www.fas.org

HansM.KristensenDirector,NuclearInforma7onProjectFedera7onofAmericanScien7sts

Phone:202-454-4695Email:hkristensen@fas.org

Presenta7ontoNuclearThreatIni7a7ve

Washington,DCAugust24,2016

Taking Stock: New START Implementation and Outlook

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NuclearArsenals:GlobalInventoriesMorethan125,000warheadsproducedsince1945

Peakof64,500stockpiledwarheadsin1986(70,300ifincludingre7redwarheads)

• USstockpilepeakedearly(1967)• Russianstockpilepeakedlate(1986)

Enormousreduc7onssince1986peak:

• ~54,000warheadstockpilereduc7on• ~47,000+warheadsdismantled

~10,000warheadsinstockpiles(~15,000ifcoun7ngre7redwarheadsawai7ngdismantlement)

USandRussiapossess90%ofglobalinventory(94%ifcoun7ngre7redwarheads);eachhasmorethan47mesmorewarheadsthanrestofworldcombined;157mesmorethanthird-largeststockpile(France)

Decreasing:US,Russia,Britain,France

Increasing:China,Pakistan,India

Israelrela7velysteady;NorthKoreatrying

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

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NuclearArsenals:Trends Withmorethan90%ofworldinventory,USandRussiahavespecialresponsibilitytoreduce

Reduc7onofdeployedstrategicwarheadsfromsome23,000in1989to3,700in2016(NewSTARTcounts3,216)

Readinesslevelofremainingstrategicforcesishigh:about1,800warheadsonpromptalert

Noofficialde-aler7ng,butsignificantreduc7onofoverallalertnumbers:heavybombersde-alerted,USICBMsandSLBMsdownloaded,non-strategicforcesde-alerted

Trend:paceofreduc7onsisslowing

UScutonly400warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith3,500warheadscutin2005-2009

Russiacutanes7mated1,100warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith2,600in2005-2009

Insteadofcon7nuingpaceorincreasingreduc7ons,USandRussianstockpilesappeartobelevelingoutforthelonghaul;newemphasisonmoderniza7on

Newini7a7vesneededtopreventstallingofarmscontrol

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

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4Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

History:

April8,2010:Signed

December22,2010:SenateAdviseandConsent

February5,2011:EntryIntoForce

February5,2018:EntryIntoEffect

February5,2021:Expires(unlessextendedfor5years)

February5,2026:Expires(ifextendedfor5yearsfrom2021)

NewSTARTTreatySummary

Threeaggregatelimits(nosub-limits):

Nomorethan800totalstrategiclaunchers

Nomorethan700deployedstrategiclaunchers

Nomorethan1,550warheadsondeployedstrategiclaunchers(actualwarheadnumbersonICBMs/SLBMs,fakecountofonebombsperbombers);significantuploadcapacityremains

DataExchange:

Everysixmoths:forcestructurestatus

No7fica7ons:11,436(asof7/28/16)

Inspec7ons:

SimplerversionofSTARTinspec7onregime

18on-siteinspec7onsannually(10todeployedforcesand8tonon-deployedforces):201inspec7onsconductedsince2011(asof7/28/16)

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5Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

SinceFeb2011:reduc7onof141deployedlauncherswith319warheads.41deployedand37non-deployedlauncherstogo.

Droppedbelowwarheadlimitinlate-2015

2011-2015:PhaseOne-eliminated“phantomlaunchers”(B-1B,B-52G,emptysilos)

2015-2018:PhaseTwo-reduc7onofrealweapons:

• Bombers:De-nuke30opera7onaland12non-opera7onalB-52Hs.Leaving41nuclearfortotalof60deployednuclearbombers

•  ICBM:Offload50MM3sfromsilos,leaving400(allsinglewarhead;½cans7llMIRV)

• SSBN:Reducetubesfrom24to20,leavingnomorethan240deployedSLBMson12opera7onalsubmarines

USImplementa7onStatus

Imagestop-down:lastB-52Gdestroyed(111re7redB-52svisibleatDavis-MonthanAFBasofend-2015);ICBMsiloelimina7onatMalmstromAFB;ICBMsremovedfrom50silos;firstB-52Hde-nuclearizedatBarksdaleAFB;SSBNtubestobereducedfrom24to20persub.

100Russianinspec7onsofUSforcessince2011

NewSTARTisalsolong-termplanningforcelevel

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6Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

SinceFeb2011:reduc7onof0(zero)launchersandincreaseof198warheads

Russiawasbelowtreatylimitforlaunchersandwarheadswhentreatyenteredintoforcein2011

Russiacurrentlyhas220deployedlauncherslessthantheUnitedStatesand179lessthantreatylimit

Noreduc7onofdeployedlaunchersrequired,but56non-deployedlaunchersmustbeeliminated(currently39%ofRussiantotallaunchersarenon-deployed;USra7ois16%)

Deployedwarheadlevelhasincreasedby375from1,400in2013to1,735in2016

Reduc7onof185deployedwarheadsneededtomeetlimitby2018

Mighthavetocreateformalhedgeofnon-deployedmissilewarhead

101USinspec7onsofRussianforcessince2011

RussianImplementa7onStatus

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7Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

Despitewhatyoumighthear,Russiannuclearforcesarenotina“build-up”

RussiaisphasingoutSovieteralaunchers(SS-18,SS-19,SS-25,SS-N-18)andreplacingthemwithfewernewones;processbeganinlate-1990s

BecauseRussiahasfewerdeployedlaunchers,itiscompensa7ngforthedisparitybydeployingmorewarheadsoneachlauncherthantheUnitedStates;implica7onsforcrisisstability

Trends:greatershareofICBMwarheadsmobile;greatershareofwarheadsatsea(mighthavetocreateformalSLBMwarheadhedgetostaybelowNewSTARTlimit)

RussianForceStructureOutlook

Es7matedRussianICBMs

Es7matedRussianICBMWarheadTypes

Es7matedRussianSLBMWarheads

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8Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

UnitedStates:

• Limitonlaunchers(break-outpoten7al)

• Importanceofverifica7onregime

• “providingpredictabilityabouttheRussiannucleararsenalata7meofcon7nuedpoorrela7onswithMoscow.”(Go;emoeller2016)

• “moreimportantnowthanwhenitwentintoeffect.Itgivesustheconfidenceandlevelofoversightweneed–andcouldnototherwisehave–byallowingU.S.inspectorsunprecedentedaccesstoRussiannuclearfacili7es.”(Kerry2016)

• Wouldliketoseemorereduc7ons

• ArmscontrolopponentsinCongressusingtechnicalimplementa7onissuestoargueagainstreduc7ons

RussianFedera7on:

• CorrectedSTART2treaty;NewSTART(START3)seenasmorebalanced(especiallyremovalofICBMMIRVban)

• Doesn’tlimitRussianmoderniza7onprogram(alreadywellbelow)

• LimitsonlaunchersimportantgivensignificantUSwarheaduploadcapability(breakoutpoten7al)

• Valuesinsightprovidedbyverifica7onregime

• Notinterestedinnewtreatyun7lNewSTARTisimplemented;willlikelylinkotherstrategicissuestonextround

Percep7onsofTreatyValue“Basedontheinforma7onavailableasofDecember31,2015,theUnitedStatescer7fiestheRussianFedera7ontobeincompliancewiththetermsoftheNewSTARTTreaty.”

“TheUnitedStatesdoesnotassessthatthereisastrategicimbalancebetweentheUnitedStatesandtheRussianFedera7on.”USDepartmentofState,AnnualReportonImplementaJonofTheNewSTARTTreaty,January2016

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9Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

Noimportantstrategicstabilityissues,but

Largedisparityindeployedstrategiclaunchersfuelsasymmetricpostures(warheadandlauncherdistribu7on)

Russianincreaseofdeployedwarheadssince2013givesimpressionthatRussiaisnotdemonstra7nggoodfaithandfuelsuncertaintyaboutperiodarer2018

USreten7onoflargewarheaduploadcapacityand“warm”ICBMsilos,especiallywhenseentogetherwithadvancedconven7onalweaponsandgrowingmissiledefense,seenasdestabilizing

Overallstrategicmoderniza7ons,especiallyincontextofnewpoli7calcrisis,fuelsuspicionandworst-casescenarioplanning

US-Russiaagaininofficialadversarialrela7onship;bothareadjus7ngnuclearplanningaccordingly

StrategicStabilityIssues

EvenifRussiadeployedaddi7onalstrategicwarheadstoconductadisarmingfirststrike,evensignificantlyabovetheNewSTARTTreatylimits,it“wouldhaveli;letonoeffectsontheU.S.assuredsecond-strikecapabili7esthatunderwriteourstrategicdeterrenceposture.”

The“RussianFedera7on…wouldnotbeabletoachieveamilitarilysignificantadvantagebyanyplausibleexpansionofitsstrategicnuclearforces,eveninacheaJngorbreakoutscenarioundertheNewSTARTTreaty…”

DOD,ReportontheStrategicNuclearForcesoftheRussianFederaJon,2012

Problem!

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ICBM•  SS-27Mod2(mobile):replacingSS-25satNovosibirsk,Tagil,Yoshkar-Ola•  SS-27Mod2(silo):replacingSS-19satKozelsk•  SS-27Mod2(rail):envisionedbutuncertain•  RS-26(compactSS-27):toreplaceSS-25satIrkutskandVypolzovo•  RS-28(Sarmat):toreplaceSS-28satDombarovskyandUzhur

SSBN/SLBM•  SS-N-23SLBMlife-extension(Sineva/Layner)inDeltaIVSSBN•  BoreiSSBN:8planned(possibly10-12)•  SS-N-32(Bulava):fielding

Bombers•  UpgradesofsomeTu-160(Blackjack)andTu-95(Bear)•  Newbomber(PAKPA)indevelopment•  NuclearALCM(Kh-102)indevelopment

Tac7cal•  Tu-22M(Backfire)upgradeunderway•  Su-34(Fullback)fielding(replacingSu-24)•  Yasen(Sverodvinsk)SSGNfielding•  SLCM(SS-N-30,Kalibr)fielding•  GLCMtest-launched(notdeployed)•  SSM(SS-26,Iskander)fielding(replacingSS-21)•  SAM(S-400/SA-21)fielding(nuclear?)•  ABM(A-135)upgradeplanned

RussianModerniza7on

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

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ICBM•  MinutemanIIIlife-extensioncomple7ng•  Warheadfuzes/interoperablewarheadplanned•  GBSD(ICBMreplacement)indevelopment

SSBN/SLBM•  TridentIID5SLBMlife-extensionproduc7on•  SSBNreplacementdevelopment(12planned)•  EnhancedW76-1warheadlife-extensiondeploying•  W88-1warheadlife-extensiondevelopment

Bombers•  UpgradeofB-2andB-52underway•  B-21next-genera7onbomberindevelopment•  B61-12guidedstandoffbombindevelopment•  LRSO(ALCMreplacement)indevelopment

Tac7cal•  F-35Anuclearcapabilityindevelopment•  B61-12guidedstandoffbombindevelopment

Infrastructure•  UraniumProcessingFacility(secondaries)construc7on•  Plutoniumproduc7onfacili7es(primaries)construc7on•  Warheadsurveillance/simula7onfacili7esupgrades

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

USModerniza7on

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12Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

ObstaclesandPossibili7es Arerfullimplementa7onin2018,withcurrentemploymentstrategy,theUnitedStateswills7lldeployone-thirdmoreweaponsthanmilitarysaysitneedsforna7onalandinterna7onalsecuritycommitments.

ImplementaJonnotindoubt

Obstaclestoarmscontrol:

•  Accusa7onsoftreatyviola7ons(INFGLCMandNewSTARTSS-25dismantlement)

•  Moderniza7ons:howtolimitdynamic,avoidincreasingroleandnuclearweapons

•  East-Westcrisis:erosionoftrustandresurgentofmilitarystandoffandadversarialrela7onshippolluteseverything

•  GrowingconcernaboutRussianlimitednuclearusescenariosandUS“WestofLaunch”strategies(preven7onorpreemp7on)

Possibili7es(dependingonpoli7calclimate/will):

•  Incen7ves:Evenifnewbi-lateraltreatyisnotpossiblenow,bothsideshaveclearna7onalintereststolimitforcesandopera7onstoreducecostsandrisksandtonedownrhetoric

• Treatyextensionbeyond2021un7l2023(2026?).ExtensionwouldnotbesubjecttoadviceandconsentoftheUSSenate• Execu7veorder(orhand-shakefollow-onagreement)tocutthroughbureaucracy,suspicion,andworst-casemindsets(ex:NFU)

• NextNewSTART:~500launcherswith~1,000warheads(wouldnotrequirechangestoUS(andprobablynotRussian)strategy• AnotherTreaty:~500launchers,~500warheads,noorlimitedMIRV,noorlimitedALCMs(MIRV-like).InvolvementofChina?

• DreamTreaty:limitsonstrategicdeployed,non-strategic,non-deployed,readiness,exercises(size,frequency,loca7on),moderniza7ons.

Russia“wouldnotbeabletoachieveamilitarilysignificantadvantagebyanyplausibleexpansionofitsstrategicnuclearforces,eveninacheaJngorbreakoutscenarioundertheNewSTARTTreaty…”

DOD,ReportontheStrategicNuclearForcesoftheRussianFederaJon,2012

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13Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

QUESTIONS?

Addi7onalinforma7onandresourcesfromFASNuclearInforma7onProject:

FASStatusofWorldNuclearForcesOverviewhwps://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/

FASNuclearNotebookSeries(ColumninBulle7noftheAtomicScien7sts):hwp://thebulle7n.org/search/feature-type/nuclear-notebook

FASStrategicSecurityBlog:hwps://fas.org/blogs/security/

FASNuclearRelatedPublica7ons:hwps://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-informa7on-project-publica7ons/