~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r...

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---- -- n .AltQ I " ' C41JOIII R.&UVc.a .. '( A\TnlVP ' TY ur ' r"A V J Nf . I H8T. 8 010.1 DA TKD 115 lUll Uf>. · 3/ ( l6 ) IINITEU I'A( ' IFIC 1<'1.1<:" ;1' TIlUW .,'I.EI.;'t' I, ()P. ( t!. Da t ,.,- 1- ;r ., Serial 0 0 fill .. FrClm : Th e TIlllW F1uut . . To The Commander in Ch i ef, U ni te d State s Fl ee t.• Via: Tho Commander iIl C hie f, Unit ed Fleot and Pac ifio Quean Areas . Subject: Act ion Re port -- Period 23- 26 October 1944 j both dat os in c lu si ve. Reference: Paoifi c Fl ,e t C onI . Le tter (b) C in cPO& di sp at ch 25 J.935 Oc t ober . Enclo tlUN : (A) All messages pe r ta.1 rd.ng t o coo.bat opo r ati on.'J re ce iv ed ;) r · ori ginl!.ted by C or.lmLLJ'ldo r 'l '"rlIlill duri ng t ho por1od i 3- 26 October 1944, bot.h dato!) 1nc1u:.i vc, t imes . - p ,I (B ) DiapatchoD or (":lIlltl.aud('ro THlIID and S'C f:::.rUli Fl oo t hing op<lratione 24- 26 Oc t obe r 191..4 . _ p. 'i (C ) Trl\ck Chart . _ [. ;J S (D ) Compoaition 0 Own f'orc os 23 - 26 19 44 . - f. J(. , . -- '--- _. ( 1::) Report of damAgo , OYm Forc fJtI , 2; - 26 Ootobor 1944. - p '10 . (r )- Summary ot ut atomt'n t. a "f pr isone rs 01 ' WI4r . _ p .' 11 1. n11.o Actio n Rtlpo rt COV01' S tho o pera ti ons of t ho TIIIlID Fl eo t o!el4in!: t the Ja paJioBo Flo. _ during tho po r iod Oct ob "r , 1941., 111 clu o.i vo . 11 1 c ompll u.nce with C cmlWlu(l r iII Chie!, U.S. Pac ir ic Fluet di upa. l ch 25 1935 , it co piea of all pertni ning t o opo r ationo tor this puri od . It i8 written [rom t.ho viow-point of t he Con:mandor THIRD Fleot and only d ew with tho De ot t he engagemon t. that waro ot primAry t.o th e Fleet COIrJI1a1'ldor proliminlU 'Y to , and dW"ing t he tlJ:lO t he f or ces in c ontact, and .iJm;odiately contact W&l3 l ost . 2. Deta.ila r eported by subordinato comman ders in t hei r Ac ti on lw- porto w ill be t he su bJoct of appropria t o couuuont by e nd or!.l om.o nt.. 3. For purpose& of idon t i! :!.cat i on, the eDemy cu rl er .co rc e will be call ed the Nor-thorn Forco ; the fo r r:e th at Dor ti od t hrough San Bo rn ar din o Str u t_, the C(\",\t,er forco j W1d the for cG that ente red Suri cao St r ait a ! :' 0Cti tho wes tward, the Southarn Force . All t imeo aro I'rlll! . 4. On 23 Oc t obel' 1944, f r om t he multi pli city of sighti ng N port :s , and 1Ptoll1gence from ot he r sources, it w as e vi J Qnt th at t he landing. on Leyte hlA provoked a v iol ent r eac ti on end that the eomty W D.D pr epuring t o ma.ke a ma jor st and 0.1' 30ma so rt in t he Phllippin us. '!be on emy W aB not c lear , but hi s reported nava l moveme nts on th e 23 rd definitely cons ti tuted an 109147 1 238 ("

Transcript of ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r...

Page 1: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

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n AltQ I C41JOIII RampUVca C llli i l 1J~TI Jo~

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DATKD 115 lUll O~Ufgtmiddot3(l6 ) I INITEU ~TAl E~ IA( IFIC 1lt11lt1 TIlUW IEIt I ()P ~ ~ ( t Dat - 1- r

Serial 0 0 fill

FrClm The Command~r TIlllW F1uut To The Commander in Chi ef United States Flee t bull Via Tho Commander iIl Chief United Stat~a P~citic Fleot

and Pacifio Quean Areas

Subject Action Report -- Period 23- 26 October 1944 j both datos inclusive

Reference ( ~ ) Paoific Fl et ConI Letter 2C~ (b) CincPOamp dispatch 25 J935 Oct ober

EnclotlUN (A) All messages per ta1rdng t o coobat opor ationJ r eceived )r middot ori ginlted by CorlmLLJldor lrlIlill F~ el3t duri ng t ho por1od i 3shy26 October 1944 both dato) 1nc1uivc IT~ t imes - p I

(B) DiapatchoD or (lIlltlaud(ro THlIID and SCfrUli Floot II~ hing opltlratione 24- 26 Oc t obe r 1914 _pi

(C ) Trlck Chart _[ J S (D ) Compoaition 0 Own forc os 23- 26 ~tobur 1944 - f J(

-- --- _ (1) Report of damAgo OYm Forc fJtI 2- 26 Ootobor 1944 - p10 (r )-Summary ot utatomtn ta f pr isone r s 01 WI4r _ p11

1 n11o Action Rtlport COV01 S tho operati ons of t ho TIIIlID Fl eo t oel4in t the JapaJioBo Flo _ during tho po r iod ~J-26 Oc t obr 1941 111cluoivo 111 compllunce with CcmlWlu(lr iII Chie U S Paciri c Fluet diupal ch 251935 i t cont~ copiea of all me5Jas~tI pertnining t o co~at opor ationo tor this puriod It i8 written [rom tho viow-point of t he Conmandor THIRD Fleot and only dew with thoDe aspo~tB ot t he engagemon t that waro ot primAry c onc~rt to the Fleet COIrJI1a1ldor proliminlUY to and dWing t he tlJlO t he f orces lfQ~ in contact and iJmodiately ~tor contact Wampl3 l ost

2 Detaila r eported by subordinato commanders in t hei r Ac ti on lwshyporto will be t he subJoct of appropriat o couuuont by endorlomont

3 For purposeamp of idont icat i on the eDemy cu r l er co rce will be called the Nor-thorn Forco the fo r re that Dor tiod t hrough San Bornardino Stru t_ the C(ter forco j W1d the forcG that entered Suricao St r ait a 0Cti tho wes tward the Southarn Force All t imeo aro Irlll

4 On 23 Oct obel 1944 f r om t he multiplicity of sighting N ports and 1Ptoll1gence repol~B from ot her sources it was eviJ Qnt that t he landing on Leyte hlA provoked a viol ent r eact i on end tha t the e omty WDD pr epuring t o make a major stand 01 30ma sort in t he Phllippinus be onemy int~nt WaB not clear but his reported naval movements on the 23rd definitely const i tuted an

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Serial t

Subject AItion Report - Period 23- 26 Octobel 1944 both dat 3

indusive

irJlediatu thraot Cocnand~r THL1D Fleet decide d to initiate carri r lIearchea to obtain earliest informati)n of ony neIDY movement t Olfl1rd Leyte

5 After nearly two weelai 0 intenaiV6 operations against Oldnamp l Formosa a d luzcn all of the carrie-r group3 neode rearming except for torshype jo~s aJld for the AP and SAP bawDs habtuaUy r eserv d for use egainst corbatshyant smiddot ip ene eroup Ta3k (roup 381 had be1ll started toward lithi on 23 October Task Groups 382 38 3 Cl1d 33 j~ were inw6diately nvailabl e

6 On the night 23- 24 Octo er Mk Groups 38 2 3 3 and 38 4 er aoved in close to ~he Philippine coas t pr el~1~r to lWQnching searches Task Grou~ )0 3 was placed eltl$ t of olillo I sland 0 cover the ~ e~t Coast ot Luzon Tasl Grenp 33 2 was phced close to ~an Bernardino Straits and Trusk C up 38 4

~ sent to be vicinity of Suri ~ao Str aits

7 At daTI 24 October search teams each conais t ing of Hellcats and Helldivers wero launched to cover t he Wes t Coast of LuLon an d the Sulu Sea and it s apgtroaches The sectors -ere aa shon on Track Chart ( Ene osu (C) ) The weatler ras favorable for search and stlike operatiols At 0046 (24) TaIk Grollp 3dl was oraered to ~t ltlbout and j)oceed too ~ a f uclinpound r endezvous wi h Task Units 30 8 4 and JO ~ 8 in La~itude 15i1 LonGit lde 10E at 0700 ( 25 )

g i~t 0810 24th seHrch plenes from Task Group 36 ~ sirhted t e Cente orce in Latitude 12-14 I Loncitude 121- 32 ~ on course 015 s ~ee lB bull bullhis force Wll in two [TOUps Thfl composition of the flrst Ereu as r epor t ed is 2 ~ B J or 4 CA or CL and 6 DO Ihe Jecond uoup wn3 rSi-orted to co tain 2 r- ) or 4 or CL ami 7 [10 fne COlllma de r TIl l(t i1Itercep ed t c3Ich nLJHl r Iort on V W 3clJIcl frc iU1 cy Md nt 022 olii nt-cd bIl rrent ciiPt h (23 2)U ) to GTF J13 eTC J83 and Cl 38 J~ and t l1e usual infor mati on addrellaees ivinG the contllct cOUlpositi on J bull eourSfl and speed IiliD was follo--shyea ct 0lt327 by urgent dispatch inatructne TElsk GlOlp 3 3 and Task Croup 38 4 to cone ntt te tOiard TWlk Group 3~ 2 at bFlst sp(Iec an to 8trike t hi s force

9 t 19u5 24th t Ie lltllk _ up 384 search ifltercepted and at tacked a force of 6 1 CAJ 4 DD at Latituu(t 08-5 I Lon - itude ill-50 E 90 thwet of e-1O1 The earch tem Nportcd 2 boLlb hi Ls in each BB roc Qt hit s on CA and 2 DD ~o heavy lStrafine of other 2 DD It ~ as ~dec1de t o adhere to the docill1on to have TG 384 cl0 e TG 38 2 and to shill target to the Center flrce on lLe c- ption thnt sm ~TH Fleet foroCis could takE care of the smaller Sout hern rorc bull

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LO Analysis subsequent to the oppound1ration and stat ements of POls r eCClvered from t he water indicate t hat the ~nter Forc e contained 5 BE ( YAU-AlO lUSASHl NAGAro KOG0 HARUNA) 7 CA ICHOKU HAGURO llYOKO KUAW SVZUYA 1013 CHlKUUA) 1 CL ( N03HIi10 ) 13 DD Reports or 2-3 aaditionaJ CL cannot be r econciled See enclvsure (F) f or inio~~tion conoor ning composition of Southern Force Soe encl osure (F) concerning f at e of ATAGO and YAYA The probbble moveshyments of TAKAO are ment ioned in paraeraph 40 of t his r eport

11 ~e enemy r eact ed by launching a viciouB air attack against Ta~k Group 383 Pr~cr to t he enemJ attack our f or ces shot dowu 40 pl anes About 110 planes were shot down around Tsk Group 38 3 but the pnnCZTQN was i1it hard Task Group 38 3 was delayed in c omplyi ng with the orde r to concentrate by recove7 of search and a t t ack groups and by eUorts to ass i s t the burning PRUICJTQN BL1l1GIJA lORRISON and m I N whil e 88s i s t ing PRINGETOl wcr u batUy damaged when i he PRINCcroN I 8 after magadnau bl Gt up Lator in the day in or der t o b f ree t o ItJve tovlard t he enenv Northe r n Force PRI~JCETOlI was sunk DJid BI RlJlNGHUl UORRISON GATLn~G and IltIiN were Berlt to Ulithi f fgtr r epairs and for hospitalizashyt ion of the wounded

12 At thi~ t ime it waS evident that the Japanese Navy Wa8 making amp

maj or effort whether fo r dir ec t attack or tr=u1S JXlrt 111amp troops or botl was not apparent r thi~ was to be an all-out attacc by tho Japanes e Fleet theM was one piece missing in the puzz l e - the carrier 3 They wer e believed to hve been in th( Eipire and t her e had been sight i ngs and intelligence r eportgt which indishycated that r eple-Jshmeot measures might have bpen taRen for s ome import3J1t moveshyment from Elnpi M wat~rs AlthouG~ our submarines statluned 1r Enpire waters had not reported a carri euroll for ce it was felt that they wer e sure to be empioYEld in some munner 1n any operation as gre at as that revealed on t he morning of the ~tb CO1lequectly a search t o t he north by our carrie r pione was or dered and at 1640 I t 6l11 a search plane from Task Group 383 r epor t ed a forc e at Latitudtl 18-10 N Lo~tude 125- 30 L course 2]0 s peed 15 (The Northern Force)

13 Amplifying r eports of t his Northern Frlce varied In his 240817 eTF 38 listed thi~ t erce ae J CV 3-4 heavy cruisers and 6 DD at Latitude 18-10 N LoIl8i tude 125- 30 E c0111se210 spfJ ed 15 and stated that one of the enemy carrier s wal an lSE 01amp83 CTF 38 1~ 240942 dispatch statod that pilots who had had a good l ook reported 2 SHOKAKU CV 1 en 3 CL and 3 DD on course 270 speed 15 at Lati t ude 18-25 N Longi t ude 125-28 S at 1640 I t em while at Latitude 18-10 N Lonej t ude 125- 30 E ~ere 4 BB or CA 5 cruisers 6 DD on course 210 speed 15 at 1540 ItOIll Ono of t he BB was 1Gpor tgd to hayo Q f ll-ght do ck att At 1600 Item 2 DO war~ ropo1tod by bull oarrier aoaroh pl AnO t Lati t udo 19-40 N lAngitudG 123-00 i oourSG 240 lpooc1 12 CODIIWldr THIRD r ioetoonc1udod t hat th NOltherll Foro

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Al6-J( 16) llNIlIamp) SIATES l FI( IEImiddotl 1 1I11Ugt 1 La- middot1

i)erlampl

Subject Action Report -- ~eriod 2-26 Octob~r 1944 both dates inc1usl vo bull

was disposed in two groups es t imated to contain a total of at least 17 ships and po5sibly as many a s 24 shi ps

L A curious pltint was apparent f r om the contact middot reports of the t hree ~orces they were Clll proceeding at deliberate speed oll1d it was inferred that t lere was a predcter-nined focus of geographical l ocation and time The IWve~Ilt8 indicated that a carefully worked-out coordinated Japanese plan waa in moti on nth 25 October as the earliest date of planned concerted action

15 Throughout the day (24th) carrie r strDc~s had been launched againt the Cl3nter Fore and all leports indicatod that t he Cente r ForcoJ~shying effectivelY and bpa~y drun~ In tho face of t hese continued strikes the Gent e r Force kept cotring with a det en lination that commanded r ospect By dusk t he ollowiIll damage hurl bee n r eportod At lo~t 4 and probably 5 BB torp9doed CUlQ bombod one probably Dunk Do miaiJJllUIl or 3 howy cruisor ll torpodoed tLfld other

ombodj 1 CL sunk 1 00 ounk 1 OD probably t)lnk iLOJ 4 dtJJllpoundIiiu c

16 T(Ulk Gr oup 30 2 m~Lda A total of 116 SOltiuu droPlgtod 23 lont ot bombs an J torpedl)e~~ r eporting t he DB YAU 1O dunared by j t or pedo hits arother YAATO BB ( pos$ibly same me) by 1 torp9do hit and 2 batci)s 1 ~AGTO BB hit by 1 torpedo and 1 bomb 1 KOiiGO BB by2 torpedoe s and 6 bombs 1 CA llCG I

possibly sunk by torpedo hit 1 CA NACHl hit by 1 t orpedo 1 CA TOrE hit by 1 torJ~do Task Gr oup 383 reported 1 BB badly hit damaging 2 others cnd 4 CA and 2 IL damaged i n the Center Force Task Group 384 reported 1 BB(1USASEI7) hit by torpedo afire dmll at bow and probably sWlk 1 YAlIAT0 BB 1 to 3 torpecoea 2 bomb hits 1 middotOllGO BB 1 bomb hit cruiser damaged 1 CL sunk 1 middot DO sunk 1 DO probab~ sunk 4 DO damaged Some details of the f oY-eeoing information were not available at dusk but f l as h r eports indicat ed beyond doubt that t he Center For ce had been badly mauled ~~th all of its BB and most of its CA tremendou8~ r eductld in f ightinG power and life

17 Although the Lenter Forco Iontinued to nove fo rward tho Cormand8r THIRD Fleet decided t hlt t his en~ forcn must be blindly obeyingmiddot an lIperi al C~1~ t o do o~ die but ~~th battl e e ffic i ency poundreatly impaired by t or pedo hits bomb hits topside d8J1lDge fi res and oasualties r r om l middot)i~ experienoe with tha J aps their blind adheNtnce to plan and th~ir i nabi lity to r eadjust dis turbed plans the COlllIllaOde r THlRD Floet had long ago aJoptod a policy of att3cking irate The Sjuthern and Center Forces had been under heavy and persiitent air att ack while procee~ t hroueh inland waters lJl daylight J ap dogg~ldne58 was adilrlttod and COlDlLallder THlRD Pleut r ecognizod lhe p08DibUity ~at tho ~entor Force might plod througP San Bernardino Straits and on to attack Lsyte forc~~ a 1a Guadalshycanal but C~1der THInD Fleet was convinced that the Center Force was ~o

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-Subject Action Report - Period 23-2) October 1944 both dates

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heavily iamaged that it could not yin a decision while the po6s ible marlmum strength of t he Northern Force as reportd by CTF 38 240942 cons tituted a fresh anel poerf ul threat It was decided that earlleet poosible attack on the POKaI shyf u NOlt1erl (carrier) Forco was essontial f or breaking up the e flaIlOY plan and rstainin~ t he initiative

18 n 10 altornati ves wer e to

( a ) Divide the f ON es l eaving T1 34 t o block Slln Bernardino Stn 1 te whll~ t ho carr i e rD with light screo ns attaclted tho Northern Forctjj

(b) lJaintain int egr ity of our own entire etr11dllg s troneth conctmtrated off San Bernad1ngt Straits j

(c) Str i ko t he Northern Forco rlth tll of our own striking s t lunfth concent rJtee a1d le ave San BornarJino Str llitlJ wlguar dud

( a ) was reje t od j the potont i ti s t r e neth of the ltnd~ud Northe rn Force a too groat to l aavo W1lIlOlesmiddotod and reqldrin~ IT 34 to e06lge the ContJr Force whi1 at t he Sallie time exposed t o at tnll( by l lJld-bnsed alld poss ibly carri er-besed air attack V s not sOW1d This alternltivs s pr ad our s trength and ri sited unprofi t abl e d~nag9 in dotail

( b ) WaB rojoctod b eOlUS6 i t perdtted middotthe Norther n Force to funotion 13 planuo lest6d and because destruot ion of J apan S oa r r ier roro~ would Ulte ltlll mumiddoth t)

futue oporati ons

( c ) wal adoptod it mllintninod tho i ntority of tho Blue s t riki ng flee t i t offered bes t posaibility of 91lrpr ise nnd de3truti cn of unCJmY carr i er force It

s particularly sound and nocas liary i t the s t re th of tho Northern FOJoe proved to be the mwcilaum reported It lias r e coenizedthat the Center Force might sortie and inflict soons dlllll8Ge but its f ighting po(e r was cOI13id~ ted too seriously ashypaired to win a decision Finally_ i t W83 calculat ed that the Mrd Floet )rea could r etu--n in timB to Nvarse any advantage t hat the Center Forco m gi euroclLn and Commande r THIRD Fleet was 1i-m1y conv lod that (c ) would oontributl me n too the over-all philippines campaign even it a teJllporarily Ugh situation eXeted at teyte

19 It was i hard decision to llIaka and having made it Icamander

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bullSubject Action Report -- Pe~iod 2j-26 October 1944 both dates

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THIRD Fleet was gravely concer~led until he received word that t l1e Centrn Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVSNTH fleet CV~ groupbullbull

20 At 2022 Task Groups )82 383 and j84 were givan orders t o as semble CLnd make night rw1 toward ~orthe rn Force preparatory to dawn attack The Jap lrnows hltW t o shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of COOmander THIRD r _eet plans had for weeks been prl3dicated on de~rirg the enemy that advant86e bJ closing promptly

21 At 2030 and 2l45 ( 24th) the Centor Force Ias snooped by an I NIERNDlJJCE VF(N) north of lotasbate on Vaiou6 COllr5es and trai1ing rrucn~~

--- 22 DurinC the run north care was t aken not to ovorrun the dlljmiddotlight

c1rcle of the No-thern Force a s to ao so would place the lJorthe rn Force beh en Task Force 38 and Leyto By daylight Task Force 34 was foruad up uhead of ~h8 carr ie r groups to provide for coorilinat ed air and surface attack on the i~orthel1l middot rorce

23 Dawn searches were launched and strike groups put in the air r adyen to hit as soon as contact faS made The Nort hern Force was located In Latltl Je 18-) 7 N Longit ude 126-15 E at 0730 Item on course 80 speed 20 and the first s trikes proceeded It once

24 In the meantime Task Gr uup 381 had put about and at 0700 (25) was in Latitu~ 15 N Longitude 10 E r eady to fuel from Task Units )084 and 308 8 Task liroup )81 was or dered to ll1l1Dent the a ~ arches from Talk Groups 382 38 ) and )84 to assis t in l ocat inb t he Northern Force and to obt rdn positive or negati ve informat ion oonce~ any enOln~ forc es to the east-war bull

25 The Northe rn Force was caught by urprise but Coumander THmD FleGt was puzzled by t he fact that there were scarcely any planes on ~he dl ke of or in the air near the enerny force and no sign of bogies around oW own force Later in the morning large bogies were picked up on the screen approChshyiog from the south j they did not attack and it is believed that they ~nc 9JBIl88 of the e~ carrier groups ferrying out to the carriers ~d an~ ampr~viag tHO late

26 The firat strike on the Northern Force r esulted in tbl 1 L~J r eported dallla6e 1 CV hit by a torpedo and J bonbs 1 CVL exploded anei oi l l C afire from bomb hits 1 DD hit Taok Force 34 waa advanoed for the ldll

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Sub ject Action Repol~ -- Period 23-26 October 1944 both dates inclusive - --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

27 In his di llpatchtgts 242225 242227 242230 and 242329 Comande r S vNTH Flee t nace urgent appeals f or help the SEVamplTH Fleet CVZS we r e u~der gunfi r e at t ack frOJl t he Cant er Forc tj nnd wlde r an attack from per si s t ent and s uic i dal s llore- lgt aseu air for c63 Although Talk Forc lI ) 4 was within 42 mi l os of t hl crippled UOlth0rn Force ~olDnande r THI RD Fla E t at 1115 t ur ne d TM k Group 38 2 plus 1 ASHI~GlOI JADuL lLSSJC l iDS=TTS and SOUTH DAKOT A 8oth nd di spa t ch ~d Tak Group 34 5 Rear Adniral Badge r in l a lA tj~l JiHili VI CJ~ lES lil lJJl HI LQXl and De sRon 52 ahead at high speed to t he as s isL[lllCe of the SEVl1lTIl Fleet Coreea

28 CTG 381 was direct ed to s trike the e neuy Center Force and to proc eed to a ssi s t SVpoundNTH Fle et f orces

29 Task Groups J83 aId J $4 (le ss detached eleoenttl) continued attacJs on the ~orthero For~e and ComSubPac ordered threo packs of submarines 0 tltJe posi tion between 120 E and 123 E to cut off eneq retreat Cruisers i iI ( destroyers of t he carrier grolips unde r Re or Adoiral Du Bose including the SiJjlA F~) MOBrIE iIlCHITA KEl OHIEA1 S and a dozen dostroyer went after the cripr- ltmiddot- The orthern For c e i s n OYI evaluat ed t o have consisted of 1 CV (ZUIKAKU) 3 en (CPlTOSE CIIYODA and ZUIHO - or pos s ibly RYUHO instead) 2 Bl3-XCV (ISE and liYUGA) 1 CA (pos s i bly l BUKI or lJCX~ ) 4 CL (OyeOO or possibly YAHAGI N~~A~IA ABUKUJiA and KISO 6 DD incl uding probably 3 TWU1SUKIs

) 0 The Nor t hern Force sustained the following los ses and damate at the hands of THlRD Fl pound9t forces 1 CV (ZUUI AKU ) sunk gt CVL ( CHITOS~ CHIYODA and ZUIHC ) sunk 1 Cr or DD and 1 DO sunk 1 CL possi bly sunk J 2 BB-XCV (ISE and HYUGA ) d~cd o~e by at l eas t 2 and pr obably 4 t orpedoes and bombs 1 CA d~ecd by soveral bOlllbs 1 CL dunaged by s ever al bombs j 1 CL torpedoed and later s unk by sub lDltgtri nea j 2 DO hoavily a t r of ed

) 1 Roache s Raiders and C1ar~y5 Crushers had o~ned in two groups in Latitnde 21 N LoI1(itude 125-30 E - l2h-30 E and Latitude 2l N Longi t ude lZ7 t - 128 E r espect i vely and caused further damage t o fleeing romnants of the Northern Force

32 In the lllSantirae I vthileTask Group 382 and Task Group 345 were middot oovi1t to t he s out hvtnrd at best speed t o r einforce the SEVEl~TH Fleet t he ePSlDf

ent er Force br oke of f the eneagement with the SEVEl~TH Fleet C1T~ and reti red t oward an Berna r dino Straits The reas on f or movements of the Cent er Force be t we6n 0924 and 1310 are not clear At 1046 CTi 77 reported the enemy Ntiring northeaft but accordios to lat e r report on~ as on course 150

0 at 1055 and

225 at ll45 middothen t he strike from Task Group 381 reached the Center Force at 1310 he was on course 010 chaJlJcd to 090 and then through 270

0 to the right t

000 At 1310 the Center Force Vias in Latitude U-46 1- Lltmgitude 126-16 E abv1t 13 milefl west of his reported 0722 position During this period h~ had been 1 mi J lj ng around in the same general area he railed to overwhelm the eVE grcupa

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Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

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J erill

93

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( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

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bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

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in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

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Page 2: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - -

= bull

rll~

Al6-3(16) UNIrEU STATE~ PACIFIC liLEET THIRD FLEFT

Serial t

Subject AItion Report - Period 23- 26 Octobel 1944 both dat 3

indusive

irJlediatu thraot Cocnand~r THL1D Fleet decide d to initiate carri r lIearchea to obtain earliest informati)n of ony neIDY movement t Olfl1rd Leyte

5 After nearly two weelai 0 intenaiV6 operations against Oldnamp l Formosa a d luzcn all of the carrie-r group3 neode rearming except for torshype jo~s aJld for the AP and SAP bawDs habtuaUy r eserv d for use egainst corbatshyant smiddot ip ene eroup Ta3k (roup 381 had be1ll started toward lithi on 23 October Task Groups 382 38 3 Cl1d 33 j~ were inw6diately nvailabl e

6 On the night 23- 24 Octo er Mk Groups 38 2 3 3 and 38 4 er aoved in close to ~he Philippine coas t pr el~1~r to lWQnching searches Task Grou~ )0 3 was placed eltl$ t of olillo I sland 0 cover the ~ e~t Coast ot Luzon Tasl Grenp 33 2 was phced close to ~an Bernardino Straits and Trusk C up 38 4

~ sent to be vicinity of Suri ~ao Str aits

7 At daTI 24 October search teams each conais t ing of Hellcats and Helldivers wero launched to cover t he Wes t Coast of LuLon an d the Sulu Sea and it s apgtroaches The sectors -ere aa shon on Track Chart ( Ene osu (C) ) The weatler ras favorable for search and stlike operatiols At 0046 (24) TaIk Grollp 3dl was oraered to ~t ltlbout and j)oceed too ~ a f uclinpound r endezvous wi h Task Units 30 8 4 and JO ~ 8 in La~itude 15i1 LonGit lde 10E at 0700 ( 25 )

g i~t 0810 24th seHrch plenes from Task Group 36 ~ sirhted t e Cente orce in Latitude 12-14 I Loncitude 121- 32 ~ on course 015 s ~ee lB bull bullhis force Wll in two [TOUps Thfl composition of the flrst Ereu as r epor t ed is 2 ~ B J or 4 CA or CL and 6 DO Ihe Jecond uoup wn3 rSi-orted to co tain 2 r- ) or 4 or CL ami 7 [10 fne COlllma de r TIl l(t i1Itercep ed t c3Ich nLJHl r Iort on V W 3clJIcl frc iU1 cy Md nt 022 olii nt-cd bIl rrent ciiPt h (23 2)U ) to GTF J13 eTC J83 and Cl 38 J~ and t l1e usual infor mati on addrellaees ivinG the contllct cOUlpositi on J bull eourSfl and speed IiliD was follo--shyea ct 0lt327 by urgent dispatch inatructne TElsk GlOlp 3 3 and Task Croup 38 4 to cone ntt te tOiard TWlk Group 3~ 2 at bFlst sp(Iec an to 8trike t hi s force

9 t 19u5 24th t Ie lltllk _ up 384 search ifltercepted and at tacked a force of 6 1 CAJ 4 DD at Latituu(t 08-5 I Lon - itude ill-50 E 90 thwet of e-1O1 The earch tem Nportcd 2 boLlb hi Ls in each BB roc Qt hit s on CA and 2 DD ~o heavy lStrafine of other 2 DD It ~ as ~dec1de t o adhere to the docill1on to have TG 384 cl0 e TG 38 2 and to shill target to the Center flrce on lLe c- ption thnt sm ~TH Fleet foroCis could takE care of the smaller Sout hern rorc bull

2 - 2 shy

- middot1-==_

nu

Al6-3(16)

Serial II - I

UNITED STATE~ PACIFIC FLrET TIIlIW LEET

Subject Action Report - Period 23-26 October 1944 both datea inclusive - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - --- - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

LO Analysis subsequent to the oppound1ration and stat ements of POls r eCClvered from t he water indicate t hat the ~nter Forc e contained 5 BE ( YAU-AlO lUSASHl NAGAro KOG0 HARUNA) 7 CA ICHOKU HAGURO llYOKO KUAW SVZUYA 1013 CHlKUUA) 1 CL ( N03HIi10 ) 13 DD Reports or 2-3 aaditionaJ CL cannot be r econciled See enclvsure (F) f or inio~~tion conoor ning composition of Southern Force Soe encl osure (F) concerning f at e of ATAGO and YAYA The probbble moveshyments of TAKAO are ment ioned in paraeraph 40 of t his r eport

11 ~e enemy r eact ed by launching a viciouB air attack against Ta~k Group 383 Pr~cr to t he enemJ attack our f or ces shot dowu 40 pl anes About 110 planes were shot down around Tsk Group 38 3 but the pnnCZTQN was i1it hard Task Group 38 3 was delayed in c omplyi ng with the orde r to concentrate by recove7 of search and a t t ack groups and by eUorts to ass i s t the burning PRUICJTQN BL1l1GIJA lORRISON and m I N whil e 88s i s t ing PRINGETOl wcr u batUy damaged when i he PRINCcroN I 8 after magadnau bl Gt up Lator in the day in or der t o b f ree t o ItJve tovlard t he enenv Northe r n Force PRI~JCETOlI was sunk DJid BI RlJlNGHUl UORRISON GATLn~G and IltIiN were Berlt to Ulithi f fgtr r epairs and for hospitalizashyt ion of the wounded

12 At thi~ t ime it waS evident that the Japanese Navy Wa8 making amp

maj or effort whether fo r dir ec t attack or tr=u1S JXlrt 111amp troops or botl was not apparent r thi~ was to be an all-out attacc by tho Japanes e Fleet theM was one piece missing in the puzz l e - the carrier 3 They wer e believed to hve been in th( Eipire and t her e had been sight i ngs and intelligence r eportgt which indishycated that r eple-Jshmeot measures might have bpen taRen for s ome import3J1t moveshyment from Elnpi M wat~rs AlthouG~ our submarines statluned 1r Enpire waters had not reported a carri euroll for ce it was felt that they wer e sure to be empioYEld in some munner 1n any operation as gre at as that revealed on t he morning of the ~tb CO1lequectly a search t o t he north by our carrie r pione was or dered and at 1640 I t 6l11 a search plane from Task Group 383 r epor t ed a forc e at Latitudtl 18-10 N Lo~tude 125- 30 L course 2]0 s peed 15 (The Northern Force)

13 Amplifying r eports of t his Northern Frlce varied In his 240817 eTF 38 listed thi~ t erce ae J CV 3-4 heavy cruisers and 6 DD at Latitude 18-10 N LoIl8i tude 125- 30 E c0111se210 spfJ ed 15 and stated that one of the enemy carrier s wal an lSE 01amp83 CTF 38 1~ 240942 dispatch statod that pilots who had had a good l ook reported 2 SHOKAKU CV 1 en 3 CL and 3 DD on course 270 speed 15 at Lati t ude 18-25 N Longi t ude 125-28 S at 1640 I t em while at Latitude 18-10 N Lonej t ude 125- 30 E ~ere 4 BB or CA 5 cruisers 6 DD on course 210 speed 15 at 1540 ItOIll Ono of t he BB was 1Gpor tgd to hayo Q f ll-ght do ck att At 1600 Item 2 DO war~ ropo1tod by bull oarrier aoaroh pl AnO t Lati t udo 19-40 N lAngitudG 123-00 i oourSG 240 lpooc1 12 CODIIWldr THIRD r ioetoonc1udod t hat th NOltherll Foro

3 - 3

- - - - - - -- - - -

YIU

Al6-J( 16) llNIlIamp) SIATES l FI( IEImiddotl 1 1I11Ugt 1 La- middot1

i)erlampl

Subject Action Report -- ~eriod 2-26 Octob~r 1944 both dates inc1usl vo bull

was disposed in two groups es t imated to contain a total of at least 17 ships and po5sibly as many a s 24 shi ps

L A curious pltint was apparent f r om the contact middot reports of the t hree ~orces they were Clll proceeding at deliberate speed oll1d it was inferred that t lere was a predcter-nined focus of geographical l ocation and time The IWve~Ilt8 indicated that a carefully worked-out coordinated Japanese plan waa in moti on nth 25 October as the earliest date of planned concerted action

15 Throughout the day (24th) carrie r strDc~s had been launched againt the Cl3nter Fore and all leports indicatod that t he Cente r ForcoJ~shying effectivelY and bpa~y drun~ In tho face of t hese continued strikes the Gent e r Force kept cotring with a det en lination that commanded r ospect By dusk t he ollowiIll damage hurl bee n r eportod At lo~t 4 and probably 5 BB torp9doed CUlQ bombod one probably Dunk Do miaiJJllUIl or 3 howy cruisor ll torpodoed tLfld other

ombodj 1 CL sunk 1 00 ounk 1 OD probably t)lnk iLOJ 4 dtJJllpoundIiiu c

16 T(Ulk Gr oup 30 2 m~Lda A total of 116 SOltiuu droPlgtod 23 lont ot bombs an J torpedl)e~~ r eporting t he DB YAU 1O dunared by j t or pedo hits arother YAATO BB ( pos$ibly same me) by 1 torp9do hit and 2 batci)s 1 ~AGTO BB hit by 1 torpedo and 1 bomb 1 KOiiGO BB by2 torpedoe s and 6 bombs 1 CA llCG I

possibly sunk by torpedo hit 1 CA NACHl hit by 1 t orpedo 1 CA TOrE hit by 1 torJ~do Task Gr oup 383 reported 1 BB badly hit damaging 2 others cnd 4 CA and 2 IL damaged i n the Center Force Task Group 384 reported 1 BB(1USASEI7) hit by torpedo afire dmll at bow and probably sWlk 1 YAlIAT0 BB 1 to 3 torpecoea 2 bomb hits 1 middotOllGO BB 1 bomb hit cruiser damaged 1 CL sunk 1 middot DO sunk 1 DO probab~ sunk 4 DO damaged Some details of the f oY-eeoing information were not available at dusk but f l as h r eports indicat ed beyond doubt that t he Center For ce had been badly mauled ~~th all of its BB and most of its CA tremendou8~ r eductld in f ightinG power and life

17 Although the Lenter Forco Iontinued to nove fo rward tho Cormand8r THIRD Fleet decided t hlt t his en~ forcn must be blindly obeyingmiddot an lIperi al C~1~ t o do o~ die but ~~th battl e e ffic i ency poundreatly impaired by t or pedo hits bomb hits topside d8J1lDge fi res and oasualties r r om l middot)i~ experienoe with tha J aps their blind adheNtnce to plan and th~ir i nabi lity to r eadjust dis turbed plans the COlllIllaOde r THlRD Floet had long ago aJoptod a policy of att3cking irate The Sjuthern and Center Forces had been under heavy and persiitent air att ack while procee~ t hroueh inland waters lJl daylight J ap dogg~ldne58 was adilrlttod and COlDlLallder THlRD Pleut r ecognizod lhe p08DibUity ~at tho ~entor Force might plod througP San Bernardino Straits and on to attack Lsyte forc~~ a 1a Guadalshycanal but C~1der THInD Fleet was convinced that the Center Force was ~o

tt~ - 4 shy

Fl tE

)6-)(16) UItED STATES PACIFIC F bullbullEET

Serial HInD ILEET

bull

-Subject Action Report - Period 23-2) October 1944 both dates

inclusive

heavily iamaged that it could not yin a decision while the po6s ible marlmum strength of t he Northern Force as reportd by CTF 38 240942 cons tituted a fresh anel poerf ul threat It was decided that earlleet poosible attack on the POKaI shyf u NOlt1erl (carrier) Forco was essontial f or breaking up the e flaIlOY plan and rstainin~ t he initiative

18 n 10 altornati ves wer e to

( a ) Divide the f ON es l eaving T1 34 t o block Slln Bernardino Stn 1 te whll~ t ho carr i e rD with light screo ns attaclted tho Northern Forctjj

(b) lJaintain int egr ity of our own entire etr11dllg s troneth conctmtrated off San Bernad1ngt Straits j

(c) Str i ko t he Northern Forco rlth tll of our own striking s t lunfth concent rJtee a1d le ave San BornarJino Str llitlJ wlguar dud

( a ) was reje t od j the potont i ti s t r e neth of the ltnd~ud Northe rn Force a too groat to l aavo W1lIlOlesmiddotod and reqldrin~ IT 34 to e06lge the ContJr Force whi1 at t he Sallie time exposed t o at tnll( by l lJld-bnsed alld poss ibly carri er-besed air attack V s not sOW1d This alternltivs s pr ad our s trength and ri sited unprofi t abl e d~nag9 in dotail

( b ) WaB rojoctod b eOlUS6 i t perdtted middotthe Norther n Force to funotion 13 planuo lest6d and because destruot ion of J apan S oa r r ier roro~ would Ulte ltlll mumiddoth t)

futue oporati ons

( c ) wal adoptod it mllintninod tho i ntority of tho Blue s t riki ng flee t i t offered bes t posaibility of 91lrpr ise nnd de3truti cn of unCJmY carr i er force It

s particularly sound and nocas liary i t the s t re th of tho Northern FOJoe proved to be the mwcilaum reported It lias r e coenizedthat the Center Force might sortie and inflict soons dlllll8Ge but its f ighting po(e r was cOI13id~ ted too seriously ashypaired to win a decision Finally_ i t W83 calculat ed that the Mrd Floet )rea could r etu--n in timB to Nvarse any advantage t hat the Center Forco m gi euroclLn and Commande r THIRD Fleet was 1i-m1y conv lod that (c ) would oontributl me n too the over-all philippines campaign even it a teJllporarily Ugh situation eXeted at teyte

19 It was i hard decision to llIaka and having made it Icamander

- 5 shy 5

Yl LE

Al6-3(16) UlilTED STATES 1(111( FLEET TlIllUgt loLEE1

Serial ~ bull r bull bull

bullSubject Action Report -- Pe~iod 2j-26 October 1944 both dates

inclusi ve - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_- - - - shy

THIRD Fleet was gravely concer~led until he received word that t l1e Centrn Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVSNTH fleet CV~ groupbullbull

20 At 2022 Task Groups )82 383 and j84 were givan orders t o as semble CLnd make night rw1 toward ~orthe rn Force preparatory to dawn attack The Jap lrnows hltW t o shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of COOmander THIRD r _eet plans had for weeks been prl3dicated on de~rirg the enemy that advant86e bJ closing promptly

21 At 2030 and 2l45 ( 24th) the Centor Force Ias snooped by an I NIERNDlJJCE VF(N) north of lotasbate on Vaiou6 COllr5es and trai1ing rrucn~~

--- 22 DurinC the run north care was t aken not to ovorrun the dlljmiddotlight

c1rcle of the No-thern Force a s to ao so would place the lJorthe rn Force beh en Task Force 38 and Leyto By daylight Task Force 34 was foruad up uhead of ~h8 carr ie r groups to provide for coorilinat ed air and surface attack on the i~orthel1l middot rorce

23 Dawn searches were launched and strike groups put in the air r adyen to hit as soon as contact faS made The Nort hern Force was located In Latltl Je 18-) 7 N Longit ude 126-15 E at 0730 Item on course 80 speed 20 and the first s trikes proceeded It once

24 In the meantime Task Gr uup 381 had put about and at 0700 (25) was in Latitu~ 15 N Longitude 10 E r eady to fuel from Task Units )084 and 308 8 Task liroup )81 was or dered to ll1l1Dent the a ~ arches from Talk Groups 382 38 ) and )84 to assis t in l ocat inb t he Northern Force and to obt rdn positive or negati ve informat ion oonce~ any enOln~ forc es to the east-war bull

25 The Northe rn Force was caught by urprise but Coumander THmD FleGt was puzzled by t he fact that there were scarcely any planes on ~he dl ke of or in the air near the enerny force and no sign of bogies around oW own force Later in the morning large bogies were picked up on the screen approChshyiog from the south j they did not attack and it is believed that they ~nc 9JBIl88 of the e~ carrier groups ferrying out to the carriers ~d an~ ampr~viag tHO late

26 The firat strike on the Northern Force r esulted in tbl 1 L~J r eported dallla6e 1 CV hit by a torpedo and J bonbs 1 CVL exploded anei oi l l C afire from bomb hits 1 DD hit Taok Force 34 waa advanoed for the ldll

- 6 - hi

~

I LE Al6-3(16) U~ITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TIIJHD FLEET Seri~

~ l

Sub ject Action Repol~ -- Period 23-26 October 1944 both dates inclusive - --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

27 In his di llpatchtgts 242225 242227 242230 and 242329 Comande r S vNTH Flee t nace urgent appeals f or help the SEVamplTH Fleet CVZS we r e u~der gunfi r e at t ack frOJl t he Cant er Forc tj nnd wlde r an attack from per si s t ent and s uic i dal s llore- lgt aseu air for c63 Although Talk Forc lI ) 4 was within 42 mi l os of t hl crippled UOlth0rn Force ~olDnande r THI RD Fla E t at 1115 t ur ne d TM k Group 38 2 plus 1 ASHI~GlOI JADuL lLSSJC l iDS=TTS and SOUTH DAKOT A 8oth nd di spa t ch ~d Tak Group 34 5 Rear Adniral Badge r in l a lA tj~l JiHili VI CJ~ lES lil lJJl HI LQXl and De sRon 52 ahead at high speed to t he as s isL[lllCe of the SEVl1lTIl Fleet Coreea

28 CTG 381 was direct ed to s trike the e neuy Center Force and to proc eed to a ssi s t SVpoundNTH Fle et f orces

29 Task Groups J83 aId J $4 (le ss detached eleoenttl) continued attacJs on the ~orthero For~e and ComSubPac ordered threo packs of submarines 0 tltJe posi tion between 120 E and 123 E to cut off eneq retreat Cruisers i iI ( destroyers of t he carrier grolips unde r Re or Adoiral Du Bose including the SiJjlA F~) MOBrIE iIlCHITA KEl OHIEA1 S and a dozen dostroyer went after the cripr- ltmiddot- The orthern For c e i s n OYI evaluat ed t o have consisted of 1 CV (ZUIKAKU) 3 en (CPlTOSE CIIYODA and ZUIHO - or pos s ibly RYUHO instead) 2 Bl3-XCV (ISE and liYUGA) 1 CA (pos s i bly l BUKI or lJCX~ ) 4 CL (OyeOO or possibly YAHAGI N~~A~IA ABUKUJiA and KISO 6 DD incl uding probably 3 TWU1SUKIs

) 0 The Nor t hern Force sustained the following los ses and damate at the hands of THlRD Fl pound9t forces 1 CV (ZUUI AKU ) sunk gt CVL ( CHITOS~ CHIYODA and ZUIHC ) sunk 1 Cr or DD and 1 DO sunk 1 CL possi bly sunk J 2 BB-XCV (ISE and HYUGA ) d~cd o~e by at l eas t 2 and pr obably 4 t orpedoes and bombs 1 CA d~ecd by soveral bOlllbs 1 CL dunaged by s ever al bombs j 1 CL torpedoed and later s unk by sub lDltgtri nea j 2 DO hoavily a t r of ed

) 1 Roache s Raiders and C1ar~y5 Crushers had o~ned in two groups in Latitnde 21 N LoI1(itude 125-30 E - l2h-30 E and Latitude 2l N Longi t ude lZ7 t - 128 E r espect i vely and caused further damage t o fleeing romnants of the Northern Force

32 In the lllSantirae I vthileTask Group 382 and Task Group 345 were middot oovi1t to t he s out hvtnrd at best speed t o r einforce the SEVEl~TH Fleet t he ePSlDf

ent er Force br oke of f the eneagement with the SEVEl~TH Fleet C1T~ and reti red t oward an Berna r dino Straits The reas on f or movements of the Cent er Force be t we6n 0924 and 1310 are not clear At 1046 CTi 77 reported the enemy Ntiring northeaft but accordios to lat e r report on~ as on course 150

0 at 1055 and

225 at ll45 middothen t he strike from Task Group 381 reached the Center Force at 1310 he was on course 010 chaJlJcd to 090 and then through 270

0 to the right t

000 At 1310 the Center Force Vias in Latitude U-46 1- Lltmgitude 126-16 E abv1t 13 milefl west of his reported 0722 position During this period h~ had been 1 mi J lj ng around in the same general area he railed to overwhelm the eVE grcupa

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nll

Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

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IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

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( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

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Page 3: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

- middot1-==_

nu

Al6-3(16)

Serial II - I

UNITED STATE~ PACIFIC FLrET TIIlIW LEET

Subject Action Report - Period 23-26 October 1944 both datea inclusive - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - --- - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

LO Analysis subsequent to the oppound1ration and stat ements of POls r eCClvered from t he water indicate t hat the ~nter Forc e contained 5 BE ( YAU-AlO lUSASHl NAGAro KOG0 HARUNA) 7 CA ICHOKU HAGURO llYOKO KUAW SVZUYA 1013 CHlKUUA) 1 CL ( N03HIi10 ) 13 DD Reports or 2-3 aaditionaJ CL cannot be r econciled See enclvsure (F) f or inio~~tion conoor ning composition of Southern Force Soe encl osure (F) concerning f at e of ATAGO and YAYA The probbble moveshyments of TAKAO are ment ioned in paraeraph 40 of t his r eport

11 ~e enemy r eact ed by launching a viciouB air attack against Ta~k Group 383 Pr~cr to t he enemJ attack our f or ces shot dowu 40 pl anes About 110 planes were shot down around Tsk Group 38 3 but the pnnCZTQN was i1it hard Task Group 38 3 was delayed in c omplyi ng with the orde r to concentrate by recove7 of search and a t t ack groups and by eUorts to ass i s t the burning PRUICJTQN BL1l1GIJA lORRISON and m I N whil e 88s i s t ing PRINGETOl wcr u batUy damaged when i he PRINCcroN I 8 after magadnau bl Gt up Lator in the day in or der t o b f ree t o ItJve tovlard t he enenv Northe r n Force PRI~JCETOlI was sunk DJid BI RlJlNGHUl UORRISON GATLn~G and IltIiN were Berlt to Ulithi f fgtr r epairs and for hospitalizashyt ion of the wounded

12 At thi~ t ime it waS evident that the Japanese Navy Wa8 making amp

maj or effort whether fo r dir ec t attack or tr=u1S JXlrt 111amp troops or botl was not apparent r thi~ was to be an all-out attacc by tho Japanes e Fleet theM was one piece missing in the puzz l e - the carrier 3 They wer e believed to hve been in th( Eipire and t her e had been sight i ngs and intelligence r eportgt which indishycated that r eple-Jshmeot measures might have bpen taRen for s ome import3J1t moveshyment from Elnpi M wat~rs AlthouG~ our submarines statluned 1r Enpire waters had not reported a carri euroll for ce it was felt that they wer e sure to be empioYEld in some munner 1n any operation as gre at as that revealed on t he morning of the ~tb CO1lequectly a search t o t he north by our carrie r pione was or dered and at 1640 I t 6l11 a search plane from Task Group 383 r epor t ed a forc e at Latitudtl 18-10 N Lo~tude 125- 30 L course 2]0 s peed 15 (The Northern Force)

13 Amplifying r eports of t his Northern Frlce varied In his 240817 eTF 38 listed thi~ t erce ae J CV 3-4 heavy cruisers and 6 DD at Latitude 18-10 N LoIl8i tude 125- 30 E c0111se210 spfJ ed 15 and stated that one of the enemy carrier s wal an lSE 01amp83 CTF 38 1~ 240942 dispatch statod that pilots who had had a good l ook reported 2 SHOKAKU CV 1 en 3 CL and 3 DD on course 270 speed 15 at Lati t ude 18-25 N Longi t ude 125-28 S at 1640 I t em while at Latitude 18-10 N Lonej t ude 125- 30 E ~ere 4 BB or CA 5 cruisers 6 DD on course 210 speed 15 at 1540 ItOIll Ono of t he BB was 1Gpor tgd to hayo Q f ll-ght do ck att At 1600 Item 2 DO war~ ropo1tod by bull oarrier aoaroh pl AnO t Lati t udo 19-40 N lAngitudG 123-00 i oourSG 240 lpooc1 12 CODIIWldr THIRD r ioetoonc1udod t hat th NOltherll Foro

3 - 3

- - - - - - -- - - -

YIU

Al6-J( 16) llNIlIamp) SIATES l FI( IEImiddotl 1 1I11Ugt 1 La- middot1

i)erlampl

Subject Action Report -- ~eriod 2-26 Octob~r 1944 both dates inc1usl vo bull

was disposed in two groups es t imated to contain a total of at least 17 ships and po5sibly as many a s 24 shi ps

L A curious pltint was apparent f r om the contact middot reports of the t hree ~orces they were Clll proceeding at deliberate speed oll1d it was inferred that t lere was a predcter-nined focus of geographical l ocation and time The IWve~Ilt8 indicated that a carefully worked-out coordinated Japanese plan waa in moti on nth 25 October as the earliest date of planned concerted action

15 Throughout the day (24th) carrie r strDc~s had been launched againt the Cl3nter Fore and all leports indicatod that t he Cente r ForcoJ~shying effectivelY and bpa~y drun~ In tho face of t hese continued strikes the Gent e r Force kept cotring with a det en lination that commanded r ospect By dusk t he ollowiIll damage hurl bee n r eportod At lo~t 4 and probably 5 BB torp9doed CUlQ bombod one probably Dunk Do miaiJJllUIl or 3 howy cruisor ll torpodoed tLfld other

ombodj 1 CL sunk 1 00 ounk 1 OD probably t)lnk iLOJ 4 dtJJllpoundIiiu c

16 T(Ulk Gr oup 30 2 m~Lda A total of 116 SOltiuu droPlgtod 23 lont ot bombs an J torpedl)e~~ r eporting t he DB YAU 1O dunared by j t or pedo hits arother YAATO BB ( pos$ibly same me) by 1 torp9do hit and 2 batci)s 1 ~AGTO BB hit by 1 torpedo and 1 bomb 1 KOiiGO BB by2 torpedoe s and 6 bombs 1 CA llCG I

possibly sunk by torpedo hit 1 CA NACHl hit by 1 t orpedo 1 CA TOrE hit by 1 torJ~do Task Gr oup 383 reported 1 BB badly hit damaging 2 others cnd 4 CA and 2 IL damaged i n the Center Force Task Group 384 reported 1 BB(1USASEI7) hit by torpedo afire dmll at bow and probably sWlk 1 YAlIAT0 BB 1 to 3 torpecoea 2 bomb hits 1 middotOllGO BB 1 bomb hit cruiser damaged 1 CL sunk 1 middot DO sunk 1 DO probab~ sunk 4 DO damaged Some details of the f oY-eeoing information were not available at dusk but f l as h r eports indicat ed beyond doubt that t he Center For ce had been badly mauled ~~th all of its BB and most of its CA tremendou8~ r eductld in f ightinG power and life

17 Although the Lenter Forco Iontinued to nove fo rward tho Cormand8r THIRD Fleet decided t hlt t his en~ forcn must be blindly obeyingmiddot an lIperi al C~1~ t o do o~ die but ~~th battl e e ffic i ency poundreatly impaired by t or pedo hits bomb hits topside d8J1lDge fi res and oasualties r r om l middot)i~ experienoe with tha J aps their blind adheNtnce to plan and th~ir i nabi lity to r eadjust dis turbed plans the COlllIllaOde r THlRD Floet had long ago aJoptod a policy of att3cking irate The Sjuthern and Center Forces had been under heavy and persiitent air att ack while procee~ t hroueh inland waters lJl daylight J ap dogg~ldne58 was adilrlttod and COlDlLallder THlRD Pleut r ecognizod lhe p08DibUity ~at tho ~entor Force might plod througP San Bernardino Straits and on to attack Lsyte forc~~ a 1a Guadalshycanal but C~1der THInD Fleet was convinced that the Center Force was ~o

tt~ - 4 shy

Fl tE

)6-)(16) UItED STATES PACIFIC F bullbullEET

Serial HInD ILEET

bull

-Subject Action Report - Period 23-2) October 1944 both dates

inclusive

heavily iamaged that it could not yin a decision while the po6s ible marlmum strength of t he Northern Force as reportd by CTF 38 240942 cons tituted a fresh anel poerf ul threat It was decided that earlleet poosible attack on the POKaI shyf u NOlt1erl (carrier) Forco was essontial f or breaking up the e flaIlOY plan and rstainin~ t he initiative

18 n 10 altornati ves wer e to

( a ) Divide the f ON es l eaving T1 34 t o block Slln Bernardino Stn 1 te whll~ t ho carr i e rD with light screo ns attaclted tho Northern Forctjj

(b) lJaintain int egr ity of our own entire etr11dllg s troneth conctmtrated off San Bernad1ngt Straits j

(c) Str i ko t he Northern Forco rlth tll of our own striking s t lunfth concent rJtee a1d le ave San BornarJino Str llitlJ wlguar dud

( a ) was reje t od j the potont i ti s t r e neth of the ltnd~ud Northe rn Force a too groat to l aavo W1lIlOlesmiddotod and reqldrin~ IT 34 to e06lge the ContJr Force whi1 at t he Sallie time exposed t o at tnll( by l lJld-bnsed alld poss ibly carri er-besed air attack V s not sOW1d This alternltivs s pr ad our s trength and ri sited unprofi t abl e d~nag9 in dotail

( b ) WaB rojoctod b eOlUS6 i t perdtted middotthe Norther n Force to funotion 13 planuo lest6d and because destruot ion of J apan S oa r r ier roro~ would Ulte ltlll mumiddoth t)

futue oporati ons

( c ) wal adoptod it mllintninod tho i ntority of tho Blue s t riki ng flee t i t offered bes t posaibility of 91lrpr ise nnd de3truti cn of unCJmY carr i er force It

s particularly sound and nocas liary i t the s t re th of tho Northern FOJoe proved to be the mwcilaum reported It lias r e coenizedthat the Center Force might sortie and inflict soons dlllll8Ge but its f ighting po(e r was cOI13id~ ted too seriously ashypaired to win a decision Finally_ i t W83 calculat ed that the Mrd Floet )rea could r etu--n in timB to Nvarse any advantage t hat the Center Forco m gi euroclLn and Commande r THIRD Fleet was 1i-m1y conv lod that (c ) would oontributl me n too the over-all philippines campaign even it a teJllporarily Ugh situation eXeted at teyte

19 It was i hard decision to llIaka and having made it Icamander

- 5 shy 5

Yl LE

Al6-3(16) UlilTED STATES 1(111( FLEET TlIllUgt loLEE1

Serial ~ bull r bull bull

bullSubject Action Report -- Pe~iod 2j-26 October 1944 both dates

inclusi ve - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_- - - - shy

THIRD Fleet was gravely concer~led until he received word that t l1e Centrn Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVSNTH fleet CV~ groupbullbull

20 At 2022 Task Groups )82 383 and j84 were givan orders t o as semble CLnd make night rw1 toward ~orthe rn Force preparatory to dawn attack The Jap lrnows hltW t o shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of COOmander THIRD r _eet plans had for weeks been prl3dicated on de~rirg the enemy that advant86e bJ closing promptly

21 At 2030 and 2l45 ( 24th) the Centor Force Ias snooped by an I NIERNDlJJCE VF(N) north of lotasbate on Vaiou6 COllr5es and trai1ing rrucn~~

--- 22 DurinC the run north care was t aken not to ovorrun the dlljmiddotlight

c1rcle of the No-thern Force a s to ao so would place the lJorthe rn Force beh en Task Force 38 and Leyto By daylight Task Force 34 was foruad up uhead of ~h8 carr ie r groups to provide for coorilinat ed air and surface attack on the i~orthel1l middot rorce

23 Dawn searches were launched and strike groups put in the air r adyen to hit as soon as contact faS made The Nort hern Force was located In Latltl Je 18-) 7 N Longit ude 126-15 E at 0730 Item on course 80 speed 20 and the first s trikes proceeded It once

24 In the meantime Task Gr uup 381 had put about and at 0700 (25) was in Latitu~ 15 N Longitude 10 E r eady to fuel from Task Units )084 and 308 8 Task liroup )81 was or dered to ll1l1Dent the a ~ arches from Talk Groups 382 38 ) and )84 to assis t in l ocat inb t he Northern Force and to obt rdn positive or negati ve informat ion oonce~ any enOln~ forc es to the east-war bull

25 The Northe rn Force was caught by urprise but Coumander THmD FleGt was puzzled by t he fact that there were scarcely any planes on ~he dl ke of or in the air near the enerny force and no sign of bogies around oW own force Later in the morning large bogies were picked up on the screen approChshyiog from the south j they did not attack and it is believed that they ~nc 9JBIl88 of the e~ carrier groups ferrying out to the carriers ~d an~ ampr~viag tHO late

26 The firat strike on the Northern Force r esulted in tbl 1 L~J r eported dallla6e 1 CV hit by a torpedo and J bonbs 1 CVL exploded anei oi l l C afire from bomb hits 1 DD hit Taok Force 34 waa advanoed for the ldll

- 6 - hi

~

I LE Al6-3(16) U~ITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TIIJHD FLEET Seri~

~ l

Sub ject Action Repol~ -- Period 23-26 October 1944 both dates inclusive - --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

27 In his di llpatchtgts 242225 242227 242230 and 242329 Comande r S vNTH Flee t nace urgent appeals f or help the SEVamplTH Fleet CVZS we r e u~der gunfi r e at t ack frOJl t he Cant er Forc tj nnd wlde r an attack from per si s t ent and s uic i dal s llore- lgt aseu air for c63 Although Talk Forc lI ) 4 was within 42 mi l os of t hl crippled UOlth0rn Force ~olDnande r THI RD Fla E t at 1115 t ur ne d TM k Group 38 2 plus 1 ASHI~GlOI JADuL lLSSJC l iDS=TTS and SOUTH DAKOT A 8oth nd di spa t ch ~d Tak Group 34 5 Rear Adniral Badge r in l a lA tj~l JiHili VI CJ~ lES lil lJJl HI LQXl and De sRon 52 ahead at high speed to t he as s isL[lllCe of the SEVl1lTIl Fleet Coreea

28 CTG 381 was direct ed to s trike the e neuy Center Force and to proc eed to a ssi s t SVpoundNTH Fle et f orces

29 Task Groups J83 aId J $4 (le ss detached eleoenttl) continued attacJs on the ~orthero For~e and ComSubPac ordered threo packs of submarines 0 tltJe posi tion between 120 E and 123 E to cut off eneq retreat Cruisers i iI ( destroyers of t he carrier grolips unde r Re or Adoiral Du Bose including the SiJjlA F~) MOBrIE iIlCHITA KEl OHIEA1 S and a dozen dostroyer went after the cripr- ltmiddot- The orthern For c e i s n OYI evaluat ed t o have consisted of 1 CV (ZUIKAKU) 3 en (CPlTOSE CIIYODA and ZUIHO - or pos s ibly RYUHO instead) 2 Bl3-XCV (ISE and liYUGA) 1 CA (pos s i bly l BUKI or lJCX~ ) 4 CL (OyeOO or possibly YAHAGI N~~A~IA ABUKUJiA and KISO 6 DD incl uding probably 3 TWU1SUKIs

) 0 The Nor t hern Force sustained the following los ses and damate at the hands of THlRD Fl pound9t forces 1 CV (ZUUI AKU ) sunk gt CVL ( CHITOS~ CHIYODA and ZUIHC ) sunk 1 Cr or DD and 1 DO sunk 1 CL possi bly sunk J 2 BB-XCV (ISE and HYUGA ) d~cd o~e by at l eas t 2 and pr obably 4 t orpedoes and bombs 1 CA d~ecd by soveral bOlllbs 1 CL dunaged by s ever al bombs j 1 CL torpedoed and later s unk by sub lDltgtri nea j 2 DO hoavily a t r of ed

) 1 Roache s Raiders and C1ar~y5 Crushers had o~ned in two groups in Latitnde 21 N LoI1(itude 125-30 E - l2h-30 E and Latitude 2l N Longi t ude lZ7 t - 128 E r espect i vely and caused further damage t o fleeing romnants of the Northern Force

32 In the lllSantirae I vthileTask Group 382 and Task Group 345 were middot oovi1t to t he s out hvtnrd at best speed t o r einforce the SEVEl~TH Fleet t he ePSlDf

ent er Force br oke of f the eneagement with the SEVEl~TH Fleet C1T~ and reti red t oward an Berna r dino Straits The reas on f or movements of the Cent er Force be t we6n 0924 and 1310 are not clear At 1046 CTi 77 reported the enemy Ntiring northeaft but accordios to lat e r report on~ as on course 150

0 at 1055 and

225 at ll45 middothen t he strike from Task Group 381 reached the Center Force at 1310 he was on course 010 chaJlJcd to 090 and then through 270

0 to the right t

000 At 1310 the Center Force Vias in Latitude U-46 1- Lltmgitude 126-16 E abv1t 13 milefl west of his reported 0722 position During this period h~ had been 1 mi J lj ng around in the same general area he railed to overwhelm the eVE grcupa

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Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

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IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

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Page 4: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

- - - - - - -- - - -

YIU

Al6-J( 16) llNIlIamp) SIATES l FI( IEImiddotl 1 1I11Ugt 1 La- middot1

i)erlampl

Subject Action Report -- ~eriod 2-26 Octob~r 1944 both dates inc1usl vo bull

was disposed in two groups es t imated to contain a total of at least 17 ships and po5sibly as many a s 24 shi ps

L A curious pltint was apparent f r om the contact middot reports of the t hree ~orces they were Clll proceeding at deliberate speed oll1d it was inferred that t lere was a predcter-nined focus of geographical l ocation and time The IWve~Ilt8 indicated that a carefully worked-out coordinated Japanese plan waa in moti on nth 25 October as the earliest date of planned concerted action

15 Throughout the day (24th) carrie r strDc~s had been launched againt the Cl3nter Fore and all leports indicatod that t he Cente r ForcoJ~shying effectivelY and bpa~y drun~ In tho face of t hese continued strikes the Gent e r Force kept cotring with a det en lination that commanded r ospect By dusk t he ollowiIll damage hurl bee n r eportod At lo~t 4 and probably 5 BB torp9doed CUlQ bombod one probably Dunk Do miaiJJllUIl or 3 howy cruisor ll torpodoed tLfld other

ombodj 1 CL sunk 1 00 ounk 1 OD probably t)lnk iLOJ 4 dtJJllpoundIiiu c

16 T(Ulk Gr oup 30 2 m~Lda A total of 116 SOltiuu droPlgtod 23 lont ot bombs an J torpedl)e~~ r eporting t he DB YAU 1O dunared by j t or pedo hits arother YAATO BB ( pos$ibly same me) by 1 torp9do hit and 2 batci)s 1 ~AGTO BB hit by 1 torpedo and 1 bomb 1 KOiiGO BB by2 torpedoe s and 6 bombs 1 CA llCG I

possibly sunk by torpedo hit 1 CA NACHl hit by 1 t orpedo 1 CA TOrE hit by 1 torJ~do Task Gr oup 383 reported 1 BB badly hit damaging 2 others cnd 4 CA and 2 IL damaged i n the Center Force Task Group 384 reported 1 BB(1USASEI7) hit by torpedo afire dmll at bow and probably sWlk 1 YAlIAT0 BB 1 to 3 torpecoea 2 bomb hits 1 middotOllGO BB 1 bomb hit cruiser damaged 1 CL sunk 1 middot DO sunk 1 DO probab~ sunk 4 DO damaged Some details of the f oY-eeoing information were not available at dusk but f l as h r eports indicat ed beyond doubt that t he Center For ce had been badly mauled ~~th all of its BB and most of its CA tremendou8~ r eductld in f ightinG power and life

17 Although the Lenter Forco Iontinued to nove fo rward tho Cormand8r THIRD Fleet decided t hlt t his en~ forcn must be blindly obeyingmiddot an lIperi al C~1~ t o do o~ die but ~~th battl e e ffic i ency poundreatly impaired by t or pedo hits bomb hits topside d8J1lDge fi res and oasualties r r om l middot)i~ experienoe with tha J aps their blind adheNtnce to plan and th~ir i nabi lity to r eadjust dis turbed plans the COlllIllaOde r THlRD Floet had long ago aJoptod a policy of att3cking irate The Sjuthern and Center Forces had been under heavy and persiitent air att ack while procee~ t hroueh inland waters lJl daylight J ap dogg~ldne58 was adilrlttod and COlDlLallder THlRD Pleut r ecognizod lhe p08DibUity ~at tho ~entor Force might plod througP San Bernardino Straits and on to attack Lsyte forc~~ a 1a Guadalshycanal but C~1der THInD Fleet was convinced that the Center Force was ~o

tt~ - 4 shy

Fl tE

)6-)(16) UItED STATES PACIFIC F bullbullEET

Serial HInD ILEET

bull

-Subject Action Report - Period 23-2) October 1944 both dates

inclusive

heavily iamaged that it could not yin a decision while the po6s ible marlmum strength of t he Northern Force as reportd by CTF 38 240942 cons tituted a fresh anel poerf ul threat It was decided that earlleet poosible attack on the POKaI shyf u NOlt1erl (carrier) Forco was essontial f or breaking up the e flaIlOY plan and rstainin~ t he initiative

18 n 10 altornati ves wer e to

( a ) Divide the f ON es l eaving T1 34 t o block Slln Bernardino Stn 1 te whll~ t ho carr i e rD with light screo ns attaclted tho Northern Forctjj

(b) lJaintain int egr ity of our own entire etr11dllg s troneth conctmtrated off San Bernad1ngt Straits j

(c) Str i ko t he Northern Forco rlth tll of our own striking s t lunfth concent rJtee a1d le ave San BornarJino Str llitlJ wlguar dud

( a ) was reje t od j the potont i ti s t r e neth of the ltnd~ud Northe rn Force a too groat to l aavo W1lIlOlesmiddotod and reqldrin~ IT 34 to e06lge the ContJr Force whi1 at t he Sallie time exposed t o at tnll( by l lJld-bnsed alld poss ibly carri er-besed air attack V s not sOW1d This alternltivs s pr ad our s trength and ri sited unprofi t abl e d~nag9 in dotail

( b ) WaB rojoctod b eOlUS6 i t perdtted middotthe Norther n Force to funotion 13 planuo lest6d and because destruot ion of J apan S oa r r ier roro~ would Ulte ltlll mumiddoth t)

futue oporati ons

( c ) wal adoptod it mllintninod tho i ntority of tho Blue s t riki ng flee t i t offered bes t posaibility of 91lrpr ise nnd de3truti cn of unCJmY carr i er force It

s particularly sound and nocas liary i t the s t re th of tho Northern FOJoe proved to be the mwcilaum reported It lias r e coenizedthat the Center Force might sortie and inflict soons dlllll8Ge but its f ighting po(e r was cOI13id~ ted too seriously ashypaired to win a decision Finally_ i t W83 calculat ed that the Mrd Floet )rea could r etu--n in timB to Nvarse any advantage t hat the Center Forco m gi euroclLn and Commande r THIRD Fleet was 1i-m1y conv lod that (c ) would oontributl me n too the over-all philippines campaign even it a teJllporarily Ugh situation eXeted at teyte

19 It was i hard decision to llIaka and having made it Icamander

- 5 shy 5

Yl LE

Al6-3(16) UlilTED STATES 1(111( FLEET TlIllUgt loLEE1

Serial ~ bull r bull bull

bullSubject Action Report -- Pe~iod 2j-26 October 1944 both dates

inclusi ve - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_- - - - shy

THIRD Fleet was gravely concer~led until he received word that t l1e Centrn Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVSNTH fleet CV~ groupbullbull

20 At 2022 Task Groups )82 383 and j84 were givan orders t o as semble CLnd make night rw1 toward ~orthe rn Force preparatory to dawn attack The Jap lrnows hltW t o shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of COOmander THIRD r _eet plans had for weeks been prl3dicated on de~rirg the enemy that advant86e bJ closing promptly

21 At 2030 and 2l45 ( 24th) the Centor Force Ias snooped by an I NIERNDlJJCE VF(N) north of lotasbate on Vaiou6 COllr5es and trai1ing rrucn~~

--- 22 DurinC the run north care was t aken not to ovorrun the dlljmiddotlight

c1rcle of the No-thern Force a s to ao so would place the lJorthe rn Force beh en Task Force 38 and Leyto By daylight Task Force 34 was foruad up uhead of ~h8 carr ie r groups to provide for coorilinat ed air and surface attack on the i~orthel1l middot rorce

23 Dawn searches were launched and strike groups put in the air r adyen to hit as soon as contact faS made The Nort hern Force was located In Latltl Je 18-) 7 N Longit ude 126-15 E at 0730 Item on course 80 speed 20 and the first s trikes proceeded It once

24 In the meantime Task Gr uup 381 had put about and at 0700 (25) was in Latitu~ 15 N Longitude 10 E r eady to fuel from Task Units )084 and 308 8 Task liroup )81 was or dered to ll1l1Dent the a ~ arches from Talk Groups 382 38 ) and )84 to assis t in l ocat inb t he Northern Force and to obt rdn positive or negati ve informat ion oonce~ any enOln~ forc es to the east-war bull

25 The Northe rn Force was caught by urprise but Coumander THmD FleGt was puzzled by t he fact that there were scarcely any planes on ~he dl ke of or in the air near the enerny force and no sign of bogies around oW own force Later in the morning large bogies were picked up on the screen approChshyiog from the south j they did not attack and it is believed that they ~nc 9JBIl88 of the e~ carrier groups ferrying out to the carriers ~d an~ ampr~viag tHO late

26 The firat strike on the Northern Force r esulted in tbl 1 L~J r eported dallla6e 1 CV hit by a torpedo and J bonbs 1 CVL exploded anei oi l l C afire from bomb hits 1 DD hit Taok Force 34 waa advanoed for the ldll

- 6 - hi

~

I LE Al6-3(16) U~ITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TIIJHD FLEET Seri~

~ l

Sub ject Action Repol~ -- Period 23-26 October 1944 both dates inclusive - --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

27 In his di llpatchtgts 242225 242227 242230 and 242329 Comande r S vNTH Flee t nace urgent appeals f or help the SEVamplTH Fleet CVZS we r e u~der gunfi r e at t ack frOJl t he Cant er Forc tj nnd wlde r an attack from per si s t ent and s uic i dal s llore- lgt aseu air for c63 Although Talk Forc lI ) 4 was within 42 mi l os of t hl crippled UOlth0rn Force ~olDnande r THI RD Fla E t at 1115 t ur ne d TM k Group 38 2 plus 1 ASHI~GlOI JADuL lLSSJC l iDS=TTS and SOUTH DAKOT A 8oth nd di spa t ch ~d Tak Group 34 5 Rear Adniral Badge r in l a lA tj~l JiHili VI CJ~ lES lil lJJl HI LQXl and De sRon 52 ahead at high speed to t he as s isL[lllCe of the SEVl1lTIl Fleet Coreea

28 CTG 381 was direct ed to s trike the e neuy Center Force and to proc eed to a ssi s t SVpoundNTH Fle et f orces

29 Task Groups J83 aId J $4 (le ss detached eleoenttl) continued attacJs on the ~orthero For~e and ComSubPac ordered threo packs of submarines 0 tltJe posi tion between 120 E and 123 E to cut off eneq retreat Cruisers i iI ( destroyers of t he carrier grolips unde r Re or Adoiral Du Bose including the SiJjlA F~) MOBrIE iIlCHITA KEl OHIEA1 S and a dozen dostroyer went after the cripr- ltmiddot- The orthern For c e i s n OYI evaluat ed t o have consisted of 1 CV (ZUIKAKU) 3 en (CPlTOSE CIIYODA and ZUIHO - or pos s ibly RYUHO instead) 2 Bl3-XCV (ISE and liYUGA) 1 CA (pos s i bly l BUKI or lJCX~ ) 4 CL (OyeOO or possibly YAHAGI N~~A~IA ABUKUJiA and KISO 6 DD incl uding probably 3 TWU1SUKIs

) 0 The Nor t hern Force sustained the following los ses and damate at the hands of THlRD Fl pound9t forces 1 CV (ZUUI AKU ) sunk gt CVL ( CHITOS~ CHIYODA and ZUIHC ) sunk 1 Cr or DD and 1 DO sunk 1 CL possi bly sunk J 2 BB-XCV (ISE and HYUGA ) d~cd o~e by at l eas t 2 and pr obably 4 t orpedoes and bombs 1 CA d~ecd by soveral bOlllbs 1 CL dunaged by s ever al bombs j 1 CL torpedoed and later s unk by sub lDltgtri nea j 2 DO hoavily a t r of ed

) 1 Roache s Raiders and C1ar~y5 Crushers had o~ned in two groups in Latitnde 21 N LoI1(itude 125-30 E - l2h-30 E and Latitude 2l N Longi t ude lZ7 t - 128 E r espect i vely and caused further damage t o fleeing romnants of the Northern Force

32 In the lllSantirae I vthileTask Group 382 and Task Group 345 were middot oovi1t to t he s out hvtnrd at best speed t o r einforce the SEVEl~TH Fleet t he ePSlDf

ent er Force br oke of f the eneagement with the SEVEl~TH Fleet C1T~ and reti red t oward an Berna r dino Straits The reas on f or movements of the Cent er Force be t we6n 0924 and 1310 are not clear At 1046 CTi 77 reported the enemy Ntiring northeaft but accordios to lat e r report on~ as on course 150

0 at 1055 and

225 at ll45 middothen t he strike from Task Group 381 reached the Center Force at 1310 he was on course 010 chaJlJcd to 090 and then through 270

0 to the right t

000 At 1310 the Center Force Vias in Latitude U-46 1- Lltmgitude 126-16 E abv1t 13 milefl west of his reported 0722 position During this period h~ had been 1 mi J lj ng around in the same general area he railed to overwhelm the eVE grcupa

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- -~rc - ~t r1 Lll o~ rc 10 J ~lJl C I Tl)f 0 RrotIor t~~ to~J ~tmiddot ~_C~ t J

m o n~9np 1=-t 1- o U ru ~q rgto 40( 1 Tt~L ~ L~

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J1311 mmu 1111 J JJIJJ SUVLS a3JJ~n ~-

nll

Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

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~

IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

o ~

Page 5: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

Fl tE

)6-)(16) UItED STATES PACIFIC F bullbullEET

Serial HInD ILEET

bull

-Subject Action Report - Period 23-2) October 1944 both dates

inclusive

heavily iamaged that it could not yin a decision while the po6s ible marlmum strength of t he Northern Force as reportd by CTF 38 240942 cons tituted a fresh anel poerf ul threat It was decided that earlleet poosible attack on the POKaI shyf u NOlt1erl (carrier) Forco was essontial f or breaking up the e flaIlOY plan and rstainin~ t he initiative

18 n 10 altornati ves wer e to

( a ) Divide the f ON es l eaving T1 34 t o block Slln Bernardino Stn 1 te whll~ t ho carr i e rD with light screo ns attaclted tho Northern Forctjj

(b) lJaintain int egr ity of our own entire etr11dllg s troneth conctmtrated off San Bernad1ngt Straits j

(c) Str i ko t he Northern Forco rlth tll of our own striking s t lunfth concent rJtee a1d le ave San BornarJino Str llitlJ wlguar dud

( a ) was reje t od j the potont i ti s t r e neth of the ltnd~ud Northe rn Force a too groat to l aavo W1lIlOlesmiddotod and reqldrin~ IT 34 to e06lge the ContJr Force whi1 at t he Sallie time exposed t o at tnll( by l lJld-bnsed alld poss ibly carri er-besed air attack V s not sOW1d This alternltivs s pr ad our s trength and ri sited unprofi t abl e d~nag9 in dotail

( b ) WaB rojoctod b eOlUS6 i t perdtted middotthe Norther n Force to funotion 13 planuo lest6d and because destruot ion of J apan S oa r r ier roro~ would Ulte ltlll mumiddoth t)

futue oporati ons

( c ) wal adoptod it mllintninod tho i ntority of tho Blue s t riki ng flee t i t offered bes t posaibility of 91lrpr ise nnd de3truti cn of unCJmY carr i er force It

s particularly sound and nocas liary i t the s t re th of tho Northern FOJoe proved to be the mwcilaum reported It lias r e coenizedthat the Center Force might sortie and inflict soons dlllll8Ge but its f ighting po(e r was cOI13id~ ted too seriously ashypaired to win a decision Finally_ i t W83 calculat ed that the Mrd Floet )rea could r etu--n in timB to Nvarse any advantage t hat the Center Forco m gi euroclLn and Commande r THIRD Fleet was 1i-m1y conv lod that (c ) would oontributl me n too the over-all philippines campaign even it a teJllporarily Ugh situation eXeted at teyte

19 It was i hard decision to llIaka and having made it Icamander

- 5 shy 5

Yl LE

Al6-3(16) UlilTED STATES 1(111( FLEET TlIllUgt loLEE1

Serial ~ bull r bull bull

bullSubject Action Report -- Pe~iod 2j-26 October 1944 both dates

inclusi ve - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_- - - - shy

THIRD Fleet was gravely concer~led until he received word that t l1e Centrn Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVSNTH fleet CV~ groupbullbull

20 At 2022 Task Groups )82 383 and j84 were givan orders t o as semble CLnd make night rw1 toward ~orthe rn Force preparatory to dawn attack The Jap lrnows hltW t o shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of COOmander THIRD r _eet plans had for weeks been prl3dicated on de~rirg the enemy that advant86e bJ closing promptly

21 At 2030 and 2l45 ( 24th) the Centor Force Ias snooped by an I NIERNDlJJCE VF(N) north of lotasbate on Vaiou6 COllr5es and trai1ing rrucn~~

--- 22 DurinC the run north care was t aken not to ovorrun the dlljmiddotlight

c1rcle of the No-thern Force a s to ao so would place the lJorthe rn Force beh en Task Force 38 and Leyto By daylight Task Force 34 was foruad up uhead of ~h8 carr ie r groups to provide for coorilinat ed air and surface attack on the i~orthel1l middot rorce

23 Dawn searches were launched and strike groups put in the air r adyen to hit as soon as contact faS made The Nort hern Force was located In Latltl Je 18-) 7 N Longit ude 126-15 E at 0730 Item on course 80 speed 20 and the first s trikes proceeded It once

24 In the meantime Task Gr uup 381 had put about and at 0700 (25) was in Latitu~ 15 N Longitude 10 E r eady to fuel from Task Units )084 and 308 8 Task liroup )81 was or dered to ll1l1Dent the a ~ arches from Talk Groups 382 38 ) and )84 to assis t in l ocat inb t he Northern Force and to obt rdn positive or negati ve informat ion oonce~ any enOln~ forc es to the east-war bull

25 The Northe rn Force was caught by urprise but Coumander THmD FleGt was puzzled by t he fact that there were scarcely any planes on ~he dl ke of or in the air near the enerny force and no sign of bogies around oW own force Later in the morning large bogies were picked up on the screen approChshyiog from the south j they did not attack and it is believed that they ~nc 9JBIl88 of the e~ carrier groups ferrying out to the carriers ~d an~ ampr~viag tHO late

26 The firat strike on the Northern Force r esulted in tbl 1 L~J r eported dallla6e 1 CV hit by a torpedo and J bonbs 1 CVL exploded anei oi l l C afire from bomb hits 1 DD hit Taok Force 34 waa advanoed for the ldll

- 6 - hi

~

I LE Al6-3(16) U~ITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TIIJHD FLEET Seri~

~ l

Sub ject Action Repol~ -- Period 23-26 October 1944 both dates inclusive - --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

27 In his di llpatchtgts 242225 242227 242230 and 242329 Comande r S vNTH Flee t nace urgent appeals f or help the SEVamplTH Fleet CVZS we r e u~der gunfi r e at t ack frOJl t he Cant er Forc tj nnd wlde r an attack from per si s t ent and s uic i dal s llore- lgt aseu air for c63 Although Talk Forc lI ) 4 was within 42 mi l os of t hl crippled UOlth0rn Force ~olDnande r THI RD Fla E t at 1115 t ur ne d TM k Group 38 2 plus 1 ASHI~GlOI JADuL lLSSJC l iDS=TTS and SOUTH DAKOT A 8oth nd di spa t ch ~d Tak Group 34 5 Rear Adniral Badge r in l a lA tj~l JiHili VI CJ~ lES lil lJJl HI LQXl and De sRon 52 ahead at high speed to t he as s isL[lllCe of the SEVl1lTIl Fleet Coreea

28 CTG 381 was direct ed to s trike the e neuy Center Force and to proc eed to a ssi s t SVpoundNTH Fle et f orces

29 Task Groups J83 aId J $4 (le ss detached eleoenttl) continued attacJs on the ~orthero For~e and ComSubPac ordered threo packs of submarines 0 tltJe posi tion between 120 E and 123 E to cut off eneq retreat Cruisers i iI ( destroyers of t he carrier grolips unde r Re or Adoiral Du Bose including the SiJjlA F~) MOBrIE iIlCHITA KEl OHIEA1 S and a dozen dostroyer went after the cripr- ltmiddot- The orthern For c e i s n OYI evaluat ed t o have consisted of 1 CV (ZUIKAKU) 3 en (CPlTOSE CIIYODA and ZUIHO - or pos s ibly RYUHO instead) 2 Bl3-XCV (ISE and liYUGA) 1 CA (pos s i bly l BUKI or lJCX~ ) 4 CL (OyeOO or possibly YAHAGI N~~A~IA ABUKUJiA and KISO 6 DD incl uding probably 3 TWU1SUKIs

) 0 The Nor t hern Force sustained the following los ses and damate at the hands of THlRD Fl pound9t forces 1 CV (ZUUI AKU ) sunk gt CVL ( CHITOS~ CHIYODA and ZUIHC ) sunk 1 Cr or DD and 1 DO sunk 1 CL possi bly sunk J 2 BB-XCV (ISE and HYUGA ) d~cd o~e by at l eas t 2 and pr obably 4 t orpedoes and bombs 1 CA d~ecd by soveral bOlllbs 1 CL dunaged by s ever al bombs j 1 CL torpedoed and later s unk by sub lDltgtri nea j 2 DO hoavily a t r of ed

) 1 Roache s Raiders and C1ar~y5 Crushers had o~ned in two groups in Latitnde 21 N LoI1(itude 125-30 E - l2h-30 E and Latitude 2l N Longi t ude lZ7 t - 128 E r espect i vely and caused further damage t o fleeing romnants of the Northern Force

32 In the lllSantirae I vthileTask Group 382 and Task Group 345 were middot oovi1t to t he s out hvtnrd at best speed t o r einforce the SEVEl~TH Fleet t he ePSlDf

ent er Force br oke of f the eneagement with the SEVEl~TH Fleet C1T~ and reti red t oward an Berna r dino Straits The reas on f or movements of the Cent er Force be t we6n 0924 and 1310 are not clear At 1046 CTi 77 reported the enemy Ntiring northeaft but accordios to lat e r report on~ as on course 150

0 at 1055 and

225 at ll45 middothen t he strike from Task Group 381 reached the Center Force at 1310 he was on course 010 chaJlJcd to 090 and then through 270

0 to the right t

000 At 1310 the Center Force Vias in Latitude U-46 1- Lltmgitude 126-16 E abv1t 13 milefl west of his reported 0722 position During this period h~ had been 1 mi J lj ng around in the same general area he railed to overwhelm the eVE grcupa

- 7 shy

J bullbull

- -~rc - ~t r1 Lll o~ rc 10 J ~lJl C I Tl)f 0 RrotIor t~~ to~J ~tmiddot ~_C~ t J

m o n~9np 1=-t 1- o U ru ~q rgto 40( 1 Tt~L ~ L~

r~00 G~~v_ ~

~~

UI [-~ ~ bull ~1( 1 ~ ~ ~~ -C ~ I ~) ~ ~ r~J T-~ ~I- -j ~~ I ~ Ii -L~middotr ~

l l

--rshy

r[ 1

1 - I

-1 0

7~-

bull -r

- ---------- - - shy ~---bull omiddot

t _bull 0 7p t O 1 J~

--r bullbull

J1311 mmu 1111 J JJIJJ SUVLS a3JJ~n ~-

nll

Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

-9shy q

ro trlo t~

-=-gt

~

IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

o ~

Page 6: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

Yl LE

Al6-3(16) UlilTED STATES 1(111( FLEET TlIllUgt loLEE1

Serial ~ bull r bull bull

bullSubject Action Report -- Pe~iod 2j-26 October 1944 both dates

inclusi ve - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_- - - - shy

THIRD Fleet was gravely concer~led until he received word that t l1e Centrn Force had given up in the face of the valiant efforts of the SEVSNTH fleet CV~ groupbullbull

20 At 2022 Task Groups )82 383 and j84 were givan orders t o as semble CLnd make night rw1 toward ~orthe rn Force preparatory to dawn attack The Jap lrnows hltW t o shuttle from carrier-to-target-to-airfield and all of COOmander THIRD r _eet plans had for weeks been prl3dicated on de~rirg the enemy that advant86e bJ closing promptly

21 At 2030 and 2l45 ( 24th) the Centor Force Ias snooped by an I NIERNDlJJCE VF(N) north of lotasbate on Vaiou6 COllr5es and trai1ing rrucn~~

--- 22 DurinC the run north care was t aken not to ovorrun the dlljmiddotlight

c1rcle of the No-thern Force a s to ao so would place the lJorthe rn Force beh en Task Force 38 and Leyto By daylight Task Force 34 was foruad up uhead of ~h8 carr ie r groups to provide for coorilinat ed air and surface attack on the i~orthel1l middot rorce

23 Dawn searches were launched and strike groups put in the air r adyen to hit as soon as contact faS made The Nort hern Force was located In Latltl Je 18-) 7 N Longit ude 126-15 E at 0730 Item on course 80 speed 20 and the first s trikes proceeded It once

24 In the meantime Task Gr uup 381 had put about and at 0700 (25) was in Latitu~ 15 N Longitude 10 E r eady to fuel from Task Units )084 and 308 8 Task liroup )81 was or dered to ll1l1Dent the a ~ arches from Talk Groups 382 38 ) and )84 to assis t in l ocat inb t he Northern Force and to obt rdn positive or negati ve informat ion oonce~ any enOln~ forc es to the east-war bull

25 The Northe rn Force was caught by urprise but Coumander THmD FleGt was puzzled by t he fact that there were scarcely any planes on ~he dl ke of or in the air near the enerny force and no sign of bogies around oW own force Later in the morning large bogies were picked up on the screen approChshyiog from the south j they did not attack and it is believed that they ~nc 9JBIl88 of the e~ carrier groups ferrying out to the carriers ~d an~ ampr~viag tHO late

26 The firat strike on the Northern Force r esulted in tbl 1 L~J r eported dallla6e 1 CV hit by a torpedo and J bonbs 1 CVL exploded anei oi l l C afire from bomb hits 1 DD hit Taok Force 34 waa advanoed for the ldll

- 6 - hi

~

I LE Al6-3(16) U~ITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TIIJHD FLEET Seri~

~ l

Sub ject Action Repol~ -- Period 23-26 October 1944 both dates inclusive - --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

27 In his di llpatchtgts 242225 242227 242230 and 242329 Comande r S vNTH Flee t nace urgent appeals f or help the SEVamplTH Fleet CVZS we r e u~der gunfi r e at t ack frOJl t he Cant er Forc tj nnd wlde r an attack from per si s t ent and s uic i dal s llore- lgt aseu air for c63 Although Talk Forc lI ) 4 was within 42 mi l os of t hl crippled UOlth0rn Force ~olDnande r THI RD Fla E t at 1115 t ur ne d TM k Group 38 2 plus 1 ASHI~GlOI JADuL lLSSJC l iDS=TTS and SOUTH DAKOT A 8oth nd di spa t ch ~d Tak Group 34 5 Rear Adniral Badge r in l a lA tj~l JiHili VI CJ~ lES lil lJJl HI LQXl and De sRon 52 ahead at high speed to t he as s isL[lllCe of the SEVl1lTIl Fleet Coreea

28 CTG 381 was direct ed to s trike the e neuy Center Force and to proc eed to a ssi s t SVpoundNTH Fle et f orces

29 Task Groups J83 aId J $4 (le ss detached eleoenttl) continued attacJs on the ~orthero For~e and ComSubPac ordered threo packs of submarines 0 tltJe posi tion between 120 E and 123 E to cut off eneq retreat Cruisers i iI ( destroyers of t he carrier grolips unde r Re or Adoiral Du Bose including the SiJjlA F~) MOBrIE iIlCHITA KEl OHIEA1 S and a dozen dostroyer went after the cripr- ltmiddot- The orthern For c e i s n OYI evaluat ed t o have consisted of 1 CV (ZUIKAKU) 3 en (CPlTOSE CIIYODA and ZUIHO - or pos s ibly RYUHO instead) 2 Bl3-XCV (ISE and liYUGA) 1 CA (pos s i bly l BUKI or lJCX~ ) 4 CL (OyeOO or possibly YAHAGI N~~A~IA ABUKUJiA and KISO 6 DD incl uding probably 3 TWU1SUKIs

) 0 The Nor t hern Force sustained the following los ses and damate at the hands of THlRD Fl pound9t forces 1 CV (ZUUI AKU ) sunk gt CVL ( CHITOS~ CHIYODA and ZUIHC ) sunk 1 Cr or DD and 1 DO sunk 1 CL possi bly sunk J 2 BB-XCV (ISE and HYUGA ) d~cd o~e by at l eas t 2 and pr obably 4 t orpedoes and bombs 1 CA d~ecd by soveral bOlllbs 1 CL dunaged by s ever al bombs j 1 CL torpedoed and later s unk by sub lDltgtri nea j 2 DO hoavily a t r of ed

) 1 Roache s Raiders and C1ar~y5 Crushers had o~ned in two groups in Latitnde 21 N LoI1(itude 125-30 E - l2h-30 E and Latitude 2l N Longi t ude lZ7 t - 128 E r espect i vely and caused further damage t o fleeing romnants of the Northern Force

32 In the lllSantirae I vthileTask Group 382 and Task Group 345 were middot oovi1t to t he s out hvtnrd at best speed t o r einforce the SEVEl~TH Fleet t he ePSlDf

ent er Force br oke of f the eneagement with the SEVEl~TH Fleet C1T~ and reti red t oward an Berna r dino Straits The reas on f or movements of the Cent er Force be t we6n 0924 and 1310 are not clear At 1046 CTi 77 reported the enemy Ntiring northeaft but accordios to lat e r report on~ as on course 150

0 at 1055 and

225 at ll45 middothen t he strike from Task Group 381 reached the Center Force at 1310 he was on course 010 chaJlJcd to 090 and then through 270

0 to the right t

000 At 1310 the Center Force Vias in Latitude U-46 1- Lltmgitude 126-16 E abv1t 13 milefl west of his reported 0722 position During this period h~ had been 1 mi J lj ng around in the same general area he railed to overwhelm the eVE grcupa

- 7 shy

J bullbull

- -~rc - ~t r1 Lll o~ rc 10 J ~lJl C I Tl)f 0 RrotIor t~~ to~J ~tmiddot ~_C~ t J

m o n~9np 1=-t 1- o U ru ~q rgto 40( 1 Tt~L ~ L~

r~00 G~~v_ ~

~~

UI [-~ ~ bull ~1( 1 ~ ~ ~~ -C ~ I ~) ~ ~ r~J T-~ ~I- -j ~~ I ~ Ii -L~middotr ~

l l

--rshy

r[ 1

1 - I

-1 0

7~-

bull -r

- ---------- - - shy ~---bull omiddot

t _bull 0 7p t O 1 J~

--r bullbull

J1311 mmu 1111 J JJIJJ SUVLS a3JJ~n ~-

nll

Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

-9shy q

ro trlo t~

-=-gt

~

IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

o ~

Page 7: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

~

I LE Al6-3(16) U~ITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

TIIJHD FLEET Seri~

~ l

Sub ject Action Repol~ -- Period 23-26 October 1944 both dates inclusive - --- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - shy

27 In his di llpatchtgts 242225 242227 242230 and 242329 Comande r S vNTH Flee t nace urgent appeals f or help the SEVamplTH Fleet CVZS we r e u~der gunfi r e at t ack frOJl t he Cant er Forc tj nnd wlde r an attack from per si s t ent and s uic i dal s llore- lgt aseu air for c63 Although Talk Forc lI ) 4 was within 42 mi l os of t hl crippled UOlth0rn Force ~olDnande r THI RD Fla E t at 1115 t ur ne d TM k Group 38 2 plus 1 ASHI~GlOI JADuL lLSSJC l iDS=TTS and SOUTH DAKOT A 8oth nd di spa t ch ~d Tak Group 34 5 Rear Adniral Badge r in l a lA tj~l JiHili VI CJ~ lES lil lJJl HI LQXl and De sRon 52 ahead at high speed to t he as s isL[lllCe of the SEVl1lTIl Fleet Coreea

28 CTG 381 was direct ed to s trike the e neuy Center Force and to proc eed to a ssi s t SVpoundNTH Fle et f orces

29 Task Groups J83 aId J $4 (le ss detached eleoenttl) continued attacJs on the ~orthero For~e and ComSubPac ordered threo packs of submarines 0 tltJe posi tion between 120 E and 123 E to cut off eneq retreat Cruisers i iI ( destroyers of t he carrier grolips unde r Re or Adoiral Du Bose including the SiJjlA F~) MOBrIE iIlCHITA KEl OHIEA1 S and a dozen dostroyer went after the cripr- ltmiddot- The orthern For c e i s n OYI evaluat ed t o have consisted of 1 CV (ZUIKAKU) 3 en (CPlTOSE CIIYODA and ZUIHO - or pos s ibly RYUHO instead) 2 Bl3-XCV (ISE and liYUGA) 1 CA (pos s i bly l BUKI or lJCX~ ) 4 CL (OyeOO or possibly YAHAGI N~~A~IA ABUKUJiA and KISO 6 DD incl uding probably 3 TWU1SUKIs

) 0 The Nor t hern Force sustained the following los ses and damate at the hands of THlRD Fl pound9t forces 1 CV (ZUUI AKU ) sunk gt CVL ( CHITOS~ CHIYODA and ZUIHC ) sunk 1 Cr or DD and 1 DO sunk 1 CL possi bly sunk J 2 BB-XCV (ISE and HYUGA ) d~cd o~e by at l eas t 2 and pr obably 4 t orpedoes and bombs 1 CA d~ecd by soveral bOlllbs 1 CL dunaged by s ever al bombs j 1 CL torpedoed and later s unk by sub lDltgtri nea j 2 DO hoavily a t r of ed

) 1 Roache s Raiders and C1ar~y5 Crushers had o~ned in two groups in Latitnde 21 N LoI1(itude 125-30 E - l2h-30 E and Latitude 2l N Longi t ude lZ7 t - 128 E r espect i vely and caused further damage t o fleeing romnants of the Northern Force

32 In the lllSantirae I vthileTask Group 382 and Task Group 345 were middot oovi1t to t he s out hvtnrd at best speed t o r einforce the SEVEl~TH Fleet t he ePSlDf

ent er Force br oke of f the eneagement with the SEVEl~TH Fleet C1T~ and reti red t oward an Berna r dino Straits The reas on f or movements of the Cent er Force be t we6n 0924 and 1310 are not clear At 1046 CTi 77 reported the enemy Ntiring northeaft but accordios to lat e r report on~ as on course 150

0 at 1055 and

225 at ll45 middothen t he strike from Task Group 381 reached the Center Force at 1310 he was on course 010 chaJlJcd to 090 and then through 270

0 to the right t

000 At 1310 the Center Force Vias in Latitude U-46 1- Lltmgitude 126-16 E abv1t 13 milefl west of his reported 0722 position During this period h~ had been 1 mi J lj ng around in the same general area he railed to overwhelm the eVE grcupa

- 7 shy

J bullbull

- -~rc - ~t r1 Lll o~ rc 10 J ~lJl C I Tl)f 0 RrotIor t~~ to~J ~tmiddot ~_C~ t J

m o n~9np 1=-t 1- o U ru ~q rgto 40( 1 Tt~L ~ L~

r~00 G~~v_ ~

~~

UI [-~ ~ bull ~1( 1 ~ ~ ~~ -C ~ I ~) ~ ~ r~J T-~ ~I- -j ~~ I ~ Ii -L~middotr ~

l l

--rshy

r[ 1

1 - I

-1 0

7~-

bull -r

- ---------- - - shy ~---bull omiddot

t _bull 0 7p t O 1 J~

--r bullbull

J1311 mmu 1111 J JJIJJ SUVLS a3JJ~n ~-

nll

Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

-9shy q

ro trlo t~

-=-gt

~

IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

o ~

Page 8: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

J bullbull

- -~rc - ~t r1 Lll o~ rc 10 J ~lJl C I Tl)f 0 RrotIor t~~ to~J ~tmiddot ~_C~ t J

m o n~9np 1=-t 1- o U ru ~q rgto 40( 1 Tt~L ~ L~

r~00 G~~v_ ~

~~

UI [-~ ~ bull ~1( 1 ~ ~ ~~ -C ~ I ~) ~ ~ r~J T-~ ~I- -j ~~ I ~ Ii -L~middotr ~

l l

--rshy

r[ 1

1 - I

-1 0

7~-

bull -r

- ---------- - - shy ~---bull omiddot

t _bull 0 7p t O 1 J~

--r bullbull

J1311 mmu 1111 J JJIJJ SUVLS a3JJ~n ~-

nll

Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

-9shy q

ro trlo t~

-=-gt

~

IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

o ~

Page 9: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

nll

Al6-3(16) UNITED STATES PACIFIC JLEET TIIIHD JqEET

Serial shy-~

Subject Action Report -inclusive

- - - - - shy -e

-riod 2

- - shy3

- --26

- - -Octo

- - - shyber 1944 both dat~a

- -40 It i s belie ved th lt the f ol1gtwinG ships of tho Cltmtr Force

f inally escaped int o the China ampn 4 BB ( YAlJATO M GlTO t(OIJGO and HAllUlA) all heavily damaged 4-5 CA s ouw damaamp~d 1-2 CL 7-9 OD FrOOl the afternoon o t he 26th al t hough BBs we ro sighted by Far Eas t e rn Air Force planes no l6lOr~ t han 3 BBs lte r e reported together cUld it is pos sibh that one KOHGO rra have dropped out a nd possibly s ank The rol stat ed that 111AO had been torpedoed on 23 October (by Blue submarine ) and h ad ropped back anaJys if of subsequent s i ght irlgs indicated t hat Tili AQ may have rejoined vi~ e as t of PamplaYian on the 26th and may have bee n one of tbe 4-5 CA that finally escaped

41 For the purposes of t his r eport t he action with the Japanese Fleat is considered to hav~ t erminat ed at 2400 Item 26 October 1944 I regretshyfully n port the lo~ s of t he RIllCETON and of 40 planes in cooabat and 10 operati mally (incomplete report) Yihich can be replaced ~iith far deeper r egret I have -ece i ved t he r eports of t he irreparable lose of the gallant officers and men who have given t heir live s to our cause

42 This report doe8 not include ony attempt at detailed analyui s i t he dellllnds f)f continuing opera~i(ns preclude any s uch at tempt here That mu6t be done by 9benci es havi ng t he necessary t ime pers onnel and facilities LelB Ons learned will b~ derived from the Act ion Reports of ~lbordinate commanders or discuss~d in separate cor r espondence Suffice it to say here that

(a ) Communicatio~ wer e generally excellent considering tho forcesIiIlvolvedI

(b ) Contact r eports were well handled from the Fleet COJDIIwlde r 18

standpoi nt

( c ) The ~etec~ed departure of the Northern Force from the Empire and its -mobserved approach to the Philippines was surprising it is preswned ~hat submarin~s fl tationed C10S8 to the Japanese Coast W6l8 pinned down by shoNs-ba36d air

(d ) Results of air attacks on oneJny combatant ships (other than enomy carriers ) were disappointing Aside from the rugg3dness of J apanese ships contrbuting factors may have been (1) pilot fatigle after prolonged operations (2) t endency f or pilots to go aft e r cripples rather than unshydamaged ships (3) poor torpedo pe rformanoe or too shallow depth st~g

-9shy q

ro trlo t~

-=-gt

~

IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

o ~

Page 10: ~TA'l'E~ I, O~ ;r., - ibiblio.org reports/ComThrid... · THL1D Fleet decided to initiate carri r lIearche.a to obtain earliest informati;')n of o.ny neID,Y movement t Olfl1rd Leyte.

ro trlo t~

-=-gt

~

IILE o~ rJ ~ 10 ~ ~ J~UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEETu 3(16) THIRD FLEET

J erill

93

poundljl 3utject middot tiO lC it2j0rl - P~lmiddotiod 23- 6 October 1941 LJt bull

i cluslv~

( e) Tho (l1ccr iro Fleet r eelet] -le lOlt5 of l Ol- t op-ortut LO j li~ It Oil ilth Jn~ aCliult ti UlS OJ t ) 10 fCmiddot rwJ 1 lJ Cjirioll Jru f r-I(acllinl COl uoraLi on ot IwomiddotrcJ o U-O I ~ c ~

on the two oc camp i ollJ lIen Jurfuce lLrikir fOl C lure lri thelrmiddot m Ju~ crfor ( tAl~i J1e urfocc ellcrront

bull(f j c~l cirmcd o r cos wert Tl01d reasonall cloio t j iJ co)

ltH aoea anJ prc l duri jLrt ~nd r ultl ~ sfr vi c e

~ b ) ~Le ilbilit~middot of t e Cen er force t i3s _1d 5Lnl1 f rJ a1di r~ up to thc indi cates nptiO) Cj- tl e clice itin the J iJp s u ns shyi=-~ f11 t bc Glolj due the CT crcurs

( h ) 7le c~fgtlo~7ltleot 0 f CQIlnric r middot~ cti ~ ~ tl

i n tris t i on I~d a hspJ he Bt~d-oint o f r~l

d~ uns(ltrd

) Pnilll I tll~ c-~acor 7JiL~ r l e9t can cOlidu tlj )_1 thi c~in cr~ ta brill i ant oper~tiors of the Ii loct

in ( l) utt3T faillre of the J apanl5e gt1 l1 t o )r ftmt the r e-occupatr tgt

i un of the hu1ipine ( b) the crushine oeiolt of Lne J npLIloJe Fl eet and (c t)o elij nat i on of serious naval threa t t o our opolIti(JOs to r Iuny ~orth J i1 ~t f orever

-jll~~~ I F ii J s~ _

Jdvalce ogty (le Zncl to ( 1

Cordrch 7J ( I f)Otl~1 1( r )

1

o ~