Surveillance Stats Chapter

8/9/2019 Surveillance Stats Chapter

1/9

FederallawrequiresreportingonsomeformsofsurveillanceEachyearsince1997,theAdministrativeOfficeoftheUSCourtshascompiledandpublishedadetailed

report

on

the

number

of

law

enforcement

wiretaps

and

other

electronic

intercepts

that

occurred,

at

the

stateandfederallevel,inthepreviousyear.Thereportisextraordinaryinitshighqualityianddetail,

revealingthenumberofwiretapsrequestedandapprovedonacity/countyscale,thekindof

interception(phone,computer,pager,fax),thenumberofpeoplewhosecommunicationswere

intercepted,thenumberofinterceptedmessages,thenumberofarrestsandconvictionsthatresulted

fromtheinterception,andthefinancialcostofthewiretap.Notablymissingfromthereportarethe

namesofthetelecommunicationscarriersthatreceivedandcompliedwiththerequests.

Likewise,eachyear,theDepartmentofJusticeisrequiredtosubmitseveralsurveillancerelatedreports

toCongress.Likethewiretapreport,noneofthesereportsincludeanyinformationaboutthe

companiesthatreceivetheorders.Thesereportsare:

1. Areportregardingtheuseofpenregistersandtrap&tracedevicesbyfederallawenforcementagencies.ii

2. AreportdetailingthenumberofemergencydisclosuresofthecontentsofcommunicationstotheDepartmentofJusticebyInternetServiceProviders,pursuanttoUSC2702(b)(8).iii

3. AreportdetailingthenumberofapplicationsmadebytheGovernmenttoconductelectronicsurveillanceand/orphysicalsearchesundertheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct,Section

215requestsforbusinessrecordsandtangiblethingsforforeignintelligencepurposes,and

nationalsecurityletterssentbytheFederalBureauofInvestigation.iv

MostfederalsurveillancestatisticsareflawedUnfortunately,theDOJreportslackthedetail,scopeandqualityoftheWiretapReportssubmittedby

theUSCourts,andareeachflawedinnumerousways.

Thepenregisterandtrapandtracereportsareparticularlyflawed:

1. TheyonlyapplytofederalordersobtainedbytheDepartmentofJustice.Stateandlocaluseofpenregisters(whicharelikelyfargreaterinnumber)arenotreported.

2. Between1999and2003,theDepartmentofJusticefailedtocomplywiththerequirementthatthereportbesubmittedtoCongresseachyear.Instead,19992003datawasprovidedto

Congressinasingle"documentdump,"whichsubmittedfiveyearsofreportsinNovember

2004.vInOctober2009,theDepartmentofJusticesentanotherdocumentdumptoCongress,

thistimeprovidingthereportsfor20042008.vi

3. Inaddition,whenthereportshaveeventuallybeenprovidedtoCongress,thedocumentsfailedtoincludealloftheinformationthatthePenRegisterActrequirestobesharedwithlawmakers.


2/9

Thedocumentsdonotdetailtheoffensesforwhichthepenregisterandtrapandtraceorders

wereobtained,asrequiredby18U.S.C.3126(2).Furthermore,thedocumentsdonotidentify

thedistrictorbranchofficeoftheagenciesthatsubmittedthepenregisterrequests,

informationrequiredby18U.S.C.3126(8).vii

4. Thereportsarenotmadepublicbydefault,contrarytoCongressionalintent.viiiThereportsthatare

currently

public

are

as

aresult

of

Freedom

of

Information

Act

requests

filed

by

privacy

activists.

Similarly,theemergencyrequestreportsarepracticallyworthless,listingonlytherequestsmadeatthe

federallevelandnotlocalorstatelevel.Theyalsoonlycoveremergencyrequestsforcontent,butnot

thelikelyfarmorenumerousemergencyrequestsfornoncontentandaccountinformation. Thus,

althoughVerizonreceivesover25,000emergencyrequestsperyearfromgovernmentagencies,the

reportcompiledbytheDepartmentofJustice(coveringemergencyrequeststoallcarriersandISPs)

revealslessthan20requestsperyear.

Finally,theFISA,Section215andnationalsecurityletterreportsprovidelittleusefulinformation,as

theydonotlistthenumberofindividualsorconnectionsmonitored.ix

SurveillancestatisticshelptoinformthepublicdebateofsurveillancepolicyInspiteoftheirmanyflaws,theexistingsurveillancereportsarestilluseful,andprovideacademics,

privacyactivistsandthoseinCongresswithapartialsenseofthescaleofmodernsurveillance,atleast

atthefederallevel.

Forexample,thewiretapreportdocumentsthesignificantdeclineofelectronicsurveillanceorders

(whichare

required

to

intercept

Internet

traffic,

computer,

pagers

and

fax

machines),

from

nearly

700

peryearin1998,tolessthan10eachin2006,2007and2008.xSimilarly,thenumberofwiretaps

involvingfixedlocationshasdeclinedastheuseofmobilecommunications,includingtextmessaging

fromcellulartelephones,hasbecomeincreasinglywidespread.In2009,atotalof96percent(2,276

wiretaps)ofallauthorizedwiretapswereforportabledevices.xiFinally,thereportsrevealoneofthe

lesserknownsideeffectsofthewarondrugs:theexpansionofthesurveillancestate.Thus,86percent

ofallwiretapsinvolveadruginvestigation.

Thepenregisterreportsalsodocumentthesignificantgrowthintheuseofpenregisterandtrap&

tracesovertheyears 6,976penregistersand3898trapandtraceorderswereobtainedbyfederal

agenciesin2004,comparedtothe11,126penregistersand9773trapandtraceordersobtainedin

2008.xii Thereportsrevealtheextenttowhichtheuseofthesesurveillancetechniquesdwarfsthe

numberofwiretaps. Forexample,in2008,Federalagentsused54timesmorepenregistersandtrap&

tracesthanintercepts.Perhapsthiswasbecauseeachofthe386Federalinterceptorders(describedas

superwarrantsbysomeexpertsxiii)obtainedin2008hadtobethoroughlyevaluatedandthen

approvedbyajudge,whilethe20,899penregistersandtrap&tracerequestsonlyreceivedacursory

reviewatbest.xiv


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Thepublishedstatisticsarealsoextremelyusefulatdebunkingoverblownandhyperbolicclaimsbylaw

enforcementofficialsandsomelegislators,whohaverepeatedlyoverstatedparticularthreatsinorder

tojustifythepassageofdraconiannewsurveillanceauthorities. Forexample,overthepasttwo

decades,highlevelfederalofficialshaverepeatedlypaintedencryptiontechnologyasademonthatwill

thwartthegovernmentsabilitytoengageinlegitimateinvestigations.xv Themotivationfortheirclaims

hasbeen

adesire

to

seek

the

passage

of

mandatory

key

escrow

legislation,

and

companion

statutes

banningtheuseofencryptionwithoutsuchbackdoors.xvi

In2000,SenatorsLeahyandHatchsuccessfullyamendedthewiretapreportingrequirementstoalso

includestatisticsonthenumberofinterceptordersinwhichencryptionwasencounteredandwhether

suchencryptionpreventedlawenforcementfromobtainingtheplaintextofcommunications

interceptedpursuanttosuchorder.xviiSpeakingontheSenatefloorinsupportofhisamendment,

SenatorLeahyarguedthatcompilingthestatisticswouldbeafarmorereliablebasisthananecdotal

evidenceonwhichtoassesslawenforcementneedsandmakesensiblepolicyinthisarea.

Sincetheencryptionreportingrequirementwasaddedin2000,therehavebeenatotalof91instances

inwhichencryptionwasencounteredduringafederalorstatewiretap,andnotasingleinstancein

whichtheencryptionpreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof

communicationsintercepted.Furthermore,overthepast4years,thenumberofinstancesinwhich

encryptionwasencounteredhasplungedtolessthan2casesperyear.xviiiThetotalsforeachyear

presentedinthetablebelow.

Year Stateandfederalwiretapsinwhichencryptionwasencountered

Wiretapswhereencryptionpreventedofficialsobtainingplaintextofcommunications2000 22 0

2001 34 02002 16 02003 1 02004 2 02005 13 02006 0 02007 0 02008 2 02009 1 0

Statisticsnamingcompaniesanddetailingtheirassistancewithcertainactivitiescouldhelptocreateamarketforsurveillanceprivacy


4/9

Boththecurrentlyreleasedofficialsurveillancestatistics,aswellasthestatisticsvoluntarilyprovidedby

companiesdolittletoenableconsumers(andtheirproxies,suchaspublicinterestgroupsandthe

media)todeterminewhichcompaniesarethemostprivacyprotecting.

Forexample,Verizonreceived88,000governmentrequestsin2006,whileGooglereceived3,000

requestsfrom

the

US

government

during

six

months

of

2009.

Does

this

mean

that

Verizon

is

aworse

companyforprivacy,orabetterone?Itisimpossibletoknow.Missingfromthesenumbersaredetails

onthenumberofrequeststhateachcompanyrefusedtocomplywith,theamountofdatathatwas

eventuallydisclosed,andthenumberofcustomerswhosedatawasdelivered.

Inordertostimulateamarketforeffectivecorporateresistancetogovernmentsurveillance,public

statisticsneedtodocumentactivitiesandpoliciesoverwhichthecarriersandprovidersactuallyhave

somedegreeofcontrol.

Specifically,meaningfulinformationandstatisticswouldinclude:

1. Thenumberofemergencyrequeststhecompanyreceived,inwhichnosubpoena,courtorderorotherlegalprocesswassubmitted.

2. Thenumberofemergencyrequeststhatthecompanyrejected,andthenumberitcompliedwith.

3. Thenumberofinstancesinwhichthecompanyrefusedtocomplywithademandforinformation,andwenttocourttoquashtheorder.

4. Thekindofinformationsought(prospective/realtime,orhistorical).Intheeventthatlogsorotherstoredinformationissought,theageoftheinformationdisclosedtothegovernmentfor

eachrequest.

5. Thenumberofinstancesinwhichthecompanyhadnothingusefultodeliver,duetodatadeletion

policies,

or

the

use

of

encryption

in

which

it

does

not

have

the

key.

FixingthesurveillancestatsOverthelastdecade,CongresshaslargelyfailedtoprotectAmericansfromtheincreasinggazeoflaw

enforcementandintelligenceagencies.Timeandtimeagain,thegovernmentsauthorityhasbeen

expanded,andtheevidentiarythresholdrequiredtogetaccesstosensitivedatahasbeenlowered.In

onerareinstancewheremanyinCongressbelievedtheywerestrengtheningprivacyprotections,the

statutorychangewaslaterrevealedtohaveactuallyexpandedtheDepartmentofJusticesabilitytoget

data.xix

Becauseofthistrend,IholdtheratherpessimisticviewthatCongressisunlikelytopassanylegislation

restrictinglawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesaccesstocitizensprivatedata,orthatisintended

toencouragecompaniestosaynotogovernmentrequests.However,Congressdoeshaveaprettygood

recordinsuccessfullypassinglegislationtoincreasetransparencyovercertainsurveillanceactivities.xx


5/9

Althoughtherearenumerousflawsintheexistingsurveillancereportingrequirements,whichI

describedabove,itisnotunreasonabletoimagineCongressattemptingtofixtheseflaws,ifjusttobe

abletobetterperformitsoversightresponsibilities.Assuch,Inowpresentseveralspecificlegislative

proposalsthatwouldsignificantlyenhancethestatutorysurveillancereportingrequirements.

Penregisterandtrapandtracereports

First,Congressshouldmakethepenregister/trap&tracereportingrequirementsapplytostateand

localuseofthesesurveillancetechniques,justastheWiretapReportalreadycoversnonfederal

electronicandtelephoneintercepts.xxi

Second,penregisterandtrap&traceordersaresealedforeverbydefault,xxiiandasaresult,mostcases

remainsealedforever.xxiiiThisisincontrasttothedelayednoticeprovisionsforrequestsforstored

communicationsmade

pursuant

to

18

USC

2703(d),

which

can

be

delayed

for

90

days

(and

this

can

be

repeatedlyextended). Congressshouldmodifythepenregisterstatutetomirrorthedelayednotice

provisionsspecified18USC2705,sothatthesealontheseorderseventually,andnaturallyexpire.That

is,thedefaultshouldbeforeventualtransparency,ratherthanperpetualsecrecy.

Third,responsibilityforcreatingandpublishingthesereportsshouldbetransferredtothe

AdministrativeOfficeoftheUSCourts,sincetheDepartmentofJusticehasprovenitselftobegrossly

incompetentinmeetingthestatutoryreportingrequirementsbothbynotincludingtherequireddata,

andbysubmittingtheannualreportsonlyonceeveryfiveyears.Emergencyrequestreportsrequiredby18USC2702(b)(8)

First,thesereportsshouldincluderequestsmadebystateandlocalauthorities,whichsubmitseveral

ordersofmagnitudemorerequestsperyear.xxiv

Second,thereportsshouldalsoapplytoemergencyrequestsforrecordsorothernoncontent

informationmadepursuantto18USC2702(c)(4),inadditiontotherequestsforcontentpursuantto18

USC2702(b)(8)thatarecurrentlyrecorded.

Third,thereportsshouldincludethenumberofrequests,andnotjustthenumberofinstancesinwhich

thegovernmentreceivedinformationinresponsetoanemergencyrequest.Thatis,thereportshould

clearlyindicate

the

number

of

instances

in

which

companies

refused

to

provide

the

information

sought.

Newreportingrequirements


6/9

Congressshouldrequirethemandatoryreportingofstatisticsregardingthecompelleddisclosureof

customerrecordsandcommunications(bothcontentandnoncontent). Thiswouldapplytothe

disclosureoffinancialrecords,creditcardtransactions,storedemailmessages,instantmessages,

documentsstoredinthecloud,geolocationinformation(historicalandprospective,regardlessofthe

legalprocessusedtoobtainit),searchenginerecords,IPaddressandotheraccesslogs,andsubscriber

information.This

information

is

currently

not

reported

at

all,

and

likely

consists

of

hundreds

of

thousandsofrequestsperyear.

Finally,Congressshouldrequirethatwherepossible,thenamesofthecompaniesthatreceiveand

respondtoordersbedocumentedinthereports.WhilealloftheotherreportingfixesIhavesuggested

wouldimprovetheextenttowhichCongress,andpublicunderstandthescaleofcertainsurveillance

activities, withoutbeingabletocomparethedegreetowhichindividualcompaniesreceiveandrespond

totheserequests,thepublicwillbeunabletodeterminehowprivacypreserving(orprogovernment)

theirprovideris.

iTheAOhasdoneanexcellentjobofpreparingthewiretapreports.StatementbySenatorLeahy,CONTINUED

REPORTINGOFINTERCEPTEDWIRE,ORAL,ANDELECTRONICCOMMUNICATIONSACT (Senate December03,

1999),availableathttp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi

bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=1999_record&page=S15228&position=alliiTheAttorneyGeneralshallannuallyreporttoCongressonthenumberofpenregisterordersandordersfortrap

andtracedevicesappliedforbylawenforcementagenciesoftheDepartmentofJustice.18U.S.C.3126(2009).iiiOnanannualbasis,theAttorneyGeneralshallsubmittotheCommitteeontheJudiciaryoftheHouseof

RepresentativesandtheCommitteeontheJudiciaryoftheSenateareportcontainingthenumberofaccounts

fromwhichtheDepartmentofJusticehasreceivedvoluntarydisclosuresundersubsection(b)(8);and asummary

ofthebasisfordisclosureinthoseinstanceswhere voluntarydisclosuresundersubsection(b)(8)weremadeto

theDepartmentofJustice;andtheinvestigationpertainingtothosedisclosureswasclosedwithoutthefilingof

criminalcharges.18USC2702(d).ivSeesections107and502oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActof1978(the"Act"),asamended,50U.S.C.

1801etseq.,andsection118ofUSAPATRIOTImprovementandReauthorizationActof2005,Pub.L.No.109177

(2006).vLetterfromWilliamMoschella,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,toCongressmanJohnConyers,Jr,etal.,Nov.3,2004

availableathttp://paulschwartz.net/pdf/penregisterreport.pdfviLetterfromRonaldWeich,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,toCongressmanJohnConyers,Jr,etal.,October29,2009.

Onfilewithauthor.vii

http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/ltr_pen_trap_leahy_final.pdfatpage3.viii

In

this

way,

the

Congress

and

the

public

will

be

informed

of

those

jurisdictions

using

this

surveillance

techniqueinformationwhichiscurrentlynotincludedintheAttorneyGeneralsannualreports.Statementof

SenatorLeahy,http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi

bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=f:s236is.txt.pdfixAJusticeDepartmentofficialattributedthedropofftotherecentchangesinthelawandcautionedagainst

drawinginferencesbasedonthenumbersalone.ThenumberofForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActapplications

submittedtotheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtdecreasedin2008andagainin2009duetosignificant

changesinthelegalauthoritiesthatgovernFISAsurveillancespecifically,theenactmentoftheFISA

AmendmentsActin2008andshiftingoperationaldemands,butthefluctuationinthenumberofapplications


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doesnotinanywayreflectachangeincoverage,theofficialsaid.http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/05/07/fisa

applicationsdippedagainin2009/

WilliamMoschella,formerPrincipalAssociateDeputyAttorneyGeneralintheBushadministration,saidthe2008

amendmentseliminatedtheneedforFISAwarrantsinsomeinstancesxThisismostlikelyduetothefactthatcellphonesandtextmessageserviceshavelargelyreplacedpagers.Cell

phoneintercepts

are

reported

as

wire

intercepts,

whereas

pager

intercepts

are

reported

as

electronic

intercepts.

xiSeehttp://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2009/2009Wiretaptext.pdf

xiiSee:http://files.spyingstats.com/prtt/DOJpenregisters20042008.pdf

xiiihttp://intelligence.senate.gov/050419/kerr.pdf

xivSee18U.S.C.3123(a)(1).Thecourtwillnotconductan"independentjudicialinquiryintotheveracityofthe

attestedfacts."InreApplicationofUnitedStates,846F.Supp.1555,1559(M.D.Fla.1994).SeealsoUnitedStates

v.Fregoso,60F.3d1314,1320(8thCir.1995)("Thejudicialroleinapprovinguseoftrapandtracedevicesis

ministerialinnature.")xv

JanetReno,Clinton'sattorneygeneral,saidinSeptember1999thatthenewregulationsstruckareasonable

balancebetweenprivacyandsecurity.Whenstoppingaterroristattackorseekingtorecoverakidnappedchild,

encounteringencryptionmaymeanthedifferencebetweensuccessandcatastrophicfailures.

ThefourhijackedairplanesandthedisasterstheycreatedhaveabruptlyreturnedthedebateonCapitolHillto

whereitwasyearsago,whenFBIDirectorLouisFreehspentmuchofhistimetellinganyonewhowouldlistenthat

terroristswereusingencryption andCongressshouldapproverestrictionsondomesticuse.Weareveryconcerned,asthiscommitteeis,abouttheencryptionsituation,particularlyasitrelatestofightingcrimeand

fightingterrorism,FreehtoldtheSenateJudiciarycommitteeinSeptember1998.NotjustbinLaden,butmany

otherpeoplewhoworkagainstusintheareaofterrorism,arebecomingsophisticatedenoughtoequip

themselveswithencryptiondevices.Headded:Webelievethatanunrestrictedproliferationofproductswithout

anykindofcourtaccessandlawenforcementaccess,willharmus,andmakethefightagainstterrorismmuch

moredifficult.http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/09/46816xvi

"Justiceshouldgoaheadnowandseekalegislativefixtothedigitaltelephonyproblem,andallpartiesshould

preparetofollowthroughontheencryptionprobleminaboutayear.Successwithdigitaltelephonywilllockin

onemajorobjective;wewillhaveabeachheadwecanexploitfortheencryptionfix;andtheencryptionaccess

optionscanbedevelopedmorethoroughlyinthemeantimehttp://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/calea/Scowcroft.gif

InafloorspeechonThursday,Sen.JuddGregg(RNewHampshire)calledforaglobalprohibitiononencryption

productswithout

backdoors

for

government

surveillance.

This

is

something

that

we

need

international

cooperationonandweneedtohavemovementoninordertogettheinformationthatallowsustoanticipate

andpreventwhatoccurredinNewYorkandinWashington,Greggsaid.Gregg,theGOP'schiefdeputywhip,

predictedthatwithoutsucharequirement,thequantumleapthathasoccurredinthecapacitytoencrypt

informationwillfrustratetheU.S.government'seffortstopreservethesafetyofAmericans.

http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/09/46816;Seegenerally,ARTICLE:THEMETAPHORISTHEKEY:

CRYPTOGRAPHY, THECLIPPERCHIP,ANDTHECONSTITUTION,MichaelFroomkin,JANUARY,1995,143U.Pa.L.

Rev.709.xvii

PublicLaw106197amended18U.S.C.2519(2)(b)in2001torequirethatreportingshouldreflectthenumber

ofwiretapapplicationsgrantedinwhichencryptionwasencounteredandwhethersuchencryptionpreventedlaw

enforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofthecommunications interceptedpursuanttothecourt

orders

Encryptiontechnologyiscriticaltoprotectsensitivecomputerandonlineinformation.Yet,thesametechnologyposeschallengestolawenforcementwhenitisexploitedbycriminalstohideevidenceorthefruitsofcriminal

activities.AreportbytheU.S.WorkingGrouponOrganizedCrimetitled,EncryptionandEvolvingTechnologies:

ToolsofOrganizedCrimeandTerrorism,releasedin1997,collectedanecdotalcasestudiesontheuseof

encryptioninfurtheranceofcriminalactivitiesinordertoestimatethefutureimpactofencryptiononlaw

enforcement.Thereportnotedtheneedforanongoingstudyoftheaffectofencryptionandotherinformation

technologiesoninvestigations,prosecutions,andintelligenceoperations.Aspartofthisstudy,adatabaseofcase

informationfromfederalandlocallawenforcementandintelligenceagenciesshouldbeestablishedand


8/9

maintained.Addingarequirementthatreportsbefurnishedonthenumberofoccasionswhenencryptionis

encounteredbylawenforcementisafarmorereliablebasisthananecdotalevidenceonwhichtoassesslaw

enforcementneedsandmakesensiblepolicyinthisarea.See:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi

bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=1999_record&page=S15228&position=allxviii

In2009,encryptionwasencounteredduringonestatewiretap,butdidnotpreventofficialsfromobtainingthe

plaintext

of

the

communications.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2009/2009Wiretaptext.pdf

In2008,twoinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsencounteredduringstatewiretaps;neitherprevented

officialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofthecommunications.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2008/2008WTText.pdf

In2007,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionencounteredduringanyfederalorstatewiretap.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2007/2007WTText.pdf

In2006,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionencounteredduringanyfederalorstatewiretap.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2006/2006WT.pdf

In2005,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsbeingencounteredduringafederalwiretap.State

jurisdictionsreported13instancesinwhichencryptionwasencounteredinwiretapsterminatedin2005;however,

innoneoftheseinstancesdidtheencryptionpreventlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof

communicationsintercepted.http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2005/WTText.pdf

In2004,twoinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsbeingencounteredonwiretaps.Onefederaljurisdictionandonestatejurisdictioneachreportedthatencryptionwasencounteredinawiretapterminatedin2004;however,in

bothcases,theencryptionwasreportedtohavenotpreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplain

textofcommunicationsintercepted.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2004/2004WireTap.pdf

In2003,noinstanceswerereportedofencryptionsbeingencounteredonfederalwiretaps.Onestatejurisdiction

reportedthatencryptionwasencounteredinawiretapterminatedin2003;however,theencryptionwasreported

tohavenotpreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofcommunications intercepted.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2003/2003WireTap.pdf

Encryptionwasreportedtohavebeenencounteredin16wiretapsterminatedin2002andin18wiretaps

terminatedincalendaryear2001orearlierbutreportedforthefirsttimein2002;however,innoneofthesecases

wasencryptionreportedtohavepreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof

communicationsintercepted.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2002/2002wttxt.pdf

Encryptionwasreportedtohavebeenencounteredin16wiretapsterminatedin2001;however,innoneofthese

caseswasencryptionreportedtohavepreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof

communicationsintercepted.http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2001/2001wttxt.pdf

In2000,encryptionwasreportedtohavebeenencounteredin22wiretaps;however,innoneofthesecaseswas

encryptionreportedtohavepreventedlawenforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextof

communicationsintercepted.

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/WiretapReports/2000/2000wttxt.pdfxix

TheUSAPATRIOTReauthorizationandImprovementActof2005(actuallypassedin2006)madeanumberof

changestoPatriotsurveillancepowers,amongthemaprovisionrequiringspecialhighlevelauthorization

beforecertaincategoriesofsensitiverecordscouldbeobtainedunderFISAsbusinessrecordsprovision,

usuallyreferredtoasSection215.Theveryslightcontemporarydiscussionofthischangeseemstohave

universallytakenforgrantedthatthiswasanaddedlimitationonintelligencepowers. Thelegalanalysis

providedbythenonpartisanCongressionalResearchServicecharacterizedtheseasenhancedproceduralprotectionsInfact,theeffectofthischangewastoenableaccesstomanyoftheserecordsforthefirst

time.See:http://www.juliansanchez.com/2010/03/15/oversighttheaterandsecretlaw/xx

Section804oftheImplementingRecommendationsofthe9/11CommissionActof2007,Pub.L.11053,entitled

theFederalAgencyDataMiningReportingActrequiresthatfederalagenciesusingordevelopingdatamining

programstosubmitdetailedreportstoCongressabouttheirprograms.

TheUSAPATRIOTImprovementandReauthorizationActrequired:directstheAttorneyGeneraltosubmitto

Congressanannualreportregardingtheuseofsection215authority(Section106(h)).Section106AoftheAct


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providesfortheInspectorGeneraloftheDepartmentofJusticetoconductacomprehensiveaudittodetermine

theeffectiveness,andidentifyanyabuses,concerningtheuseofsection215authority,forcalendaryears2002

2006. Inaddition,theAttorneyGeneralmustsubmitareportsemiannuallyonallNSLrequestsmadeunderthe

FairCreditReportingAct.TheAttorneyGeneralisalsoinstructedtosubmittoCongressanannualreport

describingthetotalnumberofrequestsmadebytheDepartmentofJusticeundertheNSLstatutes.Thisreportis

tobe

unclassified,

in

order

to

permit

public

scrutiny.

See:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf

PublicLaw106197amended18U.S.C.2519(2)(b)in2001torequirethatreportingshouldreflectthenumberof

wiretapapplicationsgrantedinwhichencryptionwasencounteredandwhethersuchencryptionpreventedlaw

enforcementofficialsfromobtainingtheplaintextofthecommunications interceptedpursuanttothecourt

orders.ItalsorequirestheAttorneyGeneraltoreporttoCongressontheidentity,includingthedistrict,ofthe

agencymakingthepenregisterandtrapandtraceapplicationsandthepersonauthorizingtheorder.xxi

Seegenerally:18USC2519,requiringreportingbyalljudges,principalprosecutingattorneyofaState,andthe

principalprosecutingattorneyforanypoliticalsubdivisionofaState.xxii

ThePen/TrapStatutedirectsthattheordersbesealeduntilotherwiseorderedbythecourt,butleavesthe

durationofthesealingordertothediscretionofthecourt.18U.S.C.A.3123(d)(1).xxiii

Whatissurprisingisthat,outof4,234electronicsurveillanceordersissuedfrom1995to2007,atotalof3,877

(91.6%)remainundersealtothisday.Thepercentagejumpsevenhigherifoneexcludesthe348orderswhich

werenotsealedtobeginwith.Thus,outof3,886ordersinitiallysealeduntilfurtherorderofthecourt,99.8%

arestillsecrettodaylongafterthecriminalinvestigationwasclosed.See:http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2009/jmffedctslrev5.pdfxxiv

Forexample,ofthe88,000lawfulrequestsanddemandsVerizonreceivedfromfederal,stateandlocalofficials

in2006,25,000ofthemwererequestsforemergencyassistance.Ofthese25,000,just300requestswerefromthe

federalgovernment.

Surveillance Stats Chapter

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