Taming the Dragon: Assessing the Militarized Assets in the South China Sea and their Implications...

7/30/2019 Taming the Dragon: Assessing the Militarized Assets in the South China Sea and their Implications for the United States

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TamingtheDragon

AssessingtheMilitarizedAssetsintheSouthChinaSeaandtheir

ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates

JohnCarofano

DR.PHILLIPKARBER

GOVT-451

DECEMBER24 2012


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INTRODUCTION

ThroughouttheColdWar,Asiawasdelineatedalongideologicalfaultlines,

whichinturnfosteredstabilityandpreventedanylocalactorfromaspiringto

regionalpredominance.Afternearlyfiftyyearswithoutamajorglobalconflict,however,aweakandineptSovietUnioncollapsedfromwithin.AstheIronCurtain

fell,ColdWarrigiditiesgavewaytoregionalspheresofinfluence,inturnfracturing

thegeopoliticalsystemthatdefinedthegreaterpartofthe20thcentury.

Sincethe1990s,thelackofdirectSovietandAmericaninterferenceinthe

regioncoupledwiththemilitaryandeconomicriseofChinahavefurtheralteredthe

strategicbalanceintheAsian-Pacific.ForthefirsttimesinceWorldWarII,China

candirectlychallengetheUnitedStatesbroaderstrategicaimsintheregion.

Therefore,asChinacontinuestodevelopamodernmilitary,thePRCwilllookto

consolidateitssovereigntyintheregionsmostsignificanttheatre:theSouthChina

Sea.

TheSouthChinaSeaisthebodyofwaterinthePacificthatspansfrom

SingaporeandtheStraitofMalaccainthesouthtotheStraitofTaiwaninthenorth.

Inall,theseaincludesmorethan200smallislandswiththevastmajority

concentratedintheParcelandSpratlyIslandchains.Whilemostoftheseislands

areuninhabitable,theyarebitterlycontestedandthusrepresentsignificant

geopoliticalimportanceintheregion.

Intotal,theSouthChinaSeaisdisputedamongsixoftheregions

predominantactors.TheParcelsaredisputedamongstVietnamandChinawhilethe

muchlargerSpratlyChainisclaimedinwholeorinpartybyChina,Taiwan,Vietnam,

thePhilippines,MalaysiaandBrunei(China,TaiwanandVietnamclaimtheentire

chain).Whiletheclaimsarehistoricallypolitical,theclaimantsbeganbuilding

militaryfacilitiesontheislandsinthe1950stoprojectpowerinthecontested


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waters.Thisdevelopmentaddedasignificantmilitarydynamictoonetoofthe21st

centuriesmostcomplexdisputes.1

ThispaperwillexploretheloomingcrisisintheSouthChinaSeabyanalyzing

themilitarysignificanceoftheoccupiedislands.Moreover,thisstudywillargue

thatintheircurrentstates,themilitarizedislandsintheSouthChinaSeawillnotbe

adecisivefactorinfutureconflict.Thatbeingsaid,givenChinasmilitarydoctrine

andbroaderstrategicaims,controlofthefeaturesintheSouthChinaSeawill

augmentthePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)anti-accesscapabilities,inturn

shiftingthebalanceofpowerinChinasfavor.Overall,thispaperaimstouncover

whytheSouthChinaSeaissignificantandhoweachclaimantnationcanuseits

militarizedclaimstoprojectpowerintheeventofaconflict.

ASIAPOSTWWII

Aftertwelveyearsofpersistentandunprecedentedwarfare,theJapanese

ruledoveranempirespanningupwardsof7,4000,000squarekilometers.Itwasat

itsapexinJuneof1942,however,whentheUnitedStatesengagedtheJapanesefleet

atMidway.Afterlosingfourofitsaircraftcarriersinoneofthewarsmostdecisive

battles,theEmperorandhisgeneralscouldonlyfighttostemtheAmericantide.2

Fromthatpointforward,theAlliesdismantledtheJapaneseEmpireislandbyisland,

ultimatelypavingthewaytothebombingofHiroshimaandNagaswakiinAugustof

1945.

TheTreatyofPeacewithJapanwassignedonSeptember8,1951;nearly6

yearsaftertheEmperorofJapanannouncedhisunconditionalsurrender.Whilethe

vastmajorityoftheaccordsarewellbeyondthescopeofthisstudy,ArticleIIreads,

Japanrenouncesallright,titleandclaimtotheSpratlyIslandsandtotheParcel

Islands.3Thisissignificantfortworeasons.One,thetreatyfailedtomakeanofficial

1Cronin,P.,Dutton,P.,Fravel,T.,Holmes,J.,Kaplan,R.,Rogers,W.,&Storey,I.(2012). Cooperationfromstrength:Theunitedstates,china,andthesouthchinasea.().WashingtonDC:CenterforaNewAmericanSecurity.34.2Pike,F.(2010).Empiresatwar:AshorthistoryofmodernasiasinceWWII .London:I.B.Tauris.62.3United Nations Treaty Series 1952 (reg. no. 1832), vol. 136, pp. 45 - 164.http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm


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resolutionregardingsovereigntyovertheSpratlyandParcelIslands,andtwo,China

alreadydelineatedtheSouthChinaSeain1914andreassertedtheseclaims

sporadicallythrough1947(theseclaimswillbeexplainedindepthlaterinthis

report).4

Ironically,from1947to1971,Chinasclaimswerelargelyuncontested.This

istheresultofseveralfactors.First,inthewakeofWorldWarII,Asiawasatthe

mercyoftheColdWar.AlmostimmediatelyfollowingJapanssurrender,President

TrumanclaimedthatAmericasprimeforeignpolicyobjectivewasthepeaceful

developmentofnations,freefromcoercion.5Moreover,thefreepeoplesofthe

worldlooktousforsupportinmaintainingtheirfreedoms.Ifwefalterinour

leadership,wemayendangerthepeaceoftheworldandweshallsurelyendanger

thewelfareofourownnation.6Theseinfamousstatementslaidthefoundationfor

theTrumanDoctrine,whichwouldcommitU.S.foreignpolicytoitsglobal

hegemonicresponsibilitiesforthebetterhalfoftheColdWar.7

Trumansresolve,however,wasimmediatelychallengedwiththefallof

ChinatoMaoscommunistpartyin1949.AsKimIISungsinvasionofSouthKorea

wouldgoontoprove,U.S.regionalhegemonywassusceptibletowhatatthetime

wereregardedasSovietencroachments.Consequently,Asiabecameatheaterof

significantstrategicvaluefortheUnitedStatesandthehysteriawasenoughto

encourageWashingtontodevelopasignificantforcepostureintheregion.Itis

importanttorecognizethatdespiteseveralhotconflicts,theUnitedStateswasable

tomaintainitshegemonyandencouragemutualstabilityandeconomicgrowthin

theAsianPacific.8

TheTrumanDoctrinealone,however,cannotexplainAmericassuccessful

policiesorthelackofdisputesintheSouthChinaSea.Inreality,therewereseveral

underlyingdynamicsthatdictatedthecourseofAsianaffairsthroughthe1970sas4Garofano, J. (2008). China, the south china sea, and U.S. strategy. China's energy

strategy: The impact on beijing's maritime strategy(pp. 279). Annapolis: Naval

Institute Press. 279-2815Pike,107.6Ibid7Ibid,110.8Ibid,113.


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muchifnotmorethanWashingtonscommitmenttotheprotectionoffreepeoples.

WhiletheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionsoughtgloballeadership,themajority

ofAsiawastoopoorandinternallyfocusedtomakeseriousbidsforregional

predominance.9Coupledwithaprimitivealliancenetworkandbittermemoriesof

WorldWarII,mostleaderswereleftwithlittlechoicebuttoacceptWashingtons

presence.

Moreover,acommitmenttoeconomicdevelopmentcreatedaculturethat

believedstabilitywasessentialforthebroaderdevelopmentoftheregion.This

culturesooninterlockedtheregionssecuritypartnershipswithatradingcyclethat

broughttogetherAmericanconsumers,NorthAsianmanufacturing,SoutheastAsian

labor,andAustralianmineralsandenergy.10ThebondamongstAsias

noncommunistcountrieswhetheractiveAmericanalliesormeredependentson

Americasregionalrole-grewsostrongthatitwaseventuallyinstitutionalizedas

theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)in1967.11

Takentogether,thesedevelopmentsencouragedaperiodofpeaceand

prosperitythatappliednotonlytotheregionaswhole,butalsotothewatersofthe

SouthChinaSea.Overthelastdecade,however,anewhierarchicalparadigmstarted

toemergeasChinadevelopedaneconomythatcouldsupportmilitary

modernizationandregionalambitionsnotseensincetheoutbreakofWorldWarII.

HistoryoftheDispute

TheentireSouthChinaSeacontainsupwardsoftwohundredislands,rocks,

andothernegligiblefeaturesthataremostlyconcentratedintheSpratlyandParcel

Islandchains.WhiletheParcelsareonlydisputedbi-laterallybetweenChinaand

Vietnam-whichtheformerhascontrolledsince1974-theSpratlyIslandsareclaimed

inwholeorinpartbysixnations:China,Taiwan,Vietnam,thePhilippines,Brunei,andMalaysia.China,Vietnam,andTaiwanclaimallofthe230featureslocated

9Wesley,M.(2012).Asia'snewageofinstability.TheNationalInterest, (November-December2012),

1.10Ibid,2.11Ibid


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withinthechainwhilethePhilippinesandMalaysiaclaim53and12respectfully.12

Asnotedabove,however,Chinadisregardsallotherpartialclaimsbydeclaring

indisputablesovereigntyovertheentirearea.13

EverynationinvolvedintheterritorialdisputeovertheSouthChinaSea

providesrationaleforitsclaimsthroughhistoricalrecords,the1982UnitedNations

ConventionontheLawandtheSea(UNCOLS),oracombinationofthetwo.

AccordingtoArticles55though57ofUNCLOS,theExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ)

ofastateencompassesa200nauticalmilezonethatallowsthestatetoexploreand

exploitanynaturalresourceswithinthisarea.Article76goesontodefinethe

continentalshelfofanationascomprisingtheseabedandsubsoilofthesubmarine

areasthatextendbeyondits[thenations]territorialseathroughoutthenatural

prolongationofitsland.14Theinnateproblemwiththeloftyrhetoricistwofold.

One,themaritimerightsdescribedaboveconcernquestionsofjurisdictionnot

sovereignty.Inotherwords,thelawslaiddownbytheUNCOLSonlypermitstates

toexploittheresourceswithintheirrespectivezones.Second,eachstateinterprets

theconventioninitsownway.Vietnam,Malaysia,thePhilippines,andBruneieach

measuretheirEEZsfromtheircoasts,whileIndonesiaassertsitsrightsfrom

NatunaIsland.15

EvenmoreproblematicisChina.AsnotedaboveChinabegandelineatingthe

SouthChinaSeabasedonhistoricalrecordsdatingasfarbackastheHanDynastyin

thesecondcenturyBC.ThePRCallegesthatdiplomatsmadevarioussovereign

claimsovertheSouthChinaSeaanditsislandsduringtheSong,Yuan,Ming,and

Qingdynasties.Suchclaims,however,arelargelyambiguousandarecompletely

irrelevantwhenhelduptointernationalscrutiny.Thatbeingsaid,amapissuedby

12Cronin,P.,Dutton,P.,Fravel,T.,Holmes,J.,Kaplan,R.,Rogers,W.,&Storey,I.(2012). Cooperation

fromstrength:Theunitedstates,china,andthesouthchinasea.().WashingtonDC:Centerfora

NewAmericanSecurity.34.13Ibid,57.14Joyner,C.C.(2002).Thespratlyislanddispute:Legalissuesandprospects.InJ.Baker,&D.

Wieneck(Eds.),Cooperativemonitoringinthesouthchinasea ().Westport:Praeger.15Cronin,34.


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|

CHINA

S O U T H

C H I N A

S E A

Kuala Lumpur

VIETNAM

LAOS

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

MALAYSIA

INDONESIAINDONESIA

MALAYSIA BORNEO

BRUNEI

Singapore

SPRATLYISLANDS

G U L F

O F

T O N K I N

G U L F

O F

T H A I L A N D

SUMATRA

Brunei negotiated maritime boundaryIndonesia negotiated maritime boundaryMalaysia negotiated maritime boundaryThailand negotiated maritime boundary200-nautical-mile limitChinese nine-dash lineMajor shipping lanes

Phnom Penh

Ho Chi Minh City

STRAIT

OFMALACCA

Hanoi

Bangkok

Hong Kong

PARACELISLANDS

BRUNEI

HAINANISLAND

PALAWAN(Phi l ippines)

TAIWAN

Taipei

Bandar SeriBegawan

Cam RanhBay

Manila

PHILIPPINESPHILIPPINES

Source: Middlebury College, Asian Studies Vitual Librar y, southchinasea.org. Accessed September 29, 2011.

theNationalistChinesegovernmentin1947(seebelow)symbolizesthePRCsmost

officialclaimtodate.16

Thegraphanditsnine-dashlinedwereadoptedbythePRCin1949and

werecodifiedintolawthroughtheLawofthePRConTerritorialSeaandContiguous

ZoneandtheLawontheExclusiveEconomicZoneandtheContinentalShelfofthe

PRCin1992and1998respectfully.17Asaresult,ChinainterpretsitsEEZfromboth

disputedislands(suchastheSpratly)andtheChinesemainland,effectivelyplacing

90%oftheSouthChinaSeainChinasjurisdiction.18Whileitisclearthatthe

Chinesehistoricalrecordlegitimizesoverlappingandconflictingclaims,itisfar

moreimportanttorecognizethattheassertionscoincidewithaperiodofgreat

prosperityandregionalinfluenceinChinashistory.Notonlydoesthisperiodevoke

immensenationalistpride,butitalsoservesasabenchmarkthatChineseleaders

arestrivingtorestore.19

TakenfromCooperationfromStrength

16Ibid.17Jamandre,T.(2011).ChinaaccusesPhilippinesofinvasion.VERAFiles, ,2012.18Ibid,14.19Cronin,34.

Figure1:DelineationintheSouthChinaSea


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PreviousConfrontation

Despitethecomplexnatureofthedispute,ChinasclaimsintheSouthChina

Seawerelargelyuncontesteduntilthediscoveryofpotentialhydrocarbonsinthe

1970s.20Infact,noclaimantevenactivelydefendeditsclaimsupuntilthatpoint.

Sincethen,however,theregionhasbeenplaguedbysporadicconflict.

Figure2:TakenfromChinasGatheringAmphibiousandAirborneExpeditionaryCapabilities

Date NatureofIncident

1974 ChinacapturestheParcelsfromVietnam

1988 Chinasinks3VietnameseshipsneartheSpratlyIslands,killing70

1992-1994 Vietnamreports134incidentsof

Vietnamesevesselsbeingharassed,inspected,ordetainedbyChina

1995 ChinainvadesandcapturesthePhilippinesMischiefReef

May2000 FilipinotroopskillaChinesefishermanandarrestsevenothersneartheisland

ofPalawanApril2010 20Vietnamesefishingandcoastguard

shipssurroundaChineseFisheriesAdministrationpatrolvessel

February25,2011 Chineseshipsfirethreeshotsat

unarmedFilipinofishermenMay26,2011 ThreeChineseshipsstopaVietnamese

seismicsurveyandsupposedlycuttheshipsseismiccables

April8-10,2012 ThePhilippineNavyinterceptsaChinesetrawlerintheScarboroughShoal

April14,2012 ChinasendsmoreshipstotheShoalafteraweekofstandoffs

20Garofano,278.


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SignificanceoftheSouthChinaSeainthe21stcentury

Simplyput,theSouthChinaSeaiswhereglobalizationandgeopolitics

collide.21Spanning3.5millionsquarekilometers,theSouthChinaSeaisthesixth

largestbodyofwaterintheworld,andfromaneconomicstandpoint;theSouth

ChinaSeaisarguablythemostsignificantseaonearth.Situatedinthefastest

growingregionintheworldandsurroundedbyover3.5billionpeople,theSouth

ChinaSeassealinesofcommunication(SLOCs)seethreequartersoftheworlds

hydrocarbonsand90%ofallcommercialgoodspassthoughitswaterseachyear.22

Comparatively,theflowofoilthroughtheSCSisthreetimesthatthroughtheSuez

CanalandfifteentimesthatthroughthePanamaCanal.23In2011alone,70,000

shipscarried$5.3trillionworthofgoodsthroughtheregionsSLOCs,ofwhich$1.2

trillionwastradedirectlyaffiliatedwiththeUnitedSates.24

Tradeaside;theSouthChinaSeaishometowhatsomeanalystsseeasthe

worldslargestuntappedoilandnaturalgasfields.The2012U.S.Energy

InformationAdministrationAnnualEnergyOutlookestimatesthatChineseoil

consumptionwillgrowby2.8%from8.33millionbarrelsperday(mmb/d)to18.50

mmb/dbetween2009and2035.Duringthatsameperiod,Chineseoilproductionis

onlyexpectedtogrowby.4%perannumfrom3.99to4.70mmb/d.Thismeansthatby2035,Chinawillrelyonimportstocover13.8mmb/dofitsoildemand.25This

sametrendholdstruefortherestoftheclaimantsasASEANconsumptionis

expectedtogrowatanaveragerateof4.4%from375milliontonsofoilequivalent

(MTOE)to1,018MTOEfrom2007to2035.26

21Cronin,7.22Ibid23Garofano,279-281.24Halloran,R.(2012).Stormcloudsoverthesouthchinasea.AirForceMagazine,95(8)25U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.(2012).Annualenergyoutlook2012.().WashingtonDC:

U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.170.263rdASEANenergyoutlook. (2011).().Japan:TheASEANCenterforEnergy.1.


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Withprovenreservesupwardsofsevenbillionbarrelsandanestimated900

trillioncubicfeetofnaturalgas,theSouthChinaSeahasthepotentialtoalleviate

regionwideenergyinsecurity.27Notsurprisingly,Indonesiabeganexportinglimited

amountsofgasfromfieldssurroundingNatunaIslandviaa400-mileundersea

pipelinein2001.Furthermore,thePhilippineslinkedtheMalampayaandCamago

gasfieldswiththreepowerplantsthroughanextensive312-mileunderseas

pipeline.28Bothofthesedevelopmentsareinwatersclaimedinwholeorinpartby

thePRC,butoppositionhasbeenlimitedtodate.Thisislargelytheresultofthe

frontiernatureoftheplays.Asdeepwaterdrillingtechnologiescontinuetodevelop,

27Cronin,7.28U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.(2008).Southchinasea.RetrievedNovember12,2012,

fromhttp://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=SCS

Figure3:U.S.EnergyInformationAdministration.(2008).Southchinasea.RetrievedNovember12,2012,fromhttp://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-

to ics.cfm?fi s=SCS


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however,explorationwillmovefurtheroffshoreintoincreasinglycontested

portionsoftheSouthChinaSea.

Ironically,Vietnamsdevelopmentofoffshoreoilalreadysparked

confrontationandheavy-handedthreatsfromthePRC.Inearly2011,staterun

IndianoilfirmOilandNaturalgasCorporationsingeda3-yeardealwith

PetroVietnamtocooperativelydeveloptheoilsectorinVietnamsExclusive

EconomicZoneintheSouthChinaSea.29Inresponse,ChinasForeignMinistry

Spokesman,HongLei,stressed,anyforeigncompanythatengagesinoil-

explorationactivityinwatersunderChinasjurisdictionwithouttheagreementof

ChinahasviolatedChinassovereignrights.30Sincethen,Chinaissuedadirective

prohibitinganyforeignoilcompaniesfromhelpingVietnamdevelopitsresourcesin

theSouthChinaSea.31

ThisisindicativeofChinasstarkrejectionofforeigninterferenceinthe

regionandofthetrendtowardsincreasedconfrontationasexplorationand

productiondevelops.InDecember2008,thePRCapprovedaChinaNational

OffshoreOilCorporations(CNOOC)Chinasthirdlargestoilproducer-program

thatallocates$29.2billiontowardsthedevelopmentofoilandgasresourcesinthe

SouthChinaSeathrough2029.32CNOOCexpectsthedealtoincreaseSouthChina

Seaoilproductionto1millionbarrelsperday,whichexceedsproductionatChinas

biggestonshoreoilfieldatDaqing.Theoutputwillalmostexclusivelydependon

deepwaterandultra-deepwaterexplorationandproduction(E&P)atdepthsof

1,500to3,000meters.33

Itisobviousthatenergyinsecurityisandwillcontinuetobeamajor

strategicthreattoallactorsintheregion.Thehugeenergyrequirementsjust

described,butmoreimportantlytherelianceonimportsfromabroad,hasthe

29Blanchard,B.,&Huang,S.(2011).Chinapaperwarnsindiaagainstvietnamoildeal.Reuters,30Page,J.,&Wright,T.(2011).Indiafacesstandoffwithchinaonseaoil.WallStreetJournal, 31Westhead,R.(2012).Battleforthepacific:Navalarmsraceinthechinasea.TheStar32ASEANStudiesCenter.(2009).Energyandgeopoliticsinthesouthchinasea:ImplicationsforASEAN

anditsdialoguepartners. (No.8).Singapore:ISEASPublishers.25.33Ibid


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potentialtodestabilizetheentireregionintheeventofamajorhydrocarbons

discovery.

GeostrategicSignificance

Sofar,thispaperhasdiscussedtheeconomicsignificanceoftheSouthChina

Sea.Whileonecannotargueagainsttheimportanceoftradeandenergyinthebasin,

thesemotivationsarelargelyovershadowedbythegeopoliticalimplicationsfor

China,theregion,andbyassociation,theUnitedStates.ForChina,theSouthChina

Seaisaboutconsolidatingsovereignterritoryandprojectingregionalsupremacy.

TheUnitedStatesontheotherhand,islookingtomaintainbothitshegemonyinthe

regionandthebalanceofpowerthathaspersistedsinceWorldWarII.34Evenin

theirsimplestforms,thesestrategicgoalsareatutteroddswithoneanother.

WhetherpolicymakersinWashingtonwanttoadmititornot,theSouth

ChinaSeawilldeterminethefutureroleoftheUnitedStatesinAsia.35Withoutthe

properpolicyorforceposturing,theSouthChinaSeacanverywelltransformfrom

anopenandprosperousmaritimecommonstoapolarizedhotbedof

contestationwithColdWarlikerigidities.36Whilelarge-scaleconventionalconflict

isunlikely,currenttrendswillsoonshiftregionalpowerinChinasfavor,thus

fundamentallychangingtheUnitedStatesroletheregion.

ChineseNavalStrategy

ThemodernizationofthePeoplesLiberationArmyNavy(PLAN)overthelast

decadeistheculminationofthepreviouslydiscussedtrends.Whileconcrete

numbersareimpossibletocomeby,estimatesclaimthePRCwillspend$106billion

onitsmilitaryin2012,nearlyaneightfoldincreasefrom2000.37Theexpansionary

budgetallowedChinasnavytogrowfromtwoSoviet-eradestroyersin1990toaforceofroughly78principalsurfacecombatants,71submarines,211patroland

34Cronin,7.35Ibid36Ibid37Westhead


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costalcombatants,andafunctioningaircraftcarrierin2011.38Whilethenumbers

arecertainlyimpressive,theyareirrelevantwithoutanunderstandingofhowChina

perceivesfutureconflict.

Chinaalwaysstressedapeacefulrise,andjustifiesitsmilitarybuildupasa

meanstoprotectitscorenationalinterests.39Historicallyspeaking,thetermcore

interestswasusedinstrictlyadomesticcontext.ItwasnotuntilJanuary19,2003

inameetingbetweenthenSecretaryofStateColinPowellandformerChinese

ForeignMinisterTanJiaxuanthatthetermwasusedinreferencetoaforeign

objectiveinanofficialcapacity.40StateCouncilorDaiBingguoclaimsChinascore

interestsarethreefold:topreserveChinasbasicstatesystemandnationalsecurity,

toenforcenationalsovereigntyandterritorialintegrity,andtocontinuestable

developmentofChinaseconomyandsociety.41Notsurprisingly,national

sovereigntyandterritorialintegritytheunderlyingrationalforChinasclaimsin

theSouthChinaSeaarewidelyregardedbyChineseofficialsasChinasmain

diplomaticpriorities.Todate,theseprioritieshaveincludedTaiwan,Tibet,Xinjiang,

andtheSouthChinaSea(althoughthereismuchspeculationastowhetherthe

SouthChinaSeaisactuallyconsideredacoreinterestbythePRC).42

Coreinterestsareperceivedasstrategicobjectivesthatarenon-negotiable,

thusconveyingalevelofrigidityandperhapsmilitancytowardwhateverissue

mightbedefined.43Therefore,theclassificationoreventhementioningofthe

SouthChinaSeaasacoreinterestjustifiesChinasnavalmodernization.According

totheDepartmentofDefenses2011reporttoCongressonthemilitaryandsecurity

developmentsinthePRC,PLANdoctrinefocuseson6campaigns:blockade,anti-sea

lanesofcommunication,maritime-landattack,anti-ship,maritimetransportation

38InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies.(2012). Themilitarybalance2012. ().London:InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies.39An.(2010).Modernizingnavyforselfdefense.Xinhaunet,,November10,2012.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-07/13/c_13397060.htm40Swaine,M.(2011).China'sassertivebehavior-partoneoncoreinterests.ChinaLeadership

Monitor,34.3. 41Ibid,5.42Ibid43Ibid,1.


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protection,andnavalbasedefense.44Ifcorrectlyimplemented,thePLANdoctrine

willdirectlysupportanoffensiveintheSouthChinaSea,whilepreventingforeign

(UnitedStates)intervention.

ThisrepresentsasignificanttransformationofMaosPeoplesWardoctrine.

Fromthebeginning,thePRCfoughtastrategicallysuperiorenemy.Activedefense

andtacticalsuperiorityhavebeenatthecenterofthePeoplesWardoctrinefrom

thetimeoftherevolution.Therefore,theshiftisawayfromMaosmanover

weaponsmentalitytoonethatfocusesonlocalwarunderhigh-technology

conditions.45

Chinaisnotanirrationalactor.PLAstrategistsarewellawareoftheUnited

Statestechnologicalandmilitarysuperiority.Thatbeingsaid,DengXiaopings

TheoryofWarandPeaceassertsthat,TheUnitedStateslackstheeconomicpower

todominatetheworldwhichhascreatedasituationwherebyvariousforcesare

increasinglybalancingeachother.46Thisperceivedcloutinanincreasingly

multipolarworldencouragedPLAofficialstofocusondefendingtheperiphery

throughmaritimeforceprojection.47Thismeansdevelopinganavythatcan

effectivelycontroltheSouthChinaSeawhilesimultaneouslypreventingU.S.

interferenceintheregion.

SignificanceofMilitarizedClaimsintheSouthChinaSea

Chinasanti-accessdoctrineismotivatedinpartbythemilitarysignificance

oftheislandsintheSouthChinaSea.Todaytheclaimantsactivelyoccupy48

featuresoftheSpratlyIslands.Vietnamoccupies27features;thePhilippines,8;

China,7;Malaysia,5;andTaiwan,one.Militaryoccupationbeganin1956when

TaiwanestablishedTaipingIsland-thelargestdisputedisland-asapermanent

44DepartmentofDefense.(2011).Militaryandsecuritydevelopmentsinvolvingthepeople'srepublic

ofchina.().WashingtonDC:DepartmentofDefense.45Pillsbury,M.(Ed.).(1998).Chineseviewsoffuturewarfare .WashingtonDC:NationalDefenseUniversityPress.XCXII.46Ibid47Cliff,R.,Burles,M.,Chase,M.,Eaton,D.,&Pollpeter,K.(2007). Enteringthedragon'slair:Chinese

antiaccessstrategiesandtheirimplicationsfortheunitedstates .SantaMonica:RAND.XIV


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militarybase.Itwasnotuntiltheearly1970s,however,thattheothernationsbegan

establishinganenduringpresence.48

Figure4:NavalBalanceintheSouthChinaSea

PLAN PLANSouthSeaFleet

Taiwan Vietnam Philippines

Submarines 71 1SSBN;2SSN;18SS

4SSK 2SSI 0

PrincipalSurfaceCombatants 78 5DDGHM;8FFGHM;15FFG

4CGHM;20FFGHM;2FFGH

0 1FF

PatrolandCostalCombatants 211+ 40PCFG/PCG

2PCFG;59PCG;

4PBG;8PBF

7PCFGM;2PCC;8

PBFG;3PBFT;3PHT;2PH;20PB;4PBR

1PCF;13PCO;18PBF;

33PB

MineWarfare/Countermeasures

161 10MCMV 8MSC;4MSO

2MSO;4MSC;7other

0

Amphibious(LCandLS) 238 1LPD;51LS

2LSD;13LST;288

LC

3LSM;3LST;30

LC

7LST;26LC

TakenfromtheIISSMilitaryBalance2012(seeAppendixAforabbreviations)

WiththeoverallnavalbalancefromFigure4inmind,thefollowingsection

willassesswhatmobilizationwouldlikeintheeventofaconflict,andhoweach

claimantsoccupationsinthecontestedwaterswouldassistand/orhurttheir

strategicobjectives.WhilethisstudyonlyconsidersthesignificanceofChina,

Taiwan,VietnamandthePhilippinessmajoroutposts,thereareotherislands

withinthecontestedwatersthatbearmilitaryvalue,butweredeemedinsignificant

giventhepapersobjective.

48Cronin,34.


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TakenFromhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spratly_Islands

Figure5:ClaimsintheSouthChinaSea


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Taiwan

TaipingIslandSpratlyChain

Figure6:http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1027416/senior-taiwan-officials-raise-tensions-

visit-taiping-island

Withanareaof41.3hectares,TaipingisthelargestislandintheSpratly

chainandisthemostheavilyoccupiedislandintheSouthChinaSea.49Taiwanhas

occupiedandadministeredovertheislandsince1956,butVietnam,thePhilippines,

andthePRCalsoclaimsovereigntyovertheisland.WhiletheTaiwanese

governmentiscommittedtoapeacefulresolutionoftheterritorialdisputes,many

high-rankingofficialshavecalledformoreaggressivebehavior.50Forexample,after

astarkincreaseinconfrontationinthesummerof2011,advisorsinsidePresident

MasNationalSecurityCouncilproposedremilitarizingTaipingunderthebackdrop

ofincreasedU.S.presenceintheregion.Someevenwentasfarasadvocatingfor

increasedoccupationintheSouthChinaSea.51Whiletheproposalwasultimately

rejected,thosewithintheNationalSecurityCouncilmerelydisagreedonitstiming,

49InternationalCrisisGroup.(2012).Stirringupthesouthchinasea:Regionalresponses. (No.229).

Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup.37.50Ibid,12.51Ibid,13.


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18

andagreedtoactproactivelyafterasignificantoildiscoveryorintheeventof

adversarialactionthatcouldthreatenTaiwansaccesstovitalresources.52

Taiwanhasnotstationedanyactivetroopsontheislandsincethe

replacementofmarineswithcoastguardtroopsin2000.Thatsaid,remilitarization

ofTaipingiswellunderway.AftertwoVietnamesevesselsencroachedwhatTaiwan

perceivesasitssovereignwatersaroundTaipinginMarch2012,membersofthe

ParliamentaryForeignandNationalDefenseCommitteevisitedTaipingtoassessits

defensecapabilities.GivenitssituationwithChinaandtherecentVietnamese

incursion,however,Taiwanbelievesithasalimiteddiplomaticroleinanyfuture

SouthChinaSeadisputes.Inturn,Taiwaniscommittedtosendanadditional100

coastguardtroopsanddoubleitsmortarunitsontheisland.Moreover,the

TaiwaneseDefenseMinistrydisclosedaspecialairborneunitthatcandeployto

TaipingviaC-130sinjustunderfourhours.53

DespiteTaiwansdecreasedmilitarypostureoverthepastdecade,theisland

isstillfundamentallystrategic.ItsmainassetistheTaipingAirport,whichwas

completedinDecember2007.The1,200-meterlong,30-meterwiderunwaycan

accommodatetwoC-130transportplanes,andtheROCiscurrentlyconstructingan

antennatowerandotherassociatedfacilitiesinanefforttoexpandtheairports

operationalcapabilities.Thefacilityalsoconsistsofahelipad,whichTaiwan

infrequentlyuses.54

Furthermore,JapanhistoricallyusedTaipingasawartimesubmarinebase,

addingsignificantvaluetotheisland.Taiwanacknowledgesthatintheeventofwar

withChina,submarinesstationedatthebasecoulddeployintotheSouthChinaSea

toattackChineseoiltankers.However,thesmallpieratthesouthwestcornerofthe

islandlimitscurrentnavalactivitytothreeM-8TaiwaneseCoastGuardvessels

(Nanhai4,Nanhai5,andNanhai6)thatpatroltheisland.55

52Ibid53Ibid54Iacono,N.,Gordon,P.,&Preskenis,K.(2012).Thesouthchinaseainbrief. ().GeorgetownUniversity.55Ibid


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19

PeoplesRepublicofChina

WoodyandRockyIslands-ParcelChain

AsChinasonlytruenavalbaseintheSouthChinaSea,WoodyIslands

strategicsignificanceishardtooverstate.First,Woody(Yongxing)Islandislocated

intheParcelIslandchainandisroughly300kilometerssoutheastoftheChinese

mainland.LocationalonegreatlyextendsthePLANsoperationalcapacitywithin

theSouthChinaSea.Second,WoodyIslandisthePLANsmaincontrollinkbetween

theMalaccaStraightandtheSouthSeafleetheadquartersatZhanjiang.56

LocationsofChinesemilitaryelectronicareconcealedonthemainland,but

aremuchmoreobservableintheSouthChinaSea.57

OverheadsurveillancesuggeststhattheislandsupportsChineseType791X-bandprecisionapproachradar,which

56Bussert,J.,&Elleman,B.(2011).People'sliberationarmynavycombatsystemstechnology .

Annapolis:NavalInstitutePress.141.57Ibid,140.

Figure7:TakenfromGoogleEarth


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20

issimilarincapabilitiestotheSovietTwoSpotRSP-7system.58TheType-791hasa

6-dwgree-elevationantennathatsupportsveryhighfrequency(VHF)andultra-high

frequency(UHF)aircommunications.59Moreover,a2001WashingtonTimesarticle

claimedthePLAinstalledHY-2anti-shipcruisemissiles(ACSM)ontheisland.This

particularweaponssystemrequireslong-rangesurface-searchradar,whichif

accurate,meanstheislandiscapableoftargetingsurfaceshipsremotelyand

strikingacombatantvesselwithinits95-100kmeffectiverange.6061Evenifthe

laterprovesfalse,knowncapabilitiesallowlocalfleetcommanderstocommunicate

directlywiththeislandviasatelliteandradiocommunications.62

Coupledwithasignalsintelligence(SIGNIT)stationontheattachedRocky

Island(thehighestpointintheParcelchain),thedevelopmentofadvanced

command,control,andcommunicationcapabilitiesonWoodyIslandpresentsa

uniqueopportunityforthePLAs2ndArtillertytheballisticmissilebranchofthe

PLA.63IfthedeploymentofHY-2ACSMisanyindication,Chinaispreparedtouseits

claimsintheSouthChinaSeaasforwarddeploymentpostsforitsballisticmissiles.

Figure8:StrikingDistanceofPLAAircraftandBallisticMissilesTakenfromFASReport

58Ibid,143.59Ibid60Ibid61FASMilitaryAnalysisNetwork.(1999).C-201/HY-2/SY-1CSS-N-2/CSS-C-3/SEERSUCKER.

Retrieved,2012,fromhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/c-201.htm

$ $ $ $

' ' $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

$ $ $ $ '

$

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

$ $ $ $

$ $ $ $ $ $


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21

$ $ $ $

' ' $ $ $ '

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

$ $ $ $ $ !

AlthoughWoodyIslanddoesnotyethavethelogisticalcapabilitiesto

supporttheabovemissileplatforms,thePLANcanandwilllikelyaugmentits

missilesystemsontheisland.Thisextendstherangeofitssystemsanadditional

162nauticalmilescomparedtoalaunchfromtheChinesemainland,whichallows

theD-3AtostrikeU.S.forcesinGuam.WithregardstotheSouthChinaSea,

however,theincreasedstrikecapacityoftheDong-Feng(DF)21wouldbethemost

decisiveinapotentialconflict.64

TheDF-21anti-shipballisticmissile(ASBM)iscapableofperformingamid-

courseballisticmissilecorrectionmaneuverthatallowstheweapontoreadjust

andstrikeamovingtargetusingaManeuveringReentryVehicle(MaRV).65This

changeintrajectoryallowstheDF-21toeffectivelyneutralizeamovingvessel,

includingU.S.carriers,andcomplicatesanyenemyefforttointercepttheprojectile

withmissiledefense.66Fromastrategicperspective,theDF-21allowsChinato

createitsmuch-emphasizedkeepoutzone.WhileitsunclearifChinaactuallyplans

todeploytheDF-21toWoodyIsland,theover-the-horizonradardescribedaboveis

anessentialfirststepinretrofittingthebaseforDF-21deployment.Whenandif

thathappens,WoodyIslandwillexpandthePLANsanti-accesscapabilities.

62Ibid63Bussert,143.64FASSlideshow65AmodernnavywithChinesecharacteristics.(2009).().Suitland:OfficeofNavalIntelligence.26.66ibid

Figure9:DF-21ConceptofOperationsTakenfromAModernNavywithChineseCharacteristics


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22

Inreality,theelectronicsandcombatsystemsdescribedabovederivemost

oftheirutilityfromtheaircraftandwarshipscapableofusingWoodyIslandasan

operationalbase.Althoughstrategicallylimitedgivenitssize,WoodyIslandisoneof

twoexternalPLANbasesthatcansupporttheSouthSeafleetssubmarinesand

ships.67Whiletheharborsspecificaccommodationsarehardtoconfirm,analysis

suggeststheharborcandockvesselswithlessthan5,000tonsofdisplacement.This

iswellwithintherangeofthePLANsLuda-class(Type-051)andLuhu-class(Tyep-

052)guidedmissiledestroyers.68

Ofthe22submarinesintheSouthSeaFleet,onlytheHan(Type-091),Kilo,

Romeo,Ming(Type-035),Song(Type039),andtheYuan(Type39A/B)submarines

arecapableofsurfacingatWoodygivenitsdisplacementrestrictions.Althoughthe

strategicfleetstilloperatesoutofZhanjiang,Woodyallowsthetacticalarmofthe

SouthSeaFleettooperatewithinthewatersoftheSouthChinaSea.Eachofthe

submarinesaboveareequippedwith533mmtorpedotubes(TT)andtheKiloand

SongclassesarecapableoflaunchingKlubanti-shipcruisemissiles(ASCM)and

SaccadeASCMrespectfully.69Eventhoughthesesubmarinesaretheoldestand

leastadvancedintheSouthSeafleet,theyallowthePLANtopatroltheSouthChina

Seawithincreasedfrequencyandreducedresponsetimeintheeventofaconflict.

Therefore,theislandsinherentstrategicvaluerestswiththeYongxingIsland

Airport,whichwasconstructedbythePRCinJuly1990.Theairports7,874-foot

runway,fourhangers,andseveralfueltankssupportmanythird-generation

PeoplesLiberationAirForce(PLAF)fighterssuchastheH-6bomberandother

resupplytransports.70Consequently,theairstripcompensatesforthelackofan

aircraftcarrierintheSouthSeaFleetbyincreasingthePLAsmaritimeprojections

intheSouthChinaSea.Whilethefacilitycannotsupportaircraftforextended

periods,planescanstillland,refuel,andredeploytoattackforwardtargetsoutsidethescopeofattackslaunchedfromthemainland.

67Bussert,72.68Ibid69InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,232.70Bussert,142.


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23

Figure10:H-6BomberRangeTakenFromInstituteforDefenseStudyandAnalysis

Takentogether,theislandhasupsidepotentialasaforwarddeployment

baseforoperationsintheSouthChinaSea.Intheeventofconflictoperationswill

havetobelaunchedfromHanin,butasupgradescontinue,thecommunicationlinks

andenhancedmobilityfromWoodyIslandwillallowthePLANtooutmaneuver

regionalcompetitorsintheabsenceofdirectU.S.support.71

71Bussert,180.


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24

Vietnam

TruongSaIsland-SpratlyChain

Figure11:TakenfromVietnamNetBridge

VietnamhasoccupiedTruongSaIsland(SpratlyIslandProper)since1974

despiteclaimsbythePRC,Taiwan,andthePhilippines.Located254nauticalmiles

fromCamRanhPort,TruongSaIslandisVietnamsadministrativecapitaland

militarystrongholdfortheentireSpratlyChain(whichitclaimsinwhole).72

Moreover,theislandholdssentimentalvalueforVietnamesenationalsfollowing

clasheswiththeChineseNavyinthesurroundingwatersthatleft68Vietnamese

soldiersdeadin1988.73

Theislandsmilitarysignificanceistwofold.Intermsofactualmilitary

facilities,theislandoffersa610-meterairstripcapableofaccommodatingsmall,

fixed-wingreconnaissanceaircraft.74WhiletherunwayistooshortforVietnams

MiG-21bisandMiG-21UMfightergroundattack(FGA)jets,TruongSaiswithinthe

rangeoftheBe-12MailMaritimePatrolAircraft,whichiscapableofseatakeoffand

72Truongsalon:Growingtownatsea.(2011).RetrievedNovember2,2012,

fromhttp://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/Truong-Sa-Lon-growing-town-at-

sea/20115/18351.vnplus73Cronin,34.74Iacono


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25

landings.75TheBe-12isprimarilyanantisubmarineamphibiousaircraft,butcan

easilyserveasareconnaissanceplane.Thatbeingsaid,itsmaximumweaponsload

isroughly3,000kgandincludesacombinationofdepthcharges,mines,bombs,

anti-shippingmissiles,homingtorpedoes,androckets.76

Theislandisalsoequippedwithahelipad,asmalljettywithtwopiers,anda

radiotower.77Givenitsrangefromthemainland,theMi-24Hindattackhelicopter

andtheKa-28HelixantisubmarinehelicoptercanaccessthehelipadonTruongSa

intheeventofaconflict.78TheKa-28istheexportvariantoftheRussianKamovKa-

27PLandiscapableofcarryinguptoa2,000kgpayload.79Witharangeof800-km,

thehelicoptercanstrikeanyfeatureintheSpratlyChainwithacombinationof

homingtorpedoes,torpedorockets,uptotenPLAB250-120bombs,andtwoOMAB

bombs.80Moreover,theweaponssystemcancarryRussianSV3depthbombs,which

usesonarguidancetotrackelusivesubmarines.81Finally,theMi-24Hindisan

assaultgunship,butislimitedtoarangeof450km.Itisequippedwith412.7mm

machineguns,a30-mmtwinbarrelcannon,57-mmrockets,andAT-2C/6CSpiral

anti-tacticalguidedmissiles(ATGM).82

Outsideofdirectmilitaryvalue,theislands1000civilianinhabitantsraiseits

significanceintheeyesofVietnamesestrategists.83Tothatend,theVietnamese

mainlandrecognizedTruongSaIslandonmultipleoccasionsformilitaryexcellence,

givingtheislandssoldiersthe3rdGradeMilitaryMedalin2011,thetitleHeroof

thePeoplesArmyForcesin1985,the3rdClassFeatofArmsMedalin1984,andthe

2ndClassFeatofArmsMedalforfiveconsecutiveyearsfrom1996-2000.84

75InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies76AeroFlight.(2010).Berievbe-12mali.RetrievedOctober30,2012,fromhttp://www.aeroflight.co.uk/aircraft/types/beriev-be-12-mail.htm77Ibid78

InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,282.79SinoDefence.(2009).Ka-28helixnavalhelicopter.RetrievedNovember1,2012,fromhttp://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/helicopter/ka28.asp

80Ibid81Ibid82FASMilitaryAnalysisNetwork.(2000).Mi-24hind.RetrievedOctober29,2012,

fromhttp://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/mi-24.htm83Iacono84VietnameseNationalPress.(2012).Truongsalonisland.RetrievedOctober29,2012,fromhttp://www.qdnd.vn/qdndsite/en-US/75/72/182/155/188/195578/Default.aspx


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26

Philippines

ThituIsland-SpratlyChain

Figure12:TakenfromIslamTimes

ThituIslandisthesecondlargestintheSpratlychain,andisthePhilippines

mostsignificantmilitaryholdingintheSouthChinaSea.Theislandhasbeen

occupiedbythePhilippinessince1970andhassincebeenretrofittedwitha1.4kmunpavedairstrip.AsidefromTaiwansTapingIsland,ThituIslandistheonly

featureintheSouthChinaSeacapableoflandinglargeresupplyaircraftliketheC-

130.Inaddition,therunwaysimpressivelengthcansupportawidearrayof

PhilippineNavalandAirForceaircraft.Thatbeingsaid,thecapabilitiesofcurrent

Phillippineaircraftareessentiallylimitedtomaritimepatrolandintelligence,

reconnaissance,andsurveillance(ISR)functions.Ofparticularsignificancearethe

F-27-200,N-22SLSearchmaster,andtheOV-10Bronco.85Therefore,theislands

truepotentialrestswiththePhilippinescloserelationswiththeUnitedStates,and

theU.S.PacificCommandsaircraftfleet.86

85IISSMilitaryBalance2012,268.86AsidefromJapaneseoccupationbetween1942-1945,thePhilippineshavebeenunderU.S.sovereigntysincetheendoftheSpanishAmericanWarin1898.(TakenfromtheStateDepartment)


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27

Ascanbeseeninthepictureabove,ashallowcoralbasesurroundsThitu.

ThecoralreefcausedtheBRPLanaodelNortetorunagroundin2004andhas

preventedthePhilippinesfromusingThituasanavalbase.Asaresult,the

PhilippineNavyproposedaplantoupgradetheislandsairstripandbuilda

causewaytothedeepwaterssurroundingtheislandin1999.87Whileneverputinto

motion,theincreasedcontestationintheSouthChinaSeaespeciallythe

encroachmentoftwentyChinesefishingvesselsandtwofrigatesearlierthisyear-

revitalizedimplementationefforts.88Officialreportsclaimdevelopmentsarebeing

drivenbycommercialfactors,buttheexpansionofThitusfacilitieswillopenthe

islandtothePhilippines,andbycorrelation,UnitedStatesNavy.

Tosummarize,Thituclearlyholdslittlemilitaryvaluewithouttheproposed

expansions,buttheUnitedStatesdeeprelationshipwiththePhilippinesgreatly

enhancestheislandsstrategicsignificanceintheeventofaconflict.

87Gupta,V.,&Bernstein,A.(1999).Keepinganeyeontheislands:Remotemonitoringinthesouthchinasea.().OfficeofStrategicServices.38.88Pilapil,J.,Depasuil,W.,&Bauzon,C.(2012).Navytodeployshipstopag-asa.ManillaTimes,


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28

Conclusion

TheDangerousRoadAhead

Onanindividualscale,noneofthemilitarizedfeaturesintheSouthChinaSea

holdenoughmilitaryvaluetodictatetheoutcomeofafutureconflict.Thatbeing

said,ChinasforceposturingonWoodyIslandoffersthegreateststrategicbenefit.

Therunwaycoupledwithonetheseaslargestnaturalharborswouldatthevery

leastallowthePRCtolaunchstrategicbombingcampaignsinboththeParceland

theSpratlychains.Moreover,submarinesandlightvesselscanquicklyresupplyat

theisland,whichgreatlyincreasesboththePLANsoperationalreachand

enduranceintheSouthChinaSea.

Thatbeingsaid,themilitarysignificanceoftheislandsintheSouthChinaSea

meansmuchmorethanaccesstoresourcesorsimpleforceposturingforthePRC.

Theabilitytocontrolalloftheseascontestedfeaturesensuresthesuccessofthe

LocalWardoctrine,whichinturnincreasesanti-accesscapabilitiesandpreventsthe

UnitedStatesfrominterferinginAsianaffairs.Ashydrocarbonexploration

progressesandthebalancecontinuestoweighinChinasfavor,theheatedrhetoric

andmilitarydemonstrationssurroundingtheSouthChinaSeadisputewillboilover

intoalimited,butpotentiallydestabilizing,conflictintheabsenceofenhanced

politicaleffortstodiffusethesituation.

ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates

Shouldwarbreakout,Chinasamphibiouslandingcapabilitiesandsuperior

firepowerwillallowthePLAtotakealmostallofthedisputedislandswithoutU.S.

intervention.Thisis,ofcourse,ahypotheticalsituation.Giventhestrategic

significanceoftheregiontobothtradeandU.S.globalhegemony,anyopenconflictbetweenChina,Vietnam,Taiwan,thePhilippines,orMalaysiawilldragtheUnited

Statesstates-willinglyorunwillingly-intothedispute.Therefore,theconflictwill

quicklyevolveintoonebetweentheUntiedStatesandChinaasopposedtoone

amongregionalcompetitors.


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29

Althoughoutsidethescopeofthispaper,theconventionalmilitarybalance

stronglyfavorstheUnitedStates.ThePLAslackofdirectcombatexperience

coupledwithatechnologicallyinferiormilitary,however,willforcethePRCto

resorttoasymmetrictactics,thatintheory,willcounterU.S.superiorityandalter

thebalanceofpowerintheSouthChinaSea.Thisassumptionisbasedonseveral

perceivedvulnerabilitiesintheUnitedStatesabilitytooperateeffectivelyinthe

region.89

First,shouldtheUntiedStatesgetinvolvedinaconflictintheSouthChina

Sea,Washingtonwillhavetoplanandfundtwomajorcontingencesatoppositeends

oftheglobe.EvenastroopswithdrawfromAfghanistanin2014,theUnitedStates

isforevercommittedtotheMiddleEastandSouthAsia.Moreover,current

developmentsinIranandSyriaarelikelytogetworsebeforetheygetbetter,and

willrequiredirectU.S.involvementtopreventregionwidechaos.90

Second,defensespendingcutstoavoidthefiscalcliffandaworrisome

declineinU.S.maritimepowerwillseverelyconstrainanyU.S.effortstopivotto

Asia.ThecurrentUnitedStatesNavalFleetstandsat284ships,downfrom600

duringtheReaganEra.91WhiletheNavyhopestoincreasethisnumberto313,

proposedcutscoupledwithdecommissioningwillreducetheNavysfleetto250

ships.92TheU.S.isalreadyataseriousdisadvantageintheSouthChinaSeagivenits

lackofsubmarinesinthe7thSeaFleetandsequestrationfurtherrestrains

operationalcapacityatatimewhenChinasdefensebudgetisessentiallylimitless

andsolelyfocusedontheFirstandSecondIslandchains.

Third,theUnitedStateshastotravelaconsiderabledistancetodeployan

effectiveforceintheSouthChinaSea.NotonlydoesthisaffectthetimingofaU.S.

responsetoanySouthChinaSeasituation,butitalsoallowsChinatolaunchcyber

attacksagainstcriticallogisticssystemsandcommunications.Moreover,theUntied

89Cliff,R.,Burles,M.,Chase,M.,Eaton,D.,&Pollpeter,K.(2007). Enteringthedragon'slair:Chinese

antiaccessstrategiesandtheirimplicationsfortheunitedstates .SantaMonica:RAND.ExecutiveSummary.

90Ibid91Cronin,8.92Ibid,6.


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30

Statesdependsonpotentiallyunreliablealliesthatareincreasinglymoreconcerned

withappeasingBeijingthanWashington.Intheeventofaconflict,Chinawill

pressureitsregionalpeerstolimitU.S.accesstoitsregionalbases,thuspreventing

theU.S.fromprojectingpowerintheSouthChinaSea.93

Finally,ChinahastheabilitytodenytheUnitedStatesaccesstotheSouth

ChinaSea.TechnologicaldevelopmentssuchastheDF-21giveChinatheupper

handineffectivelyimplementingakeepoutzoneinitsdirectperiphery.Liketactics

developedbyinsurgentsinIraqandAfghanistan,ChinawillfocusonU.S.

vulnerabilities-themostsignificantofwhichistheaircraftcarrier-togainan

operationaladvantage.

Therefore,withoutadiplomaticsolution,theSouthChinaSeaisapolitical

andmilitaryquagmirefortheUnitedStates.Chinasabilitytoconquertheislandsin

theSouthChinaSeawhilesimultaneouslypreventingtheUntiedStatesfrom

accomplishingsomeorallofitsmilitaryobjectivessignificantlyraisesthecostsfor

theU.S.tooperateintheregion.Thispresentstwolikelyoutcomes.Eitherthe

UnitedStatesdecidesthepriceforSouthChinaSeainterventionistoohighandasa

resultstaysoutofafutureconflictinturnsacrificingitsregionalhegemony-orthe

U.S.engagesChinainacostlywar.Whileeitherscenarioisunlikelygiventhe

regionsmutualinterestincontinuedeconomicprosperity,theSouthChinaSeawill

ultimatelydictatewhethertheUnitedStatesorChinacanexploittheregionforits

ownstrategicaims.

93Cliff,ExecutiveSummary.


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31

AppendixA

SSBN=nuclearpoweredballisticmissilesubmarine

SSN=attacksubmarinenuclearpowered

SSI=attacksubmarine

SS=diesel-electricsubmarine

SSK=conventionalsubmarine

CGHM=cruiserwithAShM(anti-shipmissile)withhangerwithSAM

DDGHM=destroyerwithAShMwithhangerwithSAM(surface-toairmissile)

FFGH=frigatewithAShMwithhangar

FFGHM=frigatewithAShMwithhangarwithSAM

FFG=frigate

FF=fastfrigate

PH=patrolhydrofoilship

PHT=patrolhydrofoiltransport

PCB=patrolboatwithguidedmissile

PBF=fastpatrolboat

PBFT=fastpatrolboat

PBFG=fastpatrolboatwithguidedmissile

PBR=patrolboatreconnaissance

PCFG/PCG=fastpatrolcraftwithguidedmissile

PCO=patrolcraftoceanic

PCFGM=fastpatrolcraftwithguidedmissilewithSAM

LPD=landingplatform/dock

LS=landingship

LST=landingshiptank

LSM=landingshipmaritimeLC=landingcraft

LSD=landingshipdock

MSC=minesweepercraft

MSO=minesweeperordinance(non-magnetic)

MCMV=minecountermeasuresvessel


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32

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Taming the Dragon: Assessing the Militarized Assets in the South China Sea and their Implications...

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