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XM>Questions for GAO Interviews on U.S. EmbassyNon-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Policies and Procedures (as of 4/17/02)

Name: Andrew B.MitchellDate: 19 April 2002 Post: AMEMBASSY Algiers

1) Has your post made any of the following changes to the NTV application and approval processsince September 11 , 2001? (Check all that apply)

a. Strengthened anti-fraud programsb. Instituted new or changed existing standards on how closely anapplicant's name and date of birth must match the name and dateof birth returned by CLASS (before consular officers submitrequests for a Security Advisory Opinion)c. Reduced the availability of personal appearance waiverprogramsd. Increased the percentage of NIV applicants who areinterviewede. Other (please specify)f. Other (please specify)

Yes NoXX

N /A

XX

Please provide additional comments, if any.AMEMBASSY Algiers operates on a manned drop-box basis. Applications are verythoroughly screened before they ever enter the consulate. T he consulate's entire work-loadwould likely qualify as drop-box in most embassies in the world.Post already thoroughly scrutinizes al l cases fo r signs of fraud. Staffing limitations(Algiers has no full-time consular officers) make an y increased anti-fraud efforts non-feasible.

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2) Abo ut what percent of N IV ap plicants were interviewed at your post (a) in the 12 monthsprior to September 11, 2001 , and (b) since September 11, 2001?a. 12 months prior to September 11,2001 16 %b. Since September 11 ,2001 28%Please provide additional comments, if any.

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3) In your opinion, to what extent, if any, do the followin g security procedures an d requirementshelp your post's consular officers identify potential terrorists?(Please check one box in each row.)

a) Security AdvisoryOpinion for selectedindividuals from StatesSponsoring InternationalTerrorism (see State109933)b) Visas Viper Committeesc) CLASSname check sd) The 20-day waitingperiod for selectedapplicants (see State196355)e) Requirement thatapplicantsprovideinformation on the DS-157formf) The Visas Condorprocess (see State 015702)

Great extentX

X

X

Some extent No extent Not sure

XX

X

No basis to judge

Please provide additional comm ents, if any.The Visas Condor process, although difficult is a great com fort to consular officers. It is good toknow that applicants are being broadly screened throughout the USG.

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4) For your post, to what extent, if any, would th e following proposed changes to the NIVapplication process help identify potential terrorists? (Please check one box in each row.)

a. Interview a greater percentage of all applicants( I f yo u check very or somewhat helpful, pleaseindicate the percentage % )b. Interview all applicantsc. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (I f youcheck very or somewhat h e l p f u l , please indicate thepercentage %)d. Fingerprint all applicantse. Improve training for consular officers in identifyingsuspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/international organizations,and cultural sensitivityg. Make the visa process a law enforcementfunction ( I f you check yes, please elaborate in thecomments section onhow this should beaccomplished, e.g., should the function remainwithin State or bemoved to another agency)h. Other (please specify)i. Other (please specify)

Veryhelpful

XX

Some-whalhelpfulNothelpfulX

X

Not sure

XX

Please provide additional comments, if any.Fingerprinting of applicants would only be effective if a mechanism were pu t in place tocompare the fingerprints to those of known criminals or terrorists in a timely manner. In the

absence of drastic technological improvements (i.e. immediate electronic fingerprint comparisonat post), fingerprinting applicants will cause serious delays to legitimate (non-terrorist) travelerswithout guarantees of increased protection. I personally have doubts that fingerprints sent in toWashington would get appropriately screened.Th e Visa function should be made a law enforcement function only to the extent that itgives consular officers access to the full store of information available to the law enforcementagencies. In fact, there is no real need to change the visa function. Thefailure of the lawenforcement agencies to fully open their record to be used in the CLASS lookout system is ademonstration of the kind ofarrogance that puts protection of "turf" at a higher priority thenprotecting the borders. There is no way a consular officer doing a line interview cancatch adetermined terrorist through interview alone. If someone in our government knows the identityof a terrorist and does not put that information in the system, they are blinding the officer who isin the position to keep the terrorist out.

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5) How feasible would it be for your post to implement the following proposed changes to theNTV process? (Please check one box in each row.)

a Interviewa greater percentage of all applicants (I fyou check very or somewhat helpful, pleaseindicatethe percentage 90 % )b. Interview all applicantsc. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (I f youcheck very or somewhat h e l p f u l , please indicate thepercentage % )d. Fingerprintall applicantse. Improve training for consular officers in identifyingsuspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/international organizations, and cultural sensitivityf. Make th e visa process a law enforcement functiong. Institute a secure travel docume nt that incorporates abiometric such as fingerprintsh. Other (please sp ecify)i. Other (please spe cify)

V e r yf e a s i b l e Some-w h a t f e a s i b l eX

N otfeasible

XX

X

N otsure

XX

Please provide additional comments, if any.Training to ident i fy suspected terrorists would be good if it would work, I strongly doubt

that it will. Trained, professional terrorists are not going to give themselves up under simplequestioning at a consular window. Those who would give themselves up are likely to already bespotted during interview. The key is not training but information sharing. If a certain socialorganization has terrorist links, the entire consular core should be notified. The same goes forspecif ic businesses. If the "law enforcement agencies" do not want to share the information thatthey have with consular officers, then there is no way we ca act on it.

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6) Would any of the following factors ma ke it difficult fo r your post to fully implement th eproposed changes listed in questions 4 and 5? (Please check one box in each row.)

a. Consular staffing shortagesb. Lack of space, facilitiesc. An adverse effect on U.S. interestsin the host country (please elaboratein comments section)dHost country would require sameof U.S. citizens (reciprocity)e. Other (please specify)

Yes, to a great extentXX

X

Yes, to some extent

X

X

N o N ot sure

Please provide additional comments, if any.Other, not only would staffs and spaces have to be drastically increased (tw o or threefold) bu t equipment would also have to be added. More interview s = more w indows = morecomputers = more appl icants = more guards = more admin staff to handle guard HR needs .U S interests w ould no doubt be affected but, in my view, that is of a lesser importance thankeeping terrorists off of US soil.