Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies
Transcript of Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies
Brigham Young University Brigham Young University
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Theses and Dissertations
1994-04-01
Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies Tacit Cooperation Between Enemies: Two Case Studies
Kristina Handy Brigham Young University - Provo
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tacit cooperation between enemies
two case studies
thesis
presented
david M kennedy center international area studies
brigham young university
partial fulfillment
requirements degree
master arts
kristina handy
april 1994
thesis kristina handy accepted present form david M
kennedy center international area studies brigham young university
satisfying thesis requirement degree master arts
7 1
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valerie M 144sonhunson committee ah6hchair
stan ataylor ommitteevmmitteegommitteecommittee member
ziailo10 WWdate valerier M hudsonhudonhudin gfjbuate18yate programogram coorcoordinatormator
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CHAPTER 1
TACIT cooperation
introduction
research follows I1 attempt form
framework contextualcontextualizeize two case studies cooperation
born situations conflict like war
seems studying war conflict competition players
uniformly team opposing sides intricatealliances axis allied powers world war II11
elegant black white chess board
considering complexities human motivation what
happen black suited pawn saw eye eye
white counterpart did own king queen
leader uniforms still same colordynamics game how played changed
these changes particularly context war
international conflict where my interests begin
war tool conquest liberation defense
means promoting ideologies way gain economic
strength show national honor politician war
both opportunity doom poet eternal
2
reciprocity tears 1 1985 john stoessinger compared
war nietzschesNietz sches great abyss life own
war subject volumes works politicalscientists philosophers painters poets
far common thread studies internationalpolitics
rules weapons war change case studiesincrease each passing year while predictionprescriptions too often elude students nationalinternational conflict find our peace controllingvariables our own war studies
my research I1 assert cooperation spring
conflict war specifically I1 propose
international conflictualconflictual relationship occurs
resembles iterated prisoners dilemma meets
certain conditions cooperation emerge cooperation
conflict variables research project
parameters cooperation
while I1 wait until next sectionchapter define cooperation detail I1 want explain
I1 looking incidents lower levelbureaucratic cooperation I1 do question
authority question controlling
taken final line wilfred owens poeminsensibility owen british poet killed action during world
war I1
3
policies propelling two statessituation conflict war maintaining
conflict I1 avoid very large tangent selectinglower level bureaucrat actorinstigatoractor instigator
cooperation lower level bureaucrats positionagents national policy make policies
themselves
conflict hand originates higher
source maintained levels includingpawns field words national authority
creates maintains conflict cooperation emerges
illicitly lower ranks why I1 use
term tacit cooperation cooperation mostly
unsanctioned emerges source
authoritative command
stated above conflictualconflictual situationcooperation emerges resemble iterated prisonersdilemma I1 using game describe
conflict I1 borrow game theory literatureinitial idea use game theory comes robert axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrodsevolution cooperation evolution cooperation
major source development definition what I1
term tacit cooperation book where I1 am
introduced tony ashworthsAshworths research world war I1 trench
warfare my first case study tacit cooperation
second case study I1 use relationship
4
developed between paul nitze yuli kvitsinskyKvit sinsky during
intermediate nuclear forces INF talks 198119831981 1983 1I
utilize strobe talbottsTalbotts many chronicles talkspiece together events led tacit cooperation
between two negotiatorsnegotiatory
though world seems far removed war likeworld war I1 superpower cold war conflictspassed away soviet communist rule berlin wall
conflict war nevertheless incessant parthuman experience introduction work war
change world politics robert gilpin notes although
evolved through centuries technologicaldevelopments those developments altered relationsamong states war continuing unsolved problem 7
ergo fundamental change world politics taken
place 213 james rosenau takes gilpin task saying
neglects possibility similar outcomes iewar may result vastly different structuresprocesses 73 whether structures internationalrelations changed whether war
conflict inevitable outcomes human relationsworld system historically currently filledincidents conflict war until changes
topics cooperation conflict high many
peoples agendas study understand
5
definitions
tacit cooperation lower level bureaucrat how
defined terms game theory
robert keohane defines cooperation mutual
adjustment state policies another 1984 31
another scholar jerome bernstein disagrees arguing
cooperation forced cooperation much
result decisive policy realizationlimits power politics policies strategies
ensue therefrom 1989 97
these definitions discounting many
others attributed political literaturepart involved cooperation among political
ideological allies therefore how does define
collaborative association between hostile rivals enemies
mentioned above cooperation I1 seek
case study analysis I1 develop framework
contextualizecontextualize occurs among lower level bureaucrats
lack power form implement policieschange structure conflictualconflictual relationship
involved words privatesarmy cannot make decision either end escalatebattle participating tacit cooperation
therefore unsanctioned even illicit act form
6
agreement sometimes spoken sometimes symbolized known
developed agreeing parties involved
tacit cooperation does necessarily demand
altruistic reasons taking place reasonableassume cooperation occurs two individuals
groups see benefit involved collaborativeprocess result cooperate reason
gaining personal benefit nature payoffs
strategies described field game theory
classic fights games debates rapoport
delineates difference between fight game stating
essential difference seefight idealized devoidrationality opponents while gamecontrary idealized strugglecomplete rationality opponents assumedrapoport 1960 10
I1 emphasize rationality indispensable game
theorist body research relations between
opposing entities two nations war
analyzed game fight furthermore
rapoport states game opponents cooperate
follow rules game absolutely 11
community between opponents opponent
speaks same language seen nuisance
mirror image self whose interests may
7
diametrically opposed nevertheless existrational being 1960 9
certain games prisoners dilemma stag
hunt cooperation may primary choice
considered highest payoff strategy time
point make cooperation rational choice
cooperation therefore strategy yieldhighest mutual payoff definition based
prisonersprisonerI1 dilemma2dilemmadilemmas2 fframeworkramework f my case
study analysis next chapter contain descriptionuse research
conflict conflictualConflictual relationships
conflict defined terms game
research important begin understanding how payoffs
motivate define players interactions I1 mentioned
conflict begins authoritative level nationsgovernment game policymakerspolicy makers involves zero
sum pay off system win10 loseolose0boseo lower level
bureaucrat involved heat conflict I1 submit
2belowabelowelow payoff matrix prisoners dilemma
Bj cooperate defect
cooperate 33 05
defect 50 11
table I1
8
game resemble prisoners dilemma payoffpay off matrix
yield positive payoffspay offs those wish
cooperate refer footnote 2 therefore conflictdilemma prisoners dilemma broken
proper conditional strategy
focus & scope research
robert axelrod developed theory evolution
cooperation describes emergence cooperation
among contending entities theory I1
create specific framework reference
collusion among political rivals andor enemies axelrodargues iterated prisoners dilemma game called
tit tat fit promote cooperation
cooperation occur under given set necessary
conditionspieces cooperation literature
provide fundamental theoretical background material form
tacit cooperation framework michael taylorspossibility cooperation describes emergence
cooperation similarly axelrod yet delineatesstrategies just tit tat being able support
cooperation equilibrium3equilibriumequilibriums3 contribution
3anaan equilibrium saddle point place payoff matrixboth players strategies rationally fall prisoners
dilemma equilibrium strategy DD see footnote 2 seeprisoners dilemma payoff structure DD 11 shows
equilibrium strategy
9
taylor makes specifically notion altruism
defines altruism being zero sum based payoffs
interdependent 111
further scholarly input kenneth oyescooperation under anarchy contributionenhance widen necessary conditions emergent
cooperation important point oye makes
conditional strategy effective easilyrecognized playing game black white choices
cooperation defect make strategiestransparent furthermore oye discusses number game
players how size affect outcome game
methodology
I1 explicate two historical episodes using game
theoretic framework cooperation I1 use case study
approach show least twice internationalsetting tacit cooperation emerged theory tacitcooperation drafted chapters 2 3 followed
case studies set necessary conditions
extracted describe what sorts structurestheory promote possibly eventuate cooperation among
players game information case studiestaken primarily secondary sources
explication each depend upon inescapably
subjective interpretation events however
10
framework I1 am attempting examine explicitfactor interpretation description events
these sources sort check balanceusing these materials small portion my researchcome primary sources mostly memoirs
literature review
steven brams superpower games applying games
superpower conflict states conditional game theoryinvolve following implicit conversation you
cooperate I1 certainty you do my
response without saying what appropriate1985 141414 14 conditional strategy described
research tit tat break prisonersdilemma axelrod states tittifctifttitttiac tat policycooperation first move then doing whatever
player did previous move 1981 308 axelrod
cited repeatedly game theory cooperation
literature testing durability success
strategies like tit tat lead cooperation
axelrod become my window field game theory
without going too much detail study games
received widespread attention 1944 publicationvon neumann morgensternsMorgensterns theory games
economic behavior robert leonard notes editedbook toward history game theory though game theory
11
now plays central role economic theory ideas1944 primarily appropriated developed
mathematicians weintraub 1992 29 now game theorybecome interdisciplinary british biologistrichard dawkins devote entire chapter selfishgene 1989 describing ways robert axelrodamerican political scientist taken mathematical
theory exciting new directions 202
what does game theory do political scientistjames schellenberg 1982 wrote science
conflict game theory created especially analyze
situations involving conflicts interest 167
continues explaining social scientistmathematical approach games usefulconstructing theories clear titlesbig two soviet american perception foreign policyrapoport 1971 superpower games applying game theory
superpower conflict brams 1985 many politicalscientists found niche theorygame theory almost exclusively examines conflictcooperation international political pundit much
gain elegance robert axelrod exception
my research I1 start axelrod school
evolutionary cooperation apply conditional strategy
tit tat explain two very different internationalsituations where cooperation develops thrust my
12
research describing cooperation amidst conflictwhile cooperation literature existed politicalstudies particularly exclusively use
game theory study tacit cooperation defined
research axelrod given me theory
strategy reference cooperation develops during
conflict left open levelcooperation occur further research use
two political scientists game theoretic approaches
oye taylor I1 am able select I1 want study
agents cooperation lower level bureaucrat
international political studies cooperation
never wholly involved individual actor unless actorauthority symbolically representing state
studies cooperation between rivals enemies involve
wartime alliances state centric approaches
studying why soviets signed aggressionnonaggressionnon pact
nazis 1939 course systemic approach
commonly used look how bipolarbi polar political world
form US soviet cooperation many utilizesystemic approach view US soviet rivalry two
nations identical fates yanov 1989 several scholars
note superpowerssuperpowers used rivalry gain
international superiority especially lesser developed
nations bernstein 1989 metz 1989 scholars view
cold war politics cooperation hot war between
13
united states soviet union never broke craig1990 kremenyukKremenyuk midlarsky et al 1994
game theory often utilized describing coldwar superpower relations rapoport did 1971
big two soviet american perception foreign policy
recently manus midlarsky uses axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tit tatexplain part why great powers did learncooperate prior 1914 appear done during
cold war era midlarsky et al 1994 26 researchinvolving cooperation among individuals receivedmuch attention international studies many cases
however level cooperation analyzed
ambiguous left reader determine axelrod1984 robert kuenne 1988 1989 outcomes
cooperation readily studied causes
group scholars notes 1962 important question
antecedent cooperative relationships receive
relatively little consideration compared
consequences kelly et al 1 particularly studiesinternational politics statement remains somewhat
true however onset post cold war era
taking everyone surprise many scholars rosenau
1990 suggesting radical new approaches describewhat happening world today
research does lofty goal
attempts simply funnel international situation
14
conflict down individual level see what happen
given set circumstances accounting
small personal choices big picture internationalexchange
CHAPTER 2
FRAMEWORK TACIT cooperation
understanding conditions allow cooperationemerge appropriate actions taken foster development
cooperation specific setting
axelrod 1984 6
introductionunder what conditions cooperation emerge
world egoistsegotists without central authority axelrod 1981
306 question robert axelrod studiesbook evolution cooperation through
answering question theory tacit cooperation
part begin take shape evolutioncooperation axelrod uses game theory builds upon
assumptions explains why utilizes game theory
developing ideas cooperation
way needed represent what commonsituations without becoming bogged down
details unique each fortunatelyrepresentation available famous prisoners dilemmagame 1984 7 1
axelrod uses game theorystheodysorys prisoners dilemma createpithy explanation study cooperation though
1 game prisoners dilemma created early1950s merrill flood melvin dresher
16
clear details specific cooperative relationshipslost process simplification strength comes
ability identify common factors differentinstances emerging cooperation
study cooperation solelydeliberation social sciences I1 must therefore borrow
various fields already establishedmathematical philosophical theoretical proofs
utility cooperation theories literature stands
study cooperation multi disciplinary inquiry
axelrod taylor being two few political scientistsquoted body literature following section
consist rather generic explanation game theory
application here research
game theory prisoners dilemma
game theory mathematical origins statedpreviously theory games formalized untillate 1940s early 1950s2 von neumann morgenstern
smith 1982 1 though originating mathematical
concept game theorystheodysorys progeny quickly became usefuleconomists today used mathematicians
2 II gameiigame theory generally attributed von neumannpapers 1928 1937 although recently frechet raised question
priority suggesting several papers borel 195311953early 20s120s really laid foundations game theory luce raiffa1957 2
17
economists political social scientistshard scientists microbiologistsmicrobiologists geneticists
luce raiffa stated mans
written record preoccupation conflictinterest possibly topics god love inner
struggle received comparable attention 1957 1
luce raiffa note further study conflictinterest vast diverse must attempt
abstract certain large classesmathematical system 2 abstracting two theoristswarn important details lost limiting utility
theory games specific fields researchscholar notes
decades followed von neumannmorgensternsMorgensterns creation mathematical theorymatured applications multiplied you need
look under heading game theoryprisoners dilemma abstracts psychology
sociology political science journals seeproliferation davis 1983 xiii xvi
study game theory expanded dramatically since
50s luce raiffa wrote classic games
decisions game theory offered many scientists tersedescription oft confusing decision making process
study game theory concerned
interaction decisions these interactions what
define game theory considers how should make
decisions lesser extent how does make them
18
davis 1983 3 decisions may depend course upon
game being played strategiesselected number players entering specifiedgame3gamec
game theodystheorysorys major goal according andrew colman
find solution game hand states
solution specification decisionsmade outcome therefore
reached decision makers rational accordingcriteria laid down theory 1982 5
using game theory framework research
interactions participants under given setcircumstances colman states behavior decisionmakers accordance normative
prescriptions theory problem empirical
research theory merely tells outcomes game
interactions strategies played
under given set conditions does attempt
guess why player players behave certain ways
tangential line reasoning discussiongame theorystheodysorys elemental assumption notion
rationality bertrand russell states reason
perfectly clear precise meaning signifieschoice right means end you wish
achieve 1954 8 according many game theory scholars
3 use game theory research limited twoparty opposed n person games
19
however term rational far precise
certainly means different things different theoriesdeveloped luce raiffa 1957 5
nonetheless concept rationality used here
persons playing game use strategycoincide desires fears needs every
player minimize potential maximum lossprisoners dilemma game axelrod adheres
assumption rationality 1984 18
prisoners dilemma game defines
rationality essence very positivisticallyscenario game gleans title presented
thusly
imagine you your accomplice chargedhaving committed crime now prisoners
sitting separate cells unable communicateawaiting trial enough circumstantialevidence convict both you even you bothremain silent you both convicted locked
year you admit your guilt helpconvict your silent partner you free
put away ten years reverse happenscourse confesses you remain silentyou both confess then unfortunately you both
get nine years campbell 1985 4
rules you want minimal amount years jailpossible you dont care how many years your
accomplice gets you both know knows scenario
neither you know how decide
choices according prisoners dilemma either
20
confess guilt defined non cooperation
defecting D silent defined
cooperation C you confess D your partnerremains silent C you receive highest payoff
go free you dont confess your partner does you
get lowest payoff 10 years prison second
highest payoff both you remain silent CC
year prison dilemma derivedsuspense uncertainty though better take
risk unilaterally defecting remain cooperativemay leave you suckers payoff case 10
years prison 11
book prisoners dilemma study conflictcooperation rapoport chammah add insight
problem rationality game theory note how
definition rationality specifically affectsinterpretation prisoners dilemma state
prisoners dilemma rational choicestrategy both players leads outcomeworse both chosen strategiesirrationally paradox remains unresolved long
insist adhering concept rationalitymakes perfect sense zero sum games
makes questionable sense non zero sum games 196513
result rapoport chammah deriveexperimentation prisoners dilemma
rationality changes game played long
period time iterated prisoners dilemma
21
rational choice becomes predominantly cooperate
opposed defectthrough looking prisoners dilemma based
game theory tacit cooperation constructedlower level bureaucratic interaction seen
representing prisoners dilemma game showing how
paradox game broken theory 4 framework
fabricated understand emergence tacitcooperation
robert axelrod evolution cooperation
book evolution cooperation robertaxelrod explores notion breaking rationalityparadox prisoners dilemma game argumentation
based particular strategy tit tat how
use strategy prisoners dilemma bringsemergence evolution cooperation
axelrod notes four areas inquiryprisoners dilemma used analytical tool
first study social psychology used
understand examine human behavior axelrod states
4 idea paradox works together definitionrationality according prisoners dilemma gamerational strategy defect case payoffcomparatively low low compared mutual cooperation lowunrequited cooperation paradox best strategy
rational strategy until paradox brokenbest strategy becomes yields highest payoff bestdefined here noticeably strategy highest mutualpayoff
22
iterated prisoners dilemma become E colicollcolfcoifsocial psychology 1980 565 6 second use
prisoners dilemma purpose
conceptualizing social processes many bestdeveloped models important political social economic
processes prisoners dilemma foundation
1980 6 third body literature discusses how
prisoners dilemma abstract game aids scholaranalyze characteristics elemental universal issuesspecifically related field like psychology
economics why people do do cooperate
what rationality luce raiffa discuss etc
finally fourth body literature concentrates how
eliminate dilemma writers rapoport axelrod
discussed issue length realm
my research focus although axelrod states none
these fields reveal very much how play
prisoners dilemma very well 1980 6
axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods thesis new approach needed
allow players learn choosing strategyway dilemma broken
proposes new strategy strategy comes testperformed way tournament
second chapter evolution cooperation
axelrod describes tournament arranged find
fit strategy break prisoners dilemma
23
support emergence well maintaincooperation tournament designed form
round robin sixty people many disciplinescountries ages participated overall winner
tournament strategy name tit tatcreated anatol rapoport
tit tat strategy defined axelrod thuslyTIT TAT starts cooperative choice
thereafter does what player did previousmove 31 success tit tat dependent upon
following proposition axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods first discountparameter w sufficiently high beststrategy independent strategy used
player 15 discount parameter refers weight
Ww future moves particularly next move relativecurrent move therefore w refers percentage
payoff lost each consecutive move
constitutes rate discount assuming example
1 current status payoff being 100 percentw number greater 0 less 1
subtracted 1 giving discount parameter 5 point
axelrod makes future important enough
5 discount parameter part mathematical formulaetest viability theory games use hereresearch purely metaphorical words discountparameter used mathematical formulaquantitative research used abstracted senseaxelrod does describing certain instances conflict whether
discount parameter high low
24
cast shadow back upon present thereby affectcurrent strategic situation 12
according axelrod discount parameter must
high order tit tat scenario functionterminology discount parameter substituted
poetic words shadow future oye questionshow does shadow future affect likelihood
cooperation oye 1986 13 according firstproposition noted above better strategy
your opponent shadow futurerelationship relatively high consequently partialanswer oye cooperation emerge future play
either important course futureplay 6 single play prisoners I1 dilemma obvious
situation D defect emerge
expectation ability predict subsequent
trust yet learned each player therefore
first condition noted shadow future must
high
martin shubik states indirectly showing
infinite games supergamessupergames iterated games
6 single play game each player makes movelead agreement absence sovereign oye 1986
12 sufficient time moves playersutilize conditional strategy cooperation emerge
forced sort authority having powerplayers involved
25
equilibrium fall another category justdefect states
suppose game repeated endlessly thenpayoffs become unboundedly large howeveraverage payoff per period remain bounded
argued reasonable assumeplayers consider payoffs per period
take account manage achievetemporary stationary state better 00
defect enforced equilibrium pointsuppose each player chosen
first move initial subgamesubgapesubgame then each thoughtswitch second move
forever retaliation violation statusquo enough run joint maximum
equilibrium
course stationary state better defect 1111either cooperate 33 perfect exploitation
5 0 however according shubiksskubiksShubiks reasoning perfectexploitation equilibrium entails
worse stationary state 11 players
therefore equilibrium state betterdefect DD 11 cooperate CC 33 7
problem how do know shadow
future high logically two parties come togethervery sublime purpose discount parameter
high empirically however matter complex
two bureaucrats players representing rationalitiesconflicting entities interact say
understanding shadow future same
7 see chapter 1 footnote 2 example payoff matrix
26
even present shadow future high
personalities involved situationmeaning interacted long period
time knowledge makes mutual behavior patternseasily predictable iee trust ambiance
situation makes decisions portentous namely
threat nuclear war death etcdiscount parameter argued ratherempirically tested though analysis should present strong
case way
merely egoistsegotists recognize factfutures interactive does mean cooperation
emerge high discount parameter necessary
condition means does constitute sufficientcondition nevertheless essential conclusion
cooperation emerges evolutionary process
spontaneously argument cooperation
ability emerge world dominated conditions
unconditional defection small clustersindividuals able interact cooperatively axelrod1986 14550145 50 furthermore way cooperation
emerge conditional words echoing
axelrod interaction based reciprocity herein
lies second necessary condition
effectiveness strategies based reciprocityargued context axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods tournament where tit
27
tat won tit tat strategy conditional play
should naturally emerge under first necessary conditionlarge shadow future becomes clear
these two necessary conditions intrinsicallylinked
further condition axelrod noted talliedtournament scores strategy compete well
nice being first defectbeing willing forgive limited defectionplayer major reasons these nice strategiesdid well axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods tournament eight top ranking
strategies nice strategies scored
extremely well playing each true teststrength then see how well nice strategies did
against meanies11meaniesmealiesmeanies 1188 tournament tit tatprosperous axelrod warns against strategiesconsidered nice defining nice
strategy three points discusses
first strategy should allow player
defect early game without provocation
probably lead mutual defection secondly
fit strategies tournament
forgiving axelrod states forgiveness rulepropensity cooperate moves player
8theathe8 term imeaniesImemeanies defined here does forgivebegins play defection cooperation
28
defected 1980 14 words once provoked
nice strategy allow provoker make amends
cooperation still therefore possible axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrodstournament showed certain strategies did do well
forgiving strategy nalforgiving then impossible cooperation develop
first defection thirdly strategy should
overly pessimistic prospects opponent
defecting initial move strategies trycreate probabilistic model opponents strategy
strategy like tit tat does care
likelihood opponent defecting fact very
optimistic opponents initial moves
unconditionally cooperates first move sum
nice strategies must employed order cooperation
evolve third necessary condition
rather implicit assumption becomes
fourth necessary condition emerging cooperation
system entities interact anarchic
hierarchy authority present forcing cooperation
defection then logically cooperation defection does
naturally emerge naturally sustained two
nations entities conflicting war
central authority 9 however lower level
9 argue united nations powercentral authority figure while may case between national
29
bureaucratic activity may determined hierarchicalauthority discussed chapter 1
lesser bureaucrats disobey authority become
own central authority even sub levelactivity authority overseeing both sides
conflict god notwithstanding
central authority head stategoverning body thwart emergence cooperation
sees cooperative effort undermining sanctitypower idea directly opposing traditional
hobbesian thought state statenecessary humans naturally exist stateprisoners dilemma cooperation emerge
must coerced 10 UN developed type
analysis however axelrod breaking canon
stating central authority non existentnecessary cases detrimental
natural cooperative interaction emerge
axelrod notes variety ways resolvedilemma prisoners dilemma developed
1981 308 states further these various
solutions strategy allow additional activity
entities UN little do tacit negotiating definedpaper tacit negotiations do involve third parties
10 see taylor1987for further insight theoreticalfundamentals hobbes hume theoretical relationsprisoners dilemma
30
alter strategic interaction between among
players initial problem needs solved
longer exists very nature problem
changed fundamentally under normal conditionsprisoners dilemma exist however these types
remedies available axelrod 1981 307 8
these normal conditions constituted four partsaccording axelrod firstmechanism available players make enforceable
threats commitments 1981 308 then players must
know every possibility open themselves
opponents order receive optimal payoffs
conditions anarchy central authorityway threats commitments ensured
player power guarantee move makes
course making move axelrod state words
backed actions cheap meaningless
1981 308
second condition virtually impossible
predict opponents strategy particularly each
subsequent move means player must make
move according move already made
according move made second guessing
opponent axelrod notes concerning
existence condition eliminates possibilityreliable reputations might based watching
31
player interact third parties 1981 308
result strict attention must paid each player
interpret moves player moves must made
claritythird condition players cannot get rid
opponents nor run away interactionaxelrod 1984 11 player cannot decide
opponent reason strategy based
personality type interaction type
game players behave accordingly
finally way change opponents
payoffs once payoffs changed game changes
example prisoners dilemma defined payoff
matrix even slight change payoff structure may
change game chicken something else
utilities payoffs already include whatever
consideration each player interestsaxelrod 1981 308
these four conditions occurring naturallyprisoners dilemma axelrod presents theory
evolutionary cooperation conditions necessary
cooperation emerge
32
axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods critics
hirshleiflerHirshleifler collcoilcoll11
according these authors unless axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods exact
assumptions present prisoners dilemma situationthen theory evolutionary cooperation using tittat strategy does function stateshirshleiflerHirshleifler coll claim axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournament
analysis idiosyncratic features ought
make analysts cautious drawing very sweeping
conclusions 370 first note assuming
prisoners dilemma corresponds very many real lifesettings hazardous statehost significant classes mixed motive
interaction patterns chicken battle sexes
forth damaging criticism here whether
assume prisoners dilemma actuallycoincides physical real life situation
while forms conflict may real lifeprisoners dilemmas I1 argue case studies developed
chapters 4 5 do resemble prisoners dilemmas
trenches world war I1 two sides given
choice 1 kill D 2 shoot miss avoid
dispensing damage C play game IDD
11 hirshleiflerHirshleifler coilscollscolis critique axelrod takenarticle journal conflict resolution june 1988
33
rational choice axelrod states weakening
enemy important value promote survivalmajor battle ordered sector 1984 75
prisoners dilemma payoff equation setchoices ordered thusly 1111 represents greater
1 shooting kill while your enemy does
DC
2 neither side shoots kill CC
3 both sides shooting kill each DD
4 your enemy shoots kill you do CD
intermediate nuclear forces talks choices
negotiatorsnegotiatory 1 make concessions D 2
compromise make arms control deal setchoices ordered like
1 your negotiating counterpart makesconcessions while you make none you pleaseyourself your bosses DC
2 both sides make concession you both do yourjob well your bosses pleased CC
3 neither side makes concessions you both dojob you assigned do DD
4 you make concessions look like poornegotiator you may lose your job yourcounterpart makes concessions
these two cases neatly fit prisoners dilemma scenario
true game does explain human
interactions hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll state
34
arguably explain situations two identifiedhere
second argument hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll make
axelrod impetuously assumes interactionrandom words did allow social
stratification perhaps under certain circumstances
men example interact men doctors
doctors etc according criticschange nature model axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournament
randomly tested every strategy played every
strategy hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll arguing under
interactive situations certain strategy combinations
always play way tit tatstrategy invade these strategy combinations thereforeevolution possible article however
hirshleiflerHirsh leifler coll never prove point factrun experimentation using same assumption
axelrod uses namely populations interact randomly
state
our analysis conducted solely withinunderlying prisoners dilemma payoff environment
assuming homogeneous unstructuredpopulation individuals 371
whether criticism sound authors do
validate own claim point do even
address point once made two cases I1
research here point becomes moot anyway
35
players interacting arbitrarily assigned each
words must interact either defectcooperate
third cogent argument make
results tournament dependent upon structuretournament itself axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournament
conducted round robin allowed strategiesplay each hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll show
elimination tournament round robin then
results quite different state
tit tat does poorly elimination contests
essentially never able defeat competing strategyencounter 1988 370 difficult
argument deflect interactive situationwhere axelrod claims cooperation evolve does
assembly participants resemble round robin
elimination tournament neither while may
little bearing given interactive situationargument stands paper
finally hirshleiflerHirshleifler coll argue
strategies presented tournament
representative limited number experts even
basic strategies cooperate defectoverlooked state
two strategies enteredcontests simpler still thesearchetypical prisoners dilemma options always play
36COOPERATE always play DEFECT turns
important circumstances thesearchetype strategies defeat TIT TAT
displace evolutionary competition 371
axelrod readily admits strategies limitedeven describes strategy beat tit tatnamely tit two tats defectsopponent defects twice 1984 38 40 tit two tats
forgiving strategy axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods assumptions based
how certain strategies fared tournaments derived
general principles tournament results absoluteanswers tit tat strategy point
show how under what conditions cooperation evolve
why tit tat should used prisoners
dilemma situationsrapoport responds hirshleifers coilscollscoilscolis argument
stating futile conclude
TITFORTATTIT TAT performed best contests
simulations eye eye policy works
effective eliciting cooperation 1988 399
continues point noting important
lesson learn prisoners dilemma strategywhat happen even what likely happen
what logically happen consequential factlook axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods tournament according rapoport
tit tat while doing very poorly toonecontest excelled round robin thus general notion
logically reached tit tat
37
nice strategies played everyone better offrapoport 1988 400 fact tit tat
thwarted another nice strategy defends axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrodsevolutionary theory adds hirshleiferscoilscolls critique
michael taylortaylor book possibility cooperation
1987 critiques axelrod point interaction taylorstates
even where real world interactionstruly pairwise unlikely takestrange form assumed axelrod analysishinges assumption individualplay whole infinite supergamesupergame
player 1987 70
while may case general real life situationsiterated prisoners dilemma precisely axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods
perspective explain least partinteraction between lower level bureaucrats tacitinstitutions cooperation develop long-
standing andor sublime interaction tournaments go
axelrod socialization examined takes place
pairs according taylor limit
itself stated above very well
misinterpretation real life interactions tend
flexible axelrod asserts evolutioncooperation actual critique results
38
tournament 12 assumptions made
practical use these results fact remains under
these conditions pairwise interactions resultsaxelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tournaments show general substantialtheoretical matter theoretical matter
substance thesis relevance actualoccurrences tacit cooperation nevertheless response
taylor I1 use axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods theory describe pairwise
interactions
conclusion
axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods assumptions become point referenceframework notion tacit cooperation
conditions among conditions focus
chapters 2 3 begin index phenomenon
tacit cooperation though proofs axelrodmakes book various articles may may
test theory according critics sketch
provides emergence cooperation very usefulnoted used here research laid
several conditions place may lead
cooperation these conditions briefly reiteration1 large shadow future high discount
parameter 2 reciprocal conditional relationship 3
12 taylors calculations actually coincide axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods seetaylor 1987 69
39
strategy used playing game must nice 4
lack central authority degree anarchy
speculated these place time
2 party conflict then definition both conceptual
tangible made tacit cooperation chapters 4
5 contain two different historical incidents resemble
cases cooperation I1 abstract both cases using
framework identify emergence tacit cooperation
CHAPTER 3
FRAMEWORK II11 ADDITIONS AXELROD
introduction
section examine two theoristscontributed cooperation literature both theoristsmichael taylor kenneth oye use principles game
theory prisoners dilemma two person games
framework just axelrod does contributionresearch show conditions
allow cooperation emerge prisoners
dilemma these conditions including
axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods present interactive situationsnaturally come interaction cooperationemerge axelrod say evolve must noted
formula made decide how many these
conditions necessary cooperation emerge
conditions high discount parameter hold
importance others however same reasoning
personalities how interact may do
resulting cooperation present condition
interactive situation taylor oye add insight lesstangible conditions altruism might allow
cooperation emerge
41
michael taylors possibility coopeCoppecoodecooperationcationrationcatlonmichael taylor book possibility
cooperationlcooperation1Cooperationcooperations1 attempts inspect how well prisoners
dilemma correctly represents public goods interactionsclaims prisoners dilemma does accuratelyrepresent these interactions then wants examine
prospects voluntary cooperation game 1987
ix examination shed lightpotential cooperation settings enmity mutual
mistrust probable defection
taylor critiques liberal justificationstate asserts human nature diversenumber people planet socialstructure state must set order forcepeople cooperation taylor utilizes issues
collective action externalizesexternal izes andor problem
public goods case studies research though
critique hobbes humes liberal thoughts
state very stimulating research taylorsdiscussion cooperation definition altruism
illustrativedeliberations cooperation similar
axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods presents set proofs show
ithe possibility cooperation second revised editionanarchy cooperation 1976
42
certain conditions promote cooperation largeshadow future yet describes strategiesjust tit tat defect being able
reach equilibrium 2 another strategy reaches
equilibrium tit tat called B plays mutated
tit tat called BIB mutated tat tat exactlysame except does unconditionally cooperate
first move unconditionally defects resultstrategy brings alternating cooperate defectcooperate defect etc course idealcooperative situation yet axelrod argue
adheres principles being nice
strategy however B does follow rule 3
axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods nice strategy guidelines cooperate does
emerge sense taylor manufactures convenient
proof axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods proposition nice strategiesseems however real dog eat dog world nice
strategy likely yet individualsconfronted enemys face resembling own nice
strategies common case studiesdemonstrate
taylors major contribution notion altruism
altruism defined him following
2anaan equilibrium saddle point placepayoff matrix both players strategies rationally fall
simple prisoners dilemma equilibrium strategy DDsee table I1 reference chapter 1 footnote 2
43
altruism considered here takes very simple formeach player assumed maximize additive function
own payoff playerspayoffs just long weight attached
players payoff nonzeronon zero I1 shall sayindividual acts altruistically I1 shall considerbriefly what I1 call sophisticated altruismwhere players utility depends uponplayers utilities might incorporate form
altruism well payoffs 111
altruism difficult phenomenon trace occurs
two players realize future payoffs dependent
upon each words players strive
best payoff default end helping opponent
reach best payoff taylor continues
light noting assumed individuals
altruistic expense being egoistic pure
altruism denotes player wishes maximize
persons payoff 115 cares little nothing
own simply does happen relationships
among states frankly seldom happens setting
nevertheless possibility under conditional
circumstances shall see later tony ashworthsAshworths
research INF negotiations case study
altruist prisoners dilemma looks like
44
Bcooperate defect
cooperate 11 12
defect 2 1 00
table II11
though prisoners dilemma payoffpay off matrix
shows how altruists react given prisoners
dilemma altruists cooperate realizebeneficial do want
exploit player 3 accordingly strategycooperate emerge equilibrium satisfying
both players consciencesprisoners dilemma between conflicting players
actors pure altruism present however altruismdefined here taylor may play important part
lower level bureaucratic decision making negotiationimportance perhaps found concept
altruistic attitude help initiate cooperation
nothing else altruism allows rivals enemies break
through zero sum philosophy allow them understand
3seeasee3 see taylor 1987 page 119 full explanationdifferent altruist matrices
45
mutual cooperation yield higher payoffs
mutual defection
taylor makes point defining playersprisoners dilemma being pure egoistsegotists
concerned maximizing own payoff
costs probably clear approximation
reality 109 people situations tend
mix altruist egoist4 taylor statesway altruism make difference typicalprisoners dilemma setting setting where
rational defect declares
individuals contribute sufficientlyaltruistic then might thereby provide starteraround conditional cooperation others
rational egoistsegotists develop 110 words
altruism condition present nourishes
seeds cooperation sprouting once two people began
understand futures even slightlyinterdependent then cooperation see first signs
spring next chapter tony ashworthsAshworths case study
emergent sustainable cooperation world war I1
trench warfare develops concept altruism lessabstractly
41t4jt must noted analyzing national conflictsafer assume people pure egoistsegotists courseproblem prisoners dilemma you must assume peopledefect rationally altruism coexists egoism though fear
pure egoism creates prisoners dilemma
46
kenneth oyes corpeCoppecooperationkationration under anarchanarchyoye states
nations dwell perpetual anarchy centralauthority imposes limits pursuit sovereigninterests times absence centralizedinternational authority precludes attainment commongoals possibility breach promiseimpede cooperation even cooperation leave
better off yet times states dorealize common goals through cooperation under anarchy
1986 1
again words kenneth oye sense
paradox common discussions cooperation
emerging prisoners dilemma states even
possibility defection promise enough
impede cooperation oye states cooperation
necessarily forced through sort hobbesian statenature lockeanlockbeanLockean civil society cooperation
possibility where chaos disorder ruleanalysis oye makes three points calls
circumstantial dimensions explain cooperation
exists how promoted long term
first notes changing payoff structuregame cooperation enhanced question
stated thusly how does payoff structure determine
significance cooperation simplified answer
payoff high enough boost mutual
cooperative outcome then players want
47
cooperate prisoners dilemma payoff
structure changed easier cooperate
unrequited cooperation does become suckerspayoff then cooperation emerge same
time game change conversely mutual
cooperation C receives lower payoff mutual
defection D then probability game
yield cooperative outcome though oyes first point
somewhat off mark research I1 am
describing prisoners dilemma configuration does
become useful describing point
cooperation strategy abandoned defection strategysecond section oye discusses shadow
future axelrod taylor many scholars
addressed conclusions course same
under iterated prisoners dilemma potentialdefector compares immediate gain squealing
possible sacrifice future gains mayresult squealing single play stag hunt eachhunter tempted defect order defend himselfagainst possibility defection othersreputation reliability resisting temptationreduces likelihood defection 14
sense reliability comes mutual realizationfuture hold present decisions
made every move every game qualifiedshadow eventuality present futureinterdependent notion reiterated reinforced
48
cooperation literature point conviction
while large shadow future does constitutesufficient condition emergent cooperation represents
condition logically lend itself perhaps
condition lessening mutual
defection even logically cooperative
conditions present iterative interactive event
likely cooperation emerge oyes third point
adds another dimension likelihood evolving
cooperative
states number players prisoners
dilemma game affects trend towards cooperation
defection oyes thesis number player
diminishes likely cooperation emerge
begins assumption altruism statingcooperation requires recognition opportunities
advancement mutual interests 19 smaller
number players easier recognition comes
interaction varied familiar trustcome easilysecondly number players increases
likely player defect predictability becomes
harder haphazard strategylikely default defect thirdly number
players increases feasibility sanctioning defectorsdetectorsdefectors
diminishes 19 system free riding take place
49
many circumstances break down cooperative
efforts smaller number easier team
players focus punishment defectorplayers difficult retaliate without destroyingforms cooperation
while small number players does particularlyconstitute necessary condition trendwatched various case studies see factorleading cooperation
additional point oye makes
conditional strategy effective easilyrecognized playing game states black
white choices cooperation defect make
strategies transparent further necessary conditionstrategies employed each player must
recognized words player cooperates
player 13 thinks opposite then player may well
defected first place cooperation
emerge under these conditions misinterpretationside note may enlightening note how communication
defection cooperation correctly determined
ones foe again ashworth enlighten us
point
50
conclusionoye while reinforcing fundamental components
theory tacit cooperation adds new dimensions
number game players well transparency
strategy these ingredients come togetherfollowing two sections tony ashworthsAshworths look
trench warfare study INF talks realtoreallife situations represented these case studiesthese abstract cooperation conditions viewed
concrete
CHAPTER 4
WORLD WAR I1 TRENCH TRUCES FORMS cooperation
jn trench war structure ritualisedritualized aggression ceremonywhere antagonists participated regular reciprocal discharges
missiles bombs bullets forthsymbolized strengthened same time bothsentiments fellow feelings beliefs enemyfellow sufferer
ashworth 1980 144
introduction
ashworthsAshworths study world war I1 trench warfare
subject section book represents case
study tacit cooperation defined him
analysis describing awakening cooperation
provides theoretical insight how cooperation began
sustained
robert axelrod devotes whole chapter ashworthsAshworthsbook evolution cooperation axelrod asks four
pertinent questions explicates ashworthsAshworths findings 1
how possible live let live system ever
started 2 how did continue 3 why towards end
war did break down 4 why live letlive system common world war I1 uncommon
trench wars 74 these questions answered
ashworthsAshworths research might substantiate axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods
52
assumptions evolution cooperation thesequestions discussed further detailsection
axelrod continues point although ashworth
himself never quite states situation trenchfighting world war I1 iterated prisoners dilemma
short term much logical destroyenemy far trench wait see whether
kill first logic typicalprisoners dilemma language war statedkill killed though zero sum game
prisoners dilemma initially pushes players opine
highest possible payoff assuring opponents defeat
doesnt necessarily occur players same
time both win both lose through
realization cooperation begin
axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods questions how does cooperation get startedespecially situation war ashworthsAshworths explanation
follows
tony ashworthsAshworths trench warfare
ashworth illustrates title book
live let live truce where enemies stoppedfighting agreement period time britishlet germans live provided germans let them live
return essentially term live let livedenoted process reciprocal exchange amongantagonists where each diminished others risk
53death discomfort injury deliberaterestriction aggressive activitycondition requited restraint 198019
terms used denote same mutual behavior
laissez faire rest let rest let sleeping dogs lietacit trucescruces mutual obligation element many others 1
continuing description these implicit agreements
ashworth states while trucescruces always tacitthough usually tacit always
unofficial illicit states
agreement between antagonists unspokenexpressed certain actions non actions
meaningful front fighters alwaysothers trucescruces illegal timesneither creakedcreated nor legitimated authorityexplicitly forbidden unofficial policy live
let live antithesis official killkilled 19 emphasis added
ashworth continues description further define
tacit cooperation setting trucescruces occur among
few many troops states trucescruces occur
between just two people between two direct adversarieschatting dinner mans land occur
among hundreds troops infinite number ways
investigation begins question how did cooperation
begin ashworth states
lthesehese terms coined ashworth himself actualsoldiers officers whose records ashworth studied research
example term principle laissez faire comes warmemoirs siegfried sassoon
54outset study must distinguish
between problems origins cruces problemspersistence through time concerning origins
want know where tacit understandingsfirst occurred how happened duringbattle where each antagonist ostensibly intentupon killing 24
history told occurrences christmas trucescruces
according ashworth cooperation existed before
first christmas truce 1914 form many types
detailed cooperation overshadow christmas trucescruces
significance historians great war generallyaware christmas trucescruces tend state
beginning end war cooperation ashworth
shows cooperation existed before christmas 1914
extended isolated settings until end
war event 1914 christmas likenedsudden surfacing whole iceberg visibleincluding non combatants war
remained largely submerged invisible save
participants ashworth 1980 24
seems first sign tacit cooperation began
meals early november 1914 food deliveredtrenches same time each evening both sides
hungry stop fighting eat under
circumstances inclement weather conditions trenchestend mirror each others behavior british
combatant explains situation thusly
55childs play shell road behind
enemys trenches crowded mustration wagons water carts bloodstainedwilderness wholesilence you prevent your enemy
drawing rations remedy simpleprevent you drawing yours beith2beitha 1916
224
ashworth notes normal fronts where fightingconstant first targets supply line behind
trench 26 reciprocal avoidance these
targets becomes newly formed temporary perhaps by-
law unspoken agreement emerges agreement createdhierarchical authority soldiers concert
themselves these laws resemble tittilfor tat behavior
rapoport axelrod examine ashworth triesexplain below
point empathic process where eachantagonist learned shared needspriorities overt fraternisationfraternization rather coverttrucing always possible outcome examplewhere fraternisationfraternization might necessary satisfyshared need
line reasoning denotes same sortaltruism taylor discusses analysis
reiterate taylor states players utility depends upon
players utilities might incorporate
form altruism well payoffs 111
words payoff british received trying
2beitheith wrote under pseudonym lanian hay ashworthbook refers beith entirely lanian hay
56
destroy germans depended upon payoff germans
received same action utilities derived
futures both combatants players
interdependent quote captain liddell hart explains
significance trench fighters future
remains our battalioneight hundred strong outset set off back across
mans land three small parties lessseventy men four officers wearysix nights scarcely sleep movedstupor stumbling along painfully until reachedhappy valleyvailey sheltered hollow filled dumps
where later our dead buried 23
captain hart noted these memoirs smell
bacon morning gained conquest stench
lime covered corpses much time
brought tacit truce battle front well
preventing insanity troops
these breakfast mealtime bad weather cruces began
each side saw whatever kind punishment
given side returned equally
sometimes even heavily punishment britishexample causing even allowing travail
enemy participating behavior akin selfpersecution definition altruism however does
fully allow understanding why cooperation emerged
between trench enemies axelrod say
issue
57
shadow futureaxelrod notes book cooperation emerges much
readily time does spontaneously under
these conditions trench fighting shadow
future largeaccording axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods interpretation trench
troops rotated average every eight days
leave soldiers very little time experiment
cooperation important factor overcomes
time constraint process socializationashworth discusses
trucescrucesTruces maintained britishsanctioning germans germans sanctioning british
british sanctioning british germanssanctioning germans former interarmyprocess among antagonists latter intraarmyintraarmyprocess among compatriots 153
kind intraarmyintraarmy communication occurred two
different levels ashworth discusses 1interpersonallevel 2 relationships among different weapons groups
during combat aggression trench fighterendangered enemy compatriots
especially members own section ashworth 153
avoid inciting enemy aggressive behavior
soldiers attempted promote anti hostile behavior among
comrades these practices carriedtroop troop example troops leaving
trenches talk incoming men tacit
58
accordance existed enemy ashworth
notes particularly british soldierssuggest try promote enforce
cooperation fellow soldiers soldierdefect defect sense game theory
sense going AWOL then ofttimes receivepunishment own friends fellow soldierfurthermore aggressive soldier type
socialized group wished obey
tacit rules live let livesocialization battalion battalion within
battalions well ashworth describes follows
consider B C D E each every pointtime simultaneously rewards B C D E giving
aggression B simultaneously rewards C D
E C simultaneously rewards B D E
forth moreover these exchangessynchronic successive setexchanges follows another immediately consecutivepoints time both frequency intensityexchange extremely high promote strong feelings
fellowship among group members since certaintyeach rely every harm
rash action grows passage time 154
note here passage time allows reliancegrow emphasized thus larger shadow
future reliance grows
concerning relationships among different weapons
groups ashworth notes groups greater
interests maintaining cruces others 159
59
example infantry lose live let livedeteriorated kill killed ashworth 1980 159
weapons groups interest maintaining live letlive system depended inversely capability secure
itself harm ashworth notes
infantryIlnfantryInfantry high commitment heavy artillerylow commitment live let live describe
process negative sanctions intergroup levellargely show how weapon groups highvulnerability low capability discouraged groupslow vulnerability high capability agressionegressionagression
160
training trench soldiers taught
ideology kill killed mind
decisions made present great effectfuture decision makers decision makers being
troops choosing what type aggression unleash
live let live system just convenient
alternative allow encouraging
future 3 stream thought gently merges next
question axelrod asks
how cooperation sustained
ashworthsAshworths analysis trench fighting shows how
axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods oyes taylors conditions promote
endurance tacitillicittacit illicit cooperation
3theathe shadow future logically large decisionmade present participate aggression war lead
either personal harm death future alternativepromoting cooperation seemed quite reasonable preference
60
ashworth notes while evolution cooperationmay complex issue perplexing questionhow conditional cooperation sustained seeks
answer looking inter intraarmyintraarmy communication
question stated how did everyone understand tacitrules rules never recorded never spoken
stated above plenty intraarmyintraarmy
communication new troops come war
front old troops tell common peace
held between two sides new troops come
replace parts front line divisionwords ashworth often instructed art
peace well war 29 british soldier statedincoming soldier bosche aint bad feller you
leave imlimrim alone ell leave you alone macgill 1916 84
many similar manuscripts show quiet trenches4trenches4
these sorts dialogues common way
tacit trucescruces sustained through modificationimage war experienced front line
itself however while shows how sustainedintraarmyintraarmy communications does make
adequate statement how cooperation sustained among
antagonists themselves how did communicate
each side tell enemy cooperating
4theathe term quiet describe trench used ashworthcharacterize trenches carrying tacit cooperation
61
communication
ashworth states direct indirect trucescruces
interarmy setting direct communication involved
use either verbal written symbols
spoken word overt fraternisationfraternization ashworth 1980 32
these kinds trucescruces almost immediately spoiledhigh command punishment include arrest andortransfer very active front line battaliongenerally troops troop commanders merely warned
headquarters discontinue trucescruces common
these christmas trucescruces where both sides agree
verbally put war rest strict period time
order celebrate holiday whatever occasion
besides exchanges peaceful cooperation trenchfighters exchange news war sometimes food
occasionally polite conversation even once soccergame mans land each cooperative scenario
described tit tat game plan almost memoirs
soldiers state actions dependent upon
reciprocal interaction did snipe them
left us alone raimes 1931 798079 80
indirect communication entails inertiainertial andorritualization 11 type communication less
vulnerable high command easilyrecognized outsiders including outside troops inertia
defined ashworth
62
suspension hostilities happenedconscious decision specific agreement merely
each side seemed disinclinedinclineddis aggressantagonists sometimes shared vague general
passive attitude mind 40
just firing mortar sniping enemy very
overt act soldier communication abstaining these
characteristic expected actions conversely
communication non aggression again inertia based
strict reciprocity
british pacivitypacivity unconditionalgermans knew responded inertiaaggression british retaliate kind
hand germans knewreciprocate british inertia establish set
mutually contingent exchanges where neither sideexercised choice aggress ashworth41
lack fighting course obvious high
command response action enforce
offensive spirit trenches ashworth notes
early part war circa 1915 raid orders high
command possible due poor communication lateryears show however increased communication
technology high command ordered raidsquotas numbers dead numbers captured thesetypes orders above made inertia difficult stance
maintain
ritualization communication quite differentritualization made appearance war seem real high
63
command according ashworth allowed soldiersfollow letter law without adhering spirit
ritualization fascinating trucingprocess became important trench fighters
willing deceive top command sake
cooperating called enemy during these trucescruces
enemy sense became friendly high
command
ritualization either routinization bombing
sniping raids perfunctory tactic weapon
use haphazard use weapons signal
side heart wasnt words
british soldier aim high miss targetsignaling german soldier did want
kill german soldier realizing adversary
across trench ability aggress hittarget reciprocates action mode
perfunctory weapon use axelrod notes analysisashworth germans demonstrate excellentability hit target shooting designs
smiley face parapet thus telling britishgermans kill them inclined
instead refrainedroutinization aggression equally
fascinating routinization included larger weapons
mortars larger bombs routine develop
64
where bombs sent side specifictimes specific places schedules did vary
while cooperative routine lasted memoir
demonstrates etiquette
hadnt single show merely fewunexciting patrols led old hand way
war carried champagne reallyludicrous 7.22722 am half dozen coal boxes
six inch variety landed bunch our frontline 7.25725 six ours returned complimentpromptly noon each side sent heavy mortarshell way evening blessingmutual exchange coal boxes beginning precisely7.22722 exchange compliments dueretired our famous concrete shelters
side mans land things presumablyjust same very comfortable bucher1932 1367136 7
ashworth states both germans french
meticulous observance live let livecourse tacit cooperation form ended side
whatever reasons broke truce again silverrule eye eye tit tat bylawlaw
cooperation sustained these overt well
deceptive mutual arrangements communication seemed
key maintaining positive tit tat outcome
large shadow future cooperation
emerged withstood feeling reciprocal
altruism helped ignite desire cooperation
axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods question still remains why did cooperation breakdown towards end war
65
how whose hand cooperation terminated
ashworth notes second phase trench warfare
violent aggressive firststates
personal regimental control aggression typicaltrench war first phase replacedsecond phase impersonal control change
local central regulation where producersviolence longer directed disposition 96
usually central command able force trench fighteraggressive demanding raids battalion commander
know whether unauthorized cooperation
taking place noted above number own
dead counted significant numbers number
enemy prisoners taken point under centralcommand live let live system broke down quickly
axelrod comments necessary condition cooperation
emerge interaction take place where
central authority inhibiting players develop
natural communication lead kind
cooperation axelrod again notes proverbial straw
broke peaceful camels back institutiontype incessant aggression headquarters
monitor 82 ashworth defines type incessantaggression raiding 177 continuous raiding put end
tacit cooperation ashworth states
66raids ended cruces creating backgroundassumptions uncertainty thus indirectly promotingaggression generated self sustainingdirect motives aggression 200
end trucescruces triggered negative reciprocityopposes tacit cooperation negative tit
tat eye eye tooth toothashworth notes these raids provoked rule retaliation
counter aggression escalatoryescalatory nature
evolution cooperation then reversed become
evolution confrontation hostility deterioratingdegrees according established necessary conditions
cooperation strategy must nice allow
cooperation continue once strategy becomes
unforgiving longer considered nice
retaliatory stance trenches break trustopposing trench unforgiving strategies ensue
apparently unfortunately fortunatelyfate world war I1 trench fighting
french example however
demonstrates persistence cooperation even face
adverse authority event occurring 1917
know french mutinies why did cooperation prevailfrench point mutiny
french mutinies
according historian incident french
mutinies just mere trifle allied forces
67
crisis due mutinies french armiesspring early summer 1917 brought allied
cause within nodding distance defeatresulted millions lives having
sacrificed vain spears 1966 11
ashworth notes these mutinies neither isolated nor
ephemeral widespread persistent involving
half total number divisions french army
224 mutinies mainly consisted french troops
refusing fire enemy unless being fired upon
even greater extreme these troops left battle fieldwords went AWOL according general
pepetainsdetainsPetains memoirs mutinies rebellion caused
part exhaustion troops stateshopelessness pessimism spread army
interior swamping did mood superficialenthusiasm whipped above never reallytaken root 86
during times these mutinies tacit trucescruces
occurring germans germans aware
french rebelling against superiors
participating french live letlive scenario ashworth portrays being common
among british front lines according severalsources5sources 5 half french troops
participated these mutinies 151 recorded incidents
5jc kings first world war macmillan E spears twomen saved france stein day quoted references
68
above mutinies show cooperation sustainedeven expense lawfulness many
courtmarshalledcourtmarshalled many 23 executed crimes
pertaining mutinies themselves
conclusion
cooperation began emerge among opposing troops
clear nice strategies initially being used
clarify troops cooperative intentionsaxelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods oyes taylors conditionsrecognizable elements emergent cooperation ashworthsAshworthsstudy axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods amended framework cooperation even
during war does seem impossible framework
gives us ability understand how cooperation
thwarted seems rationality prisonersdilemma broken these soldiers found saddle point
interaction CC until directlyordered raid study does particularlydemonstrate cooperation productsbyproducts war
concurrently human aggression necessarily
result wartime interaction game theoristssay world defect where tacit
cooperation conditions exist war then thwarted
peace
CHAPTER 5
WALK WOODS FORMULA cooperationINF negotiations
arms control proposal arms control processappears reagan administrations feeling make goodoffer head home holidays good offer howeverenough must underwrittenunderwritten bureaucratic willingness dohard work hammering political climategood faith negotiation believed
new republic dec 19 1983
july 16 1982 paul nitze chief US intermediate
nuclear forces INF negotiator met soviet counterpart
yuli kvitsinskyKvit sinsky front step soviet mission
clad rough walking clothes hopped
kvitsinskys car drove 20 kilometers north geneva
hike jura mountains dividing switzerland france
kvitsinskyKvit sinsky led me logging road appearedlead down through woods right said
wintertime membersdelegation gone time time crosscountry ski planned our informal conversation
weeks nitze 1989 367
though negotiatorsnegotiatory dressed suitsdid begin publicized opening statements
discussion took place crest juramountains day perhaps earnest attempt
during geneva talks procure arms control deal
nitze prepared 4 papers through D extended
70
kvitsinskyKvitsinsky major concessions sanctioned
prescribed formal US stand kvitsinskyKvitsinsky made deal
joint venture wrote alterations while readingpapers rain storm subverted negotiations
moved partnership soviets car where
kvitsinskyKvitsinsky copied everything down pad paper two
half hours amenable INFINP arms control agreement
later parties broke prepared trips home
where meet harsher less negotiable opposition
did wooded mountains outside geneva
episode nicknamed walk woods
focus my next discussion tacit cooperation
walk itself though poetically provoprovokingkingi1 played
relatively minor role cooperative process whole
actual moment clear identifiable cooperation
found proposal nitze presented
kvitsinskyKvitsinsky authored hike I1 reiterate both
parties made difficult concessions sanctioned
governments back home actual informal walk
woods sanctioned stepping
both kvitsinskyKvitsinsky nitze outside respective
official negotiating positions constitutes mutual
tacit cooperation
ileelleeee blessing created award winning play same title1986 play opened broadway february 28 1988
71
chapter I1 show how new reagan
administration interested deploying missileseurope catch russianscontrolling reducing arms unless arms controlnegotiations meant US win public opinion war
having politically appealing position europe
I1 show although governments
odds cooperative relationship developed between
kvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze concerning euromissilesEuromissiles factunique relationship evolved cold war environment
makes another worthy case study tacit cooperation
I1 begin explanation policiesprocedures both place developing
time INF talks began then I1 use framework
developed chapters 2 3 analyze interactionskvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze I1 include discussion centralauthority part played both walk
woods deal eventual soviet walkout talkslate 1983
birth defects INF
INF negotiations began november 1 1981 lessyear reagans oath office new
administration branded hawkish wanted createpositive image arms control arena while
disassociatingassociatingdis itself SALT II11 blunders under
72
carter many policies carter administration came
haunt reagans defense department important case
being dual track initiative europe dual trackcompromise policy coupled US deployment
pershing tomahawk missiles europe arms control
talks limit those same missiles exchange equal
levels andor reductions soviet SS 4s 5s
particularly newest members soviet arsenalmirvedmidved SS 20s
reagans defense secretary casper weinberger
weinbergersWeinbergers advisers fred ikle richard perle feltdual track mistake talbott 1984 43
however attempts repudiate dual tracksquelched alexander haig state department haig
right hand man lawrence eagleburger undersecretarypolitical affairs felt continuity between
administrations regarding dual track vitalmaintaining good relations NATO constituency
particularly britain france germany
I1 use dual track both example perpetual
conflict among national security council NSC statedefense departments well illustration how
conflicts usually resolved bureaucratic in-
fighting common procedure agency able
gain upper hand reagan agency
controlled policy case dual track agencies
73
reached impasse settled eagleburger
padded reagans first address margaret thatcherendorsement moment presidential statement
made publicly dual track became US policyatmosphere nitze selected chief
negotiator INF talks
enter diplomat
naive mendacious say paul henry
nitze considered lower level bureaucrat
past deputy secretary defense chief SALT negotiator
united states oldest distinguisheddiplomats time dec 14 1981 45 nitze enjoyed
power came prestige longevity 2 though
certainly leadership credentials superior
several circumstances mitigated power
bargaining tables geneva
begin nitze 74 year old democrat albeithawkish few allies new reagan government
nitzesnifczesbitzes biggest confederate however directorarms control disarmament agency eugene rostow
2nitzeitze served 7 administrations advised every USpresident truman bush helped implement marshall planeurope coestablishedestablished NATO supervised NSC 68 main actor
cuban missile crisis negotiated SALT I1 INF START blocked SALT
II11 attempted compromise SDI quoted december 211987 time article 78 saying number occasions my careerI1 quit jobs I1 disagreed policy im just interested
being part government im interested government beingright
74
rostowsstowsrostoksRo boss richard alienallenailen director NSC actedrostowsstowsrostoksRo recommendation give nitze job spiteprotests eagleburger boss secretarystate nitze disliked state department
mistrusted defense particularlysecretary international security affairs richard perle
weinbergersWeinbergers closest aides talbott describes
conflict
nitze seemed destined respected hawksdoves alike always strong reservationshawks never entirely forgive him rolebringing SALT I1 doves never entirelyforgive him role bringing down SALT II11
talbott 1984 p 55
nevertheless NSC prevailed bid name
INF negotiator paul nitze appointed
neither pentagon nor state department
wholeheartedly wanted him job nitzesbitzes abilitynegotiate amount flexibility compromised
lack support home lack support became
increasingly apparent talks geneva continued
fateful walk kvitsinskyKvitsinsky almost everyone
washington came down hard nitze ally again
seemed rostow long january 12
1983 rostow made appointment george shultz3shultzz go
bat nitze issue flexibilitymeeting shultz informed rostow president
3georgecgeorgegeorge shultz replaced aleandermeander haig secretary state
75
longer confidence him Rosrostowtowl wanted
resignation talbott 1984 167168167 168 rostow case
showed how february 7 1983 new republic articlestates 7 white house scolded hawks acting
like doves rostowsstowsrostoksRo dismissal nitze leftwithout advocate DC
once rostow left office spoke publiclycontent nitzesbitzes kvitsinskys mountain walk
wanted show how nitzesbitzes efforts being thwartedreagans bickering advisors instead winning publicopinion walks outcome americans saw nitzedelinquent negotiator reprimanded restricted
president point US negotiator lostconsiderable ground though feared
discharged well nitze contrary asked
reagan continue post geneva during 2 years
talks nitze constantly frustrated lack
control policies framing negotiating position
sovietsunited states seasoned career
politicians nitze initially accepted position chiefINF negotiator condition freedom
barter arms control deal however while nitzedoing job geneva NSC state defense
department bureaucrats arguing policiesaffecting negotiations what became difficult
76
seemingly impossible policy nitze work
zero option pursuit policyhighest level US government demonstrates
complete lack negotiability US side
ways count nil zero options
nitze begins chapter memoirs 1989 421
games structure gainside must balanced equal loss
side sum losses sidegains side always zeroarms control negotiation objective shouldarrive nonzeronon zero sum outcome where both sides gain
neither side loses
I1 choose quote nitze antitheticalpolicy came direct him INF
negotiations zero option policy unveiledreagan november 18 1981 promised europe
US negotiate geneva eliminate medium range
missiles europe meant US abrogate
pershing II11 tomahawk deployment scheduled
late fall 1983 soviets destroySS 4s 5s 20s 4
according talbott policy originated zerosolution chancellor schmidts social democratic party schmidt
responding upsurgentsurgent peace movement among rival partiesnumerous vociferous voters germany clear USadoption zero solution among many reasons chosen wooeurope fact did short time
77
soviet side zero solution rigorously
disregarded propaganda french britishnuclear arsenal 162 missiles worth remain
continent rendering USSR soviets saiddefenseless intolerable soviet position
match nonnatonon NATO arsenal SS 20s
destroying outdated SS 4s 5s then agree
US forgo pershing tomahawk deployments
course intolerable west tri mirvedmidved
SS 20s having superiority speed accuracy throw
weight french british bombs
thus stalemate seemed inevitable even before talksbegan however policy washington regarding zero
option completely decided yet statedepartment especially haig ill disposed accept
zero option unconditionally while pithy easilydefined verifiable position certainly lacked
realistic negotiating terms europeans quickly became
aware word zero became tenacious partimpending INF talks US state defense
departments argued whether zero end
just beginning US soviet accord
defense headed weinberger perle endorsed
zero option according talbott 1984 60 perle
saw great political advantages coming down zero
staying american commitment achieving zero
78
acceptable outcome put sovietsdefensive keep them february 7 1983
new republic article concurs sentiment
negative connotation zero option attractiveour planners least failnothing our excuse 8 even burt haigs arms
control deputy chronicled time article concerning
zero option saying purpose exercisemaximum political advantage arms controlengaged alliance management dec 5 1983 19
even state did want get shut zero
option left room compromise negotiationeurope well help soviets come
realize zero ethically morally
motivated first seemed
despite opposition defense made voice heard
through perle november 30 before senate armed
services committee less 2 weeks presidentsformal proposal said middle ground between
full deployment zero perles became
reagans voice reason
dual track zero option interagency
polemics foundation INF nitze able maneuver
between fissures stated policy beginning
tenure geneva both US sovietpolicies came clearly focus became less easy
79
ignore nitze became aware did kvitsinskyKvitsinsky rostow
europe liberal press INF failureimminent these conditions led walk
woods
INF table across ocean woods
nitze elegant urbane glintmischievous humor eye slightly pudgy kvitsinskyKvit sinsky
dour outspoken openly ambitious december 14
1981 time article 45 describes first meeting between
yankee germanist chief INF negotiatorsnegotiatory
nitze considered many experienced US
bargainer soviets time december 17 1984 48
met kvitsinskyKvit sinsky informally hour half before
negotiations began late november 1981 nitzesbitzes firstimpressions favorable 1 I found him easy get along
sense humor 1989 370 kvitsinskyKvit sinsky 30
years younger much less negotiating experience
chosen expertise german studies 5 before
long press trumpeted two being friendsnegotiations began US tabling
position soviet delegation less direct holding
back until round 2 before presenting comprehensive formal
5kvitsinskykvitsinskyKvit sinsky spoke german before speaking russian parentspolish immigrants kvitsinskyKvitsinsky spent years both east
west germany official capacity soviet union chose himchief INFINP negotiator prove sensitivity germanysgermanasGermanys concerns
80
position figure 2 indicates6indicates6 initial missile count
proposed reductions both sides including french
british count
US USSR french & british
balance pershingpershingllsils 108 SS 20s europe 245
time tomahawks 464 SS 20s asia 100 missilesSS 4s 5s 291 162negotiation
total missiles 572total warheads 572 total missiles 636
total warheads 1326
US pershing Us 0 SS 20s total 0zero option tomahawks 0 SS 4s 5s5s00 missiles
162total missiles 0 total missiles 0
total warheads 0 total warheads 0
soviet pershing Uslis 0 SS 20s europe 162
zero option tomahawks 0 SS 4s 5s5s00 missiles162
total missiles 0 total euro missiles 162total warheads 0 total euro warheads 486
based november 1983 scheduled deployment
number does include 100 SS 20s permanently stationedasia soviets did count these US did
figure 2
these figures sum almost impossible conflictexisted between US soviet zero option positions
january 31 1983 time article states sovietposition
6theathe6 idea figure 2 taken USets news world reportarticle january 31 1983 31 revised usechptercapter
81
SS 20 pride sovietstrategic rocket forces kremlin sunk billions
rubles developing training crewsgetting place way moscow
agree dismantle every these missilesexchange paper reductions missilesUS deployed might abledeploy 18 .1818
conflict however primarily played
rhetorical wars highest levels important
element study tacit cooperation note
while INF negotiations going US
soviet heads state open conflicttelling note few months before INF talksbegan reagan proposed 1.31313 trillion dollar defense budget
end what reagan saw extreme soviet militarysuperiority US too clear reagan
primarily interested solving nuclear militaryproblem building reducing arms controlsecurity matter public relations opportunity
side soviets attempted persuade europe
accept forthcoming tomahawks pershing IIsUsilslisconvince europeans allow government
house US missiles soviets maintain nuclearsuperiority very minor sacrifices clearlyzero sum situation leadership both sides
82
european war battles rhetoric bad press
prior reagans november 18th announcement zero
sum president brezhnev announced 5 year plan budget
adjustment november 17 1981 washington post cover storysuggests soviets diverting 42 billiondollars infrastructure planning defense meet
american challenge soviets threatened match
each new US weapon appropriate counterbalance
tone US soviet exchange reagan gave
first major foreign policy speech national press
club november 18 1981 just 12 days before first INF
round begin
vintage speech reagan took moral high
ground explicated US foreign policy during coldwar noted gos 70s US
decreased reduced military spite sovietbuildupbuild american zero option reagan said
giant step mankind surprising tass response
recorded same front page new york times articlenovember 19 1981 states US president made
groundless allegations came absolutely
fantastic figures article describes reagans speech
ploy hobble geneva talks present
american course escalating arms race insuring
military superiority peace initiative
83
comparable first footsteps moon
brezhnevs own response zero option recorded
interview german magazine der spiegel
those united states advance kindproposal apparently do minute expect
soviet union might agree them probablyauthors proposals do really want
talks let alone successful talks what needbreakdown talks use sortjustification continuing planned arms race 7
though brezhnevs response perhaps far offreagans apparent intent US presidents speech
rhetorically much softer soviets just few
months earlier significant shift evilempire rhetoric first few months officeexample reagans first presidential news conference
january 29 1981 called soviets immoral
reserved right commit crime lie cheat
nevertheless posturing november woo
USSR convince europe seriousarms control
two days later soviet government releasedpublication threat europe blamed united
states nuclear proliferation like reagans speech
publication intended western european
7 quoted new york times article nov 19 1981algaig
84
audience november 22 2 days pamphlets
release 4 days reagans speech brezhnev visitedbonn proposed unilateral reduction hundreds
medium range bombs good gesture european
neighbors 8 attempted persuade west german
leaders success put moratorium 1983
scheduled deployment tomahawks new pershingsPersh ingsmany schmidts social democratic party sympathetic
considered delay deployment bombs
arrive arrive indefinite time dual
track leverage US negotiating side losttalbott chronicles american officials aghast
1984 94
these very cool political posturing battles raged
intermittently during time INF negotiationsprocess european opinion american zero option
shifted sanguine skeptical many policy makers feltnecessity add credibility US arms control
policy may 2 1982 new york times article reports
state department analyst stated zero option
proposal serious january following
year typical news conference blunder reagan retortedselling zero sum europe propaganda
public relations reagans plan attack
8 course bombs destroyed obsolete SS 4s5s crafty ploy won respect europeans
85
visit europe early following summer course
rhetorical war continued unsurprising fashion
soviets blamed US escalating falklandsFalk lands war
giving carte blanche approval britain US
vehemently denounced soviet based military crackdown
poland 1982 while kvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze making
concessions soviet US leaders heightening
cold war
1983 worse march reagan calls sovietunion evil empire star wars SDI conceived
may US congress allottsalliotts 625 million develop
MX andropovantropovAndropov tells germans decrease
number europe targeted SS 20s july KGB
accused being behind assassination pope
september soviets shoot down KAL 007 reagan callsmassacre later september gromyko does attend
UN aeroflotAeroflot allowed land
US october US invades grenada november
december soviets walk INF suspend both
START vienna talks conventional arms
first time 14 years kind arms control andorlimitation negotiation progress
following january two consecutive weeks
new york times opinion page first kvitsinskyKvitsinsky then nitzerecounted own versions walk woods
86
reasons soviet walkout time
failed negotiations public animosity between two
cooperation ended
walkwaik woods
though negotiatorsnegotiatory cooperation sustainedworsening US soviet relations important
speculate how why cooperation ever startedfirst place how stopped section use
rationale chapters 2 3 explicate emergence
cooperation between nitze kvitsinskyKvit sinsky
talbott notes nitze aware rolegeneva limited
nitze see what might very well finalappointment government service turning
exercise problem solvingdiversion smokescreen othersmake sure problem managing militarycompetition between superpowerssuperpowers solvedarms control 1988 173
yet nitze subverted wishes government
proposing walk woods compromise kvitsinskyKvit sinsky
shadow futureshadow future high assumption behind
question whether future futuredecisions cooperate defect relativelyimportant present very nature
87
kind US soviet relations time
substantial shadow future historydangerous animosity future potentially destructiveclashes decision affecting relationship whether
made presently future considered weighty
while may consideration both
negotiatorsnegotiatory matters certainly part
rhetoric repertoire perhaps important considerationhow successful job9joba negotiate
arms control agreement nitze doggedly optimistic
nitze asked whether chancesoviets accept US proposal reply
hard conceive theyd accept fastthats appropriate criterion judgingproposal appropriate criterion should
solid basis continuing negotiationsanswer yes spoke negotiations
dialectical process hinting eventual synthesisunited states scale back INF
deployment soviets scale down SS 20force just NATO ministers intended 1979talbott 1988 170
nitze good negotiator preconditions
accepting geneva post given
flexibility negotiate negotiating strategieshope future hold compromise eventualagreement
9forifor9 part information comingamerican side inferences made soviet reaction
negotiating strategy questions intentionanswered answered predominantly nitzekvitsinskyKvitsinsky
88
kvitsinskyKvit sinsky scenario complex
intentions harder infer nitzesmitzesbitzes memoirs
talbotstalboysTalbots notes kvitsinskyKvit sinsky described very politicalanimal difficult determine whether
cooperation nitze negotiator cooperation
soviet policy young political appointee played
greater role perhaps additional factor priorwalk spent work time together
social time enlarged shadow future nitzenotes
start tried expand informal contactsbetween two delegations muchkvitsinskiy I1 frequently met my
wife phyllis I1 invite kvitsinskiywife inga dinner manner socialgatherings outings lake picnicsformal receptions period time cameknow kvitsinskiys well possibleknow senior soviet official 1989 37071370 71
even defensive january 19 1984 letter new
york times opinion page nitze claimed period
time I1 came think I1 generally sort true
false what kvitsinskykvitsinskylKvit sinsky said intimating
knew kvitsinskys personality rather well
sublimeness international nuclear situationnegotiating time spent together makes strong case
existing large shadow future
89
strategy nice
nice strategy reminder defectunilaterally forgiving pessimistic
perhaps difficult concept check
perhaps impossible context study yet
couple points made firstnitze made clear firstdefect defect mean choose conditionsagreement benefit own position expense
counterparts position nitzesbitzes philosophy arms
control nonzeronon zero sum statesmemoirs where both sides gain neither side loses
1989 421 apparently allow zero option
keep him being able fully negotiate deal
constantly fought administration point
secondly each negotiator demonstrated forgiving attitudecounterparts hard line governmental stance nitze
proposed plan enable each negotiator blame
walk proposal nitze states you
blame me your people kvitsinskyKvit sinsky understood
ill tell them your scheme you tell them
mine said talbottTalbotfc 1984 129 tacit agreement
meant undermine authority without fearreprisals responsibility ownership entail
90
furthermore nitze constantly siftinglooking past kvitsinskys rhetoric statesformal statements kvitsinskykvitsinskylKvit sinsky hesitation puttingforward continuous stream sided propaganda
arguments knew advance lacking factualbasis logic 11 nitze continues privatediscussion away ears associatesappeared surprisingly frank discussionmoscow politics speculative possibilities 1989
37172371 72 nitze quick understand kvitsinskyspropaganda statements inserted moscowsMos cows demand
confidential conversation both used forgiving strategieslooked past rhetorically antagonistic statements
made publicly
question altruismaccording taylor altruism phenomenon
exists two people two opposing sides realizedecisions subsequent payoffs made
players decided effect upon own payoffs
futures linked sort identifyingeach shown following conversation
how confident you asked nitzeforced humor everything saying isntbeing overheard
91
playing along nitze replied pretty confidentsomebody may put listening device
gestured rolled awningright said kvitsinskyKvit sinsky better meet
woods schukin nitze done during SALT I1 10
fact both negotiatorsnegotiatory felt need keep
talks quiet chiefs shows
understood similar fates particularly tellingsoviet side why developed you blame
me ill blame you rule altruisticdevice agreement able take place woods
day
clarity paucityoye speculates number players game
decreases incidence players choosing defectdecrease evident above conversation
between two negotiatorsnegotiatory feltcandid private nitze writes kvitsinskyKvit sinsky
felt much freer stray moscowsMoscows hard lineaway associates case oyes theory
cooperation emerge readily number
players smaller useful walk woods
scenario number players increasednumber choices defect increased thus resulting
eventual soviet walkout
losee10 see talbott 1984 pages 121 detailed conversation
92
further point oyes decisions made
parties recognizable during walk nitze spelledagreement paper kvitsinskyKvit sinsky responded kind
amending agreement own pen walk
made very extemporaneous environment problem
clarity came months following both negotiatorsnegotiatoryrespective countries having way notify
each success failure proposal
soviets heard rumors US disapproved
nitzesbitzes proposal decision reject well
intentions each negotiator inferredcounterpart private spoken word
taken face value apparent informal
candor between two deteriorated did success
negotiations
anarchy authorityvery clear hierarchical authority inhibited
negotiatorsnegotiatory efforts make negotiationscompletely cooperative enterprise play authoritygoverned strongly before negotiations
during walk two alone free parleyonce walk woods deal made
involvement authority became problematic talbott stateswalk woods formula what called
93
diplomatic parlance non paper easilydisavowed higher authority 1988 175
disavowed both negotiatorsnegotiatory reprimanded
parts played agreement talbott states
kvitsinskyKvit sinsky claimed bosses given himhard time part walk woods
shultz put nitze noticeback channel dealings advance furthernitze speaking secretarystate shultz well himselfwalks woods unless youre underinstructions too 1988 177
kvitsinskyKvit sinsky similarly chastised clearly authoritypresent policy decision making cooperative moves
hampered defection became likely
conclusion
paul nitze yuli kvitsinskyKvit sinsky cooperated extent
themselves came accord how reduce
euromissilesEuromissiles while governments open
opposition respect INF terms two chiefnegotiatorsnegotiatory stepped made game yield equal
payoffs both sides bureaucracy unavoidably
regained control cooperative actions two men
surpassed negotiations failedaxelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods theory cooperation additions
taylor oye presents least tool describe
conditions may evoked relationship
94
kvitsinskyKvitsinsky nitze developed just livelet live system world war I1 trenches unlikely theme
cooperation place discussed lightwalk woods may seen less circumstance
chance fair game good intentions
CHAPTER 6
conclusion
according thomas hobbes leviathan humankind
exists natural state equality another
continues equality abilityarisetharideth equality hope attainment our ends
87 our hopes desires clash naturallyevolve state war todays vernacular hobbes
describing tragedy commons problem
aptly explained prisoners dilemma hobbes solutionprisoners dilemma remove dilemma
altogether establishing despot absolute power
extort cooperation case individual freedoms
lost scholar notes however modern liberalstate designed responsive
governed guarantee individual rights question
however whether arrangements liberal statework solve our prisoners dilemma martin 1992
179 two case studies I1 just explicatedprisoners dilemma did exist structuredenvironment both cases existed anarchic realm
authority each opposing side subverting individualchoices lower lever actors making decisions
96
break own prisoners dilemma what hobbes did
consider did find own societyindividuals may break dilemma without coercion
INF trench war cases show
my research I1 chose address issuecooperation among lower level bureaucrats even though
axelrod ambiguous level cooperation might
emerge I1 do believe completely absurd
suggest same tit tat strategy cause
cooperation evolve levels ie organizational
state etc group cooperation scholars note
intergroup conflict cooperation research
finding valid generalization reached topic
level analysis contradicted factgains support valid generalizations reached another
level sherif et al 1961 3 I1 noted chapter 1
many international studies scholars used prisoners
dilemma explain 1944 1989 bipolar world
these scholars midlarsky midlarsky et al1994 353635 36 uses axelrodsaxelrodeAxel rods tit tat strategy explain
three types cooperation develops
continuum continuum begins primitive
cooperation merely absence conflictadvanced level reactive cooperation like tit tat
advanced type proactivepreactiveproactive cooperation
protagonists seek cooperation cases without
97
expectation gain I1 list midlarskys continuum
purpose contrasting two case studies my
research
before I1 begin however I1 argue
continuum both primitive reactive cooperation
based conditional strategies midlarsky gives
example mutual assured destruction philosophy
type primitive cooperation primitiveprotagonists do actively seek participatepositive cooperative act merely abstain non
cooperative behavior signified conflict what
defines cooperation instance hand
absence action I1 agree
primitive type cooperation two types
yet I1 note does fall outside limitconditional strategy break prisoners
dilemma
primitive cooperation clearly resembles livelet live system discussed chapter 4 according
ashworthsAshworths study meal time ration trucescruces
beginning signs cooperation active fronts rationsupply line primary target either side
cooperators however supply line area
reciprocal abstinence aggression even cooperation
evolved advanced forms conditional exchange
ritualization involved avoidance direct
98
confrontation alliance against common foe
treaty trench trucescruces real life example mutual
assured destructionoccasionally primitive cooperation showed signs
advanced communication friendliness story
told british officer rutter noted ashworth 146
german grenade going off during these tacit trucescruces
though hurt both sides readied retaliationuntil german soldier bravely stood parapet
apologize english troops damned prussian
artillery hoping injured personal
exchanges these others seemed even
primitive cooperation room evolve
nitze kvitsinskyKvit sinsky actively engaged
activities fostered cooperation interactionresembles second form cooperation midlarsky
defines reactive 35 friendly candid exchange
returned another until each negotiator stepped
proverbial limb agree upon proposal
priori unacceptable both US soviet rhetoricalstances nitze initiated proposal kvitsinskyKvit sinsky okayedoklyed
making additions changes just before sovietwalkout cooperation noticeably broke down tit
tat defection swapped leaving negotiatorsnegotiatorydiscouraged unfriendly nitze walk
park episode came known mysterious
99
byzantine ended my feeling bitterness toward
kvitsinskiy 1989 389 though defection between two
reached sort point return nitze admits latermemoirs kvitsinskys behavior probably
motivated partly save face preserve
fiction masters moscow gone pains
invent 397 even embittered nitze showed limitedforgiveness important point here
through reciprocal cooperative effort private agreement
made while kvitsinskyKvit sinsky nitze broke
prisoners dilemma
limitationsresearch use game theory understand
how tacit cooperation emerge several fundamental
limitations first game theory concerned
narrow range decision making outcomes truedescriptive strength comes abstracting
process details personalities how decisions
arrived lost may critical flaw
discussion lower level bureaucratic interactions where
personality variables relevant example INF
case evident nitze negotiated similarlyschukin soviet delegate during SALT I1
secondly researchsresearches outcomes limited furtherlack additional case studies even INF
100
trench war cases cooperation sustainedadd strength research include case study where
cooperation completely disrupted
thirdly facts both case studies rathersided particularly case INF I1
do infer intent kvitsinskys camp
ashworthsAshworths study memoirs world war I1 trenchexperience almost exclusively british french biased
while several limitations resultsanalysis show additional research taken
direction further case study showing same conditionspresent conflictualconflictual exchange where cooperation does
emerge may shed light whether these conditions
tacit cooperation merely necessary
sufficient study unsuccessful emergent cooperationmay give insight what behaviors attitudesreadily elicit dad1D rather C 1
trench war case study ashworth indicatestrucescruces particularly rule trenches
live let live system endemic trench
warfare22warfare 22 trucescruces occurred during small scaleordinary every day trench fights among certaintroops words these cruces did occur during
large battles somme passchendaele etc trucescruces
never occurred among elite fighting units among
defensive units ashworth suggests cases many
101
soldiers involved trucescruces less aggressive
instinctuallyinstinctual ly tended shoot return fire never
offensively perhaps michael taylors notion altruismmake sense attitudes
INF case cooperation deterioratedincreasing defection US soviet decision makers well
unwillingness negotiatorsnegotiatory particularlysoviet side withstand boss pressures make
uncooperative moves certainly see nitzekvitsinskyKvit sinsky under good conditions tacit cooperation
emerged then perished bureaucracy became
involved how game played speculatedtwo negotiatorsnegotiatory left alone implement
INF accord walk woods proposal
come early 80s almost identicalform several years later
conclusions
I1 processed my own interests study
cooperation through conflict I1 often concerned
justifying research my analysis
underlying notion cooperation desirable outcome
yet both cases cooperation punished authoritycooperative act against national policy
use game theory jargon actors chose defectagainst authority moment chose cooperate
102
adversary certainly policy makers particularlyduring war want subordinates undermine
security authority state sake
individualmy interest find sort cooperation
develop unlikely situations situationswhere irrational agree environments
conflict war animosity prisoners dilemma trenchwar unlikely environment yet I1 like
see same inquiry extended ethnic prejudicialconflicts wars where seems cooperation
even less chance develop
nevertheless research does show under
given conditions cooperation emerge cases
merely shows tacit cooperation emerged during
INF negotiations limited amount during world war I1
trench fighting clear many instancesmay reasons discussed here cooperation emerge
fact remains tacit cooperation
emerged among lower level bureaucrats whose nationsopen conflict war
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tacit cooperation between enemies
two case studies
kristina handy
david M kennedy center international area studies
MA degree april 1994
ABSTRACT
research details point reference understand two case studiescooperation developed among lower level non policymakingpolicy making bureaucratsduring times conflict war using components game theory I1 propose
international conflictualconflictual relationship occurs resembles iteratedprisoners dilemma meets certain conditions tacit cooperation emergetacit cooperation consists illicit implied cooperation sanctionednational policy level
research I1 develop framework tacit cooperation relying heavilyupon robert axelrodsaxelrodeAxelrods theory evolutionary cooperation frameworkplace I1 then explicate two international case studies world war I1 trench warfarecooperation INF walk woods between kvitsinskyKvitsinsky nitze showhow theory used describe ways cooperation occur hostileconflictconflictualual environment
COMMITTEE APPROVALvalerie hudsbuds0 cmmitteecamittee chair
gy v
stan taylor conumttee member
yu ivalerievalene M hudson gradmtegradate program coordinator