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(forthcoming)International Journal, Vol 57, No. 4, Autumn 2002.

Regimenting the Public Mind: The Modernisation of Propaganda in the PRC

Dr Anne-Marie Brady

Department of Politics, University of Canterbury

CCP

China in the 21st century is a post-communist society that still retains its communist

government. How does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintain its political

acceptability while dismantling the socialist system? How can the government maintain

popular support when the uniting force of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology is spent and

discredited? And what has taken the place of communist ideology? Since the two major

political watersheds of the last ten years of the Mao era and the dramatic events of 1989,

the CCP has undergone a repackaging, similar to the re-invention of the British Labour

party under Tony Blair.1 The CCP is seeking to extend its rule over China indefinitely,

and in doing so, is attempting to move from being a revolutionary party to a political

party. In the post-1989 era the outward symbols and the all-important name brand CCP

remain, but the content and meaning of the partys activities have changed significantly.

Rather than the revolutionary romanticism of the Mao period, scientific

guidance is the new theme of CCP rule. Party strategists now acknowledge the collapse

of faith in Marxist revolution, and in the dictatorship of the proletariat and Marxist

economics, yet still need to find a means to justify the one-party state in China. The new

economic and political goals of the post-Mao era are symbolised by Dengs Four

Cardinal Principles and the Four Modernisations, meaning in practice: adopting

marketisation and other capitalist-type systems without calling it that, while maintaining

the CCP dictatorship. Post-1989 and throughout the 1990s, Jiang Zemin has attempted to

forge a new consensus in China, a logic for continuing CCP rule indefinitely. The party

leadership is determined that the CCP will avoid the fate of the CPSU in the Soviet Union

and learn from its mistakes.2 Party think-tanks are also studying the fate of other long

term one-party states, such as Mexico, and trying to learn from their mistakes and

successes. In 1999 Jiang Zemin announced the new policy of the three represents


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which called for the party to represent the advanced social productive forces, the

forward direction for China's cultural advancement, and the truest representative of the

fundamental interests of China's vast population.3 Now party leaders are refining notions

of turning the CCP into a party for all the people (quanmin dang). At meetings for

senior leaders at the resort of Beidaihe in September 2001 Jiang hinted that the CCPs

long-standing goal of class struggle had been abandoned, and said that the party must

open its door to the new classes of private business people and professionals.

According to Jiang, in the current era business people and professionals had now

displaced workers and peasants as the vanguard of society.4

Propaganda work is playing a central role in the repackaging of the CCP.

Propaganda - publicising the governments activities and educating the population - has

always been an essential element of the CCP hold on power. The Central Propaganda

Department (Zhongyang xuanchuanbu) of the CCP sets guidelines over the Chinese

media, film, drama, art, news, literature and education, and disciplines those who break

the rules on what can and cannot be presented in these mediums.5 The propaganda system

(xuanjiao xitong) remains one of the key groupings of bureaucracies within the Chinese

political system.6 This article surveys the modernisation of the propaganda system in

China, examining continuities and new developments in the system, in particular,

attempts to manufacture consent for the re-invention of the CCP.

Unifying Public Opinion

Propaganda work in the 1990s and into the early 21st

century has focused on the goals of

uniting public opinion in China, strengthening government power, and improving both

the party and the militarys image. With the decline in faith in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

Thought since the end of the Mao era and especially since 1989, the CCP has faced the

difficult task of finding a suitable replacement for communist ideologys unifying role.

Nationalism, or rather chauvinism, has come to be an important tool to unite the Chinese

nation.7 Immediately after June 1989 the government made a point of blaming the growth

of the student movement on outside forces and warned of the danger of peaceful

evolution, heping yanbian.8 The phrase stemmed from a comment by US Secretary of

State, John Foster Dulles, in 1955, that Chinese communism would be undermined by


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means of the gradual influence of Western ideas and culture, a peaceful evolution rather

than violent invasion.9 Throughout the 1990s, CCP propagandists worked to foster a

sense of antagonism towards Western countries, especially focusing on the imperialist

past. Numerous books, films, television programs, and exhibitions continually reminded

Chinese citizens of the wrongs enacted against Chinese society by foreign countries.

Beginning in the mid-1990s Beijing raged that in addition to peaceful evolution plots,

Western countries were now trying to contain China, ezhi Zhongguo, and attacked the

China threat theory proposed by some Western analysts as the fig leaf for justifying

Chinas containment.10 A leading article in Liberation Daily in 1995 claimed that

proponents of the China threat theory were mobilising public opinion to secure a

bigger slice of the enormous Asian arms purchasing pie for the US. The article stated the

theorys supporters were trying to sow discord between China and its Asian neighbours,

creating a leading role for Washington in the region.11

Patriotic sentiment was further invoked through a continual series of propaganda

campaigns targeted on sensitive topics designed to stimulate nationalistic fervour. These

ranged from the lead-up to the return of Hong Kong and Macau to the Chinese mainland;

attacks on Taiwanese leaders associated with the Taiwan independence movement such

as Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, and even mock armed attacks on Taiwan itself

during the lead up to the Taiwan elections in 1996; encouraging anti-US demonstrations

in China after NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the war in

Kosovo in 1999; jingoism during the Sydney 2000 Olympics12

; and dragging out the US

spy plane incident on Hainan Island in 2001. Such campaigns built on existent anti-

foreignism within the Chinese population that had erupted in earlier eras (also with

official encouragement) such as the first three years after 1949 and the late 1960s.13

The

central government was careful to manage such sentiment, not allowing it to spill over

into outright xenophobia. Nonetheless, allowing a certain degree of anti-foreignism to

exist within Chinese society was regarded as a useful antidote to its opposite emotion -

extreme adulation for Western society (summed up by the phrase chong yang mei wai) -

regarded as potentially much more threatening to CCP power.14

In addition to encouraging hostility to the foreign Other, party propagandists have

also focused on creating a sense of CCP-style Chineseness. The communist


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authorities have long constructed a notion of the Ancestral land, zuguo,15

which

legitimates their rule. To oppose this rule is to be unpatriotic, even unfilial. The slogan

that sums up this concept without the communist party there would be no new China

(mei you gongchandang, jiu mei you xin Zhongguo) is a phrase drummed into the

consciousness of all Chinese citizens. According to CCP ideology, the party is new

China, the spiritual and actual embodiment of the resurgence of an ancient civilisation. In

1995, as part of the partys renewed nation-building project Jiang Zemin proposed a

spiritual civilisation campaign advocating a return to traditional socialist and

Chinese values. In the same year, he also publicly urged cadres to stress politics, an

indirect reference to the perceived corrupting influences of excessive Westernisation.

Deng Xiaoping had of course earlier launched similar campaigns and warnings in the

1980s. Along with Deng era campaigns along these lines, and indeed those of the Mao

era, model figures, both old and new, were promoted as part of the campaigns, as an

example to the population of how they ought to behave. In the early 1990s, even Lei

Feng, revolutionary hero of China in the 1960s reappeared. Where Jiang differed from

Mao and Deng was his stress on traditional Chinese values, in addition to traditional

Marxist-Leninist ones. The goals of Jiang Zemins spiritual civilisation campaign have

followed a pattern familiar from late-Imperial China, stressing the superiority of Chinese

culture and advocating a selective adopting of Western technique only. Jiangs (or

rather his team of policy-writers) concept of which traditional socialist and Chinese

values might be adopted was further articulated in the late 1990s by the new theories of

the Three Represents (san ge daibiao) and the call to rule China by law and morality

(yifa yide, zhi guo), both of which have been strongly promoted in the Chinese media.

The evolution of Jiang Thought (continuing the history of ideological development in

CCP history beginning with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and on to the

Theories of Deng Xiaoping) is a necessary step if Jiang and his supporters within the

party are to maintain their influence within the CCP after the transition to the next

generation of senior leaders, and even more so if the CCP is to continue its overwhelming

dominance of Chinese politics.16

A further theme of post-1989 propaganda work has been selective coverage of the

problems of other post-communist societies, especially Russia and the former


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Yugoslavia. This effort has been particularly successful in creating popular acceptance of

the inevitability of the continuance of CCP-rule in the medium term at least, in the

absence of any other alternatives.17

The political, economic and social chaos (luan) of

these post-communist societies is deliberately contrasted in the Chinese media with an

incessant barrage of positive news stories on Chinas economic prosperity and ethnic

harmony. Even failure can be turned in to success according to these guidelines, viz, the

Chinese medias coverage of the Chinese soccer teams dismal efforts at the 2002 World

Soccer Cup. Since the events of 1989 emphasising the positive, or positive propaganda

(zhengmian xuanchuan), has been the guiding line (koujing) on China-related news

stories.18 Manipulating the news is an old and tried tactic of CCP propagandists. In the

past the phrase the news media is the mouthpiece of the party was commonly cited, in

the 1990s, blurring the lines on the realities of one-party rule the saying has been re-

phrased as, the news media is the mouthpiece of the government.19

Apart from uniting the nation by means of strengthening nationalistic sentiment,

the other main themes of CCP propaganda campaigns throughout the 1990s and into the

early 21st century were specifically aimed at improving both the partys and the militarys

image, both of which had taken a body blow after 1989. An example of such image-

building campaigns was the utilisation of natural disasters as a focus for central and local

government propaganda work. CCP propaganda specialists recommend this as a

particularly useful means of raising government approval ratings.20 In 1991 during floods

in Anhui and Jiangsu a successful propaganda campaign was adopted on the theme rain

or wind in one boat, warm feelings amongst the people (fengyu tong chuan, qing nuan

renjian).21 During the 1998 flood season, central authorities organised a nationwide Anti-

Flood Campaign (kang hongshui yundong), which promoted the work of the Peoples

Liberation Army (PLA) to combat the floods and attempted to involve the whole

population in the struggle against the floods by conducting an extremely unpopular

nationwide voluntary flood campaign donation program. The campaign was

reminiscent in its style and tone to earlier political campaigns, but this time the enemy

was Mother Nature rather than a human one. This propaganda campaign not only aimed

to improve the image of the PLA, it was an attempt by the party to seize the moral high


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ground on environmental issues such as deforestation (which was allegedly the cause of

the 1999 floods) from popular environmental groups that had sprung up in the 1990s.

The governments main concern with the threat of the spread of environment

groups in China was not so much their activities, but their organisational abilities and

their capacity to offer an appealing alternative to CCP ideology (think Green politics).

For similar reasons, since April 1999 when 10,000 Falungong followers demonstrated in

Beijing, the rise of the religious group Falungong has been regarded by senior party

leaders as one of the most severe threats to CCP power in recent years. Since mid-1999

anti-Falungong propaganda activities have dominated the Chinese media. Ever mindful

of how other Communist regimes have toppled, the CCP is particularly concerned about

the growth of religious believers outside the control of the officially managed religions in

China. These are organised into the various so-called patriotic, or China-based, Chinese

government controlled faiths, divided up into Catholics, Christian (meaning all

Protestant denominations), Buddhists and Moslems. The Falungong propaganda

campaign has seen a revival of propaganda methodology not seen since the late 1960s

and early 1970s, using such tactics as broadcasting programs of followers going through

political re-education, i.e. what in Chinese and English is known as brainwashing (xi

nao); denouncing the group as an evil cult; and promoting the anti-Falungong

campaign as a morality movement. One particularly effective tactic in turning public

opinion has been the continual broadcasting of horrific images from the self-immolation

suicide attempt of a number of alleged Falungong followers in Tiananmen Square in

January 2001. The constant coverage of these acts has severely tarnished the image of

Falungong and its leader Li Hongzhi and has succeeded in gaining support for the

governments response to the religious group.

New Approaches

In addition to the tried and true tactics of CCP propaganda practice such as targeted

propaganda campaigns, new methodology has been introduced from Western public

relations technique and advertising. The use of this new methodology in the Chinese

propaganda system was first proposed in the 1980s, but really came into play in the

1990s. Western-style public relations and advertising methodology have fitted


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surprisingly well with the new needs of the CCP government.

Before we look at how and why PR and advertising have been adapted by the

CCP propaganda system, it is useful to look first at the history of public relations (PR).

The notion of publicity and the public evolved in the United States out of the belief

that factual disclosures could help to create a conversant democratic public.22

Progressive thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson believed that democracy was dependent

on a literate, informed public, constantly engaging in an exchange of ideas on

contemporary topics.23 By the late 19th

century the genre of investigative journalism had

developed in the US - described derogatively by US President Teddy Roosevelt as

muck-raking24 - which sought to act as a check on the powers of big business and

government. However, by the 1920s, a number of thinkers in the United States had come

to regard the watchdog role of the American media as a serious threat to social stability.

Public relations - creating positive publicity and image building - was proposed as the

answer to this problem.25

The earliest origins of PR work in the US show striking parallels with its use in

contemporary China, reflecting a fear of the chaos of mass rule. Ironically in the US,

especially in the 1930s and the late 1940s, the PR industry was closely linked with anti-

communism as big business engaged in PR campaigns to oppose efforts such as public

health insurance and public sponsored housing. Walter Lippman, one of the founding

figures in PR, developed theories about the inherent malleability of the public through

the mass media, building on the work of French social scientist Gabriel Tarde. 26 To

Tarde, the public, linked by the media, could be manipulated to create standardised

thinking on various topics. This would bring about a new means of social rule. In Walter

Lippmans words, PR work could manage public attitudes on various topics in order to

manufacture consent for the continuing rule of the governing elite.27 One of the

techniques Lippman advocated for manipulating public opinion was the creation of news

stories in order to get the public to take sides.28 This approach has long been a favourite

of CCP propagandists. According to another early PR specialist Ivy Lee, PR was the

secret by which a civilisation might be preserved.29 And to the influential PR guru

Edward Bernays, PR was useful for regimenting the public mind.30 To Bernays, PR

enabled elites to preserve their social, economic and political advantages against rising


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democratic expectations in a society.31 Bernays recommended PR as recipe to

manufacture the imprimatur of popular support to validate the decision-making

activity of elites. The process required was 1) study the public to ascertain their opinion

on various topics, and, 2) utilise this research to set out a strategy to influence the

public.32

In a curious twist of history, the Nazi head of propaganda Goebbels was

influenced by Bernays writings and those of other early American PR specialists,33 while

Soviet propagandists adopted some of the Nazis techniques for use in the Soviet Union.

The CCP communist system in turn, was modelled on the Soviet one. So the Chinese

propaganda system has in fact long absorbed some of the basic principles of PR work,

and its utilisation in the post-1989 period could be said to be more in the realm of a

rediscovery, or an upgrading of existing ideas and approaches, rather than an innovation.

The modernisation of the Chinese propaganda system in recent years can be

traced back to the early days of the post-Mao reform period. As the goals and

methodology of the Cultural Revolution period were negated, so too were the goals and

methodology of propaganda work in that era, which had played such a central role in

some of the most crucial central government power struggles. Propaganda cadres in the

early 1980s were advised to absorb techniques from the West,34

and, (especially with

regard to propaganda aimed at foreigners) to cast off the dated methods of the past. From

the mid-1980s, in English and other foreign languages, the more neutral phrases public

relations, publicity and information came to be used in preference to propaganda

to describe the governments publicity and information activities. By the early 1990s,

these phrases were increasingly being used in Chinese as well, as propagandists noted the

negative connotations the word for propaganda in Chinese xuanchuan had acquired.35

A considerable number of books in Western languages on the subject of public relations

were translated into Chinese,36

in addition to books and articles written by Chinese

authors that drew heavily on the classic works of Western-style PR.37 Reflecting the

complex relationship between the government and the market in China, these books are

usually aimed at readers working both in the public service and the private market. One

such book is Hu NingshengsA Course of Study in Governmental PR (Zhengfu gonggong

guanxi jiaocheng), published in 1996 by the Central Party School.


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Following closely in the footsteps of Lippman and Bernays (though typically of

Chinese authors writing for an official audience, not citing their names), Hu advocates

the use of PR in order to mould (suzao) public attitudes towards the government.38

According to Hu, political PR helps to promote a good impression of the government,

while pushing forward the governments own goals.39 Hu cites Coca Colas international

success as an example of how if you have a good image, any problem can be solved. 40

The Chinese government can use political PR to gain the understanding, appreciation

and support of most of the public.41 PR is an administrative tool of modern democratic

government.42

As Edward Bernays once did, in another era and another political system, Hu

advocates using public opinion polls to establish what the Chinese governments image

problems are and creating a plan for government action on that basis.43 Hu praises

political PR as a means to join local and central governments together, since it is in the

interests of the local governments to support the central authorities.44 PR can be used to

make Chinese people have more affection for Chinese politicians, necessitating 1)

scripting and pre-planning of what senior leaders should wear, say and act during public

appearances 2) Chinese senior leaders should give special addresses to the nation on TV,

similar to US presidents, 3) they should talk about national issues openly.45 All of these

suggestions (though perhaps to a lesser degree the one about talking about issues openly)

have been put into place in the Chinese political scene in the last few years.

New Bottles, New Wine, Same Brand

One of the most important changes in CCP propaganda work in the 1990s has been the

embracing of new technologies and new approaches. One of the earliest changes in the

early 1990s was in the realm of television programming. From 1994 a host of new

investigative journalism programs were broadcast, such as Focus Point (Jiaodian

fantan) andEastern Horizon (Dongfang shikong)46 which, with the blessing of the central

authorities, produced in-depth news programs on topical issues such as corruption, local

elections, environmental issues, as well as international news. Party leaders also took to

heart the message about gaining better media savvy. Senior Chinese politicians such as

Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji clearly took lessons on how to improve their television


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image, with Zhu Rongji coming off especially well.47

Another change has been the introduction of political advertising on television. In

the past the CCP made much use of large hoardings and local display boards to broadcast

political messages in public spaces. In the mid-1990s a new technique was introduced,

political advertising on television, officially described as public service announcements

(gongyi guanggao).48

In 1997 central authorities even put pressure on Western advertisers

to produce some public service morality messages promoting the goals of the spiritual

civilisation campaign for the Chinese media.49 One of the earliest example of the new

political ads in 1997 was a mixture of the traditional Chinese and socialist values

Jiang Zemin was urging Chinese citizens to adopt. In a direct reference to the slogans of

the Qing self-strengthening movement, a 30 second patriotic message showing scenes

of sweaty steelworkers was flashed across TV screens during ad breaks on CCTV

channels with the slogan self-strengthen, create, and be glorious, ziqiang chuangzao

huihuang. 1997 also marked the beginning of the regular showing of a new political

trailer preceding the nightly CCTV1 7 oclock news (which had come to be the modern

equivalent of a daily political study session). The 45 second trailer flashed a succession

of split-second images of China past and present while the national anthem played in the

background. The emphasis was on Chinas strengths and achievements both in the

present era, represented by the high-tech skyscrapers of Shenzhen, and to those of the

past, symbolised by the Great Wall. The images symbolise the CCPs new, new China; a

China that is both rooted in the past, and looking to the future.

Walter Lippman particularly recommended the use of pictures and visualisation in

PR work, describing them as the most effective passageways into inner life.50 Symbols,

according to Lippman, could be manipulated to form mental agreement in the public

mind.51 To Lippman, the utilisation of media images were the the means by which

leaders and special interests might cloak themselves in the fiction that they stand as

delegates of the common good. He asserted that symbols helped to magnify emotion

while undermining critical thought, to emphasise sensations while subverting ideas.52

Since 1997 many other political advertisements have appeared on Chinese television such

as those promoting environmental messages, promoting Chinas entry into the WTO, and

promoting the PRC under the CCP as modernising and technologically advanced.


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The Internet has been growing in importance as a tool of government propaganda

in recent years. Though many analysts claim that the Internet will be one of the major

means to ultimately undermine the communist system in China,53

a Carnegie Endowment

study has revealed that to date, at least, the Internet has been effectively incorporated as a

tool of the government system with its dangers (so far) held in check.54

Beijings goal is

to get the whole of the Chinese government represented on the Internet by 2006. All

major Chinese newspapers are now freely available on the Internet and many of the

papers have Bulletin Boards and discussion groups that have become the key focus for

gauging public opinion in China in the last few years. In a surprising new twist, since

1999 the bulletin board of the CCPs flagship paper Peoples Daily, Strong Nation

Forum (Qiang guo luntan) has become one of the most popular and controversial sites.

The boards are highly censored and carefully monitored, but they are read at the highest

levels and some of their feedback has been incorporated into the governments response

to controversial domestic and international incidents.55

Though television has taken over in overall importance as the governments main

propaganda tool, radio still has a useful role. In recent years, following on from other

changes in the Chinese economy, many new commercial stations have sprung up in

China. Although these stations are run as self-sufficient, self-funded businesses, this does

not mean they are outside the control or influence of the propaganda system.56 Through

such highly popular stations as Guangdongs Pearl River FM and China Radio

International broadcasting in FM in Beijing, Shanghai and other major cities, the

government is able to reach a young urban audience that might be turned off from other

more traditional outlets for government propaganda such as the nightly news. The same

situation is occurring in the host of new, relatively independent newspapers that have

sprung up in the 1990s such as Southern Weekend(Nanfang zhoumo) andBeijing Youth

Daily (Beijing qingnian bao). If these papers do step too far beyond the boundaries of

official propaganda, central officials have no difficulty in reeling them back to a more

conservative line, whether through censure or sacking (and even arresting) key staff.

Conclusion: A New, New China

Since the developments of 1989 and the fall of Socialist regimes in Eastern Europe in the


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early 1990s, the CCP has clearly moved beyond the concept of itself as a Marxist-

Leninist political party. The party is looking for ways to maintain and justify its hold on

power; propaganda work is playing a crucial role in the re-invention of the CCP from a

revolutionary party to a political party. Amongst the toolkit for the partys bid to maintain

power are a renewed emphasis on nationalism, including strengthening notions of both

the foreign Other and the Chinese Self; an ongoing effort to present a negative picture of

post-communist societies in order to bolster fears of the potential for chaos in China if the

CCP was overturned; image building activities in order to mould public opinion in favour

of both the CCP and the PLA; as well as targeted campaigns focusing on perceived

threats to CCP power, such as Falungong and Muslim separatists in Xinjiang. While

some tried and true practices are still being utilised such as the promotion of model

figures, propaganda work in the current period has been strengthened by the introduction

of a host of innovative new approaches: ranging from rebuilding and indeed, recreating

the partys image; utilising the Internet as a tool of the government rather than fearing it

as a threat to government stability; and utilising various aspects of PR methodology for

regimenting the public mind. The CCP has shown itself adept at adapting to change

and challenging circumstances, absorbing new approaches and taking on new directions

when necessary. This chameleon-like quality of the CCP is one of the secrets of its

success as one of the few remaining communist governments left in the world and bodes

well for its bid to stay in power indefinitely.

1Indeed the transformation of the British Labour Party and other European left wing

parties have been a topic of study for the CCP in recent years. See Oliver August and

Philip Webster, China Turns to Blair for Tips on Transformation,

http://www.timesonline.co.uk, accessed 29 May 2002.2Yu Yunyao, "Fully Strengthen Party Building in the New Era In Accordance With the

Requirements of the 'Three Represents," p. 1, "China Investigation Report 2000-2001 - A

Study of Contradictions Among the People Under New Conditions," edited by the

Central Organization Department Research Issue Group and published by the CentralCompilation and Translation Press, 2001, FBIS translation, CPP20010824000143.3Yu Yunyao, p. 1.

4Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China Progresses with the Times, 5 September 2001, CNN.com,

accessed 5 September 2001.5For an insiders account of this system see Wu Xuecan, Ba mei ge ren biancheng

jianchayuan Zhongguo gongchandang dui meiti de quanfangwei kongzhi,


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http://www.bignews.org/20020312.txt accessed 4 June 2002. Wu was formerly an editor

at the Peoples Daily Overseas Edition.6On the role ofxitong in the Chinese bureaucratic system and for a description of the

xuanjiao xitong, see Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China; From Revolution Through

Reform, New York: W.W. Norton and Co, 1995, pp. 194-5, 197-99.7See the document Realistic Responses and Strategic Choices for China After the Soviet

Upheaval, published inZhongguo qingnian bao in 1991. This neibu document

renounced the Marxist-Leninist legacy and advocated nationalism as a unifying force,combining Western rationalism with Chinese culture. Cited in Gu Xin and David Kelly,

New Conservatism: Intermediate Ideology of a New Elite, in David S. Goodman and

Beverley Hooper (eds.), Chinas Quiet Revolution, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1994,

pp. 219-233.8Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang xuanchuan, sixiang gongzuo de tongzhi 28

July 1989, Zhonggong xuanchuanbu bangongting (ed.),Dang de xuanchuan gongzuo

wenjian xuanbian, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1994, Vol. 4, pp.

1812-1813.9Teng Wensheng, ed., Fan heping yanbian jiaoyu da wen lu, Beijing: Falu chubanshe,

1992, p. 16; see also Liu Honghu, ed.,Xifang zhengyao he baokan guanyu heping

yanbian de zuixin yanlun, Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 1992; Xin Can,Xifang

zhengjie yaoren tan heping yanbian, Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1991.10

Proponents of the China threat theory believe that China is becoming increasingly

belligerent and will threaten the interests of the West in the future, see for exampleRichard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, New York:

A.A. Knopf, 1997; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Re-making

of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.11

China Poses No Threat to Others, China Daily, 7 November 1995.12

For a study of the effectiveness of Chinas official coverage of the Olympics in buildingsupport for the government see Sun Wanning, Semiotic Over-determination orInfotainment: Television, Citizenship, and the Olympic Games, in Stephanie Hemelryk

Donald, Michael Keane and Yin Hong (eds.), Media in China: Consumption, Contentand Crisis, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 116-127.13For more on this topic see Anne-Marie Brady,Making the Foreign Serve China:

Managing Foreigners in the Peoples Republic, Boulder, Colorado: Rowman and

Littlefield, 2002 (in press).14

See Shewai renyuan shouce, Guangzhou: Xinhua shudian, 1985, pp. 19-20.15The standard Chinese translation ofzuguo is Motherland, though Ancestral Land is

the actual meaning of the term in Chinese. I have adopted the latter translation as being a

more accurate reflection of the connotations this term evokes in Chinese.16For a recent high profile speech on the importance of Jiang Zemin Thought and Chinas

future see Xuexi 5.31 jianghua shixian san ge daibiao,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-06/04/content_422748.htm accessed 4 June2002.17In an anonymous 1995 public opinion poll conducted by foreign and Chinese

researchers, the majority of respondents preferred social order and stability to freedom.

See Yang Zhong, Jie Chen, and John M. Scheb II, Political Views from Below: A


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Survey of Beijing Residents, PS: Political Science and Politics, September 1997. The

results of the survey also indicated that popular support for the government is strongerthan it was in the mid-1980s. See Jie Chen, Yang Zhong, and Jan William Hilliard, The

Level and Sources of Popular Support for Chinas Current Political Regime, Communist

and Post-Communist Studies 30, 1 1997.18Xuanchuan dongtai, 1990, p. 11.

19Hu Ningsheng,Zhengfu gonggong guanxi jiaocheng, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang

dangxiao chubanshe, 1996, p. 28.20Hu, pp. 93-94.21Hu, p. 93.22

Stuart Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin, New York: Basic Books, 1996, p. 50. This

research owes an intellectual debt to Stuart Ewen, whose fascinating interview on ABCradio in 1998 got me thinking about the parallels between the history of PR and new

developments in CCP propaganda work.23

Ewen, p. 50.24Ewen, p. 48.25

See Walter Lippman, Public Opinion, New York, 1922.26

Ewen, p. 70.27See Lippman, Public Opinion, and The Phantom Public: A Sequel to Public Opinion,

New York, 1927.28

Ewen, p. 154.29

Ewen, p. 132.30Edward Bernays, Propaganda, New York: 1928, p. 27.31

Ewen, p. 399.32

Edward Bernays, Engineering of Consent, Annals of the American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science 250, March 1947, pp. 113-20.33

Ewen, p. 446.34

Duiwai bianji jiagong de ABC,Dui wai baodao cankao, 1983, No.2, p. 29.35Hu, p. 122.36See for example Jean Chaumeley (Qiaomoli), Denis Huisman (Yusiman), Gonggongguanxi, Beijing: Shangwu shudian, 1996; F. Jefkins (Jiefujinsi), Gonggong guanxi,Lanzhou: Gansu renmin chubanshe, 1989; Daniel A. Moss (Mosi), Gonggong guanxi

shiwu, Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 1996.37

See for example Guo Huimin (ed.), Guoji gonggong guanxi jiaocheng, Shanghai: Fudan

daxue chubanshe, 1996; Hu Ningsheng (ed.),Zhengfu gonggong guanxi jiaocheng,Beijing: Zhong gong zhongyang dang xiao chubanshe, 1996; Li Bin, Guoji liyi yu jiaojilijie, Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985; Liao Weijian, Guangdong gonggong

guanxixue de fazhan yu zhanwang,http://www.lib.szu.edu.cn/szulibhtm/AD_zyjs/BD_sdsjk/xb//880409.ht, accessed 26

November 2001; Liu Luxiang, Shewai gonggong guanxi, Dalian, Dalian chubanshe,

1996; Xiao Lin, Gonggong guanxi yu xiandai guanli,http://www.lib.szu.edu.cn/szulibhtm/AD_zyjs/BD_sdsjk/xb//880402.ht, accessed 26

November 2001; Wang Xiaochun (ed.), Shewai gongguan yu liyi, Taiyuan: Shanxi jingji

chubanshe, 1995; Wu Yita, Yang Xuemei (eds.), Gonggong guanxi, Beijing: Shehui

kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1994; Yuan Libin (ed.), Gonggong guanxi, Beijing: Renmin


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chubanshe, 1994; Zhang Yonghua (ed.),Dazhong chuanboxue, Shanghai waiyu jiaoyu

chubanshe, 1992; Zhao Pugen, Zhang Da, Hu Youan (eds.), Gonggong guanxi

jiaocheng, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dang xiao chubanshe, 1996.38

Hu, p. 8.39Hu, p. 31.40Hu, p. 30.41

Hu, p. 30-31.42Hu, p. 8.43Hu, p. 91.44Hu, p. 77-78.45

Hu, p. 32.46

CCTV producer Li Xiaopings article Significant Changes in the Chinese TelevisionIndustry and Their Impact in the PRC: An Insiders Perspective, Center for Northeast

Asian Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, August 2001, argues that such programs

have an important watchdog role in Chinese politics. Kevin Latham Nothing But the

Truth: News Media, Power, and Hegemony in South China, The China Quarterly 163,September 2000, pp. 633-654 similarly argues for the existence of a growing watchdog

role in the Chinese media. My own research shows that both these articles represent anoverly optimistic assessment. While investigative media activities might be allowed to be

watchdogs on certain issues about which the government wants to air public debate,

many other topics are clearly off limits politically. Indeed since the crackdown on

Falungong after 1999Jiaodian fantan and other current affairs programs have beenactively involved in the anti-Falungong propaganda campaign, demonstrating that their

role is indeed that of the mouthpiece of theparty not the people.47

On how government officials have been trying to improve their media skills in the1990s see Li Xiaoping, p. 14.48

On the links between the advertising industry in China and the party-state, see GeremieBarm, CCP and Adcult PRC, The China Journal, No. 41, January 1999, pp. 1-23.49Tom Korski, Western Advertisers Urged to Push Ethics, South China Morning Post,

14 May 1997. See Steven Wayne Lewis, What Can I Do for Shanghai? Selling Spiritual

Civilization in Chinas Cities, inMedia in China,pp. 139-151 for a depiction of howcommercial interests are working in with political interests in the production of private

enterprise funded political advertising.50

Ewen, p. 152.51

Ewen, p. 155.52Ewen, p. 157.53

Dai Xiudians, Chinese Politics of the Internet: Control and Anti-Control, Cambridge

Review of International Relations 13: 2, Spring-Summer, is typical of this point of view.Dai describes the Internet as a double-edged sword for the CCP, predicting that it will

bring about long-term change for China. Bi Jianhai, The Internet Revolution in China:

What is the Significance of the Development of the Internet for Traditional Forms ofCommunist Control,International Journal 56, 3, Summer 2001, adopts a similar point

of view.54

See Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas, The Internet and State Control in

Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba, and the Counterrevolution, Information


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Revolution and World Politics Project, Global Policy Program, no. 21, July 2001,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The conclusions of Christopher ReneHughes in Nationalism in Chinese Cyber Space, Cambridge Review of International

Relations 13: 2, Spring-Summer, appearing in the same issue as Dai Xiudians article

(see previous footnote) support the analysis of Kalathil and Baos. See also Hu Xin, TheSurfer-in-Chief and the Would-Be Kings of Content: A Short Study of Sina.com and

Netease.com, inMedia in China, pp. 192-199 which describes how the two major

independent Internet providers in China steer clear of political topics, focussing insteadon tabloid journalism. My own research tends to support the conclusions of the above

authors.55

Personal communication from a Chinese diplomat, 2002.56

Daniel C. Lynch,After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and Thought Work in

Reformed China, Stanford University Press, 1999 has written in some detail on this topic,

see especially chapter 3. I disagree with the basic premise of Lynchs research in this

book, which argues that the CCP propaganda system is breaking down due to economic

and technical changes in China (p. 7) and predicts that the outcome will be a genuinepolitical crisis (p. 10). Lynchs research finished in 1995, seven years later his

prescriptions appear overly pessimistic (or optimistic, depending on your point of view).My own research indicates that the CCP has been relatively successful in regaining

legitimacy throughout the 1990s and that the propaganda system has played a useful role

in this process. Unlike Lynch I do not see any contradiction between a market economy

as practised in China and the continuance of the one-party state. See Zhao Yuezhi, Media

Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line, Urbana

and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1998, (which follows similar ground to Lynch)

for a more conservative analysis of the impact of commercialisation and its affect on theCCP-dominated media industry in China.

Tarde Bernays

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