World War II genocides in Yugoslav historiography

Tea Sindbæk The communist partisans’ “National Liberation Fight” against the Axis occupiers and their Yugoslav allies under World War II was the founding myth of socialist Yugoslavia. The war, however, had also been the scene of large scale massacres and atrocities among national groups within Yugoslavia. Thus the communists, who presented the partisan war effort as an all-Yugoslav liberation fight under the slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity” and claimed that they had solved Yugoslavia’s national problem, had also to cope with a recent history of genocide. For these reasons the historiography of the National Liberation War was, to a larger extent than other fields of historical research, penetrated by politics. By the end of the 1980s, as Yugoslavia was disintegrating into national and nationalist entities, the history of wartime massacres and genocide was vigorously discussed, especially within Croatian and Serbian historiography. It was argued by some Serb historians that the wartime massacres for political and nationalist reasons had remained unexamined, while a renowned Croat historian, later to become president, claimed that Jasenovac, the largest concentration camp of the Fascist Ustasha regime in Croatia, was somehow a myth.1 At this time World War II history was hardly less intertwined with politics than it had been in the years of Tito, but the political environment, with which historiography was correlating, was rather different. It remains difficult to distinguish whether we are confronted with taboo-breaking or myth-making – or simply new national historiographies. What is clear, however, is that history and historiography had indeed changed over the 45 years since the end of the war. Among the main issues of dispute had been the number of war-victims, those of Jasenovac in particular, the question of guilt of war crimes, and whether some of these crimes were deliberately kept secret. This paper surveys the Yugoslav, especially the Serbian and Croatian, historiography of the inter-Yugoslav genocides and massacres of World War II with the aim of exploring how it developed and changed in the era of communism. Establishment of the “partisan myth” In the years after World War II the Yugoslav communists carefully established an official Titoist interpretation of Yugoslavia’s wartime experience. In memoirs written by former partisan commanders and party celebrities, and in reports and huge collections of

1 See Vladimir Dedijer’s introduction to: Dedijer, V. & A. Miletić: Proterivanje Srba sa ognjišta: 1941-1944: Svedočanstva. Belgrade 1989, p. 8, or Jefto Šašić’s introduction to: Miletić, A.: Koncentracioni Logor Jasenovac, 1941-1945. Belgrade 1986, p. 7; Tudjman, F.: Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti. Zagreb 1990 (first published 1989) pp. 10-17, 90-101.

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documents the partisans would be presented as un-compromising self-sacrificing warriors, and the genius of their leadership, now the heads of state, would be highly praised. Most important was probably Tito’s own ‘report’, given at the 5th Party Congress of 1949.2 The report’s picture of the warring parties is thoroughly Manichaean, showing on the one side the ‘heroic partisans’ and on the other an almost undifferentiated group of ‘occupiers’, ‘quislings’ and ‘collaborators’. An example of the official worship of the partisan leadership can be found in the Institute of Military History’s publication of documents of the National Liberation Fight in Croatia: “Our revolution took place under specific conditions, and the key to its success is the brilliant clear-sightedness of comrade Tito and our Party, who under these very circumstances were able to find appropriate ways and forms to lead the general people’s uprising to victory.”3 The great sacrifices born by the Yugoslav peoples were emphasised. In a report of the reparation commission after the war it is claimed that “The number of Yugoslavs killed in war, shot or in any other way dead in fascist camps and factories of death – is far higher than the number of sacrifices in any other allied country, except the Soviet Union and Poland. The Yugoslav losses represent 34%, thus more than a third of all allied losses.”4 The number of war losses was officially set at 1.7 million, a figure which, as we shall see, has later been the cause of much debate. There was no attempt at internal reconciliation, as all guilt of war crimes and suffering was laid on the occupying powers and the so-called collaborationists: primarily the Croatian Ustaša regime, The Serbian Chetnik movement led by Draža Mihailović, and Serbia’s pro-Nazi administrators. The stigmatisation of traitors and collaborators was elaborated and widely published, as was the case with the reports of the trial against Bishop Stepinac and other representatives of the Catholic Church in Croatia and that against Draža Mihailović and other Chetnik leaders, who were collectively found guilty of national treason and numerous “crimes against the peoples”, amongst this mass murder, massacres, and torture in concentration camps.5 The memory and interpretation of the war became even more important after 1948, when Yugoslavia was excluded from the Com-inform bloc and the Yugoslav communists needed other sources of legitimacy than the international communist movement. The partisan war now had to justify the construction of the new federal state, supply heroic national myths for the communists, and serve as a proper autochthonous socialist revolution.6 Thus the Yugoslav communists guarded and guided the image of the National Liberation Fight.

2 Tito, J.B.: Izvještaj na V kongresu KPJ. This report is widely cited in Yugoslav historiography and, according to the ten year report and bibliography of the National Committee of Yugoslav Historians, accounts for the basic source on the beginning of World War II in Yugoslavia. Tadić, J. (red.): Dix années d’historiographie Yougoslave 1945-1955. Beograd 1955, s. 578. 3 Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodno-oslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda. Tom V, Knjiga 1. Borbe u Hrvatskoj 1941God. Beograd 1952, p. IX. 4 Reperaciona Komisija pri Vladi Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije: Ljudske i materijalne Žrtve Jugoslavije u ratnom naporu 1941-1945. Belgrade 1945, p. 5-6. 5 Suđenje Lisaku, Stepincu, Šaliću i družini, ustaško-križarskim zločincima i njihovim pomagačima. Dokumenti o protunarodnom radu i zločinima jednog dijela katoličkog klera. Zagreb 1946; The Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović. Stenographic record and documents from the trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović. Beograd 1946, p. 504-508. 6 For an example of the Yugoslav communists’ defence of the national liberation war, see: Popović, K.: Za pravilnu ocenu oslobodilačkog rata naroda Jugoslavije. Komunist 1949, no. 3.

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Within this image they also had to handle the problem of inter-Yugoslav wartime massacres. The massacres in Titoist historiography Compared to the partisans’ strategic exploits the wartime massacres received relatively little attention in professional historiography. This has led some historians to conclude, that there was a taboo on these issues, while others have argued that the events themselves could be discussed, but that there were limitations on approaches, meaning primarily that national aspects could not be assessed.7 In spite of the relatively few publications about the wartime atrocities, however, it is a fact that they were not kept secret. In the years after the war memoirs were published, in which the horrors of Jasenovac and massacres committed by Ustasha units on whole Serbian villages were described.8 This could not have been accidental, as Yugoslav historiography, especially the part of it concerned with modern and contemporary history, was under some degree of political control. After 1948 this was probably, as a result of the official abandonment of Stalinism after the break with the Com-inform bloc, less than in other Countries of Eastern Europe, but Marxism-Leninism was still a necessary interpretative framework, politicians would demand that certain aspects and explanations be emphasised, and speeches from the parties leading figures did possess a certain “normative power”.9 If the guiding of the party was not adhered to, employment could be endangered and publication could become impossible. Thus the explanations given by Tito in his “report” at the 5th Party Congress of 1949 would underlie discussions and conclusions in the works of historians. Through the 75 pages of Tito’s report concerned with the period of World War II the massacres are regularly mentioned as part of a general and well-known background. Only twice are they discussed over more than one sentence: Firstly at the beginning of the war, when, according to Tito: “… the Ustashas started to commit mass slaughtering of Serbian citizens … and the people started to flee into hills and forests to save their lives. The party sent their folks to take the lead of this unfortunate people to resist the bestial Ustasha mass murderers.” And later, when discussing the so called “first enemy offensive”, Tito

7 Bracewell, W.: National histories and national identities among the Serbs and Croats. In: Fulbrook, M. (ed.): National histories and European history. Boulder 1993, p. 157, Höpken, W.: Von der Mythologisierung zur Stigmatisierung: „Krieg und Revolution“ in Jugoslawien 1941-1948 im Spiegel von Geschichtswissenschaft und historischer Publizistik. In: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. (ed.): Kommunismus und Osteuropa. Konzepte, Perspektiven und Interpretationen im Wandel. München 1994, p. 183, Boban, L.: Jasenovac and the manipulation of History. East European Politics and Societies, vol. 4, no. 3, 1990, p. 590 8 See for example: Čolaković, D.: Jasenovac 21.8.1941/31.3.1942. Sarajevo 1948, especially pp. 35-110; Nikolić, N.: Jasenovački logor. Zagreb 1948; Vujasinović, T.: Ozrenski partizanski odred. Sarajevo 1950, p. 75, 81. In: Tadić, J. (red.): Dix années d’historiographie Yougoslave are mentioned more than 300 works on the National Liberation Fight, of which about ten are said to be at least partly about the massacres. 9 Grothusen, K-D.: Jugoslavien und die „Geschichte seiner Völker“. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, vol. 10, 1963; Pawlovich, S.K.: The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988. London 1988, p. 129-130; Shoup, P.: Communism and the Yugoslav National Question. Columbia University Press, New York and London 1968, s. 198-201; Lilly, C.S.: Problems of Persuasion: Communist Agitation and Propaganda in Post-War Yugoslavia, 1944-1948. Slavic Review, vol. 53, no. 2, 1994, p. 410; Höpken, W.: Von der Mythologisierung zur Stigmatisierung, p. 166-174.

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recounts: “See, such a robbers’ collective … burnt, killed, and plundered in the peaceful villages of Macva and in Pocerina: Ustashas, nedić-people, ljotić-people, Pećanac’s Chetniks – all these bandits together with the German fascist beasts committed this terrible cruelty on the peaceful citizens … Eight hundred and sixty Serbian peasants, women, children, and old people, who were found killed … were strewn with flour to make the swine eat them.”10 Indeed Tito does not keep silent about the massacres – he even mentions some of the uncomfortable details. What is important, though, is that there is no differentiation of the enemies – they are all collaborators, all committing atrocities, and nobody is more guilty. The Ustasha-massacres do not receive special attention. In another of the authoritative works from the side of the Yugoslav communists, the classic Tito biography of 1953, written by the renowned partisan and journalist-historian Vladimir Dedijer, more space is dedicated to the Ustashas’ atrocities. Dedijer uses the terms “mass extermination” and “some of the worst murdering” of World War II and describes how “Whole villages were led in front of huge graves and here men and women, mothers and children, were slaughtered and thrown into them. At other places people were simply thrown into ravines.”11 However, Dedijer immediately afterwards points to the murdering committed by Serbian “quislings” on Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, though these are accounted for less explicitly. Dedijer literally describes the atrocities committed by Serbian and Croatian quislings as two sides of the same thing, namely Hitler’s occupation policy in Yugoslavia. Thus the crimes and the guilt are carefully balanced between the different collaborators. The concentration camp of Jasenovac, one of the issues later to be hotly disputed not least by Dedijer himself, is hardly mentioned in the biography. Only in a note in the final chapter dealing with the post-war reconstruction of Yugoslavia, Dedijer turns to it, claiming that more than 200 thousands were killed in that camp during the war.12 Taking the works of Tito and Dedijer as models it seems that the framework given from political hold to historians working with crimes of the war allowed discussion even in some detail of the atrocities, and that it allowed the pointing out of perpetrators and victims and ethnic affiliation. Thus I do not think it is entirely correct that ethnic and national aspects could not be addresses. Rather, what was prohibited was the ascription of guilt of war crimes to only one of the Yugoslav parties collaborating with the occupiers. The guilt must be balanced. National sensitivities in historiography In the decades after the war Yugoslav historiography generally adhered to this framework. Massacres and war-crimes were dutifully mentioned in accounts of World War II, but usually not in particular detail. Some monographs were published on the crimes of the

10 Tito, J.B.: Izvještaj na V kongresu KPJ. In: Tito, J.B.: Izgradnja nove Jugoslavije III. Zagreb 1951, s. 187-188. 11 Dedijer, V.: Josip Broz Tito. Prilozi za biografiju. 2. ed., Belgrade 1953, p. 289. 12 Ibid, p. 545.

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Ustasha regime and the program of forced conversion, extradition, and annihilation of Serbs in the NDH, but without causing much discussion.13 In the 1960s much more tumult resulted from disagreement between prominent Serbian and Croatian historians about the role played by Croatian bourgeois politicians and Croatian communists and partisans in the war, the discussion running heaviest between two former partisan commanders turned historians, Franjo Tudjman and Velimir Teržić.14 Allegedly discussions about Jasenovac and the number of victims did go on, but behind closed doors. In his book Bespuća from 1989 Franjo Tudjman claims that in 1965, as the communist party was planning a memorial session for the victims of Jasenovac, the number of which was then estimated to between 600.000 and 800.000, he himself opened the discussion of the number of victims. According to Tudjman, he was the author of a letter to the party top, in which he argued that the number of victims could be 240.000 at the largest, and thus the memorial session was given up.15 A couple of years later, in connection to the Croatian national mass movement of 1967-1971, Tudjman was ousted from the power circles as a result of his involvement with nationalist intellectual circles. In 1972, as the publication of the third volume of “History of the Yugoslav Peoples” kept being postponed, Vladimir Dedijer together with Ivan Božić, Sima Ćirković and Milorad Ekmečić published a one-volume history of Yugoslavia. Dedijer, who authored the last part of the book, treating the period from Yugoslav unification to the end of World War II, regularly mentions atrocities committed throughout the war and from most sides: Ustasha massacres and burning of Serbian villages, mass killings of Muslim villagers committed by Serbian peasants and vice versa, Chetnik death squads killing Muslims and Croats, etc. Dedijer even mentions the partisans’ “counterterror” against Chetnik-sympathetic villages in Montenegro.16 Despite Dedijer’s openness his part of the book did not cause much reaction. This was not because the Yugoslav historiographers lacked the ability to discuss, even when touching upon ethnic and national issues; the contributions by Milorad Ekmečić on the 19th century and the national politics of this period caused much dispute, not least from the side of the Croatian historians Petar Strčić and Mirjana Gross.17 Presumably, Dedijer’s writings were simply not controversial.

13 Simić, S.: Prekrštavanje Srba ze vreme drugog svetskog rata. Titograd 1958; Simić, S.: Vatikan i Jasenovac. Titograd 1958; Peršen, M.: Ustaški logore. Zagreb 1966. 14 The most obvious examples are Tudjman, F.: Narodnooslobodilaački rat. Encyklopedija Jugoslavije, vol. 4, Zagreb 1960, pp. 273-278 (The Encyklopedija Jugoslavije was not unusually a field of major academic battles); Teržić, V.: Jugoslavija u aprilskom ratu. Titograd 1963. See also Bosnić, S.: The political career and writings of Franjo Tudjman. South Slav Journal, vol. 14, no. 1-2, 1991, p. 31, note 18 & 19, p. 39. Another interesting example is the celebrations of different days to commemorate the first uprising in Yugoslavia. See: Roksandić, D.: Shifting References: Celebrations of Uprisings in Croatia. East European Politics and Societies, vol. 9, no. 2, Spring 1995. 15 Tudjman, F.: Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti, p. 56-57. 16 Dedijer, V, et al.: History of Yugoslavia. New York 1974, pp. 580-641. 17 See: Časopis za Suvremenu Povijest, no. 2, 1973; Jugoslovenski Istorijski Časopis, vol. 14, 1975, nr. 1-2; vol. 14, 1975, nr.3; vol. 15, 1976, nr. 1-2.

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The 1970s saw a number of more detailed and careful investigations of the Ustasha movement and the NDH, especially from the side of Croat historians.18 There are, however, indications that the Jasenovac question was a sour one for some Croatian historiographers. In his article on the Ustasha movement in the Yugoslav Encyclopaedia of 1971 Ljubo Boban writes in some detail about extradition, forced conversion, mass killings, annihilation etc. committed by the Ustashas against Serbs and other peoples in the NDH, but in the case of Jasenovac and the other concentration camps of the NDH he avoids stating anything. Instead he cites a long passage of the Military Encyclopaedia, in which the number of Jasenovac victims is set to “about 600.000”.19 A very similar manoeuvre is made by Fikreta Jelić-Butić in a carefully investigated book on the Ustasha movement. She describes the persecution, internment in camps, and mass slaughtering of Serbs and others, but when it comes to Jasenovac she hesitates, in a manner that seems quite at odds with her otherwise dry and factual style, to state or even suggest a number of victims. Instead she proposes that “some hundreds of thousands” were killed there, and then she cites different sources, rating the number of victims between 360.000 and 700.000, but obviously Jelić-Butić does not wish to confirm these numbers.20 Thus thorough factual treatments of at least some of the wartime atrocities did occur, as well as heated discussions of historical questions of nationally sensitive character. But apparently the question of Jasenovac remained sensitive and undetermined and could not really be assessed. Iconoclastic and nationalist historiography Tito’s death in May 1980 was followed on by manifestations of traditional Titoism from the side of the regime and by iconoclastic markings from the side of dissident intellectuals and academics. Through the 1980s the approach to the history of genocides and massacres was to change substantially, especially in the republic of Serbia. It has been suggested that the war and its “secret stories” was first taken up by writers rather than historians.21 But in fact one of the first to readdress these themes was the omnipresent Vladimir Dedijer in his huge volume of “New contributions” to Tito’s biography. The “New contributions” aimed mainly at revealing scandals and hitherto hidden controversial sides of Tito’s person, but it did also reintroduce the issues of the terror against Serbs in the NDH, the role of the Catholic Church, and the number of dead in Jasenovac. Citing Anton Miletić Dedijer suggested that more than a million persons went through Jasenovac and that between

18 E.g. Jelić-Butić, F.: Ustaše i nezavisna država Hrvatska 1941-45. Zagreb 1978 (first published 1977); Krizman,, B.: Ante Pavelić i Ustaše. Zagreb 1977. For a critique of the neo-positivism of these works, see: Trifkuvić, S.: Croatian separatism and European politics. London 1998, p. 308-309. 19 Boban, L.: Ustaše. Encyklopedija Jugoslavije, vol. 8, Zagreb 1971, pp. 438-444. 20 Jelić-Butić, F.: Ustaše i nezavisna država Hrvatska, p. 187. The figure given by Jelić-Butić is “nekoliko stotina tisuća”, indicating definitely several hundreds of thousands, but presumably less than 500.000. 21 Hoepken, W.: War, Memory and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia. East European Politics and Societies, vol. 13, nr. 1, 1999, s. 205.

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480.000 and 800.000 were killed there.22 As has been shown, the points themselves were not really new, and Dedijer did indeed balance his presentation by also discussing the genocide committed by the Chetniks. But obviously the number of Jasenovac-victims was steadily growing in Dedijer’s works. In 1984 same Dedijer was elected head of the committee set down by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, SANU, to “collect material on genocide on the Serbian and other Yugoslav peoples in the 20th century.” According to Dedijer himself, the work of this committee was badly needed, because the Yugoslav state, under the influence of powerful persons and for nationalistic reasons, had for more than 40 years totally neglected these questions, included herein the need to establish the true number of war victims.23 The committee had planned 21 publications on genocides committed mainly in Yugoslavia. By 1990 six of these were published, making up 10 large volumes, of which only one did not have Serbs as the victim group. Some of these works from SANU’s genocide committee are seriously breaking with principle of balancing the guilt, in scope – as is seen in the relatively very large amount of publications on the crimes of the Ustasha – and more importantly also in the argument: In the introduction to Antun Miletić’s large work on the camp of Jasenovac Jefto Šašić states that the Ustashas were “the most faithful agents of the government of the German Reich” and that “in the distribution of quisling roles … the criminal hitlerism primarily counted on the Ustasha”.24 Furthermore, Šašić quotes a long passage by a survivor from the camp, describing some of the horrors of the camp and stating that no such crimes has ever existed before. All this takes up more than a page before Šašić pays a tiny lip service to Titoism and in a few lines points to other victims of World War II than Serbs and other fascists and collaborators than the Ustashas within Yugoslavia. Another issue taken up in Serbian historiography was the responsibility of the Chetniks. Some historians attempted to represent the Chetniks as another force of anti-fascist struggle rather than as collaborators and war criminals.25 Obviously this constituted a break with the Titoist interpretation – and that of Dedijer as well – indeed it made the act of balancing the guilt impossible. In the second half of the 1980s, as Serbian nationalism and revanchism became parts of the political agenda under Milošević, the works on genocide history became widely cited also in journalism. Within Croatian historiography the numbers of Jasenovac-victims suggested from Serbian side was considered wildly inflated, and the discussion within Serbian historiography was perceived as proposing an inherently “genocidal” mentality of

22 Dedijer, V.: Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita. vol. 2, Rijeka 1981, pp. 489, 531-557. 23 Vladimir Dedijer in the introduction to: Dedijer, V., A. Miletić: Proterivanje Srba, p. 8 24 Jefto Šašić in the introduction to: Miletić, A.: Koncentracioni Logor Jasenovac, 1941-1945. Belgrade 1986, p. 7. My italics. 25 See Petranović, B.: Revolucije i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945, Beograd 1983, vol. 1, p. 129, or, for a much more radical example: Djuretić, V.: Saveznici i jugoslovenski ratna drama. Beograd 1985. Also: Banac, I.: Historiography of the countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia. The American Historical Review, vol. 97, no. 4, 1992, p. 194-195, 1101-1102; Höpken, W.: Von der Mythologisierung zur Stigmatisierung, p. 188-190.

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the Croatian nation – which some historians had indeed almost done.26 By the end of the decade some Croatian historians, who had until then adhered to the official condemnation of the ustaša regime, countered by questioning the validity of the Serbian “genocide history” – arguing that a “Jasenovać-myth” was developing within Serbian historiography.27 This point of view was supported by new calculations of the number of Yugoslav war losses of World War II, which pointed to a number just above one million.28 Almost dialectically opposed to the Serbian interest in the Ustasha state and the camp of Jasenovac, there was a growing attention within Croat public debate on the “Bleiburg massacres”, a series of mass killings committed by the communist partisans on Croatian refugees at the end of the war.29 Thus by the end of the decade the Serbian focus on their own national victimisation was countered by a Croatian one. Throughout the Serb-Croat war and in the years after it Serbian and Croatian historiography moved ever further apart, turning into national institutions. Symptomatic is it that by 2002 Serbian history textbooks for high school pupils carefully described cruelties of the Ustasha-regime and paid only little attention to the crimes of the Chetniks, while Croatian schoolbooks from 2001 hardly mentioned the terrors of the Ustasha rule but elaborated on Chetnik atrocities and the Bleiburg massacres.30 In conclusion Though the inter-Yugoslav massacres of World War II were paid relatively little attention in Titoist historiography, they were definitely not kept in silence either. But the possible approaches to the history of the massacres were limited within the Titoist framework: most importantly the guilt of war crimes had to be balanced between the Yugoslav collaborators of different nationalities. In the first decades after the war, the massacres were mentioned and described mainly as a part of the general experience of the war. Later, especially in the 1970, they were to a larger extent studied in their own right as one of many aspects of the war. The treatments of the massacres, however, remained factual and detailed descriptions. Apparently these issues could not be more openly discussed. Neither the question of Jasenovac, which was seemingly a matter of dispute, was assessed openly. From the mid-1980s the principle of balancing the guilt was broken, initially from Serbian side, and the theme of wartime massacres became very present in historiography as

26 Krestić, V.: O genezi genocida nad Srbima u NDH. Književne Novine, 15.9 1986. 27 Gross, M.: Wie denkt man kroatische Geschichte? Österreichische Osthefte, vol. 35, no. 1, 1993, p. 93-95; Boban, L.: Jasenovac and the manipulation of History; Boban, L.: Still more balancing on the discussion of Jasenovac and the manipulation of history. East European Politics and Societies, vol. 6, no. 1, 1992; Tudjman, F.: Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti. 28 Zerjavić, V.: Jugoslovenske ljudske žrtve u drugom svetskom ratu. Zagreb 1989; Kočović, B.: Žrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji. London 1985. 29 Discussed in: Hayden, M.: Recounting the dead. In R. S. Watson (ed.): Memory, History and Opposition under State Socialism. Santa Fe 1994. See also Gross, M.: Wie denkt man kroatische Geschichte?, p. 93-95 30Nikolić, K., N. Žutić, M. Pavlović, Z. Špadijer: Istorija 3/4. Beograd 2002; Matković, H., F. Mirošević: Povijest 4. Zagreb 2001.

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well as in public debate. In principle it should have been possible by then to discuss this theme. But as historical research became nationally polarised at the end of the 1980s, these question could not be addressed in a balanced manner. Instead the national historiographies turned into nationalist institutions moving still further apart. References: Banac, I.: Historiography of the countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia. The American Historical Review,

vol. 97, no. 4, 1992 Boban, L.: Ustaše. Encyklopedija Jugoslavije, vol. 8, Zagreb 1971 Boban, L.: Jasenovac and the manipulation of History. East European Politics and Societies, vol. 4, no. 3,

1990 Boban, L.: Still more balancing on the discussion of Jasenovac and the manipulation of history. East

European Politics and Societies, vol. 6, no. 1, 1992 Bosnić, S.: The political career and writings of Franjo Tudjman. South Slav Journal, vol. 14, no. 1-2, 1991 Bracewell, W.: National histories and national identities among the Serbs and Croats. In: Fulbrook, M. (ed.):

National histories and European history. Boulder 1993 Časopis za Suvremenu Povijest, no. 2, 1973 Čolaković, D.: Jasenovac 21.8.1941/31.3.1942. Sarajevo 1948 Dedijer, V.: Josip Broz Tito. Prilozi za biografiju. 2. ed., Belgrade 1953 Dedijer, V.: Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita. vol. 2, Rijeka 1981 Dedijer, V, et al.: History of Yugoslavia. New York 1974 Dedijer, V., A. Miletić: Proterivanje Srba sa ognjišta: 1941-1944: Svedočanstva. Belgrade 1989 Djuretić, V.: Saveznici i jugoslovenski ratna drama. Beograd 1985 Gross, M.: Wie denkt man kroatische Geschichte? Österreichische Osthefte, vol. 35, no. 1, 1993 Grothusen, K-D.: Jugoslavien und die „Geschichte seiner Völker“. Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,

vol. 10, 1963 Hayden, M.: Recounting the dead. In R. S. Watson (ed.): Memory, History and Opposition under State

Socialism. Santa Fe 1994. Höpken, W.: Von der Mythologisierung zur Stigmatisierung: „Krieg und Revolution“ in Jugoslawien 1941-

1948 im Spiegel von Geschichtswissenschaft und historischer Publizistik. In: Schmidt-Hartmann, E. (ed.): Kommunismus und Osteuropa. Konzepte, Perspektiven und Interpretationen im Wandel. München 1994

Hoepken, W.: War, Memory and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia. East European Politics and Societies, vol. 13, nr. 1, 1999

Jelić-Butić, F.: Ustaše i nezavisna država Hrvatska 1941-45. Zagreb 1978 Jugoslovenski Istorijski Časopis, vol. 14, 1975, nr. 1-2; vol. 14, 1975, nr.3; vol. 15, 1976, nr. 1-2. Kočović, B.: Žrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji. London 1985 Krestić, V.: O genezi genocida nad Srbima u NDH. Književne Novine, 15.9 1986. Krizman,, B.: Ante Pavelić i Ustaše. Zagreb 1977 Lilly, C.S.: Problems of Persuasion: Communist Agitation and Propaganda in Post-War Yugoslavia, 1944-

1948. Slavic Review, vol. 53, no. 2, 1994 Matković, H., F. Mirošević: Povijest 4. Zagreb 2001. Miletić, A.: Koncentracioni Logor Jasenovac, 1941-1945. Belgrade 1986 Nikolić, N.: Jasenovački logor. Zagreb 1948. Nikolić, K., N. Žutić, M. Pavlović, Z. Špadijer: Istorija 3/4. Beograd 2002 Pawlovich, S.K.: The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia and its Problems 1918-1988. London 1988 Petranović, B.: Revolucije i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji, 1941-1945, Beograd 1983 Peršen, M.: Ustaški logore. Zagreb 1966. Popović, K.: Za pravilnu ocenu oslobodilačkog rata naroda Jugoslavije. Komunist 1949, no. 3. Reperaciona Komisija pri Vladi Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije: Ljudske i materijalne Žrtve

Jugoslavije u ratnom naporu 1941-1945. Belgrade 1945 Roksandić, D.: Shifting References: Celebrations of Uprisings in Croatia. East European Politics and

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