Taylor - 2001 - Bribery in Athenian Politics Part II Ancient Reac

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Greece & Rome, Vol. 48, No. 2, October 001

BRIBERY IN ATHENIAN POLITICS PART II:ANCIENT REACTION AND PERCEPTIONS*

By CLAIRE TAYLOR

Efforts to stop bribery

Bribery (or more specifically, bribery accusations) seem to have been amajor feature of Athenian political life, if the evidence of law courtspeeches and comic drama is to be believed. How the Athenian demosreacted to this unsavoury feature of their political system, both legallyand intellectually, is the subject of this article. It is clear from the viciousnature of many bribery accusations and the amount of anti-briberylegislation that it was generally thought of as detrimental, and wassomething that the Athenians wanted to reduce. They did this prin-cipally in two ways: through direct legislation to deter and punishwrongdoers and through preventative measures designed to make itdifficult to successfully give or receive bribes.

Legislation

The strongly adversarial nature of Athenian law and the completefreedom of private prosecution ensured that ho boulomenos ('anyonewho wishes') could bring an action against an offender if his crimeaffected the whole community. There was considerable freedom tochoose the type of procedure when bringing a lawsuit, and the choiceof procedure dictated the penalty awarded to the defendant if he wasfound guilty.

If a magistrate was accused of bribery he could be prosecuted by oneof seven different procedures, the choice of which depended on theplaintiff.' Ath. Pol. 59.4 states that the offence was liable to prosecution

by the graphe d6ron, but there are no surviving cases where it was used.2It is thought that this law was primarily aimed at serving officials, andwas used to prosecute both those giving and receiving bribes, but it is atheory which is impossible to test. It was probably intended for cases


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BRIBERY IN ATHENIAN POLITICS PART II

which were considered less serious, but again, since there are nosurviving cases of its use, it is simply unclear.

Bribe-takers could alsobe

prosecutedunder laws which

penalizedother criminal behaviour in the political arena. The graphe para presbeisfor the misconduct of ambassadors, the graphe prodosias or treason andthe graphe klopes demosion chrematon for the embezzlement of publicmoney could all be used against bribe-takers since all three charges tosome extent covered or were connected to bribery. Many accusations ofbribery were pursued under these laws as 'add-ons,' instead of asseparate charges under the graphe d6orn,3 which emphasizes the easewith which an additional charge could be brought (17, 22, 23).

The annual euthyne provided an important arena for bribery againstlow level officials (16). According to Ath. Pol. 54.2 the penalty was a fine,ten times that of the bribe the magistrate accepted: 'if they prove that aman has taken bribes and the jurors convict him, an assessment is madeand this sum is ... repaid tenfold.'4 If this fine was not paid within theallowed time limit the debtor was probably subject to atimia (disfranch-isement or loss of citizen rights), and was therefore unable to enter anysanctuary, hold a magistracy or defend himself in court. This, in turn,

could lead to voluntary, self-imposed exile. It also seems as if there was analternative penalty of death available under this procedure. Dinarchusquotes the law in his speech against Demosthenes (34):

concerning men who accept gifts they have set only two assessments - either death, sothat meeting with this penalty the man who has taken gifts may be a warning to everyoneelse, or the assessment is to be ten times the original gain from the gifts, so that thosewho dare to commit this offence may not profit from it.5

Whether a penalty of death was common in aeuthyne

accusation isunknown: it was probably fairly unusual since the biggest offenders wereremoved from office before they had the chance of submitting to aeuthyne. The euthyne was only available to outgoing magistrates (16).What happened if the offender was in the middle of his term of office, orwas not a magistrate to start with?

To remove a magistrate from office mid-term or to prosecute anorator, the eisangelia procedure was needed. Eisangelia (denunciation)could be to the Assembly, who in the fourth century often delegated the

business of the trial to the law courts, or to the Boule. It appears to be themandatory procedure in the fourth century for accusations of briberysince it brought those accused to trial quickly.6 It was often, therefore,reserved for serious cases which involved treason (20, 25, 27, 28).7 The

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regularity with which politicians pursued their political differencesthrough the law courts is probably a major factor in the use of the

eisangelia procedure.The

politicaland

judicial spheresof Athenian life

often encroached on each other: there was indeed little distinctionbetween the two. Using legislation against bribery to further personaland political conflict was easy, and therefore common, and eisangeliacould ensure the quick removal of a rival. The penalties in the eisangeliaprocedure, as in the euthyne, were either a ten-fold fine or death. Thedeath penalty was more common here than in the euthyne owing to thefact that most of those accused were leading politicians, often strategoi,and so the stakes were higher (5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 25, 28). However, strategoiwere not the only victims of eisangeliai: orators (17, 27, 33) and envoys(18, 19, 20, 29, 31) were often impeached, and bribery accusations werefrequent in the list of charges.

Another procedure, related to eisangelia, was apophasis. This could alsobe employed to prosecute an official or an orator. It took the form of areport by the Areopagus, which was either proposed by the Assembly orinitiated by the Areopagus itself (but usually for its own members only).The most well-known use of apophasis (possibly the only use in this

context) was in the trial of Demosthenes which resulted in his exile (34).8It is evident that office holders were not the only men accused oftaking bribes, and orators who proposed policy in the Assembly wereequally regularly suspected. A further problem for the Athenians washow to react to bribery in the law courts, a crime for which there was aspecial law: the graphe dekasmou.9 This law prescribed the death penaltyfor both giving and receiving bribes: there was no alternative penalty, asthere was with crimes committed by officials or other persons in thepublic eye. This seems to indicate that the Athenians viewed jurycorruption as a more serious crime than any other form of bribery.Why this was so can perhaps be explained by the common notion thatpoorer men were more likely to be involved in financial irregularitiesthan their wealthy counterparts: if the poor were more likely to acceptbribes than the rich, they would need a greater deterrent.10 However,this would not explain why the same penalty was awarded to thosedistributing bribes amongst jurors and to those jurors who acceptedpayment. Bribing a jury would be an expensive undertaking, which

surely could only have been completed by those who were very wealthythemselves (13, 23). Perhaps these strict measures represent a desireamongst politicians to put a halt to bribery, which they could noteffectively do in the mainstream political circuit owing to the enormous

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prevalence of a gift/bribe culture there. It can even be suggested thatcorruption in general was so rife that it would have been against theinterests of the

majorityof

political figuresto

seriously attempt to stop it,if it was not indeed impossible for them to do so. The true motivation fortrials against politicians does not seem to be outrage at the audacity ofaccepting bribes from (e.g.) a foreign power, but personal rivalry ordisagreement on a policy, which suggests the presence, at least on somelevel, of a bribe culture. Even so, the intention of the Athenians wasclearly to limit the opportunity for corruption, but in practice societycould only crack down harshly on bribery in law courts, which wasprobably not nearly as frequent in any case. The law courts did not onlyrely on legislative deterrents to discourage bribery: there was a great dealof emphasis on measures to prevent corruption in the first place.

Prevention

Limiting the opportunities for underhand dealings was an importantfunction of the legislative process, designed to deter and prevent

corruption in political life. However, it was not the only mechanismthe Athenians used to reduce politically related bribery. The importanceplaced on the accountability of officials attempted to ensure that no-onewas committing crimes whilst serving the polis. This feature, where allmagistrates had to submit to public scrutiny, promoted the smoothrunning of the democracy. The Athenians were, therefore, serious aboutpreventing venality: archons, when appointed to office, had to swear anoath that they would not take bribes; if they did, they had to dedicate agold statue. The incoming archons 'swear that they will exercise theiroffice justly and in accordance with the laws, and will not take bribes onaccount of their office or, if they do so, will dedicate a golden statue'.(Ath. Pol. 55.5)." Furthermore, the actual mechanics of the politicalsystem in itself sought to prevent widespread corruption. Fairness andequality (isonomia) were important principles of the democracy since theearliest times and the measures used to create this system also limited theopportunities for bribery. Originally introduced to undermine theestablished aristocracy as early as Solon, the selection of magistratesby lot had the effect of randomizing the selection process and thereforemaking bribery difficult.12 The unpredictability of the outcome madeelections to minor magistracies harder to influence. However, all themajor offices of state were not appointed by lot, but by direct election,

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and although there is little evidence of electoral bribery in Athens,13 thevast majority of allegations arose from these offices: 'although we have

prescribedthe

penaltyof death for

anyonewho is convicted of

bribery,we elect men who are most flagrantly guilty of this crime as ourgenerals.'14

The personnel of most magistracies rotated annually and many servedon Boards of Ten. The principles of rotation and collegiality, whilstensuring high numbers of participants in the democracy, also madebribery difficult since no-one was in power for very long, nor were theyindividually responsible for any decision - it is, indeed, harder to buy tenmen than one. However, as mentioned above, the most important offices

were not chosen by lot, nor were they affected by rotation or collegiality.Does this mean that there was more opportunity to accept bribes inthese offices? It would be tempting to see Athenian strategoi as morevenal than their less important counterparts, but this would be unwise. Itis clear that most cases of bribery involved either strategoi, ambassadorsor other important orators (e.g. 28, 20, 27 respectively). Naturally themost important cases, involving the largest amounts of money, involvethe most important politicians in the state, and these are the cases that

are recorded and survive. The temptations may indeed have been higherat this level, but the only conclusion that can safely be drawn is thatbribery accusations played an important part in high politics. Whetherthis was due to increased levels of dishonesty of the top politicianscompared with lesser magistrates, or due to the convenience of a briberyaccusation in the context of a politico-personal feud, is open to debate.

The mechanics of the democracy sought to prevent corruption as wellas provide a fair and equal system of participation, and this extended tothe increasingly complicated methods the Athenians used to organizetheir juries.15 Evidently, after some problems in the fifth century with thecorruption of juries, the Athenians twice revised their selection process,which was specifically designed to prevent bribery of the dikasts. In thefifth century a dikast was allocated to a court for the whole year, so it waseasy to know beforehand who would be listening to your case. Bribescould be offered directly to particular dikasts and the system was easy tomanipulate. This changed early in the fourth century (at least by 409) toa system of allocation, not to a court, but to a letter, which was drawn by

lot on the day of the trial. This system was manipulated by Anytos (13)and by the mid fourth century the method of choosing juries hadevolved into a yet more complicated procedure, described by Ath. Pol63-9.16 The Athenians were therefore concerned with the opportunities

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available to bribe a jury and did their utmost to reduce these. Corruptionof juries was a fundamental abuse of the democracy since it underminedthe

decision-making processof the demos and was viewed within this

serious context.

Perceptions of bribery in Athenian society - a questionof ethics?

Did the Athenians see bribery as morally wrong? Was it an action thatwas considered

reprehensible,or was it an

accepted partof

political life;a hazard of office? The language of bribery is noticeably neutral andnon-judgmental, but it would be wrong to judge from this that theAthenians turned a blind eye to corruption.17 It was obviously a verylarge problem: dishonesty was neither dismissed nor ignored. Thefrequency of allegations of corruption in the ancient sources must bestressed: it is undeniable that Athenian politicians were quick to accuseopponents of resorting to bribery. Even in tragedy and myth theimmediate reaction to receiving unwelcome political intelligence is the

accusation of bribery by opponents. Thus Creon accuses a sentry ofbeing on the payroll of his enemies:

... There's a party of malcontentsIn the city, rebels against my word and law,Shakers of heads in secret, impatient of rule;They are the people, I see it well enough,Who have bribed their instruments to do this thing.

(Soph. Ant. 288-92)

Historical figures were also quick to accuse others of bribery: a chargewhich was hard to prove. Severe personal vilification either direct orimplied, comic criticism and insinuations of politicians conspiring toincrease the power they wielded through oratory are all commonelements in the surviving source material.18 It is through these tech-niques that rival politicians found fertile ground for accusations, seriousor otherwise. A politician had to destroy his rival before his rivaldestroyed him and this inevitably led to a plethora of false (or impossible

to substantiate) accusations. This is not to say that all allegations wereunfounded. Some Athenian politicians undoubtedly took bribes some ofthe time. However, the openness of the Athenian political systemproduced a mechanism in which allegations could easily be made.

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It is profitable to analyse dorodokia in the context of reciprocity.Financial gain bestowed certain obligations, but if these obligations werecreated

byunderhand methods the

politicianwas

layinghimself

opento

accusations of acting against the demos. Having obligations meant that itwas your duty to help your friends, but by extension this provided anopportunity to help yourself and to a certain degree this was con-doned.'9 The failure of reciprocity, as an important element in Atheniansociety, was that it did not set firm boundaries to what was acceptable.

Bribery was not seen as 'ethical' or 'acceptable' per se, but in certainsituations the lines were blurred between what was acceptable behaviourand what was not. Three areas have been distinguished which merit

further discussion: the role of patronage and gift-giving in Atheniansociety (d6rodokia), the role of ambassadors and guest-friendships(xenia) and the role of the demos and its need for accountability. Thiswill help to explain how the Athenians perceived their own socialinteractions and clarify the climate into which the large number ofbribery accusations fit.

Bribery in the context of gift-giving

A bribe could include payments of goods as well as payments of money,and a cynic can argue that any type of favour given or received by apolitician could be described as a bribe. The problem for a modernhistorian, and perhaps the ancient Greeks also, is to determine where thecommon, customary practice of gift-giving ended and bribery began.The lack of a separate vocabulary for the two practices of 'gift-giving'and

'bribery'demonstrates the fine line that existed between

legitimateand more sinister transactions: when was a 'gift' a genuine voluntarytransaction between two people, and when did other motivations comeinto effect?20 This is especially difficult to distinguish when payments toa politician take the form of goods, and it is no easier to differentiate inour own society. Aristophanes gives a list of such goods in The Wasps:

these men [the demagogues] they [other cities] ply with gifts - jars of salt fish, wine, rugs,cheese, honey, sesame, pillows, libation bowls, dress clothes, drinking cups, health andwealth (Arist. Wasps 675-7)

Distinguishing 'gifts' and 'bribes' was also a problem for the Athenians.The distribution of both gifts and bribes served the same end, in thatthey conferred mutual obligations on both parties and were, therefore,

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functionally very similar.21 Added to this is the notion that makingmoney from office was, up to a point, acceptable. Hypereides even

admits, in his speech against Demosthenes in 323 (34), that bribery wastolerated unless it was detrimental to the city:

As I said in the Assembly, members of the jury, you willingly allow generals and oratorsto make large profits - it is not the law that allows them to do so, but your kindness andhumanity - only maintaining one condition, that the money is taken for and not againstyour interests. (Hyp. 1.24-5)22

Dorodokia n itself, therefore, was not seen as morally wrong. It was itseffects in relation to the polls that was the important factor. In one senseit is not surprising that there was some toleration of d6rodokia ince theAthenians often openly admitted performing certain actions purely forthe benefits they would receive at a later date, rather than simply for thesake of doing a good, or civic-minded, deed. It was the deed itself thatmattered, not the motivation behind it.23 Thus, unless the actions of amagistrate were seen to be detrimental to the polis they were notquestioned. Society not only condoned but actively encouraged gift-exchange and it was easy for the bribe-taker and giver to blur the two

activities. Even religion was seen as the mutual exchange of favoursbetween human and god.24Political gift-giving was an acceptable practice in some contexts, most

notably those which involved foreign autocracies: diplomatic missions.Gifts were always associated with kings. If a monarch offered gifts it wasinconceivable to refuse them. However, by accepting these gifts anambassador would be opening himself up to allegations of bribery (18,26, 29, 31). As the polis developed from its pre-archaic community, therole of a powerful king - necessarily an outsider - exercising an undueinfluence on political leaders became more abhorrent.25 Ideologydictated that the actions of a polis member should be for the commonadvantage of the city, but by receiving gifts, and therefore creatingobligations with an outsider, an ambassador was putting himself in astate of ethical limbo: where did his true obligations lie? On a fairlynarrow level with his immediate benefactor, or on a wider level with thepolis? The answer necessarily depended on the point of view of theinquirer, and no doubt many accusations were trumped up by the

immediate political rivals of the accused (5, 31, 34).26 The line between'gifts' and 'bribes' was, therefore, a very fine one, but a distinction canperhaps be drawn if 'gifts' are seen as the traditional custom of givingpresents to incur a non-specific obligation, and 'bribes' as gifts given for

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a purpose, with a specific intent in mind.27 It was perhaps this confusionthat led many leading political figures to justify 'bribes' as 'gifts'. Therole of gift-giving in Athenian society, therefore, provided an excuse foralready corrupt politicians and justification for a magistrate thinking ofaccepting a 'gift', and it was the imprecise nature of the Athenianattitude which caused the peculiarity in the system.28

Bribery and ambassadors

Being an envoy in ancient Greece was a distinction, but one which neededa great deal of personal wealth to perform. Ambassadors were paid only asubsistence wage, but they could entail considerable expense to them-selves, particularly f an embassy was a long one. They did not receive anyfinancial compensation, as with other high offices of state, but it isassumed that their wage was designed to limit the opportunities forprofiteering from an embassy.29 So, why are there so many accusationsinvolving ambassadors in the sources? It was customary for ambassadorsto be highly honoured in the Greek world: holding banquets was common,

as was the offering of gifts. The notion of guest-friendship (xenia) had astrong reciprocal element, but any gift exchange with a foreigner left anambassador vulnerable to charges of bribery.30 Ambassadors were par-ticularly vulnerable in their dealings with autocratic Persia and Macedon(6, 18, 19, 26, 29, 31). Gift-exchange with these states could easily be seenas treasonable or at least questionable actions because they involvedobligational ties with non-Greeks, whose method of government wasabhorrent to the Athenians. To admit the domination of the Greek worldby a non-Greek power was terrible, and to think of Greek co-operation inthis process was deemed as an evil. Accepting bribes from an enemy ofthe state was not a legitimate way of making money from politics, and thisled to the close association of bribery and treason.31 Time and again intrials which involved bribery accusations the official charge was one oftreason (prodosia) and the procedure used was often that of eisangelia(denunciation/impeachment), a procedure used mainly for serious casesof treason (22, 25, 28).32 The law stated that eisangelia could be used:

if any person . . .seeks to overthrow the democracy of the Athenians . . . or if heattends a meeting in any place with intent to undermine the democracy, or forms apolitical society, or if anyone betrays a city, or ships, or any land, or naval force, or,being an orator, makes speeches contrary to the interests of the Athenian people,receiving bribes. (Hyp. 4.7-8)

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Treason and bribery were, therefore, closely related. This is supportedby Dem. 19.268: 'whenever, men of Athens, you see any man takingbribes, you may be sure that he is also a traitor.' The bribe-taker wasbetraying the demos by deliberately not pursuing the interests of thepeople. It was a short step, therefore, to view bribe-takers as 'demos-haters,'33 and it was probably the seriousness of the charges that enabledaccusations of bribery, and therefore treason, to be used as politicalweapons. Athenian ambassadors were often leading politicians of theday and embassies were not removed from the 'daily conflicts of partisanpolitics.'34 The perceived failure of an embassy allowed opponents totake the political advantage through bribery accusations, and it has been

noted that the majority of trials resulting from such an accusationfollowed a defeat in war or other crisis at Athens, and this is surelysignificant. General approval of an embassy was forthcoming if themission was successful, but if there was any doubt, a trial could occur(29). A perception of failure could be seized upon by politicalopponents for their own ends, rather than any well-grounded fear ofcorruption (31), and the importance of gift-giving in society was a majorfactor which allowed this to happen. Aeschines styled himself as the

guest-friend (xenos)of

Philipof

Macedon,but the anti-Macedonian

elements in Athenian politics viewed him as being on the Macedonianpayroll, and therefore a traitor. The accusations of Aeschines' venalityshould be seen in the context of his long-running dispute with Demos-thenes and the 'anti-Macedonian party' in Athens, rather than based onany secure evidence of corruption, which Demosthenes does not give inhis prosecution speech (31).35 There were a large number of trialsinvolving accusations of bribery against envoys (6, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26,29).36 Whether this indicates that bribery of Athenian ambassadors wascommon is impossible to say owing to the unverifiable nature of many ofthe charges, but it is clear that there are more extant accusations in thefourth century than in the fifth. Some scholars believe that many trialswere almost definitely unjustified and there were a large number offabricated charges for reasons of politics or personal conflict.37

Bribery in terms of the demos

The sovereignty of the demos was the underlying principle of Atheniandemocracy and the demos was master in both political and judicialspheres. The accountability of politicians was a vitally important

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factor in the smooth running of the democracy, and it was in thisutilitarian context that many politicians were accused and convicted ofpolitical crimes. Bribery was just one of many possibilities: politics couldbe dangerous game. The more successful a politician was, the morelikely he was to be prosecuted if he failed at any time.38 Politicalprosecutions were very frequent owing to the use of the law courts byindividuals to further their own career, and the political casualty rate canbe described as high. However, the effect of an allegation on theaccused's career seems to have been minimal in some cases (7, 18,30). The demos has been accused of being fickle and ruthless, destroyingthe careers of many leading figures in the democracy.39 However, the

demos was not wholly to blame for this state of affairs. Politicians oftenexploited the Assembly and the law courts for their own political ends,using them as places in which they destroyed their opponents. TheAthenians recognized that the accountability of officials was crucial tothe maintenance of their own sovereignty, and although this processsometimes went awry, in general they effectively kept control of theirpoliticians as much as was possible. The suspicion - or realization - thatevery official would have his hand in the till, so to speak, and that hewould be

persuaded by bribes, was reflected in the attitude towardsthose who were found guilty of the offence.40 The demos was, bydefinition, always right and if it made a bad decision the blame waslaid with the proposer of a decree or the general in charge of anoperation, who was duly charged and brought to trial:

if the common people decide on a course of policy which turns out badly, they pick on afew individuals and fasten the responsibility on them, claiming that they have actedagainst the interests of the common people and thus ruined their plans, if the policysucceeds, of course, they claim the credit for themselves. (Ps-Xen. 2.17)

These charges often incorporated accusations of bribery. Many caseswhich involve bribery allegations include another, more serious charge,usually of treason (22, 25, 28), which would fit into Hypereides'notion of dorodokia as acceptable unless it is detrimental to the city.There was a direct relationship between the failure of politicians tofulfil what the demos asked of them and political prosecutions (9, 11,14, 28), and this led to a situation where, especially in times of crisis,

failure was not tolerated.41 It was, in part, the inability of the demos tohold itself to account for its own bad decisions which enabledpoliticians to pursue their political rivalries in the courts in the formof bribery allegations.

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It was a widely held notion in the fifth century that political power waswon by expenditure of money in return for receiving charis from the

demos,42 nd this reciprocal relationship was inevitably open to accusa-tions of manipulation.43 The traditionally heavily stratified society ofAthens collided with the democratic ideal of isonomia, and politicianswere at pains to reconcile the two ideologies. Aristocratic rivalries playedan important part in democratic politics and the evolution of the wholedemocracy as a political system can be interpreted in this context. Thishas led to the interpretation of policies which involve payments to thedemos (misthos) as 'subtle and indirect bribery,'44 such as the introduc-tion of jury pay, grandiose liturgies and even comprehensive

buildingprojects. However, this is an argument which depends entirely on thepolitical view of the analyst. Caution is necessary since the sources wehave are, by nature, aristocratic, and are therefore more likely to becritical of any measure which gives the demos more political power. Thiscan be demonstrated by the way the sources handle the respectivemotivations of both Pericles and Cimon. Pericles has been accused ofpaying the demos n return for their support by introducing jury pay 'as apolitical measure to counter the generosity of Cimon'.45 This mayindeed be true but, put cynically, what politician has ever introduceda measure which did not seek, at least in part, to act as a counter to hisopponents? The effects of Pericles' policies in Athens ensured aredistribution of wealth which enabled larger numbers of citizens toparticipate in the democracy and kept him in power for many years.Democrats like Pericles were opposed to the aristocratic argesse of mensuch as Cimon, primarily because they could not match it, but alsobecause it went against the democratic ideology of preserving the demos'

independencefrom the

wealthy which enabled them to participate.They therefore sought to create the same charis relationship throughpolicy, rather than patronage.46 I do not doubt that many of themeasures introduced in Athens, which had the effect of strengtheningthe developing democracy, were in fact conceived through self-interest,class rivalry and personal vendettas, but I would hesitate to describesuch measures as 'bribery.' Cynically, one could argue that all politicaladvantages obtained by the demos arose only out of their manipulationby a powerful individual, purely for his own political benefit. However, itis unwise to accuse one side of such politically motivated bribery withoutaccusing the other side of exactly the same thing. The mechanisms mayhave been different, but the aim was always the same: to gain a goodpersonal reputation and charis amongst the demos, which could be

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capitalized on the political arena. It is difficult therefore to distinguishPericles' action in this case from the actions of every other politician in

everyother

politicaldecision.

To what extent was bribery tolerated?

'No man is free from audit who has held any public trust', proclaimsAeschines (3.18). The Athenians were, it is fair to say, naturallysuspicious of their politicians, with seemingly good reason: there wasplenty of opportunity for men in power to line their pockets with giftsfrom foreign kings and many politicians were proved by the courts to beuntrustworthy. However, evidence from Hypereides and Isocrates

suggests a certain degree of acceptance, or toleration at least, of

politicians receiving gifts for supporting a course of action.47 This was

explained by the proviso that accepting gifts was an acceptable part of

politics so long as there was no detrimental effect on the city. This wasthe crucial factor in deciding whether a politician had taken bribes. A

politician could accept gifts to promote a policy in the Assembly, but if

the policy was viewed as a failure the politician was usually left with alawsuit on his hands. Failure, or the perception of failure, was indeed a

major factor in many of the cases involving allegations of bribery comingto court. The demos was too willing to attribute military defeat and ill-

judged decision-making to the acceptance of dbra by their strategoi andrhetores, and not to other factors such as incompetence or lack ofresources (11). However, the fact that they were able to do this suggestsa widespread acceptance of the presence of d6rodokia n politics. On theone hand, the large number of bribery accusations indicates a desire toclean up politics and shows a refusal to give licence to dora in thepolitical system but, on the other hand, its use as a 'cover-all' chargeshows that dorodokia was accepted as being a common feature of the

political culture and was a believable charge to level at nearly everypolitician: few in number are the leaders known for their incorrupt-ibility.48 This must have indicated a certain degree of toleration of dora,or at least a recognition of their place in the political system. There are

large numbers of accusations, but this does not necessarily suggest that

all Athenian politicians were incredibly venal, and caution must beexercised about attributing shady motivation to every action, especiallyin a society where gift-giving played such a large role. The lack ofdistinction between gifts and bribes means that dorodokia should not

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always be assessed as corrupt. In some contexts it was a legitimateinstitution which sought to reimburse leaders for their support of a

particularcourse of

action,a reimbursement that

theywould

justnot

receive otherwise - or this was the excuse used by corrupt politicians.Many officials probably had an established view on a particular matterand accepted gifts as sweeteners to pursue their politics further. In otherwords, it is useful to see politicians as being paid, and not bought. Todescribe the motivation behind all incidences of d6rodokia as venality isperhaps too strong. Dorodokia in itself does not necessarily involvecorrupt motivation and this explains why a bribe is only a bribe if ithad a detrimental effect on the city, and by extension why a certain level

of political 'gift-giving' was tolerated in public life.

Was there a bribe culture?

The frequency of accusations of bribery against politicians suggests thatAthens was a society in which such transactions were readily tolerated,or at least had an ambiguous status. However, the question still remains

to be asked: how many of these accusations were true? It is regrettablyimpossible to tell which accusations are true and which are not, and eachcase needs to be assessed on its own merits. Some accusations may havebeen designed to provoke a general public feeling of hostility against anopponent, others must have been cynical attempts at characterassassination, more still made simply for rhetorical effect. In onespeech alone there are over forty allegations of the defendant's corrup-tion, presumably designed to keep the alleged actions of the defendantuppermost in the minds of the jury and make him appear as unfavour-able as possible.49 There was indeed plenty of opportunity for officials toaccept d6ra in many different aspects of political life, but there were alsomassive opportunities to accuse others of bribery: accusations whichwere impossible to prove. Within the framework of a working demo-cracy it was easy to accuse a fellow politician of bribery and directsuspicion onto him. The competitiveness that existed between Athenianleaders gave rise to this situation: aristocratic rivalries were still playedout in the fourth and fifth centuries as they were in the sixth. In the

context of a society that attached great importance to reciprocity, gift-giving and bribery could be easily merged together and accusationscould fly.50 In such a situation it did not matter, to a certain extent,whether the accusations were perceived to be true or not: it simply

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diverted attention from the accuser. Many politicians seem not to havebeen affected politically by accusations made against them, because

many allegationswere

simplya form of character

denigrationrather

than serious accusations complaining about an individual's behaviour ona particular occasion. Cimon was still very powerful after his trial in 463(5) and Pericles only gained from the accusations against him (7). Manyof the accusations and allegations, therefore, should be seen as politicalfabrications designed to slander an opponent, and hopefully knock himout of politics permanently. The benefits of destroying a politicalopponent were numerous and many figures took the opportunitieswhenever they arose to do precisely this, often blurring the distinctionsbetween gifts and bribes in the process. In the politics of ClassicalAthens, therefore, there was not so much a bribery culture, more anaccusation of bribery culture.

Endpiece

Gifts were always commonplace in Greek society (1, 2, 4), but the

political atmosphere of democratic Athens gave rise to a culture wherethe prosecution of leaders for accepting these gifts was common. Lawstried to address the problem, and they were successful to some extent:there were numerous prosecutions and convictions. However, theAthenians could not regulate the influence of outside forces anddifferent political cultures where dorodokia was a customary way ofgaining power. 'Philip . . . spent money freely in bribing traitorous

persons in all the cities, and tried to promote embroilment and disorder',complains Dem. 18.19. The Athenian demos feared Greeks bearinggifts, but especially feared foreigners bearing gifts, since it skewed theirnotions of acceptable reciprocity. The prominence of gift-giving inGreek society joined with the need of the demos to hold its leaders toaccount and combined itself with point-scoring politicians exploitingtheir differences in the law courts. This created a situation where leaderscould easily accuse one another of taking bribes.

It is regrettably impossible to discover the extent of bribery inAthenian politics. Many politicians probably did accept gifts for pursu-

ing a certain policy, but it is difficult to judge the norms of one society asbeing immoral from the perspectives of another. All that can be said isthat the Athenian demos perceived that the receipt of d6ra by politicianscreated an irregular relationship which was undesired. Unfortunately

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dora seemed to have played a large part in politics, but whether largenumbers of politicians intentionally changed their minds because of

them is impossible to know. Both d6ra and accusations of bribery werefree-flowing in the politics of ancient Athens.

NOTES

* This article should be read in conjunction with Claire Taylor, 'Bribery in Athenian Politics PartI: Accusations, Allegations and Slander', G&R 48 (2001), 53-66. All references in (bold) in thisarticle refer to an entry in the 'Table of Accusations of Bribery on pp. 58-61 of that article.

1. According to M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracy n the Age of Demosthenes Oxford,1991), 193, the seven procedures available for prosecuting a magistrate accused of taking bribes

are: 1. Eisangelia to the Assembly, (22); 2. Eisangelia to the Boule; 3. Apophasis (Areopagusreport), (34); 4. The Boule acting on its own initiative; 5. Ho boulomenos nder graph doron; 6. Hoboulomenos by apographe; 7. Euthyne, (16).

2. See P. J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981), 662,(hereafter CAAP), S. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford, 1993), 106, 110, J. H. Lipsius,Das attische Recht und Rechtsverfahren Leipzig, 1912), 401-4.

3. Treason and embezzlement are often seen as related to bribery. Treason because of thedetrimental effect bribery could have on the city and embezzlement because it was an abuse ofpower in the financial sphere which demonstrated the politician's dishonesty and therefore hiswillingness to be led astray by bribes.

4. Ath. Pol. 54.2. See CAAP, 598-9.5. Din. 1.60. Hyp. 5.24 supports this: 'those guilty of accepting gifts (are) to pay tenfold; and it

is possible according to the laws to assess the penalty as death.' See also D. M. MacDowell, RIDA30 (1983), 58-61.6. See M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth

Century and the Impeachment f Generals (Odense, 1975), J. T. Roberts, Accountability n AthenianGovernment Wisconsin, 1982), 15 f.

7. Hansen, op. cit. (n. 6) cat. nos. 82, 100-2, 109 respectively.8. For apophasis see D. H. MacDowell, The Law in Classical Athens (London, 1978), 190-1.

For the Harpalus case see the speeches by Dinarchus and Hypereides against Demosthenes.I. Worthington, A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later FourthCentury Athens (Michigan, 1992), passim, E. Badian, JHS 81 (1961), 16-43.

9. Aes. 1.86, Isoc. 8.50, Ath. Pol. 27.5. See also MacDowell, RIDA 30 (1983), 64-9.10. It is probably not remiss to assume that there were larger numbers of less wealthy members

of society serving on juries than serving as strategoi or rhetores. See Ps-Xen. 1.6, Plato. Prt. 319d.Xen. Mem. 3.7.6. Also M. M. Markle, in P. Cartledge & F. D. Harvey (edd.), Crux: Essays Presentedto G. E. M. de Ste Croix (Exeter, 1985), 265-97; R. K. Sinclair, Democracy and Participation inAthens (Cambridge, 1988), 119ff., 127ff., Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 125-7, 248-9.

11. See CAAP, 621.12. See E. S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (London, 1972), 61-72, J. W.

Headlam, Election by Lot at Athens, 2nd ed. revised by D. C. MacGregor (Cambridge, 1933).13. Compared to Republican Rome electoral bribery seems insignificant in Athens. Arguably

this was because there was less intense rivalry in the Athenian upper classes compared with theRoman upper classes. The political stakes were not as high in Athens as in Republican Rome(Athenian magistrates did not wield nearly the same level of power). For electoral bribery in theRoman Republic see M. Jehne, in M. Jehne (ed.), Demokratie n Rom? Die Rolle des Volkes n derPolitik der romischen Republik, (Stuttgart, 1995), 51 ff., P. Nadig, Ardet Ambitus (Frankfurt amMain, 1997), E. A. Bauerle, Procuring an Election: ambitus n the Roman Republic Univ. of MichiganDiss. 1990), A. Lintott, JHS 80 (1990), 1 ff., L. R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar(Berkeley, 1959), 67ff. See also Staveley, op. cit. (n. 12), 105, Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 80ff.Common consensus says that the Athenians would not let themselves be bribed in elections owingto the importance of the functions of the offices they were voting for, i.e. the offices needed skilled

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experts, and the Assembly, when presented with a list of candidates, would not choose a poor one ifa better candidate was there. See Staveley, op. cit. (n. 12), 103, Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 159-60.However, can the lack of (evidence for ?) electoral bribery be seen as a symptom of the use of thelaw courts, rather than elections, as an arena for political feuding? The Athenians simply used adifferent arena to assault their upper class enemies. See Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 210.

14. Isoc. 8.50.15. See Ath. Pol. 63-9 with CAAP, 697-735; Aristophanes, Wasps 242-4, 303-5, 1107-9; Ekkl.

681-8; Wealth 277, 1166-7. See also MacDowell, RIDA 30 (1983), 64ff., The Law in ClassicalAthens (London, 1978), 36-8; Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 197-9; Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 70ff.

16. See CAAP, 697-735.17. For discussion of the vocabulary of bribery see F. D. Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes: Some Aspects

of Bribery in Greek Politics' in Cartledge & Harvey (edd.), Crux (Exeter, 1985), 72-9. Also seeG. Herman, Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge, 1987), 75 ff.

18. See K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle Oxford, 1974), 23 ff.19. L. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece California, 1962), 162: 'if a man's excellence or

justice was determined by his willingness or ability to help his friends, it was also recognised that hemust, within limits, help himself.' See also A. Missiou in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite & R. Seaford(edd.), Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford, 1988), 188-91; M. Schofield in P. Cartledge,P. Millett & S. von Reden (edd.), Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in ClassicalAthens (Cambridge, 1998), 37-51; S. von Reden, Exchange n Ancient Greece London, 1995), 93-5; T. W. Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructing he Domestic Economy(Cambridge, 1991), 143-69.

20. For discussions on the role of gift-giving and patronage in Greek society see M. I. Finley, TheWorld of Odysseus (New York, 1979), 66 and P. Millett, 'Patronage and its Avoidance in ClassicalAthens', in A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), Patronage in Ancient Society (London & New York, 1989),15 ff: Millett denies the existence of a patron/client relationship like that of the Romans, especially ina democratic polis such as Athens, since democracy depended on political equality (isonomia) andpatronage depended on the exploitation of inequalities: the two ideologies were incompatible.However, the independence of the demos was not always maintained, e.g. the poorer citizens werenot economically independent from the wealthy and relied on public state pay for services such asjury or military service. This was their protection or 'insurance policy', rather than a traditionalpatron/client relationship as personified by Cimon's generosity. See Ath. Pol. 27.3, Plut. Cim. 10.Also CAAP, 338-9. For Pericles' introduction of pay for jury service in direct political competitionto Cimon see Plut. Per. 9.

21. See J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1990), 236, who establishes thegreat importance of charis (gratitude).

22. B. Strauss, 'The Cultural Significance of Bribery and Embezzlement in Athenian Politics',Ancient World 11 (1985), 71.

23. See Lys. 16.17: Mantitheus at his dokimasia openly admits that his extensive military servicewas undertaken 'in order that if at any time I should be exposed to an unjust prosecution, myactions would give you a better opinion of me and I should receive all my rights'. This is obviouslyan acceptable motivation otherwise it would not have been used as an argument for the defence.

24. Plato Rep. 390e demonstrates the fine line between gift-giving and bribery by implying thesimilarity between religious offerings and venality: 'gifts persuade gods, gifts persuade reverendkings'. See also Strauss, op. cit. (n. 22), 72-3, R. Parker, 'Pleasing Thighs: Reciprocity in GreekReligion', in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite & R. Seaford (edd.), op. cit. (n. 19), 120-1.

25. Herman, op. cit. (n. 17) sees dorodokia n the context of a clash of ideologies between theheroic age of kings on one hand and the continuing development of the polis into a collection ofpolitically active persons on the other: a 'battle of ideologies between heroic and civic values', p. 78.He states that it is impossible to bribe an autocrat because a bribe is only so if it is against theinterests of the community. Since tyranny is necessarily (in the Greek view) against the interests ofthe community, a bribe would have no extra undesired effects. 'Gifts' to Philip of Macedon, or the

Persian kings, are gifts and not bribes by definition. However, gifts given to Philip or the Persiankings will be bribes if they are designed to achieve ends which would not have been achievedotherwise or if they are contrary to Athenian interests. See Harvey, op. cit. (n. 17), 106-7, especiallyn. 109.

26. Aeschines sees the problems caused by creating obligations with foreigners in Aes. 3.46: 'lest

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anyone set a higher value upon the gratitude of a foreign state than upon that of his own country,and so become corrupted'. Herman, op. cit. (n. 17), 79, interprets this as 'a mark of misguidedsolidarity'. See also Strauss, op. cit. (n. 22), 73: 'bribes threatened to turn an individual against thecommonwealth, hence they were outlawed. Nevertheless individuals did not give up their belief inindividual gifts, at least not entirely.'

27. See R. Kulesza, Die Bestechung m politischen Leben m 5. und 4. Jh v. Chr. (Konstanz, 1995),11-12: he describes gifts as 'sittengemif3e Gabe, Prasent,' and bribes as 'ein Geschenk, das demGebenden einen Nutzen gewahren soll.'

28. See Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 276.29. See D. J. Mosley, Ancient Society 3 (1973), 13, F. Adcock & D. J. Mosley, Diplomacy in

Ancient Greece London, 1975), 155.30. See Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 180, S. Perlman, GRBS 17 (1976), 226ff., M. Miller, Athens

and Persia in the Fifth Century BC (Cambridge, 1997), 112-14.31. For politicians profiteering from office see Arist. Pol. 1309a3-7. For examples of ways in

which they benefited from office see Dem. 19.238 (gratitude), 249 (paid clerkships with free mealsin the Theseum); Lys. 19.57 (doubled the money spent), 27.11 (theft). See also Ober, op. cit.(n. 21), 245ff. and M. H. Hansen, Class. et Med. 32 (1971-80), 124-5.

32. For discussion of eisangelia see especially Hansen, op. cit. (n. 6), passim. These cases appearin his catalogue as numbers 73, 75, 100-102 respectively.

33. See Ober, op. cit. (n. 21), 332. This could be applied to orators accused of taking bribes aswell as ambassadors.

34. D. J. Mosley, Ancient Society 3 (1973), 12; Miller, op. cit. (n. 30), 114.35. Demosthenes had previously tried to prosecute Aeschines for bribe-taking in 346 through

Timarchus (30), but Aeschines parried the prosecution by accusing Timarchus of sexualimpropriety, forcing him to drop the charges. See also Kulesza, op. cit. (n. 27), 23, 28f., E. M.Harris, Aeschines and Athenian Politics (Oxford, 1995), 116 ff.

36. Although this is disputed by S. Perlman, GRBS 17 (1976), who claims that they were not asfrequent as is generally assumed and the number of actual cases is small.

37. Adcock & Mosley, op. cit. (n. 29), 233: charges of bribery and corruption were regularlymade 'almost as if by reflex action but in Athens they were rarely justified and carried little weight,'p. 162; Perlman, op. cit. (n. 36), 233: 'accusations of bribe-taking against ambassadors werefabricated in order to strengthen arguments in a controversy on foreign policy.' For issues related tothe distribution in time of accusations see n. 39.

38. R. A. Knox, G&R 32 (1985), 146: 'if he was normally successful, failure appeared to provenot incapacity but criminal conduct'.

39. W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. II (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1974). He statesthat the increasing poverty of the fourth century led to an increase in accusations as the 'demosthrived on hearing words about corruption in political life', p. 132. See also Miller, op. cit. (n. 30),114. However, it is difficult to see a direct link. There are more accusations in the fourth century,but there are also more surviving law court speeches and, as this is the medium of preservation of

the majority of accusations, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions from the distribution ofaccusations in time. The implication that the demos hrived on destroying their politicians should bedisputed. Bribery occurs in every political culture, not just in democracies. (For bribery in Spartasee K. L. Noethlichs, 'Bestechung, Bestechlichkeit und die Rolle des Geldes in der spartanischenAussen und Innenpolitik, 7-2 Jh v. Chr.', Historia 36 (1987), 129-170.)

40. Hyp. 1.24-25, quoted above p. 8.41. The role of dora was thus: 'd6ra become bribes when they lead to political failure; and ...

such failure will be encoded in terms of bribe-taking, whether or not there is any evidence thatmoney has changed hands.' Todd, op. cit. (n. 2), 306.

42. See Ober, op. cit. (n. 21), 236 and J. K. Davies, Wealth and the Power in Classical Athens(New York, 1981), 92 ff.

43. For discussion of the phenomenon of political groupings and policy of the period after the

Peloponnesian War as a development from the money - charis relationship see especially B. Strauss,Athens After the Peloponnesian War- Class, Faction and Policy, 403-386BC (New York, 1986), 13 ff.

44. Davies, op. cit. (n. 42), 66. For misthos as a term for bribery see Harvey, op. cit. (n. 17), 84-5.45. Ath. Pol. 27.3. CAAP, 339, comments: 'what Cimon achieved by personal liberality, his

successors had to achieve by misthos.' A fragment of Theopompus (115 F89) describes Cimon's

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172 BRIBERY IN ATHENIAN POLITICS PART II

generosity and through this 'he won his reputation and was the first of citizens'. Cimon's patronagewas therefore legendary and was obviously successful in promoting his popularity. W. R. Connor,Theopompus and Fifth Century Athens (Cambridge, 1968), 35, describes Pericles' answer as

'politically inspired payments that are little better than bribery'.46. See Millett, op. cit. (n. 20), 37ffwho describes public pay 'as a practical antidote to personalpatronage'.

47. Hyp. 1.24-5, Isoc. 8.50.48. Pericles: Thuc. 2.60.5, 2.65.8; Plut. 15.3. Aristides: Plut. Arist. 4.3, 7.2, 7.7. L. Pearson,

Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece California, 1962), 161.49. Aes. 3.19; 48; 62; 66; 73; 81; 85; 91; 92; 93; 94; 103; 105; 114; 125; 129; 143; 146; 149; 156;

167; 173; 209; 212; 214; 218; 220; 221; 226; 233; 237; 239; 244; 257; 259, and also inDemosthenes' reply. See Kulesza, op. cit. (n. 27), 75.

50. See Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 175: 'Athenian leaders displayed a spirit of rivalry which wasreminiscent of the fierce bitterness with which the aristocratic leaders of the sixth century and theearly fifth century had vied for power.'

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