TAKING STOCK: The Cure for Chronic Overfishing (2007)

8/14/2019 TAKING STOCK: The Cure for Chronic Overfishing (2007)

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TAKING STOCK:The Cure for Chronic Overshing


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In numerous cases around our coasts, no amount o warning economic o

ecological has deterred continued overshing. Too oten shing pressure is

intense enough to reduce sh populations below the minimum needed to sustain

themselves, or to prevent recovery to sustainable levels.1 Examples abound

including the collapse o the Pacic sardine shery in the 1960s, the halving o the

Atlantic swordsh population since the 1970s, the depletion o red drum during

the blackened red sh craze o the 1980s, and the epic New England shery

disaster o the early 1990s.

Although the amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1996 (MSA) dened

overshing, prohibited shery managers rom setting shing quotas above the

maximum sustainable yield, and required managers to rebuild overshed stocks

as quickly as possible, loopholes in the MSA have allowed overshing to continue

unchecked in some regions. The shery management councils have too otenignored the advice o scientists and permitted unsustainable levels o shing yea

ater year, largely by ailing to adopt or enorce the catch limits recommended by

shery scientists. The absence o accountability or exceeding limits has allowed

overshing to continue with impunity. The National Marine Fisheries Service

(NMFS), the agency responsible or management o U.S. ocean sh populations

has not stepped in to disapprove management plans that ail to accomplish the

objective. The result is chronic overshing, a condition characterized by persisten

levels o shing beyond what is sustainable.

The ndings o this report indicate that there has been very limited improvement in

reducing overshing since 1998, when NMFS issued its rst report on the status

o U.S. sh stocks. The most recent report to Congress on the status o stocks

(or 2006) actually showed an increase in the number o stocks experiencingovershing, or the rst time in eight years.2 Moreover, the ndings o this repor

indicate that overshing is still a chronic problem in many U.S. sheries, primarily

in regions where managers have ailed to employ science-based catch limits and

to close sheries when the catch reaches those limits. Specic ndings include:

For the majority (54%) o managed sh stocks, NMFS still does not know i

overshing is occurring.

Despite limited progress in reducing the number o stocks subject to overshing

since 1998, the practice persists and is threatening overall ecosystem health.

In general, overshing has continued on stocks managed by councils that

implemented ineective eort-based controls, such as limiting the days a vesse

can go to sea, rather than enorced catch limits.In regions where annual catch limits are employed and enorced, chronic

overshing is not occurring.

The ailure to end overshing ueled the debate over reauthorization o the MSA

in 2006. The new Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act (MSRA) removes the

discretion that allowed managers to avoid imposing limits in the past; the MSRA now

requires annual catch limits in all U.S. sheries as well as accountability measures

These requirements, together with the stipulation that catch limits may not exceed

the shing level recommended by the councils scientic advisors,3 are aimed a

addressing the underlying causes o chronic overshing. Now it is time or NMFS

to write clear, unambiguous rules or implementing the new requirements and to

enorce those rules when regional shery management councils ail to comply.

SUMMARY AND FINDINGS


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When shing feets take more sh than a population is producing, that stock

experiences overshing. I allowed to continue or a long period, overshing can

cause proound changes not only in the target sh stock but also in the sea around

it. Numerous scientic reports, congressional hearings, and scientic journa

articles have identied overshing as a persistent problem in U.S. sheries or

decades,4 with predictable results: many depleted sh stocks have not recovered

and sheries ail to realize their long-term potential yield.

For the rst 20 years o U.S. shery management ollowing the passage o

the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1976, the law

required councils to dene overshing or managed species and stipulated

that they should prevent overshing. But neither the law nor National Marine

Fisheries Service (NMFS) guidelines explicitly compelled the councils or the

agency to halt the practice. Many managers have been persuaded to mistrustscientic recommendations or nd them unpersuasive in the ace o stakeholde

demands. Short-term economic concerns pressure managers to keep catch

limits high. The 1996 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act attempted to

tackle overshing by amending management requirements in several key areas

as shown in the box below.

But loopholes in the MSA and the regulations implementing the new requirements

allowed managers to put o tough measures to halt overshing. Managers have

continued to ignore scientic advice. Fishing has continued without hard and

ast catch limits, and NMFS never ullled its legal responsibility to disapprove

decient plans and develop measures to end overshing i a council ailed to do

so. In some cases, deadlines or recovery o overshed stocks stretch so ar into

the uture that some stocks may never recover. Ten years ater passage o the

MSA, overshing is still common practice.

The ailure to end overshing ueled the debate over reauthorization o the MSA in

2006. The highest priority in the newly amended law is to end overshing, a chronic

condition in too many o our nations sheries. The amendments to the sheries law

require the regional shery management councils to set annual catch limits or al

managed sheries, accompanied by measures to ensure accountability.5 The new

law also requires the preparation and implementation o a plan that immediately

INTRODUCTION: THE WHAT AND WHY OF OVERFISHING

Limited the allowable catch to maximum sustainable yield (MSY);

disallowedovershingforeconomicorsocialreasons

Requiredmanagementplanstodeneovershingusingobjectiveandmeasurablecriteria

Established deadline for ending overshing and rebuilding depleted

populations,withsomeexceptions

MSA AMENDMENTS OF 1996


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ends overshing and commences rebuilding o overshed stocks within two years

o being identied as overshed or approaching overshed.6 These requirements

together with the stipulation that catch limits may not exceed the shing leve

recommended by the councils scientic advisors,7 are aimed at addressing the

underlying causes o continued overshing.8

Chronic overshing has resulted in enormous losses o potential revenue

exports, jobs, recreation and other economic activity. By one estimate, Americans

have oregone nearly $3 billion in revenue rom our sheries annually because

stocks are not producing what they could i overshing ended and populations

rebounded.9 Despite some encouraging trends in some sheries, the recorddemonstrates that the tough new requirements or annual catch limits are long

overdue and urgently needed.

NMFS is now revising its regulatory guidelines to implement the new MSRA

requirements in order to end overshing. Last revised in 1998, the National Standard

Guidelines are intended to provide shery management councils with guidance on

how to implement the laws 10 national standards, the rst o which concerns

overshing and optimum yield. National Standard 1 stipulates: conservation

and management measures shall prevent overshing while achieving, on a

continuing basis, the optimum yield rom each shery.10 To accomplish this goal

the new rules or implementing annual catch limits and accountability measures

must provide clear guidance to the councils or risk allowing the councils to interpret

the law as they see t.

Even though the short-term eect o stopping overshing may result in reduced

catches, shorter seasons and decreased incomes, the long-term costs o allowing

overshing to continue are much higher.

Requiresmanagementplanstosetannualcatchlimits

Councilsmustheedrecommendationsofscienticadvisorswhensetting

catchlimits

Adds the requirement for accountability measures to ensure that

objectivesaremet

Requiresmanagerstoendovershingwithintwoyears

MSA AMENDMENTS OF 2006


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Has overshing persisted long enough to be considered chronic? Certainly the

notion that overshing is something to be avoided has been part o the Magnuson

Act since its passage in 1976. Since the 1996 amendments, the law has required

that managers actually keep track o overshing and report to Congress on their

success at ending it.11

Using that requirement as a starting point provides almost a decade o inormation

to consider, as shown in Figure 1. The gure shows that stocks experiencing

overshing, as a percentage o all managed stocks, have changed very little

over the period. This is attributable to the act that NMFS has made a number o

administrative changes which consolidated and reduced the total number o stocks

evaluated in the annual reports rom over 900 beore 2005 to only 530 since

2005. In contrast, when one examines the change in the percentage o assessed

stocks experiencing overshing, the picture seems a bit brighter, as illustrated in

Figure 2. However, NMFS still does not know i overshing is occurring or abou

hal (54%) o the stocks that are reported annually to Congress.

Figure 1. Thebarsrepresentthepercentages,bystatus,ofallmanagedstocksovertheperiod

forwhichcomparabledataareavailable(1999-2006).Althoughthetotalnumberofmanaged

stocksreportedtoCongressannuallyhaschangedovertime,thenumberofstockssubjectto

overshinghasremainedrelativelyconstantatapproximately10%.

FIGURE 1. STATUS OF ALL MANAGED STOCKS, 1999-2006

CHRONIC OVERFISHING BY THE NUMBERS


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The rst annual Report to Congress: Status o Fisheries o the United States, o

Status o Stocks (SOS) report was issued in 1998. O the 152 species whose

status was reported in the rst edition o SOS, 102 were classied as overshed

in 1998. By 2006, one-third (35) o those same species were still reported as

overshed. Eight o the original species are no longer reported because o changes

in status or NMFS made changes in how it reported status. 12 Also among the

stocks no longer appearing in the annual report are 10 species o Pacic salmon

that are endangered, and 16 species o sharks that were known to be experiencing

overshing, but disappear rom the list ater their consolidation in a shark complex

assessed as status unknown. In act, a 2006 report by the Network ound that75 percent o the reduction in the number o stocks subject to overshing is the

result o administrative shufing and reclassication.13

Despite these changes and the diculties o assessing trends when the baseline

o stocks reported to Congress has changed so dramatically, many o the assessed

stocks listed as experiencing overshing have remained on the list year ate

year. Depending on how one denes chronic overshing, between 30 and 50

species14 appear on the list o species being shed too intensively on a routine

basis, including some o the most important in the country, such as cod and red

Figure 2. Comparing only assessed stocks, not all stocks, there has been no real

improvementin thepercentageof stockssubject toovershingsince2001,whichhashoveredaround20percent.

FIGURE 2. ASSESSED STOCKS SUBJECT TO OVERFISHING,

1999-2006

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FIGURE 3. STOCKS SUBJECT TO CHRONIC OVERFISHING,

1998-2006

Figure 3. Ofthe49stocksthathavebeensubjecttochronicovershingforsixormoreyears

since1998,31werestillsubjecttoovershingin2006.Only6speciesactuallyshowedenough

improvementtobereclassiedasnotovershed.

snapper. Dening chronic as subject to overshing in six or more o the nine

years (1998-2006) results in 49 stocks that t the denition. In addition, there are

the instances where no overshing denition was in place or several years, but

once it was dened or a stock, overshing has continued rom that time to the

present adding more stocks.

The bottom line? Chronic overshing takes a toll. O the 49 stocks on which

overshing persisted or six or more years o the nine-year period since 1998, 31

were still subject to overshing in 2006. In addition, the status o 12 shark stocks

which were previously subject to overshing was reclassied as unknown. By

2006, only 6 o the stocks suering a six or more year bout o chronic overshing

showed enough improvement to be reclassied as not overshed. Figure 3

shows the number o stocks subject to overshing, and or how many years

they experienced overshing. Table 1, below, is an expanded view o the stocks

subject to chronic overshing. It lists specic stocks, by council, that have been

subject to overshing in six or more o the nine years since the rst Status o

Stocks report assessed them.


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FIGURE 4: STOCKS SUBJECT TO CHRONIC OVERFISHING BY COUNCIL

CHRONIC OVERFISHING BY

MANAGEMENT REGION

The regional councils with the highest percentages o stocks subject to chronic

overshing are those that do not employ hard catch limits: the New England

Councils groundsh complex, the South Atlantic Councils ree sh complex and

the large coastal shark complex managed by NMFS. Figure 4 shows the percentage

o managed stocks experiencing chronic overshing by council.

Neither the Pacic nor North Pacic council had stocks that were subject to

chronic overshing by this reports denition. Overshing has occurred in some

years on some species within the Pacic groundsh complex, where managemen

was conounded by lack o data and fawed assumptions in stock assessmentsSubsequent management actions to limit catches on seven badly overshed

rocksh stocks have prevented chronic overshing, but it took a lawsuit by

conservation groups to compel council action. In the North Pacic, intermittent

overshing has occurred on several crab stocks, but imposition o reduced catch

limits also prevented overshing rom becoming chronic.

The most telling point is that where managers ended overshing, and stocks

were healthy enough to be reclassied rom overshed to not overshed, the

management plans included concrete annual catch limits that were enorced


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SOURCES OF CHRONIC OVERFISHING

Lack o rm catch limits, absence o eective accountability measures, ailure

to heed scientic advice on limits, and risky decision-making are all major actors

contributing to chronic overshing. Even though ending overshing has been

a goal o shery management since at least 1976, these actors have made

it dicult or managers to accomplish the goal. Managers in councils and the

agency have oten knowingly allowed overshing to continue; New England

groundsh, mid-Atlantic summer founder, and Gul o Mexico red snapper are al

examples o this. NMFS has approved council plans that did not end overshing

within required time limits.

Absent or Inadequate Annual Catch Limits (ACLs). The most blatant is theabsence o annual catch limits on a shery. Examples o this include: New England

groundsh such as cod and haddock managed under the Northeast Multispecies

Complex Fishery Management Plan (FMP); snowy grouper, golden tilesh, black

sea bass and vermilion snapper managed under the South Atlantic Snapper Groupe

FMP; and summer founder managed by the Mid-Atlantic Summer Flounder, Scup

and Black Sea Bass FMP. In the rst, the shery is controlled by eort limits such as

mesh size and days-at-sea rather than catch limits. In the South Atlantic, size, gea

and area restrictions have been applied unsuccessully. In the Mid-Atlantic, ACLs

are inadequate because while total landings are limited, total catch is not, making

it dicult to determine the extent to which discards are contributing to shing

mortality. Finally, some councils, like New England, knowingly set ACLs that allow

overshing in a misguided attempt to mitigate short-term economic impacts.

Risk-Prone Decision-Making. Another source o chronic overshing is reluctance

by managers to apply the precautionary approach when they lack the specic

inormation to manage many individual components o a mixed species shery

Despite guidance to the contrary,16 managers err too oten in avor o risky shing

rather than sustainable shing. In the ace o uncertainty and pressure rom

the shing industry, shery managers tend to base their decisions on an overly

optimistic view o the condition o shery resources. The result is that no catch

limits are set, or limits are set at a point that does not allow a margin o error

or uncertainty in underlying inormation or changes in environmental conditions

These risk-prone decisions eventually result in overshing.17

In the case o Pacic groundsh, or example, the Pacic Fishery ManagementCouncil set catch limits too high in the 1990s based on inadequate inormation and

optimistic assumptions regarding the health o groundsh stocks. Managers were

initially slow to act at the rst signs o distress because o limited inormation

about these species. Better inormation by the late 1990s revealed that long-

lived rocksh have among the lowest productivity rates o any sh in the world

and indicated that the stocks were badly depleted, and thus the catch limits had

been too high to sustain healthy stocks. As a result, the Secretary o Commerce

declared the shery a disaster in 2000.

New England Groundfsh

The sorry state of cod, ounder andhaddock off New England became theposter child for the ght to end chronicovershing. The shery rst came underamanagementplanin 1985.By 1989,thecouncilhadadmittedwhatscientistshadbeen saying for years about overshing,but continued to delay action to deviseconcretemeasurestostopovershing.

Despite a lawsuit, congressionalintervention, changes in the law aimeddirectly at their inaction, declaration ofa shery disaster, and a multi-millionfederal bailout, the council still manageswithout catch limits. The combinationof effort-based controls such as amoratoriumonnewshingpermits,days-

at-sea restrictions, and trip limits underamendments to thegroundshplanhavefailedtoendovershingofthefamedcodstocksofGeorgesBankandGulfofMaine.

Although shing mortality does appearto have declinedfrom the peak levels ofthe early 1990sand the cod stocks haverebounded slightly from the record-lowlevelsofthemid-1990s,bothstocksarestillexperiencing overshing and spawningstocks remain far below the targetrebuildingbiomasslevels.

Ironically,thespeciesthathasrecovered

most yellowtailounderis subject toahardbycatchcapimposedaspartofaprogram to allow scallop shermen intogroundshclosureareas.

The New England groundsh crisisillustrates the consequences of ignoringscienticadviceandknowinglyovershingin a misguided attempt tomitigate short-termeconomicandsocialimpacts.


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Summer ounder is second only to striped bass in its popularity

withMid-Atlanticanglers,andisinthetop10forbothcommercial

andrecreationalspeciesinpoundsandnumbersofshlanded.Yet

summerounder,alsoknownasuke,hasbeensubjecttoovershing

foryearsinbothsectors.Conservationgroupssuedsuccessfullyin

1999arguingthatquotasweresettoohigh.AsrecentlyasNovember

2007,managerswereurgingallowablelandingsinexcessofscientic

recommendationsandcomplainingthatthecurrentlimitsaretoolow.

TherecreationalsheryforukewasshutdowninNovemberafter

exceedingthequota.

The council approved the rst plan for summer ounder in 1988;

an overshing denition was adopted in 1991 and quotas set for

therst time in 1993.Initialmanagementmeasures included gear

specications, mesh restrictions, minimum sh sizes, possession

limitsandarearestrictions.Lateractionlimitedentrytotheshery.

Managers have been trying to cut shing mortality on summer

oundersincethelate1980s,butanunwillingnesstoimposeeconomic

burdensonshermen,overlyoptimisticquotasetting,underreporting

from states, dealers and shermen, all contributed to excessive

catches.Overagesintherecreationalsheryandtoalesserexten

thecommercialsheryhaveallcontributedtoexcessivecatches.

Stateandfederalmanagershaveadheredtoarisk-pronepolicyo

settingthesummerounderlandinglimitatthemaximumallowable

level,allowingnomarginofsafetyagainstdiscardmortalityorexcess

catchintherecreationalsector.Asaconsequenceshingmortalityon

thisstockhassurpassedtargetlevelsconsistently,resultinginchronic

overshing. The 2006 stock assessment advised a precautionary

TotalAllowableLandings(TAL),lowerthanwhatmightbeindicated

byprojections,tocompensateforthehistoryofunderestimationo

shingmortalityandoverestimationofstockbiomass.

Most recently, the council and states have recommended a 2008

TAL well well above recommendations of their scientists. NMFS

has issued a proposed rule that fails to adhere to the scientic

recommendationsandcautionaryadviceofferedbytheagencysown

regionaladministrator.

Ignoring the Best Available Science. Yet another contributor to chronic

overshing is a ailure by managers to ollow the scientic advice provided to

them by their own experts. For example, stock assessment scientists urged a

50 percent reduction in mortality or spiny dogsh or many years, only to be

overruled repeatedly in council votes. As predicted, overshing continued until

2003, and spiny dogsh continue to be depleted today. In the case o red snapper

in the Gul o Mexico, scientists have been recommending catch levels be set

well below what the council has consistently allowed, delaying rebuilding o this

stock indenitely.

One o the reasons Gul o Mexico scientists have urged tighter limits on red

snapper catch is because this species is subject to extraordinary levels o bycatch

mortality; perhaps as many as 80 percent o juvenile snappers are killed in other

sheries. Bycatch o overshed species such as yelloweye rocksh (in directed

sheries on the rest o the Pacic groundsh complex) has complicated rebuilding

plans there. Bycatch (the catching and killing o non-target sh and other ocean

wildlie) is one reason why catch or mortality limits are exceeded. Others include

lack o enorcement, ailure to account or exceeding caps in subsequent season

limits, and just plain cheating.

SUMMER FLOUNDER


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Lack of Accountability. It is not enough just to have a catch limit. Instances where

limits are in place but are routinely exceeded underscore the need or accountability

measures to accompany catch limits. For example, discards in the summer founde

shery in the Mid-Atlantic are not monitored. The shery operates with a size limi

so that both the commercial and recreational sectors discard undersized sh

Mortality associated with these discards is not adequately accounted or in setting

catch limits. Further, landings rom the recreational sector in that shery and in the

Gul o Mexico red snapper shery are not known until ater the season has ended

The recreational limits have been exceeded annually in both sheries or many

years without any reduction in the limits or subsequent seasons.

In another example o the need or accountability, the large Pacic whiting traw

shery was closed in summer 2007 ater it exceeded the widow rocksh bycatch

limit established based on the rebuilding plan or this overshed stock. In one

case, enorcement ocers ound that a whiting boat had disabled its monitoring

camera and dumped an unreported widow rocksh catch overboard.

GULF OF MEXICO RED SNAPPER The red snappershery has alonghistoryin theGulfofMexico.

Fishingforredsnapper,apopularfoodandgamesh,commercially

datesbacktothelate19thcenturyandrecreationalshingintheGulf

forredsnappertookoffinthemiddleofthe20thcentury.Decades

ofpopularityamongcommercialandrecreationalshermenledtoa

steadydeclineinredsnapperabundanceintheGulfofMexico.In

addition, shrimp trawlerskilllarge numbers (up to25 to45million

annually)ofjuvenileredsnapperasbycatch,shthatneverhavean

opportunitytoreproduce.Todaythepopulationofmatureredsnapper

isestimatedtobeonlyaboutthreepercentofhistoricallevels.

Scientists rstassessed redsnapper asovershed in1988.Catch

limitswererstsetin1990.Varyingsizelimits,closedseasons,triplimits,andbaglimitshaveallbeenusedtoreducethecatchofred

snapperbycommercialandrecreationalshermen.Fisherymanagers

alsorequiretheuseofbycatchreductiondevicesinshrimptrawlsto

allowjuvenileredsnappertoescapethetrawls.Unfortunately,catch

limitswereexceededregularlybyshermenandbycatchreduction

devicesdidnotreducetheamountofredsnapperkilledbyshrimpers

asmuchasanticipated.Becauseofthis,sherymanagerspushed

backtherebuildingdeadlinesforredsnapperfromasearlyas2000

untilthecurrentdateof2032.

In addition, shery managers blatantly set the catch limit fo

red snapper 50% higher than the recommendations of their own

scientistsin2005.Thisshort-termthinkingledtomoreandgreate

cutsinshingin2007andputofftheeconomicrewardsofarebuil

redsnappershery.Infact,afederalcourtruledinMarch2007that

sherymanagersbasedtheexistingplantorebuildredsnappero

awedlogic,notscience,anddidnotfollowthelaw.

Duetothislawsuit,theGulfofMexicoFisheryManagementCouncil

votedinJune2007tosetacatchlimitforredsnapperbasedonthe

adviceoftheirscientistsforthe2008shingyear.TheGulfCouncalso put new restrictions on shrimpers to reduce the amount o

bycatchofredsnapperintheirtrawls.

NowitisuptotheNationalMarineFisheriesServicetoimplemen

thesenewrulesinordertorebuildtheredsnappersheryinth

GulfofMexicosothattherearemoreshingopportunitiesin the

future,notfewer.

1


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The new provisions in the MSRA remove the remaining discretion that has allowed

shery management councils to put economic considerations above biologica

imperatives. These provisions close the loopholes with respect to the time allowed

or responding to overshing, and they demand that managers heed the advice o

their scientic experts. NMFS is now proceeding with rulemaking to implement

the new directions called or in the MSRA. NMFS plans to have guidelines in

place in 2008 that will incorporate guidance or annual catch limits into its existing

guidelines or National Standard 1. Councils have until 2010 to bring their plans

into compliance with new requirements to end overshing through the use o

ACLs and accountability measures or stocks subject to overshing, and 2011 o

all other stocks. In the meantime, councils are required to ollow scientic advice

when setting catch limits.

Critical issues that advocates will watch or in the coming months include

application o the precautionary approach, avoiding the boom and bust cycles tha

result rom targeting displaced eort to unassessed stocks, rigorous response

either in-season or in subsequent years to cases where shing exceeds annua

limits, and explicit guidance or moving toward a more holistic, ecosystem-based

approach to shery management, in which the ood needs o other sh and wildlie

are considered and accounted or when setting ACLs.19

To ensure that the new provisions are eective, NMFS must write strong rules

and enorce compliance when councils ail to live up to the intent o Congress. TheNetwork believes that the revised National Standard 1 guidelines must include the

eatures summarized in the next page.

HOW MSRA CAN HELP

MANAGERS END OVERFISHING


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END NOTES

1 National Research Council. 1999. Sustaining Marine Fisheries. National Academy Press. Washington, D.C.

2 NOAA Fisheries. Report to Congress: Status o Fisheries o the United States or 2006.

3 MSRA Sec. 302(h)(6) (16 U.S.C. 1852(h)(6))

4 See, or example, CEQ, 1981; American Fisheries Society, 1989; Fox et al, 1990; S.Rpt. 101-414, 1990; Hearings House MerchanMarine & Fisheries on H.R. 780, 1993; Our Living Oceans, 1999.

5 MSRA Sec. 303(a)(15) (16 U.S.C. 1853(a)(15))

6 MSA Sec. 304(e)(3).

7

MSRA Sec. 302(h)(6) (16 U.S.C. 1852(h)(6))8 See USCOP (2004), Recommendations 19-1, 19-2, and 19-3 requiring regional FMCs to set catch limits within the bounds

recommended by the councils science and statistical committees.

9 Somma, A. 2003. The environmental consequences and economic costs o depleting the worlds oceans. Economic Perspectiveselectronic journal o the U.S. Department o State. Vol. 8 No. 1, Jan. 2003. Available online at http://usino.state.gov/journalsites/0103/ijee/somma.htm

10 MSA sec. 301(a)(1); 16 U.S.C. 1851.

11 The Secretary shall report annually to the Congress and the Councils on the status o sheries within each Councils geographicaarea o authority and identiy those sheries that are overshed or are approaching a condition o being overshed. For thosesheries managed under a shery management plan or international agreement, the status shall be determined using the criteria oovershing specied in such plan or agreement. 16 U.S.C. 1854(e)(1).

12 No longer appearing in SOS are two stocks o silver hake, one determined in 2002 to be rebuilt, the other in 2003 to be rebuildingred hake, whose status was last reported in 2001 as unknown; Bering Sea snow crab, not overshed as o 2005, Washington-

Oregon-Caliornia Bank rocksh, not overshed as o 2000; Washington-Oregon-Caliornia silvergrey rocksh, whose last status wasreported as unknown in 2002; yellowtail snapper, reported last in 2003 as not overshed; pelagic armorhead, combined in a complexin 1999, and squirrelsh snapper, also combined in a complex in 1999 and reported as not overshed.

13 For a detailed examination o how administrative changes aected the picture o stock status, see, Marine Fish ConservationNetwork. Shell Game: How the Federal Government is Hiding the Mismanagement o Our Nations Fisheries. Washington, D.C.(2005).

14 The Status o Stocks Report to Congress lists stocks rather than species. Some o these stocks are collections o species groupedor separated or management purposes, sometimes to account or geographically discrete populations o the same species, or oother reasons. This report has attempted to examine not only the complex but also the component species within it. Where SOShas split a species into several stocks, or grouped species into a complex the analysis ollows the species groupings assessed inOur Living Oceans, which preceded the SOS.

15 Marine Fish Conservation Network. Gul o Mexico Fishery Management Council Report. Washington, D.C. (2006).

16 Restrepo (Convenor) et al. 1998. Technical Guidance on the Use o Precautionary Approaches to Implementing National Standard 1

o the MSFCMA. NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO July,1998.17 National Marine Fisheries Service. 1991. Strategic Plan.

18 In the past, shery managers operated under a presumption that in the absence o inormation about a stock, especially a previouslyunexploited one, shing could proceed without restriction. As established sheries became depleted, feets moved on to newtargets. Without status inormation or catch limits, stocks such as monksh, spiny dogsh and tilesh soon became overshed,too.

19 National Research Council, Committee on Ecosystem Eects o Fishing, Phase II. Dynamic Changes in Marine Ecosystems: FishFood Webs, and Future Options. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. (2006) 160 pp.

The Marine Fish Conservation Network wishes to acknowledge the work o Sherry L. Bosse, JD, and Suzanne Iudicello

JD, in preparation o the background documents and analysis that went into this report.

Photo Credits: All photos are rom the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Library.


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Marine Fish Conservation Network

600 Pennsylvania Ave. SE, Suite 210

Washington, DC 20003

P 202. 543. 5509 F 202. 543. 5774

[email protected]

The Marine Fish Conservation Network is the

largest national coalition solely dedicated to

promoting the long-term sustainability of marine

sh. With almost 200 members including

environmental organizations, commercial and

recreational shing associations, aquariums, and

marine science groups the Network uses its

distinct voice and the best available science to

educate policymakers, the shing industry, and

the public about the need for sound conservation

and better management practices.

TAKING STOCK: The Cure for Chronic Overfishing (2007)

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