T7 B19 Gore Questions Fdr- Gore Questions- Various Drafts 590

8/14/2019 T7 B19 Gore Questions Fdr- Gore Questions- Various Drafts 590

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COMMISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT A LBERT GO RE

Aviation security as a national security issueThe Gore Commission's first recomm endation in the aviation security chapter was "Thefederal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, andprovide substantial funding for capital improvements."Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should betreated as a national security issue? W hat are the specifics of that in terms of funding,policies, priorities, procedures etc?Question: What advice do you have for this commission about what that approachshould mean today?Question: Please discuss th e Com mission's intentions in designating aviation security asa national security issue. How did this square with th e revisions in the BW Grecomme ndations which sharply reduced the federal funding goal, diminished theconsequences of CAPPS, pu t less stress on an expanded role for the FBI, an d apparentlydropped the notion of an enhanced security baseline?A Layered SystemThe Gore Com mission stressed th e importance of a "layered" aviation security system.Question: What do you regard as the fundament principles of a "layered" system.Question: In the course of the Gore C omm ission's work did you find the aviationsecurity system to be an effectively layered system? If so, why? If not, why notwhatwas missing?CheckpointsQuestion: The Gore Commission had recommended a rule to certify screeningcompanies and yet by 9-11 that rule still had not be finalized. If aviation security were anissue of national security why was it taking so long to implement such an importantreform of the system?Funding for AVSECThe report suggest ed that the federal government should "devote significant resources, ofapproximately $100 million annually, to meet capital requirements identify by airportconsortia and the FAA."


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004Question: The vast majority of the additional m oney for aviation security that wasappropriated as a result of this recom m endation w as for explosive detection equipment.W as that the commission's intent? What process did you expect to be used in allocatingthese new resources?TW A 800Question: Did y ou perceive that the focus from the administration, Congress and/or thepublic on aviation security dim inish after the incident was deem ed to be a safety issuean d not an act of terrorism ?Question: Do you have any reason to believe that TWA 800 was a terrorist act?Question: What w as your im m ediate evaluation and response to the crash of TW A 800in 1996? How, when and why did your understanding change over time?Intelligence and threat analysisQuestion: In the deliberations of the Gore Co m m ission what was your mech anism forunderstand ing the threat to civil aviation? W hat intelligence informa tion/assessm ents didyou receive in order to inform your recomm endations?Question: How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation from the intelligence youreceived in the course of the Com mission 's work and, in general, as Vice President?Question: The FAA has told the Com m ission that they were frustrated by the lack ofintelligence ("a blind spot") on domestic threats. Did you perceive this blind spot and, ifso, how serious did you think it was?Question: What w as your analysis of the Bojinka plot uncovered in Manila in early1995? Did this event change in any way, your and the Clinton Administration'sevaluation of the Bin Laden threat to U.S. civil aviation? If so, how? What was done inresponse?FBIThe Gore Commission recommended that the FBI "significantly increase" the number ofagents assigned to counterterrorism investigation to im prove intelligence. In theaftermath of the 1993 W TC bombing the FBI pledged to devote mo re resources and focuson the counter terrorism agenda.Question: Do yo u believe that the FBI adequately responded to this new em phasis andth e Commission 's recommendation?


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004Hijacking/SabotageQuestion: The Gore Commission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.Little was said about hijacking. What was the Com mission 's view of the hijacking threatan d given the know n shortcomings of our checkpoint screening operations, why wa sn'tthis more of a focus?Question: Did you ever discuss or consider the use of aircraft as weapons as a threat tocivil aviation security? For instance, in 1994 when the private plane crashed into theWhite House lawn, was this method of attack a topic of conversation or worry? If so,what steps were taken?Question: During your deliberations with the Commission, was the panel aware of the"common strategy" employed by FAA to address hijacking which basically instructedflight crew to accom mo date hijacker dem ands? If so, what were your views on theapproach?Question: Please provide us with your recollection of the following doc ume nts that relateto the evaluation of the terrorist threat to civil aviation produced by the F A A 'sintelligence division as well as by the Intelligence Com mu nity. In particular, do yourecall their consideration of the possibility of suicide hijackings within the United States?If so, how did you and the Adm inistration respond to this information?

A. The portion of the National Intelligence Estimates of (give dates) whichpertain to civil aviationB. The FAA's assessment (include names from Manno letter to JI )C. The 2000-2001 FAA C D-RO M presentation for aviation security stakeholders(quote)

TechnologyQuestion: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Com mission focused on theimportance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice doyou have for this com mission about how to set an aviation security R& D agenda, to fundit and to deplo y the technology?Question: How do we avoid the problem of waiting to deploy improved technology inth e hope that some even g reater capability is right around the corner? W hat principlesshould w e app ly in this regard?Passenger ProfilingThe Gore Commission strongly supported the use of passenge r prescreening initiatives todetermine those passengers who m ight pose mo re than a m inim al risk to aircraft in orderto better focus scarce security resources, consistent, of course, with the protection of civilrights. The Comm ission's report recom men ded that research be developed on


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004

"terrorists, hijackers, an d bombers." W e note "hijackers" because when the computerprescreening system was implemented it was only applied to passengers who checkedbags, and the only consequence of selection was to screen the baggage for explosives orapply positive passenger bag match (PPBM).Question: Was it the comm ission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify thosewho m ay pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in m ind identifying those w ho migh tpose a hijacking threat as well?Question: Were yo u aw are that the FA A h ad limited application of prescreening only tothose passengers who checked bags and the consequences of selection meant additionalscreening of your checked bags only, not secondary screening of the passenger's personand/or carry-on belongings?Question: How do you be lieve civil rights issues affected prescreening and screeningoperations? (GET LETTER TO UNITED)Question: What advice do you have for how civil rights issues should be considered sowe can meet the goal of protecting both lives an d civil liberties in the field of homelandsecurity?Positive P assenger Bag MatchThe Gore Commission also endorsed the practice of Positive Passenger Bag Match,including as a means of addressing the risk posed by those identified as prescreeningselectees.Question: How did you evaluate positive passenger bag m atch as an appropriate defensemeasure in an era when suicide terrorism w as a grow ing practice?National Airspace M anagement

The Gore C om mission devoted a lot of attention to modernizing and filling gaps in theNational Air Space (NAS ) managem ent system, including improving surveillance ofaircraftQuestion: Was this focus on national air space management issues exclusively a safetyand efficiency issue, or did you see this in terms of security as well?Question: Specifically, was there concern about gaps in surveillance net in the event of ahijacking? Do rem emb er if the military or FAA weighed-in on this point?TEAM 8 COMME NT


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004Air RageThe G ore Com mission addressed issues related to air rage being a danger to aircraft andflight crew, and focused i ts recom mend ations on more vigorous prosecution.Question: Did consideration of this issue include new rules about securing cockpitsagainst intrusion?Reinventing GovernmentThe Commission on Reinventing Government that yo u also chaired foc used intently onraising barriers to the imp osition of new federal rules.Question: Given that aviation security was a regulatory p rocess that depended onrulemaking to effect improved security m easures, was there concern that the lessons fromthe Commission on Reinventing Go vernment, might unwittingly frustrate reformscontemp lated in the report of the W hite House Com mission on A viation S afety andSecurity?Question: How did the Reinvention of Government initiative relate to the FederalAviation Adm inistration? W hich, if any, of the Reinvention initiatives impacted on civilaviation security?RecommendationsQuestion: What would you tell th e Com mission they should recommend to improveaviation and transportation security in particular and ho meland security in general?Question: W hat advice would you have for us to help ensure that our recommendationsare duly considered and implemented?(Note: Perhaps we can share som e of our draft recommendations w ith the Vice Presidentto get his views, including the notion of making the NTSB the NTSS B (nationaltransportation safety and security board).General Assessments

Question: Upon becoming V ice President in January 1993, please tell us your perceptionof the following issues. Please provide specifics wherever possible.A. The threat to the United States from Islamic fundamentalistsB. The terrorist threat to U.S . civil aviationC. The status of the civil aviation security system in the United S tates

Question: Bef ore your service on the Gore Com mission, what were yo ur views on theso-called Dual Mandate of the FA A, and of the security system of divided responsibilities


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004between the F AA, the airports and the airlines? How were these views reflected in theAdministration's aviation security policy?Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system as of the end ofthe Clinton-Gore Adm inistration? What were its strengths an d weaknesses?Question: W hat was your assessment of the perform ance of FAA A dministrator JaneGarvey? Deputy Adm inistrator Monte Belger? Civil Aviation Security head Irish Flynn?Do you recall an y occasions on which either they sought to get a security measureadopted which the Adm inistration declined, or you asked them to undertake any securitymeasu res which they indicated they wo uld be unable to carry out?Question: What is your analysis of the civil aviation security system on 9/11/01? Whereand why did it fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believe eitherthe Clinton or Bush A dministrations could have done which would have prevented thosedisasters?Question: What is your assessment of the state of aviation and transportation securitytoday? What has been imp roved? What are the major remaining weaknesses?Baseline Working G roupQuestion: When did you become aware of the FA A ' s Baseline Working Group (BWG),which issued its final report in December 1996? What was your evaluation of itsman date, and its interaction with the W hite House Com mission on A viation Safety andSecurity?Question: W hat is your recollection and evaluation of the following B WGrecommendations, and how did they impact the work of the White House Comm ission?

A. The notion of raising the aviation security "baseline"B. The consequences of profiling "selection"C. An expanded role for the FBI in civil aviation securityD. The need to end unfounded federal mandates on civil aviation security and toprovide $9.9 billion in federal funding for aviation security over the following 10years.Question: What role, if any, did you play in the O MB objection to the BW Grecommendations on the grounds that these were too costly an d that they departed fromthe user-pays p rinciple?Gore Commission: General

Question: What was your understanding of the mandate of the White House Comm issionon Aviation Safety and Security, which you were named to chair? Did that mandate


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QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE

Aviation security as a national security issueThe Gore Com mission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "Thefederal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, an dprovide substantial funding for capital improvements."Question: What did the commission mean when it said aviation security should betreated as a national security issue? What are the specifics of that in terms of funding,policies, priorities, procedures etc?Question: What advice do you have for this commission about what that approachshould m ean today?A Layered SystemThe Gore Commission stressed the importance of a "layered" aviation security system.Question: What do you regard as the fundam ent principles of a "layered" system.Question: In the course of the Gore Com mission's work did you find the aviationsecurity system to be an effectively layered system. If so, why? If not, why notwhatwas missing?CheckpointsQuestion: The Gore Commission had recommended a rule to certify screeningcompanies and yet by 9-11 that rule still had not be finalized. If aviation security were anissue of national security why was it taking so long to implement such an importantreform of the system?MiscellaneousQuestion: What was your view of the dissent to the Gore Co mm ission report issued byVictoria Cummock .

Funding for AVSECThe report suggested that the federal government should "devote significant resources, ofapproximately $100 million annually, to m eet capital requirements identify by airportconsortia and the FAA."


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Question: The vast major i ty of the additional m oney for aviation security that wasappropriated as a result of this recom m endat ion was for explosive detection equipment,was that th e commission's intent? What process did you expect to be used in allocatingthese new resources?TWA 800Question: Did y ou perceive that the focus from the administration, Congress and/or th epublic on aviation security dim inish after the incident was deem ed to be a safety issue notan act of terro rism ?Question: Do you have an y reason to believe that TWA 800 was a terrorist act?

Intelligence and threat analysisQuestion: In the deliberations of the Gore Commission what was your mechanism fo runderstanding th e threat to civil aviation. What intelligence information/assessments didyou receive in order to inform your recommendat ions?Question: How did you perceive th e threat to civil aviation from th e intelligence youreceived in the course of the Commission ' s work and, in general, as Vice President?Question: The FAA has told th e Commission that they were frustrated by the lack ofintelligence "a blind spot" on threats do m estically. Did you perceive this blind spot an dho w serious did you think it was?FBI

The Gore Com m iss ion recom m ended that the FBI "significantly increase" th e number ofagents assigned to co unterterrorism investigation to improve intelligence. In theaftermath of the 1993 WTC bo m bing the FBI pledged to devote m ore resources and focuson th e counter terrorism agenda.Question: Do you believe that the FBI adequately responded to this ne w emphasis an dthe Comm ission 's r ecomm endat ion.Hijacking/SabotageQuestion: The Gore Comm iss ion focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.Little w as said about hijacking . What was the Commission 's view of the hijacking threatan d given th e known shor tcomings of our checkpoint screening operations w hy wasn ' this mor e of a focus?Question: Did y ou ever discuss or consider the use of aircraft as weapons as a threat tocivil aviation security? For instance, in 1994 when th e private plane crashed into the


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W hite House lawn, was this method of attack a topic of conversation or worry? If so,what steps were taken?Question: During your d eliberations with the Commission, was the panel aware of the"common strategy" employed by FAA to address hijacking which basically instructedflight crew to accommodate hi jacker demands? If so, what were you r views on theapproach?

TechnologyQuestion: Both the Pan Am Commiss ion and the Gore Com mission focused on theimportance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice doyou have for the com mission about how to set an aviation security R& D agenda, to fundit and to deploy the technology?Question: How do we avoid the problem of waiting to deploy imp roved technology inthe hope that som e even greater capability is right around the corner? W hat principlesshould we apply in this regard?

Passenger P rofilingThe Gore Com mission strongly supported the use of passenger prescreening initiatives todetermine those pa ssengers who might pose m ore than a minima l risk to aircraft in orderbetter focus scarce security resources, consistent, of course, with the protection of civilrights. The Commission's report recommended that research be developed on"terrorists, hijackers, an d bombers." W e note "hijackers" because when th e computerprescreening system was implemented it was only applied to passengers who checkedbags, and the only consequence of selection was to screen the baggage fo r explosives orapply positive passenger bag match (PPBM).Question: Was it the com m ission's intent that prescreening be used only to identify thosewho may pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind iden tifying those who m ightpose a hijacking threat as well?Question: W ere you aware that the FAA had limited application of prescreening o nly tothose passengers who ch ecked bags and the conseq uences of selection mean t additionalscreening of your checked bags only, not secondary screening of the passenger's personand/or carry-on belongings?Question: How do you believe civil rights issues affected prescreening and screeningoperations? (GET LETT ER TO UNITED)Question: What advice do you have for how w e should recom me nd civil rights issues beconsidered in resolve so we can meet the goal of protecting both lives an d civil liberties?


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Question: The Gore Commission recommended that "The FBI and CIA should develop asystem that would allow imp ortant intelligence inform ation on known or suspectedterrorists to be used in passenger profiling without com prom ising the integrity of theintelligence or its sources." Did this recommendation mean that the FAA should useintelligence comm unity and law enforcem ent watch lists to stop known or suspectedterrorists from flying? If not, what was intended by this recomm endation?

Positive Passenger Bag MatchThe Gore Co mm ission also endorsed the practice of Positive Passenger Bag Match,including as a means of addressing the risk posed by those identified as prescreeningselectees.Question: How did you evaluate positive passenger ba g match as an appropriate defen semeasure in an era when suicide terrorism was a growing practice?

National Airspace Managem entThe Gore Co mm ission devoted a lot of attention to m odernizing and filling gaps in theNationa l Air Space (NAS) man agem ent system, including to improve surveillance ofaircraftQuestion: W as this focus on national air space man agem ent issues exclusively a safetyan d efficiency issue, or did you see this in terms of security as well?Question: Spec ifically, was there concern about gaps in surveillance net in the event of ahijacking? Do rem emb er if the m ilitary or FAA w eighed-in on this point?TEAM 8 COMMENT

Air RageThe Gore C om mission addressed issued related to air rage being a danger to aircraft andflight crew, an d focused its recommendations on more vigorous prosecution.Question: Did co nsideration of this issue include new rules about securing cock pitsagainst intrusion?

Reinventing Governm ent


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The Co mm ission on Reinventing G overnment w hich you also chaired focused intently onraising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules.Question: Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that depend ed onrulemaking to effect improved security measures, was there concern that the lessons fromthe Com mission on Reinventing Government, m ight unwittingly frustrate reformscontemplated in the C omm ission on Aviation Safety and Security?RecommendationsQuestion: What would you tell the Com mission they should recommend to improveaviation an d transportation security in particular an d homeland security in general?Question: What advice wo uld you have for us to help ensure that our recom men dationsare duly considered and implemented?(Note: Perhaps we can share some of our draft recommendations with the Vice Presidentto get his views, including the notion of making the NTSB the NTSSB (nat ionaltransportation safety and security board).

Other notes for usGore Co mm ission required each airport to conduct a vulnerability study and an "actionplan" to improve security. W e need to ge t the "action plans" fo r Dulles; Logan an dNewark. They were supposed to define local security threats based on input from FAAan d FBI.Gore com mission called on pe rforma nce agreements to outline goals and specific meansof measuring progress for AVS EC what was done in this area.


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GORE QUESTIONS

1. Irish Flynn, former Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security at FAA testifiedto the Com m ission on January 27 th , 2004 that the Gore report was disappointing becauseit didn't stress the central im portance of intelligence and law enforce m ent in detectingan d countering terrorist activities aim ed at aviation. Did the Co m m ission co nsider theissue of intelligence, particularly domestic intelligence in identifying threats to civilaviation.2. Flynn said that the C om m ission request for o nly 1 00 million per year implied that thethreat to civil aviation security was not imm inent. He said it was well known that ove r1000 CTX m achines were needed an d that given the need to buy other equipment, 1000million would permit purchase and installation of about 50 EDS per year. At that pace itwould take 20 years to com plete.3. Gore Co m m ission suggested that aviation security be treated as a National SecurityIssue. W hat did that m ean to you?4. Why was CA PS conseque nces lim ited just to checked baggage? W ere their civil rightsconcerns about applying secondary screening to selectees for their person or5. How did you see the "reinventing government" effort and the goal of no new rulesimpacting th e rulemak ing process for CAS?


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QUESTIONS FOR VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE

Aviation security as a national security issueThe Gore Commission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "Thefederal governm ent should consider aviation security as a national security issue, andprovide substantial funding fo r capital improvements."Question: What did the comm ission mean when it said aviation security should betreated as a national security issue? W hat are the specifics of that in terms of funding,policies, priorities, procedures etc?Intelligence and threat analysisQuestion: The Gore C omm ission report m entioned the changing threat from terrorismand that it was a vital issue dom estically. How did you perceive the threat to civilaviation both domestically and internationally from the intelligence you received in thecourse of the C om mission's w ork and, in general, as Vice P resident?Hijacking/SabotageQuestion: The Gore Co mm ission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.Little was said about hijacking. What was the C om mission's view of the hijacking threatand given the known shortcom ings of our checkpoint screen ing operations, why wasn'tthis more of a focus?TechnologyQuestion: Both the Pan Am C omm ission and the Gore Com mission focused on theimportance of m axim izing the use of technolo gy to promote security. Wh at advice doyo u have fo r this commission about how to set an aviation security R& D agenda, to fundit and to deploy the technology?Passenger ProfilingWill you share with us you r recollection of the com m ission's d eliberations about thefollowing key issues: Aircraft as weapons; the security consequences fo r passengersselected by the computer prescreening system the commission endorsed; the civilliberties aspects of CA PS and CA PS conseq uences; and the use of watchlists to stopsuspected terrorists from flying? For instance, was it the commission's intent thatprescreening be used only to identify those who may pose a sabotage threat, or did youhave in mind identifying those who might pose a hijackin g threat as well?


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Reinventing GovernmentThe Commission on Reinventing Government that you also chaired focused intently onraising barriers to the impo sition of new federal rules.Question: How did the Reinvention of Go vernm ent initiative relate to the FederalAviation Ad m inistration? Given that aviation security was a regulatory process thatdepended on rulemaking to implement improved security measures, was there concernthat the lessons from the Commission on Reinventing Government, might unwittinglyfrustrate reforms contemplated in the report of the W hite House Com mission on AviationSafety and Security?General AssessmentsQuestion: W hat was you r analysis of the civil aviation security system in place leadingup to and on 9/11/01? W hy were the attacks able to succeed? How and why did thesystem fail, in your view? In retrospect, is there anything that yo u believe either theClinton or Bush Administrations could have done which would have prevented thosedisasters?Gore Com mission; GeneralQuestion: Com missioner Victoria Cum mock filed a dissent to m any of theCom mission's recomm endations, arguing that in some cases they lacked sp ecificity,responsibility, substance, accountability, applicability and timelines and deadlines.Further, her dissent included what she thought would address those perceived gaps.Could you com men t on that dissent in terms of its validity and how the co mm ission dealtwith her views?RecommendationsQuestion: What w ould you tell the Com mission they should recomm end to improveaviation and transportation security in particular and ho meland security in general andwhat steps can we take to enhance the probability that our recomm endations are dulyconsidered and implemented?Question: Threats and v ulnerabilities to the nation's transportation system are many andvaried. They include no t only aviation bu t maritime, rail, pipelines and other surfacemodes. How wou ld you advise that priorities be determined? How should cost beallocated am ong stakeholders?


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Aviation security as a natio na l security issueThe Gore Com mission's first recommendation in the aviation security chapter was "Thefederal government should consider aviation security as a national security issue, andprovide sub stantial funding fo r capital improvements."Question: W hat did the com mission mean wh en it said aviation security should betreated as a national secu rity issue? W hat are the spe cifics of that in terms of funding,policies, priorities, procedures etc? i.Question: What advice do you h ave for this commission about what that approachshould me an today?

Question: Please discuss th e Commission's intentions in designating aviation security asa national security issue. How did this square with th e revisions in the BW Grecommendations which sharply reduced th e federal funding goal, diminished th econsequences of C APP S, put less stress on an expanded role for the FB I, and apparentlydropped th e notion of an enhanced security baseline?

A Layered SystemThe Gore Com mission stressed th e importance of a "layered" aviation security system .Question: What do you regard as the fundament principles of a "layered" system.Question: In the course of the Gore C om mission's w ork did you find the aviationsecurity system to be an effectively layered system? If so, why? If not, why notwhatwas missing?CheckpointsQuestion: The Gore Commission had recommended a rule to certify screeningcompanies and yet by 9-11 that rule still had not be finalized. If aviation security were anissue of national security why was it taking so long to implement such an importantreform of the system?Funding fo r AVSECThe report suggested that th e federal government should "devote significant resources, ofapproximately $100 million annually, to me et capital requirements identify by airportconsortia and the FAA." /. |IrlA1 ' '

0


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COM MISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004Question: The vast majori ty of the additional m oney for aviation security that wasappropriated as a result of this recom m endation was for explosive detection equipm ent.Was that the com m ission's intent? W hat process did you expect to be used in allocatingthese new resources?TWA 800Question: Did you p erceive that the focus from the administration, Congress and/or thepublic on aviation security dim inish after the incident was deemed to be a safety issueand not an act of terrorism?Question: Do you have any reason to believe that TWA 800 was a terrorist act?Question: W hat was your im m ediate evaluation and response to the crash o f TWA 800in 1 996? How, when and why did your understanding change over time?Intelligence and threat analysisQuestion: In the deliberations of the Gore Commission what was your mechanism fo runderstanding th e threat to civil aviation? W hat intelligence infonnatiou/assessiriefits didyou receive in order to inform your recomm endations?Question: How did you perceive the threat to civil aviation from the intelligence youreceived in the course of the Com m ission's work and, in general, as Vice President?Question: The FAA h as told the Co m m ission that they were frustrated by the lack ofintelligence ("a blind spot") on dom estic threats. Did you perceive this blind spot and, ifso, how serious did you think it was?Question: What was you r analysis of the Bojinka plot uncovered in Manila in early1995? Did this event change in any way, your and the Clinton Ad m inistration'sevaluation of the Bin Laden threat to U.S. civil aviation? If so, how ? W hat was done inresponse?FBI

The Gore Commission recommended that the FBI "significantly increase" the number ofagents assigned to co unterterrorism investigation to im prove intelligence. In theaftermath of the 1993 WT C bom bing the FBI pledged to devote m ore resources and focuson the counter terrorism agenda.Question: Do you believe that the FBI adequately respo nded to this new emphasis an dth e Com m ission 's recom mendat ion?


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004

Hijacking/SabotageQuestion: The Gore Comm ission focused heavily on the sabotage threat to aviation.Little was said about hijacking. What was the Com mission's view of the hijacking threatan d given the known shortcomings of our check point screening operations, why wasn' tthis mo re of a focu s?

*Question: Did you ever discuss or consider the use of aircraft as weapons as a threat tocivil aviation security? For instance, in 1994 when the private plane crashed into theWhite House lawn, was this method of attack a topic of conversation or worry? If so,what steps were taken?Question: During your deliberations with the Commission, was the panel aware of the"common strategy" employed by FAA to add ress hijacking which basically instructedflight crew to accom mod ate hijacker dem ands? If so, what were your views on theapproach?Question: Please provide us with your recollection of the following doc um ents that relateto the evaluation of the terrorist threat to civil aviation produced by the FAA'sintelligence division as well as by the Intelligence Com mu nity. In particular, do yourecall their con sideration of the possibility of su icide hijac king s within the Un ited States?If so, how d id you and the Adm inistration respond to this information?

A. The portion of the National Intelligence Estimates of (give dates) whichpertain to civil aviationB. The FAA's assessment (include names from Manno letter to JI)C. The 2000-2001 FAA CD -ROM p resentation for aviation security stakeholders(quote)TechnologyQuestion: Both the Pan Am Commission and the Gore Comm ission focused on theimportance of maximizing the use of technology to promote security. What advice doyo u have for this com mission about how to set an aviation secu rity R& D agen da, to fundit and to deploy the technology?Question: How do we avoid the problem of waiting to deploy improved technology inthe hope that some even greater capability is right around the corner? W hat principlesshould we apply in this regard?Passenger ProfilingThlTGore Commission strongly supported the use of passenger prescreening initiatives todetermine those passengers who migh t pose more than a m inimal risk to aircraft in orderto better focus scarce security resou rces, consistent, of course, with the protection of civilrights. The Com mission's report recom mend ed that research be developed on

tlv U


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004"terrorists, hijackers, an d bombers." W e note "hijackers" because when the computerprescreening system was implemented it was only applied to passengers who checkedbags, and the only consequence of selection was to screen the baggage for explosives orapply positive passenger bag match (PPBM).Question: Was it the comm ission's intent that prescre ening be used only to identify thosewho may pose a sabotage threat, or did you have in mind identifying those who mightpose a hijacking threat as well?Question: Were yo u aware that the FAA had limited application of prescreening only tothose passengers w ho checked bags and the consequences of selection meant additionalscreening of your checked bags only, not secondary screening of the passenger's personand/or carry-on belongings?Question: How do you believe civil rights issues affected prescreening and screeningoperations? (GET LETTER TO UNITED)Question: What advice do you have for how civil rights issues should be considered sowe can meet the goal of protecting both lives and civil liberties in the field of homelandsecurity?Positive Passenger Bag MatchThe Gore Co mm ission also endorsed the practice of Positive P assenger Bag Match,including as a means of addressing the risk posed by those identified as prescreeningselectees.Question: How did you evaluate positive passenger ba g match as an appropriate defensemeasure in an era when suicide terrorism was a growing practice?National Airspace Management

The Gore C om mission devoted a lot of attention to m odernizing and filling gaps in theNational Air Space (NAS) managem ent system, including improv ing surveillance ofaircraftQuestion: Was this focus on national air space managem ent issues ex clusively a safetyand efficiency issue, or did you see this in terms of security as w ell?Question: Specifically, was there concern about gaps in surveillance net in the event of ahijacking? Do rem em ber if the military or FAA weighed-in on this point?TEAM 8 COMME NT


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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004Air RageThe Gore Co mm ission addressed issues related to air rage being a danger to aircraft an dflight crew, and focused its recommendations on more vigorous prosecution.Question: Did consideration of this issue include new rules about securing cockpitsagainst intrusion?Reinventing GovernmentThe Commission on Reinventing Government that yo u also chaired focused intently onraising barriers to the imposition of new federal rules.Question: Given that aviation security was a regulatory process that depended onrulemaking to effect improved security m easures, was there concern that the lessons fromthe Com mission on Reinventing Governm ent, might unwittingly frustrate reformscontemplated in the report of the W hite House C om mission on A viation Safety andSecurity?Question: How did the Reinvention of Gove rnment initiative relate to the FederalAviation Administration? Wh ich, if any, of the Reinvention initiatives imp acted on civilaviation security?RecommendationsQuestion: W hat would you tell the Com mission they should recom men d to improve

/aviation and transportation security in particular and hom eland security in general?^Question: What advice would you have for us to help ensure that our recommendationsare duly considered and implem ented?

(Note: Perhaps we can share some of our draft recommendations with the Vice Presidentto get his views, including the notion of making the NTSB the N TS SB (nationaltransportation safety an d security board).General AssessmentsQuestion: Upon becom ing Vice President in January 1993, please tell us your percep tionof the following issues. Please provide specifics wherever possible.

A. The threat to the United States from Islamic fundamentalistsB. The terrorist threat to U.S. civil aviationC. The status of the civil aviation security system in the United StatesQuestion: Befo re your service on the Gore Com mission, what were your views on theso-called Dual Mandate of the FAA, and of the security system of divided responsibilities


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004between the F AA, the airports and the airlines? How were these views reflected in theAdministration's aviation security policy?Question: What was your analysis of the civil aviation security system as of the end ofthe Clinton-Gore Administration? What were its strengths an d weaknesses?Question: What was your assessment of the performance of FAA Adm inistrator JaneGarvey? Deputy Adm inistrator Monte Belger? Civil Aviation Security head Irish Flynn?Do you recall an y occasions on which either they sought to get a security m easureadopted which th e Ad ministration declined, or you asked them to undertake an y securitymeasures which they indicated they wo uld be unable to carry out?Question: What is your analysis of the civil aviation security system o 9/11/01? Whereand why did it fail, in yo ur view? In retrospect, is there anything that you believe eitherthe Clinton or Bush Adm inistrations could have done which would have p revented thosedisasters?Question: What is your assessment of the state of aviation an d transportation securitytoday? What has been improved? W hat are the major remaining weaknesses?Baseline Working G roupQuestion: When did you become aware of the FAA 's Baseline Working Group (BWG),which issued its final report in December 1996? What was your evaluation of itsmandate, and its interaction w ith the W hite House Com mission on A viation Safety andSecurity?Question: What is your recollection and evaluation of the following BW Grecomm endations, and how did they impac t the work of the W hite House C om mission?

A. The notion of raising the aviation security "baseline"B. The consequences of profiling "selection"C. An ex pan ded role for the FBI in civil aviation securityD. The need to end unfou nded federal man dates on civil aviation security and toprovide $9.9 billion in federal funding fo r aviation security over the following 10years.Question: W hat role, if any, did you play in the O MB objection to the B WGrecommendations on the grounds that these were too costly an d that they departed fromthe user-pays principle?Gore Commission: General

Question: What was your understanding of the mandate of the White House Com missionon Aviation Safety and Security, which you were nam ed to chair? Did that man date


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COMMISSION SENSITIVEWorking Draf t March 28, 2004change as the Adm inistration's understanding of the cause of the TW A 800 crashevolved? If so, how?Question: W hat role did the airlines; th e airports an d labor organizations play in thework of the White House Commission?Question: What, in your view, were the major recommendations of your Com mission?How did you seek to implem ent them? What were th e results?Question: What was your view of the dissent to the Gore Commission report issued byVictoria Cummock?Question: Please respond to a question posed to the Commission by the Families of the9/11 victims: Why were implementation timelines scrapped from th e final report of theGore Commission? (Check exact wording of question.)

Other notes for usGore Com mission required each airport to conduct a vulnerability study and an "actionplan" to improve security. W e need to get the "action plans" fo r Dulles; Logan an dNewark. They were supposed to define local security threats based on input from FAAand FBI.Gore com mission called on perform ance ag reemen ts to outline goals and specific meansof measuring progress fo r AVSEC what was done in this area.

T7 B19 Gore Questions Fdr- Gore Questions- Various Drafts 590

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