Limits copying or distribution

by copyright or copy protection?

16. Validates data as it is entered

or stored in the application?

17. In addition to using established keywords,

allows searches to be performed with

criteria chosen by the user?

18. Quality data sources were usedand updates will be available

as source information changes?

19. Allows reports or graphs to be

designed by the user?

Access may be limited through passwords

and/or encryption of stored data.

Menu driven: provides help screens:

clearly presented instructions: uses a

mouse or touch screen.

Training classes and materials may

be required when the system is installed

and as employees are hired: cost of training

should be considered.

Allows modification of procedures

for handling a spill or release according

to facility or community practices.

A new field of data can be added to

the database (e.g., new type of chemical

information: facility response procedures).

Some vendors limit the ability to

make copies of the software and require

copies to be purchased for each user.

Tests data against valid ranges (e.g., pH <14)

or lists of acceptable data (e.g., chemical

names).

Data can be identified by other

than preset criteria such as through a menu

(e.g., user defined searches).

Chemical data content is current andgenerally accepted by science and

health agencies such as EPA, OSHA, NIH,

NOAA, U.S.Coast Guard, DOT, and others:cost and timeliness of updates should be

considered.

User can specify data to be included,

physical layout, and headings for

columns of data.

12 /87 K-4



Computer System Requirements (Continued)

Criteria Explanatiorn/Examples

20. Allows data to be transferred System can communicate with other systems

(input and output) with other (e.g., Lotus, dBASE, ASCII and DIF data

types of software packages and formats: Macintosh and IBM equipment).

hardware systems?

21 Is in use by others who are Vendors may provide names of current

willing to provide information users of the system who would be

on their experience? willing to discuss their experience.

22 Will the system software and New capabilities that are compatible

data be updated by the vendor? with the current system may be added.

23 Vendor provides continued service If this type of service is available, a

and support if the user experiences maintenance and support fee will probably

any type of difficulties in operating be charged.the system?

HAZARDS IDENTIFICATIONObjective: Provide information on the identity, quantity, location, physical properties, and toxicity

of chemicals at sites within the planning district.

Criteria

Explanation/Examples

Facilities

1. Accepts data on one or more

manufacturing and storage facilities?

2. Accepts chemical inventory and

storage data?

3.

Accepts information concerning

facility accident potential or

history?

4. Records or describes engineering

controls and safeguards at

specific facilities?

Locations: activities: and inspection records.

Chemical names; quantities: site

location(s); storage methods, temperature,

and pressure.

Events that could result in damage;

anticipated damage and consequences:

and historical accident records.

Detection, fire suppression, and

security systems: containment and

drainage systems: and utility shutoffs.

1 2 /8 7

K-5



HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION (Continued)


Transportation Routes

1. Records shipping routes taken to Identifies route taken and materialsdeliver materials to facilities transported.(e.g., highway, rail, and air)?

2. Accepts information on the Routes may create problems because of:

major safety characteristics width: access: traffic patterns: and

of routes? jurisdictions.

3. Logs transportation data, Tracks planned cargo shipments for

schedules, and exceptions? location and time expected.

Chemical Information

1. Database contains information As required by the Title Ill regulations

concerning the extremely (i.e., threshold planning quantities).

hazardous substances?

2. Contains information about the Flammability; reactivity; corrosivity;

chemical and physical properties? vapor pressures: physical states: boiling and

melting points.

3. Contains the health hazards and Exposure routes and limits: signs and

risks, toxicological data, and symptoms: target organs: and medical

first aid procedures? conditions aggravated by exposure.

4. Contains methods for the safe Identifies the equipment, clothing

handling and use of the chemical, and procedures required.

and emergency response?

5. Indicates if notification Identifies notification requirements

requirements apply to the for release of reportable quantitieschemical released? of chemicals (e.g., CERCLA, SARA).

12/87 K-4



VULNERABILITY ANALYSISObjective: Identify geographic zone of the community that may be affected by an airborne release

and populations that may be subject to harm.


1. Accepts information on critical areas

around facilities and routes?

Drinking water supplies: cropland;

livestock: sensitive natural areas.

2. Accepts information on the

characteristics of populations located in

areas that could be in the vulnerable

zone?

Location of special populations

(e.g., elderly: handicapped: hospitals:

prisons; schools) and population density.

3. Calculates the vulnerability

zone based on the maximum quantity

present for screening?

Calculations are based on credible worst

case assumptions identified in this technical

guidance document.

4. Allows site-specific inputs to the

calculation of vulnerability zones

and provides release scenarios?

Calculations are based on site-specific

planning factors such as wind speed,

stability class, and chemical toxicity.

Modeling the Release of Chemicals (predicting the path, the effect, and the area of impact of the

chemical release using mathematical analysis)

Inputs (information that drives the model)

1. Accommodates physical

characteristics of the chemical?

2. Addresses different types of

releases?

3. Supports multiple point sources?

4. Address releases from any source

or only pre-selected sources?

Liquids at boiling point or ambient temperature;.

powdered solids: solids in solution:

molten solids: gas density.

Instantaneous and continuous releases

including spills, leaks, fires, explosions,

and BLEVEs.

Several release sources operating concurrently.

Modeling ability may be limited to a specific set

of pre-established sites or may be capable of

representing releases from any possible location

(e. g., transportation accident).

12 / 87

K-7



VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS (Continued)


5. Accepts data on meteorological

conditions?

Wind velocity and direction:

temperature: stability class: precipitation.

a. Allows observed data to bemanually input?

Data are typed into the system usingthe keyboard.

b. Allows a modem link for

direct data entry?

Accepts data directly from

laboratories or weather stations.

c. Requires a meteorological

tower for data input?

Facility or community meteorologic

tower is required for data collection.

6. Accepts data input for the

level of concern?

Uses the data entered to calculate

the vulnerable zones.

Algorithms (equation(s) and assumptions used to calculate the results such as the concentration

of the plume of released chemicals)

1. Employs dispersion models that

are consistent with those used

in this technical guidance

document?

2. Identifies the types of assumptions

used?

3. Calculates chemical dispersion

rates and routes?

4. Supports terrain modeling and

considers complex terrain?

Gaussian dispersion models based on

Turner’s Workbook of Atmospheric

Dispersion Estimates, PHS Pub. No.

999-AP-26. Different air stabilities and wind

speeds are used.

Some models are not documented to provide

information on the assumptions used to

perform calculations and their effect on the

model’s results, or the limits of the model’s

ability.

Provides information on the plume size,

motion, and concentration over time: and

predicts toxic corridors.

The ability to accommodate site-specific

effects of terrain can be significant under

some circumstances.

Outputs (the results of the calculations performed)

1. Presents pictorial representation Presents model output as dispersion

of dispersion plumes? plume overlaid on a map of the area.

12 / 87

K-8



2. Produces line, bar, or pie graphs? Presents model output in graphical format

(e.g., concentrations experienced at a

location over time).

3. Retains the results of calculations Systems differ in their ability to re-enact a

in final form for future review or stores series of calculations or to reproduce a

the input parameters to allow the specific output.results to be reproduced?

RISK ANALYSISObjective: Provide a basis to judge the relative likelihood (probability) and severity of various pos

sible events. Risks can be expressed in qualitative terms (high, medium, low) based on subjec

tive, common-sense evaluations, or in quantitative terms (numerical and statistical calculations).

Criteria


1. Allows judgement to be made

concerning facilities and routes,

for probable hazard and severity

of consequences?

Judgement may be based on the accident

history, type of facility, storage conditions,

control technologies in place, and other

factors.

2. Assembles quantitative faci lity

information concerning possible

release scenarios?

Recognized systematic approaches include:

hazard operability study (HAZOP):

event tree analysis: fault tree analysis.

3. Allows priorities to be recorded

according to community concerns

and opinions?

Judgement and concerns of the

community can be entered into the

ranking and prioritization for community hazards.

1 2 /8 7

K-9



EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNINGObjective: Assemble detailed information concerning hazards, vulnerability, and risk; provide

action outlines for responders and criteria for plan review; present maps of the local area; and

provide simulation capabilities for training.

Criteria


1. Provides detailed methods for promptly

identifying the affected area and

population based on release

information?

a. Maps facility locations and

transportation routes?

b.

Plans routes for hazardous

chemical shipments?

2. Accepts emergency information and

plans provided by chemical facilities?

a. Records facility emergency

contacts?

b. Generates floor plans of

facility storage sites?

c .

Indicates location of

engineering controls/safeguards?

3.

Provides an action outline for

emergency responders?

4. Identifies the needed emergency

response equipment for various

types of emergencies?

5.

Stores the inventory of local

response equipment and provideslocation and availability

information?

Mapping: modeling; demographical

statistics: worst case release.

Provides details of relative

locations of hazards and vulnerable zones.

Based on characteristics of routes

available, selects the least dangerous route.

Plans; procedures: site diagrams:

emergency checklists.

Provides names, titles, and 24-hr. phone

numbers for emergency purposes.

Shows building layout and chemical

locations graphically.

Identifies safeguards such as

emergency shut-offs graphically, or

by detailed description of the location.

Provides a chain of events or considerations

that is based on the site-specific conditions

involved.

Provides a decision aid for choosing

proper equipment and required medical

supplies based on the chemicals involved.

Assists in the identification of equipment

available from chemical facilities, local

emergency responders, hospitals,

other communities, and private

contractors.

12/87

K-1O



EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING (Continued)


6. Stores information on community

emergency procedures and plans?

7. Provides criteria for evaluating

existing emergency response

functions?

8. Prompts for information to update

emergency response plans?

9. Identifies hazardous material

training program requirements

and stores training information

and schedules?

10. Provides simulation capabilities

for training?

Direction and control; communications:

evacuation and sheltering: medical

treatment facilities: resource management:

cleanup and disposal: decontamination: and

documentation.

Identifies the essential elements that

should be present in the plans based

on regulatory requirements and local

community priorities.

Flags information that changes frequently

(e.g., emergency contacts, telephone

numbers, and addresses).

Provides criteria for evaluation of training

programs and stores information on

training completed per regulatory

requirements.

Provides example test emergencies to

exercise the plan and train response personnel.

12/87

K-11



IDENTIFICATION OF REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

Obiective: Track regulatory deadlines and assist in the assessment of compliance with reporting

requirements, as well as record the status of required information and log requests for informa

tion.

NOTE: These criteria concentrate on planning and response requirements of Title Ill of SARA. The

following is only a partial list of the possible capabilities that computer applications may possesswith

regard to the identification of regulatory requirements.


1. Tracks deadlines for reporting Deadlines for reporting as required

requirements under Title Ill of under Title 111 of SARA Sections 302, 304,

SARA? 311-312, and 313.

2.Provides a means to respond to Report capabilities may include

informat ion reporting requirements production of the submission forms or

of Title III of SARA? letters or partial assembly of the needed

information.

3. Has the capability to store and Data manipulation including cross

manage MSDS and chemical indexing lists to identify all facilities

inventory form data? using a particular chemical.

4. Addresses public requests for Record type and number of requests

information under Title Ill of SARA? and provide information to answer them.

5. Tracks the status of planning Identify when a plan was developed

in the local districts? and when it was last updated.

12/87 K-12



APPENDIX L

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

This appendix lists some other documents that may prove helpful to anyone organizing a communityawareness and preparedness program for responding to releases of extremely hazardous substances

(EHSs).

1. Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide (NRT-1). Washington, D.C.: National ResponseTeam: prepared by ICF Incorporated, 1987.

NRT-1 was prepared to comply with the requirement in Section 303(f) of SARA. It contains generalguidance on selecting and organizing the planning team, and describes how to carry out fundamentalplanning tasks (e.g., review existing plans, assess response capabilities, conduct a hazards analysis).The guide describes in detail what should be included in a hazardous materials emergency plan andsuggests how this material could be organized.

NRT-1 can be obtained free of charge from:.

Hazmat Planning Guide WH-562A

401 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

2. Community Teamwork: Working Together to Promote Hazardous Materials Transportat ion Safety .

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Research and Special Programs Administration; prepared by Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 1983.

This publication provides State and local (i.e., fire, police, emergency service/civil defense, transportation, public safety, and environmental protection) officials with guidance on the most efficient use of

their resources to develop effective hazardous materials programs. The bulk of the guide describeshow one can, with a limited budget (1) perform a risk analysis: (2) obtain and mobilize emergencyresponse services: (3) perform hazardous materials inspections: and (4) obtain hazardous materialstraining.

Deliberate and detailed attention to minimizing costs is a- consistent aspect of DOT’s Community

Teamwork. Because most communities must take into consideration strict budget limitations whendevising preparedness plans, Community Teamwork should be of interest for this reason alone. Com

munity Teamwork will also prove helpful to those planning to provide personnel safety equipment andclothing. Copies of Community Teamwork can be obtained by calling (202) 426-2301 or writing to:

Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation, Attn.: DHM-50

Research and Special Programs Administration


400 7th Street, S.W.


3.

Hazardous Materials Management System: A Guide for Local Emergency Managers. Portland:Multnomah County Office of Emergency Management, 1983.

This handbook is a detailed guidance document prepared at the local level and published by theMultnomah County Office of Emergency Management in Portland, Oregon. This handbook guides thelocal emergency manager in the development and implementation of a comprehensive system approach for dealing with hazardous materials incidents within a specific geographic area. It is writtenfrom the perspective that such a system is multi-disciplinary and requires a team effort under theleadership of a local “emergency manager.”

12/87

L-1



4.

Information on availability of the Multnomah County guide can be obtained by calling (503) 255-3600 or

writing to:

Multnomah County Emergency Management 12240 N.E. Glizan

Portland, Oregon 97230

4.

Community Awareness and Emergency Response Program Handbook. Washington, D.C.: ChemicalManufacturers Association (CMA), 1985.

This private sector planning document is similar to those prepared by government agencies. However,

the CMA document addresses two areas of chemical plant management:

Community awareness: developing a community outreach program and providing the public

with information on chemicals manufactured or used at local chemical plants: and

Emergency response planning: combining chemical plant emergency plans with other local

planning.

This CMA document presumes that the key organizing person might have no experience in contin

gency planning; hence, the information is provided in elementary detail to help just such an organizer.Pages 1-40 will prove helpful to any community preparing to develop an emergency plan to respond to

EHS incidents. Appendix 1 lists typical components of a chemical plant emergency response plan: Appendix 2 provides highlights of interrelated plant, community, and State plans.

Copies of the CMA guide are available for $10.00 and can be obtained by calling (202) 887-1100 orwriting to:

Chemical Manufacturers Association

2501 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037

5. An Unconstrained Overview of the Critical Elements in a Model Stare System for Emergency Re

sponses to Radiological Transportation Incidents. U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryWashington, D.C.:Commission and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; prepared by Rockwell International,

1981.

6. Atmospheric Emergencies: Existing Capabilities and Future Needs. Washington, D.C.: Transportation Research Board, 1983.

7. Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS), Manual II: Hazardous Chemical Data.

Washington, D.C.: United States Coast Guard, Department of Transportation, 1984.

8. Criteria and Methods for Preparing Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (EEGL) Documents.

Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, May 1985.

9. Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Prepared

ness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. Washington, D. C. : U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

and Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1980. (NUREG 0654/FEMA-REP-1).

10. Emergency Planning, Student Manual. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management

Agency, August 1983.

11. Disaster Operations: A Handbook for Local Governments. Washington, D.C.: Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, 1981.

12/87

L-2



12. 1987 Emergency Response Guidebook. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation,1987. This guidebook is available at:

Office of Hazardous Materials Transportation, Attn. : DHM-50

Research and Special Programs Administration


400 7th Street, S.W.


13. Guidance for Developing State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness

for Transportation Accidents. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983.(FEMA-REP-5)

14.

Guide and Checklist for the Development and Evaluation of State and Local Government Radiologi

cal Emergency Response Plans in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of International and State Programs, 1974.

15.

Guide for Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans, CPG 1-8. Washington,D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, October 1985.

16.

Multi-Media Compliance Inspection: Union Carbide Corporation, Institute, WV. Philadelphia:Environmental Protection Agency, Region Ill, 1985.

17. The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. Washington, D.C.: U.S.Environmental Protection Agency, 40 CFR Part 300. (Usually referred to as the National Contingency Plan).

18 . Objectives for Local Emergency Management, CPG 1-5. Washington, D.C.: Federal EmergencyManagement Agency, July 1984.

19. Risk Assessment/Vulnerability Users Manual for Small Communities and Rural Areas. Washington,D.C.: U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration; Prepared by Department of Civil Engineering, Kansas State University, 1981.

20.

Emergency Handling of Hazardous Materials in Surface Transportation, Student, Patrick J. (ed).Washington, D.C.: Association of American Railroads, Bureau of Explosives, 1981,

21. Overview of Environmental Pollution in the Kanawha Valley, Vincent, James R,. Denver: EPAOffice of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, 1984.

22. Highly Hazardous Materials Spills and Emergency Planning, Zajic, J.E., and Himmelman, N.A.New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1978.

23. Hazardous Mat erial s Transportat ion: A Synthesis of Lessons Learned from t he DOT D emonst rat i on

Projects. Washington, D.C.: ICF Incorporated. This report summarizes seven DOT-sponsoreddemonstration projects on prevention and preparedness planning. Appendix F contains a discussion of the lessons learned so that other communities can benefit from the experience.

24. Hazardous Materials Response Guide, Kelty, J. Emergency Response Unit, Illinois Environmental

Protection Agency. This guide is designed to provide rapid access to information on hazardous

properties of chemicals involved in emergency incidents.

25. Safeguards Report. University of Charleston, Charleston, West Virginia: National Institute for

Chemical Studies, November 1986. A Community Hazard Assessment for the Kanawha Valley ofWest Virginia.

12/87

L-3



26. Criteria and Methods for Preparing Emergency Exposure Guidance Level (EEGL), Short-Term Pub

lic Emergency Guidance Level (SPEGL), and Continuous Exposure Guidance Level (CEGL) Docu

ments. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986. This document was developed by theBoard on Toxicology and Environmental Health Hazards of the National Research Council. It is

designed exclusively for the use of the Department of Defense (DOD) for the chemicals of interestto it.

27. The Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, Turner, B., Public Health Service PublicationNo. 999-AP-26, 1970.

28. Analysis of Hazardous Materials Emergencies for Emergency Program Managers: Student Manual.

FEMA SM-110.

29. DOT Hazardous Materials Table. 49 CFR 172.101.

30. Fire Protection Guide on Hazardous Materials. Quincy, MA.: National Fire Protection Association,

1986.

12/87

L - 4



APPENDIX M

EPA AND FEMA REGIONAL CONTACTS

A. EPA Regional Preparedness Contacts

Region I

(Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,Rhode Island, Connecticut)

60 Westview StreetLexington, MA 02173

Region II (New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands)

26 Federal Plaza

Room 900

New York, NY 10278

Region Ill(Pennsylvania, Maryland, D.C., Delaware, Virginia,

West Virginia) 841 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Region IV

(North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky)

345 Courtland Street, N.E.

Atlanta, GA 30365

Region V

(Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,

Ohio, Minnesota) 230 South Dearborn Street

Chicago, IL 60604

Region VI

(New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas) 1445 Ross Avenue

Allied Bank Tower at Fountain Place

Dallas, TX 75202

Region VII

(Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri)

726 Minnesota Avenue

Kansas City, KS 66101

Environmental Services Division(617) 861-6700, ext. 221

Response and Prevention Branch

New Jersey: (201) 321-6657

New York: (212) 264-2525

Office of Emergency Response

(215) 597-8907

Emergency Response and Control

Section(404) 347-3931

Emergency Response Section

(312) 886-1964

Regional Information Center(214) 655-2270

Preparedness Coordinator

(9 13) 236-2806

12/87 M-1



Region VIII

(Montana, Wyoming, Utah, Colorado,North Dakota, South Dakota)

One Denver Place

999 18th Street

Suite 500 Denver, CO 80202

Region IX

(California, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam)

215 Fremont Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

Region X

(Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Alaska)

1200 Sixth Avenue

Seattle, WA 98101

Title III/CEPP Information HOTLINE NUMBER

Emergency Response Branch(303) 293-1723

Toxics Division

(415) 974-7460

Hazardous Waste Division

Emergency Response Team(206) 442-1263

1-800-535-0202 (in Washington, D.C.: (202) 479-2449)

12/87 M-2



B. FEMA Regional Offices

(Note: Direct all requests to the “Hazmat Program Staff” of the appropriate FEMA

Regional office.)

Region I

(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusettes,

New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont)442 J. W. McCormack POCHBoston, MA 02109(617) 223-9540

Region II

(New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico,

Virgin Islands)

Room 133726 Federal PlazaNew York, NY 10278(212) 238-8208

Region Ill(Delaware, Washington DC, Maryland,Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia)

Liberty Square Building105 S. 7th StreetPhiladelphia, PA 19106(215) 597-9416

Region IV

(Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee)

Suite 700

1371 Peachtree Street, N.E.

Atlanta, GA 30309

(404) 347-2400

Region V

(Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin) 4th Floor 175 W. Jackson Blvd.

Chicago, IL 60604

(312) 431-5501

Region VI

(Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,

Oklahoma, Texas)Federal Regional Center, Room 206800 N. Loop 288Denton, TX 76201-3698

(817) 898-9399

Region VII

(Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska)911 Walnut Street, Room 300Kansas City, MO 64106(816) 283-7060

Region VIII(Colorado, Montana, North Dakota,South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming)Denver Federal Center, Building 710Box 25267Denver, CO 80225-0267(303) 235-4811

Region IX

(Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada,

American Samoa, Guam) Building 105

Presidio of San Francisco, CA 94129

(415) 923-7100

Region X

(Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington) Federal Regional Center

130 228th St., S.W. Bothell, WA 98021-9796

(206) 481-8800

US GOVERNMENT PRlNTlNG OFFlCE 1991- 5 17- 003/ 4 7004

1 2 / 8 7 M - 3

Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis

Documents

Transcript of Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis