Supreme Court Rulings on Agrarian Law 2008-2010

8/12/2019 Supreme Court Rulings on Agrarian Law 2008-2010

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SUPREME COURT RULINGS ON AGRARIAN LAW

2008 to 2010

DELA CRUZ v. QUIAZON, G.R. No. 171961, November 28, 2008

Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of Amelia G. Quiazon, was the registered owner of a

parcel of land brought under the coverage of PD 27. In 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a

tenant-farmer, was issued a CLT over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said property. In

1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and

Partition with Waiver adjudicating among themselves all the properties left by both oftheir parents, except for the subject property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of

respondent.

In 1993, A, Quiazon filed a Complaint with the PARAD against petitioner Ferdinand dela

Cruz, alleging that in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract with A. Quiazon, by

virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991,

petitioner F. dela Cruz allegedly failed to deliver the stipulated rental because he had

already abandoned the landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment

from the property and the termination of their tenancy relationship

1. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Citing Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 178-179 [1996]:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy

that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no

other available or adequate remedy. When a party has

another remedy available to him, which may be either a

motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision ofthe trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,

mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or

taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.

Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
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avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of

the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise,

the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to

appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.2. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFEREFFECT

CitingPlanters Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December 9, 2005,

477 SCRA 185, 199;Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, G.R. No. 60269, September 13,

1991, 201 SCRA 536, 540:

The issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the

holder.

CitingMartillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA

195, 203-204:

The issuance of the CLT does not sever the tenancy relationship

between the landowner and the tenant-farmer. A certificate of

land transfer merely evinces that the grantee thereof is qualified

to avail himself of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of

ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under P.D. No.27. It is not a muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee

absolute ownership of his tillage.

CitingPagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252,

259:

It is only after compliance with the conditions which entitle a

farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the

vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding

a rightwhich then would have become fixed and established, and no

longer open to doubt or controversy. HTcDEa

3. PERSONALITY OF LANDOWNER TO RAISE ABANDONMENT
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CitingEstolas v. Mabalot, 431 Phil. 462, 469 [2002]:

For this reason, the landowner retains an interest over the

property that gives him the right to file the necessary action

to evict the tenant from the landholding should there be anabandonment despite the fact that land acquired under P.D.

No. 27 will not revert to the landowner.

4. ABANDONMENT

CitingCorpuz v. Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1111 (2000):

Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to

renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and(b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or

carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a

departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,

resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have

been abandoned.

Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106-

107;Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 238 (2004);Palele v. Court of Appeals, 414Phil. 417, 429 (2001):

The immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the

U.S.A. did not necessarily result in the abandonment of the

landholding, considering that one of his sons, petitioner

Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the land. Personal

cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the

land by the tenant (lessee) himself or with the aid of theimmediate farm household, which refers to the members of

the family of the tenant and other persons who are

dependent upon him for support and who usually help him

in the [agricultural] activities.
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5. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER

RETENTION/CANCELLATION

CitingDaez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 742, 754 (2000):

Without doubt, the landowner's right of retention may beexercised over tenanted land despite the issuance of a CLT

to farmer-beneficiaries. However, the cancellation of a CLT

over the subject landholding as a necessary consequence of

the landowner's exercise of his right of retention is within

the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary, not the DARAB, as it

does not involve an agrarian dispute.

InTenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93045,

June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 545),the Court sustained the authority or jurisdiction of

the DAR Secretary to cancel the CLT issued to tenant-beneficiaries after the

landowners' right to retain the subject landholding was upheld. The Court ruled that

the issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer falls within the

Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as implementor of P.D. No. 27.

6. COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT

CitingArcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 264 (1997):

To conclude, respondent's remedy is to raise before the

DAR Secretary the matter of cancellation of petitioner's

CLT as an incident of the order granting the landowners'

application for retention over the said landholding. In the

same forum, petitioners can raise the issue of the validity of

the DAR order granting the application for retention based

on their claim of denial of due process, or in a separate

action specifically filed to assail the validity of the

judgment. A collateral attack against a judgment is generally

not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its

nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals.
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xxx xxx xxx

2009

LAND BANK v. PACITA AGRICULTURAL MULTI-PURPOSE

COOPERATIVE, G.R. No. 177607, January 19, 2009

Eight parcels of land with an aggregate area of 34.96 hectare was placed under the

coverage of OLT. Between the years 1978 to 1983 CLTs were issued to farmer

beneficiaries. Between 1986 to 1990, EPs were issued. In 1986 and, LBP paid AAC

P35, 778, the amount of only two of the eight parcels of land. Thereafter, AAC sold the

landholding to Pacita. Pacita then inquired from LBP regarding the price of the

remaining six parcels. LBP valued the same at P148,172, which was refused by Pacita.

Upon the passage of DAR AO, Series of 1994, a 6% per year increment on the value of

land from the date it was taken up to October 1994 shall be imposed. Hence, the valuewas increased to P537,538. However, the said value was still refused by Pacita, which

then filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the SAC. It asked

that the value of the remaining parcels be pegged at 2.7M.

1. JUST COMPENSATIONWHEN COMPUTED

The instant case involves a closely similar factual milieu as that

inNatividadandMeneses.The DAR acquired the subject property in 1972 through

its Operation Land Transfer Program, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Since

then, the subject property has already been distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries

who, since then, have exclusively possessed the same and harvested its produce.Eventually, the Emancipation Patents were issued in the beneficiaries' favor. Even

after the lapse of 23 years from 1972, when the DAR took the subject land

property, until 1995, when respondent filed its Petition before the SACthe full

payment of just compensation due respondent has yet to be made by petitioner.

These circumstances, the same as inNatividad andMeneses, make it more

equitable for the SAC to determine the just compensation due the respondent for the

remainder of the subject property using values at the time of its payment.

xxx xxx xxx

LANDICHO v. SIA, G.R. No. 169472, January 20, 2009

The Aragons were the owners of a parcel of land tenanted by Arcadio Landicho. Upon

the latter's death, his son Francisco Landicho succeeded him in his tenancy. Francisco

Landicho cultivated the landholding with the help of his son Buenaventura Landicho and

his brother Federico Landicho. Subsequently, he surrendered his tenancy rights over the
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landholding in favor of E. Zolota, wife of one of the Aragons as per aKasulatan.Despite

the execution of theKasulatan, F. Landicho, et al. continued in the possession and

cultivation of the landholding. Years after, anotherKasulatanevidencing the surrender of

rights was executed. On the day of the execution of the secondKasulatan,the Aragons

sold the subject landholding to Sia who managed to convert the use of the land for

residential purpose without a DAR clearance. Thus, the Landichos filed a complaint fordisturbance compensation. TcCSIa

1. TENANCYESTABLISHMENT

CitingRA 1199:

A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a

tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake

jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landholder,as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right

to continue working on and cultivating the land.

2. TENANCYQUANTUM OF PROOF

CitingHeirs of Jugalbot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170346, March 12, 2007,

518 SCRA 202, 214-215, citingBerenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-

60287, August 17, 1988, 164 SCRA 431, 438-439:

The petitioners cannot rely on their self-serving statementsto prove the existence of a tenancy relationship because

independent and concrete evidence, aside from self-serving

statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing

of harvests, or consent of the landowner.

3. CULTIVATIONINSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH TENANCY

CitingDanan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132759, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA113, 126:

A tiller or a farmworker does not automatically become an

agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws by mere

occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land.
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4. ELEMENT OF TENANCYSHARING OF HARVESTS

Citing Cornelio de Jesus, et al. v. Moldex Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 153595, November

23, 2007, 538 SCRA 316:

Independent evidence, such as receipts, must be presented toshow that there was a sharing of the harvest between the

landowner and the tenant. And, assuming the landowners

received a share of the harvest, that the fact of receipt,

without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso

factocreate a tenancy.

5. IMPLIED TENANCY

Acquiescence by the landowner of their cultivation of the land does not create an

implied tenancy if the landowners have never considered petitioners Federico and

Buenaventura as tenants of the land and if the essential requisites of a tenancy

relationship are lacking. There was no intention to institute the petitioners as

agricultural tenants.

CitingEpitacio Sialana v. Mary Y. Avila, et al., G.R. No. 143598, July 20, 2006,

495 SCRA 501:

For an implied tenancy to come about, the actuations of theparties taken in their entirety must be demonstrative of an

intent to continue a prior lease established by the landholder.

6. CAPACITY TO GIVE CONSENT

CitingMario J. Mendezona v. Julio H. Ozamiz, et al., 426 Phil. 888, 906 (2002):

A person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of

advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. It isonly when such age or infirmities impair the mental

faculties to such extent as to prevent one from properly,

intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she

considered incapacitated.


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7. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OF PUBLIC INSTRUMENT

It is also important to note that both the 1976 and 1987 Kasulatanare duly

notarized and are considered as public documents evidencing the surrender of

Francisco's tenancy rights over the subject landholdings. They were executed with

all the legal formalities of a public document and thus the legal presumption of theregularity and validity of theKasulatanare retained in the absence of full, clear and

convincing evidence to overcome such presumption. Strong evidence is required to

prove a defect of a public instrument, and since such strong and convincing

evidence was not presented in the instant case, the 1976 and the 1987Kasulatanare

presumed valid.

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CASTILLO v. TOLENTINO, G.R. No. 181525, March 4, 2009

Tolentino was the owner of two parcels of land and a caretaker of another. The said

parcels were tenanted by Castillo who promised to remit lease rentals to Tolentino.

Castillo wrote the PARO informing the latter of his intention to construct a water

reservoir. Tolentino also received a copy of the letter and opposed the same. Despite this,

Castillo proceeded with the construction of the water dike. Tolentino filed a case for

ejectment. PARAD ruled for the ejectment of Castillo. DARAB initially affirmed the

Decision but reversed itself in a Motion for Reconsideration. CA reinstated the Decision

of the PARAD since it held that the appeal was filed out of time.

1. OBLIGATIONS OF A TENANT WITH RESPECT TO CONSTRUCTION

OF IMPROVEMENTS ON THE LANDHOLDING

Section 32 of R.A. No. 3844 specifically requires notice to and consent of the

agricultural lessor before the agricultural lessee may embark upon the construction

of a permanent irrigation system. It is only when the former refuses to bear the

expenses of construction that the latter may choose to shoulder the same. More

importantly, any change in the use of tillable land in the leasehold,e.g. through the

construction of a sizeable water reservoir, impacts upon the agricultural lessor's

share in the harvest, which is the only consideration he receives under the agrarian

law. This being the case, before the agricultural lessee may use the leasehold for a

purpose other than what had been agreed upon, the consent of the agricultural lessormust be obtained, lest he be dispossessed of his leasehold.

The law (Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 3844) does not give blanket authority to the

agricultural lessee to construct an irrigation system at anytime and for any reason;

instead, it presupposes primarily that the same is necessary.
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2. IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF A TENANT

The fact that CASTILLO was convicted by final judgment of an offense against

TOLENTINO's son, George, demonstrates how relations between the two have

deteriorated. While R.A. No. 3844 authorizes termination by the agricultural lessee

of the lease for a crime committed by the agricultural lessor against the former orany member of his immediate farm household, the same privilege is not granted to

the agricultural lessor. Yet, this does not mean that the courts should not take into

account the circumstance that the agricultural lessee committed a crime against the

agricultural lessor or any member of his immediate family. By committing a crime

against TOLENTINO's son, CASTILLO violated his obligation to his lessor to act

with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, an

obligation that is deemed included in his leasehold agreement. Provisions of

existing laws form part of and are read into every contract without need for the

parties expressly making reference to them.

3. VIOLATION OF OBLIGATION OF A TENANT GROUND FOR

DISPOSSESSION

In sum, we hold that the construction of the reservoir constitutes a violation of

Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844, an unauthorized use of the landholding for a purpose

other than what had been agreed upon, and a violation of the leasehold contract

between CASTILLO and TOLENTINO, for which the former is hereby penalized

with permanent dispossession of his leasehold. SEAHcT

4. SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY

CitingBautista v. Mag-isa, G.R. No. 152564, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA

259;Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110335, June 18, 2001, 358 SCRA

598:

Agrarian laws were enacted to help small farmers uplift

their economic status by providing them with a modest

standard of living sufficient to meet their needs for food,

clothing, shelter and other basic necessities. It provides theanswer to the urgent need to alleviate the lives of the vast

number of poor farmers in our country. Yet, despite such

laws, the majority of these farmers still live on a hand-to-

mouth existence. This can be attributed to the fact that these

agrarian laws have never really been effectively


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implemented. Certain individuals have continued to prey on

the disadvantaged, and as a result, the farmers who are

intended to be protected and uplifted by the said laws find

themselves back in their previous plight or even in a moredistressing situation.

CitingDe Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72282, July 24, 1989,

175 SCRA 559:

R.A. No. 3844, or the Agricultural Land Reform Code, was

enacted by Congress to institute land reforms in the

Philippines. It was passed to establish owner-cultivatorship

and the family size farm as the basis of Philippineagriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small

farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints and

practices; as well as to make the small farmers more

independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a

source of genuine strength in our democratic society.

R.A. 3844 and R.A. 6389, being social legislations, are designed to promote

economic and social stability and must be interpreted liberally to give full force andeffect to their clear intent, not only in favor of the tenant-farmers but also of

landowners.

5. SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY NOT INTENDED TO COUNTENANCE

WRONGDOING

We cannot allow a situation where despite the one-sided nature of the law

governing agricultural leasehold tenancy (R.A. No. 3844), which exceedingly

favors the agricultural lessee/tenant and farmworker the agricultural lessee has

shown lack of courtesy to the landowner and, instead, abused his rights under said

law, at the same time neglecting or willfully refusing to take advantage of his rights

under the comprehensive agrarian reform law which would have otherwise fulfilled

its mandate to provide land for the landless. The primary purpose, precisely, of

agrarian reform is the redistribution of lands to farmers and regular farmworkers

who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement.


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The law recognizes and condones that a leasehold tenant may have his own land

while he tills that of another, but certainly we cannot see any justification why a

tenant should give away for free and sell his own agricultural land until nothing is

left, and then insist himself on someone else's without giving the landowner the

proper respect and regard that is due him, acting presumptuously and beyond his

stature as mere agricultural lessee.

CitingCecilleville Realty and Service Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120363,

September 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 819:

The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance

wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the

underprivileged. Compassion for the poor is an imperative

of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a

rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.

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MERCADO v. MERCADO, G.R. No. 178672, March, 19 2009

The grandfather of Edmundo Mercado was the owner of a parcel of land tenanted by

Julio Mercado. J. Mercado was issued a CLT, and subsequently, an EP covering the

landholding. Having been designated in his grandfather'sHuling Habilin,E. Mercado

was able to obtain a Certificate of Retention. Thus, he filed a complaint for the

cancellation of the EP, alleging that the same had been irregularly issued, and ejectmenton the ground of deliberate non-payment of lease rentals. The PARAD declared the

validity of the EP. The said Decision was reversed by the DARAB, ordering the ejecment

of J. Mercado. No appeal having been taken within the reglementary period, the DARAB

Decision became final and executory.

1. IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT

CitingBiglang-awa v. Philippine Trust Company, G.R. No. 158998, March 28,

2008, 550 SCRA 160, 177:

The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long

become final and executory, hence, immutable and

unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in any

respect, even if the modification is meant to correct

erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Excepted from this


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rule is when the modification involves correction of 1)

clerical errors, 2)nunc pro tuncentries which cause no

prejudice to any party, and 3) void judgments. None of these

exceptions is present in the case at bar, however.2. JURISDICTIONDARAB

CitingHermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489

SCRA 556, 563:

Jurisdiction over a case does not thus disappear the moment

a certificate of title is issued, for the issuance of such

certificate is not a mode of transfer of property but merely

an evidence of such transfer.

3. JURISDICTION BY ESTOPPEL

CitingHermoso v. C.L. Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 140319, May 5, 2006, 489

SCRA 556, 563:

IN ANY EVENT, petitioner may not question the

jurisdiction of the DARAB and its adjudicative arm at this

late juncture of the proceedings, he having activelyparticipated in the proceedings below. acADIT

4. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

Respecting the affirmance by the appellate court of the denial by the DARAB of

petitioner's Petition for Relief from Judgment, Rule XVI of the 2003 DARAB

Rules of Procedure provides the following conditions for availing of such relief:

Section 1. Petition for Relief fromDecision/Resolution/Final Order. When a

decision/resolution/final order is rendered by the adjudicator

against any party, through fraud, accident, mistake, and

excusable negligence and such party has no other adequate


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remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law, he

may file a petition for relief with said adjudicator, praying

that the decision/resolution/final order be set aside.

(Underscoring supplied)

Section 2. Form and Time of Filing of Petition.A

petition for relief must be verified and a copy thereof

together with its annexes and supporting affidavits, if any,

must be furnished to the adverse party or parties and filed

within sixty (60) days from the time the fraud, mistake or

excusable negligence was discovered and within six (6)

months after the decision/resolution/final order wasrendered. (Underscoring supplied)

Relief from judgment is thus available only against the decision of an adjudicator,

to be filed before the adjudicator, when the party seeking it has no other adequate

remedy available to him in the ordinary course of law.

xxx xxx xxx

REYNALDO v. YATCO, G.R. No. 165494, March 20, 2009

DCN 3361

Belizario was the owner of a 4.3 hectareparcel of land which she donated to Tomas

Yatco as evidence by a Deed of Donation inter vivos.Said land was tenanted by Aguido

Levardo who subsequently executed aPinanumpaang Salaysaysigned by him and his

children, waiving his rights as tenant. A. Levardo received 2M as disturbance

compensation. T. Yatco sold the landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. The Levardos

filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation, Deed of Sale and

the waiver of rights.

DCN 3362

Leoncio Yatco was the owner of a 4.2 hectareparcel of land which was tenanted by

Francisco and his son Hernando Levardo. F. Levardo likewise executed a

similarPinanumpaang Salaysaywaiving his rights as tenant. F. Levardo received 2.4M as

disturbance compensation. L. Yatco thereafter sold the landholding to Gonzalo Puyat and

Sons. The Levardos filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of

Donation, Deed of Sale and the waiver of rights.


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In both cases, the plaintiffs grounded their causes of action on the claim that the land in

dispute was covered by Operation Land Transfer (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree

No. 27 (P.D. No. 27). They contend that they were already deemed the owners of the land

on the basis of an alleged Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in the name of their father

Aguido, which was never issued by the DAR, but on the basis of an alleged certified

xerox copy of a Masterlist of tenants wherein his name appeared.

1. PD 27 COVERAGE

P.D. No. 27 should be read in conjunction with Letter of Instruction No. 474 (LOI

No. 474) and the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by

Small Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 (DAR Memorandum). The pertinent

portion of LOI No. 474 is as follows:

1. You shall undertake to place the Land Transfer

Program of the government pursuant to Presidential DecreeNo. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven

hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other

agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate

areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or

other urban purposes from which they derive adequate

income to support themselves and their families. (Emphasis

and underscoring supplied)

The pertinent portion of the DAR Memorandum is as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

5. Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or

less shall not be covered by Operation Land Transfer. The

relation of the land owner and tenant-farmers in these areas

shall be leasehold . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the lands in dispute do not fall under the

coverage of P.D. No. 27. The DAR Memorandum is categorical that lands with

seven hectares or less shall not be covered by OLT.


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2. TERMINATION OF LEASEHOLD BY PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE

COMPENSATION

Based on the evidence on record, respondents paid Aguido P2,000,000.00 and

Hernando P2,417,142.00 as disturbance compensation. A reading of

thePinanumpaang Salaysay executed by petitioners show that they gave up theirleasehold rights "dahil sa aming kagustuhang umiba ng hanap buhay ng higit ang

pagkikitaan kaysa panakahan."The money given by respondents as disturbance

compensation was indeed advantageous to the families of petitioners, as it would

have allowed them to pursue other sources of livelihood.

3. CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFEREFFECT

CitingPagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252:

Moreover, assuming arguendothat CLTs were actuallyissued to petitioners, a CLT does not vest in the

farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein.

At most, the CLT merely evidences the government's

recognition of the grantee as partly qualified to await

the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of

ownership of the land titled by him as provided in P.D.

No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent or

irrevocable.

xxx xxx xxx

LAKEVIEW GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC. v. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG

NAYON, G.R. No. 171253, April 16, 2009

Lakeview was the owner of a 60-hectare parcel of land. The DAR issued a Notice of

Coverage and served a Notice of Acquisition upon Lakeview. The latter opposed the

coverage alleging that: (1) the subject property is not agricultural having been projected

as a golf course prior to 1988; (2) that the development for its conversion and utilizationhas already been commenced; (3) that it is generally mountainous with major portions

having a slope of over 18% and minimal topsoil; and (4) that it has no tenant or

farmworker since the alleged farmer-beneficiaries are mere intruders who entered the

subject property. OSEC denied the protest and directed the acquisition of the landholding.

CLOAs were then issued and registered.
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1. JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE

DAR SECRETARY

CitingAninao v. Asturias Chemical Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 160420, July 28,

2005, 464 SCRA 526, 540:

Noteworthy, the afore-cited Section 2 of DAR

Administrative Order No. 06-00 also provides that the DAR

Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction to classify and identify

landholdings for coverage under the CARP, including

protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of

coverage. The matter of CARP coverage is strictly an

administrative implementation of the CARP whose

competence belongs to the DAR Secretary. Significantly,

the DAR Secretary had already denied petitioner's protest

and determined that the subject property was covered by the

CARP. Such ruling was even affirmed by the Court of

Appeals and this Court. Absent palpable error by these

bodies, of which this Court finds none, their determination

as to the coverage of the subject property under the CARP is

controlling. HAaDcS

xxx xxx xxx

HERMOSO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009

Two lots which form part of a bigger parcel of land were tenanted. The tenants filed an

application for the coverage of the landholding under PD 27. The said application was

granted but the issuance of EP in favor of the applicants was suspended because a

separate case for the declaration of tenancy relationship was filed by the said applicants

with the DARAB. In the latter case, the DARAB ruled that tenancy relationship existed.

Subsequently, the applicants moved for the issuance of EPs in their favor. The OSEC

approved the same. However, upon review by the OP where the owners raised the issue

that the landholding was not within the ambit of PD 27, it having been previously

reclassified by the OSEC as suited for residential, commercial, industrial and urban

purposes.

1. CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS


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The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e.,primary

classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises

agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands

specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same

provision of the Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the

public domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which theymay be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as

secondary classification. Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a

number of government agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural

lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban uses.

2. COVERAGE UNDER PD 27

For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the coverage of P.D.

No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Section 3 (c) of

R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:

(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to

agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not

classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or

industrial land.

and Section 3 (b) specifies agricultural activity as:

(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise orAgricultural Activity means cultivation of the soil,

planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the

harvesting of such farm products, and other farm

activities and practices performed by a farmer in

conjunction with such farming operations done by

persons whether natural or juridical.

On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be considered aswithin the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject lots were

reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial, industrial

or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation

under P.D. No. 27.

3. CONVERSION UNDER RA 3844 AS AMENDED BY RA 6389


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CitingDe Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156965, October 12, 2006, 504

SCRA 238, 249:

Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the

landowner to implement the conversion of the agriculturalland to non-agricultural purposes within a certain period was

deleted. With the enactment of the amendatory law, the

condition imposed on the landowner to implement the

conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural

purpose within a certain period was deleted. The remedy left

available to the tenant is to claim disturbance compensation.

xxx xxx xxx

SOLIMAN v. PASUDECO, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009

Dalmacio Sicat was the owner of a 10 hectare parcel of land. He offered to sell the

subject property to PASUDECO to be used as a housing complex for PASUDECO's

laborers and employees. The land was initially offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per

square meter. This was later reduced to P5.00 per square meter. The Board of Directors

of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution authorizing the purchase of the subject property

at P4.00 per square meter. Thereafter, Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed a Petition

seeking approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject property with payment of

disturbance compensation. The voluntary surrender was approved and the tenancy

relation was extinguished on the date they entered into the agreement. A Deed of Sale

with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter, the

documents needed for the conversion of the land to residential purposes were prepared.

TCT in favor PASUDECO was then issued and registered. However, due to financial

distress, PASUDECO did not complete the construction. For the meantime, though, it did

not authorize any person to occupy the landholding.

Petitioners alleged that in 1970, the manager of PASUDECO made one Ciriaco Almario

his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from petitioners. In turn, C. Almario

remitted the rentals to the manager. In May 1990, C. Almario certified that petitionerswere the actual tenant-tillers of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners deposited their

alleged rentals with the LBP.

The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of the

property into a housing project for its employees in the latter part of April 1990. In May

1990, petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before the


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PARAD to restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective

landholdings. Petitioners together with armed men, entered the property and destroyed

some of their crops. Traversing the complaint, the manager raised as one of his defenses

the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property.

1. TENANCY

ESTABLISHMENT

CitingReyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002, 388 SCRA 471, 481-

482:

Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the

establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by

operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said

act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either express or

implied.

By operation of law simply means the abolition of the

agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion of

share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The other

method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may

either be oral or in writing.

2. IMPLIED TENANCY

Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property

without opposition, does not mean that PASUDECO impliedly recognized the

existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued possession of the land

will not ipso factomake one ade jure tenant,because the principal factor in

determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.

3. ELEMENT OF TENANCYCONSENT

CitingMasaquel v. Orial, G.R. No. 148044, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 51,63 andBautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA

234,citingLastimoza v. Blanco, 110 Phil. 835, 838 [1961]).

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of

the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner,
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lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and

not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no

right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule

otherwise would allow collusion among the unscrupulous tothe prejudice of the true and lawful landholder. cCaSHA

4. ACTUAL AND CONTINUED POSSESSION NOT DETERMINATIVE

OF TENANCY

CitingNicorp Management and Development Corporation v. Leonida de Leon,

G.R. No. 176942 and G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008:

Occupancy and continued possession of the land will

not ipso factomake one a de juretenant, because theprincipal factor in determining whether a tenancy

relationship exists is intent.

5. QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE SHARING SUBSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE

CitingValencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA

666, 690-691:

Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of

sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence;

there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove

the element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a

receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented,

because self-serving statements are inadequate.

6. CERTIFICATION ATTESTING TO TENANT STATUS

NOT BINDINGUPON JUDICIARY

CitingSalmorin v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 169691, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 564, 571-

572:


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The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de

jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the

certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or

an authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC,concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy

relationship between the contending parties, is considered

merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification

does not bind the judiciary.

xxx xxx xxx

TARONA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 170182, June 18, 2009

Respondents Leanos were the owners of the landholding which was registered in thename of their now deceased mother. They filed a complaint for recovery of the

landholding against the Taronas who claimed to be successor-tenants (their uncle

allegedly having been recognized by the respondents' father as such tenant as per a

leasehold agreement between the two). The Leanos denied such claim arguing that the

Taronas could not have been tenants because they were not even residents of the place

where the landholding was located.

1. ELEMENT OF TENANCYPERSONAL CULTIVATION

Clearly, private respondents' evidence, which significantly the petitioners failed torefute, more than substantially proved the impossibility of personal cultivation.

Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the place where the subject land lies in

Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality which is in Caloocan City. Since

Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan City, it would undeniably be

physically impossible for the petitioners to personally cultivate the landholding.

CitingDeloso v. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 585:

While a tenant is not required to be physically present in

the land at all hours of the day and night, such doctrinecannot be stretched to apply to a case wherein the

supposed tenant has chosen to reside in another place so

far from the land to be cultivated that it would be

physically impossible to be present therein with some


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degree of constancy as to allow the tenant to cultivate

the same.

Citing Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106-

107:

It has been held that personal cultivation is an important

factor in determining the existence of an agricultural

lease relationship such that in its absence, an occupant

of a tract of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter

thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure lessee.

2. JURISDICTION OVER DETERMINATION OF CARP COVERAGE

The power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP coverage lies with

the DAR Secretary pursuant to Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Verily, it is explicitly

provided under Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules that matters

involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP and other

agrarian laws and regulations, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable

by the Secretary of the DAR. Moreover, under the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian

Law Implementation (ALI) Cases, set forth in Administrative Order No. 06-00, it is

provided that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over classification and

identification of landholdings for coverage under the CARP, including protests or

oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of coverage. This being so, the CA'sdeclaration regarding CARP coverage of the subject land was premature

considering that the Order of the DAR Regional Director in A.R. Case No. LSD

015703, entitled In Re Protest from CARP Coverage . . . upon which the CA based

its questioned declaration, was still pending review with the Office of the DAR

Assistant Secretary, as per Certification dated February 18, 2005 by the Legal

Affairs Office of the DAR.

3. IRRELEVANCE OF THE ISSUE OF CARP COVERAGE TO TENANCY

ISSUES

In any event, the resolution of the issue of whether the entire property or only part

of it is subject to CARP coverage has no bearing on the issue in this

case,i.e. whether petitioners can be considered bona fide tenants of herein private

respondents.

xxx xxx xxx


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OCTAVIO v. PEROVANO, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009

Perovano was the owner of a landholding which was entered into and planted on by

Octavio, et al. Perovano filed a complaint for ejectment with the RTC. Octavio alleged

that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case since the land was subjected to CARP

coverage. HTCDcS

1. JURISDICTIONIN GENERAL

CitingRimasug v. Martin, G.R. No. 160118, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 703,

712:

At the outset, let us be clear that jurisdiction over the

subject matter of an action is determined by the material

allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the

action is commenced, irrespective of whether theplaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims

or reliefs sought therein. It cannot be made to depend

upon the defenses

Supreme Court Rulings on Agrarian Law 2008-2010

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Transcript of Supreme Court Rulings on Agrarian Law 2008-2010