Teaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00000___d8203b9e4ed381a8f1e7a866457123d4.pdf

Teaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00001___a15f7c128af41b44975e4a9a33001c23.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00002___27be8cf21f1f556860f40499bfb58fe9.pdf

Teaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00003___9467425177e47e85c0602c8b7ea68858.pdfTEACHINGENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

edited by

CLARE PALMER

BRILLLEIDEN BOSTON

2006

Teaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00004___c0429154c4ccd9d4bbb2c60bb0f6ee9e.pdfThis book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Teaching environmental ethics / edited by Clare Palmer.p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 90-04-15005-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)1. Environmental ethicsStudy and teaching. 2. Environmental education.

I. Palmer, Clare, 1967-

GE42.T43 2006179.1071dc22

2006042506

ISBN: 90 04 15005 6

Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The NetherlandsKoninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers,

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written

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growth. During this period there was a sense that U.S. industry wasfalling behind. The problem was diagnosed as a failure of Americanindustry to maintain an innovative climate and make use of scientificbreakthroughs (Krimsky 1999: 20). The cure was to forge a closerrelationship between industry and the academy. Toward that end,Congress passed a series of acts aimed at removing barriers betweenthese institutions. The consequence was major restructuring in aca-demic science, and the academy in general.4

The Effects of Bayh-Dole

The most important of these laws is the Bayh-Dole Patent and Trade-mark Amendment, which allows U.S. universities to patent and licensediscoveries made from publicly funded research.5 Gordon Rausser,a defender of private/public alliances and former Dean of UCBerkeleys College of Natural Resources, notes that the motivationbehind this Act, is the linkage between discovery and innovationsat research universities and the capture of commercial market valuethat ultimately promotes U.S. economic growth (Rausser 1999: 3).Rausser summarizes the consequences of these changes: universitieshave responded . . . [by] expanding their technological transfer activ-ities . . . They have become a bit more like private companies (Ibid.: 1).

So the consequence of Bayh-Dole is to change the university envi-ronment by making research an important source of revenue. Forexample, in the five years from 1991 to 1996 there was a 75%increase in the number of licenses executed by universities (Ibid.: 7).Further, during this period the patent royalties more than doubled,from $248 million in 1992, to $611 million in 1997 (Ibid.). The lat-est survey by the Association of University Technology Managers(AUTM) indicates that the business of U.S. universities continues togrow despite a sluggish economy. For the 2001 fiscal year the AUTMsurvey (for which 222 institutions submitted data) shows that, Spon-sored research expenditures are up 16.6%, invention disclosures areup 14.8%, U.S. patent applications are up 13.6%, licenses and optionsare up 15.2%, license-related income is up 11.9% and new prod-ucts are up 58.9% (AUTM 2003). This translates to 9,454 patentsand $827 million in royaltiesa greater than one-third increase since1997.6 This data to some degree explain why economic pressuresand rewards have transformed American higher education in the last30 years (Engell and Dangerfield).

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The Changing Value of Knowledge and the Market-Model

In order to better understand why these changes have led to aninhospitable environment for the humanities it is important to seehow they have transformed the way knowledge is valued in highereducation. For instance, in his argument supporting university/industryjoint ventures, Gordon Rausser asserts that the distinctions be-tween public research goods and private research goods (that is, thedistinction between basic and applied research) should be dissolved(Rausser 1999: 6).7 The theory behind rejecting these distinctions fol-lows from a rejection of a commonly held model that sees a linearflow from publicly funded, basic science to privately funded, appliedscience. In place of this model is one that sees basic science drivenby applied science and the desire for marketable technologies. Tosupport his point, Rausser refers to a book by Terence Kealey, TheEconomic Laws of Scientific Research. In that book Kealey presents his-torical arguments to support the claim that basic science is drivenby marketable technologies. Kealeys radical thesis is for the aboli-tion of public science. In other words, science would do better ifmarket forces, rather than public bureaucracies governed it.

What is significant here is that marketable technologies are notseen as a windfall consequence of basic science. Rather basic sci-ence is done with potential products in view. There is no doubttruth to the idea that the relationship between basic and applied sci-ence is complex, and often flows in both directions, from basic toapplied, and vice versa. However, the significance of this social phi-losophy of science leads to fundamental changes in the way knowl-edge is valued in higher education.

To bring this point into relief it will be helpful, for heuristic pur-poses, to use to classical categories of knowledge, specifically withreference to Aristotle. Broadly speaking, the model Rausser is reject-ing holds sharp distinction between epistm and techn. To explain:in one sphere is epistm, which refers to pure theory, disinterestedknowledge as an end in itself (Ostwalt 1962: 307). It is in the broad-est sense theoretical science. In another sphere is techn, which refersto know-how, the kind of knowledge needed to produce a product.Techn is not valued as an end in itself, but as a means to otherends. It is in the broadest sense applied science (Ibid.). In the tradi-tional university epistm is valued over techn, basic science is held inhigher esteem than applied science. However, in the Market-Model

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University the relationship between epistm and techn is inverted. Perhapsmore accurately, theory is valued to the extent that it is likely toenhance marketable skills and generate profit-making technologies.

Diagnosis

This last point leads to an obvious explanation for the decline ofthe humanities. The recent trend to prioritize techn over epistmdevalues philosophy and the humanities, because philosophy, and Iassume the other humanities, primarily conceives of its activities asfocusing on theory, epistm. However, unlike computer science orbiochemistry, for instance, knowledge (epistm ) in these fields doesnot have a relationship with any techn. The profitable interplaybetween pure science and applied science does not have a parallelin the liberal arts. Philosophical theories rarely lead to, or can bedriven by, the potential for developing marketable products. Further,philosophical education is seen as not teaching skills that can be directlymarketed to employers.8

Part II: The Revitalizing Philosophy and the Humanities

Given the way knowledge is valued in the Market-Model University,how can philosophy and the humanities be revitalized? How can thesefields avoid being relegated to second-class status in the twenty-firstcenturys university? The positive task, recalling the words of LangonWinner, is to offer a renewed vision of what education is aboutand what its relationship to the larger society ought to be (Winner1997: 10). The key here is to make the case that philosophy pro-vides an essential social good that should be generously supportedby the public.

The Conservative Reaction

As noted earlier, one common reaction to the decline of the human-ities is an incredulous assertion that the study of knowledge (epistm )in the liberal arts is an intrinsic good, which cannot be convertedinto crude cost-benefit calculations. For example, the historian, RichardHofstadter, an early critic of the instrumentalist view of higher edu-

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cation, argued that, The ultimate criterion of the place of higherlearning in America will be the extent to which it is esteemed notas a necessary instrument of external ends, but as an end in itself (Press and Washburn 2000). This view represents a common reactionof those in the humanities who suddenly find themselves as second-class citizens in the university.

However, given the current state of affairs in higher educationand society at large the intrinsic value argument is not likely to per-suade. For example, Allan Blooms call to return to the classical lib-eral arts, in his 1987 polemic, The Closing of the American Mind, generatedmuch heat and sparks but little reform. According to David Orr,one reason for the failure of conservative reformers like Bloom isthey do not offer a coherent vision of the liberal arts relevant toour time (Orr 1992: 100).

There seems to be a common sense, societal assumption that the-ory must, in some way, be connected to practice.9 On the one hand,it is easy for people to see how scientific theories are related to soci-ety through the constant string of technologies that directly affectpeoples lives. Scientific theories produce tangible, societal goods. Onthe other hand, it is difficult for people to see how the pursuit ofknowledge in philosophy, for example, is related to society. The rea-son for this is philosophys overwhelming focus on theoretical issues.For example, Andrew Light and Avner de Shalit characterize aca-demic philosophy as follows:

When philosophers talk to one another at conferences, at universities,and through books and articles, they tend to generalize, theorize andexpress themselves in the abstract. They often ask questions that arepurely hypothetical, about an ideal, theoretical world (Light and deShalit 2003: 1).

As just noted, it is often hard to see how these discussions relate tosociety in general. Further, philosophers, more often than not, makeno attempt to make such connections. In sum, philosophical epistm fre-quently stand aloof, indifferent to the concrete concerns of real peo-ple. There are, of course, many exceptions, but this is the dominanttrend. Hence, to the outsider philosophy appears obtuse and irrele-vant. This is likely contributing factor to its stagnation, or decline.10

Given all this, it is hard to see how the conservative, intrinsicvalue argument can move skeptical administrators, politicians andtaxpayers to generously support philosophy and the humanities.

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The Progressive Alternative

To repeat, the task is to provide a renewed vision of philosophy andthe humanities, where these fields provide an essential social good, orin the words of David Orr, to provide a coherent vision of the lib-eral arts relevant to our times (Orr 1992: 100). This cannot be doneas long as the Market-Model dominates higher education. The human-ities, in a manner of speaking, do not have a parallel applied human-ities with the economic potential of the applied sciences, that wouldallow it to thrive under this model. However, in the Citizen-ModelUniversity, educating citizens is the primary goal, while supportingthe economy is secondary.11 Practical philosophy, and the practicalhumanities in general, plays a crucial role in providing a social good:the training of citizens.

Broadly speaking, what I am calling the Citizen-Model Universityis part of a deep tradition in liberal education in which the goal isto develop citizens. However, the notion of a citizen, like otherimportant ethical/political goals, such as freedom or justice, iscontested. While it is not possible to develop and defend an exhaus-tive ideal of a citizen in this paper, I will present the basic out-lines drawing on classical and contemporary sources, specificallyAristotle and John Dewey.

Aristotle, Citizenship, and Practical Wisdom

The Greek, eleutheria, freedom, is synonymous with citizen; it means toparticipate in the life of the polis, in contrast to slaves and foreigners.The key idea here is that a citizen is granted free choice ( prohairesis).This notion of choice, prohairesis, means more than mere preference.Aristotle observes that, It is a mistake to identify choice . . . withappetite, passion, wish or some other form of opinion (Nicomachean Ethics(NE ) 1111b, 15). Hans-Georg Gadamer writes that prohairesis refersto the human capacity to knowingly prefer one thing to anotherand consciously choosing among alternatives (Gadamer 1986: 91).He continues: The free decision takes its bearings by the order ofpreferences guiding ones life conduct, whether it be pleasure, orpower and honor, or knowledge (Ibid.: 91). Moreover, there is anexcellence or virtue (aret ) associated with choosing, which is onlyrealized fully in the free status of the citizen in the polis (Ibid.).This excellence in choosing is practical wisdom, phronsis.

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The philosopher Philippa Foot has articulated a simple but help-ful conception of practical wisdom (Foot, 1978: 322-323). In her con-ception, wisdom consists of two parts: the first is to know the rightmeans to acquire certain good ends (Ibid.). The second is to knowwhat a particular end is worth. This is to be distinguished from aclever person who knows how to acquire ends, but cannot discerntheir value. For example, a wise person understands that, in verybroad terms, pleasure is desirable and knows the best means toacquire pleasure. But a wise person also knows that health is ofgreater value than pleasure. Hence, that person will subordinate thepursuit of pleasure to that of health when they conflict.

So the moral ideal of a good citizen is one that possesses prac-tical wisdom. Aristotle writes that such people have the capacity ofseeing what is good for themselves and for mankind, and these are,we believe, the qualities of men capable of managing householdsand states (NE, 1140b, 10). The point to see here is the connectionbetween freedom, citizenship and making choices as guided by prac-tical wisdom. In sum, the good citizen is one who makes wise choiceson both the personal and social levels.

Moreover, phronsis is a third sphere of knowledge, to be distinguishedfrom theoretical knowledge, epistm, and practical know-how, techn.Gadamer writes: Practical knowledge ( phronsis) is another kind ofknowledge, [distinguishable from epistm, which aims at the true].Primarily, this means that it is directed toward concrete situations(Ibid.: 93). Further, practical wisdom is not merely master technicalexpertise (Ibid.). Therefore, the kind of education that would helpstudents become good citizens aims to develop practical wisdom( phronsis), the study of which is the province of practical philosophy.

Dewey, Citizenship, and Intelligent Choice

In this discussion, John Dewey is important for distinguishing thenotion of a free-person, or citizen, being used here, from that ofclassical Liberalism. This distinction is particularly important sinceclassical Liberalism is the antecedent of the contemporary free-marketindividualism, which underwrites the Market-Model University.

Dewey notes that there is a fallacy in the political and economictheories of classical Liberalism. He writes of its founders that:

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habits of deliberation we can move toward making better choices inthe future. In contrast, those who do not reflect on their habits ofarriving at choices are destined to repeat bad habits. Sooner or latersuch people will create conditions at odds with their desires. Forexample, many people habitually make poor purchasing decisionsleading to large credit card debt. If they do not intelligently reflecton how they are making their household decisions, they will ulti-mately relinquish their freedom to creditors.

In sum, of course, there are no guarantees that intelligent choiceswill always enhance freedom; the unexpected, luck, etc., is always inplay. However, people who develop the habits of careful, self-criticaldeliberation will, more often than not, enhance their freedom as faras possible. This idea of intelligent choice can be applied to theaggregate choices of free societies. If collectively a society does notcultivate habits intelligent choice, that society will diminish the realmof freedom.

While much more needs to be said, particularly about the moralcomponent of choices, the above should provide a sketch of the ideaof a citizen. In sum, it is centered on the acquired ability of a per-son to make free choices. Free choices require an excellence asdescribed by Deweys notion of intelligent choice and Aristotlesnotion of practical wisdom. Both thinkers see the virtue of makingwise or intelligent choices as the product of developing habits ofreflective, self-critical moral judgment and habits of deliberation,within a social context. This positive conception of freedom and cit-izenship is in contrast to the negative conception in classical Liberalism,which is the antecedent of the free-market individualism that under-writes the Market-Model University.

Practical Philosophy and the Citizen-Model University

So how does practical philosophy go about the task of education forcitizenship? To begin, in general terms the Citizen-Model Universityexplicitly focuses on courses that develop deliberative skills and moraljudgment. In both the traditional university and the Market-Modelpractical wisdom is largely taken for granted. For example, in thetraditional university epistm is of chief value and techn is subordinate;phronsis is not an explicit focus. Allan Bloom, for instance, seems tobelieve that studying the classics produces wisdom as a sort of byprod-uct. In the Market-Model techn is the primary focus and epistm is

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seen in terms of its relevance to developing marketable skills andtechnologies. Here too there is little explicit focus on phronsis, as itis relegated to the odd elective in applied ethics. In the Citizen-Model University the chief focus is phronsis, which is brought intoclose relationship with epistm and techn. The relationship might bevisualized as follows: Epistm Phronsis Techn. In simplistic terms,in the Citizen-Model University students will study, for example, thetheory behind cloning and the technology of cloning, but most impor-tantly they will deliberate over the concrete, practical question:Should we clone? One might object that such questions are alreadydiscussed. However, the real issues are emphasis, priorities and howsuch questions are approached.

Turning to the question of emphasis and priorities, in the Citizen-Model University practical philosophy is moved from the peripheryto the center. In some ways this is already starting to happen withthe proliferation of courses in applied ethics, ethics centers and pro-fessional organizations devoted to applied philosophy. There would,of course, be strong objections to making practical issues the mainfocus of philosophical research and education, particularly from aca-demic philosophers. As noted earlier, the field is dominated by theo-retical problems. Applied philosophy is a subspecialty. In his essay,The Recovery of Practical Philosophy, Stephen Toulmin respondsto this objection. He writes:

Nowadays, then, philosophers are increasingly drawn into public debatesabout environmental policy, medical ethics, judicial practice, or nuclearpolitics. Some contribute to these discussions happily; others fear thatengaging in applied philosophy prostitutes their talents and distractsthem from their proper concern with quantification theory, illocution-ary force, possible worlds, or the nature of Erlebnis. For these purists,I have a special message. These practical debates are no longer appliedphilosophy: they are philosophy itself (Toulmin 1988: 345).

Toulmin has spent a career providing arguments to support this spe-cial message to academic philosophers, most recently in his book,Return to Reason (Toulmin 2001a), and in the essay cited above. Hence,to save space I will merely refer to these works. Nonetheless, a lineof argument has already been established: either philosophers engagein these public debates or continue to drift into social irrelevance.

There is a second criticism of the increasing trend toward appliedphilosophy, articulated by Christina Sommers. Addressing this crit-icism provides the opportunity to contrast applied philosophy with

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means theoretical debate can often be avoided. This is a distinctadvantage over the logic of applied philosophy. As Light and Katzpoint out, applied philosophy requires a commitment to a theoryprior to its application (Light and Katz 1996: 10). With practicalphilosophy there is no need to engage these difficult-to-agree-upontheoretical debates as long as people agree upon the goal. Peopledo not need to reach consensus over the right ethical theory. It isenough that they agree on the goal, for whatever reason. As Nortonhas demonstrated, people do not have to share the same theoreti-cal, environmental ethics to share the same practical, environmen-tal goals (Norton 1991). That is, people with different worldviewsoften converge on the same policy goals.14 However, sometimes peo-ple do disagree about whether a particular goal should be pursuedor how various goals should be prioritized. At this point theoreticaldebates about ethical theories have their place, but it is only in con-nection to real disputes as they arise in policy deliberation.

Once a goal is agreed upon, the right or best means needed torealize the goal must be chosen. So the next step in practical rea-soning is to make an open-ended list of possible ways of achievingthe goal. This list acknowledges the fact that there is often morethan one way to realize a goal. Also, because it is open-ended, itmakes room for alternatives not yet considered or sufficiently devel-oped at the present time. Next, in deciding upon the best means toachieve a goal a list is made of the practical obstacles that might pre-vent reaching the goal through each selected means. Also, a list ofpossible side-effects is made for each alternative listed. The conclusiontakes these factors into account to arrive at the best means for achiev-ing the goal.

This model does not avoid the need to debate theoretical issues;however they are only discussed as needed in the context of con-crete problems in real-life deliberations. For example, there is theproblem of how much moral weight to assign to potential side effects.The recent intense discussion over the precautionary principle,which roughly says we should error on the side of precaution whenthere is potential for irreversible environmental harm, shows howtheoretical issues in ethics and philosophy of science are engaged inthe deliberative process. Also, the existence of practical obstacles mayimply the need for radical social and political change in order toreach a goal through a particular means. This requires social andpolitical philosophy to be discussed.

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7. In 1998 Berkeleys College of Natural Resources (CNR) made a strategicalliance with the transnational, Swiss based biotech company Novartis (now Sygenta).The arrangement brought $25 million to the Department of Plant and MicrobialBiology over five years to fund basic research. In exchange the company receivedfirst right to negotiate licenses on approximately a third of the departments dis-coveriesincluding the results of research funded by state and federal sources(Press & Washburn 2000). Moreover, it granted the company an unprecedentedtwo of the five seats on the departments research committee, which determinesproject funding. There was much faculty opposition to the agreement on the Berkeleycampus. The administrator who was the chief architect of the Novartis deal,Gordon Rausser, argued that faculty resistance was due to ignorance about thechanging economic realities of higher education (Press & Washburn 2002). Asnoted earlier, part of these new economic realities are the decline in public fund-ing and the increase in funding from corporate sources. However, another part ofthe new economic reality is the reconceived role of research at public universitiesas an engine for economic growth. For example, Rausser comments: New growththeorists argue that up to 50% of all U.S. economic growth over the last 50 yearsis due to investment in R & D. Future growth will depend on future research andinvestment (Rausser 1999: 7). Obviously, new growth theorists see the immenseresearch capacities of public universities in terms of the potential to create wealth.In sum, the theory behind Berkeleys agreement with Novartis is that marketabletechnologies should drive basic research. This is evident in the structure of theagreement. Rausser writes that what is ground-breaking about the relationshipbetween Novartis and Berkeley is that it starts, on the front end, not the backend, after some discovery has occurred (Rausser).

8. It is important to note that while industry has no doubt always exertedinfluence on the academy, over the last thirty years there has been an explicit pro-gram to merge these institutions. Accompanying these changes is a collapsing ofthe distinctions between public science and private science, basic research and appliedresearch.

9. Another problem, which I will not pursue here, might be due to the effectsof postmodernisms deconstruction of the idea of humanistic epistm. In sum, post-modern theories of theory, if you will, may be undermining the credibility of human-istic research.

10. Again, I believe what is said here of philosophy is likely to apply to otherfields in the humanities.

11. It should be noted that what Im suggesting here does not deny the impor-tance of higher education for economic development. Universities should train skilledworkers and develop marketable technologies. The issue is one of prioritizing goals.The goal of education for citizenship should be primary, supporting economic growthsecondary. There is a distinct drift in the Market-Model University that neglects orsubordinates what should be the primary goal. In order to sustain a thriving, demo-cratic society both skilled workers and good citizens are necessary, but training ofcitizens is comes before producing a skilled work force. Moreover, mastering a nar-row, technical skill does not contribute to the development of the qualities of agood democratic citizen. The totalitarian states of the 20th century trained manyfirst class technicians.

12. Conversely, nothing in these comments would discourage teaching courseson issues that could more readily be called private morality.

13. One needs to ask if people reason this way in making important personal orpolitical decisions? Do people start by deciding whether or not they are Kantians,Utilitarians, Deep Ecologists, etc.? Next, do they derive universal principles fromthat theory and apply the relevant principle to the particular controversy, thus arriv-ing at a course of action consistent with their theoretical commitments?

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Metaphysical Reflection and Environmental Ethics

I begin with a thought experiment that has become something of achestnut in the area of environmental ethics. I lay it out not in orderto adequately evaluate whether it is successful in isolating a meta-physical intuition concerning the value of the natural world (I thinkit is) but in order to explore its purported role as foundational toan environmental ethics that makes a real difference in practice.

The thought experiment I would like to consider was formulatedby Richard Routley at the dawn of environmental philosophy assuch.11 Imagine a last man, who takes it in his head to destroy theliving things and ecosystems that would otherwise survive him. Ourimmediate unreflective response would be to say that there wouldbe something very wrong about this. Thus, Routley argues, ourthought experiment shows that nonhuman beings have inherent value.There is a goodness to them that is not dependent on the thoughtprocesses of an evaluator; for, in the situation under consideration,the evaluator is absent from the scene. Routley argued that, insofaras traditional Western ethics is not able to account for this value, itis deficient, and ethics needs a new foundation. Thus environmen-tal ethics as a distinctive discipline is born.

There are various ways of countering Routleys claim, and vari-ous ways in which it can be defended, some of which Routley him-self offered to critics both potential and actual. I have much to sayon this, which I hope to soon offer the community of environmen-tal ethicists. But I here avoid such ontological speculation, since mypresent task is to wonder what effect such exploration has on actualconduct. More specifically, what effect could a college philosophyclass in which such metaphysical argumentation plays a dominantrole have on the actual behavior of students taking it? Could it con-ceivably lead to a more environmentally responsible life, after theexaminations and paper assignments are long forgotten?

Suppose that someone finds Routleys argument philosophicallyconvincing. What has happened? A thought experiment shows thatcertain things are good independent of human valuation and henceshows the inadequacy of a metaethics that denies this. Accordingly,an alternative ethical theory is required, which gives some ontolog-ical status to such goodness. This theory both posits value outsideof the human realm (a move with which Jamieson and Callicott haveno objection) and takes the source of that value to lie outside of the

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8. This view is most strongly identified with the movement known as environ-mental pragmatism; see Light and Katz (1996).

9. An anonymous referee noted that some environmental pragmatists may objectto the suggestion that they are defending orthodoxy, if orthodoxy requires a com-mitment to some fixed set of normative ends with respect to human-environmentrelationships. They would argue that pragmatism encourages a provisional andexperimental attitude toward ends as well as means (see Norton 2003). But theorthodox conception of environmental philosophy, as I have defined it, requires nocommitment to a fixed set of normative ends, whether anthropocentric or nonan-thropocentric. All that it requires is a commitment to the view that environmentalphilosophy is, or ought to be, an intellectual discipline that is primarily concernedwith ameliorating the relationship between human beings and the natural world. Iwould be surprised to find an environmental pragmatist who would not agree to this.

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engaged in class discussions, readings and writing. When placed ina more adversarial, real-world policy environment, we believe ourstudents can better articulate their own positions as well as betterevaluate other positions. Anecdotal feedback we have received fromour graduates confirms this. But, we strongly agree with an anony-mous reviewer of this paper that if one adopts the pedagogy wedescribe here, one ought to discuss with students the differences theywill likely experience between the cooperative methods of discoursethey use in our classrooms and the more adversarial methods of dis-course that currently dominate real-world policy arenas. A morecooperative real-world policy process is a worthy long-term goal, andwe believe that in providing our students with the skills to engagein a more cooperative policy process, we can begin to move towardsthat goal.

Finally, having worked with hundreds of students, we find thatour approach more often than not leads students to beliefs (and, weassume, actions) that are more beneficial to the planet and its humanand nonhuman inhabitants. That is to say, they tend not to choosebeliefs or actions that a reader of this journal might find objection-able or repulsive. Instead, by not imposing our beliefs or professingthe superiority of one type of ethic over another, students engage indeep and respectful inquiry and discussion, and nearly always stu-dents end up finding their ways to ethics of great environmentalsophistication, depth, and sensitivity.

Benefits of Respectful, Non-advocacy Driven Discussion

This brings us to our third principle: a course that does not advocatefor a particular environmental ethic may enhance rather than inhibitstudents moral development. In our course, we facilitate respectfullistening and discussion that have as their goal not a search for theright argument but instead a search for better understanding ofdiverse viewpoints (note that this does not preclude a search forsound arguments). In promoting respectful listening and discussion,however, we are not promoting ethical relativism. Our course explic-itly assumes that there are better and worse, more ethical and lessethical ways of being and acting. We make this assumption explicitto students early in the semester when we discuss ethical relativismand its negative implications for collaborative ethical inquiry. But we

Teaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00113___9322579c3f6d03106205fd20d3c8f22e.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00114___a316da985214132b8814f39654a98d85.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00115___13fd49d87cb319cbbdd62a06e2f28903.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00116___cf0b89fb4f9668764b7e0fb429c9309c.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00117___2fd1ed9fdb5ee6f67ecfbce00a366b3b.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00118___6738a85016c0ea3efc6a6720c31979ed.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00119___312ad02eb1e5240913f40565d54e9763.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00120___d7ba9a00d1f28fff6cb1eaaec9ab14c9.pdf112 dr. daniel f. shapiro and dr. david takacs

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Students Translate Conservation Biology into Conservation Policy. ConservationBiology.

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15:61-74.Wondolleck, J.M. and S.L. Yaffee. 2000. Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from

Innovation in Natural Resource Management. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.

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2. Decision-making Process: Identify who will decide what will happenin the future, explain how that decision will be made, and identifydifferences in each stakeholders ability influence the decision-makingprocess.

3. Policy Alternatives: Identify at least two policy alternatives, andfor each: name the stakeholders who support that policy recom-mendation, the most important empirical claims used to support thatpolicy recommendation, and the most important value claims madeby stakeholders supporting that policy recommendation (these valueclaims may either be explicitly stated in the article or inferred by you).

4. Ethical Analysis: Identify major differences in a) frameworks for ethical decisions making (e.g. utilitarian vs. rights-based ethic), b) value claims, and/or c) fundamental assumptions that you believe lead the stakeholder groups to support different policy recommendations.

Part II: Policy Recommendation

1. Identify which of the policy recommendations identified in Part Iyou support.

2. Explain why you support this policy recommendation. Yourexplanation should be based solely on your previous analysis; youshould not be introducing new information here. (Note: If your pol-icy recommendation is that we should do nothing until we obtainadditional empirical information, you will need to justify the deci-sion to do nothing and explain how the additional empirical infor-mation you propose we collect will help you determine the bestcourse of action.)

3. Explain why you rejected the alternative policy recommendations.

Part III: Personal Reflection

1. Identify your personal interest in this problem/issue. 2. Identify your position on this issue before you started your

research and explain why you held that position. 3. Explain the extent to which you feel your personal values and

biases affected your ability to present all perspectives in a fair andnon-judgmental manner.

4. Explain how consideration of alternative perspectives affectedyour position.

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The students are not encouraged to go to the books (or the Web)to learn more about skunks; thats not the point of the assignment.They studied skunks in second grade in primary school. But sinceprimary school, they have not been outdoors, except to walk to thecar or to play sports, neither activity yielding much in the way ofopportunity to interact with nature. Our first job is to remind themthat there is, indeed, an outdoors, and that if they look at it, theywill see and learn.

4. The Recognition of Community and the Directions of Education

For Carson and for Leopold, the fundamental insight was not thatnature has economic worth that we are just too benighted to see(although they both believed that), nor yet that the creatures andlocales with which and within which they spent so many joyful hoursshould enjoy rights at law (although they may have believed that,too), but that in the natural world they, and all of us by extension,are at home, among our relatives, in the village that nurtured us,in the community where we belong.

Why are we so at home in the natural world? Edward O. Wilsonnicely describes the relationship:

The life-sustaining matrix (for human life) is built of green plants withlegions of microorganisms and mostly small, obscure animalsin otherwords, weeds and bugs. Such organisms support the world with efficiencybecause they are so diverse, allowing them to divide labor and swarmover every square meter of the earths surface. They run the world pre-cisely as we would wish it to be run, because humanity evolved within living com-munities and our bodily functions are finely adjusted to the idiosyncratic environmentalready created. Mother Earth, lately called Gaia, is no more than thecommonality of organisms and the physical environment they main-tain with each passing moment . . . (Wilson 1992: 345)

Holmes Rolston III also cites the million-year intimacy of co-evolu-tion as the source of the value that nature has for us. In the courseof considering, and rejecting, a radical subjectivism as the basis forthe value we place on nature, he concludes:

But the valuing subject in any otherwise valueless world is an insufficientpremise for the experienced conclusions of those who respect all life.Conversion to a biological view seems truer to world experience andmore logically compelling. Something from a world beyond the human

Teaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00135___a5aecb8b84841cb42c60fb48e4a74576.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00136___5c6f4885ccb199b21144b376db99a763.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00137___383f6c4c15009e619d0dbeca6a16c78e.pdfTeaching_Environmental_Ethics/9004150056/files/00138___242291aeb65a2cc39d7a92887104d019.pdfWALKING THE TALK: PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATION ON

THE ISLE OF RUM

Emily Brady, Alan Holland and Kate Rawles

AbstractThis paper describes our experience of teaching environmental ethics as part of aPhilosophy of Conservation field trip to Rum, off the West coast of Scotland. Thefield trip was formalised into an M.A. Module in 1999. After outlining the educa-tional aims of the module, and how these are implemented in this setting, we indi-cate some of the key issues in ethics and aesthetics that emerge as we explore twospecific conservation sites. We close with a reflection on the value of experientialeducation in this area, and the importance of combining experiential, emotionaland intellectual engagement in any exploration of normative issues.

Keywords: Environmental ethics, environmental aesthetics, environmental education,nature conservation, environmental values, wilderness

Introduction

Rum is an island off the west coast of Scotland. For some years phi-losophy lecturers from Lancaster University have been visiting theisland with a small party of postgraduate students and we have con-structed a module on the Philosophy of Conservation around ourvisit. We tell our students that the text for the module is the islanditself. It is not such a large text, being approximately lozenge-shapedand measuring some fourteen kilometres across at its wider points.But since it is rough and rugged terrain, the idea takes some get-ting used to, and our foot-sore students do on occasion hanker formore conventional texts. It is an excellent site for studying the phi-losophy of conservation since it challenges almost every pre-conceivedidea one might have on the subject. More generally it is an excel-lent site for doing (the ill-named) applied philosophy, when this isproperly understood not as the application of philosophical ideas toparticular situations but as an engagement with the challenge posedto philosophical ideas by particular situations.

We stay in simple hostel accommodation on the island, sharingall the chores between us, and eating our meals under the baleful

Clare Palmer (Ed.), Teaching Environmental Ethics, 130-147. 2006 Koninklijke Brill NV. Printed in the Netherlands.

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ethics. One such approach starts with a tale of environmental woe,and infers that we should change our values if we are to makethings better. The Rum trip, while it might connect at a number ofpoints with wider tales of woe, largely moves along different routesfrom practice to values. But it is passionately concerned with values,and part of this includes challenging three (at least) commonly heldassumptions about values and what they are like:

One is the assumption that we can simply change our values,as if this were a process somewhat akin to changing a suit ofclothes. Instead, we believe that, if values change is called for,this in turn will require a lot of hard and sustained critical, emo-tional and experiential engagement with a range of issues.

Another assumption is that values precede and determine actions.Whilst the interplay between values and actions is complicated,we believe it is often more accurate to picture values as what wereason towards, rather than what we reason from.

A third is the tendency to regard values as subjectivea matterof opinion and beyond the reach of critical reflection. But in ourview, values are pre-eminently a subject for critical examination,debate and reflection, as well as being importantly connected toemotions and experience. We start, then, not from tales of envi-ronmental woe coupled with recipes for their solution, but fromthe practical problems faced on the ground by those charged withconserving nature on our behalf. And, if we reach the tales ofwoe at any point in our journey, we work hard to take a robust,critical understanding of values into this particular fray with us.

The third over-arching aim is to point up the fact that environ-mental policy-making, much like our field trip itself, has to be con-ducted in all weathers. From the sudden storms of political upheavalto the icy blasts of EU regulation, all must somehow be accommo-dated in the current management plan, alongside the possibly gen-tler demands of local councils, boards of managers and local residents.Again, this works to debunk any myths about the detached, scientificand objective nature of conservation practice. The manager of theFalls of Clyde, for example, has to meet exacting conservation stan-dards, but he also has to fell a swathe of trees that are at risk ofinterfering with the overhead power lines that run across his site.He makes the most he can of the situation by letting the trees liewhere they are felled, choosing to face out the criticism that they

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In this way, a philosophical approach to conservation can be seenas mirroring philosophical work that, we believe, is extremely use-ful in the wider environmental agenda. Here too, environmentalproblems such as climate change or biodiversity loss can be pre-sented in a way that obscures the value issues that inevitably under-pin them (as soon as a phenomenon is described as a problem,value judgments are involved). Values and value judgments alsounderpin our responses to environmental issues and the way theyare prioritised and framed. Drawing attention to these values, andopening them out for critical debate is, arguably, a key componentof the kinds of changes that many of us believe will be part of atransition to more sustainable ways of living (Rawles 1998).

On a number of occasions we have encountered conservationorganisations and individual practitioners who, while arguably shar-ing very similar values and objectives, nevertheless have strikinglydifferent styles or attitudes. Sometimes these differences can be dis-cerned within the same practitioner as, for example, when a formerwarden of Rum told us both that he saw Rum as an outdoor lab-oratory and that he believed that the trees should be allowed togo where they choose. Clearly, one suggests a much more inter-ventionist and controlling approach than the other. Here too, parallelscan be explored between different conservation attitudes and moregeneral ways in which humans understand their relations with thenon-human world. Do we see ourselves as part of the environmentor immersed in it? Is our attitude towards the environment largely oneof co-operation, or management or domination? Does it make anysense to ask these questions about human attitudes to non-humans,or do they need to be located in specific practices, such as agricul-ture? And so on. Again, once underlying attitudes have been identified,they can be critically considered and appraised (Rawles 1995).

A range of more specific ethical dilemmas and challenges emergefrom these encounters with conservation practices and underlyingvalues and attitudes. One that has not already been mentioned isthe tension between an ethical concern for sentient animals as indi-viduals, and a focus on entities and concepts such as habitat, speciesor biodiversity. By no means all of the young Sea Eagles flown injets from Norway survived the journey, and the survivors experiencedsignificant levels of stress. Conservation practice often rests on theassumption that compromising the welfare of individual creatures isjustified in the interests of goals such as protecting biodiversity through

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(NSA). The forty NSAs in Scotland are defined as areas of specialprotection that represent the most prized of Scotlands scenery.

But on our field trip, the experience of Rum is only occasionallyone of scenery. During our 2003 trip we had fine weather on theday of our departure. From the ferry, the magnificent peaks of theisland form a dark outline against the blue green sea and clear sky.On another fine day (there are not very many of these), standingon top of one of these peaks one can take in much of the islandstextures, from a creamy, sandy beach to the bushy tops of the for-est by the castle, to the dark, distant peaks of the Cuillin range onthe neighbouring island of Skye. During our May trips, the realityof our day to day aesthetic experience of Rum is its dramatic weatherpatterns: low clouds and mist obscuring higher ground, usually windy,changing rapidly from sun to driving rain, maybe to hail and backagain to a sunny spell. Besides the sounds of the weather, it is a rel-atively quiet place, especially inland, away from the sounds of coastalbirds, except at night when the huge population of Manx shear-waters return to their burrows, and in the morning when a dawnchorus is heard in the woodlands around Kinloch.

Along these lines, one issue raised with students is the need tomove beyond Rums scenic value to discuss and grasp the aestheticfeatures of the island as an environment all around us, through all thesenses, perhaps also through our imaginative and emotional responses.That is, we attempt to capture the dominant aesthetic character ofRum. The field trip setting is ideal for teaching environmental aes-thetics, primarily because our discussion is based on first hand expe-rience of a case study. Not only is it first hand experience of theisland environment, but the same environment is experienced by allof us, at our own leisure or at the same time while out togethertaking a walk across the island or up one of its peaks. Such firsthand experience is especially relevant to studying philosophical aes-thetics, because many would argue that the aesthetic response is bydefinition based on first hand experience. The opportunity to dis-cuss a shared experience is invaluable to the process of understandingthe relevance of aesthetics to conservation strategy on Rum.

On the third day of our five days on Rum, we have a classroomseminar session on landscape designations and the concept of theaesthetic character of environments. This lecture and discussion givesstudents knowledge of a range of concepts and strategies used forunderstanding the aesthetic value of environments, and how that

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Rawles, Kate. 1995. The Missing Shade of Green in Don Marietta and LesterEmbree (eds) Environmental Philosophy and Environmental Activism. Lanham: Rowmanand Littlefield. pp. 149-167.

. 1998. Philosophy and the Environmental Movement in David Cooper andJoy Palmer (eds) Spirit of the Environment. London: Routledge. pp. 131-145.

. 1997. Conservation and Animal Welfare in T. Chappell, (ed.) The Philosophyof the Environment. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 135-155.

Samuel, Andy. 2000. Rum: nature and community in harmony?. ECOS, Vol. 22,Issue no 1; 36-45.

Scottish Natural Heritage. Website, http://www.snh.org.uk www.snh.org.uk. 1997. Scotlands Natural Heritage, No. 11 RumThe First Forty Years

Perth: Scottish Natural Heritage. Sibley, Frank. 1959. Aesthetic Concepts. Philosophical Review 68:4: 421-450.Warren, K., Sakofs, M. and J. Hunt (eds). 1995. The theory of experiential education.

Kendall: Hunt Publishing.

walking the talk 147

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individuals have been involved in teaching the course, including theco-authors of this article.

Granting that there are severe limits to what normally can beachieved in a college level environmental ethics course, courses suchas NR 407 nonetheless can play an important role in a studentsoverall journey to maturity, and even may at times provide a cru-cial element in their ethical formation. Several fundamental pointshave been critical to our approach, which notably is not mainlyabout preparing students to do further study in ethics in a philoso-phy graduate program or in a theological seminary, but rather aboutwhat is effective, appropriate, challenging, and fulfilling for studentswho will likely take only one ethics course during their college/grad-uate school years.

From the very beginning, our goal has been not to focus on giv-ing students specific answers to particular problems in environmen-tal ethicse.g., the ethics of white-tailed deer management, whetheror not wolves should have been re-introduced to Yellowstone NationalPark, tradeoffs between concern for individual animals and for ecosys-temsbut rather to help students learn how to think about ethicalissues, in particular to learn what kind of understanding is necessaryeven to begin to think clearly about such matters. To be sure, wehave looked at a range of specific policy issues, occasionally in con-siderable detail. But the main focus of the course has been moretheoretical than applied. An examination of the syllabus of Religion,Ethics, and the Environment makes clear what we mean by this approach.1

The Influence of Iris Murdoch

Our thinking and practice with regards to how to do ethics hasdrawn heavily on the work of British novelist and philosopher IrisMurdoch.2 Murdoch argues that the fundamental questions to addressin ethics concern who we are and what the world is like, and thatonce we gain clarity on these fundamental questions many moraldilemmas resolve themselves rather quickly. Thus we spend a gooddeal of time in the course discussing issues like the meaning of nature,the nature of animals and human beings, what constitutes knowl-edge, whether or not moral claims can rightly be considered knowl-edge claims (closely related to the issue of moral relativism), and

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new information to the students; rather it awakens ideas that thestudents already hold fiercely and passionately, stretches them tothink beyond their assumptions, and provides space for respectfuldebate about larger questions.

Conclusion

All of us, professor and teaching assistants, share the view that studentshave responded so positively to the course not mainly because it hasbeen well taught but because the approach and the content deeplyengage students as total persons, not just as disembodied minds. Mostof the students have found it difficult to remain disengaged observers;rather they encountered ideas and a kind of teaching that addressedthem as total persons, constantly challenging them to live differentlyand not just to think differently.

For thirty years, Richard Baer has concluded his semesters finallecture with the following quotation from Thomas Merton. In NewSeeds of Contemplation, Merton writes this:

What is serious to men is often trivial in the eyes of God. What inGod might appear to us as play is perhaps what he himself takesmost seriously. At any rate the Lord plays and diverts himself in thegarden of his creation, and if we could let go of our own obsessionwith what we think is the meaning of it all, we might be able to hearHis call and follow Him in His mysterious, cosmic dance. We do nothave to go very far to catch echoes of that game, and of that dancing.When we are alone on a starlit night; when by chance we see themigrating birds in autumn descending on a grove of junipers to rest andeat; when we see children in a moment when they are really children;when we know love in our own hearts; or when, like the Japanesepoet Bash we hear an old frog land in a quiet pond with a solitarysplashat such times the awakening, the turning inside out of all val-ues, the newness, the emptiness and purity of vision that make them-selves evident, provide a glimpse of the cosmic dance.

For the world and time are the dance of the Lord in emptiness.The silence of the spheres is the music of a wedding feast. The morewe persist in misunderstanding the phenomena of life, the more weanalyze them out into strange finalities and complex purposes of ourown, the more we involve ourselves in sadness, absurdity, and despair.But it does not matter much, because no despair of ours can alter thereality of things, or stain the joy of the cosmic dance which is alwaysthere. Indeed, we are in the midst of it, and it is in the midst of us,for it beats in our very blood, whether we want it to or not.

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12. Cf. John ONeills claim: To hold an environmental ethic is to hold thatnon-human beings and states of affairs in the natural world have intrinsic value(ONeill 1992: 119).

13. See also Norton 1991.14. Here are just a few of hundreds of similar comments from thirty years of

students:

As a student somewhat disenchanted with the university, I would not regretmy decision to attend Cornell based on this course alone.

I would consider this the best class I have had in my career at Cornellsimply because it has caused me to think and to engage more than any otherclass I have taken.

Natural Resources 407 is probably the most important course I will takein college, because it has allowed me to form a basic world view from whichI will conduct the rest of my education and future career.

You have empowered more people than you know with this course and Ithank you for your service.

Without a doubt, it is the class that I have found the most valuable in myfour years at Cornell.

I was totally unprepared for the radically different kind of learning thatwas found in this class. . . . [It] asks more of its students. It says, there is moreto the human experience than a sum of simple, separable and discrete parts.

This course is inherently valuable. . . . It is one of those key experiences ina students career that will greatly affect the way they continue to live oncethey have left the course and the university.

Although frustrating at times, [NR 407] will prove to be incredibly reward-ing in the future.

I wished that schools would tape the mantra life is a gift on top of everyblackboard, because I believe acceptance of that fact goes a long way towardmaking us better people.

The material in this class isnt just for a grade, but for a lifetime of appli-cation and that is why I value this class so much.

I come away from this course with some answers, some tools towards findingnew answers, and a lot of questions.

References

Baer, Richard A., Jr. 1977. Values Clarification as Indoctrination. The EducationalForum 56 (2) January, 155-165.

. 1979. Praise for All Things. Princeton Seminary Bulletin, 11 (2) (New Series):124-133.

. 1980. A Critique of the Use of Values Clarification in EnvironmentalEducation, The Journal of Environmental Education, 12 (1) Fall: 13-16.

. 1982. Teaching Values in the Schools: Clarification or Indoctrination?Principal, 61 (3) January: 17-21, 36.

Barbour, Ian G. 1966. Issues in Science and Religion. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Coles, Robert. 1989. The Call of Stories: Teaching and the Moral Imagination. Boston:Houghton.

Hauerwas, Stanley. 1981. The Significance of Vision: Toward an Aesthetic Ethic,in Vision and Virtue: Essays in Critical Ethical Reflection. Notre Dame, IN: Universityof Notre Dame Press, pp. 30-47.

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Texts consulted included Thomas Castens Turning Off the Heat(1998), Energy: Science, Policy and the Pursuit of Sustainability edited byRobert Bent, Lloyd Orr, and Randall Baker (2001), and DonaldBrowns American Heat: Ethical Problems with the United States Responseto Global Warming (2002). Bent, Orr and Bakers anthology provideda basic interdisciplinary perspective on global energy problems fromwhich students drew when addressing electricity generation and usein the United States. Browns text proved indispensable for identi-fying key ethical concerns that have been absent in positions advo-cated by the United States government during global warmingnegotiations. Castens market-based solution for decarbonizing theUnited States economy, promoting energy efficiency, and establish-ing a renewable energy future sparked critical and creative dialogueamong the students. A plethora of articles and documents from fed-eral and state governments, electric utilities, private renewable energycontractors, and advocacy groups were also assigned for full semi-nar discussion or consideration by teams. An on-line learning pro-gram14 was used for additional dialogue among the students and fordownloading team-generated presentations and drafts of reports.15

The seminar met formally for two hours once a week with team ses-sions held in between.

At the commencement of the seminar, students reviewed currentstatistics issued by the United States Department of Energy on nationaland sector electricity consumption and types of generation that aprofessor in Marquettes Department of Electrical Engineering hadprepared for their use. Also examined were the Energy Policy Proposalformulated under the leadership of the Vice President of the UnitedStates and the latest versions of energy bills in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives and Senate. The students considered several ways oforganizing their research project and began to draft an outline forthe final seminar report. Components needed for each report wereidentified in seminar, and the desire for uniformity was upheld inorder to produce a cohesive report. Categories of various types ofinformation and sources were specified after deliberation on the pos-sibilities, and the students opted for a combination of scholarly sourcesfrom the pertinent disciplines, federal and state documents, infor-mation from non-governmental organizations, including religious andenvironmental advocacy groups, public utilities that generate electricity,and official statements by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church andthe Society of Jesus. For their first research tasks, the students selected

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living in a social setting. According to Darwin, at this point, orbecause of this point, ethics come into being since we cannot livein a social setting without some sort of limitations on our freedomof action, or without ethics. I sometimes summarize this in black-board shorthand as follows:

No Ethics No Society No Survival

Not only are we are ethical creatures because we are social creatures,but we are ethical creatures to the extent that we are social creaturesas well. That is, the more intensely social we are as animals, themore complex are our ethical structures (in fact, those with moreintense societies even have bigger neo-cortexes).5 Again, continuingto root this explanation of ethical development in what the studentsthink of as science seems to command their attention even thoughthey were previously unfamiliar, and even uncomfortable, with eth-ical discourse.

Leopold (1949: 203-4) writes:

All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that the individ-ual is a member of a community of interdependent parts. His instinctsprompt him to compete for his place in the community, but his ethicsprompt him also to co-operate (perhaps in order that there may be aplace to compete for).

In short, given the kind of creatures that we are, our continued exis-tence is more likely given the presence of a society, and for soci-eties to flourish there must be some sort of rule, some sort of limitationon the freedom of action, some sort of ethics.

Teaching the Leopoldian Land Ethic: Sentiment and Ethics

Students often want to know how ethics originate. Darwin assertsthat ethics emanate from the natural parental or filial affections, or inthe biologically ingrained emotional bond of caring for young. Thismeans that, biologically, we all possess the ability to extend moralconsideration to others, or that our moral sentiments are malleable.The notion of a shared ethical capacity here butts up against stu-dents preconceived, but not reflected on notion that ethics are wildlysubjective and fickle (although many have no problem making very

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Historical Social Evolution

Clan Tribe Nation Nation State Global Village Biotic Community

Corresponding Ethical Change

Clan Ethic Tribal Ethic Nation Ethic Patriotism Human Rights Land Ethic

= rationality on the first level, sentimentality on the second, andan arrow between rows can be used to illustrate the correlative natureof the relationship between the level of social realization and thecorresponding ethic.

At this point some caution needs to be exercised. Students oftenreact skeptically to the emotion/moral sentiment approach to ethics.6

Although the tradition Leopold is reflecting here does claim tha