T Deans Review of Knowledge and the Sacred

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Review: Primordial Tradition or Postmodern Hermeneutics? A Review Essay on"Transcendence and the Sacred" and "Knowledge and the Sacred, the Gifford Lectures, 1981"

Author(s): Thomas DeanSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 211-226Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398920 .

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Feature Book Review

Thomas Dean Primordialtraditionor postmodernhermeneutics?

A reviewessay on Alan M. Olson and Leroy S. Rouner, ed., Transcendence nd

the Sacred (Notre Dame, Indiana,and London:University of Notre Dame Press,

1981),andSeyyedHossein Nasr, Knowledgeand theSacred, TheGiffordLectures,

1981 (New York:Crossroad, 1981).

The volume of essays edited by Olson and Rouner, selected from the annual

series of lectures sponsored by the Boston University Institute for Philosophy

and Religion, has two goals. It attempts, first, to define and give examples of an

approach to philosophy of religion that is cross-cultural.As Olson says in his

introduction, the term "cross-cultural" refers to "a self-conscious attempt to

disavow any and all privileged positions and perspectives, whether cultural,

confessional, ideological, or methodological" (p. 2). Second, by drawingon "the

various meanings of transcendenceand the sacred in multi-cultural contexts," it

addresses itself to a concern sharedby all the contributors, "that if the symbolictermstranscendenceand the sacred no longer have 'cash value', ... then human

existence is much less than we have understood it to be traditionally" (p. 2).

The volume is organized in three parts. The first is methodological and

features threeessays offering quite differentapproaches to cross-cultural philo-

sophy of religion and its contribution to a renewed sense of transcendence and

the sacred. Huston Smith proposes to reconnect the mystical/Platonic tradition

of Western philosophy, viewed as itself a religion, to the ]dna strand of Indian

(primarilyVedantic) thought. Peter Slater, drawing on early Christianity and

Buddhism, suggests that we redefine transcendence as a process of transforma-

tion rather than a metaphysical entity or state of being. Edith Wyschograd,

drawingon the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, emphasizes the contextual

determination of all models of transcendence and the sacredby the civilizational

perspectives that "constitute" them.

The second part presents four specific views of transcendence, mostly drawn

from Asian traditions.Two essays areapologetic in nature: J. G. Arapura arguesfor the superiorityand universalapplicability of the Brahmanic model of trans-

cendence in the Vedantic tradition,while Robert Thurman,in opposition, arguesfor the superiorityof a Mahayana "Emptiness" model in "the arena of world-

circle philosophy." The other two essays are historical-descriptive:Robert Lee

analyzes the sociological function of different models of transcendence in the

Kamakura period of Japanese Buddhism, while Pheme Perkins explains whyGnostic models of transcendence proved unable to meet the criticisms of thin-

kers like Plotinus.

Thomas Dean is in theDepartmentof Religion, Temple University,Philadelphia,Pennsylvania.REVIEWDITOR'SOTE: he second of the two books reviewedhereinwas also reviewedby Huston

Smithin theJanuary1984 issue of thejournal. Readerswill see that the scope, thrust,and conclusions

of the reviews differsubstantively,and I hope that the readerstherefore,will, concur in the decision

to publish both of them in the interestsof promoting scholarly dialogue.

PhilosophyEast and West34, no. 2 (April, 1984). © by the University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.



212 Feature Book Review

The final part consists of four essays on different modes of transcendence

("Will, Mind, and Praxis") and refers mostly to Western traditions. Leroy

Rouner confronts the dualist model of transcendence in Calvin with William

James' attempt to break through dualism by appealing directly to religious

experience.J. N. Findlay, following Huston Smith, argues for the superiorityof

"theHindu-Buddhist-Pythagorean" cosmology

overagainst

both the other-

worldly eschatologies of the Judaic-Christian-Islamictraditions and their this-

worldly counterpart in Marxism. Hans-Georg Gadamer reports on "the reli-

gious dimension" in Heidegger's work, both early (where time is experienced as

"that which comes" as in St. Paul) and later (where he finds in Nietzsche and

Holderlin resources for a "thinking on Being" that is no longer onto-theo-

logical). Frederick Lawrence looks to Johannes Metz for a political model of

transcendence as "interruption"and critique of the secular ideologies, liberal

and Marxist, which have dominated our scientific, technological, and progress-

worshippingera.As this brief overview perhaps already suggests, several difficulties emerge

when this volume is measured by the initial definition and statement of goals

provided by Olson. First, the individual contributors for the most part do not

seem interested in doing cross-cultural philosophy of religion the way Olson

defines it. There appears to be little dialogue (as opposed to polemic or apol-

ogetic argument)either within or among the various essays. The two historical

pieces by Lee and Perkins do reflect a methodology sensitive to cross-cultural

issues,but

theyarenot

essaysin

philosophyof

religion.The

essays bySlaterand

Wyschograd more clearly suggest a method appropriate to cross-cultural

studies, but only Slater's reflects the outcome of that "fusion of horizons"

(Gadamer) we might expect from genuinely cross-cultural conversation. (In

Slater's case, this is seen in his very fruitful and original use of the term "non-

dualism" to express the nature of the transcending process.)

Second, though in his introduction Olson is aware of the chief issues raisedby

these essays and frequently indicates where he stands on most of them, he does

not presentthese issues in a systematicor even in a summarizingway. The reader

is left to figureout whetherthe volume as a whole exemplifiesthe phenomenon ofcross-culturalphilosophy of religion even if the individual essays do not, and, if

so, what its overall contribution is to the spiritual problematic it addresses.

Here two observations may be made. There is a surprisingamount of agree-

ment among the contributors on several points: they agree that the contem-

porary world has lost its sense of transcendence and the sacred, and that the

blame rests on the scientific-technological characterof modern Western civiliza-

tion. Further,they agreethat any solution must recognize that knowledge of the

sacred,unlike knowledge of things secular, is at once cognitive and transforma-

tive. Finally, they agree that the metaphysical resources of Western religious

thought, as traditionally understood, are inadequate for recovering the trans-

cendent, since this tradition is itself partly responsible for our contemporary



213

spiritual malaise ("because philosophy and relgion, transcendence and the

sacred, have suffered a series of radical demarcations one from the other in the

West" (Olson, p. 11)).

When we turn to their proposed solutions, however, we discover two rather

differentresponsesemergingin this volume-responses which, though agreed in

opposing the traditional metaphysics and theology of the West (what Heideggercalls "onto-theo-logy"), are deeply opposed to one another as alternative stra-

tegies of spiritualrenewal, and which may thus be taken as presentingus with a

fundamental philosophical and religious choice.

The first position, represented by Smith, Arapura, Thurman, and Findlay,

rejects the dualist assumptions of the Western religious tradition. It appealsinstead to a transcendent referent nondualistically conceived (with the help of

language drawn from Hindu, Buddhist, or mystical traditions), in which all

culturally derived religious differences are ultimately transcended. (Smith calls

this the "PrimordialTradition.") This transcendentrealityis what is alreadyandalways there, and our knowing of it, which involves a mode of thinking that

transcends our ordinary mode of cognition, is similarly a knowledge (gnosis)that is "alreadythere." Knowing is primarilya matter of clarifying, of "remov-

ing the veil of darkness that obscures," this primordial truth (Arapura).

Questionsabout this transcendentrealityor primordialtruth are thereforebetter

understood as "alreadyansweredquestions" and "as needing no further existen-

tial engagement other than review and re-enactment" (Arapura). As a unitive

reality and truth that transcends the culture-bound categories of our respective

traditions, this Primordial Tradition is universal and therefore universallyavailable as a cross-cultural foundation for recovering a sense of the trans-

cendent and sacred.

The second position, represented most clearly by Slater, Wyschograd, Lee,and Gadamer, seeks not the rejection but "thedeconstruction or demontage" of

the Western tradition. It appeals to a counter-ontology and a distinctively

postmodern (post-Nietzschean) mode of thinking for which Being involves "a

dialectics of absence that is a strangekind of presence." If ontology or theology

are thought to requirea reference to some fixed entity or state of being-"themyth of the stable origin" with its "properword and unique name" (Derrida),"the irremoveable reality of something or other" (Wyschograd), "some single

great fixture"(Findlay)-then this alternative way of thinking can no longer be

considered "onto-theo-logical" in any of the traditional senses. As Gadamer

points out, it is neither"atheism"nor "theism,"neither"negativetheology" nor

"positive theology." By thinking of Being in temporal rather than eternalist

terms-not as "purepresence"but as "that which comes," as that which is thus

"present" n the mode of "absence"-such thinking sees the events of revelation

as dialectical events of "concealment and disclosure," "trace and origin," inwhich the "traces"of the gods or God are disclosures of the divine not only as

"fugitive"or "absent"but as that of which "wehave yet more" (Holderlin), that




whichis still (andever)"coming."The sort of thinkingappropriateo "thatwhichis coming" as distinctfromthinkingabout that which "is alwaysand

already here")mustdifferentiatetselffrom"traditionalwaysof thinking" sa

mode of thinking that expressesthe fundamental"questionableness"or"question-worthiness,"ragwiirdigkeit)f Beingand thedivine hatdelivers ne

over to a sense of "religiousmystery" Lawrence) atherthan "absolutecer-tainty" Arapura).t is a kind of thinking hattakes ts rise

within hatfragilemomentwhen thequestion s not yetdeterminednoughforthehypocrisy fananswer o havealreadynitiated tselfbeneath he maskof thequestion,and not yet determined noughfor its voice to have been alreadyfraudulentlyrticulatedwithin heverysyntaxof thequestion. Derrida,Writingand Diference, p. 80)

As mightbe guessed,equallydivergenthermeneuticaltrategiesollowfrom

these two positions.For the firstposition,modern(Western) hinking s an

"epistemologyf prometheanism"Smith) hat results romourhavingbecome"forgetfulof Being"and that issuesinevitably n the nihilismof Nietzsche's

proclamation f thedeathof God. The "zenith"of the Western raditionwas

achieved n thevocabulary ndgrammar f its Platonic trand,a traditionwhich

hassincebeen"systematicallybusedanddenigrated."Ourhermeneuticalask

today is accordinglyone of getting "beyond-or behind-the dogmatic

overlay"-not of "importing" omething hat "is not therealready,"but of

recoveringhe answers hat have alreadybeengiven.Sucha hermeneutics f

recoverycannot be "confinedhistorically" ince it consists in a "far moreprimordial pprehensionf Truth."

For the "deconstructionist"ermeneutic, n the other hand, if Beingand

primordial r revelatoryruthare seenas temporal,as involvingan historical

dialecticof "disclosure nd concealment,""traceand origin"(therebeingno

"firstor primaltrace";Wyschograd,citing Derrida),then there can be no

hermeneuticsf recovery onceivedof as "a returnof thesame,"a recovery f a

unitive,unchangingPrimordialTruth.Andindeed, he workof suchmastersof

thehermeneuticsf suspicionasNietzsche,Freud,andMarxpromptsus to ask

about the hidden motivationsof contemporary ffortsat a hermeneutics frecovery.To advocatesof the highly cultivatedspiritualityof the Hindu-

Buddhist-Pythagoreanersionof the PrimordialTradition,the thought of

Nietzsche,Marx,andHeideggers anexpression f thespiritual icknessof the

modernworld.Onanalternativeeading,however,t is rathera radical herapy

designed o unmaskand curethe "onto-theo-logical" is-ease hat lies behind

thisaristocraticonging or a return o thespiritual entersof civilizationspast

(Findlay: those ife-giving enters f civilization ndbeautywhicharemainly o

be found nFrance, nGermany,n Italy,andinGreece,"and whichareinturn

"cultural eplicasof Rome,Carthage,Antioch,Athens,andAlexandria").Instead f regardinghemodernnsight nto "therelativism f each successive

world-viewndconceptof transcendence"s anexpression f nihilism "signsof



215

decadence"),nsteadof surrenderingo the temptation o call for "a return o

more traditionalconceptsof transcendence," r to "a cosmologyto end all

cosmologies,"omefavoredpictureof the"sacred anopy," nsteadof trying o

absolutizeoruniversalize singlespiritual trandorreligious raditionwhether

"Hindu-Buddhist-Pythagorean"r "Judaic-Christian-Islamic"),his alterna-

tivehermeneuticindsapositive

virtue n the fact that

Our magesbothrevealand concealwhat s emerging.Theinterplay f textandcontext n the articulation f true visionis neverwhollyfixed.... Someimagesmaybeclassicaln theaccumulation fa tradition.But, nGadamer'sense, heymustbere-presentedo eachnewgeneration.Slater,p. 53)

As Slaterurges,the hermeneutical rocessshouldnot be viewedas striving or

"simplya repetitionof its predecessors' r a replicaof some eternalpattern."Norisita "straightforwardrogression."Rather t shouldbe seenas "aspiralof

evermorecomprehensiveoncerns."For thisposition,too, therefore, he her-

meneuticalprocess s closelyboundup witha concernfor the renewalof oursenseof the transcendent ndthesacred.Butthisrenewals to beaccomplishednotbygoingback oaPrimordialTraditionhatperhapsneverwas,butbygoingforward oward heemergingglobalcommunityof our future."Onlythroughthe interesecting nd overlappingof our symbolsand storiesdo we evoke its

presence" Slater,p. 54).Whenwe turnfromtheseconflictinghermeneuticaltrategies o the under-

standing of cross-culturalphilosophy of religion associated with them, we find

onceagain

a fundamentalisagreement.

t would seemthat the view of cross-

cultural hinkingput forwardby the advocatesof the PrimordialTradition s

closeto thepositionrepudiated yOlsonin his introductory efinition.Thusit

wouldseemthat for Smith,for example, he taskof cross-cultural hilosophyinvolves he apologeticadvocacyof one particular radition,or of one strand

within severaltraditions,as the privilegedperspectiveon truth "culturally,

confessionally,deologicallyandmethodologically."t is a "generalization"f

"theso-calledHinduor Buddhistpointof view,"andinvolves"collapsingnto

comprehensiveormulae"hevariousmeanings f transcendence nd the sacred

in different raditions. n otherwords,cross-cultural hilosophyof religion sconstruedhere as the apologeticactivityof arguing or the superiority f one

particular piritual trandor tradition,and claiming n addition that this po-sition scapableof beinggeneralized nduniversalizedo as to berepresentativeor paradigmaticorall.

This view has a powerfulemotional and spiritual/intellectual ppeal, but

ultimatelytrestson anappeal o nostalgia,on whatOlsoncalls"aromanticism

of theprimordial."t is the ideologicalexpressionof a spiritualattitude akingtheformof a "radical ritique" f the "prometheanism"nd"nihilism" f the

modernworld,and standing n profoundestantipathy o the storywhich themodernworldwouldtell of itself-from the Renaissanceand Enlightenmentdownto therevolutionarymovements f ourday.Accordingly,hereare certain



216 FeatureBook Review

questions which must be asked of this "primordialist"strategy, not only by the

postmodernisthermeneuticsof suspicion, but by anyone interestedin the cross-

cultural approach to philosophy of religion envisaged by the editors of this

volume:

(1) Can any strand, let alone tradition, serve as a "controlling paradigm" for

cross-culturalphilosophy of religion?Should we be engaged in argumentsaboutthe "superiority"or "universality"of one strand or tradition at all when we are

trying to achieve genuine cross-culturalunderstanding?

(2) What is meant when a particularstrandor tradition is called "primordial"?

Heidegger, too, sees in ancient philosophical and poetic texts "sayings"that are

"primordial"(urspriinglich,"origin-al"). But for Heidegger

Its originality, its beginningness, has its force not so much in the prestige of atimeless arche as in its inaugural power to effect and make claims upon us, its

Wirkungsgeschichte r historical efficaciousness.... Since these inaugurals are

beginningsrather than primordialities,theircreativefundamentsmust be under-stood in a dialectical-historicalmanner,in virtueof which there is a history of theworld. (Michael Murray,in Paperson LanguageandLiterature17,no. 1 (Winter1981):57, 61.)

What makes the great revelatory events "primordial" is not that they are

"differentways of regarding the same reality" (Findlay), but that within their

respective civilizational settings, they each constitute "origins," "beginnings,"

"inauguralevents" that call into being and set in play new historical "worlds"in

whichgods

andmortals, sacred

andmundane,

enter into new relations with one

another.

This suggests a different view of the task of cross-cultural philosophy of

religion-not as the attempt of one tradition or strand to legitimize itself as the

one universal truth that always was, but as an invitation to dialogue among the

many revelational traditions in the name of that which yet may come. Such

dialogue is not the one-sided advocacy of the absolute certainty to be found in

the "already answered questions" of one particular tradition or type of spiri-

tuality; it is a shared community of questioning, a co-thinking on Being, that

is "not an invitation to aggression or attacking; rather it invites one toabide" (Gadamer, on Heidegger)-to dwell close to, protect, and preservethe abiding mystery of Being in an ongoing dialectic of disclosure and

concealment.

Such an approach to cross-culturalphilosophy of religion does not mean we

cannot bear witness to the truth of our own tradition, or go back and rethink

what was said by Nagarjuna, Sankara or Plotinus. The hope of cross-cultural

understanding, with its singular contribution to a renewal of our sense of the

transcendent and sacred, is that by "understandingother traditions"we may be

assisted in "rethinkingone's own tradition" (Rouner). But what is of crucial

importance is the waywe go about "rethinking"our own tradition. For accord-

ing to Heidegger, "the traditional ways of thinking are not sufficient."Not what



217

wethinkabout,buthowwe thinkabout t is the issueat stake n theconfrontationof thePrimordialist ndthePostmodernist ermeneutics.

Herethehermeneuticalmodelof Heidegger's deconstructive"ethinking f,anddialoguewith,the Western radition s instructive or an understandingf

cross-cultural hilosophyas well. "Bythis modelHeidegger ried to thinkall

overagain,but not in thesenseof metaphysics"Gadamer)-that is, not in themode of thinkingof "somethinghat once was"butin the mode of thinkingof

"something oming."ThusHeideggerhoughtof Nietzschenot as a "nihilist"

but as the discovererof humanbeingas "everwaiting"Being;he thoughtofHolderlinnot as "merely poet"butas the discoverer f "adialecticsof absencethat is a strangekind of presence"-in short, Heideggerdid not think in

"traditionalways"aboutthe traditionbut allowednew"sayings" f Being, resh

disclosures f transcendencendthesacred, o speak o usfrom hefutureof ourtradition. n a similarway, cross-cultural nderstandingnd the rethinking f

ourowntradition n thebasisof anunderstandingfother raditions an be seenas an opportunityor or even an embodiment f the renewalof transcendenceandthesacred.For suchunderstandings itself a processof transcendence,neventof spiritual enewal,always ocated n a particular ivilizational r tradi-tionalperspective ut at the sametimetransformingndextendingtshorizonsinwhatonehopes s "aspiralof evermorecomprehensiveoncern"eading o an

evermorecomprehensive ommunityof traditions n a sharedworld.Forthisreader,hen,though he individual ssays n thisvolume or the most

partdo not seemto engage n cross-cultural hilosophyof religionas the editordefines it, the volume as a whole, if read as a vigorous and clear-cut

Auseinandersetzungetween wo philosophically nd spirituallymportantbut

divergentpaths in ontology, hermeneutics,and cross-culturalmethodology,achievesboth its goals:it introducesus to the problems nvolved n tryingtoformulate napproach o philosophyof religion hat isgenuinely ross-cultural,and it initiatesus into the search for solutions to the spiritualproblems hatconfrontus in ourlatetwentieth-century orld.

S.H. Nasris notonlythe firstMuslimbut the firstOriental o havegiventheGiffordLectures, ndhe views tas histasktoopposetheideasof thosewhohave

precededhim in the series. Specifically,he advocates that we reject those"modern ideas which have characterizedthe Western world since theRenaissance ndwhichhave beenspreadingntothe Eastsincethe lastcentury"andthatwereturn nstead o "thattruthwhich lies at the heartof theOriental

tradition, nd nfact of all tradition ssuchwhether t beof theEastorthe West"

(p.vii).Nasr's

specialconcern is with the loss of

knowledgeof the sacred in the

modernperiod.Suchknowledge eatureda senseof permanence,ertitudeand

immutability; hierarchy f levelsof beingandknowing;anda transformationof theknower na stateof blissorecstaticunionwiththesacredreality.Theloss




of this knowledge began with the separation of human reason from the divinely

illumined Intellect and from Revelation at the rise of the modern era. The

subsequent"fall" of human reason is the story of the gradual"reduction"of our

capacity for knowledge of the sacred to one which is "limited to the realm of

profane knowledge" (pp. 3-4). The modern academic study of religion has not

reversed this process; rather it contributes to it "by interpreting ... sacredteachings through historicism, evolutionism, scientism, and the many other

means whereby the sacred is reduced to the profane" (p. viii).

In fact, for Nasr this process of desacralization through the separation "of

philosophy from theology, reasonfrom faith, and mysticismfrom gnosis" (p. 40)

began already with the ancient Greeks. This suggests that the metaphysicalresources of the entire mainstream Western tradition, even before the modern

period, are fundamentally inadequate to redress the situation. Hence the task of

a thinker from the Orient invited to address the West must be not simply "to

present the traditional perspective of the millennial civilizations of the Orient"

(p.vii),but to helpthe West rediscover"the millennialtraditionof the West itself,"

that is, "that perennialwisdom, or sophia perennis, which is both perennialand

universaland which is neither exclusively Eastern nor Western" (pp. viii-ix).

I shall focus on the implications of Nasr's exposition of this "perennial

wisdom" for our selected topics of ontology, hermeneutics, and cross-cultural

philosophy of religion (all of which he addresses at length, though he also has

substantial and illuminating chapterson anthropology, cosmology, science, art,

and soteriology). The first thing to be said is that Nasr is quite consciously anapologetic advocate of the Primordial Tradition. He opposes Modernism be-

cause he views "thetotal world-view,the premises,the foundations" upon which

it is based as "wrongand false in principle"(p. 84). He proposes instead a return

to traditionalmetaphysics, to scientiasacra, without which, he says, the concept

of Traditionwould itself collapse. It is a metaphysics that refers to a transcendent

or ultimate Reality nondualistically conceived ("the Absolute ... remains

beyond all dualityand relativity"(p. 142)) in termsdrawnfrom the Neoplatonic

andmystical traditionsof the West togetherwith their Indian (Advaita Vedanta)

counterparts. Knowledge of the sacred shares the ontological features of this

ultimate, nondual Reality: unlike our ordinary (dualistic or separative)mode of

cognition, it is "unitive"and involves "the dissolution of all limited and separa-

tive knowing" (p. 20); it is not indirector mediated but involves "thepresence in

him of knowledge of an immediate and direct nature which is tasted and

experienced"(p. 130);and it is "primordial,"that is, it contains already at the

beginning the potentialities of all things, it is knowledge of that which is always

and already there.

Here we touch on the relation of the Sacred to becoming and change, therelation of the EternalReality to time. For Nasr the Sacred, as Origin, " 'was' at

once the source of cosmic reality 'at the beginning' and is the origin of all things

in this eternal 'now', in this moment that always is and neverbecomes, the 'now'



219

whichis the ever-recurringin the beginning'" p. 2). What is striking s that

Nasr's nterpretationf the Sacredas anontemporal r "eternal"Beingseems o

be grounded n an implicittemporal nterpretation f realityin termsof the

priorityof thepast.For it is thepast,UltimateRealityas Origin,whichalreadycontainsall that is or evercanbe.Hence,for Nasr the manifestation f timeand

the worldof becoming s an unfolding f what is alreadyandalwayswasthere:

"theunfoldedrealitywasalreadyat thebeginning ndnothingcan beaddedto

itspureunconditional tateby anyprocesswhateverof changeandbecoming"

(p. 127,n.58). Knowledgeof the sacred,similarly, s immutable,permanent,

certain,mperviouso thechangesof fashionorravagesof time.Bycontrast, t is

"thereductionof reality o the temporalprocess,of beingto becoming,of the

immutablecategoriesof logic, not to mentionmetaphysics, o ever-changing

thoughtprocesses"hat marks heloss of thesacred n themodernworld p.43).Undersuchguisesas "historicism,ecularutopianism, ndtheideaof progress

andevolution... timehas,for modernman,tried o devour ternity ndusurp tsplace"(p.234).

Whenwe turn ohermeneutics,efindthatforNasr,asfor HustonSmith,our

presenthermeneuticalituation s theoutcomeof a "historyof forgetfulness,"

forgettingof SacredBeing which becomes especially prominent n and ac-

celeratedby the processof modernism,which,by definition,represents "re-

bellionagainstradition"pp.3,85;compareH.Smith,ForgottenTruth, p. x-x).Thiseclipseof theSacred s summedupandepitomizedbyNietzsche'snihilistic

proclamation f the "deathof God,"which n its turn s theinevitable utcome

of thesecularism ndhumanism nitiatedbythe Renaissance.Thehermeneuticsof modernism in Ricoeur'sphrase,the "hermeneutics f suspicion") s an

example ndexpression f thisskepticism ndnihilism.Formodern heologianshermeneutics as been"reduced o thedesacralizationf theHolyBook itselfbya mentalitywhich[has]lost the senseof the sacred"(p. 18).At theirhands

"scripturalxegesisbecomesreducedoarchaeology ndphilology,notto speakoftheextrapolationf thesubjective rrors f thepresent raback nto theageof

revelation"p. 149).

Theresponseof Traditional r Primordial ermeneuticso thismoderncriti-queof traditioncanonly be one of "unrelenting pposition" p. 84)and mustthereforeproceed n precisely he oppositedirection.It willbe a "questof the

rediscoveryf thatwhichhas beenalwaysknownbutforgotten,not thatwhich sto bediscovered"p. 309).As the title of one of Nasr'schaptersndicates,"The

Rediscovery f the Sacred"musttake the form of "TheRevivalof Tradition"

(chap. 3). This "traditional"hermeneuticsof recovery (revival, restoration)

proceedsnotbymodern cientific xegesis,butbyuncoveringhe innerspiritualor "sapiential"meaning-the "esoteric"or depth significance-behind the

literalor "exoteric" urfacemeaningsof thetext. Butbecauseof this,it is not ahermeneuticpentoall. Itcan beundertakennlyby"apersonwhose ntellect s

alreadysanctifiedand illuminatedby the Logos" (p. 18). And this is made




possibleonlyto thosewho have received he oral and"secret" ransmission f

Traditiontself,for which"spiritualmasters"arerequired p. 17).Thatwhich

comes to be knownthrough uch esoteric nterpretation,hesapiential ontent

of textsandtradition, s, of course, hatsophiaperennis,hat"inner ruthwhich

lies at the heartof different acredforms and which is uniquesinceTruth is

one"(p. 71).Here hermeneutics nablesus to uncovera "universalityf reve-lation"thatgoes "hand n handwiththe ideaof a primordialruthwhich has

alwaysexistedandwillalwaysexist,a truthwithout istory"p.72,italicsmine).As noted,Nasr'sappeal o an "esoteric" ermeneutics inpartmotivatedby

an "unrelenting pposition"to the spiritualsituationof the modern world.

Anotherway of expressing his, Nasr tells us, is to say that it arisesfrom

nostalgia, anostalgiaorthat mmemorialranquillityfanOrientwhich s also

theOrigin" pp.96-97). Butthoughthis"esoteric"hermeneutic f "recovery"seeks tsorigins n theOrient,n thiscenturythasbeenexpounded"throughhe

penand wordsof thosewho livedin Europeor wrote n Westernanguagesbutwho had been transformedntellectuallyand existentiallyby the traditional

world view" (p. 100). (Nasr has in mind primarilyRene Guenon, Ananda

Coomaraswamy,nd,aboveall,his own "traditionalmaster,"FrithjofSchuon

(pp. ix, 100-109).)Nasr devotes an entirechapterto cross-culturalphilosophy f religion(chap. 9),

doingso,of course, romthepointof viewof scientia acra,which"provideshe

criteriaordistinguishinghe wheat rom thechaff, he truefrom thefalse,and

especially he counterfeit" pp. 120,282-283, 292). He uses this criteriono

evaluatea numberof rivalstrategiesordealingwith "themultiplicity f sacred

forms."Again, he proceedsfrom the premisethat there is a "fundamental

differencebetween the evaluationof the sacredby a sanctified[traditional]intellect ndbyasecularizedmodern]ne"(p.304,n.1).Reviewing the pectaclethat'comparative eligion'presents o the modernworld,"he criticizes n turn

(1) thepositivismof the scientific tudyof religion, 2) the evolutionismof the

historical tudyof religion,(3) the "sterile ossil collecting"of the phenome-

nologyof religion, 4) "themodern yncreticand eclecticreligiousmovements"

growingoutof "modernizedHinduism,"5)recentscholarshiphatemphasizesthedifferences ather han the "transcendentnity"of religions,and,finally 6)"thesentimentalistpproach" f "manyof theecumenicalmovements"which

appear o "placemutualunderstandingbovethe totalintegrity f a tradition"

(forNasr,"ecumenism"nd"dialogue" recodewords or "modernismwithin

thechurch").Nasr's own "traditional" r "primordial"olution to the multiplicityof

religious orms is found in Schuon's doctrineof "the transcendentunity of

religions."Nasr willinglygrantsthat this solution drawson some religioustraditions r strands ather hanothers o articulate heparticularmetaphysics

requiredo support he thesis.Theseare"the threemajorspiritualuniverses f

the Eastcomprisinghe FarEast,India,andthe Islamicworld" p.85),andthe



221

"sapiential""gnostic,""wisdom") trand ratherthan the "exoteric"dimen-

sionsof theworld'sreligions.Prominently bsent,becauseunsuitableo expres-

singthis"esoteric"olution,to heunityof religions,are,of course,Judaism nd

Christianityin their "exoteric" (that is, their-in the normal sense-

"traditional")heological elf-understandings.t is theseers,sages,andthinkers

of these favored traditionsor strands within traditionswho supplythe keyconceptsanddoctrinesor the "transcendentnity" hesis.In the Westthinkers

suchas Pythagoras,Plato,and Plotinus"aregnosticswhoseteachingswere to

provideprovidentiallyhe doctrinalanguage ormanyof thesapiential chools

of Islam,Judaism, ndChristianity"p.35).It is fromthese hinker-seershatwe

receive he conceptualdistinctions "thePrincipleand manifestation,Essenceandform,Substance ndaccident, he inwardand theoutward")-the scientia

sacra-on the basisof which "Tradition tudiesreligions" p. 292).It is clear,

however, that for Nasr scientia sacra is not simply the basis upon which

Tradition tudies eligion, t is identicalwithwhat s meantbyTraditionpp.69,107).Thetranscendent nityof religions s not something o be discoveredor

proven, t is an a prioripostulateof thenotionof "tradition"tself;it is "found

already n the definitionof tradition"suppliedby such authors as Guenon,

Coomaraswamy,ndSchuon(p. 304,n.2).Nasr followsSchuonin applying his doctrineof transcendent nityto the

pluralityof religions moreprecisely,religiousforms).He sees "in the multi-

plicityofreligiousorms,notcontradictionswhichrelativize,buta confirmationof the

universalityof Truth"(p. 281). By using the bridge concept of the"relatively bsolute,"Nasr distinguishes etween"theAbsolute"as such and"eachmanifestation f theAbsolute nthe formof a revelation"whichcreatesa"world"within which certain forms appear"as absolutewithoutbeing theAbsolute tself"(p. 294).Thus,"Thetraditionalmethod of studyingreligions,whileassertingcategorically he 'transcendent nity of religion' .. is deeplyrespectful" f each particularuniverse,and "does not try to cast aside theseelementsor to reducethemto anythingother thanwhat theyare withinthatdistinctuniverse f meaning" p.293).Toaccount orsimilaritiesnddifferences

at thepenultimateevel of truth,Nasrinvokesanothermediating oncept,thatof "archetypes"whichrepresent"metahistorically"he "totalrealityof each

tradition,"whilerenderinghesimilaritiesmongreligions ntelligiblehrougha

complex"interpenetrationf reflections" hat takes place in a way "totallyindependent f historical nfluences"pp.294-295).

Nasr concludesthat the traditionalist hesis of the transcendentunity of

religionsconstitutes he only valid approachto cross-culturalphilosophyof

religion.Apartfrom t theonlyalternatives re"religiousdisputation, xclusiv-

ism,particularism,ndfinally anaticism," n theonehand,orthevariousypesof "comparative eligion"alreadycriticized as examplesof "a relativizing

processand in itselfan antireligious ctivity" pp. 290, 303). "Onlya scientiasacra of religion ... can make available to contemporary man the unbelievable




beautyand richness of other worldsof sacred form and meaningwithout

destroyinghesacredcharacter f one'sownworld" p. 303).InevaluatingNasr's contributionwe immediatelyace a difficulty.Criticism

of it couldberejected s anexampleof thatmodern"rebelliongainst radition"

thatNasr'sproposals intendedo overcome.ForNasr contends hatthosewho

havehad no firsthand"taste"of that "esctasyand bliss"whichcharacterizesknowledgeof the sacredmustnecessarilyail to understand he Primordialist

view.Hencea "modern"riticmaybestoppedbeforehe or she starts.Thereare

severalreasonsfor Nasr'sposition.First, "onlythe like can know the like."

Thus,commenting n R. C. Zaehner's ttempt o criticizeSchuon's hesis,Nasr

observesthat "thosewho have no intellectual ntuitionof the supra-formalessence .. should not be legitimately oncernedwith tryingto understand r

discern hesupra-formalnityof which Schuonspeaks" p. 125,n.34).Second,esotericknowledgesbydefinition onfined o theinitiated,whoare, moreover,

always ew(p. 317):"suchknowledge.. is not attainableby everyonebecausenot only does it needpreparationbut can be taughtonly to the personwho

possesses he capabilityand nature o 'inherit' uchknowledge" p. 220, n.5).There is, in the very natureof the case, "an unbridgeablehiatus between

intelligenceanctifiedby revelationand the intelligence.. atrophiednto that

truncatedand fragmentedacultywhich is considered cientifically s intelli-

gence" p. 149).Third, he esotericcancomprehend, ndcriticize, heexoteric,but not vice versa (see Schuon, TranscendentUnity of Religion, pp. 36, 44).

Hence,criticism hat does not originate romwithintraditionrunsthe risk ofbeingirrelevant. t wouldseemat the outset, therefore, hat the Primordialist

thesis s methodologically nassailable.

Facedwiththismethodological mpasse,what arewe to do? Onemighttry

simplyto "go around" he Primordialist osition, observing hat by its own

logicalstrictures t has removed tself fromfurthercriticalconsideration.But

even if this initialcharacterizationf the Primordialist ositionis correct, t is

stillpossiblethat there are questionswhich arenot dependenton havinghad

certain ortsofexperiencesndtowhich, hus, tisfair o askthe Primordialisto

respond.Let us look more closely, therefore,at Nasr's expositionof theTraditionalisthesisandask(a)whethert containsanyinternalnconsistencies,

(b)whatexternal roblemstposesfor cross-cultural ork,and(c)what tmight

suggestabout an alternativewayof proceeding.

(A).Thefirstquestionwould be this: s it possible hatNasr'sadvocacyof

the Primordial raditions itselfan instanceof a wayof thinking hathewould

becommitted orejecting n thebasisof his owntheory?That s,doeshepresenta particularmetaphysicaldoctrineas if it wereabsolutelyrather han simply

relativelyrue? If

so,would such a

presentationnot contravenea

guidingprinciple f his ownposition, he notionof theprovisionalityfevery ormof the

formless?Nasrfrequently emindsus of therelativity f all religious orms;but

this questionconcernsthe relativityof his own metaphysical ormulationof




"exoteric"may ead ooverly trong udgments boutother cholarly, hilosoph-ical,and theologicalalternatives,ncludingecumenicaland interreligious ia-

logue,as forexamplen Nasr'scomments nZaehner?Itis interestingo note in

thisregard hat Nasr saves some of his strongestpronouncementsorpositionsthatmight,to the outsideworld,seemmostnearlyakin to his own,andwhich

thereforestand most in need of repudiation: or example,the "vagueandemotionaluniversalism" f bhakti-inspiredmovements,"which is in fact a

parodyof theuniversalismnvisaged ytradition"p.287),and the evolutionist-

spiritualistosmologyof Teilhardde Chardin,which s nothing ess than"idol-

atry"and"aparodyof the divinecreativeact itself"(pp.241-242).)Third,maynottheattempt o interpretvery"religiousorm"withthe aidofa

scientia acrarunthe riskof fosteringa "reverse eduction" f its own in which

"allreligious reseenas so manyrepetitions... of thedoctrineof [transcendent]

unity" p.71)? trequires gooddealofphilosophical bstractiono "penetrate"

thesereligiousorms,butmaytherenotbe a loss of some mportant,maybeevenessential, imilarities nddifferences,venandespecially tthe "absolute"evel?

Is it true,for example, hat theism s always"comprehended"y nondualism,and nevervice versa?

Fourth, rom timeto timethere s expressedn the book what,borrowinga

phrase romNasr's eacher,onemightcall "thecontemptof the old Eastfor the

modernWest"(Schuon,p. 77).Numerousudgmentsaremadewhich,thoughmotivatedby thedeepestspiritual oncernandgroundedn fundamentalpiri-tual

reasons,nevertheless

ppearto reflectan attitudeof

strongrepugnancetoward"modernWesternbarbarism."My concernhereis whether,despite ts

justification,heresulting hetoricalonemightnot be excessive,more ikelyto

impedethan advanceNasr's own cause.Nasr alludesto the fact that manyOrientalshavedevelopedan "inferiority omplexvis-a-visthe modernWest"

(p. 111).Butthe"superior"oneadoptedbysomeof the traditionalistuthorsn

theirattempt o reverse he tideof modernismmay represent novercompensa-tion,onewhich,whileunderstandable,ould hinder he successful arrying ut

of theirproject.

Nasr notes that his and his fellow traditionalists' iewpointis that of a"cognitiveminority."He speaksoften of "theneglect n officialacademic,and

eventheologicaland religious,circles n the West"of the traditionalist iew-

point,andrefers o this neglectas "oneof the most amazingphenomenan a

world which claimsobjectivity" p. 281), "one of the remarkable spectsof

intellectual ife in this century"(p. 67). It is importantto acknowledge he

validityof thisminority omplaint.ButgivenNasr'snegativeassessment f the

attemptsof the modernWest and its institutions,academicor religious,to

understandhephenomena fotherreligions,whether cientifically, istorically,

phenomenologically, hilosophically, heologically,ecumenically,or dialogi-

cally, it is perhapsunderstandablehat the modernWest has until now ap-

parently ailedto takehis viewsany morepositively hanhe appears o have



225

takentheirs.This is of coursean unfortunate ituation or bothsides,for once

againit seemsto landus in a dialogical mpasse.It seemsto me,therefore, hatat thispointourprimary askas readerss to

separateout and attend to those aspectsof the book whichare primarilyan

expressionof wisdom,the primordialwisdomembodied n the great religious

traditions f humankind,OrientalandWestern,as ourauthor ntends or us todo, and to put to one side thoseaspectsof the book which areexpressions f

understandablyegative eelingsat havingbeenpassedover or ignored-as a

region,asa culture,oras apointof view.For ifthe latterareallowed o intrudet

canonlycomplicate he book'sreception.For then,exceptfor thosewhohave

already"fallenunder he sway"(p. 110)of the Schuonianvision,the responsecouldwell be an initialenthusiasm ollowedbya gradualdisenchantment. his

kindof reactionon thepartof the"modernWestern" eaderwouldbesad,for it

wouldmean a limitedreception or a point of view which, if put differently,

could,perhapswithoutcompromise, peakpowerfullyo ourdayandage.(C).Thesubstantivessue,as Ihavetried o suggest, s whether rnot Nasr sees

his ownscientia acra as simplyone moreprovisional ormfor understandingandexpressingranscendencendthesacred. thinkhemaybetempted o view

it,asseemssuggested yhiscriticisms f opposingviews,asif itwere iterallyhe

only trueposition-a truth,moreover, hat is knowableor liveableonly when

embeddedn a traditionalworld.But if suchtraditionalworldsare,as I believe,

irretrievablyone,then thequestionariseswhether heremaynotbealternative

waysof

respondingo thetruthof tradition n the

postmodernworld,responseswhosegoalwouldbe other hanthatof "restoring" traditionalworld.Onesuch

alternativewould be forNasr,like Tillichor Ricoeur, o viewhismetaphysicaldoctrinesas themselvesmyths or symbols,more specifically,as a "broken

myth," hat s,asoneimportantwayof expressingruth,but nottheonlywaynor

evennecessarilyheonlytruth.ThePrimordialTradition ould thenrecast tselfas an invitation o further houghtwhichat the sametime leavesroomforandeven invitesdialoguerather than polemic debate with other "relativelyab-

solute," houghdiffering, erhaps ven"opposing",doctrines-exoteric as well

as esoteric.This wouldrequire eeing hemodernandpostmodernworldsmoredialecti-

cally, less oppositionally,as part of a positive destiny,part of an ongoingdisclosureof SacredBeing (encompassingeven its apparent"forgettingof

Being"). nfact,Nasr himselfgrants hat it is themodernworld hat hasopenedupa newpossibilityortradition hatdid not and couldnot haveexistedbefore,

namely, hepossibilityof a genuineworldwidencounterof religious raditions

(p. 292;seealsopp. 282-283).At one pointNasrquoteshisTempleUniversitycolleague,LeonardSwidler, s saying hatthroughdialogue"wetogetherbegintoexplorenewareasof reality,of meaning,of truthwhichneitherof ushad evenbeen awareof before.... We may thus dare to say that patientlypursueddialogue anbecomean instrument f newrevelation"p.306,n.23).Nasrseems




to implythat he himself does not see dialogueas a possiblevehicle for fresh

revelation; e seesit only as a processthatviews"understandings an end in

itself,"becausefor him, as for Schuon,earlierrevelations Hinduismas the

"primordial"evelation, slamas the "final"one (Schuon,p. 83))havealreadydisclosedall the truth here s to disclose.At most theonlypointto "dialogue"wouldbe "the

preservationf one's own tradition"

p. 289). But,as I have

already uggestedn my commentson the Olson and Rounervolume,givena

different ntologyand therefore different ermeneutics,t mightbepossible o

see interreligious ialogueand cross-cultural hilosophy n the veryway that

Swidleruggests.Rather hanbeing"ends nthemselves,"uchencounters ould

haveanother,equally ate-fulldestiny-not the "recovery f the Sacred" hat

has beendisclosedalreadyand completely,but the disclosureof a new truth

which,withoutsacrificingour respective dentitiesand traditions,we could

arriveat together.Thisdistinctive"fusionof horizons," aysGadamer, nd not

thesettingupofmutually xclusiveboundaries,s whatcharacterizes llgenuineunderstandingf otherpersonsor traditions.

Theseconsiderationsuggest hatHeidegger'semporalnterpretationf the

historyof Being,anditshermeneutic laborationby suchthinkersas Gadamer

andRicoeur,mayofferan alternative asisfor expressinghe "universalist"r

tradition-transcendingruthcontained n Nasr'sposition.For Heidegger, oo,

grants hatBeingalwaystranscendshe words in whichit is expressed,buthe

does so in a waythat doesnot leaveoutthepositive"experiencesf Being" hat

shapedthe

Greek,the

European,and the Modern worlds.

(IfI

mayreverse

Nasr'sand Schuon'sargumenthere, it could be said that the Heideggerian

reading f thathistoryof Being"comprehends" asr's,whereasNasr'sreadingdoes not comprehendhe truthof Heidegger's ntology-seeing it rather,as

does Findlay,as simplyan exampleof late twentieth-century existentialist

despair.")Thusa postmodernist erspective n theexperience f transcendence

andthesacredwouldseem o callforlisteningo andfusing,notopposing o one

another,both the primordialin Heidegger's ense)wisdomof the "old East"

(andthe "oldWest"),and the equallyprimordialagainin Heidegger's ense)

disclosures f truthandBeingthat makeupthe Western toryfromthe ancientGreeksto the postmodernWest (and,we may hope, that mightembrace he

postmodernOrientas well!).At theveryleast,theseconsiderationsuggest he

need for further conversationamong these various primordialexperiences,ancientandmodern,OrientalandWestern.

Bypresenting swith twoclearlydefined ontemporarypproacheso trans-

cendenceandthesacred, ndicatingheirareasof agreement s wellas someof

the issuesbetween hem,thesetwo books,each in theirrespectiveways,have

significantlyontributedo the cross-culturalonversationwhich sincreasingly

coming o constitute hehorizonwe share n our latetwentieth-century orld.

T Deans Review of Knowledge and the Sacred

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