SYMBOLIC-COGNITIVE PROCEDURALISM AS A ROBUST JUSTIFICATION FOR DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION

Robert C. Richards, Jr. and John Gastil

The Pennsylvania State University

Department of Communication Arts & Sciences

Presentation at National Communication Association, November 2013

Overview

Ingham’s Critique of the Epistemic Rationale

Alternative Justifications

Symbolic-Cognitive Proceduralism

Estlund’s Epistemic Proceduralism

Estlund (2008) uses the criminal jury as a model to justify deliberative democratic procedures

Estlund: Jury Deliberation as Model of LegitimacyPublic deems jury verdicts legitimate, provided jury followed deliberative procedures

Source of jury’s legitimacy: “epistemic virtues” of deliberative procedures; give jury > 0.5 probability of reaching correct verdict

Estlund argues jury is analogous to legislature and executive

Ingham’s CritiqueEstlund’s model is inconsistent with “two widely shared beliefs about democracy”:

1. Nonconvergence Constraint: Consensus is impossible in a diverse society

2. Constraint on Evidence: Procedure-independent standards aren’t plausible, because agreement on those standards is impossible

Results of Ingham’s Critique

Estlund’s jury model violates both of Ingham’s constraints

Alternative Justifications for Deliberative DemocracyDeliberative democratic procedures may be justified on the basis of their:• Intrinsic Value• Expressive Value• Cognitive Value (Unrelated to Voting Decisions)• Ethical Value• Communal Value

Expressive and Cognitive Rationales

can be combined with Estlund’s “jury analogy” to form a justification that withstands Ingham’s critique

Symbolic-Cognitive Proceduralism (SCP)

Elements of Estlund’s epistemic proceduralist theory of legitimacy can be included in a new model that can withstand Ingham’s critique

This new model we call symbolic-cognitive proceduralism

SCP: Account of Legitimacy

Jury deliberation furnishes the model for the legitimacy of democratic deliberative procedures

Source of legitimacy: Expressive/Symbolic and Cognitive functions of the procedures

SCP: Symbolic Functions

Jury’s deliberative procedures express fundamental values of democracy:• Popular Sovereignty• Equality• Rational Discourse

SCP: Cognitive Functions

Jury’s deliberative procedures increase jurors’: • Knowledge of issues and solution options• Understanding of their own and others’ interests, values,

and cognitive repertoires• Understanding of collective interests• Political efficacy (internal and external)• Willingness to be civically engaged

Procedural Integrity of Democratic Deliberation

Public Legitimacy of Deliberative

Democratic Processes

Knowledge, Competence, and Civic Attitudes of

Participants

Cognitivefunction

Symbolicfunction

Ambassadorialfunction

Public demandfor deliberation

Reflective self-regulation

Individual Level Cognition/Behavior Macro-Level Social Beliefs/Demands

Empirical Content of SCP

SCP: Effect on Legitimacy

Symbolic and cognitive functions lead public to deem jury’s verdicts legitimate

Jury remains analogous to the legislature and executive

SCP: Not Susceptible to Ingham’s Critique

since SCP’s account of legitimacy does not depend on an epistemic justification

Conclusion

Ingham’s (2013) critique calls into question Estlund’s – and all other – epistemic justifications for deliberative democracy

Symbolic-cognitive proceduralism justifies democratic deliberation on the basis of its expressive and cognitive functions

Symbolic-cognitive proceduralism is not vulnerable to Ingham’s critique

References

• Ackerman, B., & Fishkin, J. S. (2004). Deliberation day. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.• Allen, M. (2009). Civil disobedience and terrorism: Testing the limits of deliberative democracy.

Theoria, 56, 15–39.• Anderson, E. (2006). The epistemology of democracy. Episteme, 3(1), 8-22. Retrieved from

http://muse.jhu.edu.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/journals/episteme/v003/3.1anderson.html• Barber, B. R. (1984). Strong democracy: Participatory politics for a new age. Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press.• Benhabib, S. (1996). Toward a deliberative model of democratic legitimacy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.),

Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political (pp. 67-94). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

• Burkhalter, S., Gastil, J., & Kelshaw, T. (2002). A conceptual definition and theoretical model of public deliberation in small face-to-face groups. Communication Theory, 12, 398-422.

• Cappella, J. N., Price, V., & Nir, L. (2002). Argument repertoire as a reliable and valid measure of opinion quality: Electronic dialogue during campaign 2000. Political Communication, 19, 73-93.

• Christiano, T. (1996). The rule of the many: Fundamental issues in democratic theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

• Cohen, J. (1996). Procedure and substance in deliberative democracy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political (pp. 95-119). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

References (continued)

• Cohen, J. (2003). Deliberation and democratic legitimacy. In D. Matravers & J. Pike (Eds.), Debates in contemporary political philosophy: An anthology (pp. 342-360). London: Routledge.

• Cohen, J. (2010). Rousseau: A free community of equals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.• Cohen, J., & Rogers, J. (1995). Associations and democracy. London: Verso.• Consolini, P. (1992). Learning by doing justice: Private jury service and political attitudes.

Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA.• Delli Carpini, M. X., Cook, F. L., & Jacobs, L. R. (2004). Public deliberation, discursive

participation, and citizen engagement: A review of the empirical literature. Annual Review of Political Science, 7, 315-344. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.121003.091630

• Dewey, J. (1976). Valuation and experimental knowledge. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.), The middle works of John Dewey, 1899–1924 (vol. 13, pp. 3-28). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

• Dewey, J. (1981). Creative democracy: The task before us. In J. A. Boydston (Ed.), The later works of John Dewey, 1925–1953 (vol. 14, Essays, pp. 224–230). Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

• Dworkin, R. (2003a). The majoritarian premise and constitutionalism. In T. Christiano (Ed.), Philosophy and democracy: An anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Dworkin, R. (2003b). What is equality? Part 4: Political equality. In T. Christiano (Ed.), Philosophy and democracy: An anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Citations are to Amazon Kindle edition.]

References (continued)

• Dwyer, W. L. (2002). In the hands of the people. New York: St. Martin’s.• Elster, J. (2003). The market and the forum: Three varieties of political theory. In T. Christiano (Ed.),

Philosophy and democracy: An anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.• Estlund, D. M. (2008). Democratic authority: A philosophical framework. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.• Farrar, C., Fishkin, J. S., Green, D. P., List, C., Luskin, R. C., & Paluck, E. L. (2010). Disaggregating

deliberation’s effects: An experiment within a Deliberative Poll. British Journal of Political Science, 40, 333-347. doi:10.1017/S0007123409990433

• Farrell, H., & Shalizi, C. (2012, May 23). Cognitive democracy. Crooked Timber. Web log post. Retrieved from http://crookedtimber.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cognitive_democracy_may20121.pdf

• Fishkin, J. S. (2009). When the people speak: Deliberative democracy and public consultation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Gastil, J. (2000). By popular demand: Revitalizing representative democracy through deliberative elections. Berkeley: University of California Press

• Gastil, J., Deess, E. P., Weiser, P. J., and Simmons, C. (2010). The jury and democracy: How jury deliberation promotes civic engagement and political participation. New York: Oxford University Press.

• Gastil, J., & Dillard, J. P. (1999). Increasing political sophistication through public deliberation. Political Communication, 16, 3-23.

• Gastil, J., & Knobloch, K. (2010). Evaluation report to the Oregon State Legislature on the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review. Seattle: University of Washington Department of Communication. Retrieved from http://www.la1.psu.edu/cas/jgastil/CIR/OregonLegislativeReportCIR.pdf

References (continued)• Habermas, J. (1975). The legitimation crisis of late capitalism. Trans. T. McCarthy. Boston, MA:

Beacon Press.• Habermas, J. (1983). Theory of communicative action (vol. 1). Reason and the rationalization of

society. T. McCarthy (Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.• Habermas, J. (1987). Theory of communicative action (vol. 2). Lifeworld and system: A critique of

functionalist reason. T. McCarthy (Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press• Habermas, J. (1996a). Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and

democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.• Habermas, J. (1996b). Three normative models of democracy. In S. Benhabib (Ed.), Democracy

and difference: Contesting the boundaries of the political (pp. 21-30). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Hartz-Karp, J. (2007). Understanding deliberativeness: Bridging theory and practice. International Journal of Public Participation, 1(2). Retrieved from http://www.iap2.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=258

• Hirokawa, R. Y., & Salazar, A. J. (1999). Task-group communication and decision-making performance. In L. R. Frey, D. Gouran, and M. S. Poole, eds., The handbook of group communication theory and research (pp. 167-191). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

• Hong, L., & Page, S. (2004). Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers. PNAS, 101(46), 16385-16389. doi:10.1073/pnas.0403723101

• Ingham, S. (2013). Disagreement and epistemic arguments for democracy. Politics, Philosophy & Economics. doi:10.1177/1470594X12460642

References (continued)• Knight, J., & Johnson, J. (2011). The priority of democracy: Political consequences of

pragmatism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.• Knobloch, K., & Gastil, J. (2013). Participant accounts of political transformation. In L. Carson, J.

Gastil, et al. (Eds.), The Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the future of deliberative democracy. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• List, C., & Goodin, R. E. (2001). Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy, 9, 277-306. doi:10.1111/1467-9760.00128

• Luskin, R. C., Fishkin, J. S., & Jowell R. (2002). Considered opinions: Deliberative polling in Britain. British Journal of Political Science, 32, 455–487. doi:10.1017/S0007123402000194

• Mansbridge, J., Bohman, J., Chambers, S., Estlund, D., Follesdal, A., Fung, A., Lafont, C., Manin, B., & Marti, J. L. (2010). The place of self interest and the role of power in deliberative democracy. Journal of Political Philosophy, 18, 64-100.

• McAfee, N., McKenzie, R., & Mathews, D. (1990). Hard choices. Dayton, OH: Kettering Foundation.

• Mill, J. S. (1966). Considerations on representative government. In On liberty, Representative government, The subjection of women: Three essays (pp. 145-426). London: Oxford University Press.

• Page, S. E. (2007). The difference: How the power of diversity creates better groups, firms, schools, and societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

• Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

References (continued)• Pearce, W. B., & Littlejohn, S. W. (1997). Moral conflict: When social worlds collide. Thousand Oaks,

California: Sage.• Pincock, H. (2012). Does deliberation make better citizens? In T. Nabatchi, J. Gastil, M. Weiksner, &

M. Leighninger (Eds.), Democracy in motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement (pp. 135-162). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Rawls, J. (2011). Political liberalism (expanded ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.• Rosell, S. A., & Gantwerk, H. (2010). Moving beyond polls and focus groups. In D. Yankelovich & W.

Friedman (Eds.), Toward wiser public judgment (pp. 110-128). Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

• Rousseau, J. J. (2002). The social contract. In S. Dunn (Ed.), The social contract and The first and second discourses (pp. 149-256). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

• Sunstein, C. (1996). On the expressive function of law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 144, 2021-2053.

• Tracy, K. (2010). Challenges of ordinary democracy: A case study in deliberation and dissent. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

• Warren, M. E. (1993). Can participatory democracy produce better selves? Psychological dimensions of Habermas’s discursive model of democracy. Political Psychology, 14, 209–234.

• Yankelovich, D. (1991). Coming to public judgment: Making democracy work in a complex world. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

• Zarefsky, D. (2008). Two faces of democratic rhetoric. In T. F. McDorman & D. M. Timmerman, eds., Rhetoric and democracy: pedagogical and political practices (pp 115-137). East Lansing: Michigan State University Press.

Acknowledgements

• Grateful thanks to:

• Professor Dr. Sean Ingham, University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs, Department of Political Science

• Professor Dr. John Christman of The Pennsylvania State University Department of Philosophy

Contact

• Robert C. Richards, Jr., JD, MSLIS, MA, BA

• PhD Candidate• The Pennsylvania State University Department of Communication

Arts and Sciences• Email: rcr5122@psu.edu• Web: http://legalinformatics.wordpress.com/about/