T3 B11 EOP Produced Documents Vol III Fdr- 6-11-03 Tab- 6-11-03 Leitch Cover Letter- 1st Pg 5-16-02...

8/14/2019 T3 B11 EOP Produced Documents Vol III Fdr- 6-11-03 Tab- 6-11-03 Leitch Cover Letter- 1st Pg 5-16-02 WH Rice Conf- Woodward-Balz Interview Transcripts

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THE W H I T E HOUSE

WASHINGTON RECE VE D

June 11,2003 JUN 1 ] 2003

Daniel Marcus, Esq.General CounselNationalCommissionon Terrorist Attack s Uponthe United States2100KS t ree tN . W.Washington,D.C. 20037

Dear Mr. M arcus:

As you know, the President has clearly stated a policy of support for the work of theNational Com missionon Terrorist Attacks Uponthe United States ("Commission"). Consistentwith that policy, and as a matter of comity between the legislative and execu tive branches, wepreviouslyprovideda set ofdocuments,as pages numbered1-572, in response to theCommission's"EOF Document RequestNo. 1," dated May 13,2003 (the "Request").Subsequently, at your request, we provided an opportunity for you and Mr. Philip Zelikow toreview the full, un-redacted textof the documentswe^provided in response to the Request,including all portionswhich had been marked as"non-responsive."

Following your review, yo u requested thatwe provide certain additional portionsofthese documentsto the Commission. Whilewe do notconcede thatthe enclosed materialsareresponsive to the Request or relevant to the Com mission's inquiry, we are providing them as anaccommodation. _

The enclosed docu me nts com prise additional portions of: (i) one transcript of aninterview conducted by Bob W oodward and Dan Balz of the W ashington Post with PresidentBush; (ii) two transcripts of interviews conducted by W oodw ard with N ational Secu rity AdvisorCond'oleezzaRice; and (iii) one transcript of interviews conducted by W oodward and Balz withDeputyNation al Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.These pages are numbered as in the originalset of docum ents provided in response to the Requ est, so that the pag es can be substituted forthose in the original response. Also enclosed is the transcript of a press c onferen ce held by Dr.Rice on May 16, 2002, whichis publicly available, includingon the White House web site.

These materialsare furnished pursuantto all terms and conditions statedin the May 21,2003 letter to you from the Counsel to the Presidentand in my May 23,2003 letterto you.

Sincerely yours,

David G. LeitchDeputy Counsel to the President


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J^ational Security AdvisorHolds Press Briefing Page1 of 9

C l i c k to P r i n tt h i s document

l( President GeorgeW .Bush

HIM 1 1 ?flfn For Immediate Releaseuun LUU.J Officeol the Press Secre ta ry

May 16, 2002

National Commission on

National Security Advisor Holds Press Briefing TerroristAttacksPress Brief ingby Nation al Secu ri ty Ad visorDr. Con do lee zza RiceTh e James S. Brady Brief ing Room

4:1 0 P.M. EOT

DR. RICE: G oo d af te rn oo n. I'm going to g ive you a chrono log y of the even ts tha t o ccur red dur ing the spr ing summer of 2001 But I want to start witha little definitional work.When we talk about threats, they come in manyvariet ies.Veryof ten we have u ncor robora ted information; some t imes we have cor robora ted but very gene ra linformation. Bu t I can tel l you th at i t i s almost ne ver the case that we have in formation that is specif ic as to t iplace, o r methodof attack.

In the period star t ingin December 2000,the intel l igence community s tar ted report ing increasein traffic _concerningterr or is t act ivit ies .In theApril-May time frame, therewas specif ic threat report ing aboutal Qaedaattacks agains t U.S. t a rge t s or in te re s t tha t might be in the works .

Now, the re was a c lear con cern tha t so mething was up , tha t so mething was coming, but i t was pr inc ipa lly focu soverseas .Th e a r ea s o f t h o s e c o n c e r n w e r eth e Middle East ,th e Arabian Peninsula ,an d Eur ope .

In the Jun e t ime f rame , a r res t s for theMllennium plot , the re was test imo ny by the par ticipants in the Millenn iumplot tha t Abu Zabeda had s a id th a t there might be in te res t in a tt acking the United Sta tes . And th is come s o ut tes t imonytha t was t h e r eas a resul tof theMillennium plot.A n dt h e n in June - o n June 26th , therewas a t h r ea tsp ike , and as a res ul t , aga in focus ing overse as , the Sta te Depar tment i s sued a wor ldwide caut ion . Again , tha twas June 26th, an dyoujjrobably remember thatcaution.

Now, the FAA wasa lso conce r ne dofthrea t sto U.S. ci t izen s s uchas airline hijackings,an d t he r e fo r e , is suedaninformationcircular- a n d a n information circular goesou t theprivate carr ie rs fro mlaw e n f o r c e m e n t-- saying thatwe have a con cern . That was a June 22nd informat ion c ircular.

At t h e en d o fJune , the r ewas a s ta tus o f threa tan d ac tion me et ing tha tthe --wha twe call th e Counter te r ror i smSecuri tyG r o u p-- it is agroup tha tis in te ragency tha t meetso n th e direct ionof an NSCSpecial A ss is tant , DickClarkeat that time. Ther ewas a meetingo f that, an d Dick Clarke reportedto me that steps were being taken byt h e C S G .

On July 2nd , as a resu l t of some of that w o rk, the FBI release da m essage s ay ingthat there a re threa t s to beworr ieda bo u t o v e r s e a s ,but wecanno t-- whilewe canno t fore se e a tt acks do mes t ica lly,we canno t ru le them out .This i s an inlet , and again, an inlet go es ou t to law en forceme nt fro m the FBI.

On July 2nd,t he FAA

is sued ano t he r1C ,say ing t ha t Res sam--

again associated withth e

Millennium plot- saidthat therewas an intention o f using explosivesin anairportterminal. This was a very specific1C.

On July 5th, the th reat re port ing h ad beco me s uff icien t ly robu st , tho ug h no t , again, very specif ic , but sufficienrobust ,there was a lo t of cha t te r in the sys te m, tha t in h i s morning meet ing the Pres iden t aske d me to g o backan d to se e wh at was be ing done about a ll of the cha t te r tha t was there . An dy Card an d I met tha t a ft e rno on wiDick Clarke,and Dick Clarke informe d us tha t he h ad a lready had a mee t ing of the CSG co re group and tha t hewas ho l d ing ano t he r m e e t ing t ha t a ft e r noo n tha t wou l d be f ocuse d on t h r ea t s , and t ha t wou l d b r ing t he d om eagencies intoth e C S G .

On July 6th,the CSGcore p layersme t aga in because therewas conce r n abou t-- very h igh con cern abou t

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THE PRESIDENT: No, before, the night before. Oh,afterwards, yes, yes, yes.

MS. HUGHES: The smaller NSC meeting after the first broaderNSC meeting.

Q That's r igh t, there were two.

MS. HUGHES: He says, we've got five questions: Who are thetargets? How much evidence do we need? How soon do we act? Thesooner we a c t , the more public support we'll have if there'scollateral damage, but some major st rikes could t ake up to 60days to put together. Four, are there any targets that are offlimits? Five, do we include the all ies. Last , we have to setdeclaratory policy announced to the world wh at we're doing.

THE PRESIDENT: Let me say -- this gives me a chance to stepback. We've got a fabulous team. Really. All of whom areworking together, all of whom I hope feel like -- I know they've

go t their say. But one of the thing~s I wanted them to know,right off the bat , was, this is the main focus of thisadministration. This is" it, this is our moment to show theAmerican people we can lead and win this war. I don ' t thinkthere's any doubt in any of their minds.

Q But on the 12th, Wednesday, th e discussion of themili tary, did "the notion of, we're no t going to do"a pin-prickstrike --

THE PRESIDENT: Probably. Listen, I was -- I can't rememberspecifically, but I do know that_the entire time I kept talkingabout, I expect there to be just ice, I said, this is going to

take a long time. I knew that one of my jobs was to explain toth e American people how we're going to fight and win this war,that it required a great deal of patience; that this wa s going totake a lot longer.

N O N - R E S P O N S I V EM A T E R I A L

I was in a hurry to get astrategy. I wanted the military to move as quickly as possible.It became clear the mi l i t a ry wasn't .

B u t , Bob, right off from the get-go, I said, 1 want to be asfierce and tough as possible. Because I understand th is , that

2.52.


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when we complete the mission in Afghanistan -- and one of thethings -- there are some comments in this -- is that I've alwaysviewed this as an opportunity, beyond Afghanistan. This is anopportunity to shake terror loose where it might exist. And Iknew full-well that if America was firm and tough and resolute --and resolute -- and one of the quotes in there is, we have shaked

terror loose in places like Syria, and perhaps Iran, and, whoknows, Iraq. But I mean that.

And therefore, the more resolute we look -- and the moresuccess we are in Afghanistan -- that's why from the get-go Ialso understood that we cannot get our mind off the task at hand.


And the coalition matters, by the way. I'm jumping around,bu t I just want to make these points. The coalition matters,because the war goes beyond just the military phase. If theobjective is to rout out terror wherever it exists, we've got tohave a strong enough coalition that will help America rout outterror where it exists, including money, diplomatic pressure - - _ _

N O N - R E S P O N S IV E M A T E R I A L

Q At that meeting on the 12th, the NSC meetingwhere --

Q I'm sorry to be so chronological, but we want to tell anarrative, because --

THE PRESIDENT: This is an important story.

Q This is a fabulous story. It really is .

Q You tasked Powell with putting the coalition together.But clearly yo u have a sense that this is not a coalition inwhich the coalition is going to help really manage it , that the


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Q But you were concerned about that at the beginning?

THE PRESIDENT: Absolutely, because --

Q That the Pentagon was going to feel like they were the-- sort of the second horse - -

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that you wanted to make sure that if,in fact, we were beginning to use the CIA as part of the boots onthe ground operation, that you didn't want interagency or inter-unit squabbling to - -

Q What did you say to people?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I actually didn't say anything rightoff the bat. I just made sure that as these meetings went on,that it became clear that Rumsfeld understood that -- andShelton, then Myers, but particularly Rumsfeld understood theutility of having the CIA_involved. ~

I think he quickly grasped what I grasped, that there'senough knowledge there and as a matter of fact , it was nearunanimity on the immediate plan for Afghanistan, which was tomate up our assets with the Northern Alliance troops. AndRumsfeld, himself, became incredibly impatient over time, becausehe was unable to get Special Forces troops in with the Northern -All iance different tribal units. The CIA was incrediblyimportant for the Pentagon - -

Q They went in first. _ _

THEPRESIDENT: Well, they

notonly

go in first, butthey

Iwere able to explain th e differences between th e Uzbeks and thejTajiks and the Pashtun. 1


I'm confident there were some moments where, as they beganto mate up , there were some kind of diff icul t ies . It never quitemade it to my level, though.

Q And, sir, the CIA said this is going to cost a lot ofmoney. And apparently, you said --

THE PRESIDENT: Whatever it takes.

Q You issued - - and then Powell an d Armitage issued avery - - sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Now you're showing off .

Q No, no. I 'm not trying to . This is the warning issuedthat day to the Pakistani intelligence chief, which was really


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T H E W H I T E H O U S E

Office of I he Press Secrelnrv

_^ Internal Transcript

I N T E R V I E W O F

S E N I O R A D M I N I S T R AT I O N O F F I C I A L

B Y

B O B W O O D W A R D

The We s t Wing

National Commission on

JUN ) 1 ? O C 3

onal CommissionTerroristAttacks

Aug usl 7, 2002


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~ In retrospect, it's am azingthat we were readyto go onOctober 7th, becauseweliad no

infrastructurein place for this war. Th is was n't like aGulf War, wh ere not only did we have . long-standingrelationshipsall over th e place, and a five-and-a-half month build-up,we were / vtrying to go inless thana month from truly a standing posit ion-- because we didn' t ha verelationshipseven.

The period before September 11th, wh en we were trying to figure a way to enhanc e thestrategy toward alQaeda and trying to figure a way to get more aggressive had rev ealed ex actlythis problem. The nonproliferation policy toward Pakistan meant thatwe had norelationshipwith Pakistan.

Q Sanctionsin place.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sanctionsin place. So we could pressurePakistan about the Taliban, but we had no incentives for Pakistan to play. Uzb ekistan, for veryreal reasonsof concerns about human rightsandlhe like, we also had no relat ionshipwithUzbekistanto speak of.

A nd if you just lookat the geographyof Afghanistan- I rememberat Camp D av idpulling the map out andlooking at Afghanistan

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Q, You talked aboutplease, some place else.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: - I mean, there's Iranand PakistanandUzbekistanand Tajikistan,a coun try nobody cou ld spell .

v " The problem was,we had norelationships.And thework thatwe did in thelead-up,th ework that was embodied in that September4th documentwas to t ry, in part ~ some of that workwas to try toaddress that problem. Becauseif you were goingto have a more robust strategytoward Afghanistan, you could not do it on the fly. You had to have relationshipswith Pakistan,yo u had to have a relationship with Uzbekistan.Y ou could not arm theNorthern Alliancebydropping w eaponson them in the north of the country. You had tohave relationshipsto do that.

,; And so, fortunately, we k new w hat to do, but the infrastruc ture was not yet in place.


There was a pretty clearunderstandinglnThTs"teamthat the important statement was going tobe

made whenwe wo uld demonstratethat we wouldput people on the ground, that that wouldbewhat was different.

Q This was thedifferentiation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Righ t, because theyhad come to believe thatwe were afraid to lose life, and that we wouldn'tfight them man to man, and that we were afraidof becomingth e Soviet Unionor the British,or whoever,and that thatw o u l dbe the break point.


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And so some of the concern was, how much distance could you have between going kinetic andgettingboots on the ground before you lost that?


V1024


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N O N - R E S P O N S IV E M A T E R IA L

SENIOR AD MINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but the problem was themilitaryhadno infrastructure. I mean, yo u know th e Americanmilitary doesn't just showup and startbombing. It has tohave bases.

Q He knows that. He knows that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIONOFFICIAL: Yes, it has to havebases, it has to hav epermission,it has to have overflightrights. Peoplehad blank et givenus overflightrights. Thatseemed to be what after September 11th, you can have overflightrights. But as youstart to getto the nitty grittyof, what can I base here,can I runoffensive operationsout of here, can w e runspecial operations fo rcesout of here?

That gets to be more difficult. I will tell you, I was very sympatheticto the Pentagon,because this was a very tough nut: no infrastructure,no targets set that madeany sensewhatsoever, a President who wasdetermined not to dosomething thatlooked just like he wasdoing it forshow. You know, the constraintson what they were being askedto do were prettyb a d . And I think it'spretty amazinghow quicklythey managed to pull this together, und erth ecircumstances.


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R E C E I V E DT H E W H I T E H O U S E

J U N 1 1 2 0 0 3O f f i c e of the Press Secre tary

( C r a w f o r d , Texas) National CommissiononTe r r o r i s tAttacks

In te rna l Transcript A u g u s t 1 9 , 2002

INTERVIEW OF

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION O F F I C I A LBY BOB WOODWAJRD

The Governor's HouseThe Bush R a n c h , Craw ford , Texas

2:00 P.M. CDT


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' SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: George asked his stationchief, give us your assessment of what a strategy might looklike. And on that Saturday at Camp David, he'd actually toldthe President that he was going to be getting something in fromthe station chief. The President said, you should talk to theprincipals about it when you get it.

' J It's not unlike what we tried to do at the beginning, but Ithink it's fair to say that there was some skepticism as to K \ r or

Taliban.

Q From al Qaeda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, because the well,split the Taliban itself,~ maybe get them to replace Mullah Omar.Because the thought -- the thought was, you know, if you couldget the Taliban to hand over al Qaeda, then that was part of the/ultimatum. But I think there was some skepticism as to whetherthat was going to be possible. " ~ ~

Q Is this the priorities, those four? Is that a fairdepiction of what the strategy was at that point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the fairerportrayal for the strategy was at that point was actually whatthe President had approved on the 17th, that morning. The maindifference here is that this plan suggested that you try tosplit the Taliban leadership, and people were willing to trythat, but not for very long.

Q And Tenet didn't think that was possible, did he,

really? I mean, he was going after -- he was saying, they'rethe same.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. But there wasnothing to lose.

Q Next page, Cheney. We have to be willing to deal withthe Russians to that end.

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N O N -R E S P O N S IV E M A T E R I A L

in 5\ ^

.; Q What about the role of the Saudis and Bandar in all of

this? Do you have any -- I mean, there's so much --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But you know, the periodyou're looking at, it's pretty -- it 's actually fairlystraightforward.

Q It is. Were they cooperating, on a level of , what --this is all on background, but I mean, there's so much mythologyand so much --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION- OFFICIAL: There is a lot ofmythology. I would say that on a scale of 107" i t ' s a t - leas t an

eight-and-a-half, and in this period, maybe even higher.They've been pretty good.

Q They were pretty good.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they really have.And a lot of what you read is just not right. I mean, they'vebeen pretty good.

A t


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THE WHITE HOUSE

Off i c e o f t h e Press Secretary

R E C E I V E D

J U N 1 1 2 0 0 3

In te rna l Transcript January 11, 2002

INTERVIEW OF SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALBY DAN BALZ AND BOB WOODWARD

West Wi n g O f f i c e

2:30 P.M. EST


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T3 B11 EOP Produced Documents Vol III Fdr- 6-11-03 Tab- 6-11-03 Leitch Cover Letter- 1st Pg 5-16-02...

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Transcript of T3 B11 EOP Produced Documents Vol III Fdr- 6-11-03 Tab- 6-11-03 Leitch Cover Letter- 1st Pg 5-16-02...