Tapping Our Potential

7/31/2019 Tapping Our Potential

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TAPPING OUR POTENTIAL DIASPORA COMMUNITIES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

TAPPINGOUR POTENTIALD I A S P O R A C O M M U N I T I E S A N D

C A N A D I A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

A Joint Initiative Of T H E M O S A I C I N S T I T U T E A N D

T H E W A LT E R & D U N C A N G O R D O N F O U N D AT I O N



TAPPING OUR POTENTIAL DIASPORA COMMUNITIES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICYTAPPING OUR POTENTIAL DIASPORA COMMUNITIES AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

TAPPINGOUR POTENTIALD I A S P O R A C O M M U N I T I E S A N D

C A N A D I A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y

A Joint Initiative Of

T H E M O S A I C I N S T I T U T E A N DT H E W A LT E R & D U N C A N G O R D O N F O U N D AT I O N




TAbLE OF CONTENTS

IntroductIon 3

Background 3Why does this matter? 3

About the report 5 Methodology and organization o the report 6

What this report is not 7 Acknowledgements 9

Disclaimer 10

toward dIaspora EngagEmEnt In ForEIgn polIcymakIngan ovErvIEw oF currEnt thought and practIcE 11

mEchanIsms For govErnmEntal consultatIon wIth canadIan dIasporagroups In ForEIgn polIcy dEvElopmEnt 29

prElImInary rEcommEndatIons 34

casE studIEs: an Introductory notE 37

1) Aghanistan 382) China 423) Eritrea 50

4) Sri Lanka 615) Sudan 70

organIzatIonal proFIlEs 75

our contrIbutors 75




INTRODUCTION

bACkGROUNDCanada has what is arguably the most international citizenry on the planet. By virtue o both our open, proactiveimmigration policies and our longstanding commitment to promoting multiculturalism, we now live in a country whereapproximately 20% o all Canadians were born outside o the country, including some 40% o those living in Vancouver

and more than 45% o those living in Toronto.1 And, compared to other countries with high levels o immigration, ourellow citizens come rom a ar greater variety o source countries. 2

Yet while there has been considerable research undertaken and social service programming developed to consider andaddress the challenges represented by the settlement and integration o new immigrants into Canadian lie, relatively littleattention has been paid to improving our understanding o the transnational dimensions o today’s immigrant experiences.While providing high-quality language or skills training to those newly arrived in Canada is o unquestioned value both tothem and to the country as a whole, it is arguably no less important to consider how the ethnocultural diversity that resultsrom our proactive immigration and multiculturalism policies aects who we are as a country, or our collective identityas Canadians. It is even less common to consider how our relationships with the rest o the world—especially those partso the world rom which our population derives—may be enriched, expanded or otherwise aected by the changingcomposition o our Canadian mosaic.

The Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation’s Diaspora Program, launched in 2004, set out to amass knowledge o theimplications or Canada’s oreign and development policies o our country’s diverse population and their ties to dierentparts o the world. Now, ater almost seven years, the Foundation is winding down its work with diaspora communitieswith the publication o this report, the dual purpose o which is to review and summarize the extent to which Canada’soreign policy has been, is and should be inormed and enhanced by the expertise and insights o Canada’s many diasporacommunities, and to encourage ongoing research and capacity-building in this area.

In publishing this paper, the Gordon Foundation is delighted to be partnering with the Mosaic Institute, whose work islargely ocused on exploring and promoting these pressing issues. Launched in 2007, the Mosaic Institute works withCanada’s ethnocultural communities to advance Canadian solutions and promote peace and development in conict-ridden or underdeveloped parts o our world.3 Both the Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic Institute believe that Canada’sdiversity can and should be harnessed to improve the content and reach o Canada’s oreign policy; that the diversifcationo our population through decades o conscious eort and ambitious public policies—while valuable in and o itsel—should also make a dierence to the way Canada relates and responds to the rest o the world. In particular, we believethat Canada’s ever-growing diversity uniquely positions it to play a signifcant role in helping to broker regional disputesand promote the practice o good government around the globe in a way that our traditional Anglo-French heritage alonedoes not.

WhY DOES ThI S MATTER?This area o research is important or many reasons. These include the ollowing, inter alia:

1) ci ei i e ie e.

Tapping into the resources and expertise o diaspora communities matters because those communities may possessinsights, experiences, and expertise that could inorm and enrich both the content and the quality o Canadianoreign policy. This reects the more general belie that the inputs o interested and experienced stakeholders romacross a wide variety o public policy areas are valuable in enhancing the quality o the policy outputs relating tothose same areas.

We see this belie demonstrated, or example, when governments invite parents and teachers to weigh in oneducational policies; healthcare practitioners to advise on health policy; or members o the country’s research

1 Statistics Canada, 2006.

2 A 2007 Migration Policy Institute study ound that “no one group dominates Toronto’s immigrant stock. Nine countries account or hal o the oreign-born population, while the rest o the oreign-born

come rom nearly every country in the world.”

Marie Price and Lisa Benton-Short, “Counting Immigrants in Cities across the Globe,” Migration Inormation Source (2007), http://www.migrationinormation.org/Feature/display.cm?ID=567

3 For more inormation about both the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic Institute, please see the Aterword to this paper.




community to contribute to the ormulation o policies related to science and technology. This common practiceis not merely political expediency designed to curry avour with politically important groups o voters; rather, itreects a general belie and perception that those with unique experiences and expertise related to these variousareas o public policy will serve as a sort o “reality check” on others’ policy ideas, and ultimately improve thequality o the resultant policy outputs.

The inputs o armers do not automatically become the policy outputs o governments any more than the inputs o bankers automatically dictate the direction o economic policy, but the ormer’s experience harvesting crops andmanaging arm enterprises and the latter’s experience managing large investment portolios are typically valued

and weighed alongside a range o other policy considerations whenever agricultural and economic policies aremade. The act that such contributors have a vested interest in the content o the government’s fnal policy outputsdoes not disqualiy them rom participating in the public policy discussion. Any concerns about entrenchedinterests are outweighed by the tacit assumption that agricultural policy will be better as a result o input receivedrom armers and economic policy will beneft to some degree rom the input o the banking community.

By the same token, the Mosaic Institute and the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation believe that diasporacommunities have legitimate experiences and expertise to contribute to Canada’s ofcial oreign policy and itsinternational activities. However, unlike armers or bankers or parents contributing to the development o publicpolicy in their respective areas o specialization, it is not well known or well understood how and to what extentdiaspora communities currently understand, have access to, or inuence the content o Canadian oreign policy asit relates to countries, regions, issues or disputes o which they have extensive knowledge.

I it is indeed the case that some diaspora communities—most likely those that are small in size or not yet well-established in Canadian lie—typically have less relative access to the oreign policy establishment than Canadiansrom larger communities or those o longer standing, then to explore ways o enhancing the contribution o suchdiaspora communities to the ormulation o Canada’s oreign policy also matters because it levels the playing feldbetween those who have more access to the oreign policymaking process and those who have relatively less.

2) c’ ei i iee e i i eii iqi i e eie c’ i iie.

Careul research in this area matters because the potential repercussions o making uninormed assumptions aboutthe ability o transnational Canadians to enhance Canadian oreign policy—whether avourable or unavourable—could be serious. This is a new enough feld o inquiry, and the potential stakes high enough, that a careul,empirically sound investigation is warranted. We must take the time frst to defne those Canadian values that helpunderpin our global priorities as a country—such as strengthening democratic governance, reinorcing the rule o law, advancing the cause o pluralism or protecting undamental human rights—and then explore how best to invite,receive and assess policy inputs rom individuals, organizations and communities that might be able to help Canadaimbue its oreign policy with those values in areas o the world o strategic and humanitarian interest to Canada.

Taking the time to careully explore and assess the capacities, the views and the priorities o diasporic Canadiansand their communities with respect to pressing issues outside o Canada, and comparing their ideas and inputsagainst the straight edge o Canadian values and interests, will help increase the possibility that ideas and inputsthat compare avourably to that straight edge will fnd their way into Canada’s ofcial oreign policy. At least asimportantly, it will also reduce the likelihood that policy suggestions that are not reective o core Canadian valueswill fnd their way into Canada’s policy outputs, and thereby reduce the risk o undermining Canada’s global

reputation or weakening its credibility among key strategic partners in regions o geopolitical importance.

Put another way, just as we have suggested that the quality o Canada’s oreign policy may be enhanced throughthe more systematic inclusion o the inputs o transnational Canadians, we are also suggesting that the automatic,rote inclusion o such inputs in our ofcial oreign policy simply because they originate rom individuals orcommunities with more obvious direct experience in or knowledge o the regional issues in question is ill-advised.While it would be oolhardy to exclude the inputs o transnational Canadians rom Canadian oreign policy ex

ante, it would be just as oolhardy to include them without considering them in the ull light o Canada’s valuesand interests. A careul, empirical approach is thereore recommended.

3) Ii e iie i e iei i ci ei i i ie ie

i ci e.




existing and potential mechanisms through which transnational Canadians might contribute constructively to Canada’sglobal peacemaking and development activities. To ground this review, this report also includes a number o case studiesdesigned to highlight the capacities o a select group o Canadian diasporic communities to provide meaningul input intothe oreign policy process.

The report provides additional knowledge and inormation on these important questions, drawing on existing literatureand on the work supported and initiated by the Mosaic Institute and the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation. Our overallaim is to provoke discussion: we don’t claim to have all the answers, and we have not even asked all o the questions. Ourhope, however, is that this report will help stimulate healthy dialogue, essential to a healthy democracy, about how best to

realize the possibilities that our increasingly diverse society holds or improving Canada’s role in the world.

This paper is primarily intended to be read by Canadian government ofcials who are charged with the challengingbut extremely important task o considering how Canada’s transnational citizenry can become more involved in theenhancement o Canada’s international policies and activities. However, we believe that it might also be o interest toacademics, non-governmental organizations involved in promoting or enhancing the content and direction o Canadianoreign policy, and ethnocultural organizations representing the interests or the views o particular communities or sub-communities o Canadians. The questions it raises might also be o somewhat broader interest among Canadians, andhelp to spark and contribute to an important public discussion about the issues it raises. Similarly, it might resonate withpolicymakers in other countries who are also beginning to grapple with related questions o citizen engagement and publicparticipation in policymaking.

METhODOLOGY AND ORGANIzATION OF ThE REPO RTThe rest o this report consists o three main sections:

1) an overview o current thought and practice (both Canadian and international) with respect to diaspora engagement inoreign policymaking;

2) an overview o existing mechanisms or acilitating the receipt o diaspora inputs into the process o making oreignpolicy decisions in Canada; and

3) a short series o recommendations based on this work.

In addition, we commissioned and have included as Appendices to this report a number o short case studies summarizingthe organizational capacities and resources o fve particular diaspora communities: Aghanistan, China, Eritrea, Sri Lankaand Sudan. Each report was written by a dierent author with a dierent relationship—whether personal, proessionalor academic—to the community being considered. This diverse group o authors included community activists, a post-doctoral ellow, a policy proessional, and a senior undergraduate.

Despite these dierences in background or training, the authors o the case studies were each asked to address theollowing list o topics and questions:

dei fe e i. Size, demographic make-up, waves and timing o migration toCanada, ties to country o origin (remittances, trips, amily, work, etc.)

Exii ii e i. What organizations exist that bring together members o a particular diaspora? Are they divided along ethnic, regional, or other lines? Are they primarily cultural orreligious organizations? Are they ocused on settlement and integration issues? Do they have an interest in or

attempt to inuence Canada’s oreign policy development?

re ii ie. What are the key oreign policy issues o concern to the diaspora community inquestion? What are the substantive oreign policy positions taken by organizations representing the diasporacommunity?

c’ e i e ii. What is the extent o Canada’s involvement in the country o origin(aid, oreign policy positions, strategic considerations)?

Iee eee e i i e ei i i. What are the avenues orexchange and consultation between the diaspora community and the oreign policy establishment? Are theseormal or inormal?




aee ie i i i. Are the substantive policy inputs consistent withCanada’s humanitarian interests and international commitments? Do the inputs advance the goals o peace,development and good governance? What are the barriers or capacity gaps or diaspora communities to moreeectively engage in shaping Canada’s oreign policy development?

These communities were chosen or a number o dierent reasons, including the importance o the home countries toCanada’s existing oreign policy, the relative degree o political organization within the communities, and the size—bothvery small and very large—o their populations within Canada. Another important actor was the degree o relevance o the community or country in question to the existing work o the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic

Institute, as some o this work provided a useul oundation or the development o a case study.

For instance, the Mosaic Institute’s 2009 study or Canada’s Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade on theSudanese diaspora in Canada was an important source o inormation used in the drating o this paper’s case study onSudan.

It should be noted that we consciously decided early on not to include a case study o any community o the Middle East.This decision was not taken in order to simply avoid dealing with one o the most challenging oreign policy concernsor Canada involving diaspora communities. Rather, we have made the conscious decision not to include a Middle East-ocused case study in order to broaden the discussion o how to better involve transnational Canadians in the expression o Canada’s global interests, and to encourage those reading this paper to explore the general relevance o these issues beyondthe well-worn parameters o the conict between Israelis, Palestinians, and their neighbours.

It should also be noted that most o these case studies were largely completed in the last quarter o 2010. Consequently,certain signifcant political events or geopolitical changes that one might otherwise expect to be included rom a reportreleased late in 2011—such as the election o a majority ederal government in Canada in May 2011; or the reerendum inSouthern Sudan in January 2011 that saw overwhelming support or the creation o the separate state o South Sudan; orthe fnal departure o Canadian troops rom Aghanistan—are absent. Nevertheless, these case studies do contain essentialbackground inormation on the size, organization, leadership and long-term priorities o key diaspora communities inCanada.

Finally, we have chosen to use the term “diaspora communities” (rather than “immigrant” or “ethnoculturalcommunities”) in this report to emphasize the ties that some o our citizens hold to other parts o the world. Some o Canada’s immigrants and reugees may have little interest in maintaining connections with countries o origin, andsome members o ethnocultural communities, ater many generations in Canada, may have little or no connection withtheir regions o ethnic origin. As such, this report, ollowing Rima Berns-McGown’s defnition o diaspora as a “space o connections,”4 uses the term diaspora to distinguish our approach rom the concerns o multiculturalism, immigrationand settlement in Canada to ocus instead on the opportunities and implications o the deep ties and connections todierent parts o the world maintained by our diverse citizenry. To be sure, the degree to which an immigrant communityis integrated into the Canadian mosaic is an important variable in their ability to provide input into policymaking, but ourocus remains on the transnational dimensions o our ethnocultural diversity.

It should also be noted that the principal concern o this paper is the degree and means o inclusion in the ormulation o Canadian oreign policy o Canadians who are resident in Canada, and who sel-identiy as members o specifc diasporacommunities to which they belong by virtue o their birth or their amily heritage. That is not to suggest that the oreignpolicy inputs o Canadians who are living outside Canada, perhaps even in the country o their own birth or their parents’birth, and who now comprise, in eect, a Canadian diaspora living abroad, might not also have the potential to enhancethe quality o Canada’s global relationships. While such a signifcant group o individuals merits consideration all its own,

our ocus or the time being is on exploring ways o ensuring that the commitment and mechanisms exist or convertingthe quantitative diversity o Canada’s resident population—those who interrelate within the Canadian polity on a day-to-day basis—into an inclusive and pluralistic oreign policy.

WhAT ThIS REPORT IS NOTSome readers may approach contentious topics such as these with some degree o preconception, or have variousexpectations about what policy reports should be. For that reason, we will conclude our introductory remarks byunderlining explicitly what presumptions and purposes are not part o this report.Diaspora inDiviDuals anD communities

4 Rima Berns-McGown, “Redefning ‘Diaspora,’” International Journal, LXII no. 1 (2008): 8.




We do not presume that all persons who themselves, or whose ancestors, immigrated to Canada identiy as members o a national diaspora or have any interest in maintaining active ties with another country o national origin. Nor do wepresume that all groups that do constitute themselves around a shared national origin outside o Canada have any, or thesame degree, o interest in oreign aairs. When we invoke diasporas in this report, however, we are reerring to thoseindividuals and communities who maintain transnational ties and take an interest in Canada’s oreign policy with respectto their countries o origin. Their perspectives, we believe, do deserve recognition as distinctive contributions to thedemocratic process and as potentially oering special assets to policymakers.

Diasporas as special interest groups

We are not arguing that diaspora groups merit the status o distinctively privileged contributors to the democratic politicaldebate and to policymaking simply by virtue o their ancestral ties to countries with which Canadian oreign policyengages. Rather, we believe that they are one among a number o civil society groups justifably seeking to have greaterinvolvement in the policymaking process. It is certainly true that many i not all o those civil society groups eel that theirvoices are insufciently heard; and we certainly endorse eorts to increase across-the-board civil society involvement inoreign policymaking. Our specifc purpose in this report, however, is to advance the proposition that diaspora groupsare legitimately part o this wider spectrum o civil society groups. That being the case, we believe eorts to boost theirdemocratic participation are merited and should address their distinctive circumstances.

Similarly, this report does not presume that diaspora groups are unique in oering special assets o knowledge and

connections to oreign policymakers. Other civil society and business groups do so as well, and o course their expertiseshould be drawn upon. Our purpose here is to establish that diaspora groups do have such expertise to oer, and that thereare constructive ways or policymakers to tap this expertise despite the challenges in doing so.

scholarly Depth

This report is intended to be read and acted upon by elected ofcials, policymakers and civil society groups, and it isnot intended to be read as a work o purely academic scholarship. Thereore, the conceptual premises about the natureo diasporas, democracy and oreign policymaking underpinning this report are not discussed or examined exhaustively;rather, they are assumed and used in ways that represent the current state o conversation within and among diasporaorganizations and the policy community.

the range of international policy issues

Because o the particular mandates and programming oci o The Mosaic Institute and the Walter & Duncan GordonFoundation, this study does not survey the entire range o international policy issues and the potential benefts o diasporaengagement in them. Most prominently, perhaps, it does not address the role o diasporas in promoting Canada’s economicrelations with their countries o origin; other prominent organizations such as the Asia-Pacifc Foundation (as well ascertain trade-ocused diaspora groups) already give this issue considerable attention. The ocus o this report is limited tothe areas o diaspora engagement in development and peacebuilding, areas that are arguably much more controversial andthat correspond to the mandates o our organizations.

recommenDations anD realities The recommendations included in this report are based primarily on principle and on other countries’ experience inengaging diasporas in oreign policymaking. Consequently, they are not necessarily intended to reect a detailed analysiso current fscal and organizational realities (i.e. the currently limited capacities o DFAIT as reected in the Mechanismssection below). Nor do these recommendations purport to be the product o a detailed easibility study; we leave it toothers to cost out the steps we recommend and weigh them against competing fscal and organizational priorities.




ACkNOWLEDGEMENTSAs joint coordinators o this “Tapping Our Potential” research project on behal o our respective organizations, we mustthank many people whose contributions were vital to the paper’s completion. They include:

Colleagues rom the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, with particular thanks directed towards t ax,President & CEO, or his insights and advice;

Colleagues rom the Mosaic Institute, with particular thanks to v ki, Chairman and Co-Founder, or his

vision and support, and to kee vee or her careul reading o various drats and her uncanny attention todetail;

The members o our Exe ai ciee, or their belie in the value o this project and their generousexpenditure o time and eort to review early proposals and drats and help ensure that the fnal report would be o relevance to community organizations, academe, and government policymakers. The esteemed members o the ExpertAdvisory Committee were:

ri be-mg, Adjunct Proessor, Centre or Diaspora and Transnational Studies, University o Toronto

ai li, Director-General, Policy Planning, Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade, Ottawa

vi sei, Proessor, Department o Sociology, McMaster University

Jeie we, Proessor in International Relations, Oxord University

ye p w, President & CEO, The Asia-Pacifc Foundation o Canada

nie bee, lead researcher and author o the central section o the report entitled “An Overview o CurrentThought & Practice.” In addition to contributing her remarkable scholarship and highly-readable prose to this paper,Natalie deserves special thanks or serving as the de acto third co-ordinator o this project since its inception. Natalie’spassion and drive have been essential to ensuring that all o the component pieces o the report ultimately cametogether into a cohesive whole;

re gi, author o the other central section o the report, entitled “Mechanisms or Governmental Consultationwith Canadian Diaspora Groups in Foreign Policy Development.” The valuable insights in Raphael’s chapter reect theproound understanding o how ederal policy is both made and implemented that he acquired during his distinguishedcareer as a senior public ofcial, including his tenure as Assistant Deputy-Minister (Operations) with Citizenshipand Immigration Canada and his overseas service as Canadian Ambassador to both the Republic o Yugoslavia andRomania;

The authors o our fve case studies, most o whom undertook extensive original research to supplement their pre-existing knowledge o the communities about which they were writing. Our case study authors were:

aj p (Aghanistan)

Ee cii (China)

hee tee (Eritrea)

sie pi (Sri Lanka), and

se veii (Sudan)

Those many individuals in government, academe, civil society and diaspora-based organizations that agreed to submitto interviews or the report or or case studies, and whose insights and observations added signifcantly to the richnesso the fnal result; and our various copy editors, or their contributions to the fnal version o this report.




DISCLAIMER

We have done our very best to listen to and implement the recommendations o our Expert Advisory Committee, as well asthe researchers, authors, and various others who have read and commented on dierent versions o this paper. Collectivelythey deserve our thanks or a job well done, and credit or any value that others may fnd in this fnal report. However, wealone bear ultimate responsibility or the content o this document, including ull blame or any errors or omissions.

natasha sawh John monahanManager, Global Citizenship Program Executive DirectorWalter & Duncan Gordon Foundation The Mosaic Institute

July 2011

Toronto, Ontario

References

Price, Marie, and Lisa Benton-Short. 2007. Counting Immigrants in Cities across the Globe. Migration Inormation Source. http://www.migrationinormation.org/

Feature/display.cm?ID=567




TOWARD DIASPORA ENG AGEMENT IN FOREIGN POLICYMAkING:AN OvERvIEW OF CURRENT ThOUGhT AND PRACTICE

Natalie Brender

INTRODUCTIONCanada’s multiculturalism—while a dening eature o our polity and a

source o great pride—makes the task o articulating a single national interest much more complex. Immigrants to this county have multiple allegiances,are transnational in their ties, and pluralistic in their world view. I believe,

however, that we should see this as a strength—rather than as an unhelpulintrusion into the business o oreign policy. Indeed, we could begin to see

ourselves as innovators: just as we have been in the oreront o creating amulticultural society, so too could we be at the oreront o thinking through

how to create a oreign policy that can respond to that reality.5

Over the past decade, policy experts, pundits, academics and citizen groups

have been reecting on the linkages that do and should exist between Canada’sstunningly diverse populace and its oreign policy. Many observers see an enormouspotential beneft to be gained by including diaspora6 communities more ully inCanada’s oreign policy. One basis or this conviction is the principle o democraticinclusiveness, which demands that citizen perspectives be incorporated intoCanada’s oreign policy along with other aspects o governance. Another reason otencited by advocates o greater diaspora engagement in policymaking is the notionthat diasporic Canadians have special kinds o expertise, knowledge, skills andconnections that can beneft their countries o origin, and which Canada can use toadvance its international goals.

Alongside these arguments, there is the reality that even without ormalgovernmental engagement, diaspora groups in Canada are already actingtransnationally in ways that aect economic, political and social aairs in theircountries o origin. They are, or instance, sending remittances on a scale thatdwars Canada’s oreign aid budget.7 As well, they are paying or amily members’educational expenses; unding community-improvement projects such as schools andclinics; investing in businesses; and contributing to political parties or movements.To be sure, not every eect o these activities coheres with the aims o Canada’soreign policy; but many do.8

The evidence o these positive transnational activities, and the potential or muchgreater contributions to come rom diaspora communities, has given rise to a viewthat diasporas should be more systematically and ully drawn into ormal channelso Canada’s oreign policymaking. On such a view, it would be a welcome start or

Canada to emulate existing international and European programs that acilitate the transerence o diaspora members’assets, knowledge and skills to the beneft o their countries o origin. However, that in itsel would not be seen assufcient, since diaspora groups in Europe and Canada alike are seeking engagement in ways that go beyond programparticipation. Not until diasporas have input into the actual policymaking process, it is argued, will their potentialcontributions be ully realized. The report o a conerence on diaspora participation in peacebuilding and development,or example, asserts an “incontestable need or governments at all levels to include diaspora and local civil society in

5 Jennier M. Welsh, “Canada’s Foreign Policy: Does the public have a say?” (unpublished paper, Dal Grauer Lecture, Vancouver, September 15, 2007), 21.

6 Although the concept o ‘diaspora’ is much-disputed, or the purposes o this paper it is understood as “a sel-identifed ethnic group, with a specifc place o origin, which has been globally dispersed

through voluntary or orced migration” (Vertovec 2006, 1). It is admittedly problematic to apply the concept o diaspora, with its core notion o a single place o origin, to ethnic groups such as Muslims,

who are increasingly becoming active pressure groups on oreign aairs issues in Canada and other countries based on their Muslim identity rather than a national one. See Radclie Ross (2009) or

analysis o this phenomenon.

7 In 2008, remittances sent to other countries rom Canada were estimated at $5-15 billion annually, in comparison with $3.6 billion spent on development assistance (Saxena 2008, 2).

8 Luin Goldring, Susan J. Henders, and Peter Vandergeest, “The Politics o Transnational Ties: Implicat ions or Policy, Research, and Communities” (YCAR-CERLAC Workshop Report, York University,

Toronto, 2003).

Some international and Europeanprograms enaling diasporas tocontriute to deelopment in teircountries of origin:

• Transfer of Knowledge ThroughExpatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) isa UN initiative mobilizing diasporamembers to undertake short term

volunteering consultancies in theircountries of origin.

• Africa Recruit is a joint venture of the New Partnership for AfricanDevelopment (NEPAD) and theCommonwealth Business Council

that supports African migrantsin the UK who offer their skillsand expertise to their countriesof origin on a temporary orpermanent basis.

• IntEnt is an initiative of the Dutchgovernment that provides support

to migrants wanting to establishsmall businesses in their countriesof origin.

• The UK Department forInternational Development (DfID)has a “Send money home” websitethat helps diaspora communitiessend low-cost remittances to their

countries of origin.




international and national policy development.”9 This imperative has echoed through multiple reports and positionstatements in the past decade.

On the part o governments, there has been an increasing acknowledgement o the potential contributions that diasporascan make toward achieving national ends. In the words o one European scholar, “governmental and non-governmentaldevelopment actors have gradually recognised the high potential o migration and migrants or the development o countries o origin.”10 Another eminent expert on diasporic aairs notes that “governments are currently looking toestablish and develop relationships with diasporic representatives rom numerous key regions or a range o reasons to dowith bilateral relations, security, trade and development.”11

In Canada, the Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has recently launched a Global Citizens Initiativepresumably aimed at advancing such objectives, although the project currently consists o research being undertaken bypolicy sta, with any subsequent activities remaining to be publicly defned (the initiative is discussed in more detail in theMechanisms section o this report). And or several years, the aim o diaspora inclusion in Canadian oreign policymaking hasalso been pursued by at least two Canadian NGOs: the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation and the Mosaic Institute.

The Gordon Foundation’s Global Citizenship program12 has supported considerable research into the potentials and capacitieso Canada’s diaspora groups to contribute to oreign policy, and the barriers currently preventing them rom doing so. It hasalso supported initiatives to engage members o diaspora communities in oreign policy discussions at the civil society level.As well, the Foundation has commissioned “Diaspora Diaries”, profles o frst- and second-generation immigrants who havebeen exemplary in giving back to their countries o origin in ways that support Canada’s goals abroad.

The Mosaic Institute, since its ounding in 2007, has produced research and programming aimed at helping Canada’sdiaspora communities contribute to Canadian peacebuilding and development eorts in their countries o origin. Itsactivities have included peace dialogues involving Canada’s Sri Lankan and Middle Eastern communities, and a oreignpolicy conerence that brought diaspora groups and ederal policymakers together to discuss the uture o Sudan. It hasalso organized a series o seminars that brought together business and community leaders rom pairs o Canadian diasporacommunities whose countries o origin are engaged in longstanding conicts (Armenia/Turkey, China/Tibet and Pakistan/India). These discussions (sometimes including consular or diplomatic ofcials rom their countries o origin and DFAITofcials) have allowed the communities to discuss not just their interactions with each other and their countries o origin,but also specifc courses o action or addressing the conicts abroad.

Notwithstanding such developments, however, the virtually unanimous assessment o diaspora activists and commentatorsis that progress toward the goal o realizing diasporic potentials or oreign policymaking has been lamentably slow inboth Europe and Canada. The author o a recent major report on the contributions o diaspora communities to Canada’sinternational goals laments the “gaps between conerence deliberations and development policy and practice” in this area.13

In Europe, evidence to date also shows that “[d]evelopment actors fnd huge difculties converting intentions to involvediasporas in development co-operation into concrete action.”14

What tangible progress in diaspora engagement has been made thus ar lies mostly in the sphere o development, in whichpolicy debate and practice are relatively advanced. In other oreign policy spheres, diaspora engagement by governmentshas scarcely begun. Recognition o the positive potential or diaspora involvement in peacebuilding, or example, has onlyrecently begun to emerge—and is oten overshadowed by a ocus on diasporas as supporters o conict in their countries oorigin.15 At DFAIT, according to an inside observer, “[p]olicy makers consumed by fnding solutions to complex ethnically-based conicts,” fnd that “conict-generated diasporas rarely contribute to peaceul, equitable solutions.” 16

The present report aims to help overcome the lag between acknowledgement o diasporic potentials and concrete action

in the area o diaspora engagement in oreign policymaking. To that end, this overview o current thought and practicehas two main goals. The frst is to understand the tangled web o issues bound up with the proposition that Canadian

9 University or Peace, “Capacity or Peace and Development: Roles o Diaspora” (UPEACE Expert Forum, Toronto, Canada, October 19-20, 2006), 31.

10 Hein de Haas, “Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development o origin countries,” Oxord: International Migration Institu te

(2006), 4, http://www.heindehaas.com/Publications/de%20Haas%202006%20-%20Engaging%20Diasporas.pd

11 Steven Vertovec, “Diasporas Good? Diasporas Bad?” (COMPAS working paper no. 41, University o Oxord, 2006), 5, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fleadmin/fles/pds/WP0641-Vertovec.pd

12 For an overview o the Gordon Foundation’s Global Citizenship program (which has now concluded its mandate), ollow this link: http://gordonoundation.ca/programs/other-programs/global-

citizenship-program.

13 Rudi Robinson, “Beyond the State-Bounded Immigrant Incorporation Regime. Transnational migrant communities: their potential contribut ion to Canada’s leadership role and inuence in a globalized

world,” Ottawa: North-South Institute (2005), 211, http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pd/transmigration_document_july_22.pd

14 Hein de Haas, “Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development o origin countries,” Oxord: International Migration Institute


15 Pä ivi Pirkkalainen and Mahdi Abdile, “The Diaspora–Conict–Peace Nexus: A Literature Review” (Diaspeace working paper no. 1, 2009), http://www.diaspeace.org/D-Working_paper_1_Final.pd

16 Geislerova does, however, report that some at DFAIT have more positive assessments about the potential o diaspora groups in general to contribute to oreign policymaking; more broadly: “[S]everal

policy makers insisted that diaspora oversight does make or a better oreign policy as long as it is adequately balanced.”

Marketa Geislerova “The Role o Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case o Canada,” Central European Journal o International and Security Studies 1, no. 2, (2007): 103, http://www.cejiss.org/assets/

pd/articles/vol12/M.Geislerova_The_Role_o_Diasporas.pd




policymakers should engage diaspora groups more systematically in oreign policymaking. Identiying what theseissues are, and sorting out where the real conceptual challenges lie, may help to loosen some o the blockages betweenrhetoric and action. The second aim o this overview is to present potential avenues or constructive action on the part o government.

Part I ocuses on examining why progress on substantial engagement with diasporas has been so slow, despite avowedgovernmental commitment to that goal. To a great extent, this revolves around the question o whether, and on whatgrounds, it is in Canada’s national interest to involve diasporas in oreign policymaking. That question in turn gives rise tothree major conceptual issues: frst, the nature o the national interest in oreign policymaking and how it is determined;

second, the role o democratic involvement in oreign policymaking; and third, the proposition that diaspora groups mayhave distinctive and substantive insights o value to policymakers.

Part II moves past the “why” questions o Part I to address the “how” questions dealing with what the Canadiangovernment can do to engage diasporas more eectively in oreign policymaking. Drawing on the extant literature aboutgovernmental engagement with diasporas, it identifes two actors required to shape an approach to diaspora engagement:frst, conceptualizing the dimensions o policymaking at issue, and second, identiying which diaspora groups andindividuals to engage with. It concludes by surveying concrete actions that government can take to promote conditionsavourable to the engagement o diaspora groups in oreign policymaking.

Although the ocus o this essay is primarily on Canadian realities and potentials, the analysis that ollows is inormed by areview o relevant international policy and scholarly literature (much o which comes rom northern European countries).

PART I: DEbATING ThE PROPOSITION OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENTThe proposition that diasporas should be engaged more ully in oreign policymaking demands consideration o severalcomplex issues:

• whether the involvement o diaspora groups in oreign policymaking is compatible with or intrinsically opposed toCanada’s national interest;

• whether the principle o democratic participation justifes a role or civil society groups and individuals—includingthose belonging to diaspora groups—to participate in oreign policymaking; and

• whether diaspora groups have special assets to contribute to oreign policymaking, which in turn justiy specialeorts to engage their input.

The tenor o media commentary, as well as anecdotal reports rom observers and participants in the feld o Canadianinternational aairs, shows considerable misgivings on each o these ronts. There is a suspicion that diaspora engagementin oreign policymaking is a matter o vote-currying by politicians or an attempt by diasporas to import ethnic conictsonto Canadian soil—and in either case, is inimical to true national interests. There is a general scepticism on the part o some pundits and diplomats that citizens have sufcient insight into national interests to be substantively involved inmatters o oreign policymaking—a view, in other words, that oreign policy is best let to the experts. And there is a morespecifc scepticism about the notion that diaspora groups have any unique expertise or knowledge that could be an asset tosound oreign policymaking.

Each o these issues will be examined in turn below, with the goal o making the case that Canada does indeed stand to

beneft by making greater eorts to engage diaspora groups in oreign policy discussions.

i) is Diaspora engagement in the national interest?

In Canada today, the thesis that government should seek out diaspora perspectives on oreign policymaking is acontentious and politically charged proposition. Every year, immigrants rom a vast range o nations pour into this country,resulting in a vast number o oreign-born citizens. According to the 2006 census, nearly one in fve Canadians was bornabroad, the highest proportion in 75 years.17 As these immigrants become citizens, their support is being ought over byvarious political parties—sometimes on the basis o diaspora communities’ attachments to identities and issues boundup with their countries o origin. To many observers, this state o aairs embodies a positive maniestation o democratic

17 Statistics Canada (2009), 2006 Census: Immigration in Canada: A Portrait o the Foreign-born Population, 2006 Census: Highlights, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/p1-

eng.cm




I there were an unambiguous national interest on issues such as ODA or peacekeeping, then interest groups maybe o less interest in the study o oreign policy. On most global issues, however, there is no clear national interest.In a democracy the national interest is what it is judged to be ater debate and discussion[.] 25

Embracing a constructivist account o how national interests are defned does not entail that any and all voices carryequal weight in the civic discussion. This is where national values come in as limiting conditions. It is (or should be)understood by all participants that only positions and attitudes consistent with Canadian values such as democracy, humanrights, mutual respect and gender equality are candidates or shaping the national interests that Canada pursues abroad.According to this criterion, a civic group has no place in the national conversation about oreign policy i it advocates

causes or means contravening those values.

Once certain bedrock values are defned as limiting conditions on national discussions, it is possible to say that diasporagroups advocating violence or an intolerance o opposing voices are clearly out o step with national interests. Thiscriterion leaves the feld open to the vast majority o diaspora groups who do embrace the values o non-violence anddialogue, and whose contributions thereore have as much legitimacy as any other voices in the national discussion overCanada’s oreign policy interests.

ii) Diaspora engagement as Democratic citizen inclusion

Ater debunking the notion that the discernment and promotion o national interests is a matter or experts, then the feldis open or more participants—indeed, citizens as such—to engage in dialogue about oreign policy matters.

The notion that Canadian oreign policymaking should be democratized has ound a place in Ottawa—at least in rhetoric,i less so in reality—since the early 1990s.26 In-person and electronic consultations and discussions have periodicallyoccurred; a centre devoted to public consultation and outreach existed or a while within DFAIT; and the 2005 InternationalPolicy Statement asserted that “the sustainability and success o our international policy depends on both leadership bythe Government o Canada and the active involvement o Canadians.”27 These steps have been seen by many observers asdisappointingly small, and many questions remain about who should participate in oreign policymaking and what orm thatparticipation should take. Nonetheless, the notion that Canada’s oreign policy should reect the views o Canadian citizenshas at least some currency as an ideal within governmental departments, as well as in national conversations more generally.

The idea that diaspora perspectives should inorm Canada’s oreign policy ollows rom the thesis that all Canadians—eventhose identiying themselves in part by their attachment to other countries o origin—have a democratic right to participatein public policymaking. Such a view is deended in a discussion o ethnic lobbying on oreign policy issues: “Given that[diaspora] groups are part o the Canadian cultural mosaic, help orm and are ormed by a broad set o Canadian values,and have become part o the landscape o citizenship, their views and ideas must be taken into account in the policymakingprocess[.]”28 This democratic principle entails that the views o diaspora groups are on an equal ooting with those o all otherCanadians. (And as the above quotation suggests, a limiting condition or equal standing is that the views and ideas at issueare consistent with a broad set o Canadian values that help defne Canada’s identity at home and abroad).

Notwithstanding this equality in principle, however, the reality is that dierent groups o citizens have widely varyingabilities to exercise their right to democratic participation. Diaspora groups ace considerable barriers in this respect,on two distinct ronts. The frst is a lack o organizational capacity on the part o many diaspora groups to participateeectively in public lie. The rigours o settlement and employment oten place a crushing burden on the time andattention o recent immigrants; and these actors, combined with unamiliarity with the Canadian system, can poseormidable obstacles to immigrant participation in public lie.29 Secondly, as already suggested, the eorts o diaspora

groups to get involved oten meet with little receptiveness on the part o government ofcials.

For these reasons, a deliberate eort by policymakers to oster input by diaspora groups may be warranted in order to bring thesegroups into the democratic conversation. I government sought out the input o diasporic citizens on matters related to their

25 Christian Leuprecht and Todd Hataley, “Just How Liberal and Democratic Is Canadian Foreign Policy?” in The World in Canada: Diaspora, Demography, and Domestic Politics, eds. David Carment and

David Bercuson (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 146.

26 Gerald J. Schmitz, “Accountable Governance and International Reviews: Canadian Foreign Policy as i Democracy Matters?” (paper presented to the annual meeting o the Canadian Political Science

Association, York University, June 3, 2006), http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Schmitz.pd

27 Government o Canada (2005), Canada’s international policy statement: A Role o Pride and Inuence in the World, http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/documents/IPS-EPI/policy-politique.

aspx?lang=eng

28 Brent E. Sasley and Tami Amanda Jacoby, “Canada’s Jewish and Arab Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy,” in Canada and the Middle East : In Theory and Practice, eds. Paul Heinbecker and

Bessma Momani, (Waterloo: Wilrid Laurier University Press, 2007), 199-200.

29 Krista Koch, “Capacity Build ing or Peace and Development: The Aghan Diaspora in Toronto,” (Discussion paper or the Expert Forum on “Capacity Building or Peace and Development: Roles o

Diaspora” in Toronto, October 19-20, 2006), http://www.gordonn.org/resfles/GC-Aghan%20Diaspora.pd, 20;

Eunice N. Sahle and Wisdom J. Tettey, “Transnationalism and the Arican Diaspora in Canada: An Examination o the Diaspora-Development Nexus,” (unpublished paper 2009), 48.




homelands, and provided resources enabling diaspora groups to represent communityconcerns eectively, members o diaspora communities would be better able toovercome barriers to the exercise o their democratic citizenship in public policymaking.

iii) Diaspora engagement asa matter of special assets

Thus ar, this overview has proposed that diaspora engagement in oreign

policymaking is not harmul to the national interest; that citizen engagementdoes have a legitimate role in oreign policymaking; and that ostering the inputo diaspora groups in particular is part o levelling the playing feld o democraticcitizenship. However, much o the past decade’s discussion o diaspora engagementin oreign policymaking does not appeal to the principled idea o democraticcitizenship per se. Instead, it rests on the more specifc and pragmatic notion thatdiasporas possess special assets o expertise, knowledge and resources that have adistinctive potential to enrich Canadian oreign policymaking.

The literature advocating greater diaspora involvement in oreign policymakingdescribes various ways o conceptualizing the assets that diaspora communitieshave to oer. An inuential 2004 article by a U.S. think tank summarizes the uniquestrengths o diasporas as “keen cultural awareness o communities o origin, ease o

working in both cultures, trust o communities o origin, better awareness o specifcneeds and/or potential pitalls, [and] long term personal commitment to projects andcommunities.”30 Those claims are echoed in a Canadian report:

Diaspora groups are able to generate inormation about their country o origin that surpasses anything that could be “discovered” through second-hand research. Their amiliarity with customs, language, tradition, and ahost o unwritten rules has the potential to make a sizeable dierence inCanada’s eorts at international development.31

Other accounts emphasize a broader range o assets that diasporas can contribute tothe development o their countries o origin:

The unique resources o diaspora organizations extend beyond their language skills and cultural knowledge.Through their networks in and understanding o institutions in countries o origin and settlement, diasporaorganizations can build bridges between institutions. There is a wealth o human, social and fnancial resourcespresent in diaspora groups. As well, diaspora groups oten have organizational structures and support bases thatgo beyond national rameworks.32

It is also asserted that the potential o diaspora citizens to contribute to oreign policymaking rests on assets gained notjust through ongoing ties to countries o origin, but also through integration into current home countries: “[S]uccessuland ‘integrated’ migrants generally also possess the attitudes, know-how, rights and fnancial capacity or setting upenterprises, participating in public debates and establishing development projects in their regions and countries o origin.” 3

Most o the extant literature on potential diaspora contributions to policymaking ocuses on the area o development.

Nonetheless, other areas o valuable input by diaspora groups can also be envisioned. For instance, the Public InternationalLaw and Policy Group has conducted many engagements with diaspora groups in the area o peacebuilding, andsummarizes the potential o such engagement in these terms:

The diaspora may add substantive knowledge to the peace process by producing recommendations or identiyingtheir priorities in resolving the conict. Many diaspora members leave their home states to pursue careers or

30 Kathleen Newland, “Beyond Remittances: The Role o Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in their Countries o Origin,” Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute (2004), 34, http://www.migrationpoli cy.

org/pubs/Beyond_Remittances_0704.pd

31 Alaa Abd-El-Aziz, et al., “Scoping the Role o Canadian Diaspora in Global Diplomacy and Policy Making,” University o Winnipeg Global College (2005), 5, http://www.gordonn.org/resfles/Scoping_

Role_Canadian_Diaspora.pd

32 Cindy Horst, “Diaspora Engagements in Development Cooperation,” PRIO Policy Brie. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, (2008), 4, http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1591888123/Diaspora%20

Engagements%20%28PRIO%20Policy%20Brie%208-2008%29.pd



The Public International Law and PolicyGroup (PILPG) is an NGO that provides

“free legal assistance to states andgovernments involved in conflicts,”as well as policy formation advice andtraining in conflict resolution. It “hasadvised over two dozen states andgovernments on the legal aspects of

peace negotiations and post-conflictconstitution drafting, and over twodozen states and War Crimes Tribunalsin Europe, Asia and Africa concerningthe protection of human rights, self-

determination, and the prosecutionof war crimes.” Its volunteers includeformer international lawyers, diplomatsand foreign relations experts, inaddition to pro bono help from major

international law firms. PILPG monitors,and on occasion involves, diasporasas part of its activities in the areasof peace negotiations, transitionalgovernments and war crimes tribunals.

In 2005, PILPG was nominated for theNobel Peace Prize.[Source: ttp://www.pulicinternationallaw.org/]




academic degrees abroad, resulting in well-educated diaspora communities capable o developing inormedrecommendations. These recommendations and issues may provide a basis or peace negotiations among theparties to a conict.34

Despite these assertions, however, claims o useul diaspora expertise are ar rom being widely or uncritically acceptedby the larger community o international policymakers. Many ofcials within government and NGOs are sceptical o thenotion that diaspora groups bring unique and indispensable assets to the development enterprise. A study o Aricandiaspora groups in Canada notes that CIDA representatives ail to see why government should und capacity-buildingprojects aimed at making diaspora groups more viable partners in development activities:

The most commonly raised argument against provision o such assistance is to question why CIDA or anyother donor would disburse development unds to build the organizational capacity o diaspora organizationsto implement a development project when experienced NGOs, who already have the capacity, can undertakeit. Again, this is a matter o perspective on the added value that diaspora organizations may bring to Canadianinternational development work in their countries o origin.35

The ailure to perceive value in the potential contributions o diaspora groups is echoed in the fndings o another projectexamining the extent o engagement with diaspora groups by Canadian international development organizations. It fndsthat such organizations preer to engage directly with their well-established partners in developing countries because theysee no need or the mediation o Canadian diaspora groups36—in other words, because the NGOs surveyed ail to perceiveany unique assets that diaspora involvement might contribute.

Part o this institutional scepticism about diaspora contributions is undoubtedly attributable to ingrained habits o thinkingabout where inormed knowledge can be ound. However, institutional reluctance to tap potential diaspora contributions isdue to other reasons as well. An obstacle that governments and other agencies fnd particularly difcult to deal with is thediversity o perspectives within diasporas. In the words o a Canadian analyst, “diaspora groups are not homogenous andare oten characterized by political, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional divisions to contend with as host countriesseek to engage specifc communities.”37 When the resulting diversity o perspectives is encountered by government ofcialsinteracting with diaspora groups, it gives rise to conusion and scepticism about whether any o the varied viewpointsbeing aired can oer a reliable basis or policymaking.

Another ground or doubt about the claim that diasporas oer insider knowledge o their communities o origin lies inthe act that perception o their source countries by diaspora groups may reect past realities rather than present ones. Asa proponent o greater diaspora involvement in development acknowledges, “[o]ne cannot assume that migrants, someo whom have not lived in the country o origin or many years, have a perectly updated understanding o the situationon the ground.”38 Likewise, as observed by participants at a Canadian orum on peacebuilding, “the distance o diasporarom homeland conict can at times decrease their level o sensitivity and real knowledge o the needs o their homelandcommunities’ historical, economic and social contexts.”39

A urther concern or policymakers is the possibility that the priorities o diaspora groups may be out o step with thoseo people currently living in the country o origin. A European briefng warns against the assumption “that the interestsand agendas o diasporas are consistent with those o home-country populations, as these may vary considerably.” 40 Thisdivergence may sometimes be attributed to the phenomenon o “long distance nationalism” identifed by sociologistBenedict Anderson, which leads diasporas to adopt identities and perspectives out o keeping with present-day realities intheir countries o origin.41 It is not uncommon or diaspora communities to adopt positions on conict in their countries o origin that are considerably more hard-line and intransigent than those held by people actually living in the conict zones.

Worries about the accuracy and trustworthiness o diaspora perspectives also arise rom the reality that the compositiono diaspora groups can dier greatly rom the demographic makeup o the country o origin. Because immigrants otencome rom specifc regional, class or ethnic subgroups within a country o origin, those particular identities are reected in

34 Publ ic International Law & Policy Group (2009), Engaging Diaspora Communities in Peace Processes, 8, http://www.diasporacentre.org/DOCS/PILPG_Engaging_Dia.pd

35 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Arica: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association or Higher Education and Development, 2007), 94, http://idl-

bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/34402/1/126427.pd

36 Razmik Panossian, “Do Diasporas Really Matter? Civil Society Organisations, Policy Makers, and Ethnic Community Organisations,” (Presentation at the International Symposium on Diaspora Politics,

27-29 April 2006, Reno, Nevada), 4.

37 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Arica: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association or Higher Education and Development, 2007), 110, http://idl




39 University or Peace, “Capacity or Peace and Development: Roles o Diaspora” (UPEACE Expert Forum, Toronto, Canada, October 19-20, 2006), 31.

40 Development Research Centre on Migration, Globali sation and Poverty, “Diaspora and Development: Building Transnational Partnerships” (Briefng no. 19, Brighton, U.K.: University o Sussex, 2009), 1,

http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/briefng_papers/BP19.pd

41 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983).




the causes that the diasporas advocate. The result, as noted in a report on Arican diaspora groups in Canada, is that civilservants and NGOs ace “the difculty o separating partisan and parochial development agendas rom more inclusive ones.” 42

These concerns about the reliability o diasporic claims to special knowledge o their countries o origin undoubtedlyinorm attitudes within Canada’s oreign policymaking establishment. They may be responsible or what some diasporamembers in Canada describe as an “exclusionary development culture … premised on the notion that members o theDiaspora rom the global South are not ‘objective observers’ o development issues in their countries o origin.” 43

Clearly, there are real grounds or caution in bringing the special assets o diaspora groups into the oreign policymaking arena. Yet

while acknowledging these caveats, advocates o greater diaspora engagement in oreign policymaking believe that they are notinsuperable barriers. Such advocates observe that the expectation o an exalted notion o objectivity rom diasporans is unwarranted;many others who collaborate with government on international issues—NGOs, multinational corporations and religious groups, toname a ew—are hardly objective in their interests and inputs.44 Further, the internal diversity o diaspora groups is hardly uniqueamong those in the feld o international aairs. As a scholar o diasporas observes, “[D]isputes, divisions and diverging interests occurnot only within diaspora groups, but also between various governments, government bodies and civil society actors.” 45 I conictingviews and claims rom those other sources can be sorted out in the policymaking process, so too can the input o diasporans.

A reasonable conclusion or policymakers is that the value o particular diasporan inputs should be assessed by drawingon a detailed knowledge both o diaspora groups within Canada and o local realities within the country o origin. A reporton diaspora engagement commissioned by the UK Department or International Development advises that the agencyshould avert diaspora inputs skewed to the interests o a particular subgroup or region by “rigorously research[ing] thecomposition and character o the diaspora and the organizations with which it seeks to engage.” 46 Similarly, alignment

between diaspora priorities and ones within the country o origin can be ensured by using both “local expertise” and a“needs assessment that includes all o the dierent actors involved” to test the soundness o diaspora inputs. 47

An important element o this alignment o priorities criterion will be the compatibility o the causes and methods o diasporagroups with Canadian values. Applying the litmus test o whether a diaspora group’s internal workings and public positionsembody values such as mutual respect, dialogue, democracy and human rights is one way o tackling the problem o intransigent hard-liners on issues o inter-community relations within Canada or conict abroad. The Mosaic Institute takesexactly this approach in the peace dialogues it conducts among and within various diaspora groups in Canada. Prior to eachdialogue exercise, it convenes organizers to discuss oundational Canadian values; out o that discussion a “Statement o Values” is produced, intended to govern the subsequent peace dialogue. For a 2010 peace dialogue on Sri Lanka, or instance,the Statement o Values declares that the organizers subscribe to the Canadian values such as peace, diversity and mutualrespect, and expect other participants to do so as well (or else be excluded rom participation). 48

The above discussions will likely ail to convince all sceptics about the legitimacy and value o diaspora engagement inoreign policymaking. Nonetheless, articulation o the issues at stake may go some way toward breaking down existingbarriers between rhetorical commitment to that goal on the one hand, and concrete action on the other. Part II o thisoverview now turns to consider what steps governments might take once they have made a commitment to action.

PART II: STARTING POINTS FOR E NAbLING DIASP ORA ENGAGEMENT IN POLI CYMAkINGi) shaping an approach

a) a r v. c a B f e

Once governments or NGOs commit to engaging diasporas in oreign policymaking and begin considering how to shapetheir approach, they will encounter an oten-mentioned problem: how to identiy appropriate groups or individualsto engage in dialogue. As discussed above, two important grounds or engaging diasporas in oreign policymaking arethe principle o democratic inclusiveness and the capacity o diasporans to contribute special assets to policy design.

42 Eunice N. Sahle and Wisdom J. Tettey, “Transnationalism and the Arican Diaspora in Canada: An Examination o the Diaspora-Development Nexus,” (unpublished paper 2009), 37.

43 Ibid., 35.




46 Nicholas Van Hear, Frank Pieke and Steven Vertovec, “The contribution o UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction,” Report by the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Socie ty

(COMPAS), University o Oxord, or the Department or International Development, (2004), 27, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fleadmin/fles/pds/Non_WP_pds/Reports_and_Other_Publications/

DFID%20diaspora%20report.pd



48 Mosaic Institu te (2010), Statement o Values or the Mosaic Institute ’s Young Canadians’ Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka.




Because these two distinct rationales exist, policymakers ace the challenge o identiying which ground or engagement isappropriate in given instances, and how to proceed in translating that rationale into action.

When policymakers seek to engage diasporas out o the principle o democratic inclusion, the question o representativeness—that is, whether individuals consulted actually reect the composition and views o the diasporacommunities in whose name they speak—is o paramount importance. Representativeness is also o acute pragmaticimportance in specifc oreign policy endeavours such as peacebuilding, where progress can be undermined by“spoilers” within a community who do not eel their positions are adequately reected in a negotiated process. Inthe words o a European policy analyst, “[]or external actors, it is crucial that individuals and organizations they

support are seen as legitimate actors by the migrant communities they represent. In acilitating diaspora engagementsWestern government bodies and NGOs ideally would like to work with diaspora representatives that embody thecollective voice o ‘the diaspora.’”49 Similarly, a Canadian commentator asserts that, “[a]ny agency interested inengaging diasporas would have to think about which group—or individual, or that matter—speaks or a specifcdiaspora community.”50

This goal o representativeness is oten difcult to meet because o the considerable ethnic, religious, class and other ormso diversity within many diaspora groups. Addressing the problem o who speaks or the community is a vexing one becausediaspora groups—like most other civil society groups—are shot through with internal power dynamics. As a scholar o genderand diaspora observes, there is a “tendency to portray elder male political leaders as representative o the communities’ views,politics and aspirations.”51 Another prominent scholar o transnationalism notes that “opposing actions and dissenting voices”within diasporas “are oten mued by better organized, networked, and fnanced actors, who are oten the ones pushingnationalist or ethnic agendas.”52 It is thereore incumbent on policymakers seeking engagement with diasporas to ask “who

speaks, with any kind o authority or democratic representation, on behal o given diasporas?” 53

How to address this question successully is oten ar rom clear. Part o the answer, as proponents o diaspora engagementacknowledge, is or diaspora groups “to present a united ront so as to have more weight with policymakers andprogramimplementers.”54 Capacity-building resources (which are discussed below) can help groups get better organized topresent a united voice; but that step alone cannot ensure that the resulting positions endorsed by groups reect the truediversity o opinion within their communities. Hence, it is important or governments seeking diaspora engagement to beaware o the range o diversity within specifc diasporas, and to consult multiple groups within them as required to arriveat a representative overview o community opinion.

Given all the complexities that the notion o representativeness brings, it can be questioned whether it is an appropriatebasis or diaspora engagement. At least one writer on diasporas and development urges that it be rejected in avour o adierent approach:

Diaspora organisations do not ‘represent’ diasporas, and development agencies are not their spokespersons ... Aslong as they unction democratically, organisations primarily represent themselves, their members and their ownobjectives ... Instead o identiying ‘the right interlocutors’ among organisations representing diasporas, a moreruitul step towards establishing eective cooperation seems to involve building alliances with truly engageddiaspora organisations sharing similar development objectives.55

In rejecting the notion o diaspora engagement as a matter o political representativeness, and instead seeing it as a mattero fnding similar-minded working partners, this perspective embraces the special assets principle o diaspora engagement.It prescribes that governments or other agencies seeking diaspora engagement should begin with a clear sense o the goalsand principles they want to advance, and then identiy which diaspora partners have the assets to be suitable collaboratorstoward those ends (with suitability being assessed according to an organization’s own goals and track record o activism

and goals embraced).



50 Bathseba Belai, Enabling Diaspora Engagement in Arica: Resources, Mechanisms and Gaps. Case Study: Ethiopia (Ottawa: The Association or Higher Education and Development, 2007), 110, http://idl


51 Nadje Al-Ali, “Gender, diasporas and post-Cold War conict,” in Diasporas in Conict: Peace-makers or peace-wreckers? eds. Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), 59.

52 Steven Vertovec, “The Political Importance o Diasporas” (COMPAS Working Paper no. 13, University o Oxord, 2005), 9-10, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fleadmin/fles/pds/Steve%20Vertovec%20

WP0513.pd

53 Nicholas Van Hear, Frank Pieke and Steven Vertovec, “The contribution o UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction,” Report by the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Socie ty

(COMPAS), University o Oxord, or the Department or International Development, (2004), 27, http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fleadmin/fles/pds/Non_WP_pds/Reports_and_Other_Publications/

DFID%20diaspora%20report.pd








Such assessment is indispensable because some orms o transnational engagement by diaspora groups can be contrary toCanada’s policy objectives in the political or development sphere.56 Attentiveness to the complementarity o aims and methodsis also important when only some members among a larger diaspora group are supportive o the oreign policy goals (such asgender equality or a democratic multiethnic society, or instance) that Canada aims to promote in their country o origin.

Perhaps in some areas o oreign policy (e.g. international development) the criterion o complementarity betweengovernment priorities and those o specifc diaspora organizations should be paramount. But given the realities o conictand division both within diaspora communities and in regions o origin abroad, the criterion o representativeness is tooimportant to jettison. Were government to adopt a highly selective approach o engaging only with diaspora partners

who are already like-minded, it would rule out the possibilities o achieving mutual understanding and compromise withoutlier groups. More generally, it would oreclose possibilities o building trust and co-operation between government anddiaspora groups. Engagement with the ull representative spectrum o groups within diaspora communities—subject to thelitmus test criterion o minimal adherence to bedrock values—must hence be pursued alongside the goal o compatibility.

B) id a r o p a

A second oundational issue that government must address in shaping an approach to diaspora engagement in oreignpolicymaking is defning the sphere o policymaking at issue. The limited literature on this topic construes policymakingin diverse ways; diaspora groups themselves have various understandings o the kind o policy engagement they seek; andvarious areas o oreign policy lend themselves to diering kinds o policy engagement.

A relatively modest or entry level interpretation o policy involvement might ocus on building co-operation with respectto initiatives o mutual interest to diaspora groups and government. This model would encourage diaspora groupsengaging with government to ormulate policies or programs that support existing transnational diaspora activities, wheresuch activities complement the government’s existing oreign policy goals. In the area o international development, orexample, it would mean engaging diaspora input into how the Canadian government could establish programs that supportdiaspora-led development projects; enable diaspora proessionals to contribute expertise toward government- or NGO-leddevelopment in their countries o origin; and make it easier or immigrants to send remittances back to their homelands.In other areas, such as peacebuilding or human rights, similar programs to support diaspora initiatives complementary togovernment policy goals might be envisioned, and diaspora input could do much to shape such programs. Achieving justthis level o policy engagement between diasporas and the Canadian government would be a welcome goal.

However, many diaspora activists urge diasporas and governments alike to move beyond a complementary initiatives levelo engagement towards a more ambitious policy dialogue. According to a report by the Netherlands-based Arican DiasporaPolicy Centre, such an aim is important because “[d]iasporas are not only implementers o projects but are also thinkerswith visions and ideas who can play active roles in the generation o ideas, inormation and more policy-relevant knowledgein the feld.”57 A more ambitious level o policy engagement would involve diasporas in defning the goals and means o governmental oreign policy.

There are any number o ways this might be achieved. In a traditional way o thinking about oreign policymaking,diasporas could inorm policies in areas or which the government has sole and sovereign responsibility. But in the presentera o multi-actor, multi-level and transnational policy initiatives, there is room to imagine much more. As internationalpolitics scholar Jennier Welsh observes, it is possible to envision government engaging very substantively with the publicon “sustained partnerships o policy advocacy” such as that which produced the Landmines Convention.58 Diasporaengagement in such partnerships oers many areas o potential policy dialogue. A similar message is articulated by aCanadian oreign policy analyst:

Transnational activities will continue to blur territorial boundaries and diminish state monopoly over oreignrelations. Foreign Ministries around the world, many o which are already seeing their inuence in internationalrelations diminished, are re-evaluating their role. Among the options they have beore them is to harness thedynamic trans-national networks diasporas weave in order to become more relevant and eective. Facilitatingand enhancing constructive activities diasporas undertake on behal o their homelands and kin could strengthenCanada’s multi-track diplomacy and make DFAIT more relevant to all Canadians.59

56 Luin Goldring, Susan J. Henders and Peter Vandergeest, “The Politics o Transnational Ties: Implications or Policy, Research, and Communities” (YCAR-CERLAC Workshop Report, York University, Toronto, 2003), 9.

57 A.A. Mohamoud, The Contribution o Arican Diaspora to Policy Dialogue (Amsterdam: Arican Diaspora Policy Centre, 2007), 5, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Migration_Developm.pd

58 Jennier M. Welsh, “Canada’s Foreign Policy: Does the public have a say?” (unpublished paper, Dal Grauer Lecture, Vancouver, September 15, 2007), 23.

59 Marketa Geislerova “The Role o Diasporas in Foreign Policy: The Case o Canada,” Central European Journal o International and Security Studies 1, no. 2, (2007), 105, http://www.cejiss.org/assets/

pd/articles/vol12/M.Geislerova_The_Role_o_Diasporas.pd




As well as exible thinking about the content o oreign policy engagement, there is also room or creative thinking aboutstyles o engagement. In addition to consulting diaspora communities or their input on particular policies, or instance,government might also hold open-ormat dialogues with the simple aim o gathering nuggets o insight that might useully shapepolicymakers’ reections. (This approach was used, or instance, in DFAIT’s unding o a policy conerence with the Canadian-Sudanese community in September 2010, which was organized on the government’s behal by the Mosaic Institute).60

ii) concrete actions government can take

a) h i sd

Many observers note that the most undamental way in which government can encourage diasporas to become citizenscapable o contributing to its oreign policy is to establish conditions or immigrants to integrate successully into theeconomy and society. In the words o a Canadian report, “a host-country’s public policy, labour market and businessenvironment that enable immigrants to utilize their skills, knowledge and experience eectively and productively is anenvironment that empowers them with the capacity to more strongly contribute to the host country’s domestic economyand, consequently to the strength o its oreign policy.”61

B) udd t c o D g

As noted above in the discussion o the “special assets” that diasporas can contribute toward oreign policy objectives, a

detailed understanding o diaspora communities is important or evaluating the objectivity and soundness o the inputsthat particular sub-groups or members o each community have to oer. A fne-grained understanding o communitydynamics is also essential or ensuring the representativeness o participants in policy areas such as peacebuilding, inwhich internal dissenters within a group could otherwise act as spoilers perpetuating the sources o conict. 62

A recent European paper on best practices or engaging diasporas in peacebuilding suggests an extensive range o inormation that governments and agencies should research about diaspora organizations in order to select suitablepartners or peacebuilding activities. Recommended selection criteria or prospective partners include:

• transparency with respect to organizational structure and governance;

• inclusiveness o membership—or barring that, clarity about which diaspora constituency an organization represents;

• accountability, as demonstrated by well-documented processes, procedures and reports;

• the nature and extent o co-operation with other actors and institutions;

• co-operation within the diaspora, and its transnational ties;

• the organization’s perceptions on peace and conict in the homeland; and

• the organization’s engagement strategy, i.e. its platorm and methods.63

Achieving this fne-grained level o understanding with respect to myriad newer and less organized diasporas in Canada wouldbe a daunting task. However, it is indispensable or making an eective choice o partners; and i done well it would probablyhelp to reduce the levels o negative experiences that policy ofcials have encountered in engaging with diaspora groups.

c) i m t s D i

As previously noted in the discussion o an “entry level” conception o how diasporas could be engaged in oreign

policymaking, the Canadian government could act to support transnational initiatives by diaspora groups that complementthe government’s existing international policy goals. A relatively well-known set o initiatives has been undertaken byEuropean governments seeking “to play an enabling role in removing barriers to diasporas taking part in development.” 64 Such measures include acilitating remittance transers; helping to identiy opportunities or diasporas to invest in theirhome countries; and establishing or supporting programs to enable diaspora members to volunteer their skills andexpertise toward home country development. These programs do not involve diaspora groups or individuals in broader

60 The Mosaic Institute, Sudanese-Canadians and the Future o Sudan: A Report on a Conerence held in Winnipeg, September 2, 2010 (Toronto: The Mosaic Inst itute, 2010), p. 3.

61 Rudi Robinson, Beyond the State-Bounded Immigrant Incorporation Regime. Transnational migrant communities: their potential contribution to Canada’s leadership role and inuence in a globalized

world, (Ottawa: North-South Institute 2005), 177, http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pd/transmigration_document_july_22.pd

62 Publ ic International Law & Policy Group (2009), Engaging Diaspora Communities In Peace Processes, http://www.diasporacentre.org/DOCS/PILPG_Engaging_Dia.pd, 27.

63 Giulia Sinatti, Key criteria o “good practice” or constructive diaspora engagement in peacebuilding (The Hague: Arican Diaspora Policy Centre, 2010), http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/ADPC_

Paper_June201.pd

64 Development Research Centre on Migration, Globali sation and Poverty, “Diaspora and Development: Building Transnational Partnerships” (Briefng no. 19, Brighton, U.K.: University o Sussex, 2009), 3,

http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/briefng_papers/BP19.pd




dimensions o the policymaking process; however, they are a much-called-or step by Canadian diaspora groups.65 Designing appropriate programs and policies would be a welcome arena or policy discussion between the Canadiangovernment, diaspora groups, and potentially NGOs as well.

D) Bd g c

A third step to oster diaspora engagement in oreign policymaking is or government to assess its own capacities. Amongother things, this can entail assessing organizational structures and mechanisms within government that may or may not

exist to enable such engagement (that topic is examined in the ollowing “Mechanisms” section o this report).

Another important element o governmental capacity-building consists in making a wholehearted commitment to diasporaengagement at the corporate level. To this end, a European proponent o diaspora engagement recommends ensuring “thatpolicy engagement is clear, well known and secured at senior governmental level in order to build dialogue with diasporasand the legitimacy or the policy targeting diasporas.”66 The notion o a governmental strategy or diaspora engagement hasbeen recently eshed out in a comprehensive study by the Washington DC-based Migration Policy Institute on the topico diasporas in global development policy. It specifes our main elements required or such a strategy: “identiying goals,mapping diaspora geography and skills, creating a relationship o trust between diasporas and governments o both originand destination countries, and, ultimately, mobilizing diasporas to contribute to sustainable development.” 67

A considerable gul exists between this recommendation and current realities within the Canadian government. As onereport notes, “an ofcial Canadian policy on diaspora engagement does not exist. For instance, although CIDA inormally

recognizes the positive contributions that diaspora organizations may make to international development and, in someinstances, has expressed increased interest in involving diaspora organizations in its operations, there is nothing in placeexclusively to guide their engagement in a systematic manner.”68 Another Canadian analyst confrms this lack o a generalpolicy commitment within government to engaging diasporas as such: “The approach o governmental agencies is that ‘Wework with Canadians as Canadians, as citizens, not as diasporans per se.’… [O]n occasion, and on specifc issues on a caseby case basis, certain diasporans are targeted or inormation ...” 69

Depending on how the import o a diaspora engagement policy is understood, adopting such a policy within the Canadiangovernment might presuppose a considerable degree o conceptual reection on the nature o citizen engagement inoreign policymaking, and on the relationship o diaspora engagement to Canada’s multiculturalism policy. Admittedly,such reections would be all the more difcult given that globalization has produced the expansion o oreign policyinto virtually every government department, with no single department clearly responsible or taking the lead on such amatter.70

A fnal dimension o governmental sel-examination that would build capacity to engage diasporas in policymakingconsists o understanding, and potentially changing, the attitudes o ofcials who interact with diaspora communities. As arepresentative o a major UK diaspora group observes, the magnitude o the potential challenge in this area should not beunderestimated:

[A]ttitudes within initiating organizations can ... help or hinder the process o diaspora engagement. Developmentproessionals, human rights activists, etc., may possess mindsets and worldviews that predispose them to be atvery least wary o engaging with diasporas to achieve developmental ends. For many organizations, an engagemeninvolving diasporas represents a step-change, which in itsel may need to be treated as an integral part o a changeprocess. Simply treating such a partnership as routine may be counterproductive.71

Some o the problematic mindsets and world views at issue might include the concerns about the diversity, motivation andobjectivity o diaspora groups that have been discussed above. Overcoming the wariness that such concerns may createwill require a readiness or sensitive and difcult conversation, as well as a commitment to learn by trial and error over thelong term.


66 Dina Ionescu, Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners or Home and Destination Countries: Challenges or Policymakers (Geneva: International Organization or Migration, 2006), 64, http://www.

iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/

published_docs/serial_publications/mrs26%20interior.pd

67 Kathleen Newland, ed., Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute 2010), 15.



69 Razmik Panossian, “Do Diasporas Really Matter? Civil Society Organisations, Policy Makers, and Ethnic Community Organisations,” (Presentation at the International Symposium on Diaspora Politics,

27-29 April 2006, Reno, Nevada), 8.

70 For a discussion o the multiple government departments involved in Canada’s oreign aid decisions, see Johnston 2010, 6-9.

71 Chukwu-Emeka Chikezie, “Engaging diasporas and migration in development policies and programs” (Paper prepared or the Civil Society Days o the 3rd Global Forum on Migration and Development

(GFMD), Athens, 2-3 November, 2009), 11, http://www.gmd2009.org/UserFiles/fle/RT%201_2%20CHIKEZIE%20paper%20%28EN%29%5B1%5D.pd




e) Bd D g’ c

An important way or government to increase the ability o diaspora groups toengage in policymaking is to oer support or capacity-building in a range o relevant areas. As many diaspora groups themselves note, their organizations areoten volunteer-based, with changing personnel who have little ormal skills inorganizing, research, conict-resolution or alliance-building, and little exposureto the government’s oreign policy priorities. Training in these areas mightproduce better-positioned interlocutors or written and in-person engagement

with government policymakers. Helping diaspora groups become more organizedand more cohesive might help lessen the intra-group conict that is oten cited asa barrier to successul engagement with policymakers. Training in how to buildinstitutional linkages and share lessons learned among diverse diaspora groupswould also add greatly to their individual and collective strengths.

Outside Canada, most current discussion and practice with respect to capacity-building does not ocus on the goal o policy engagement per se. In the sphereo international development, capacity-building is envisioned chiey as a meanso helping diaspora groups get organized and become more eective at gainingunding or and undertaking development projects in their countries o origin.A particularly ambitious example o a governmental undertaking to conductcapacity-building toward this end is an annual ten-day workshop in Israel or

women leaders o diaspora organizations, which is co-sponsored by the Israeliand German international development agencies and several international NGOs. Its curriculum includes ormingassociations, building partnerships, resource mobilization and undraising, communication and advocacy, andbuilding trust and accountability.72

In the sphere o conict resolution and peacebuilding, capacity-building can also take the specifc orm o youthinitiatives or peacebuilding dialogue; the creation o a community data bank o resources and skills among diasporamembers; and training in creative reconciliation techniques.73 Organizations that conduct capacity-building eorts inthis area include the Netherlands-based Arican Diaspora Policy Centre, which provides training in peacebuilding andconict transormation to Arican diaspora members in the Netherlands; the United States Institute or Peace, whichhas conducted training or Southern Sudanese diasporas; and the Public International Law and Policy Group, which hasprepared Kosovar and Armenian diasporas to participate in peace processes.74

A rare example o capacity-building that specifcally aims to promote the engagemento diaspora groups in policymaking is that o the Dutch NGO Oxam Novib. Thisorganization is typical o the Dutch approach to development co-operation insoaras it attaches “signifcant importance in its policy and fnancial resources tomainly (but not only) small-scale development initiatives o Dutch individuals ororganisations.”75 Since 2006, Oxam Novib has been running a capacity-buildingprogram or diaspora organizations that aims not just to improve their skills as small-scale development actors but also their ability to inuence the policymaking process.It oers training courses on project cycle management, remittances, microfnance,managing international partnerships, proposal development, and undraising.In order to promote alliance-building and to empower diaspora organizations tospeak or themselves in policy orums, the program supports strategic partnerships

among diaspora groups through an umbrella organization called Diaspora Forum orDevelopment.

In 2008, Oxam Novib commissioned an independent study to evaluate the resultso its capacity-building programs or diaspora organizations. The resulting reportfnds that many o the programs’ practical and technical goals in the areas o project development and alliance-building are measurably successul. However,it fnds difculty in assessing success with respect to the goal o diaspora groups’

72 “A Capacity Building Workshop or Women Leaders o Diaspora Associations: 15-24 November 2010, Haia, Israel” (2010), http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/iseljenistvo/?id=1396

73 University or Peace, “Capacity or Peace and Development: Roles o Diaspora” (UPEACE Expert Forum, Toronto, Canada, October 19-20, 2006).

74 Public International Law & Policy Group (2009), Engaging Diaspora Communities In Peace Processes, http://www.diasporacentre.org/

DOCS/PILPG_Engaging_Dia.pd, 14.

75 Tom De Bruyn, “Evaluation o Oxam Novib’s Capacity Building Programme or Diaspora Organisations” (Study commissioned by Oxam Novib, 2008), 7, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/Oxam_

Novib_diaspo.pd

Oxfam Novib (ON) is the Dutch affiliateof Oxfam, the international developmentNGO dedicated to alleviating poverty andinjustice. Founded in 1956 as Novib, itwas “the first politically independent

and non-religious developmentorganization in the Netherlands”; and in

1994 it became affiliated with Oxfam.It has some 350 staff at its head officein The Hague, and six field offices.

Along with a group of five other Dutchinternational development NGOs, OxfamNovib belongs to Linkis, a partnershipthat extends subsidies and adviceto Dutch groups (including diaspora

groups) undertaking small-scaledevelopment projects abroad.[Source: ttp://www.oxfamnoi.nl/en-ome.tml]

The African Diaspora Policy Centre(ADPC) is an independent policyresearch centre founded in 2006 asa platform for enabling the AfricanDiaspora in Europe to use its socialcapital for promoting peace, better

governance and “brain gain” in Africa.In addition to producing policy-relevantresearch, it convenes meetings,facilitates networking and conductscapacity-building training to build

conflict transformation skills. It alsomaintains an African Diaspora SkillsDatabase aimed at including the skilledAfrican Diaspora in developmentcooperation for the benefit of Africa.

[Source: ttp://www.oxfamnoi.nl/en-ome.tml]




empowerment to speak or themselves in the policy sphere. The report fnds that some gains have been made in diasporagroups being brought by Oxam Novib to international meetings as attendees, and diaspora groups have gained somewhatgreater visibility in the Dutch media and national policymaking. Disappointingly, though, diaspora organizations arestill not being invited in their own right to policymaking meetings, and receive only limited national and internationalattention as development actors. “[W]ithout the backing o more established organisations such as Oxam Novib,” thereport concludes, “it is still very difcult or diaspora organisations to have a strong voice in the (policymaking) debates ondevelopment co-operation.”76 The tangible gains the Oxam Novib program has made, the report notes, are strongly linkedto its larger institutional context: namely, the longstanding (and unique) tradition among Dutch government and NGOs o recognizing the potential o, and giving support to, non-traditional development actors in development co-operation. 77

Clearly, Canada is ar rom having this sort o institutional context o attitude and programming in place. Combinedwith the difculty o discerning substantial progress in diaspora policymaking engagement, even rom the Oxam Novibprogram, these acts do caution against hoping or quickly-measurable results rom similar initiatives within Canada.For this reason, as many commentators on the subject o diaspora engagement in development have observed, suchengagement must be a durable commitment that is prepared to build community capacities over the long term asinstitutional contexts evolve in tandem.

f) c ad/o s ub D o

An aspect o diaspora capacity-building with proven potential or ostering policy engagement is the establishment o umbrella organizations capable o representing the interests o, and consulting government on behal o, multiple diaspora

groups. The potential o well-developed and proessionalized diaspora groups to engage in policymaking is ormidable.By ar the most sophisticated examples o such potential are located in Europe, where the Netherlands and the UK inparticular are home to umbrella groups with considerably sophisticated accomplishments on the policy ront to their credit.

One such group is the Netherlands-based Arican Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC). Among its projects is an eort tocontribute the collective perspective o the Arican Diaspora in Europe to the Arica-European Union Strategic Partnershipand Action Plan (which was adopted in 2007 to improve development cooperation between Arica and Europe). To advancethis end, the ADPC has held events including a consultation meeting to share views among Arican intellectuals, expertsand development workers rom 11 EU countries, and a subsequent policy seminar to present those views to variousEuropean agencies, think tanks and governmental bodies.

Beyond this already substantial level o accomplishment, the ADPC is seeking more ormalized ways o promoting diasporaengagement in the Arica-EU policy dialogue. It envisions the creation o “an EU-wide platorm or ormal diasporaengagement in migration and development initiatives,” with the aim o linking various European organizations as well asgenerating advocacy, research and policy work. Another major goal is “ormal access into the policy process in both the EUand AU levels,” which entails a range o component steps. These include that the diaspora “cultivate a pool o experts whocould represent diaspora interests”; that it be granted observer status in critical meetings involving the Arica-EU StrategicPartnership; and that it be “allocated (and actively seek) seats in appropriate EU and AU assemblies and committees dealingwith migration and development.”78

A second example o a highly sophisticated umbrella group engaged in policymaking is the Diaspora Forum orDevelopment (DFD). In February 2010, it convened a European Diaspora Expert Meeting at which representatives rommigrant organizations in ten EU countries discussed the creation o a European Diaspora Platorm that would “provide amechanism or increasing the visibility o migrant communities in the countries o residence as well as enhance the rolethey play as part o civil society.”79 A workshop at this meeting was devoted to advancing the role o migrants in policy

dialogue, and it concluded that the emerging platorm could serve to improve consultations, organize dialogue with policymakers, consolidate national diasporas and orge links across diverse diaspora groups.

Turning to the UK, signifcant umbrella groups there are also attempting to shape government policy on internationaldevelopment issues. One o these, Connections or Development, was ormed in 2003 by the UK Department orInternational Development (DID), in conjunction with Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) civil society groups, as a vehicle

76 Tom De Bruyn, “Evaluation o Oxam Novib’s Capacity Building Programme or Diaspora Organisations” (Study commissioned by Oxam Novib, 2008), 47, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/

Oxam_Novib_diaspo.pd

77 Ibid.

78 Arican Diaspora Policy Centre, Position Paper: Diaspora Perspectives on the Joint Arica-EU Strategic Partnership (Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2009), 13-14, http://www.diaspora-centre.org/DOCS/

Position_Paper_-_O.pd

79 Diaspora Forum or Development, European Diaspora Expert Meeting: Towards Building a European Platorm o Diaspora Organizations: Briefng Note on Final Decisions and Recommendat ions (The

Hague, 2010), 3, http://www.nrbvoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/

European%20Diaspora%20Expert%20Meeting.pd




to promote the engagement o BME groups with DID and with internationaldevelopment issues. Among its goals is ostering the involvement o BME groupsin shaping development policy in two areas: realizing the internationally-endorsedMillennium Development Goals, and making global migration work to the beneft o international development. To these ends, Connections or Development mobilizesUK BME communities to participate in policy consultations with DID and otherrelevant government departments; and it has contributed to policy debates onmigration and development at the UK, European and United Nations levels. 80

In contrast with the government-established and –unded nature o Connectionsor Development, the Arican Foundation or Development (AFFORD), anotherUK organization, is entirely independent o government. It was ounded in 1994by Arican diaspora members within the UK who were concerned that “Aricanswere eectively marginalized rom mainstream development activity directedtowards Arica.”81 Among its other activities, AFFORD is “a think tank thatproduces knowledge, expertise, and policies on migration and development issues,… particularly as these issues aect Arica and her global diaspora.” 82 It has anextensive track record in inuencing policy and media. One o its recent high-profle policy projects is RemitAid, a global campaign to provide remittance taxrelie, through the vehicle o diaspora public-private partnerships, in support o international development.83

While all our o these umbrella organizations have signifcant policyaccomplishments to their credit, Canadian government and diaspora groups should move cautiously in emulating them.Some European observers o these organizations are critical o those ounded and unded by government, seeing them asdecidedly inerior to independently-arising and sel-sustaining organizations.

A 2009 report that DID commissioned to evaluate its programs o engagement with UK civil society groups ound thatthe goals motivating DID’s ounding o Connections or Development were admirable ones—but the vehicle used, “anew organisation … instigated by DFID and not well embedded in the broader UK BME institutional context” was poorlychosen.84 The report’s authors assert that DID ailed to understand the politics and organizational issues involved inseeking representation among a hugely diverse group o diaspora organizations that had themselves been unable to reachconsensus on an existing representative national structure to engage with DFID, and that it was a mistake or DID toseek to orm a single institutional voice or diaspora interest in international development. Consequently, Connections orDevelopment has run into conicts resulting rom its diverse membership. While the report assures that there is “scope orDFID engagement with BME civil society working with existing networks and established groups,”85 its conclusion is onethat Canada should heed careully: “I an umbrella body does not exist there is probably a good reason why. DFID cannotcreate new UK civil society organisations but it can nurture existing ones[.]”86

Other commentators on the broader range o European examples reach similar conclusions about the merits o government-led versus grassroots eorts to engage diasporas through government development initiatives. An inuential analysis o European diaspora engagement eorts states that: “Government or agency-led eorts to engineer consultative bodies ormigrant platorms do not seem to be the way orward to create alliances between the established development sector anddiaspora organisations ... [T]op-down-designed, entirely subsidised migrant platorms tend to have limited or nonexistentlegitimacy among their supposed constituencies, are not allowed a genuine inuence in policy development, and canactually reinorce the separation between the ‘two worlds’ ... [A] more ruitul strategy seems to be to support (throughco-unding) and build on existing, spontaneously created diaspora organisations or networks that are based on a true

commitment o its members who have already gained legitimacy through their active role in advocacy ... or development.”8

To be sure, there is a genuine need and desire among Canadian diaspora groups or umbrella partnerships to exist. Analystso Canada’s Arican diaspora groups, or instance, call or the ormation o “South-South Diaspora Partnerships” that could

80 Connections or Development (n.d.), “Diaspora Civil Society: the great un-tapped resource,” http://www.cdnetwork.co.uk/

sites/cdnetwork.co.uk/fles/Leaet%20or%20Meetings.pd

81 Hein de Haas, “Engaging Diasporas: How governments and development agencies can support diaspora involvement in the development o origin countries,” Oxord: International Migration Institu te


82 Arican Foundation or Development (2007a), “About Us,” http://www.aord-uk.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=43

83 Arican Foundation or Development (2007b), “RemitAid,” http://www.aorduk.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=38&Itemid=57

84 Paul Thornton and Shaun Hext, “Review o DFID’s Work to Build Support or Development through work with Businesses, Trades Unions, Faith Communities, Black and Minority Ethnic Communities,

and Diaspora Groups” (2009), 26, http://www.dfd.gov.uk/Documents/consultations/bsdreview/bsd-bus-tu-th-bmec-dia-rpt-0709.pd

85 Ibid.

86 Ibid., 34.



Diaspora Forum for Development (DFD)is a Netherlands-based platform of more than forty diaspora groupsrepresenting more than thirty countries.It was founded in 2008 to coordinate

diaspora groups involved in migrationand development, and aims to foster

diaspora members’ involvement inmigration and development issues,both in the Netherlands and in their

countries of origin. Two of its mainaims are “building strategic alliances of transnational networks both nationaland international” and “increasing thevoice of diasporas in the policy making

process at all levels.”[Source: ttp://www.d-f-d.org/new-dfd/index.pp/

wo-we-are.tml]




support capacity-building by enabling more successul diaspora groups to share “lessons learned and best practices” or“engaging with public policy issues in Canada and in countries o origin.”88 While diaspora groups themselves might takethe lead in establishing such institutional linkages, some orms o government support could help that to happen. Andnotwithstanding the reservations o European critics about government-established umbrella groups, it is also possible thatthe Canadian context is signifcantly dierent rom the European in ways that make a robust government-led eort worthpursuing.

That proviso is worth bearing in mind with respect to all dimensions o the preceding analysis. I there is a singleconcluding observation to be made about how Canada should approach the challenge o engaging diasporas in oreign

policymaking, it is that the experiences o European countries and perspectives o European commentators must beassessed against Canada’s very dierent history o immigration and its distinctive notion o multicultural citizenship.





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important fles that traditionally would have been managed by DFAIT—were then managed elsewhere. This leads to theconclusion that in today’s Ottawa, DFAIT’s control o core oreign policy issues has been weakened and its de acto lead onmany non-core issues has gone elsewhere.

A third major inuence on DFAIT’s ongoing capacity or policy leadership is budgetary. In his book Getting Back in the Game,ormer Canadian diplomat Paul Heinbecker catalogues almost $200 million in cuts that DFAIT has sustained to its operatingbudget since 2004.2 While the Transormation Agenda calls or the deployment o a larger proportion o the Department’sresources abroad, cuts in operating budgets o this magnitude cannot but reduce Canada’s on-the-ground representation abroad.This could leave notable gaps in coverage in areas such as Arica, where the current modest number o twenty-one missions

is under threat due to the latest round o budgetary reductions. Without more investment in diplomacy by the government, itis unlikely that DFAIT will be able to draw on the same level o expertise that it previously cultivated in-house. It may have todevelop alternative sources (perhaps some external to the Department) in order to carry out its mandate eectively.

ii) implications of current trenDs for Diasporainput into policy Development

While it has never been easy or any group (including those rom the diaspora) to communicate their views to decision-makers, thesedevelopments at the ederal level have made and will continue to make the initiation o a dialogue more difcult. With the prolierationo players and the shit in primacy or policy leadership away rom DFAIT, there is no longer a central contact point; and in somecases, there may be ew clues as to which policy issues are in play. In strengthening DFAIT’s platorm abroad, the TransormationAgenda calls or signifcant reductions in the size o headquarters. The geographic divisions o DFAIT, which were ormerly the primary

ocus or the management o the bilateral relationship with some 170 countries abroad, have become less o a ocus and more o acomponent in a web o operational and headquarters units that together make up a virtual team addressing priority issues.

While this may be a rational way to deploy scarce resources, it does make it more difcult or organizations external togovernment to fnd out where to plug in or whom to approach. The concept o desk ofcer and unctional specialist ora country or group o countries appears to have been supplanted by the approach o task groups orming in response tospecifc challenges. The resulting patchwork at DFAIT—and the act that some oreign policy issues may be managedeither by one or other o the central agencies or by program departments that may have less visible structures—will requirediaspora groups to work harder to develop a network o eective contacts and a dialogue with policy makers.

On the opportunity side, however, there would appear to be an opening or diaspora groups to help fll the gap that theTransormation Agenda and budget cuts risk creating in the gathering o inormation and the development o expertise onoreign policy issues. In the past, DFAIT could feld specialists both in Ottawa and abroad with expertise on each countryand region, who could supply up-to-date assessments on the implications o trends and events or Canada. Although seniormanagement at DFAIT believes that modern media and communications will deliver enough inormation about the acts onthe ground, it is counterintuitive to think that a smaller headquarters and ewer specialists will do anything but lead to adiminution o knowledge about the latest developments in countries o interest to Canada. I one accepts that the role o aoreign ministry is to advocate or Canadian interests abroad, and to interpret international events to government, it wouldollow that there could be a role or the diaspora in helping DFAIT to keep track o what is going on in various locations—thereby making up, to some extent, the capacity that the department no longer has in-house.

The Global Citizens Initiative is a research project involving policy sta o DFAIT who are trying to identiy appropriate waysto use diaspora groups in Canada and Canadians resident abroad to advocate or Canadian interests in oreign countries andto supplement inormation-gathering relevant to the policy development process. Many o the ethnic and ethno-religiousgroups that trace their origins to countries having oreign policy interest or Canada maintain active links with these countries

acilitated by the Internet and social media. This advance in communications can enable them to oer timely comment andanalysis that might not otherwise be available to policy makers. Exactly how the Global Citizens Initiative will develop andchannel this potential toward constructive use is not entirely clear at present. However, the act that the initiative is underwaybodes very well or a more vigorous dialogue between ofcials and various communities both in Canada and abroad.

This is not to say that such inputs would be equally relevant across the entire oreign policy spectrum. The process o oreignpolicy development in Canada embodies a complex amalgam o interests both domestic and international. Our diversepopulation, regional interests and ederated political structures provide the basis or policy ormulation. For example, ourreliance on oreign trade or 45% o our GDP requires the maintenance o eective relations with a diverse list o countriesthat would probably be more restricted were we not so dependent on a global trading system. Our reliance on internationaltrade also dictates an active presence in multilateral orums that promote trade and a stable fnancial system.

2 Paul Heinbecker, Getting Back in the Game (Bolton, ON: Key Porter Books, 2010).




While trade has a strong inuence, Canada’s oreign relations are not predominantly mercantile. Canada has a record o promoting peace, democratic development, respect or human rights and the rule o law. These goals have long been thecornerstone o our oreign policy, even when pursuing them restricts opportunities or the development o advantageouscommercial relationships. We helped to construct the UN system and continue to pursue an active role in it. Our supportor most UN agencies is prompted less or what it can return to Canada than or what multilateralism can do to improvepeace and stability throughout the world. While trade will always command a priority in the conduct o Canada’s oreignrelations, it will not do so to the exclusion o a determination to make the world a better place not only or Canadians butor all peoples.

That act is reected in the latest organizational change owing rom the Transormation Agenda. The new Canada Bureauthat has emerged in the reorganization o Headquarters and the Canadian feld ofces will take these feld ofces beyondtheir ormerly exclusive ocus on trade into involvement with political matters, including the development o closer linkswith ethnic and diaspora communities. As this evolves, non-governmental organizations in major Canadian centres whereregional ofces are located will be able to develop new local opportunities or dialogue.

iii) existing Diaspora consultation acrossvarious governmental Departments

Although it might be assumed that aspects o oreign policy such as deence and security do not lend themselves towidespread consultation because o their need or secrecy, in act these are areas in which interesting advances have beenmade. One o the most structured interactions with diaspora groups in Canada is ound in the Cross-Cultural Roundtable

on Security, managed by the Department o Public Saety. The operation o the Cross-Cultural Roundtable may be lessdesigned to invite comment on security matters than to reassure moderates among Canadian ethnic and ethno-religiousgroups that the anti-terrorism agenda is aimed at combating extremism and does not constitute an attack on any religiousor ethnic group. However, the Roundtable membership is composed o 13 distinguished proessionals rom the Jewish,Islamic, Sikh and other minorities (as well as Canadian Aboriginals), all o whom have credibility in their respectivecommunities. They may have been selected more or their personal achievements than or their ability to representcommunities; but their presence creates a two-way channel that provides community eedback on security initiatives.Future evaluations o the consultative mechanism will give more clarity about its useulness as a vehicle or policydialogue. Nonetheless, its very existence is unquestionably positive.

I such channels can be opened on these most security-sensitive oreign policy issues, there must be many other areasrelated to Canada’s role in the world that can and should involve consultation more openly and at an early stage indevelopment. Foreign policy choices should reect relevant interests and shared values o Canadians; policy ormulationshould take into consideration a wide range o views and interests in order to ensure as much as possible that such policiesare broadly supported by Canadians. Intuitively, i trade, aid, political policy and immigration issues bearing on a certaincountry or region are being examined, the shaping o the policy would surely beneft i residents o Canada rom thatcountry or region were able to provide considered inputs.

Nevertheless, i the ease and requency o a real policy dialogue with the diaspora is the barometer o how such a dialogueis valued by government, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that there is unanimous support among policymakersor it. Policy analysts across government may accept that diaspora groups are signifcant stakeholders in oreign policydevelopment. However, the paucity o eective mechanisms that could ensure relevant input in a timely manner indicatesa disconnect between those who might oer valuable input and those who could use such input or the development o policy options.

At DFAIT, the late 1990s saw a more active dialogue with academia and the diaspora on policy issues than has existedin the recent past. Currently there is no champion o consultations in the DFAIT Minister’s Ofce, and no centralmechanism to elicit the views o ethnic or community groups. That said, however, consultation on specifc issuesdoes occur. In the 1990s and early 2000s, or instance, a fxture o the DFAIT calendar was the annual human rightsconsultation that included NGOs and ethno-religious groups. More recent years have seen that ormat changed tosmaller group meetings concerning human rights and United Nations Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee thattake place about thrice yearly.

An example o current issue-oriented consultation with diasporas is a conerence organized by the Mosaic Institute inSeptember 2010 at the request o DFAIT’s Sudan Task Force, which brought Task Force ofcials together with academicsand leaders o Sudanese-Canadian groups. The conerence identifed pressing humanitarian issues acing Sudan as wellas challenges and opportunities acing Canada as a major donor o aid and other orms o assistance to the people o thatcountry. Its success highlights the considerable value that input rom inormed members o the diaspora can produce or




the evaluation and fne-tuning o Canadian policy. In another example, ollowing the devastating earthquake in Haiti inMarch 2010, DFAIT reached out to the Haitian-Canadian diaspora to seek their help in developing long-term objectivesbeyond immediate humanitarian relie.

The emerging pattern, then, is that DFAIT initiates contact with diaspora groups as issues develop. Perhaps the evolution o the Global Citizens Initiative and the promised outreach rom the Canada Bureau will eventually produce a more systematicmethodology and create a channel or ongoing dialogue that is not dependent on an immediate problem to be addressed.

Experiences have been varied in other departments that have a oreign policy interace. The Department o Citizenship and

Immigration created advisory panels or policy input that included community leaders who were members o the diasporagroups. However, these mechanisms have allen into disuse with successive reorganizations and changes in the machineryo government.

Although currently no standing committee or other consultative mechanism provides or such consultations, considerabledialogue is occurring. The stakeholder list maintained by the policy branch at CIC alone contains more than ftyorganizations deemed to have a primary stake in immigration, reugee and citizenship policy. The program branches arein requent contact with stakeholder groups that are partners in delivery; and CIC Ministers and senior ofcials regularlyappear at conerences convened by ethnic and other groups to discuss policy and programming. While the vast majorityo inputs to government are program- or issue-related, this process creates links enabling a policy dialogue that is moreaccessible and transparent than those in many other government departments.

CIDA has committed in principle to a consultative mechanism that includes not only partner country governments and

stakeholders but also Canadian groups rom countries that are recipients o Ofcial Development Assistance (ODA)under bilateral programs. The principle that the Agency should seriously consider Canadian stakeholders’ interests in thedevelopment o Country Development Program Frameworks (CDPFs) was accepted decades ago. As early as the late 1990s,steps were taken to provide a consultative process to enable Canadian stakeholders to comment upon drat CDPFs. In 2003,CIDA’s Policy Branch issued guidelines or CDPFs that provide or intra- and extra-Agency consultations with a wide varietyo interlocutors, including a call or a stronger all-o-government ocus. Consultations with development partners andstakeholders (implicitly including diaspora groups) were recommended to take place ater a concept paper was producedand approved by senior management, so that their input could be taken into consideration in the drating o a fnalramework that would be approved by the CIDA President.

In practice, there were attempts to implement these guidelines in the spirit in which they were intended, but coverage wassporadic at best. By 2008, most CDPFs were outdated—some by our years or more. That same year, cabinet approved theCIDA “countries o ocus” concept, which narrowed the recipient list to 20 countries. The profles and strategy or eachwas renewed, but neither o these documents required any consultations except those with other donor agencies and therecipient countries themselves. Outdated CDPFs or countries not on the list o 20 did not have to be reviewed.

An Ofcial Development Assistance Accountability Act (passed in 2008) identifes three groups—governments,international agencies and Canadian civil society organizations—that must be consulted at least every two years as a parto the decision making process relating to ofcial development assistance as defned in the Act. In October 2009, CIDAapproved updated CDPF guidelines and set up a new division o the Strategic Policy and Perormance Branch, named theConsultations and Outreach Directorate. As o today, CIDA has a mandate to consult and the machinery to achieve it. Theessentials or an active dialogue are in place.

iv) assessment of present realities anD future potentials

In concluding this analysis o diaspora inputs into oreign policy, it is useul to consider whether it is at all practical tocreate and maintain a system or government-diaspora dialogue that can be relevant and timely. There would appear to bea growing need; and undoubtedly there is some capacity in the diaspora. However, or such dialogue to take place theremust be accommodation on both sides.

A marked dierence exists in the capacity o various diaspora groups in Canada to engage in dialogue on political issues,and it could be argued that such capacity is directly tied to the degree o the successul establishment o the communityin Canada. Some communities, such as Aghans, Horn o Arica groups and Burmese, are relatively new and preoccupiedwith issues o settlement. Mature communities o Greek, Italian, Ismaili, Sikh and Jewish Canadians, on the other hand,have achieved a high level o political sophistication and have been successul in sending members to provincial andederal parliaments, where community inputs can be delivered without being fltered through consultation structures.Recent changes in Canada’s Middle East policy toward stronger support o Israel, and the establishment o a consulate




in Chandigarh, India, constitute two examples o initiatives that the Jewish and Sikh communities did not advancethrough conventional consultation mechanisms. They are a unction o the ability these communities possess not only tocommunicate to, but actually to orm part o the highest levels o government and to inuence Canada’s political lie.

As or those less well-connected communities that deal with government in a more circumscribed way, a number o highly-placed interlocutors perceive there to be an unortunate amount o wasted eort. When groups do decide to make theirviews known to government, too oten they do so on issues they oppose. A recurrent theme arising in discussions withormer ministers and ofcials currently involved in policy development is that diaspora groups must convince interlocutorsin the policy realm that they are interested in promoting a Canadian agenda in the countries o their origins, as opposed to

the interests o those countries in Canada.

Realistically, i there is to be growth in contacts and opportunities or dialogue between government and the diaspora,there must be more leadership rom the political level and more creativity in how to tap the resources that are there.Two eective models currently exist in Canada: one at CIC and the other at Public Saety. The ormer works because o an active programming interace that creates a channel or policy dialogue; the CIC Minister is accessible because theinterlocutors are partners in delivery o service. The Public Saety model works because ministers recognize that socialpeace and harmony can be protected only by an open dialogue with minority communities most aected by the securityand anti-terrorism agenda. The potential or expansion o dialogue at DFAIT and CIDA appears promising, given thatlegislation in the case o CIDA and organizational change at DFAIT proclaim an openness to consultation.

Recent projects such as those undertaken by the Sudan Task Force should help ofcials defne more concretely what mightbe achieved with the Global Citizens Initiative. Since the Sudanese community is not well-established economically in

Canada, DFAIT unded their participation in a national conerence. While cost alone would rule this out as an ongoingmodel, it should spur the search or less costly options (perhaps drawing on electronic media to bring inormed peopletogether or an exchange o views).

Finally, both parties in the dialogue need to work diligently to overcome preconceived ideas. Some recent governmentaldecisions have led to questions in certain non-governmental quarters as to whether a true dialogue that raises dissentingpolicy views is viable. On the government side, politicians and ofcials comment that diaspora groups are too otennegative. Although dissent and criticism are valued choices in any real democracy, groups seeking to bring about policychange would be well advised to emphasize the positive aspects o collaboration with government in shaping their input.

At the end o the day, Canada’s diversity oers government an opportunity to broaden its horizons with respect to what isgoing on outside our borders and to target our contributions to peace and stability in the world more productively. What isneeded is to fnd ways o tapping resources that exist within the Canadian community. Properly done, the cost o doing sowill be ar less than the cost o not doing so.




PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS

The principal purpose o this research paper has been to draw attention to the potential o Canadians rom diaspora communities toenrich the content and direction o Canadian oreign policy. It does not pretend to serve as a comprehensive and defnitive treatmeno the issue, but only—as we have said in our Introduction—to “stimulate a healthy dialogue, essential to a healthy democracy, abouhow best to tap into the possibilities our increasingly diverse society holds or improving Canada’s role in the world.” Nonethelessdialogue and discussion alone will not be sufcient in the long run. Rather, i the content o Canadian oreign policy is to be moreinclusive o inputs rom transnational Canadians possessing specialized knowledge and expertise about matters o strategic importance

to Canada, then steps will have to be taken to alter the status quo. To that end, and to provoke urther thinking and engagement withthese issues, we oer the ollowing broad recommendations, which are relevant not only to the Government o Canada, but also tocivil society institutions, philanthropic organizations and individuals, and diaspora communities in Canada.

In reading these recommendations, it should be noted, as outlined in our Introduction under the sub-heading “What thisreport is not”, that they are based primarily on principle and on other countries’ experience in engaging diasporas in oreignpolicymaking. They do not purport to reect a careul analysis o current fscal and organizational realities acing theGovernment o Canada, nor should they be read as the fndings o a comprehensive easibility study, although we do believethat the topic o this paper is pressing enough to warrant such work being undertaken by public ofcials and others or whomthe ideas presented may have direct implications.

That said, it should also be noted that while some o the recommendations do call or new or increased unding to supportthe capacity o diaspora-based organizations and/or the gathering and analysis o inormation received rom Canadians rom

dierent backgrounds, the ocus o other recommendations with obvious potential cost implications is on the advisability oreorganizing or reallocating existing public resources in order to increase government efciency and eectiveness insoar asthe making o oreign policy is concerned.

1. ti ‘ie e x’ ei ii e ee iee i ie i i

iie, iee i i ee i iie i c i e eeie i ii e eei c’ fi ei i .

rie: It is important or government to be open to the possibility o making substantial changes in the way theGovernment and its bureaucracy organizes itsel to seek out, receive, assess and incorporate policy inputs rom Canadians.Similarly, civil society organizations working in the oreign policy sphere must examine their own organizationalmemberships and practices to specifcally consider the ways in which they are—or are not—reecting the richness o Canada’s diversity. Both public sector and private sector organizations working in this feld must not limit themselvesto the possibility o making changes only at the margins o existing structures and mechanisms; rather, more extensive,systemic changes must also be within their realm o contemplation.

In part, this is because the world in which we all operate is a quickly evolving one. The advent o globalization in its manyguises—including ever-aster international telecommunications, the growth and spread o multinational enterprises, andthe international mobility o people, among others—suggests that Canada must prepare itsel in new ways to understandand respond to ideas and opportunities and challenges that originate outside o Canada.

Similarly, the Canadian population itsel is quickly evolving, and demographic patterns are shiting. More and morepeople are immigrating to Canada rom countries that a generation ago barely registered on the Canadian consciousness.They are bringing with them connections to and an understanding o issues and opportunities that were also unamiliarto Canadians until the recent past. While they, like generations o people rom scores o countries beore them, will

integrate successully into Canadian lie over time, and their children, or their children’s children, will almost assuredlybe ull participants in Canadian civic lie, it cannot be assumed that their own understanding o or access to the points o decision-making within Canada’s prevailing system o government will enable them to provide strategic inuence to thecontent or direction o Canadian oreign policy.

Given this backdrop, it would be unreasonable or either the Government o Canada or mainstream civil societyorganizations to presume that citizen experts on such matters as the Southern Sudanese reerendum, or the rise o religiousextremism in Pakistan, or opportunities or Canada to promote political reconciliation in Sri Lanka will necessarily beable or inclined to seek out and provide oreign policy inputs to the Government or civil society organizations workingwith government through existing channels and mechanisms. It would be even more unreasonable to declare, ex ante,that “oreign policy is best let to the proessionals,” as one ormer Canadian diplomat advised the Mosaic Institute priorto the inception o this research project. In today’s world—which bears only a passing resemblance to that o yesterday—“business as usual” becomes a risky bromide.




Accordingly, these organizations should review and consider the introduction and use o more eective mechanisms orgathering and collecting inormation rom Canadian diaspora communities with relevance to issues o strategic importanceto Canada. Some o the mechanisms previously described in this paper that are already in use, such as the Department o Public Saety’s Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, bear urther scrutiny, and their replication across other departmentsor their horizontal application to other areas o public policy should be considered.

In addition, both government and leading civil society organizations working in the area o Canadian oreign policy shouldproactively work to diversiy their workorces so that they are more representative o Canada’s changing demographic ace.That way, even i Canadian oreign policy continues to be largely “let to the proessionals,” such proessionals will include

a proportionate number o citizen experts rom those communities o greatest relevance to Canada’s strategic internationalinterests.

2. dee e--ee i eee, i iie, iie.

rie: One o the ways to enhance the engagement o diaspora Canadians in the ormulation and review o publicpolicy decisions is to simpliy the government’s interace with Canadians. It would not do the people o Canada anyavours or a series o individual government departments and agencies to ormulate their own elaborate ideas andmechanisms or increasing citizen engagement and involvement in their own policy development and analysis processes.To do so would only add to the challenge o dealing with government or those Canadians already intimidated by itsorganizational complexity.

Currently, a plethora o government departments and agencies share responsibility or dierent acets o Canada’s

relationship with the world. These include the Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade, the Departmento National Deence, the Canadian International Development Agency, Public Saety and Security, Citizenship andImmigration, and the International Development Research Centre, among others. Already, or certain high-profle oreignpolicy fles—such as those relating to Aghanistan, Haiti and Sudan—many o these departments and agencies alreadycollaborate in inter-departmental teams that acilitate the horizontal ow o inormation and work to oset the naturaltendency or “inormational silos” to be erected within large, multiaceted organizations (such as the Government o Canada).

The same eort should be made to co-ordinate eorts made by these and other ederal departments and agencies tostreamline the ways in which transnational Canadians are able to contribute to the oreign policy development and analysisprocess. They should lay out common principles, goals and policies in order to ensure a consistency both in the way theyinteract with Canadians who seek to participate in policy discussions and processes, and in their consideration o anyinputs they receive.

3. cie e ee e sii c, ciiei Iii c, e dee Fei ai Iei te e ee ee -ee ii e ie, i, ei, exeiee ei i-ee iee iie

ci i .

rie: At a time when population diversity seems poised to play such a crucial role in helping Canada to positionitsel and respond to opportunities and challenges in an increasingly globalized world, it is axiomatic that Canadianpolicymakers must have as much inormation about that diverse population as possible.

For instance, in 2009 the Sudan Task Force o the Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade retained the MosaicInstitute to undertake a small ethnographic study o the Sudanese diaspora living in Canada. Special runs o Statistics

Canada data cross-tabulated with Citizenship and Immigration data were helpul, but a series o community meetingsand the extensive use o “snowball sampling” techniques soon led the researchers to believe that the Sudanese diasporain Canada was much larger than ofcial numbers suggested. Furthermore, they unearthed some very interesting fndingsabout the political views o community members rom dierent regions o Sudan, and identifed a remarkable commonalityo opinion regarding Canada’s oreign policy interests in that country.

More o this kind o research needs to be done and it should not be seen as the responsibility o only one departmentor agency o government to do it. Discussions about “diasporas” raise innumerable inter-related questions aboutmigration, multiculturalism, Canada’s role in the world and so orth, and given that expertise in these oten-overlappingsubstantive areas is spread across several dierent departments and agencies o government, it is only sensible that an“all o government” approach be adopted in pursuing essential research questions related to these matters. Moreover,governmental and non-governmental organizations should also pool resources whenever possible to ensure that their data-gathering and analysis is as comprehensive and strategic as possible.




4. F i-ii i iie ee e ii i ee

eeie iii i ii.

rie: Not all diaspora communities in Canada are created equal, as even a cursory review o the case studies thatare appended to this report will confrm. Depending on a number o dierent actors—possibly including sheer numbers,longevity in Canada, degree o economic success and recognized strategic importance o their regions o origin amongthem—some communities and community-based organizations are better organized than others, and some are ar moreeective at interacing with the Government o Canada on oreign policy issues.

Rather than running the risk that more poorly-resourced ethnocultural communities or community organizations will neverbe as eective in reaching the ear o Government as those that are more-established or better-resourced, the Governmento Canada, perhaps in partnership with philanthropic organizations, should provide program-based unding to help thosediaspora communities or groups who do lack resources and sophistication about public policy decision-making in Canadato close the capacity gap.

Moreover, given the myriad dierent communities and issues o strategic importance to Canada at present, helping tostrengthen the capacity o individual communities or groups within those communities to interace with the rest o theoreign policy community would help to ensure that the overall content o Canadian oreign policy remains high andrepresentative o a ull panorama o views rom directly-aected communities.

5. F, i ei i e --f ii e, e eie ie e e ei ei iee i .

rie: There is a genuine need and desire among Canadian diaspora groups with oreign policy-related interests andagendas to increase the ow o inormation and the sharing o knowledge that exists between and among them. Lesswell-established and less Ottawa-savvy diaspora groups in Canada are well aware o the successes o larger and moreestablished groups in gaining eective access to policymakers, and they have expressed the desire or a means by whichthey could learn rom the experience o others.

For instance, as noted previously in this paper, analysts o Canada’s Arican diaspora groups have called or the ormationo South-South Diaspora Partnerships that could support capacity- building by enabling more established and “successul”diaspora groups to share their wisdom and experience with less-well-established organizations. While diaspora groupsthemselves might take the lead in establishing such institutional linkages, some orms o government support could helpthat to happen.

As also mentioned previously, there are several examples rom Europe o umbrella diaspora groups—some unded atleast in part by government—that have achieved substantive success in ensuring they and their members are included inoreign policy discussions at both the national and EU levels.

There is some criticism o government created or unded organizations, and some sense that they are both less credible andless eective at channelling substantive oreign policy contributions rom diaspora communities than are their counterpartswho have developed exclusively rom the grassroots. Some o these critics urge that governments not attempt to oundnew umbrella organizations but to support existing grassroots ones. However, in the Canadian context—which, it bearsmentioning, has a very dierent history o immigration than Europe and a distinctive notion o multicultural citizenship notknown to that continent—a robust government led eort to support the capacity o diaspora organizations with oreign policyconcerns to participate in Canadian oreign policy discussions across a number o dierent fles is worthy o consideration.

An umbrella organization to encourage Canada’s better-established diaspora organizations to share their wisdom andexperience with smaller or newer ones could not only raise the overall quality o interactions between government actorsand diaspora Canadians: it could also, i structured properly, serve as a central point where diaspora communities, othercivil society actors and government ofcials could meet and exchange ideas.




CASE STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The ollowing fve case studies are appended to this paper in order to provide a comparative overview o how selecteddiaspora communities in Canada are aring vis à vis their engagement with the ederal government’s oreign policymakers.

As explained in the Introduction, these fve diaspora groups (all rom Asia or Arica) were chosen on the basis o diversecriteria, with the prominence o their country o origin or Canada’s current oreign policy being a main (though not an

exclusive) consideration. The authors o these case studies were asked to address the ollowing issues: the demographicprofle o the diaspora community in Canada; the organizational structure and capacity o community groups; the keyoreign policy issues o concern to each community; Canada’s current involvement with the country o origin; the interacebetween the community and governmental policymakers; and any barriers or capacity gaps preventing the communityrom engaging more eectively with policymakers.

What comes out o these case studies are fndings that corroborate much o what is already known about thecircumstances o recently-arrived diaspora groups in Canada (and in other Western countries as well). For example, manycommunity groups are divided along ethnic lines reecting ethnic and political divisions in their countries o origin. Wherethere are organizations whose mission and membership cross those divides (as in the Sudanese-Canadian community),they generally have explicitly non-political mandates. And where dierent ethnic organizations do advocate oreign policypositions (as in the Chinese-Canadian community), very dierent oreign policy priorities are expressed.

On the whole, there are very ew diaspora organizations whose main ocus is on Canada’s relations with their countryo origin. To the extent that community organizations do interact with those who make oreign policy, these interactionsare mainly ocused on immigration concerns, with political and development issues having a much lower profle. Thevast majority o the diaspora organizations that do have some oreign policy ocus have very limited fnancial resourcesto dedicate to policy advocacy, and are volunteer-run. Accordingly, they report capacity limitations including requentpersonnel turnover, lack o sufcient English, and inadequate knowledge o the political system.

As to the central issue o how diaspora groups have engaged the government on oreign policy issues and what receptiontheir eorts have met with, the fndings among the fve communities are quite diverse. While the government hasconducted outreach activities to communicate with some communities, others report ew i any government eorts toengage them substantively in oreign policy ormulation. A number o human rights-ocused groups express rustrationthat their advocacy eorts are met only with minimal pro orma responses, and express puzzlement that the government’scommitment to human rights abroad is not acted upon more robustly. Several groups note that barriers to engagementare created by the government’s perception o their communities as too politicized (in the case o Eritrean-Canadians) orpotentially sympathetic to a terrorist cause (in the case o Tamil Canadians). And both the Eritrean and Sudanese-Canadianrespondents noted that ears among their own community members about engagement with government ofcials posea substantial barrier to eective interactions. Several communities explicitly call or government support or mechanismsthat would better enable low-capacity and grassroots community groups to interact with the government on oreign policyissues.

Important notE: As addressed in the Introduction to this paper, one key point to bear in mind is that these case studieswere largely completed in the last quarter o 2010. Consequently, certain signifcant political events or geopolitical changesthat one might otherwise expect to be included in a report released late in 2011—such as the election o a majority ederalgovernment in Canada in May 2011, or the reerendum in Southern Sudan in January 2011 that saw overwhelming supportor the creation o the separate state o South Sudan, or the winding-up o Canada’s combat mission in Aghanistan in mid-

2011—are absent. Nevertheless, these case studies do contain essential background inormation on the size, organization,leadership and long-term priorities o key diaspora communities in Canada.




CASE STUDY #1ThE AFGhANI DIASPORA IN CANADA

Ajmal Pashtoonyar

i) introDuction

Compared to other migrant communities, the Aghan diaspora in Canada is a relatively new group, bonded by morerecent shared experiences. The frst ofcial record o Aghans in Canada was in 1973. That year, 18 Aghans immigratedto Canada.1 Since then, Aghani migration to Canada has gradually increased due to conicts and reugee movementrom Aghanistan. While it is difcult to ascertain the exact fgure, according to Statistics Canada over 36,000 Canadiansidentifed Aghanistan as their country o birth in the 2006 Census. 2 Unofcial estimates o Aghan-Canadians, includingthose born in Canada, currently range rom 80,000 to 120,000. 3

In the Canadian labour market, Aghan-Canadians primarily engage in the retail, manuacturing, health care and oodservices industries; ewer work in proessional, scientifc and technical services. 4 Moreover, the 2006 Census data showsthat relative to other diaspora groups, the education level among Aghans is low, with many alling in the lower incomelevels.5

Aghan-Canadians are a diverse community representing Aghanistan’s various ethnic backgrounds. The majority o theAghan diaspora is settled in Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary, while other sizeable communities are ound in Edmonton,Montreal and Ottawa. Prominent diaspora groups in Canada are the Ontario-based Aghan Association o Ontario (AAO)and the Aghan Women’s Organization (AWO).

Established in 1982, the AAO is the oldest Aghan diaspora organization, providing resettlement services to Aghanimmigrants and community social programs. Likewise, the AWO also provides resettlement, skills training and educationprograms or Aghan women and youth.6 Through private donations, primarily rom Aghan-Canadians, the AWO alsomanages an orphanage or girls in Kabul and has previously undertaken education and skills training projects or Aghanreugee women and children in Pakistan.7 However, in light o drastic unding cuts by the ederal government to Ontario-based resettlement agencies, both AAO and AWO programs and services to Aghan immigrants will be impacted.8

There are also smaller Aghan community groups based in Vancouver, Edmonton and Calgary. The majority o theseprimarily ocus on community issues and organizing cultural and religious events. Many rely on community volunteers andhave limited expertise, mandate and resources to ormally engage in oreign policy issues. A number o Aghan-Canadianstudents are active in college and university campuses through Aghan student groups.

In comparison to other Aghan diaspora groups, the AWO has emerged as the leading diaspora organization that hasactively sought engagement with the government on Canada’s role in Aghanistan, in particular on Aghan women’s issues.In large part, this is due to the leadership provided by the AWO Executives, and the network that the organization has beenable to build with decision-makers in the government and community.9 Its governance, institutional capacity and resourceshave also beneftted AWO in its proactive advocacy on Canada’s role in Aghanistan. Other smaller organizations wouldwelcome engagement with the government i such opportunity were available.

Diverse opinions exist among the Aghan-Canadian community concerning Canada’s role in Aghanistan; or instance,opinions may dier among Aghans who have settled in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s as opposed to recent émigrés.Each group has a dierent history and experience o Aghan realities. For some, there is conusion about Canada’s militaryengagement in combat as opposed to a non-combatant role in the Aghan conict. Many are victims o the conict, havinglost amilies and property, and may not welcome any engagement concerning Aghanistan as they build a new lie and

1 Inormation Canada (1975), Man Power and Immigration, Immigration Statistics 1973, (Ottawa), 6.

2 Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report, Immigrant population by place o birth and period o Immigration, http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/demo24a-eng.htm

3 Canada, House o Commons, Standing Committee on Foreign Aairs and International Development, “Canada’s Mission in Aghanistan” in Evidence, no. 006 (December 4 , 2007).

4 For detailed overview o labour and education demographic, see 2006 Census Report, Ethnic origin and visible minorities, Statistics Canada http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm.

5 Ibid.

6 See Aghan Association o Ontario, http://www.aaocanada.ca/aao/; also see the Aghan Women’s Organization, http://www.aghanwomen.org/intro.php

7 Ibid.

8 With ederal unding cuts, the AAO will lose 85% o its annual budget as o March 2011 (Inormation provided by AAO).

9 As a tireless campaigner, AWO Executive Director Ms. Adeena Niazi is recongnized or her work on Aghan human rights issues. As early as 2002, Ms. Niazi was named as one o the top ten Canadians

by Maclean’s magazine. In January 2008, Ms. Niazi became the frst Aghan-Canadian recipient o the Order o Ontario.




identity in Canada. Others in the community may have no interest at all except to participate in community estivities.10 However, on an individual level, many Aghan-Canadian proessionals and entrepreneurs have returned in recent yearsto contribute to Aghanistan’s reconstruction. Notable among these Aghan-Canadians are the current Governmento Aghanistan Finance Minister, the Minister or Agriculture, and the Governor o Kandahar Province. Other Aghan-Canadians are active in the health sector and in the media in Aghanistan. 11

In terms o diaspora media, a number o Aghan-Canadian media outlets (print, radio and TV) have emerged in recentyears. Notable among these are the Aghan Hindara ( Mirror ), a weekly Aghan-Canadian cable TV program and the Aghan

Post monthly paper. Others include the Vancouver-based Ariana TV program. While these outlets primarily ocus on the

Aghan-Canadian community and local businesses, some reporting also covers current aairs in Aghanistan. In recentyears, Canadian government ofcials have engaged with these outlets to communicate Canada’s role in Aghanistan.However, limited inormation is available on how proactively these media outlets inorm ofcials on Canada’s policy inAghanistan.

ii) canaDa in afghanistan: forging an “acciDental relationship”

Just as Aghans are a recent addition to Canada’s ethnocultural mosaic, the history o state relations between Canada andAghanistan is also recent. Formal diplomatic relations between the two countries was established in 1968, lasting or onlya decade.12 Canada severed its ties with the communist regime in power at that time soon ater the December 1979 militaryintervention by the Soviet Union. Relations remained severed ollowing the Soviet troop withdrawal rom Aghanistan in1989 and in the ensuing civil conicts o the 1990s. On the international stage, Canada supported the United Nations in

seeking the secession o hostilities and condemned the harsh treatment o Aghan women under the Taliban regime. Inaddition to its diplomatic stance, between 1980 and 2001 Canada provided $150 million in humanitarian assistance toAghanistan and Aghan reugees in the region.13

Relations between Canada and Aghanistan increased considerably ollowing the September 2001 terrorist attacks inthe United States. In November 2001, Canada deployed its military orces to Aghanistan, and allocated $100 million inbilateral aid in December 2001 to help the Aghan people with “aid and comort, ood and clothing.” 14 Moreover, atertwenty-two years o hiatus, in January 2002 Canada re-established ormal diplomatic relations with Aghanistan to urtherhumanitarian and development cooperation.15

Over the ollowing years, a growing debate emerged in Canada over the direction and duration o Canada’s militaryengagement in Aghanistan. In response to increasing political and public attention, in October 2007 Prime MinisterStephen Harper established a fve-member Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Aghanistan, called the ManleyPanel.16 The recommendations o the Manley Panel resulted in new priorities or Canada’s engagement in Aghanistan or2008 to 2011, with a whole-o-government approach to diplomatic, development and security eorts that are primarilyconcentrated in Kandahar province o Aghanistan.17 A parliamentary motion in March 2008, extended Canada’s militarymission in Aghanistan to July 2011.

Under the United Nations-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, over 2500 Canadian soldierscurrently serve in Aghanistan. To date, Canada has lost over 154 soldiers, a diplomat, two humanitarian aid workers and ajournalist; hundreds o others have been injured in the ongoing Aghan conict.18 Overall, Canada’s aid commitment is $1.9billion rom 2001-2011, making Aghanistan Canada’s largest bilateral aid recipient country.19 In November 2010, the Harpergovernment announced its post-2011 policy, which will see a reduced contingent o Canadian troops continuing in trainingrather than combat roles in Aghanistan until 2014. A scaled-down development program or Aghanistan will now ocuson our priorities: education, humanitarian assistance, promoting regional diplomacy, and advancing security, rule o law

and human rights.20

10 This analysis is inormed by the author’s conversations with members o Aghan-Canadian community.

11 For example, Windsor-based Aghan-Canadian cardiologist, Dr. Asmat Naebkhill, helped establish Aghanistan’s frst acility or cardiac diagnosis and treatment in Kabul; other notable Aghan-

Canadians media personalities are Nilouar Pazira and Mozhdah Jamalzadah.

12 Mr. Charles Eustace McGaughey o North Bay, Ontario, served as Canada’s frst non-resident Ambassador to Aghanistan, while concurrently serving as Canada’s High Commissioner to Pakistan

(DFAIT press release on fle with the author).

13 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Review o the Aghanistan Program, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/acdi-cida.ns/eng/NIC-65152224-QQK

14 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Audit o Aghanistan Country Program, online: http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.ns/eng/NAT-914949-HC6.

15 “Ottawa re-establishes diplomatic ties with Kabul,” CTV News January, 25, 2002, http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CTVNewsAt11/20020125/ctvnews840729/;

For detailed analysis o diplomatic engagement see Library o Parliament, Aghanistan: Canadian Diplomatic Engagement by Karin Phillips in Ino Series, PRB 07-38E (2008).

16 Canada, “Prime Minister Harper announces Independent Advisory Panel on Aghan Mission” (News Release, October 12, 2007).

17 Canada, Report o the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Aghanistan, (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 2008).

18 “In the line o duty: Canada’s casualti es” CBC News, December 20, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/aghanistan/casual ties/list.html

19 For an overview o Canada’s bilateral aid programs to Aghanistan: http://www.aghanistan.gc.ca.

20 Canada, “[Federal] Ministers Announce Canada’s New Role in Aghanistan” (News Release, November 16, 2010).




employed only one Aghan-Canadian public servant on its Aghanistan fle.

Another missed opportunity was the Manley Panel. Not one o the appointed fve-member-panel was an Aghan-Canadian(or or that matter, an eminent Aboriginal or other diaspora community leader). Moreover, between November andDecember 2007, the Manley Panel met with representatives o only two Aghan-Canadian groups, the Canada-AghanistanBusiness Council and the Aghanistan Canada Council.31 Including a prominent Aghan-Canadian on the Manley Panelwould have permitted active diaspora engagement at the highest level o policy development.

With respect to elected ofcials, Aghan-Canadians also have had limited engagement with Canadian Parliamentarians. For

instance, in undertaking its 2007 study o Canada’s role in Aghanistan, the Standing Committee on Foreign Aairs and InternationaDevelopment invited only two Aghan-Canadian witnesses. In its report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee specifcally states:

In noting that the talent and knowledge o the Aghan diaspora in Canada have not been as systematicallyand eectively accessed to the beneft o Canada’s reconstruction and development activities in Aghanistan,the Government o Canada should actively pursue mechanisms by which the Aghan community in Canadacould be consulted and engaged in the reconstruction and development o Aghanistan.32

At a January 2007 national conerence organized by the Aghan Women’s Organization in Toronto, more than 300 Aghan-Canadian women signed a resolution calling on Canadian troops to stay in Aghanistan, with a “hope to see a changein their mission—rom combat to development.”33 This resolution was sent to each member o the House o Commonsand the Senate. The organization was invited to appear at the Standing Committee on National Deence in its review o Canada’s military mission in 2007.34

More recently, in a June 2010 report, the Parliament’s Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Aghanistan stressedthe need to use the skills o the Aghan-Canadian diaspora in building capacity or Aghan state institutions “to planand deliver development programs or Aghans.”35 In the more than two years since its ormation, however, this SpecialCommittee has yet to invite an Aghan-Canadian organization or community leader as a witness concerning Canada’songoing engagement in Aghanistan.

In spite o a limited engagement between the government and diaspora organizations, a number o Aghan-Canadiansare active on an individual level in advocacy eorts in the media, as well as in joint eorts with other non-diasporaorganizations concerning Canada’s ongoing engagement in Aghanistan. Such groups include the Canadian Women orWomen in Aghanistan, the Canada-Aghanistan Solidarity Committee, the Centre or Aghanistan Progress and FutureGenerations Aghanistan.

iv) conclusion

With the exception o the Aghan Women’s Organization, in the past decade the Aghan-Canadian diaspora has had limitedengagement with policy makers about Canada’s role in Aghanistan. The instances o the ederal government, includingelected ofcials, in engaging with the Aghan diaspora have been ew, and have ailed to establish an active rapport beyondoutreach activities. While it remains to be seen i the government will engage Aghan-Canadians in its post-2011 policy vis-à-vis Aghanistan, to date no such eort has been made. Today, relations between Canada and Aghanistan are bonded bya shared experience o sacrifce. The Aghan-Canadian diaspora has a role to play in articulating its concerns and in urtherstrengthening bilateral political and economic relations between the two countries beyond the scheduled withdrawal o Canadian troops rom Aghanistan in 2014.

31 See complete list o consultations held by the Manley Panel in Annex 2 o the Manley Report.

32 Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Aairs and International Development, “Canada in Aghanistan” in Report o the Standing Committee on Foreign Aairs and International Development, (July 2008).

33 Resolution in AWO letter addressed to Canadian Parliamentarians, Aghan Women’s Organization, http://www.aghanwomen.org/documents/AWO%20Resolution.doc.

34 Canada, Standing Committee on National Deence, “Canadian Forces in Aghanistan,” in Ofcial Report o the Standing Committee on National Deence, (June 2007), 84.

35 Canada, Special Committee on The Canadian Mission in Aghanistan, “Report on a Trip to Aghanistan, 28 May—3 June 2010” in First Report o the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in

Aghanistan, (June 2010), 64.




CASE STUDY #2ThE ChINESE DIASPORA IN CANADA

Elena Caprioni

i) profile of the chinese in canaDa1

In current English literature, the concept o Chinese diaspora has a general sense o dispersion/scattering o people whohave let their homeland to live and build communities in their adopted country. Reerring to Chinese migrants in general,Ronald Skeldon observed that a Chinese diaspora exists, but it is “made up o many separate and distinct parts,” based on thebackground and place o origin o dierent migrants.2 This chapter, rather than analyzing one homogenous Chinese diasporaprovides a clear picture o the many dierent mini-diasporas included under the big umbrella o what is in geopolitical termsthe People’s Republic o China (PRC). It analyzes their divisions along ethnic and religious lines, their dierent traditions,cultural practices and interactions with other Canadians. These communities also relate dierently with other immigrantgroups rom China by sometimes creating parallel and/or intertwined diasporas. It is through these mini-diasporas that onecan discuss the phenomenon o the Chinese diaspora in Canada.

The Chinese have been living in Canada or more than 150 years, divisible into three periods o Canadian immigrationpolicies towards the Chinese people: ree entry (1858-1884), restricted entry and exclusion (1885-1947),3 and selectiveentry (1948-present).4

a) h w

During the frst period, Chinese immigrants had the opportunity to come into Canada without restrictions. They migratedmainly to the two British colonies o Vancouver Island and British Columbia (BC) to capitalize on the Fraser River goldrush. The early migrants (men) came alone without amily members and without an intention to remain. They came romthe west coast o the United States and rom the south o Guangdong and Fujian as labour and chain migrants. Theirnumbers uctuated rom 2,500 in 1860 to 4,383 in 1881.5

The second period o Chinese immigration was associated with the construction o the Canadian Pacifc Railway in BC. 6 Due to the post-gold rush recession, racism and prejudice against the Chinese community was on the rise. Each man hadto pay a head tax to the Canadian government to migrate to the country (the price increased rom $50 in 1885 to $100 in1900 and to $5007 in 1903). Nonetheless, numerous Chinatowns mushroomed across the country. In 1923, the governmentenacted the Chinese Immigration Act (the Exclusion Act) to prohibit any Chinese immigrants rom entering Canada. Asa result, in this period the Chinese population decreased signifcantly, almost disappearing in some areas o the country.Their percentage in BC shrank rom 9% in 1881 to 4% in 1921. In 1947 the Immigration Act was repealed and ChineseImmigrants became eligible or admission to Canada under certain restrictions.

B) c w

The third period began ater 1947, when the Chinese fnally began to enjoy the civil rights that other Canadians hadlong since benefted rom. Following the changes to immigration policies in 1967 (the introduction o the points system),Chinese were allowed to migrate to Canada under the same conditions as other ethnic groups. Since the end o World WarII, most Chinese moving to Canada came rom Hong Kong and Taiwan. People rom mainland China were obstructed dueto the lack o diplomatic relations between China and Canada during the Cold War. However, during the 1970s, when thetwo countries re-established dialogue (via an agreement signed between China and Canada in October 1970) and the PRC

1 This section reers to all o the ethnic groups rom China who have immigrated to Canada.

2 Ronald Skeldon, “The Chinese Diaspora or the Migration o Chinese Peoples?”, in The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, eds. Laurence J.C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier (Lanham:

Rowman & Littlefeld, 2003), 63.

3 David Chuenyan Lai, “From Downtown Slums to Suburban Malls: Chinese Migration and Settlement in Canada”, in the The Chinese Diaspora: Space, Place, Mobility, and Identity, eds. Laurence J.C.

Ma and Carolyn Cartier (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefeld, 2003), 312-313.

4 Ibid., 320

5 Ibid., 320

6 Ibid., 313

7 Using Nominal GDP per capita calculations (measuring worth conversions), the relative value o $500 in 1903 would have been roughly $72,000 in 2009, http://www.measuringworth.com/index.html




was recognized by the United Nations as the sole legitimate government o China (25 October 1971), migrant ows startedagain.8

However, since the mid-1980s the volume o Hong Kongese immigrants to Canada (in particular the west coast)skyrocketed, reaching 30,000 a year in 1990 and 44,000 a year in 1994. 9 This was due to the agreement (1984) betweenChina and the UK who sanctioned the return o Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. Moreover, in 1985, Canada expandedthe business immigration program by including investors, entrepreneurs and the sel-employed, thus attracting manypeople rom Hong Kong and Taiwan as well. Ater that peak, the population drastically ell in the last two decades asexemplifed by the ollowing fgures: 50.1% o immigrants came to Canada in the period beore 1991, 30.9% in 1991-1995,

15.5% in 1996-2000, and 3.5% in 2001-2006.10

Taiwanese immigrants underwent a similar uctuation. From the late 1980s, an inux o Taiwanese people without amiliesor with relatives in the U.S. immigrated to Canada, in particular to BC: 19.4% o immigrants came beore 1991, 26.5% in1991-1995, 37.7% in 1996-2000 and only 16.4% in 2001-2006.11 Immigrants rom Macau are also on the decline: 52.1% oMacauese immigrants came to Canada beore 1991, 27.2% in 1991-1995, 16% in 1996-2000 and only 4.7% in 2001-2006.

In contrast, the volume o PRC immigrants rose ater 1989, when Canada endorsed a humanitarian program (OM-IS-339)on compassionate grounds, which permitted thousands o Chinese temporary residents to obtain landed immigrantstatus. Moreover, the accession o China into the WTO and the opening o economic doors acilitated a urther expansion.Permanent residents rom China began to rise annually, rom 4,415 in 1989 to 29,336 in 2008 (with many uctuations inbetween). Between 1995 and 2006, the percentage o immigrants shited rom 8.4% to 13.9%, o which 49.2% ranged inage rom 25 to 44 years old. Unlike pre-1961 when just 2% o Canada’s immigrants hailed rom the PRC, that number had

increased to 28.7% by 1991, and wavered to 14.9% between 1991-1995, to 23.2% or 1996-2000 and 33.2% in the period2001-2006. Ater the UK, the immigrant population rom the PRC is the second highest by place o birth, representing466,940 people. This number includes all o the ethnic groups in the PRC (Han and non-Han) but excludes people romHong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macau SAR and Taiwan province.12

Until the mid-90s, the Hong Kongese group was dominant in Canada (middle-class proessionals or business people) havingbecome the linguistic, political and economic hegemon in the Chinese-Canadian community. The enormous immigration owin the 1990s has played a vital role in the community by creating a more varied Chinese diaspora. Most Chinese immigrantswere admitted as skilled workers or investors. Human capital and post-graduate experience became the most importantcriterion o selecting skilled workers ater the enacting o the Immigration and Reugee Protection Act o 2001. 13

Canada is home to numerous Chinese migrants rom diverse areas and ethnic origins. Whereas in the late 19th and early20th century, most came to Canada rom the southeast province o Guangdong and Fujian (with Hong Kong as a transitlink), currently people migrate to Canada rom nearly every corner o the PRC. Today, Toronto and Vancouver in particular,have a diversifed Chinese social and cultural scene with separate mini-diasporas along ethnic, religious and sometimesregional lines. A new Chinese-Canadian community has emerged across the country, characterized by dierent cultures,education levels, heritages, languages, etc.

The subsequent sections provide in-depth examinations o the distinct mini-diasporas. Only those who all under the umbrellao China and who are signifcantly involved in international issues and Canadian oreign policy will be analyzed. The relevantcommunities are: Chinese plus Falun Daa and people rom Hong Kong (Han); Taiwanese; Tibetans; and Uyghurs.

ii) canaDa’s relationship with china

In the 1970s, the establishment o diplomatic relations between Canada and China led to the renewed exchange o ofcialvisits between the PRC and Canada. In 1978, the Canadian Department o External Aairs established the Canada-ChinaTrade Council—later renamed the China Canada Business Council (CCBC)—which aimed to urther trade relations between

8 For urther inormat ion on the history/evolution o Chinese immigration, see Peter S. Li, The Chinese in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxord University Press, 1998);

Xiao-Feng Liu and Glen Norclie, “Closed windows, open doors: geopolitics and post-1994 mainland Chinese immigration to Canada,” The Canadian Geographer 4 (1996): 306-319.

9 Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Population Groups (28), Age Groups (8), Sex (3) and Selected Demographic, Cultural, Labour Force, Educational and Income Characteristics (309), or

the Total Population o Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cm?LANG

=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=-

80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.


the Total Population o Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cm?LANG

=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=-

80&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=

13 An Act Respecting Immigrat ion to Canada and the granting o Reugee Protection to Persons Who are Displaced, Persecuted or in Danger, Statutes o Canada 2001, c. 27.




the two countries. Canada and China signed a Development Cooperation Agreement in 1983. In the frst 20 years, theCanadian International Development Agency (CIDA) supplied oreign aid to help build China’s “international linkages andlearn rom oreign expertise by supporting people-to-people contacts and education programs in Canada and China.” 14 Today, CIDA supports reorm projects in China that promote good governance, human rights, democratic development andenvironmental sustainability.15

Notwithstanding the tension between the two countries ollowing the Tiananmen Square protests, in 1994 Canadaestablished its our-pillar policy towards China: economic partnership; peace and security; sustainable development;human rights; good governance and the rule o law. In the meantime, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien signed a nuclear co-

operation agreement and a letter o intent on six development projects with Premier Li Peng. In 2001, Prime MinisterChrétien led one o the largest trade missions ever to Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. He was accompanied by close to600 business participants, eight provincial premiers, three territorial leaders, Pierre Pettigrew (Minister or InternationalTrade) and Rey Pagtakhan (Secretary o State, Asia-Pacifc). In 2005, President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Paul Martinannounced a strategic partnership with the intention to double trade within fve years. 16

Given China’s massive size and rapid economic growth, Canada does not provide direct fnancial assistance or aid to thegovernment. Instead, it provides support to acilitate the undertaking o the above-mentioned reorms. In 2009-2010, CIDAprovided $35.86 million in unding to supports Canadian organizations delivering expertise to Chinese agencies that areimplementing human rights and environmental reorms.17

Under the Conservative government, Canada’s relations with China have suered or a number o reasons. For example,the Dalai Lama was awarded honorary Canadian citizenship, the government has regularly criticized China’s human

rights record and accused China o commercial espionage, certain ministers have made pointed comments about Taiwan,18 and Prime Minister Harper did not attend the opening ceremonies o the 2008 Beijing Olympics. At the APEC Summit inNovember 2006, China appeared to initially back out o bilateral meetings to snub the Harper government, and ministersrom both sides threatened to skip out on others on numerous occasions. 19

However in 2009, both governments agreed to re-establish high-level exchanges. Harper visited China in December 2009or the frst time; bilateral agreements on climate change, mineral resources, culture and agricultural education weresigned, pointing to greater cooperation in these areas. Moreover, both countries decided to improve the role o the StrategicWorking Group, a bilateral mechanism ounded in 2005 aimed to stimulate dialogue between ofcials. Current Chinapriorities or the Harper government are: trade, governance, human rights, rule o law, climate change, and public healthand pandemics.20 This thorny relationship still needs to be nurtured in the upcoming years i Canada wants to capitalize onChina’s growing political and economic inuence.

iii) han chinese communities

In the 2006 Canadian Census, 1,346,510 persons or 4.3% o the Canadian population claimed “Chinese” as their ethnicorigin. Approximately 84% noted a single ethnic origin, while the remaining 16% reported multiple ethnic origins. Thegap between men and women o Chinese origin is in avour o the emale sex: 52% vs. 48%. It is one o the youngestcommunities as 83.4% o Chinese-Canadians over 15 years old were born outside Canada in 2006, and only 2.3% are third-generation.21

Whereas the population o Canada increased by 7.7% between 1996 and 2006, the number o respondents with Chineseethnic origins rose by 31.6% in the same time period. It is the largest ethnic group amongst those o East and SoutheastAsian origin and the fth largest ethnic group in Canada excluding Canadian, English and French. Chinese is the third-

most-spoken language in Canada, ater English and French.22

14 Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA’s Program in China, (2005), 1, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/CD4-30-2005E.pd

15 Ibid.

16 Xuecheng Liu, “China and Canada on the Global Arena”, China Institute o International Studies, (2011), http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2011-08/11/content_4400998.htm17 Canadian International Development Agency, Government o Canada. “China”, (2011), http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/china

18 “Milestones in Chinese-Canadian relations,” CBCNews, November 16, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/china/china-canada-relations.html

19 “Won’t ‘sell out’ on rights despite China snub: PM,” CBCNews, November 15, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2006/11/15/harper-snub.html

20 On Canada-China political relations, see Government o Canada, China-Canada, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/china-chine/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/china_canada_chine.

aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=14&menu=Land

21 Statistics Canada (2006). 2006 Census Report. Ethnic Origin, Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses and Sex or the Population o Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and

Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm.


the Total Population o Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cm?LANG=E

&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL= A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=80&VI

D=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=




Almost one third o the people o Chinese origin in Canada live in Toronto (537,060), which represents 10.6% o thecity’s population. This number increased by 1.6% rom 2001 to 2006. The other large slice o Chinese have chosenVancouver (402,000), representing more than 19% o the population, and rising by 1.5% rom 2001. Other sizeable Chinesecommunities reside in Calgary (7%), Edmonton (5.2%), Victoria (4%) and Ottawa (3.2%), even i their numbers do notcome close to those in Toronto or Vancouver.23

Amongst these Chinese origin respondents, only communities representing mainly Hans will be analyzed in this section.

Since the Chinese migration to Canada, a plethora o organizations rom mainland China and Hong Kong SAR have

established themselves. The Chinese Canadian National Council (CCNC), considered a leader in the Chinese Canadiancommunity, is ocused on the promotion o the ull participation o Chinese people in Canadian society. It is also seeking toadvance a balanced and holistic Canada-China relationship.24 The group, made up o paid sta, has dialogue with DFAITon international development and some human rights concerns/cases, but it does not eel that its activities are adequatelyresponded to by policymakers. According to the group, Government ministers and DFAIT improperly develop policies anddraw expertise rom textbooks and the business lobby, rather than directly engaging with diaspora communities. Theywould like to have more regular roundtables led by the diaspora, and to provide the Government with solid suggestions onCanada-China relations without the intererence o business and academic lobby groups.

The Chinese diaspora is also characterized by a coalition o associations with deep concerns about human rights abusesincluding the denial o linguistic, religious and cultural rights in the PRC. The China Rights Network (CRN), oundedin 2006 and located in Toronto, is a joint venture o Amnesty International, the Canada Tibet Committee, the FalunDaa Association o Canada, the Federation or a Democratic China, Students or a Free Tibet, the Taiwanese Human

Rights Association o Canada, the Tibetan Women’s Association, the Tibetan Youth Congress and the Uyghur CanadianAssociation. The coalition claims to have a sophisticated understanding o the government’s eorts in balancing tradeconcerns with the promotion o human rights. CRN requently writes to Canada’s Minister o Foreign Aairs and otherofcials including the Prime Minister. Most o the CRN groups participate in annual discussions with DFAIT’s China deskpersonnel. Notwithstanding its activism, the coalition resents the lack o specifcity and substantive responses to theirrequests by policymakers. Answers are limited to pro orma responses such as “The Minister takes your concerns seriouslyand is looking into it.” CRN is also aware that its outreach is limited due to the lack o time and expertise o its volunteermembers, but it also blames the Canadian government or bowing to the PRC government’s demands. The group thinksthat it would be helpul i DFAIT (including Ministerial ofces) tried to create a dialogue between Chinese diplomaticofcials, cultural and pro-democracy associations and Canadian government representatives by organizing a ull-day reviewo Canada-China policies.

The Falun Daa Association o Canada (FDAC) was ounded in Canada in 1996 and has many branches across the country.Most o its volunteer members are ethnic Chinese, even though the group is open and willing to accept everyone. Initiallyit was mainly ocused on the “high-level cultivation practice guided by the characteristics o the universe—Truthulness,Benevolence, and Forbearance.”25 The practice o this belie includes meditation, group exercises, readings, seminars andworkshops. But with the banning and persecution o Falun Daa in China in July 1999, other aims have been added: toimpede the persecution in China, to publicize human rights abuses directed at Falun Gong practitioners, and to end theChinese propaganda that gives a alse image o the community. The group is asking the Canadian government to step upanti-persecution campaigns in China and in Canada. It requests that elected ofcials uphold human rights values, andCanadian moral values and democracy by disseminating knowledge o Falun Daa persecution in Canada and China to thegeneral public, the media, DFAIT, and NGOs through letters, meetings and other means. The FDCA views the attacks onFalun Daa adherents as direct assaults on Canadian moral values and democracy.26

The volunteer-run Federation or a Democratic China (FDC), located in Toronto, was ounded in 1989 ater the Tiananmen

incident. Its guiding political principles are to promote human rights, protect social justice, abolish the one-partydictatorship, and establish a democratic China by insisting on values, rights, transparency and openness. The group,though involved with several international issues, is ocused on human rights concerns in areas such as Tibet andXinjiang.27 The vice-president o the group, Sheng Xue, expressed that looking back on her 20 years o activism, currentCanadian oreign policy seems ocused on both business issues and human rights, even i true equality between the twostill has not been reached. The association seems quite satisfed with their connection with the Canadian governmentbased on letters and meetings once or twice a year. However, it is not satisfed with the current role o policymakers,and blames the government or not having a real strategy to reach the community. On the other hand, the Ms. Xue also

23 Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report. Ethnic origins, 2006 counts, or Canada, provinces and territories, at http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm.

24 Chinese Canadian National Council, “About Us,” http://www.ccnc.ca/about.php

25 Falun Daa, “What is Falun Daa?” http://www.alundaa.org

26 Ibid.

27 Federation or a Democratic China, “About Us,” http://dc64.de/index.php?opt ion=com_content&task=blogsection&id=6&Itemid=31




recognizes that obstacles are created by the same members o her group who do not have a good command o English anddo not have sufcient knowledge o Canadian politics because “[they] come rom a non-democratic country…[and] do notknow how to deal with the government.”28 The FDC maintains that regular meetings and inormation exchanges betweendiasporas and the government, in addition to the creation o a oundation which could help all o the diasporas with theiractivities, could give more opportunities to these communities to contribute to Canada’s oreign policy development. 29

The Hong Kongese population made up hal o the Chinese population in Canada beore the 1990s. That percentage hasdecreased and there are currently 215,430 frst-generation Hong Kongese Canadians over 15 years old, o whom 40.2% rangein age rom 25 to 44 years old.30 The community is well organized, with a number o associations involved in Canadian

oreign policy issues. Two organizations are highlighted herein: the Movement or Democracy in China (MDC) and theVancouver Society in Support o Democratic Movement (VSSDM). Both were ounded in 1989 and are volunteer-run. TheMDC represents the Chinese in Canada, while the VSSDM represents Chinese residents in BC and Vancouver. Most o theVSSDM’s members are rom Hong Kong, but they were adamant that it remain completely open to all Chinese in Canada. TheMDC and the VSSDM advocate human rights and democracy in China and they are quite active in this regard. The VSSDM,or example, organizes annual candlelight vigils to commemorate the June 4 Tiananmen massacre victims, publishes a bi-monthly newsletter in Chinese to update the community on Chinese and Hong Kongese issues, and it is regularly quoted orinvited to participate in discussions on issues in China and Hong Kong on radio and TV. The main international goal o bothorganizations is to achieve human rights improvements in China, and the implementation o a truly democratic government.The MDC and the VSSDM have a good knowledge o Canada’s oreign policy and are eager to lobby the Canadian governmentto put human rights in ront o business and economic agreements when dealing with China, in order to “inuence Chinato improve human rights and environmental conditions,” as noted Pun York Tong, a spokesperson or the MDC.31 However,due to the small size o the community and the lack o human and fnancial resources and time, the MDC does not have any

dialogue with the government. Consequently, it does not have proper discourse with policymakers, but tries to co-sign appealsto the government with other larger organizations striving or similar goals.

Meanwhile, the VSSDM was regularly invited by the previous Liberal Government to participate in China roundtablediscussions. Today, it is a member o the CRN, so the group eels somewhat represented in Ottawa by this coalition whichregularly pressures the Canadian Government to take a stronger stance on Chinese human rights abuses, and constantlydialogues with elected ofcials and DFAIT. In short, according to Henry Chau, President o the VSSDM, “our involvementis limited by choice to the internal discussion in the coalition and endorsing any policy initiatives.” Their requests arenot treated adequately by policymakers, as noted by the Mr. Chau because “it depends on the standing o the incumbentgovernment.” The MDC and the VSSDM stated that their biggest obstacles are created by limited human and fnancialresources as well as the distance rom the center o power which, observed Mr. Chau, “orbid [them] to develop theexpertise in policy ormation and lobbying.” The MDC states that it is working on uniting with other groups to achievemore visibility. However, the VSSDM is extremely satisfed with its group which is thought to be very vocal in expressingits opinions on issues at stake through the media, public education campaigns or direct contact with government ofcials.Now, “it’s up to them whether they want to hear rom us or not,” concluded Mr. Chau.32

iv) taiwanese communities

In the 2006 Census, 17,705 people declared Taiwanese as their ethnic origin: 67.5% reported a single ethnic origin, while32.5% listed multiple ethnic origins, o which 48.2% are men and 51.8% women. Taiwanese are listed separately romChinese, although the PRC government considers them PRC subjects.33

Much like the early years o immigration to Canada, the majority o Taiwanese people currently live in Vancouver (9,810).The other large concentrations o Taiwanese are in Toronto (4,065) and Montreal (1,065). In other metropolitan areas such

as Edmonton, Ottawa, and Calgary, their numbers decrease drastically to 370, 365 and 255, respectively. The vast majorityo Taiwanese Canadians over 15 years old (92%) are frst-generation immigrants who were raised and educated in Taiwan,and are uent in Taiwanese and Mandarin. 34

28 Sheng Xue (Vice President o the Federation or a Democratic China), key inormant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

29 Ibid.


the Total Population o Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/tbt/Rp-eng.cm?LANG=E

&APATH=3&DETAIL=1&DIM=0&FL= A&FREE=1&GC=0&GID=0&GK=0&GRP=1&PID=97615&PRID=0&PTYPE=88971,97154&S=0&SHOWALL=0&SUB=803&Temporal=2006&THEME=80&VI

D=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=

31 P Y Tong (spokesperson or the Movement or Democracy in China), key inormant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

32 Harry Chen (president o the Formosan Association or Public Aairs), key inormant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

33 Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report. Ethnic origins, 2006 counts, or Canada, provinces and territories, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm.


Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm.




Once the frst waves o Taiwanese immigrants had arrived in Canada, they began to organize themselves in severalcommunities across the country: World United Formosans or Independence (WUFI) was ounded in the 1960s 35, theTaiwanese Human Rights Association o Canada (THRA) in 1964 (revived in 1984), the Taiwanese Canadian CulturalSociety (TCCS)36 in 1991, the Formosan Association or Public Aairs (FAPA)37 in 1993, and others.

The TCCS represents the voice o the entire national Taiwanese Canadian diaspora. It is ocused on helping Taiwaneseimmigrants integrate into Canadian society by promoting Taiwanese culture and introducing it to Canadians whilecontributing to multicultural development.38 Meanwhile, WUFI (representing only those who seek the independence o Taiwan) and the FAPA (encompassing all Taiwanese Canadians) are both volunteer organizations and are more involved in

promoting Taiwan’s status in the international community and in saeguarding reedoms, human rights and the democracyo Taiwanese people. The THRA, whose volunteer members are rom Ontario, is mainly concerned with promoting humanrights in Taiwan, China and Canada and it is a member o CRN. All our are involved in international issues along twomain strands. The TCCS, WUFI and the FAPA believe that Taiwan should be regarded as an independent country andshould be a member o the WHO and APEC without being controlled or inuenced by China. Meanwhile the THRA is moreinvolved in the struggle or the respect o human rights in government policies. The TCCS, WUFI and the FAPA would liketo see Canada stand frm on its oreign policy commitments based on the principles o democracy and human rights. Inshort, they are seeking greater Canadian support or Taiwan, and relative protection rom pressure or threats due to China’smilitary aggression. They also seek the creation o a ree and independent Taiwan, reclaiming a seat at the UN. WUFI andthe FAPA attended consultations organized by DFAIT during which Harry Chen, president o the FAPA, mentioned BillC-357 (the Taiwan Aairs Act) and requested the establishment o more equitable bilateral relations between Canada andTaiwan. The FAPA also asked or support to conduct ree elections in Taiwan without Chinese intererence and to haveobserver status at the WHO General Assembly. The TCCS occasionally pressures the government to support Taiwan’s entry

into WHO and its ull membership at APEC. Meanwhile, the THRA would like to see Canada more concerned with thepromotion o human rights, but the group is not involved in signifcant oreign policy dialogue with the government.

Some group expressed that most o their motions are not well-received or responded to by policymakers in terms o concrete answers, although the responses are always polite.39 According to some respondents, current bureaucrats inDFAIT do not want to antagonize China, but preer to remain on the sideline. The main obstacles mentioned by thevolunteer communities were lack o time and fnancial resources to complete more detailed research and develop lobbyingtechniques. The TCCS, which is the only organization with paid sta, claimed that the major obstacle is the overwhelmingCanadian interest in trade with China instead o human rights, democracy and reedom. Some o the respondentsencourage the Canadian government to create a better dialogue with diaspora groups “who have been appreciative o Canadian universal values ... and contribute to making the whole world a better and more peaceul and just place.” 40 Onthe other hand, others suggest bringing human rights issues in Taiwan to the attention o policy makers and MPs.

v) tiBetan communities

One o the most outspoken groups among the fty-six ethnic groups identifed by the CCP are the Tibetans, whose ethnichomeland is the Tibet Autonomous Region inside the PRC. Following the exile o the Dalai Lama and his ight to India in1959, then Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau agreed to accept over 200 Tibetan immigrants in the early 1970s, underthe Tibetan Reugee Program, to ease the burden on crowded reugee camps in India. 41

Tibetans, seeking job opportunities and ollowing in the ootsteps o riends and relatives, started immigrating to Canada.Today the Tibetans, classifed as a separate ethnic group in the Census, number 4,275 people: 87.7% declared a singleethnic origin and 12.3% multiple ones,42 while 51.6% are men and 48.4% women.43 During the period 2001-2006, theTibetan population increased by 200%.44 Most Tibetans in Canada over 15 years old are frst-generation (94.3%), while

only 0.3% are third45

. Almost all live in Toronto: 3,475 make up 0.06% o the total population there. Elsewhere in Canada,the number o Tibetans is minimal: 300 in Calgary, 110 in Montreal, 100 in Vancouver and 40 in Ottawa.46

35 World United Formosans or Independence. “Introduction”. http://www.wuf.org.tw/eng/ introeng.htm

36 Taiwanese Canadian Cultural Society. “About Us”. http://www.tccs.ca/english/about.html

37 Formosan Associat ion or Public Aairs. “About FAPA”. http://apa.org/new/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=19&Itemid=27

38 Taiwanese Canadian Cultural Society. “About Us”. http://www.tccs.ca/english/about.html

39 Interviews with leadership o WUFI, FAPA, TCCS, THRA held in all 2010.

40 Harry Chen (president o the Formosan Association or Public Aairs), key inormant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

41 Canadian Tibetan Associat ion o Ontario, “CTAO Background,” at http://www.ctao.org

42 Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report. Ethnic origins, 2006 counts, or Canada, provinces and territories, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm.


Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm

44 Ibid.

45 Statistics Canada (2006), 2006 Census Report, Ethnic Origin (247), Generation Status (4), Single and Multiple Ethnic Origin Responses (3), Age Groups (9) and Sex (3) or the Population 15 Years and

Over o Canada, Provinces, Territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2006 Census, http://www12.statcan.ca/English/census01/products/standard/themes/ListProducts.cm?T

emporal=2001&APATH=3&Theme=44&VID=0&VNAMEE=&VNAMEF=&FL=A&RL=0&DS=99&GK=0&GC=0&ORDER=1&ShowAll=Yes&DETAIL=0&FREE=0&S=1





According to Tenzin D. Khangsar, a Tibetan-Canadian working within the government, the Tibetan community is extremelyintegrated in Canadian society because o its eorts in speaking the ofcial languages and its peaceul Buddhist culture.Most Tibetan-Canadians ask or the genuine autonomy o Tibet, preservation o their culture and human rights. Since theywere raised in Canada—a democratic country—they eel it is their right to be part o the policymaking process regardlesso any partisan dierences. “We are considered rational and reasonable, and dierent rom the radicals who do not haveany dialogue with policymakers,” Mr. Khangsar noted.47 In this sense, it seems Tibetan associations have a good workingrelationship with the government. Tibetans are well represented in Canada in the orm o several associations across thecountry, such as the Canada Tibet Committee, the Tibetan Women’s Association, Students or a Free Tibet, the TibetanYouth Congress, and others.

For reasons o space, this section will analyze only the Tibetan organization that seems to be most involved in Canada’soreign policy issues: the Canadian Tibet Committee (CTC). Founded in 1987, it is concerned with the lack o human rightsand democratic reedoms in Tibet. This group is ocused on disseminating inormation about Tibet and promoting thecause o the Tibetan people through outreach campaigns to governments, NGOs, the public and the media by means o organizing seminars, cultural events, and publishing reports. The CTC claims to speak on behal o Tibetans and activistsor a number o issues, as noted on its detailed website.48 Among its many aims, the CTC seeks to be involved in oreignpolicy issues mainly by participating in government consultations on human rights abuses through their relations withDFAIT, CIDA, Heritage Canada and the Department o Immigration. Since 1989, there has also been an association withthe Canadian Parliamentary Friends o Tibet group, through the organization o hearings and visits with the Dalai Lama.Moreover, the CTC works with Canadian and international NGOs such as the Canadian Network or International HumanRights (NIHR) and the International Tibet Support Network (ITSN) on collective letter campaigns, statements and urgentaction or human rights. Finally, it publishes the Canada Tibet Newsletter , distributed semi-annually to Canadian MPs and

organizations. It is also a member o the CRN.

Unlike other associations analyzed thus ar, this section cannot provide more details about the CTC’s attempt to inuenceand contribute to Canadian oreign policy, or about their dialogue with, and suggestions to, policymakers. This is due tothe act that certain members were suspicious o the present project. Even ater receiving a detailed background, they didnot trust the aim o this research report, and claimed that they could not see the beneft o this study or their organizationand thus reused to participate.

Meanwhile, the Tibetan Women’s Association o Ontario (TWAO) was eager to participate. The group is made up mostly o reugee women (volunteers). It promotes the social, political and economic empowerment o Tibetan women, especially inOntario. Their international goal is to gain meaningul reedom or Tibet and its citizens by reminding their members o theimportance o the Buddhist concept o the middle way (the path o moderation). By promoting this gentle path and reachingout to Chinese communities, they seek to disseminate this mutually benefcial stance. In terms o oreign policy position, thePresident o the TWAO, Tsering Choedon, stated that the group would like to search or good ethical relations with China orthe best interest o Canada. In addition to promoting trade opportunities, Canadian ofcials should be mindul o secret andinuential Chinese interests. The barrier between the community and the government, including policymakers, is created bythe lack o fnancial resources and visibility. Tsering noted that perhaps by pushing environmental issues to the oreront o Canadian oreign policy, Canada could take a global leadership role on other pressing issues.49

vi) uyghur canaDian society

One o the smallest and youngest groups among the mini-diasporas analyzed in this report is the Uyghur community.Uyghur migration to Canada frst began in the 1990s. The Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group living in the most north-western region o the PRC, called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) by Hans, and Eastern Turkistan by

Uyghur nationalists. Uyghurs speak a Turkic language written with a version o the Arabic alphabet known as “Chagatai”and adhere to the Hanaf school o Islam. Identifed as one o the 56 ethnic groups o the PRC, the present populationo Uyghurs is approximately 9.8 million, representing 46% o the population in Xinjiang.50 However, some estimate thenumber at more than 20 million by counting Uyghurs living in Xinjiang and abroad. In Canada, the Uyghur ethnic group isnot listed in the 2006 Census under the section “Ethnic Origin and Visible Minorities.” 51 According to the community itsel,there are almost 1,000 living in Canada divided between Toronto (300), Vancouver (180), Calgary (more than 50), Montreal(approximately 70) Hamilton (around 30) and the remaining dispersed across the country. Meanwhile, based on other

Census Agglomerations, http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/rt-td/eth-eng.cm

47 Tenzin D. Khangsar (ormer Deputy Chie o Sta and Director o Multicultural Aairs to the Minister o Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism), key inormant, interview by Elena Caprioni,

2010.

48 Canadian Tibet Committee, http://www.tibet.ca

49 Tsering Choedon (President o the Tibetan Women’s Association o Ontario), key inormant, interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

50 Xinjiang Weiwuer Zizhiqu Tongjiju, 2009 Nian Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian [2009 Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook] (Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Chubanshe, 2009), 78.

51 Statistics Canada (2006), supra at ootnote 13.




sources, the number o Uyghurs is signifcantly less, around 400 people divided between Toronto (180-200), Vancouver(160), Calgary (40) and Montreal (40). Most o them are frst generation immigrants. 52

Notwithstanding the small population numbers in Canada, they are airly well represented by an organization calledthe Uyghur Canadian Society (UCS) ounded by a small group in Toronto in 2000. Today, the organization has roughly90 registered volunteer members (both male and emale) who work or lobbying purposes and to promote the cause o Uyghurs in Canada. Their aim is to support the preservation o their culture, to ensure the rights o all Uyghur-Canadiansby encouraging their greater education and integration into Canadian society, and to use an active lobbying strategy tomake their voices heard. Inside the group, some members are also involved in the Uyghur Canadian Women’s Project

centered on promoting Uyghur-Canadian women’s fnancial security and independence, health and saety, and rightsand learning privileges via educational conerences and job search workshops. The UCS is also a member o the CRNand collaborates with international NGOs to promote democracy and human rights in China. The community is involvedin international issues and in domestic policy areas. Its preeminent ocus is to promote the cause o Uyghurs in theinternational arena, to dispel perceptions that they are terrorists or barbarians (as they are sometimes labeled by Chineseauthorities) and promote Uyghur human rights.53

According to Mehmet Tohti, Former President o the UCS and a Uyghur human rights activist since his early childhoodin China, the organization appears airly well-inormed on Canadian oreign policy issues. The community is eager toconcentrate on lobbying the Canadian government to keep human rights issues on the top o the agenda without sacrifcingthese or trade privileges. It is also keen on achieving democratization in China accompanied by ull political reorm.54

The UCS is received throughout the year during NGO consultancies, and especially by DFAIT and the Parliamentary Human

Rights committee. However, UCS president Rukiye Turdush noted that his group is not entirely satisfed with its dialoguewith the government and policymakers.55 There was one major issue at stake recently, regarding the case o HuseyinCelil, the Canadian citizen o Uyghur origin who was arrested and convicted by China on questionable charges. Althoughthere was dialogue between the Canadian government and the UCS (which provided documentation to the government),the issue was not resolved in the Uyghur-Canadian prisoner’s avour, and many Canadian human rights activists havecriticized the government over its handling o the case. However, some barriers hinder the Uyghurs’ opportunity tobe completely heard by the Canadian government or integrated into society, including a lack o fnancial resources,overwhelming Chinese propaganda and intensive Chinese pressure towards amily members in Eastern Turkistan/Xinjiang.Ultimately, the UCS came to the conclusion that only through urther education and greater participation in social andpolitical lie in Canada would they be able to signifcantly contribute to Canada’s oreign policy development. 56

52 Interview with Mehmet Tohti, ormer President o the Uyghur Canadian Society (UCS), Fall 2010.

53 Ibid.

54 Memet Tohti (ormer president o the Uyghur Canadian Society), key inormant interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010.

55 Rukiye Turdush (President o the Uyghur Canadian Society (UCS)), key inormant interview by Elena Caprioni, August 2010

56 Ibid.




iii) remittances anD transnational relations

The Eritrean diaspora is actively involved in the social, political and economic situation in Eritrea. Mr. Tekie Beyene,Governor o the Bank o Eritrea, described the contributions rom the diaspora as “beyond anybody’s imagination.” 8 Theeect o remittances—or, as one writer described it, “privatized oreign aid”—on the Eritrean political economy is understudy by economists and development theorists globally. 9

Researchers have noted the difculty o obtaining statistically verifable data surrounding all aspects o the Eritreaneconomy, as there has been little internationally verifable reporting o data since 2003. 10 One Canadian source, however,

has documented Eritrea as having the highest percentage o GDP owed to remittances in the world at 37.9%, valued at$411 million USD.11 It is widely known that all Eritreans in the diaspora are required by Eritrean law to contribute 2%o their earnings to the country, based on their yearly income-tax assessments.12 Yearly payments ensure that Eritreansabroad are able to renew their Eritrean Identifcation Cards and are issued entry visas. Conducting administrative aairs(i.e. land acquisition) in Eritrea is impossible without an updated ID card and confrmation o remittances tendered.These individual and collective remittances by diaspora organizations are reerred to as the “moral economy”, a systemo nationalist commitments and obligations (both ormal and inormal) that communicate a moral expectation to remit aswell as regulate and socialize personal behaviours.13

One detailed European study has characterized our phases o Eritrean transnational relations: (1) mobilization duringthe struggle or independence (1961-91); (2) de-mobilization o the diaspora in the post-independence phase; (3) re-mobilization and institutionalization o the diaspora during the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000) and (4) diversifcation andincreasing alienation o diaspora communities rom the Eritrean state since the beginning o the new millennium. 14 Using

the above categories, the organizations reported in this study would be maniestations o the latter, third and ourth phaseso transnational relations.

iv) eritrean Diaspora in canaDa

There are at least 150,000 Eritreans living in OECD and Middle Eastern countries.15 Most Eritrean immigration to Canadahas been to large cities: Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg and Montreal. There has been a signifcant inux o primarilyrecent (0-5 years) immigrant Eritreans to Calgary, Edmonton and Saskatchewan. The current number o Eritreans living inToronto is not known; estimates vary anywhere rom 10,000 to 20,000. There are an estimated 3,000 Eritreans residing inWinnipeg.16

There is no accurate data on the size o the Eritrean populations in host countries in North America and Europe. This isprincipally due to the act that they were registered upon arrival in the pre- and post-independence period as “Ethiopians”rather than “Eritreans.”17 One important source or obtaining these numbers is the voting fgures or the 1993 Reerendumor Independence:

…according to these data, a total o 84,370 votes were cast by Eritreans outside Eritrea (Reerendum Commission o Eritrea1993). They indicate that the most signifcant host countries or Eritrean reugees outside Arica are Saudi Arabia (37,785)the U.S. and Canada (14,941) and Germany (6,994). However, these data certainly underestimate the true size o theEritrean Diaspora, largely because they record only those Eritreans eligible to vote—that is over eighteen years o age [...]1

8 Carol Pineau reporting rom Asmara, Eritrea, Voice o America (June 24, 1998), as quoted in Victoria Bernal, “Eritrea Goes Global: Reections on Nationalism in a Transnational Era,” Cultural

Anthropology 19, no. 1 (February, 2004).

9 Ilene Grabel, “Remittances, Political Economy and Economic Development,” Erasmus University Rotterdam: International Institute o Social Studies, December 2, 2009, http://www.iss.nl/DevISSues/

Articles/Remittances-Political-Economy-and-Economic-Development.10 See: “Eritrea’s Economic Survival: Summary record o a conerence held on 20 April 2007” Sally Healy Associate Fellow, Arica Programme, Chatham House and Convenor o the Horn o Arica Group,

http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108632, The Royal Institute o International Aairs, 2007. Healy is summarizing David Styan’s (Birkbeck College, University o London)

presentation on page 6.

11 David Carment, Brandon Lum and Milana Nikolko’s, Diasporas and Canadian Foreign Policy (Norman Paterson School o International Aairs –Country Indicators or Foreign Policy, May 10, 2010),

slide 17, http://www.carleton.ca/cip/app/serve.php/1296.pd.

12 Remittances are important contributions to individuals, amilies, communities and national GDP in poor countries; however, their overall eects on development have not been deeply explored.

Proessor Ashok Swain notes that remittances promote uneven and inconsistent development patterns; in eect, increasing, rather than equalizing, the gap between inequalities. Conerence

Presentation and Report on Working Group 1: Mapping Actors, Roles and Strateg ies (Section V.: Conict Prevention) by Proessor Ashok Swain, Uppsala University, Sweden UPEACE High Level Expert

Forum Panel (Toronto, ON, October 2006), 35, http://www.gordonn.org/resfles/UPEACE_conerence_report.pd.

13 Matsuoka, Atsuko and John Sorenson, Ghosts and Shadows: Construction o Identity and Community in an Arican Diaspora (Toronto: University o Toronto Press),100, quoted in Clara Schmitz‐

Pranghe, “Modes and Potential o Diaspora Engagement in Eritrea” (working paper 3, DIASPEACE, July 2010), 16, http://www.diaspeace.org/D12_WP3_Fischer_Final.pd.

14 Ibid., 12.

15 Sally Healy, Associate Fellow, Arica Programme, Chatham House and Convenor o the Horn o Arica Group, “Eritrea’s Economic Survival: Summary record o a conerence held on 20 April 2007”,

(The Royal Institute o International Aairs, 2007), 6, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108632.

16 Matt Preprost, “Protest links seminar to Eritrean terrorists,” Winnipeg Free Press, August 23, 2010, http://www.winnipegreepress.com/local/protest-links-seminar- to-eritrean-terrorists-101283344.html.

17 Nadje Al-ali, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, “The Limits to ‘Transnationalism’: Bosnian and Eritrean Reugees in Europe as Emerging Transnational Communities”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 4

(2001): 6.

18 Nadje Al-ali, Richard Black, and Khalid Koser, “The Limits to ‘Transnationalism’: Bosnian and Eritrean Reugees in Europe as Emerging Transnational Communities”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 4 (2001): 6.




v) eritrean-canaDian Diaspora anD canaDian foreign policy

Eritrean-Canadian activism, particularly since 9/11, has had a strong preoccupation with U.S. oreign policy towards the Horn o Arica, a ocus that has precluded a specifc analysis o the Canadian government’s position. While there may be many importantreasons or this, one overarching observation can be made: the U.S. role and oreign policy position concerning Eritrea hasalways been prominent and clear, whereas Canadian policy is not as clear or distinctive. Much o Eritrean diaspora advocacy ingeneral ocuses on the U.S,. position toward Eritrea, which is believed to strongly inuence the Canadian government’s stance.

There has been a distinctive Canadian advocacy ocus, however, with respect to the immigration and reugee system.

Eritrean-Canadian advocates have probed Canadian UNHCR ofcials about their commitment and support to Eritreanreugee claimants abroad and protected persons in Canada. A recent collaboration between Eritrean-Canadian diasporaorganizations and the Canadian Council or Reugees (CCR) has produced research and recommendations to Citizenship& Immigration Canada and Public Saety Ministers about the inadmissibility o ormer EPLF liberation soldiers on securitygrounds.1 This is one current example o advocacy, although there is a long history (albeit largely undocumented) o advocacy in the Eritrean-Canadian diaspora.

vi) eritrean Diaspora organizations

While this research is ocused on Eritrean organizations in the political realm, the Eritrean community has a vibrant anddiverse array o non-political groups that are culturally, socially and, or the most part, religiously organized. For example,in 2008 two new churches— Medhanie Alem Tewahdo Church and St. Michael’s Church2—were purchased in Toronto as a

result o the organizing and undraising eorts o their respective membership bases over the past 10-15 years. There arealso other strong aith-based collectives represented by the Catholic, Pentecostal and Muslim communities. One settlementand integration organization, the Eritrean Canadian Community Centre o Metropolitan Toronto (ECCC)3, is a non-proftcharitable organization established in 1985.

For those ocused on the political realm o diaspora activities, the primary mode or organizing and mobilizing in the Eritreandiaspora community is through a small number o grassroots organizations/movements. These entities have a strongemphasis on raising awareness and advocacy. Comparatively, the visions, missions and purposes o existing organizationsare quite polarized. Although most o these organizations are ocused on what is happening in Eritrea, their organizationalmissions either: (1) mostly align with the policies o the Government o the State o Eritrea (GOSE) in both its domestic andoreign policy or (2) mostly denounce the actions o the GOSE on these domestic and oreign policy issues.

There are a growing number o people “in the middle” who eel they cannot make an inormed decision due to the lack o clearinormation. They can be observed anecdotally, but do not have an organized political voice, since there is a sharp public divisiono views. Through key inormant interviews it was clear that community organizers representing opposing views on Eritrean politicsare equally rustrated with the level o polarity on these issues in the diaspora community, as it prevents dialogue and co-operation.

It is clear, however, that the environment or organizing, and even—perhaps especially—or mobilizing humanitarian aidis high-stakes and ull o tension due to the current political situation in Eritrea. The ollowing sections mostly ocus onorganizations established in Toronto, due to the scope o this study as well as the act that Toronto-based organizationshave most eectively mobilized Eritreans nationally. Some recent Eritrean-Canadian organizations are developing inWestern Canada and gaining national attention among the diaspora, such as, Hidmona—the Eritrean-Canadian HumanRights Group o Manitoba (Est. September 2009)4 who recently hosted veteran journalist, lecturer and long-time riend o Eritrea, Mr. Dan Connell, on September 18, 2011 at the University o Winnipeg. 5

vii) past Diaspora organizations (1979-2005):

While it is a small diaspora, historically the Eritrean-Canadian community has been very active in advancing its concernsto the highest level o government in Canada. Although mostly no longer operational, the ollowing organizations andcollaborations have a resonant history in the Eritrean diaspora community in Canada. They were established by the

1 Canadian Council or Reugees, Eritrean Canadian Community, Centre o Metropolitan Toronto (ECCC), Hidmona-Eritrean, Human Rights Group In Manitoba, Holy Trinity Eritrean Orthodox, Church in

Toronto, Metih Eritrea Community Newspaper, Qalna Eritrean Human Rights Group-Toronto, From Liberation to Limbo: A Report on the Impact o Immigration Security Inadmissibility Provisions on

the Eritrean Communities in Canada, and Recommendations or Reorm, submitted to the Ministers o Citizenship and Immigration and Public Saety, (2010) http://ccrweb.ca/fles/rom_liberation_to_

limbo.pd.

2 Medhanie Alem Eritrean Orthodox Tewahdo Church (Toronto, ON, Canada), http://www.medhaniealem.com; St. Michael’s Eritrean Orthodox Church (Toronto, ON, Canada), http://makidusmichael.com.

3 Eritrean Canadian Community Centre, http://www.eccctoronto.ca/.

4 Hidmona, www.hidmona.net (Hidmona translates as “Our Reuge” in English).

5 For a list o Dan Connell’s books and articles on Eritrea see his website: http://www.danconnell.net/books.




Eritrean intelligentsia who had the capacity to navigate Canadian bureaucracies such as the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA) and the Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade (DFAIT). What is notable isthat most (i not all) o this work was conducted on a volunteer basis by individuals working ull-time elsewhere; therewas no dedicated sta to do this work.

1. Eie reie aii (Era)Established during a time o high optimism regarding Eritrea’s progression toward becoming an independent and sel-reliant state, ERA-Canada (est. 1979) was a Canadian NGO ormed with the ollowing objectives: (1) provide humanitarianaid to victims o war, drought and amine; (2) assist development programs in the horn o Arica; (3) conduct development

education in Canada; and (4) provide inormation and help acilitate communication between Eritrean and CanadianNGOs.6 ERA is remembered as a dynamic transnational organization that was established during the revolution as away to ensure that an adequate ood supply reached the liberated areas captured by the revolutionary movement—theEritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). The ERA networks were revitalized under new names ater liberation: “EritreanDevelopment Fund” in the United States, “Eritrea Hilswerk” in Germany and “EriTree” in Canada.

2. Eitee (e Era-c)EriTree began ocusing on long-term, integrated agricultural rehabilitation programs, reorestation and soil and waterconservation programs to rebuild Eritrea’s ecosystem. In 2005, the Zagir Water Supply and Environmental Sanitationproject in Zoba Maekel, Eritrea was eectively implemented, whereby 5,000 villagers gained access to a clean, reliablewater supply. This was especially signifcant or emales in the village who no longer had to walk fve hours and missschool to get water or their amilies.7 In an online article by EriTree entitled “EriTree Receives $105,000 in CanadianGovernment Funding,”8 EriTree announced CIDA unding toward this project. The total budget or this project was

$170,000. EriTree needed to raise the balance o $65,000 rom its supporters—the Eritrean-Canadian diaspora community.For every dollar EriTree raised CIDA committed to matching two dollars. EriTree mobilized a large segment o the Eritreanpopulation in undraising or this project. Strong lessons rom EriTree’s partnership with CIDA have emerged and wererevealed to me in an interview with its members who are considering a new ocused role or EriTree, namely to support theoutreach and engagement o underserved Eritrean-Canadians with existing social services.

3. ci pee deee i Eie (cpdE)At the outbreak o the Border War in 1998, the Eritrean diaspora began to panic in the absence o inormation about whatwas happening during the conict. Almost immediately ater the war began, approximately 60 Eritrean proessionalsliving in North America developed the Inormation Task Force (ITF), whose purpose was to tell the Eritrean story duringthe war. The ITF created an e-list and developed press releases to work toward its mandate; however, political divisionsquickly emerged, and it disbanded. Subsequent to the ITF, Canadians or Peace and Development in Eritrea organized asa grassroots group to advocate or peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was not designed to be an ideological group anddid not ask the Canadian government to pick sides; it ocused on enabling the capacity o Eritreans to exercise their rightsas individual taxpayers to lobby the government or peacebuilding in the region. 9

4. c pee r (1998-2001)This was an attempt to co-ordinate a loose network o Eritreans. Canada Peace Rally (CPR) was a mailing list and primaryinstrument or national and international communications, inormation-sharing and organizing. This network engagedseveral high-profle bureaucrats and politicians,10 and the members o CPR began lobbying in Ottawa or increaseddevelopment assistance and emergency relie unds or Eritrea (particularly since one million people had been displaceddue to the war). CPR members were successul, as Canada was the frst oreign power to ask Ethiopia to withdraw troopsrom the region; the frst peacekeepers on the ground were 420 Canadians in the United Nations Mission on Eritrea andEthiopia (UNMEE). The CPDE team met with the Minister o International Cooperation (head o CIDA), who approved $1million in aid to Eritrea. CPDE requested more unds, given that there were so many internally displaced people (IDPs) in

Eritrea, and $2.5 million was eventually dispatched.

6 Mulugheta Ogbamichael, DEHAI Mailing List Archive, “EriTree: Aim, Vision and Goal [sic] rom All Perspectives,” April 9, 2001, http://www.ephrem.org/dehai_archive/2001/apr01/0071.html.

7 Eritrea Daily, “Eritrea: EriTree completes Water project successully,” May 28, 2005, http://www.eritreadaily.net/News2005/article200505281.htm.

8 EriTree Canada, “Eritrea Receives $105, 000 in Canadian Government Funding,” May 6, 2002, http://www.shaebia.org/wwwboard/contributedarticles/messages/54.html.

9 Key inormant interview with lead organizer o ITF, CPDE and CPR, September 2010.

10 E.g. Hon. Maria Minna, Minister or International Cooperation (1999-2002), Canadian Minister o Foreign Aairs, Lloyd Axworthy (who later became the UN Envoy or Eritrean-Ethiopian War) with

Eric Hoskins as Senior Policy Advisor (Currently serving as Ontario Minister o Citizenship and Immigration) and Art Eggleton was Minister o National Deence (1997-2002).




viii) existing organizations anD movements (2004 - present)

The ollowing are relatively new organizations and movements that have emerged in the past fve to seven years.

1. y pee’ F de & Jie (ypFdJ)The Young Peoples’ Front or Democracy & Justice (YPFDJ)11 is an international Eritrean diaspora movement o youth 12 thatwas organized to build a patriotic youth movement. Its ocus is to build a wide network o Eritrean youth who identiystrongly with an Eritrean identity, espousing six undamental principles.13 The movement is in North America, Europe andAustralia and conducts regional and international meetings. As it is a decentralized, grassroots movement, YPFDJ is unded

by their members, and the logistics are controlled by each local chapter, with each chapter organizing its own programsand events. As one o the lead organizers at the Toronto chapter, Mr. Fnan Desta, explains: “One o the main goals [o YPFDJ] is to be able to have people mobilized and be eective spokespersons or their country so that they can approachmembers o government ... [in Canada] we are not at the level we’d like to be as an organization in order to do that, but inthe long term we are interested in developing our oreign policy advocacy.”14

YPFDJ is actively involved in advocacy or the repealing o sanctions against the Government o the State o Eritrea; thedemarcation o the Eritrean-Ethiopian border and educating youth and the wider public about the goals, missions andvalues o the Eritrean government. While it is agreed by the organizers that the general perception o YPFDJ is that theywholeheartedly support the Government o the State o Eritrea, lead organizers o YPFDJ were clear in stating that YPFDJwas “… not created to support the existing government. Everyone as part o the movement can have dierent questionsand opinions about the Government o the State o Eritrea, so you can’t see the YPFDJ as a homogenous movement.YPFDJ’s decentralized and dierent views are expressed within it. This perception limits our role and we don’t want to be

put in a box. YPFDJ was created to support the sense o identity o youth in the diaspora, so that they invest fnancially,emotionally and eel connected enough to help build a strong nation.”15

This movement in Canada does not currently have the capacity to engage the Canadian government in a sustained way. Itis specifcally ocused on U.S. Foreign Policy in the Horn o Arica, since “…Canada had nothing to do with the sanction—it had no voting power at Security Council—we might approach Canada about the asset-reezes, etc., but even i we got theCanadians to accept that this is an illegal and unjust sanction, they can’t really do anything about it.”16 In 2010 the YPFDJacilitated youth registration or the Zura N’Hagerna17 trip to Sawa Military Training Camp in Eritrea where close to 130youth rom Toronto and surrounding area went on a cross-country trip to experience their country frst-hand.

2. Ei-FEri-Forum is a small, inormal, local grassroots organization ocused on bringing initial attention to the activities o theGovernment o the State o Eritrea in order to raise awareness and bring justice to the ollowing issues: 1) implementationo the rule o law in Eritrea; 2) the release o G-15 political prisoners; 3) the implementation o Eritrea’s Constitution; 4)ree and air elections in Eritrea; 5) reedom o arrested journalists; and 6) support or the sponsorship and transition o Eritrean reugees in Sudan. Although the specifc details o Eri-Forum activities are not widely publicized or known, someEritreans in the diaspora are aware o its existence anecdotally and its eorts to lobby the Canadian government to ensurethat the Government o the State o Eritrea is not supported by the international community. It is alleged (though thereis little evidence to confrm) that Eri-Forum successully lobbied the Canadian government to ensure that the FinanceMinister o Eritrea, Osman Saleh Mohammed, did not obtain an entry visa in August 2008.18

3. QQalna is a human rights organization established by Eritreans in Toronto, with a mandate o ensuring that Eritrea is a country inwhich every person enjoys all o the human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration o Human Rights. It also maintains astrong belie in the importance o applying vigilance and timely protest in order to curtail current abuses and stop urther tragedies

11 Young Peoples’ Front or Democracy & Justice (YPFDJ), http://www.youngpdj.org.

12 Youth in the Eritrean context means anyone 40 years old and under.

13 1. National Harmony. For the people o Eritrea to live in harmony, peace and stability, without distinction along regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender or class lines. 2. Political Democracy. For

the people o Eritrea, to be active participants and become decision-makers in the administration and conduct o their lives and o their country, with their rights guaranteed by law and in practice.

3. Economic and Social Development. For Eritrea to progress socially and economically in the areas o education, technology and the standard o living. 4. Social Justice (Economic and Social

Democracy). Equitable distribution o wealth, services and opportunities, and special attention to be paid to the most disadvantaged sections o society. 5. Cultural Revival. Drawing on our rich cultura

heritage and on the progressive values we developed during the liberation struggle, to develop an Eritrean culture characterized by love o country, respect or humanity, solidarity between men and

women, love o truth and justice, respect or law, hard work, sel-confdence, sel-reliance, open mindedness and inventiveness. 6. Regional and International Cooperation. For Eritrea to become a

respected member o the international community, by coexisting in harmony and cooperation with its neighbors; and by contributing, to the extent o its capability, to regional and global peace,

security and development.

14 Mr. Fnan Desta (Young Peoples’ Front or Democracy & Justice (YPFDJ)), key inormant, interview by Helen Tewolde, September 2010.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Translated, Zura N’Hagerna means: “Tour o/or our Country”—it is a tour o villages and main cities in the country including the military training base at Sawa, Eritrea.

18 Lesley Ciarula Taylor, “Eritrean minister denied Canadian visa,” Toronto Star, September 13, 2008, http://www.thestar.com/

article/498645.




rom recurring in Eritrea.19 Qalna conducts its campaigns through educational seminars, letters o protest, debates and networkingwith various national and international organizations, associations, groups and individuals engaged in promoting human rightsprotection. Most o Qalna’s activities ocus on advocacy work with the Canadian Council on Reugees (CCR), the United NationsHigh Commissioner on Reugees (UNHCR), and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). Due to a lack o capacity, Qalna doesnot have intensive engagement with Canadian Foreign Policy ofcials, but it has engaged MPs in order to stop deportations o Eritrean reugees in Libya and Egypt. Qalna has supported the Canadian Council or Reugees in developing a report by proflingEritrean reugee claimants in Canada who are in limbo20 due to their participation in armed struggle during Eritrea’s liberationmovement (1961-1991).21

ix) the current state of eritrean-canaDian aDvocacy

While the earlier years o Eritrean-Canadian advocacy appeared to have made some gains in terms o partnership and recognitionby CIDA and DFAIT, the cohesiveness o Eritrean-Canadian advocacy has changed. It now appears to align with what wasmentioned as the ourth phase o Eritrean transnational activity: diversifcation and increasing alienation o diaspora communitiesrom the Eritrean state. As one leader notes: “Eritrean-Canadian activism may appear to be diminished since the early 2000s but it isstill there. However, its net eect [in advocacy to government] is dissipated or neutralized because the political orces on each sideare so strong and ocused on their own goals.”22 The diversifcation o the diaspora and the rise o political opposition to the Stateo Eritrea in diaspora countries has created stronger local opposition to local diaspora organizations and initiatives that were oncewidely believed to be neutral or simply community-based but which are now being linked—due to their leadership, philosophyand undraising goals—directly to the State and its political or economic interests. This is a precarious position to be in given thecountry’s current international reputation and the act that the State o Eritrea is currently under sanction.

x) roster of principal issues

My research in the Eritrean diaspora community revealed a number o critical issues that the diaspora seeks to address, most o which are evident rom the mandates o the organizations reviewed above. Recurring themes have been distilled to the ollowingfve overarching oreign policy concerns, which is by no means an exhaustive list. The prioritization o principal issues diersaccording to the segment o community or organization interviewed and the issues presented below are not in any particular order.

1. “Eie si m be ae reee t!” (E-smart) ciMany Eritreans in the diaspora are involved and concerned with the E-SMART (Eritrean Sanctions Must Be Annulled andRepealed Today!)23 campaign, which mobilizes against the sanctions imposed on the state pursuant to the adopted UnitedNations Security Council Resolution 1907 (December 23, 2009) that was approved by 13 o 15 voting members at the UNSecurity Council on April 22, 2010.24 The E-SMART campaign is an international diaspora-led eort to give voice to what isconsidered the unair and unjust actions o the United Nations Security Council decision in April 2010 to sanction the Eritreangovernment based on what are considered to be alse allegations o Eritrea’s role in destabilizing the region. This issue’s eecton the Eritrean diaspora today is highly complex. It is exacerbated by the lack o substantial evidence or access to classifedinormation regarding critical claims by community leaders, and international actors including the UN and the Government o the State o Eritrea itsel.

One o the most alarming claims, made by the U.S. Government and resulting in the imposition o sanctions on the Government o the State o Eritrea, is that the Eritrean government has been arming al-Shabab militants in Somalia, in an attempt to destabilize theU.S. and Ethiopia-backed Transitional Federal Government. The Eritrean government has ervently and consistently denied theseclaims. There have been recent statements by prominent security analysts (International Crisis Group) that conclude “Eritrea is notsupporting al-Shabab”25 and that the U.S. State Department has wrongly classifed Eritrea as a state sponsor o terrorism.

19 Qalna website, “About Us,” www.qalna.com.

20 “Limbo” means they are accepted as Convention Reugees (UNHCR 1951) but cannot become permanent residents. These individuals cannot travel nor reunite with amily members abroad and

thereore experience signifcant ongoing difculties.

21 Canadian Council or Reugees, Eritrean Canadian Community, Centre o Metropolitan Toronto (ECCC), Hidmona-Er itrean, Human Rights Group In Manitoba, Holy Trinity Eritrean Orthodox, Church in

Toronto, Metih Eritrea Community Newspaper, Qalna Eritrean Human Rights Group-Toronto, From Liberation to Limbo: A Report on the Impact o Immigration Security Inadmissibility Provisions on

the Eritrean Communities in Canada, and Recommendations or Reorm, submitted to the Ministers o Citizenship and Immigration and Public Saety, (2010) http://ccrweb.ca/fles/rom_liberation_to_

limbo.pd.

22 Mr. Amanuel Melles, (Director o the Capacity Building Unit, United Way Toronto), interview by Helen Tewolde, November 6, 2010.

23 E-SMART Campaign, http://www.eritrean-smart.org/.

24 With China abstaining and Libya voting Against. The measures imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1907 (2009) include: 1. a prohibition on the sale, supply or transer o arms

and related material to Eritrea and to persons designated by the UN sanctions committee established to oversee the sanctions against Somalia and Eritrea (the 751 Committee); 2. a prohibition on

the provision to Eritrea and to persons designated by the 751 Committee o technical, training, fnancial or other assistance related to military activities or to the supply, sale, transer, manuacture,

maintenance or use o arms and related material o a ll types; 3. an assets reeze against persons designated by the 751 Committee; and 4. a travel ban against persons designated by the 751 Committee

Source: United Nations Act (P.C. 2010-479 April 22, 2010); “Regulations Implementing the United Nations Resolution on Eritrea “, Canada Gazette 144, no. 10, http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/

p2/2010/2010-05-12/html/sor-dors84-eng.html.

25 Michael Onyiego, “Analysts say Eritrea is not supporting Al-Shabab,” Voice o America, July 21, 2010, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/

-Analysts-say-Eritrea-is-Not-Supporting-al-Shabab--98924444.html.




2. be ei i Eie-Eii b cii i i 2002Prior to the E-SMART campaign, the main ocus or a large segment o the diaspora since the beginning o the Border War(1998-2000) has been a dispute over the small border village o Badme. The diaspora has sought to bring internationalpressure on the UN and the Ethiopian government in order to ensure that the “fnal and binding” agreement produced bythe Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC)—which situated Badme in Eritrea—is properly demarcated. 26

This border war was ought at high humanitarian and economic costs. In Eritrea there was orced mobilization o morethan 300,000 to 350,000 men and women at its early stage; an increase in military spending; lowered investment in theprivate sector and loss o agricultural output and port revenues. All o this severely strained the Eritrean economy.27 Eritrea

experienced a decline in real GDP growth rom an impressive 7% in 1994 through to 1997, dropping to 0.3% in 1999, beorefnally plummeting to -13.2% in 2000.28 The Government’s Damage Assessment Team estimated the cost o destruction tohouseholds, public inrastructure and private establishments at $564 million USD, greater than Eritrea’s GDP in 2000, whichwas $509 million USD. The war aected nearly 2.2 million people, with an estimated 1.1 million being directly displaced. 29 The bulk o these were elderly, women or children, and many were orced to live in camps or much o 2000 and into 2001. 30

Ten years ater the Algiers agreement, Eritrea and Ethiopia are in a “rozen conict” where there is no war and no peace.Thus, the principal issue here is the delay in implementing the ruling ater the Boundary Commission’s fnal and bindingdecision or border demarcation. The lack o international support or the Eritrean government by the UN Security Council,despite attempts to reach out to the international community by the Government in the early years ater the Border war,was viewed as a result o United States’ aligned interests with the Ethiopian government as a response to the War onTerror, and is a cause o deep rustration among much o the Eritrean diaspora community. This situation was viewed byboth the Eritrean diaspora community and many analysts as an intentional marginalization o Eritrean interests.

3. F eiFood security in Eritrea is a controversial issue. The Eritrean Government’s policy on sel-reliance is clear-cut: “oreignood aid demonizes the local people and makes them lazy.”31 While development experts diverge in their analysis on theeectiveness o oreign aid, the Eritrean policy on sel-reliance was recently lauded in Dambisa Moyo’s popular maniesto Dead Aid. 32 However, many in the diaspora allege that they are hearing the news o ood shortages and experiencingthe direct eect o ination raising the price o ood as they send remittances to relatives in the country. One personinterviewed wondered: “what happens to those who don’t have people outside to help them…are they starving to death?We don’t know.” The Eritrean government has stopped ood aid and has no NGOs or bilateral organizations in the country.In a recent interview with Al-Jazeera, President Isaias Awerki denied that there are ood shortages in the country andasked: “Why do people want to spoon-eed us when we have enough ood?” 33

4. h i e e eee iiThe reugee crisis or Eritreans has always been severe and it is continually worsening. The Government announced its commitmentto acilitate reugees’ voluntary repatriation and to assist in their reintegration, which enabled even more Eritrean reugees to returnto their homeland. A Tripartite Agreement or the voluntary repatriation o reugees between UNHCR and the Governments o theState o Eritrea and the Republic o Sudan was signed in April 2000. The 2008 UNCHR report claims that “in Arica, one-third o allpositive decisions were rendered to Eritrean asylum-seekers.”34 The same report notes that, by nationality, the highest numbers o new asylum claims were fled by individuals originating rom Zimbabwe (158,200), Myanmar (48,600) and Eritrea (43,300).35

According to UNHCR, 63,000 applied or asylum in 2009, and 1,800 cross over to Sudan every month. 36 This crisis reveals aurther strain on Eritreans in the diaspora who are obligated to fnancially support not only their amilies in Eritrea but alsoto those who are leaving the country. They also carry the burden o fnancial costs related to sponsoring and integrating

26 In 2002, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) used colonial maps to legally place Badme inside Eritrean territory. See BBC News “Eritrean Badme Ruling Upheld,” Monday, 31 March,

2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/arica/2903229.stm.

27 Amanuel Mehreteab, “‘Border Conict (1998- 2000)’ and its Psychological Impact on Youth in Eritrea’s Economic Survival,” 28-77, in Sally Healy, “Eritrea’s Economic Survival: Summary record o aconerence held on 20 April 2007” (Chatham House, The Royal Institute o International Aairs, April 2007), 30, http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108632.

28 Library o Congress—Federal Research Division, Country Profle: Eritrea, (September 2005), 8, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/rd/cs/

profles/Eritrea.pd

29 World Bank, “Initial Project Inormation Document (PID): ERITREA-Eritrea: Emergency Reconstruction Supplemental Project,” (May 29, 2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/

WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/06/02/

000104615_20030602140748/Rendered/PDF/PID0P082813.pd

30 World Bank, International Development Association Proposed Supplemental Financing (In Grant) o SDR 10.9 Million (U.S.$15 Million Equivalent) to the State o Eritrea or the Emergency

Reconstruction Project (Credit 3434-Er) (Report No. P 7590-ER, June 19,2003), 1, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/06/02/000012009_20030602094224/

Rendered/PDF/P75901ER1Supp01con1IDA1R20031012211.pd.

31 Ambassador Girma Asmerom’s (to the European Union) remarks to BBC, “Eritrea’s Controversial Push to Feed Itsel,” December 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/arica/8428492.stm.

32 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009); see also Dambisa Moyo website: http://www.dambisamoyo.com/

deadaid.html

33 Eritrean president Isaias Aewerki, interview by Jane Dutton on Al Jazeera, February 22, 2010, http://english.al jazeera.net/programmes/

talktojazeera/2010/02/201021921059338201.html.

34 UNHCR: The UN Reugee Agency, 2008 Global Trends: Reugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons (June 16, 2009), 18, http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html.

35 Ibid.

36 Eritrean president Isaias Aewerki, interview by Jane Dutton on Al Jazeera, February 22, 2010, http://english.al jazeera.net/programmes/

talktojazeera/2010/02/201021921059338201.html.




relatives to new host countries. The diminishing human rights situation in Eritrea since 2001 is widely noted as the causeo this crisis by international advocacy groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. 37 A Human RightsWatch 95-page report, Service or Lie: State Repression and Indenite Conscription in Eritrea, documents serious humanrights violations by the Eritrean government, including arbitrary arrest, torture, appalling detention conditions, orcedlabour, and severe restrictions on reedom o movement, expression, and worship. It also analyzes the difcult situationaced by Eritreans who succeed in escaping to other countries such as Libya, Sudan, Egypt, and Italy. 38

In a letter to Qalna dated March 2, 2010, ormer Foreign Aairs Minister, Lawrence Cannon, wrote the ollowing: “TheGovernment o Canada is concerned by the situation o Eritrean reugees in Libya and continues to monitor reports rom the

United Nations High Commissioner or Reugees (UNHCR) on the conditions o their detention […] Canada supports the eortso the UNHCR to fnd durable solutions or Eritrean reugees. The Government o Canada recognizes that Eritreans orciblyreturned to the country may ace arrest without charge, detention, ill-treatment, torture, and even death at the hands o theauthorities. Canada is preoccupied by Eritrea’s human rights situation, particularly with regard to democracy and the rule o law,the imprisonment or ill-treatment o political opposition members and journalists, and the protection o civil liberties.”39

5. si eie iiSome key inormants in this study identifed that the recent opportunities or mineral extraction in Eritrea, with BishaMining Share Company (BMSC) (which is 60% owned by Vancouver-based Nevsun Resources and 40% by ENAMCO, theEritrean National Mining Company), leaves the country susceptible to the same labour, human rights and environmentalabuses that other countries have experienced as an inevitable resource curse, particularly in the Third World context.BMSC began gold production in 2010,40 and already, there have been concerns in the United States and Canada aboutlax standards and regulations in Eritrea.41 Advocacy or socially responsible mining in Eritrea is emerging in diaspora

organizations that are principally concerned with exposing human rights violations in Eritrea.

xi) canaDa’s role in the country of origin

As noted on the Government o Canada’s website, relations between Canada and Eritrea are “good but limited.” Canadahas been engaged in mediating the Eritrea-Ethiopia border dispute and supports the 2000 Algiers Peace Agreement asthe “sole ramework or peace.” In 2001, Canada sent 450 peacekeepers to the border region as part o a UN orce with amandate to prepare or the United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). Canada is monitoring and concernedabout Eritrea’s human rights situation, particularly with regard to the respect or democracy and the rule o law, theimprisonment or ill-treatment o political opposition and journalists, and the protection o civil liberties. Canada does notcurrently provide bilateral assistance to Eritrea. Canada does, however, provide regional unding to multilateral partners,which may provide some beneft to Eritrea.

Bilateral trade with Eritrea is very limited. In 2009, Canadian exports totalled $2,392,424 while imports amounted toapproximately $112,024. Canadian company Nevsun Resources has investments in Eritrea or ore and other mineralextractions due or production in late 2010. Canada, as a UN member-state, must domestically implement the legallybinding sanctions against Eritrea and persons designated by a committee o the Security Council. However, implementationo the travel ban imposed by Resolution 1907 as described above is ensured in Canada under existing provisions o theImmigration and Reugee Protection Act.42

xii) interface Between the Diaspora communityanD the foreign policy community

The main avenues or exchange and consultation between the diaspora community and the oreign policy establishmentseem to be one-way: the diaspora ormally lobbies the Canadian government on critical issues aecting Eritrea andEritreans via local representatives (MP or MPPs). Ten years ago, the organization known as Canada Peace Rally hada relatively strong capacity to monitor the Canadian government’s position and engage with high-level bureaucrats

37 Human Rights Watch, “Eritrea: Repression Creating Human Rights Crisis: Host Countries Should Cease Forced Returns o Eritrean Reugees,” April 16, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/04/16/

eritrea-repression-creating-human-rights-crisis.

38 Human Rights Watch, Service or Lie: State Repression and Indefnite Conscription in Eritrea (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/82284.

39 A letter written by The Honourable Lawrence Cannon, P.C., M.P., Minister o Foreign Aairs to Mr. Haile Kiai, Vice Chair, Qalna Eritrean Human Rights, March 2, 2010, http://www.qalna.com/

Letter%20rom%20Lawrence%20cannon.pd.

40 Mineweb website, “Eritrea signs Bisha gold/base metals mining agreement with Nevsun,” December 13, 2007, http://www.mineweb.com/

mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page66?oid=41955&sn=Detail;

Nevsun website, “Bisha Mine Reaches 70% Completion & Q4 Commissioning On Track,” August 12, 2010, http://www.nevsun.com/news/2010/august12/.

41 Avinash Gavai, “Will new US ocus on extraction operations abroad lead to changes here?” Embassy Magazine, June 2, 2010, http://www.ar icafles.org/article.asp?ID=23792.

42 See Current Sanctions Regimes or Eritrea in the Canadian Economic Sanctions section o the Department o Foreign Aairs & International Trade (DFAIT) website, http://www.international.gc.ca/

sanctions/eritrea-erythree.aspx?lang=eng&menu_id=45&menu=R.




to advocate or peace and make the case or an increase in development assistance; so did EriTree in their eorts atpartnership with CIDA. Key inormant interviews reveal that the diaspora does not now have inormal access to the oreignpolicy community and that there is a lack o interest and representation in the community as it concerns Eritrea.

One key inormant recalled an MP’s advice to not waste their time trying to access the oreign policy community in Canadabecause Eritrea is “a poor Arican country and nobody will care.” This caused the key inormant to pose this questionabout the prioritization o oreign policy issues in Canada: “How are decisions related to diaspora issues made: Are theybased on human rights law and norms or domestic economic interests?”

xiii) lessons from partnership with ciDa

A number o Eritreans were able to recall the attempted partnership with CIDA. The perspective has been the same:what does CIDA mean by “partnership” with diaspora communities and organizations? The role o small partners mustbe clarifed. The experience o CIDA’s partnership with EriTree, or example, reveals that a consultant paid or by CIDAassigned to support the organization was helpul and appreciated. Mr. Tekeste Foto recalls precisely: “We even hiredsomeone who speaks and looks like CIDA, you know, without the accent, someone that was white. We knew this would bemore eective and it was.” Also, the perception is that CIDA preers to work with large organizations to lead developmenteorts and the diaspora organizations could not compete in terms o fnancial, human resources and organizationalcapacity. The past president o EriTree, Mr. Ephrem Habteselassie explains: “I always resented that even though we workedso hard we were still not seen as credible. We developed a Board o Directors, we were able to get matching unds or ourundraising eorts, and did a lot o work to ensure the environment in Eritrea was responsive. We even set up an ofce in

Eritrea which was not easy to do. But, still, we were not credible. What is credibility then?” 43

Some organizers recall that in order to work with CIDA there had to be a clear return on their investment—Canadianproducts had to be purchased and there had to be some positive eect on the Canadian economy. The perception is thatCIDA ocuses on high-level oreign policy but does not consider grassroots needs, expertise or advice. This high-levelpriority setting makes it undamentally unair or smaller diaspora organizations directly invested in development eorts:“We understand the ocus o coordinating and harmonizing oreign aid—but the collateral damage is that poor countrieslike Eritrea get orgotten.”44

xiv) gap analysis

As the role o Canada in Eritrea is limited, such are the diaspora’s policy inputs. Interviews conducted or this researchrevealed a number o challenges and gaps that Eritreans in the Canadian diaspora experience when attempting to navigatethe Canadian oreign policy community.

xv) challenges—canaDian government

1. n e i eeeWhat does successul advocacy look like? How can individuals or organizations access the Minister? What are thecriteria?

2. l i Successul lobbying/advocacy requires resources or act-fnding missions, project development, getting to and rom

Ottawa, etc. Most Eritrean diaspora organizations do this work on a volunteer basis with very ew donations, whichaects the quality and consistency o eorts. While it may not make sense or the Canadian government to undadvocacy/lobbying groups, the government can defnitely play a acilitation/convening/co-ordinating role among low-capacity groups and potential unders/resources as a way to increase substantive civic and political engagement onissues the diaspora community truly cares about.

3. l iei i e dee Fei aiThe lack o adequate representation in the Department poses a challenge or grassroots diaspora groups that may havecommunity-based or non-conventional ways o engagement with the government. Responsiveness to the diversity o approaches is important.

43 Mr. Ephrem Habteselass ie (past President, EriTree Canada), interview by Helen Tewolde, September 2010.

44 Ibid.




LIST OF DEvELOPMENT PARTNERS IN ERIT REA

Source: African Development Bank Group (2009-2011) Country Strategy Paper

DEvELOPMENT PARTNERS’ ACTIvITIES

Organization/Institution Current Program and areas of Focus

WORLD bANk Operational Framework: FY 2009-2010

Interim Strategy Note

Focus: infrastructure (energy, port and

telecommunication) and human capital

development (health and education)

Funding: USD $70.73 million (IDA 15

2009/11)

EU Operational Framework: 2009-2013:

Country Strategy Paper (under preparation) -

Program under 10th EDF

Focus: food security/rural development—

livestock production, marketing and pricing

(€70 million), road infrastructure and

regional connections (€30 million) and

capacity building (€22 million)

Funding: €122 million for six years

IFAD Operational Framework: Four year Plan

Focus: recovery and rural development—

food security (crop and livestock production

and irrigation components)

Funding: Estimated allocation per year of

USD $15-16 million

UN SYSTEM Operational Framework: 2009-2010

Strategy (under preparation)

Focus: Development program (capacity

building, health and education) and political

dialogue

Funding: USD $10 million per annum

NORWAY Operational Framework: 2009-2010

Strategy (under preparation)

Focus: Development program (capacity

building, health and education) and political

dialogue

Funding: USD $10 million per annum

IMF Operational Framework: No Fund programin place.

Dialogue: 2009 Article IV Consultation

Report.

ChINA Focus: telecommunication, industry,

education and agriculture (food security)

i) Telecommunication project USD $20

million (2006)

ii) Cement factory USD $40 million (2007)




CASE STUDY #4ThE SRI LANkAN DIASP ORA IN CANADA

Suthamie Poologasingham

PROFILE:i) history anD Demographic

The Sri Lankan diaspora demonstrates transnational citizenry and multiculturalism through its political, cultural, social,and economic contributions in Canada and Sri Lanka. The rich experiences o this multi-ethnic and multi-religiouscommunity should be an asset to shaping and inorming Canadian oreign policy. However, to date the diasporiccommunity has played only a minimal role, directing its eorts through a limited number o organizations and institutions.

Canada is home to one o the largest Sri Lankan diasporas in the world. While data rom the Canadian governmentindicates there are 105,670 Sri Lankan-born immigrants in Canada,1 this data is not representative o the total Sri Lankan-Canadian population; it excludes those o Sri Lankan origin born in Canada as well as other birth places such as Germany,

France, etc. More common estimates o the total Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada range rom 350,000 to over 450,000.2 The Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada is made up o several ethnic groups, with the vast majority identiying themselves asTamils, although Sinhalese, Muslims, Burghers and Malay Sri Lankans are also represented in the above fgures.

Prior to World War II, Sri Lankan migration to Canada was limited, as immigration was restricted to fty Sri Lankan (non-sponsored) immigrants, per annum. In 1967, immigration laws were revised to incorporate a points system, opening upCanada’s borders to additional Asian immigrants. The earliest Sri Lankan migrants let Sri Lanka because o governmentrestrictions that hindered employment and education opportunities.3 Thereater, ethnic riots and tensions in the early1980s as well as an increase in Sinhalese nationalism spurred an exodus o mainly Sri Lankan Tamil reugee migrants intoCanada. The 1990s also saw Canada open its doors to approximately 80% o Sri Lankan Tamil applicants as a result o SriLanka’s 30-year-long civil conict.4 As a result, an important characteristic o the composition o the diasporic communityin Canada is the reversal o the minority-majority role: Tamils account or a minority o the population in Sri Lanka, butthey comprise the majority o the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada. 5

ii) religious, linguistic anD familial characteristics

The religious composition o the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada includes Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, Christians andCatholics. The majority o the Tamils and Sinhalese practice Hinduism and Buddhism, respectively.

According to the 2006 Census, 10,845 and 122,020 Canadians marked Sinhala and Tamil respectively as their mothertongue.6

Collectivism−an emphasis on a collective group instead o the individual−is a defning characteristic o the Sri Lankan diaspora. Itis visible through: the weight attributed to the ties o kinship, despite world-wide migration; an increase in Canada o Family Class

immigration;7

and the substantial amounts o money sent by diaspora members in Canada in the orm o remittances to supportthe daily and supplementary needs o amily still living in Sri Lanka. Total worldwide remittances sent to Sri Lanka in 2004 throughormal methods alone was recorded at USD $1.3 billion.8 While exact fgures or unding and donations sent through the Sri LankanCanadian diaspora are unknown, the fgure is assumed to be substantial given the large number o Sri Lankan Canadians.

1 Statistics Canada, 2006 Census (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2006).

2 Interview with two Consul Generals o Sri Lanka to Canada and the Canadian Tamil Congress by Suthamie Poologasingham, 2010.

3 Paul R. Magocsi, ed., Encyclopedia o Canada’s Peoples (Toronto: University o Toronto Press, 1999).

4 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora Ater the LTTE,” February 23, 2010.

5 Government o the United States, “Background Note: Sri Lanka” (Washington, D.C., 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm.

6 Reers to the frst language learned at home in childhood and still understood by the individual at the time o the census. This includes Indian Tamils; Sri Lankan Tamils are assumed to make up the

majority o the Canadian Tamil speaking population.

7 The balance o entry o immigration applicants is thought to have shited rom mainly reugee class to amily class applicants. Anne Milan, Migration International: 2009 (Ottawa: Ministry o Industry,

July 2011).

8 Priya Deshingkar and M. M. M. Aheeyar, Remittances in Crisis: Sri Lanka Ater the Tsunami (London: The Humanitarian Policy Group at Overseas August 2006); Esperanza Lasagabaster, Samuel

Maimbo Munzele, and Sriyani Hulugalle, “Sri Lanka’s Migrant Labor Remittances” (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, December 2005).




iii) immigration

Since 2001, Canada has received approximately 4,000 to over 5,000 new Sri Lankan-born immigrants annually. While SriLanka was among the top 10 source countries or Canadian landed immigrants in 1991, 2001 and 2008, the numbers overallhave been on the decline. As o 2009 Sri Lanka is no longer a top 10 source country o new immigrants to Canada. 9

iv) canaDa’s role in sri lanka

ai aie: Canada has a longstanding and robust relationship with its Commonwealth partner that spans overhal a century. It is exemplifed by the Sri Lanka Canada Friendship Road leading rom the Katunayaka Airport in Colombo,which was constructed pursuant to Canada’s “Colombo Plan or Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asiaand the Pacifc.” Over the years, Canada has provided development, humanitarian and election monitoring assistance toSri Lanka in the orm o both unding and personnel. In 2009-2010, Canada’s assistance to Sri Lanka totalled approximately$31.3 million.10 However, Sri Lanka is no longer designated a recipient o bilateral assistance by CIDA, which now provides80% o its bilateral resources to only twenty countries in order to ensure greater eectiveness and accountability. Countriesare selected based on need, capacity to beneft rom aid and alignment with Canadian oreign policy priorities. Sri Lankahas not been placed on that list.

ti: Canada was among the top 10 source countries or visitors to Sri Lanka in 2008. In 2005, more than 21,000Canadian tourists visited Sri Lanka, representing 2.3% o all tourists.11 While tourism has recently declined due to politicalinstability and conict,12 the number o Canadian tourists is expected to increase in the uture.

pii: Sri Lanka’s polarizing conict has been perpetuated by successive governments and the Liberation Tigers o TamilEelam (LTTE).

The country’s civil conict has roots in legitimate grievances held by the minority Tamil population, dating rom SriLanka’s independence rom British rule. While steps were taken to address some o these grievances by various Sri Lankangovernments, a subsequent rise in Sinhala nationalism and ethnic violence against the minority community in 1983 ledto at least 1,000 killings and the destruction o 18,000 properties.13 The impunity o the Government o Sri Lanka (GoSL)during that time added to other grievances and encouraged the rise o the LTTE as a orce o opposition to the government.

The LTTE ormed in the early 1970s as a separatist movement to address the Tamil minority’s grievances with the GoSL.The complex history o the group includes its eventual development into a militant organization engaging in tactics suchas political assassinations, suicide bombings and the stiing o political pluralism within the Tamil community. The LTTEwas frst banned by the Indian government in 1992 ollowing its alleged involvement in the assassination o Rajiv Gandhi,the ormer Prime Minister o India.14 In 2006, it was designated as a terrorist organization by Canada pursuant to theAnti-Terrorism Act.15 This designation also helped stem diaspora unding o the LTTE’s activities. The LTTE has played adistinct role in the Sri Lankan civil conict, at one point controlling major regions o Sri Lanka in the north and east andparticipating in peace talks with the GoSL. In a fnal conict in 2009, the LTTE was militarily deeated by the GoSL.

Following this conclusion, Canada’s oreign policies have stressed the need or the GoSL to “present a viable politicalsolution ... to satisy the legitimate aspirations o all Sri Lankan citizens.”16 Sri Lanka’s current goals, however, emphasizeeconomic development over political reconciliation. Within the current political environment, there is also little room orpolitical dissent17 or reedom o the press.18

9 Anne Milan, Migration International: 2009 (Ottawa: Ministry o Industry, July 2011).

10 Canadian International Development Agency, Government o Canada, “Sri Lanka” (2011), http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/srilanka-e#a1.

11 Sri Lankan Tourism Development Authority, Annual Statistical Report 2009.

12 Ibid.

13 Chandrika Kumaratunga, President Kumaratunga’s speech at the 21st Anniversary o ‘Black July’, Presidential Secretariat (Colombo, July 23, 2004).

14 Supreme Court o India, Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction, rulings by Justice K.T. Thomas, Justice D.P. Wadhwa, Justice Quadri, Central Bureau o Investigation, 1998, http://cbi.nic.in.

15 Public Saety Canada Government o Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” June 2008. Note: pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act

16 Government o Canada, “Canada-Sri Lanka Relations,” March 2011, http://www.canadainternat ional.gc.ca/sri_lanka/

bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada-srilanka.aspx?lang=eng&view=d.

17 Mosaic Institute, “‘What’s Next or Sri Lanka?’—Session o the Young Canadians’ Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka” (Toronto, September 2010).

18 Committee to Protect Journalis ts, “19 Journali sts Killed in Sri Lanka since 1992/Motive Confrmed,” New York, 2011, http://www.cpj.org/kil led/asia/sri-lanka.




increased in Canada.27 Examples ran the gamut rom Tamil-Canadians experiencing discrimination rom employers and co-workers in their workplaces28 to the rhetoric surrounding the arrival o the MV Sun Sea boat on Canada’s west coast, flledwith Tamil reugees, all o whom were portrayed by the Department o Public Saety as potential terrorists.29 Even morerecently, during the Spring 2011 election campaign, a Progressive Conservative Tamil candidate was accused o having linksto the LTTE even though he had been thoroughly vetted by party ofcials.30

Suspicions among the incumbent GoSL in regards to Canadian political organizations, representatives o Tamil-Canadianconstituents and the Tamil diaspora have also complicated ofcial bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and Canada. In oneextreme example, Bob Rae, a ederal MP and Opposition Critic or Foreign Aairs, was denied entry into Sri Lanka when he

arrived in Colombo, despite having already been issued an entry visa by Sri Lankan ofcials in Ottawa. 31

Taken all together, these various actors illustrate the complexity o the environment within which the Government o Canada, and in particular the Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade, engages with the Sri Lankan diasporain Canada.

vi) roster of principal issues

When they consider Canada’s ofcial engagement with Sri Lanka, members o the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada identiya number o issues o critical concern. These include: persistent humanitarian and development needs in Sri Lanka; thestatus and eectiveness o inter-community reconciliation eorts; governance challenges; and amily reunifcation. Sincethe interviews or this case study were frst conducted in late 2010, the international accountability o the GoSL has also

taken centre stage as an issue o concern to the diaspora.

Humanitarian and development work by the Sri Lankan diaspora ocuses on the rehabilitation and reconstruction o areas aected by the civil war, the 2004 tsunami and poverty. Diaspora activities include extensive undraising to rebuildschools, hospitals and community centers. Ater the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, three community radio stations and one TVstation raised $2.5 million.32 In addition to monetary contributions, knowledge transer through proessional and academicexchanges has also been important.

Conict resolution and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka is another area o interest. While some organizations careully rerain rom takinga substantive position on how to address conict and promote reconciliation in Sri Lanka, other organizations do align themselveseither in avour o or opposed to such possible political solutions to persistent inter-community conict as the establishment o aseparate homeland or Tamils, or the decentralization o specifc powers rom Colombo to the various regions o Sri Lanka.

At the height o the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, the Sri Lankan diaspora renewed its interest and eorts in peacebuilding.For example, Hearts or Harmony was an event led by a group o Sinhalese youth who sought to donate outside o theircommunity by undraising or internally displaced Tamils in Sri Lanka.33 Another example is the Roots or Reconciliation event, led by Sri Lankans without Borders, a group o Tamil and Sinhalese proessionals who provide opportunities orall Sri Lankan Canadians to engage in dialogue and work together towards common goals. 34 A “Young Canadians PeaceDialogue on Sri Lanka” hosted by the Mosaic Institute and the Trudeau Centre or Peace and Conict Studies led to theestablishment o BuildChange, an initiative by young adults in Tamil and Sinhalese communities to construct wells andprovide or the most basic needs o amilies in the war-aected Wanni region. 35 That same peace dialogue also resulted in aFinal Statement about the need to pursue poverty reduction, pluralism and peacebuilding eorts in Sri Lanka. More than 50young leaders rom all Sri Lankan communities in Canada signed the statement beore it was submitted to the Governmento Canada, the Sri Lankan High Commission in Ottawa, and to media outlets active in the Canadian Sri Lankan community.

Transparency is an issue o signifcant concern to the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada. Members o the community havesought assurances that Canadian unding or Sri Lankan-based projects, including humanitarian assistance provided bythe Canadian government, reaches the intended recipients on the ground (e.g. tsunami victims and internally displaced

27 Institute or Research and Public Policy Symposium (Ottawa, September 2007).

28 Interviews with members o the Diaspora, 2010-2011; Institute or Research and Public Policy Symposium (Ottawa, September 2007).

29 O the 492 Tamil migrants aboard the MV Sun Sea only our have been deported or their links to the LTTE; Douglas Quan, “MV Sun Sea crew member cleared o people smuggling,” PostMedia News,

June 2011.

30 Anthony Reinhart, “Tories’ bid to win over South Asians opens party to Tamil Tiger remnant,” The Globe and Mail, March 2011, regarding PC candidate Shan Thayaparan; The Canadian Press,

“Hudak denies Conservat ive candidate has ties to banned Tamil group,” March 2011.

31 Mike Blanchfeld, “Ottawa rips Sri Lanka or deporting ‘security threat’ Bob Rae,” National Post, June 10, 2009.

32 Priya Deshingkar and M. M. M. Aheeyar, Remittances in Crisis: Sri Lanka Ater the Tsunami (London: The Humanitarian Policy Group at Overseas August 2006); Esperanza Lasagabaster, Samuel

Maimbo Munzele, and Sriyani Hulugalle, “Sri Lanka’s Migrant Labor Remittances” (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, December 2005).

33 Proceeds rom the Canadian event amounting to over $5,000 were donated to Act Lanka (www.actlanka.org),which in 2009 used the unds to purchase medicine or internally-displaced persons (IDPs)

in Sri Lanka; Interviews with Community associations, July 2010;

34 Sri Lankans Without Borders website, www.srilankanswithoutborders.ca.

35 BuildChange website, www.buildchange.ca.




peoples). International NGOs, the GoSL and the LTTE have all been thought to lack transparency at various times, andmembers o the GoSL and the LTTE have been accused o corruption, bribery and the inappropriate use o unds. Theinefcient and inappropriate use o unds as well as insufcient use o local employees or in-country positions by certaininternational NGOs has also been alleged.36

Family reunifcation and the desire to speed the processing o reugee claims by Tamil Sri Lankans is a point o heightenedconcern. Community organizations, prominent and well-connected individuals and some provincial and ederal Ministerswere inundated with requests to assist in this matter at the height o the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009. Concerns about theconditions aced by would-be reugees in Sri Lanka were intensifed by the arrival o 76 Sri Lankan Tamil reugee claimants

o the coast o British Columbia in May 2009, ollowed by 490 more claimants in August 2010.

Accountability and verifcation o the last stages o the civil conict is an area o distress and anger or the Tamil diasporaand human rights organizations.37 This was heightened in 2011 by the release o a report by a committee reporting to theUN Secretary-General, and by a documentary produced by Britain’s Channel 4 News.

A report was issued by the UN Secretary-General’s “Panel o Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka” in March 2011.The report highlights credible allegations that both the GoSL and the LTTE committed war crimes and crimes againsthumanity in the last stages o the war in 2009. Allegations against members o the GoSL and the Sri Lankan Army includethe shelling o hospitals, the denial o humanitarian assistance, violating the human rights o conict survivors, andintimidating and silencing members o the media and other critical observers o the war. Allegations against LTTE membersinclude: the use o civilians as human buers; the killing o civilians eeing LTTE control; the use o military equipment inproximity to civilians; and the orced recruitment o children.38

The expert panel stated that, “multiple sources o inormation indicate that a range o up to 40,000 civilian deaths cannotbe ruled out at this stage.”39 Furthermore, the UN panel determined that there was little confdence that justice would beserved in the existing political environment in Sri Lanka despite the establishment o a Lessons Learned and ReconciliationCommission by the GoSL. The latter was deemed “deeply awed” by the panel. 40

Around the same time as this report was issued, Britain’s Channel 4 News released a documentary entitled “Sri Lanka’sKilling Fields.” The flm describes the fnal weeks o war in 2009 “around the time when thousands o Tamil Canadiansdemonstrated in Ottawa and Toronto to pressure the Canadian government to ask its Sri Lankan counterpart or aceasefre.”41 The documentary contains graphic video ootage o war crimes allegedly perpetrated by members o theSri Lankan army. (Since this case study was issued, the GoSL released a video titled Lies Agreed Upon, a point by pointrebuttal to the human rights allegations in the Channel 4 documentary.)

Gordon Weiss, the UN’s spokesperson in Colombo in 2009 and a veteran journalist, also released a book supporting claimso complicity by the GoSL and the LTTE in the high civilian death toll; 42 his book urther sounds an alarm regarding thelack o a credible war crimes investigation by the GoSL which not only has domestic consequences but could also set adangerous precedent or other countries mired in conict.

Most organizations have taken a strong position on the subject o accountability. Many o the associations interviewed inpreparation or writing this case study were extremely supportive o the establishment o an independent, international inquiryinto war crimes in Sri Lanka; only a ew were opposed to the idea. Those supportive o the international inquiry pointed out thatthe GoSL would be incapable o conducting its own eective inquiry, as twenty years o ineectual GoSL commissions o inquiryhave demonstrated. They also pointed to a “ormal justice system in tatters.”43 Those opposed to the international communityconvening an inquiry in Sri Lanka believed that the panel was interering “in the internal aairs o a sovereign state.”44

The categories o concern listed above are not the only ones held by the members o the Sri Lankan diaspora living inCanada. Other concerns include reedom o the press and reedom o assembly in Sri Lanka, the resettlement o displaced

36 Interview with Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayaka, regarding the inappropriate use o NGO unding or their personal welare instead o or that o displaced peoples. Indika Sri Aravinda, “NGO

Act to be Amended,” Daily Mirror, February 28, 2010, http://www.dailymirror.lk/index.php/news/1911-ngo-act-to-be-amended.html.

37 Amnesty International, “When will they get justice? Failures o Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission,” 2011; International Crisis Group, “Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than

Ever” Asia Report no. 209, July 18 2011, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/209-reconciliation-in-sri-lanka-harder-than-ever.asp.

38 United Nations. Report on the Secretary-General’s Panel o Experts on Accountabili ty in Sri Lanka, March 31, 2011

39 Ibid., 41.

40 Ibid., 96.

41 Samy Yiagadeesen, “How the world should react to ‘Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’,” Toronto Star, June 23, 2011. Samy Yiagadeesen is Associate Proessor o International Aairs at the Norman Paterson

School o International Aairs, Carleton University, Ottawa.

42 Gordon Weiss, The Cage: The Fight or Sri Lanka and the Last Days o the Tamil Tigers (London: The Bodley Head, 2011).

43 Amnesty International, “Twenty Years o Make Believe, Sri Lanka’s Commission o Inquiry,” 2009; Canadian Tamil Congress, “Canadian Tamil Congress urges meaningul action on UN Report,” April

26, 2011; Other press releases o organizations reviewed include Coalition to Stop the War in Sri Lanka and the Transnational Government o Tamil Eelam.

44 Sri Lanka United National Association, “UN Secretary General’s Panel on Sri Lanka is a Blunder o Serious Proportions,” July 11, 2010, http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/07/11/un-

secretary-general%E2%80%99s-panel-on-sri-lanka-is-a-blunder-o-serious-proportions-2/.




people, and the country’s increasing militarization. In July 2011, Sri Lanka’s Parliament extended the country’s EmergencyRegulations or another month. The ear o unounded violence as a result o these stringent measures is demonstratedby an attack on fve parliamentarians rom the Tamil National Alliance,45 allegedly by armed soldiers,46 and the impunitytowards similar attacks on civil society organizations and media outlets. 47 The issue o the well-being o all Sri Lankans,especially vulnerable groups, will be o continued concern to the diaspora.

vii) interface Between the Diaspora anD foreign policy community

Interactions between most o the Sri Lankan diaspora organizations in Canada interviewed or this case study and theoreign policy community appear to be minimal. Regular and consistent interaction is limited to a ew organizations.

Those groups that interact with Canadian ederal government ofcials typically do so through inormal and indirectcorrespondence, including letters, petitions, phone calls and protests. In addition, cabinet ministers and Members o Parliament are invited to community events, providing brie opportunities or personal interaction with the diaspora.

Access to ederal networks is based on historical, personal and political connections. Some o the access larger organizationshave to ederal networks is based on their standing and credibility within their respective Tamil or Sinhala communities. Otherinterest groups that have personal connections may include “academics, or ormer diplomats ... who would express their viewson Sri Lanka.”48 Finally, some organizations rely on networks they develop through their relations with Canadian political partiesor Sri Lankan government representatives. At the same time, a ew organizations try to inorm the ederal government indirectlythrough the use o media coverage. While certain organizations have received extensive coverage and publish regular press

releases, none o the organizations rely solely on the press to correspond with the ederal government. As one interviewee noted,their message o humanitarian relie “got derailed ... due to the media renzy”49 during the 2009 Tamil protests.

Only two organizations interviewed mentioned direct and regular correspondence with ederal ofcials on a monthly orweekly basis. Direct methods o communication include presenting policy recommendations and holding meetings.

viii) outreach

Outreach initiated by the Canadian government is oten ad hoc and depends on current concerns o the governing ederalparty. Outreach oten takes the orm o a public orum to discuss a particular issue. For example, community organizationswere invited by Citizenship and Immigration to discuss the Balanced Reugee Reorm Act (Bill C11); they were also invitedto meet with ormer Prime Minister Paul Martin ater the 2004 tsunami, prior to his trip to Sri Lanka. These public orumshelp to garner urther insights and sentiments rom the aected communities.

More consistent outreach is initiated by a ew community organizations and individuals. During the height o the SriLankan civil war in February 2009, an emergency parliamentary debate was held in the House o Commons to whichdiaspora organizations were invited to provide input.50 The act that the debate was held at all likely reects the highdegree o outrage around the war communicated by constituents to their Members o Parliament. 51

ix) capacity

Within the majority o Sri Lankan organizations, no earmarked unding exists or the purpose o initiating or maintainingrelationships with the ederal government. Where there is capacity, volunteers and board members reach out and educate

the government based on their knowledge o the topic (such as conict, immigration, or trade) using the personal, businessand political networks they possess.

45 The Tamil National Alliance is a minority political alliance which was ormed as an amalgamation o moderate Tamil parties as well as a number o ormer rebel groups

46 Harim Peiris, “International Squeeze Tightens as Domestic Policy Tightens,” June 23, 2011, http://harimpeiris.com/2011/06/23/international-squeeze-tightens-as-domestic-pol icy-hardens. Harim was a

Sri Lankan Presidential spokesperson rom 2001-2005.

47 Reporters Without Borders, “Tamil journalist gets ‘shameul’ 20-year sentence on terrorism charges,” August 31, 2009,

http://en.rs.org/sri-lanka-tamil-journalist-gets-shameul-20-31-08-2009,34343;

Reporters Without Borders, “No news o political cartoonist one year ater his disappearance,” January 24, 2011,

http://en.rs.org/sri-lanka-no-news-o-political-cartoonist-24-01-2011,39384.html.

48 Interview with ederal government employee, July 2010.

49 Interview with community association, July 2010.

50 Government o Canada, 40th Parliament Second Session—(Emergency Debate), February 4, 2009.

51 New Democratic Party, “New Democrats called or emergency debate on Sri Lanka,” February 5, 2009, www.ndp.ca.




x) effectiveness

Sri Lankan organizations in Canada hold mixed views about whether the government adequately responds to their input.

One organization elt that the ederal government could have played a larger role in the Sri Lankan conict. For example,the Canadian government ailed to appoint a special envoy, who would have acilitated communications with the SriLankan government and advanced Canada’s humanitarian and democratic interests. Another organization spoke about thelack o a Canadian trade ofce in Sri Lanka to strengthen bilateral relations.

Alternatively, one association elt the ederal government does “pay attention but also has [its] own way o dealingwith the issues.”52 For example, in June 2009, actions were taken to expedite immigration applications rom Sri Lankaor persons who were “directly and signifcantly aected by the humanitarian situation.”53 This directive is believed tobe partially in response to ormal concerns presented by several Sri Lankan diaspora and international humanitarianorganizations.

Despite these mixed sentiments, there was consensus among all organizations interviewed that there is a need ormechanisms to allow transnational Canadian communities to inorm oreign policy. While one Tamil organization elt thatthe local Tamil community is well organized, they believed that not all communities have the organizational capacity toreach out to the ederal government regarding policy work, and elt this barrier should be eliminated.

xi) assessment of policy inputs anD gap analysis

Most o the contributions provided by the Sri Lankan diaspora are closely aligned with Canadian values, such as thepursuit o social justice and the development o civil society. However, two barriers must be overcome beore the diaspora’sinputs can be viewed as truly representative and impartial, and only a process o engagement that is transparent, all-inclusive, and consciously seeks to bring together the various entities within the Sri Lankan diaspora can help to overcomethem.

First, given the lack o dedicated resources or most grassroots groups, and little consistent opportunity or interactionwith ederal departments, engagement is oten let up to larger umbrella organizations and policy-ocused institutions. Inaddition to their community work, these large institutions have either actively engaged the Canadian ederal governmentand are thereore seen as “citizen experts,” or possess political connections that enhance their credibility. A commonconcern that results rom this engagement is that it eectively shuts out the voices o other valuable grassroots groups eveni they are constituent members o the umbrella organizations.

Second, there remains reluctance by the ederal government to engage with any organizations that hold either real orperceived ties to the LTTE. As one ederal employee stated “the [Canadian] government won’t risk any deacing o itspublic image.”54 Given the complexity o the Sri Lankan community organizations, due diligence, trust-building andongoing eorts to engage in consistent outreach are required.

Canada’s Sri Lankan diaspora has deep-rooted connections to their homeland through amily ties, humanitarian work,political afliations, trade, and travel. I cultivated systematically and transparently, this transnational community’s skillset and dedication could help to advance Canadian oreign policy in Sri Lanka and produce eective solutions that willultimately beneft both countries and their citizens.

52 Interview with community association, July 2010

53 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Government o Canada. “Sri Lanka Initiative—Applications or Family Class Members and Dependants o in-Canada Permanent Residence Applicants Aected by

the Current Humanitar ian Situation” (Operational Bulletin 119, June 3, 2009), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/manuals/bulle tins/2009/ob119.asp.

54 Interview with ederal government employee, July 2010.




ADDITIONAL REFERENCESPrimary and secondary research—please reer to Appendix AThe Canadian Geographer, Aid, confict and migration: the Canada-Sri Lanka connection, September 2003;Cheran, Rudramoorthy, Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents or Change in the Post Confict Zones o Sri Lanka, September 2003Magocsi, R. Paul Editor, Encyclopedia o Canada’s Peoples, Multicultural History Society o Ontario-1999;Wolram Zunzer, Diaspora Communities and Civil Confict Transormation, Bergho Research Center or Constructive

Conict Management, September 2004

appenDix a—primary anD seconDary research

Ieie i oii (2010):

te i i i e ii i e si l i i c ee e ieiee i e. oe ee iie iie, eie.

1. c-si l bie ci

• Their mission is to promote and assist in bilateral trade, investment, tourism, industrial co-operation andtranser o technology between Canada and Sri Lanka.

2. ci ti ce

• Their mission includes:• to uphold Canadian values o human rights, multiculturalism, religious and cultural diversity,

gender equality, pluralism and volunteerism;• To work with various levels o governments in Canada to highlight/resolve issues impacting

Tamil Canadians;• To champion equality, equality rights and equal opportunity or all diverse groups; and• To recognize and support the social, cultural and political aspirations o the Sri Lankan Tamils

worldwide.• Website: http://www.canadiantamilcongress.ca/

3. J hi lie cee ai aii i c• The association aims to bring together alumni rom the Jana Hindu Ladies College (high school) in Sri

Lanka and undraises to support the college and its students.

4. ri ree

• Ribbons or Rescue (RFR) was ounded by fve Sri Lankan youth ater the devastating tsunami in 2004.Ater seeing a lack in youth mobilization or such catastrophes, RFR was created to bridge the gap.Engaging with dierent organizations and universities to strengthen their outreach, RFR was able tolaunch a massive blue and white ribbon campaign in the Toronto area, raising close to $30,000.

• Ater the success o this undraiser RFR again mobilized youth during other devastating disasters likeKatrina, and the Pakistan earthquake in 2006.

• RFR has worked with dierent aid groups such as the Red Cross, UNICEF and Doctors Without Borders.

5. si y c

• The Sinhala Youth Club was started in 2001 in order to bring together Canadian-Sinhalese youth in aneort to promote and enrich their culture.

• A variety o events such as social meetings, sports and dances are geared towards youth to help themnetwork within their culture and urther enrich the Sinhala culture in Canada.

• The Sinhalese Youth Club also organizes volunteer drives to help the Canadian community at large whileproviding an opportunity to understand the culture o Sri Lankan youth.

6. si l wi be

• Sri Lankan’s Without Borders aims to inspire community dialogue, integration and personalgrowth. They provide opportunities or unity and solidarity, regardless o subcultural uniqueness orgeographical positioning, based on a common set o shared values.




• They encourage Sri Lankans to open their minds and hearts to new possibilities by demonstrating thatcollectively and individually they are capable o making positive changes in the diaspora community aswell as other Canadian and international communities.

• Website: www.srilankanswithoutborders.ca

7. uie ti ci c

• United Tamil Council o Canada is driven by two core objectives:• To be a non-proft, non-partisan organization that strives to unite and be inclusive o Canadian

Tamils o all background and represent them in the broader community; and

• To work towards the social, economic and political empowerment o Canadian Tamils andrepresent their aspirations rom a Canadian perspective on domestic and global issues.

interviews with inDiviDuals (2010-2011):

1. a ai, d ie, wii lie uieia. Mr. Amarasingam is currently completing his dissertation entitled, Pain, Pride, and Politics: Sri Lankan

Tamil Nationalism in Canada.b. He is the author o, “Religion and Ethnicity Among Sri Lankan Tamil Youth in Ontario.” Canadian Ethnic

Studies. 40.2: 149-169. Available at: http://amarasingam.angelfre.com/TamilYouth.pd.c. Other articles he has written include:

i. “Canadians Shouldn’t Forget Their Compassion.” The Province. September 15, 2010. Available at:

http://www.theprovince.com/news/story.html?id=3526331ii. “Why Reugees Turn to Smugglers.” The Toronto Star . August 24, 2010. A9. Available at: http://

www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/article/851509--why-reugees-turn-to-smugglers.

2. Fee gee Eee

3. te si l ree—ci, si l ci neea. The Sri Lanka Reporter is an independent newspaper and is one o the largest publications in Canada’s

ethnic press.b. In 2009, the publication completed 15 years as the Sri Lankan English newspaper with the largest

circulation in Canada & U.S.It has won three awards rom the National Ethnic Press & Media Council o Canada.

c. The newspaper is issued ree in Canada. Website: http://www.lankareporter.com/

4. vi ee e ti, si, be iie

seconDary research:

siee aii c• The Association raised unds or tsunami relie, with donations helping to build a house and contributing

to the Mahavihara Disaster Fund.• It holds two main social events per year.• Works closely with the Buddhist Temples in and around Greater Toronto Area.

si l c Fiei aii (oi)

si l uie ni aii

• The organization endeavors to promote, oster and actively maintain the social, cultural and economic tiesthat exist between Canada and Sri Lanka.

• It unctions as a channel or inter-community exchanges to improve the understanding and relationsbetween Canada Sri Lanka.

• It aims to uphold the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the national unity o both Canada and Sri Lanka.• It carries out educational and other programs to saeguard the democratic way o lie, and urther support

and protect the Constitutional guarantees o equality and undamental rights o all the citizens o bothCanada and Sri Lanka.

• An interview request was declined.




CASE STUDY #5:ThE SUDANESE DIASPORA IN CANADA

1

Sean Verigin

NOTE: This case study was originally drated in the Fall o 2010. Since then, there have been signicant changes in“the Sudans” that are not refected in this study. Most notably, a largely peaceul reerendum was held among the

people o Southern Sudan in January 2011 that resulted in their near-unanimous decision to establish an independent state o South Sudan. This reerendum was carried out pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) o 2005under careul international monitoring that included a signicant role or Canadians. Canada ocially recognized

the new state o South Sudan when it came into being on July 9, 2011. There has yet to be a comprehensive reviewundertaken o the specic role o the Sudanese diaspora(s) in Canada in the lead up to the January reerendum and

the subsequent establishment o an independent state. However, this case study does oer a helpul prole o thebroader Sudanese community in Canada, including its size, organization and oreign policy priorities, just prior to the

holding o the ateul reerendum. —Eds.

i) Demographic profile of the suDanese Diaspora community

There have been two distinct waves o Sudanese immigration into Canada. The frst wave, rom the 1960s until the early1980s, was slow in pace; on average, ewer than 100 Sudanese relocated during any given year, most oten in pursuit o post-secondary education and proessional placements.2 The onset o protracted civil conict in Sudan during the mid-1980s led to an upswell in the scale o immigration.3 Since then, there has been a steady inow o Sudanese immigrants toCanada, many seeking asylum rom Arica’s longest ongoing civil conict.

These recent arrivals maintain strong ties with riends and extended amily members in Sudan and elsewhere abroad. Themajority o the Sudanese-Canadian population comprises frst-generation immigrants who were either raised in Sudan orby Sudanese expatriates in neighbouring countries. Hence, the diaspora community is intimately connected to its culturalheritage and traditions, in addition to the ongoing hardships o relatives in Sudan. Even the youngest members o thediaspora maintain a close relationship with oreign relatives, particularly through orms o social networking. 4

The diaspora provides fnancial remittances to assist riends and extended amily members in Sudan. These remittancesare made by all members o the community, including those with limited fnancial resources. It is also not uncommonor Sudanese-Canadians to remain connected to their country o origin through requent return visits, as oten as everytwo to fve years.5 Finally, many individuals are members o Canadian chapters o Sudanese political parties, such as theSudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM).

The community has undertaken charitable and humanitarian programs with the purpose o ameliorating living conditions inSudan. For instance, Cuban-trained physicians o Sudanese origin participated in the establishment o the Sudanese PhysicianReintegration Program (SPRP) as a means to upgrade their medical skills and as a mechanism to deliver medical supplies andservices to under-served communities in Sudan. This project, which operates in partnership with the University o Calgaryand Samaritan’s Purse, has been celebrated by The Lancet or partially reversing the North-South brain drain phenomenon.6

The Sudanese diaspora also maintains close ties to Sudan through its own independent relie and development-relatedinitiatives. The Southern Sudanese Association o Alberta (SHAMA), or example, is currently raising unds to build aprimary school in the city o Wau; and the Darurian sub-set o the Sudanese diaspora is at the oreront o awareness-building and undraising projects related to the war-aicted region o Darur.

1 The inormational content o this report, which includes all transcriptions and statistical data, is a condensation o the fndings and conclusions o a research project previously conducted by the

Mosaic Institute. This report was commissioned by the Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade (DFAIT). A public domain version o its ull text, sans appendices, is available online at:

http://mosaicinstitute.ca/uploaded/tiny_mce/File/Sudanese_Report.pd

2 The Mosaic Institute, Profle o a Community: A ‘Smart Map’ o the Sudanese Diaspora in Canada (Toronto: The Mosaic Institute, 2009), 28.

3 Ibid. For instance, by the mid-2000s well in excess o 1,200 Sudanese were immigrating into Canada each year.

4 Ibid., 24.

5 Ibid.

6 Crutcher, Rodney A. et al. (2008). “Sudanese physicians’ reintegration programme,” The Lancet 372, no. 9641, 788-789.




There are competing accounts o the total population o the Sudanese diaspora in Canada. Internal counts conducted bySudanese community organizations estimate a domestic population size o roughly 35,000 to 40,000 members.7 However,ofcial Census data rom Statistics Canada fnds that the number o Canadians who sel-identiy as ethnically Sudanesewas only 12,640 in 2006.8 A report by The Mosaic Institute rom 2009 concludes that a middle-ground fgure o 25,000 to30,000 members is the most probable estimate.9

Demographic surveys conducted by Statistics Canada show that almost one-quarter o the population has received a post-secondary degree or equivalent diploma;10 approximately three-quarters o these citizens received their education outside oCanada.11 According to the 2006 Population Census, 81% o the Sudanese community is 54 years old or younger, and a slim

majority o the population is under the age o 34.12 The Sudanese population is clustered in urban centres, with the largestconcentrations located in Toronto (29%), Calgary (21%), and Edmonton (8%).13

The Sudanese-Canadian diaspora is cross-cut by geographic, ethnic and religious identity cleavages. O these markers,the North-South regional division remains the most enduring. The salience o these geographical categories is urtherevidenced due to their tight correlation with overlapping ethnic identity cleavages and religious afliations. These regionaldynamics can be enumerated thusly: Sudanese rom the North are oten descendants o the Nubian people who belong tothe Nuba, Beja or Shaigia tribes and are typically Muslim; by comparison, Southerners tend to be rom the Dinka, Nuer orBari tribes and are typically Christian.

ii) existing organizational structure anD capacity

Members o the Sudanese community have established an extensive network o community organizations in most majorCanadian cities. On average, there are two Sudanese organizations in each city, divided along ethnoregional lines. Theexception is the presence o a single multi-ethnic community organization in Winnipeg serving the city’s entire Sudanesediaspora community.14 In terms o operational capacity, these organizations are skeletal in structure, with limited ormalorganization and ew fnancial resources. This can be attributed to the dual impacts o low income levels and recent arrivaldates to Canada.

Most Sudanese community organizations tend to be inward-looking, ocusing on the settlement and integration concernso recent immigrants. These organizations stipulate in their constitutions and/or mandates a strictly apolitical orientation,and hence do not engage with Canada’s humanitarian and development activities in Sudan. The relationship o the vastmajority o Sudanese-Canadian organizations with ederal ofcials is largely restricted to the unding they receive romCitizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) in order to deliver settlement and integration services.

Those members o the diaspora who are active in the public discussion surrounding Canada’s ofcial activities in Sudan havejoined a number o domestic not-or-proft and advocacy organizations. One o the most prominent o these groups is theDarur/Sudan Peace Network (DSPN). Formerly known as Save Darur Canada, this Montreal-based NGO describes itsel as“an inormation and networking resource or Darur and Sudan advocates and grassroots groups across the country.” 15 TheDSPN is an umbrella organization that includes a national coalition o thirty likeminded member organizations and thousandso individuals throughout Canada. It operates as an inormation clearinghouse, networking platorm, and central rallying pointor interested individuals and organizations. The DSPN is well-established, with signifcant resources, an up-to-date website,and ongoing campaigns targeted at public ofcials in the ederal government. This programming has included a national letterwriting campaign that has sent over 51,000 messages to elected ofcials; a national postcard campaign that has sent over 32,000letters to the ofce o the Prime Minister; and an e-campaign during the 2008 elections.16 [NB: Unortunately, the DSPN wasdisbanded in November 2011, though much o its work continues through the eorts o its ormer member organizations. Eds.]

The Darur Association o Canada (DAC) is located in Hamilton, Ontario. Its leaders originate primarily rom within the Darurisub-set o the Sudanese diaspora. The DAC ocuses its projects on public education and profle-raising events, which otentranslates into public rallies. These serve both as a means to attract media attention and as a public platorm to host prominentspeakers.17 In addition to the DAC, the Darur Diaspora Association (DDA) conducts similar activities in Toronto, Ontario. Its

7 Immigrant Culture and Arts Association, “Sudanese Community,” http://www.diversehamilton.ca/aricanCommunity/sudanese.html.

8 Statistics Canada, 2006 Census (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 2006).

9 The Mosaic Institute, supra, 27.

10 Ibid., 32.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 31.

13 Ibid., 30.

14 Established in the mid-1990s and led by a Southerner, the Sudanese Association o Manitoba (SAM) is an optimistic symbol o unity or Sudanese-Canadians nationwide. It includes Northerners,

Southerners, members o the Lost Boys and Girls o Sudan, in addition to various ethnic groups such as Darurian and Nuba.

15 The Darur/Sudan Peace Network, “Contacting the Darur/Sudan Peace Network,” http://sudan.peacenetwork.ca/contact_us.html.

16 The Darur/Sudan Peace Network, “National Postcard Campaign,” http://sudan.peacenetwork.ca/postcards.html.

17 Past speakers have included: Dr. Norman Epstein and Dr. Acol Dor, co-chairs o Canadians Against Slavery and Torture in Sudan; John Weiss, Proessor o History at Cornell University; and Tarek Fatah, the ounder and




members’ research and publicize human rights abuses in southern Sudan. Both the DAC and the DDA publish press releases inorder to raise public awareness, attract media coverage, and educate members o the Sudanese-Canadian population.

In spite o these eorts, the Ontario-based Daruri associations are threadbare, weakly instituted, and lack sufcientfnancial resources or human capital to seriously advance their causes. At the time o this writing, both organizationsoperate as oine institutions without accessible websites. This digital divide presents a major impediment to thewidespread diusion o general inormation and campaigns.

iii) roster of principal issues

Many existing Sudanese-Canadian associations are explicitly non-political in their mandates—a act that makes it difcultto gather systematic inormation about the oreign policy priorities o community members. The only known study tohave surveyed the attitudes o Sudanese-Canadians is the 2009 Smart Map report conducted by the Mosaic Institute. Thisstudy profles the normative commitments o 77 members o the community. Those surveyed were selected based ontheir perceived leadership or active involvement in the community. These respondents represent both Northerners andSoutherners, a wide-range o ethnic categories, various aiths, and varying degrees o integration into Canadian society.

More than hal o these respondents supported the normalization o diplomatic relations with Khartoum. Almost everyrespondent elt that President Omar Bashir’s removal rom ofce is a necessary precondition to establishing a lasting peacesettlement.18 However, respondents remained evenly divided as to whether or not Bashir’s removal should include anindictment rom the International Criminal Court (ICC). There was also a young and vocal minority o respondents who

expressed their support or Southern autonomy. Echoing the appreciation that many respondents express or the Canadianmodel o ethnic coexistence, 78% elt that “Sudan’s diversity is its strength.”19 There was equally strong support or thesecularization o the Sudanese state.

Perhaps the most signifcant fnding o the report was that the Sudanese diaspora community supports a proactive andengaged Canadian oreign policy toward Sudan. A large majority o respondents elt that Canada represents a positiveinuence in Sudan; correspondingly, 86% o respondents agreed that Canada should expand its overall involvement inSudan.20 Participants also overwhelmingly agreed that Canada has a “responsibility to protect” Sudanese civilians who arethreatened by governmental negligence, incapacity, or state-sponsored violence. Indeed, 91% o respondents supportedhumanitarian intervention by the Government o Canada on behal o non-combatants in Sudan.21

Some urther insights into the political priorities and positions o the Sudanese-Canadian community can be learned byconsidering the substantive positions o the NGOs through which the Sudanese diaspora conducts most o its politicaladvocacy. For instance, the Darur/Sudan Peace Network has published a “Save Darur Unity Statement”. This is an ofcialproclamation o the common concerns and policy priorities o its broad membership. 22 Key members include AmnestyInternational Canada, STAND Canada, the Darur Association o Canada, and the Montreal Institute or Genocide and HumanRights Studies, among many others.23 The DSPN declaration advocates increasing bilateral pressure on Khartoum in orderto ensure its ull compliance with the International Criminal Court. An ofcial press release rom the Darur Association o Canada also supports this position.24 In addition, the DSPN declaration calls or increasing Canadian unding to the UNAMIDpeacekeeping mission and or an extension o the orces’ operational mandate in order to (1) include jurisdiction over thearrest warrants issued by the ICC, and (2) to provide UNAMID orces with the access and communication rights necessary toprotect vulnerable Daruri populations. In concert with community views, the Darur Association o Canada advocates thatthe Government o Canada act in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. 25

iv) canaDa’s role in suDan

Sudan remains a major overseas engagement or the Government o Canada. Since 2006, DFAIT has contributed more than$880 million to peacekeeping and humanitarian objectives in Sudan.26 According to a publication by DFAIT, “Canada’sengagement in Sudan reects Canada’s core values and oreign priorities o reedom, democracy, human rights and the rule

ormer President o the Muslim Canadian Congress.

18 The Mosaic Institute, supra, 54.

19 Ibid., 56.

20 Ibid., 47.

21 Ibid., 48.

22 Save Darur Canada/Solidarité Darour Canada, “Save Darur Unity Statement,” http://www.peacenetwork.ca/docs/unitystatement.pd, (last modifed February 2008).

23 Save Darur Canada/Solidarité Darour Canada, “Members o the Darur/Sudan Peace Network,” http://sudan.peacenetwork.ca/members.html (last modifed July 29, 2009).24 Darur Association o Canada, “Toronto’s Daruri Communities Call or Canada to Act in Darur, Sudan,” July 29, 2008 , http://peacenetwork.ca/docs/DAC-press-release-29-07-08.pd.

25 Darur Association o Canada, p. 3.

26 Government o Canada, “Canada’s Approach,” http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudan-soudan/approach-approche.aspx (last modifed July 19, 2011).




ORGANIzATIONAL PROFI LES

Tapping our Potential: Diaspora Communities and Canadian Foreign Policy is a joint initiative o the ollowing twoorganizations, both based in Toronto:

The mi Iie (www.mosaicinstitute.ca) is an action-oriented think tank that harnesses the connections, knowledgeand resources o Canada’s ethnocultural communities to advance Canadian solutions and promote peace and developmentin conict-ridden or underdeveloped parts o the world.

The premise guiding the work o the Mosaic Institute is that Canada—by virtue o its uncommon and arguably unrivalledcommitment to promoting ethnocultural diversity within its borders—has ostered the creation o an experience-richpool o experts and “thought leaders” rom around the globe who call Canada home. These citizen experts, through theirknowledge, resources and connections to the rest o the planet, have the potential to greatly enhance Canada’s contributionto global peacebuilding, conict resolution and economic and social development eorts.

The Institute seeks to provide Canadian leaders with well-inormed ideas and resh insights or advancing global peace anddevelopment. We also encourage ethnocultural communities that are in longstanding conict with one another to cometogether as Canadians to advance the cause o peace in their countries o origin. Currently, the research and programmingo the Mosaic Institute is ocused on the Middle East; Armenia-Turkey; South Asia; and Sudan.

The we & d g Fi (www.gordonoundation.ca) is an independent philanthropic oundationdedicated to the development o sound and innovative public policies. In 2004, the Foundation launched its GlobalCitizenship program, including a ocus on diaspora and transnational communities.

At the outset, the ocus o the Foundation’s work in this area was to increase knowledge o the opportunities aordedby the engagement o Canada’s diaspora and transnational communities in promoting Canada’s role in the world andthe implications or public policy. Over time, the program began work to strengthen the capacity o diaspora groups andinitiatives to inuence, shape and promote Canada’s role in the world to urther peace, development, human rights andgood governance.

While the Foundation has recently decided to wind down its grant-making activities in this area, it is important to capturethe rich knowledge that has been developed through the program and use it to advance the important goal o improvingCanada’s international work and oreign policy development through the inputs o transnational citizens with deepexperience and knowledge o regions around the world.

OUR CONTRIbUTORS

nie bee is an Ottawa-based reelance writer specializing in issues o diversity and citizenship. She has publishedon these topics in the Globe and Mail and the Ottawa Citizen, and is currently writing a book titled Our Home and Native Lands: Canadian Citizenship in a Globalized Age. Holder o a PhD in Philosophy (1996) rom Johns Hopkins University,she taught philosophy at Wesleyan University (Connecticut) or several years beore joining the Policy Branch o theCanadian International Development Agency in 2002. She then served rom 2002 to 2004 as a policy advisor (human rightsand humanitarian aairs) and speechwriter or the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister o Foreign Aairs, and rom 2005 to2008 she was policy advisor and senior writer or the President o the Conerence Board o Canada.

Ee cii is a post-doctoral ellow at the Institute o Asian Research, University o British Columbia. Her researchinterests cover a range o topics on ethnicity and nationalism in the People’s Republic o China with a ocus on Uyghursociety in Xinjiang. Her most recent publication is “Daily encounters between Hans and Uyghurs in Xinjiang” publishedin Pacic Aairs (June 2011). Holder o a PhD in International Relations (2008) rom the University o Cagliari (Italy), shecontinued her studies on Chinese ethnic minorities and overseas diasporas at Indiana University (Bloomington, U.S.) in2006, Xinjiang Normal University (Urumqi, PRC) in 2007 and Central University or Nationalities (Beijing, PRC) in 2008.Currently, she is a visiting scholar at Renmin University o China conducting research on the role o Western investment innorthwestern China.

re gi is a Public Policy and International Business Consultant who retired rom the Canadian Government’sDepartment o Foreign Aairs in August 2003. In his last overseas posting, he was Canada’s Ambassador to Romania withconcurrent accreditation to Bulgaria, Macedonia and Moldova. Previously he served in a number o senior posts in the




ederal government, including Assistant Deputy Minister o Citizenship and Immigration (Operations) and Ambassador tothe Federal Republic o Yugoslavia (1997 to 1999). Mr. Girard received his Bachelor o Arts Degree rom the University o British Columbia in 1963.

J m is the frst Executive Director o the Mosaic Institute. He previously served as Director o the Province o Ontario’s global network o trade and representation ofces, and was the inaugural Director o the Ontario Investment andTrade Centre. From 2001 to 2005, John served as Consul (Economic Aairs-Ontario) at the Canadian Consulate-Generalin New York City. Beore that, he practiced labour, employment and immigration law with Fasken Martineau DuMoulinLLP, and was an Immigration Policy Advisor and specialist in economic immigration or the Government o Ontario.

John received his JD and BA (International Relations) degrees rom the University o Toronto, and his Master o PublicAdministration degree rom Dalhousie University. He also completed programs o study at the Université des Sciences Humaines de Strasbourg , and l’Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris). John speaks and writes extensively about pluralism,global citizenship, and Canada’s role in the world.

aj p is an international criminal lawyer currently based in The Hague, Netherlands. Previously, Ajmal wasa justice sector ofcer at the Aghanistan Task Force, Department o Foreign Aairs and International Trade in Ottawa. Hehas also worked with the United Nations in Geneva and Nairobi and was a 2009-2010 Gordon Global Fellow. Ajmal hasserved as a pro bono legal researcher or Lieutenant-General the Honourable Roméo A. Dallaire, (Ret’d), Senator. He hasalso volunteered with the Canadian Red Cross and OXFAM Canada. Ajmal is a ormer World University Service o Canada(WUSC) sponsored reugee student. He holds a J.D. rom the University o Ottawa and a B.A. (Political Science) romMemorial University o Newoundland, where he is known as “the Aghan-Newoundlander.”

sie pi completed her Bachelor o Arts at Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts and a Masterso Business Immigration (2006) at York University’s Schulich School o Business. Suthamie has extensive experience inworking with the Sri Lankan diaspora in Canada. She was a Member o the Organizing Committee o the Mosaic Institute’sYoung Canadians’ Peace Dialogue on Sri Lanka (2009-2011); a member o the Board o Sri Lankans Without Borders(SLWB); and Director o Youth Aairs or Homes o Hope Lie Enrichment Centre. Suthamie was raised around the worldas the daughter o a ormer Sri Lankan career diplomat. She is currently a management consultant based in Toronto.

n s is a program manager with the Walter & Duncan Gordon Foundation, where she managed the Foundation’sdiaspora work under the ormer Global Citizenship program. With 15 years o experience working and volunteeringin government, not-or-proft and philanthropic organizations, she has ocused her work in the areas o education,international development, and civic engagement. She has a strong interest in working with youth and diasporic/transnational communities, including managing leadership programs with the Canadian Merit Scholarship Foundationand the Gordon Global Fellowship program. Her policy research experience includes positions at the Policy ResearchInitiative o the Privy Council Ofce in Ottawa and the Canada Millennium Scholarship Foundation’s research departmentin Montreal. She holds degrees rom McMaster University and McGill University in Globalization Studies and Philosophy,respectively.

hee tee is a Toronto-based researcher and development proessional specializing in issues o human-rights basedapproaches to development and leadership capacity-building or diaspora organizations and individuals. She has led,designed and participated in various university and community-based research projects related to Canadian oreign policyin education and the role o diasporas and development, such as the UPEACE High Level Expert Forum, 2006 and YorkCentre or International Security Studies (YCISS) Junior Scholars’ Award, 2007-2008. Helen received her education romMcMaster University (Hons. B.A.) and Ontario Institute or Studies in Education, University o Toronto (M.A.) specializingin Comparative, International & Development Education.

se veii is currently completing a specialist degree at the Trudeau Centre or Peace & Conict Studies at the Universityo Toronto with a ocus on the political economy o human security. He has contributed to projects at Samara Canada andrecently held an internship at the Asia-Pacifc Foundation o Canada. Sean previously interned at the Mosaic Institute,where he served as the Research Assistant on the 2009 study entitled Prole o a Community: A ‘Smart Map’ o theSudanese Diaspora in Canada, which was undertaken or the Sudan Task Force o Canada’s Department o Foreign Aairsand International Trade.

Tapping Our Potential

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