SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK · PDF fileSEVENTH: Denies knowledge or information...
Transcript of SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK · PDF fileSEVENTH: Denies knowledge or information...
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK
CHRISTOPHER A. HUGHES, ESQ. X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : Index No. 602979/08
Plaintiff, : ANSWER
- against -
MORGAN & FINNEGAN, LLP,
Defendant Morgan & Finnegan, L.L.P., by its attorneys, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz,
Edelman & Dicker LLP, as and for it Answer to the Verified Complaint dated October 15,2008
(the “Complaint”), responds as follows:
ANSWERING FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “1” of the Complaint.
SECOND: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “2” of the Complaint.
THIRD: Admits the allegations in paragraph “3” of the Complaint.
FOURTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “4” of the Complaint.
FIFTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “5” of the Complaint.
SIXTH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “6” of the Complaint.
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SEVENTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “7” of the Complaint.
to form a belief as to the
EIGHTH:
NINTH:
Admits the allegations in paragraph “8” of the Complaint.
Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “9” of the Complaint.
TENTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “1 0” of the Complaint.
ELEVENTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “1 1” of the Complaint.
TWELFTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “12” of the Complaint.
THIRTEENTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “13” of the Complaint.
FOURTEENTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “14” of the Complaint.
FIFTEENTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “1 5” of the Complaint.
SIXTEENTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “16” of the Complaint.
SEVENTEENTH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “17” of the Complaint.
EIGHTEENTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “1 8” of the Complaint.
NINETEENTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “19” of the Complaint.
TWENTIETH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “20” of the Complaint.
TWENTY-FIRST: Admits the allegations in paragraph “21” of the Complaint to the
extent that paragraph “2 1” accurately recites excerpted language.
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TWENTY-SECOND: Denies the allegations in paragraph “22” of the Complaint to the
extent that paragraph “22” accurately recites excerpted language.
TWENTH-THIRD: Admits the allegations in paragraph “23” of the Complaint.
TWENTY-FOURTH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “24” of the Complaint to the
extent that paragraph “24 accurately recites excerpted language.
TWENTY-FIFTH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “25” of the Complaint.
TWENTY-SIXTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “26” of the Complaint. *
TWENTY-SEVENTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “27” of the Complaint.
TWENTY-EIGHTH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “28” of the Complaint.
TWENTY-NINTH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “29” of the Complaint.
THIRTIETH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth
or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “30” of the Complaint.
THIRTY-FIRST: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “31” of the Complaint.
THIRTY-SECOND: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “32” of the Complaint.
ANSWERING FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
THIRTY-THIRD: In response to paragraph “33” of the Complaint, defendant repeats
and re alleges each of his responses to paragraphs 1 through 32 as if alleged at length herein.
THIRTY-FOURTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “34” of the Complaint.
THIRTY-FIFTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “35” of the Complaint.
THIRTY-SIXTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “36” of the Complaint.
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THIRTY-SEVENTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “37” of the Complaint.
ANSWERING SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
THIRTY-EIGHTH: In response to paragraph “38” of the Complaint, defendant repeats
and re alleges each of his responses to paragraphs 1 through 37 as if alleged at length herein.
THIRTY-NINTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “39” of the Complaint.
FORTIETH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “40” of the Complaint.
FORTY-FIRST: Denis the allegations in paragraph “41” of the Complaint.
FORTY-SECOND: Denies the allegations in paragraph “42” of the Complaint.
FORTY-THIRD: Denies the allegations in paragraph “43” of the Complaint.
FORTY-FOURTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “44” of the Complaint.
FORTY-FIFTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “45” of the Complaint.
ANSWERING THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
FORTY-SIXTH: In response to paragraph “46” of the Complaint, defendant repeats and
re alleges each of his responses to paragraphs 1 through 45 as if alleged at length herein.
FORTY-SEVENTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “47” of the Complaint.
FORTY-EIGHTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “48” of the Complaint.
FORTY-NINTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “49” of the Complaint.
FIFTIETH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “50” of the Complaint.
FIFTY-FIRST: Denies the allegations in paragraph “51” of the Complaint.
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ANSWERING FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FIFTY-SECOND: In response to paragraph “52” of the Complaint, defendant repeats
and re alleges each of his responses to paragraphs 1 through 5 1 as if alleged at length herein.
FIFTY-THIRD: Admits the allegations in paragraph “53” of the Complaint.
FIFTY-FOURTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “54” of the Complaint.
FIFTY-FIFTH: Denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity of the allegations in paragraph “55” of the Complaint.
FIFTY-SIXTH: Denies the allegations in paragraph “56” of the Complaint.
ANSWERING FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
FIFTY-SEVENTH: In response to paragraph “57” of the Complaint, defendant repeats
and re alleges each of his responses to paragraphs 1 through 56 as if alleged at length herein.
FIFTY-EIGHTH: Admits the allegations in paragraph “58” of the Complaint.
FIFTY-NINTH:
SIXTIETH:
Denies the allegations in paragraph “59” of the Complaint.
Denies the allegations in paragraph “60” of the Complaint.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
First Affirmative Defense
SIXTY-FIRST: The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Second Affirmative Defense
SIXTY-SECOND: The Complaint is barred by the New York Statute of Frauds
andor the General Obligations Law.
Third Affirmative Defense
SIXTY-THIRD: The Complaint is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.
Fourth Affirmative Defense
The Complaint is barred by release. SIXTY-FOURTH:
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Fifth Affirmative Defense
SIXT'J .FIFTH:Upon information and belief, if plaintiff sufferec. or sustained any loss,
damage or injury as alleged in the Complaint such damages were the direct and proximate
result of his own conduct.
Sixth Affirmative Defense
SIXTY -SIXTH: Upon information and belief, defendant's liability, if any, is
limited and governed by the provisions set forth in Article 14 of the CPLR.
Seventh Affirmative Defense
SIXTY-SEVENTH: Upon information and belief, defendant's liability, if any, is
limited and governed by the provisions set forth in Article 16 of the CPLR.
Eighth Affirmative Defense
SIXTY-EIGTH: This matter should be dismissed in favor of enforcement of the
contract provision requiring arbitration of any dispute between plaintiff and defendant.
Ninth Affirmative Defense
SIXTY-NINTH: This matter should not proceed for plaintiffs failure to join all
necessary parties.
AS AND FOR COUNTER CLAIMS
SEVENTIETH: In or about June and July of 2007, Morgan & Finnegan was exploring
ways in which to protect the firm including exploring ways to discourage departure from the
firm by revising the partnership agreement dated as of January 1, 1995 (the "2005
Agreement").
SEVENTY-FIRST: Prior to August 13,2007, drafts of the proposed revisions to the
2005 Agreement were circulated among Morgan & Finnegan partners, including plaintiff.
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SEVENTY-SECOND : On or about August 9,2007, plaintiff had a telephone
conversation with a member of the Morgan & Finnegan executive committee where it was
communicated to plaintiff that it was likely that the 2005 Agreement would be revised at the
upcoming partnership meeting.
SEVENTY-THIRD: By e-mail dated August 12,2007, plaintiff gave authority to his
then partner to vote by proxy against the proposed revisions to the 2005 Agreement.
Specifically, plaintiff instructed his proxy to (1) vote against the proposed draft of the new
partnership agreement as circulated to the partnership, (2) vote againstmy motion to waive the
14-day notice for any amendments that may be proposed for the partnership agreement, (3)
vote against each of the additional proposed changes circulated amongst the partnership by
email dated August 10, and (4) vote against (i) any change to the management book method of
calculating partner capital, (ii) any proposal which would eliminate any partner from sharing in
contingency recoveries, (iii) any new provision regarding notice required prior to a vote to alter
the partnership agreement, and (iv) any other proposal that would create disincentives for any
partner whether they be active, retired or resigned.
SEVENTY-FOURTH: The 2005 Agreement states in relevant part: "7(a) Except where
expressly provided otherwise hereinafter any changes or amendments to the terms of this
Agreement may be made only by the affirmative action of a majority of the partners at a
meeting of the partnership held after fifteen (1 5 ) days written notice of the proposed changes or
amendments and the meeting date has been given, unless such notice shall have been waived by
a vote of the holders of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding units of participation as
assigned in Paragraph No. 6 herein,. . .I'
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SEVENTY-FIFTH: On August 13,2007, a meeting of the Morgan & Finnegan
partnership was convened and by a majority vote, the Morgan & Finnegan partnership duly
voted to amend the 2005 Agreement in full accord with and the 2005 Agreement and in
particular Paragraph 7(a).
SEVENTY-SIXTH: As of August 13,2007, the operative partnership agreement
became the agreement entitled the "2007 Partnershp Agreement" (hereinafter "2007
Agreement"). The partnership of Morgan & Finnegan duly voted to enact section 13(b) of the
2007 Agreement which provides that a partner who withdraws andlfails to give proper notice I
can be obligated to relinquish any bonus monies paid within the twelve months preceding upon
a vote of two-thirds of the partnership units.
SEVENTY-SEVENTH: The 2007 Agreement dictates, inter alia, that (1) the capital
account of a withdrawing partner such as plaintiff would be computed according to the Tax
Basis and not the Management Book method; (2) a withdrawing partner such as plaintiff is no
entitled to receive benefit of any deferred or contingent fee paid to Morgan & Finnegan; (3) any
dispute regarding the 2007 Agreement would be submitted to arbitration and (4) a withdrawing
partner such as plaintiff may be obligated in certain circumstances to relinquish any bonus
monies received withm 12 months preceding the date of withdrawal.
SEVENTY-EIGHTH: On or about August 16,2007, plaintiff resigned from Morgan &
Finnegan.
SEVENTY-NINTH: Plaintiff did not provide sufficient notice of his resignation.
EIGHTIETH: Since some time prior to plaintiffs resignation, the 2007 Agreement has
been the operative partnership agreement at Morgan & Finnegan. The rights, obligations and
terms of plaintiffs withdrawal from Morgan & Finnegan is determined by the 2007 Agreement.
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EIGHTY-FIRST: The rights and obligations as between plaintiff and Morgan &
Finnegan are determined by the 2007 Agreement.
EIGHTY-SECOND: Upon information and belief, plaintiff knew that the 2005
Agreement was going to be amended and replaced with the 2007 Agreement. Plaintiff resigned
fi-om the firm as quickly as he could in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the 2007 Agreement
because, upon information and belief, he knew that the very arguments plaintiff asserts in this
litigation are wholly precluded by the plain, unambiguous terms of the 2007 Agreement.
EIGHTY-THIRD: Plaintiff opposed amending the 2007 Amendment because it created
several disincentives to withdrawing as a partner fiom Morgan & Finnegan. In the past,
plaintiff accepted modifications to the 2005 Agreement when it benefited plaintiff. Plaintiff
cannot pick and choose among the partnership agreements and modifications thereto.
EIGHTY-FOURTH: Over plaintiffs opposing vote, the 2007 Agreement was
implemented by the Morgan & Finnegan partnership. Plaintiffs disapproval of the 2007
Agreement does not entitle him to be governed by the 2005 Agreement.
EIGHTY-FIFTH: Plaintiffs reliance on the 2005 Agreement is without basis.
EIGHTY-SIXTH: Plaintiffs capital contribution was properly calculated according to
the Tax Method.
EIGHTY-SEVENTH: Plaintiff is not entitled to any share of contingency fees
recovered by Morgan & Finnegan.
EIGHTY-EIGHTH: The Morgan & Finnegan partnership duly voted pursuant to
paragraph 13@) of the 2007 Agreement to rescind the bonus awarded to plaintiff in or about
January 2007. Plaintiff is required to return his bonus awarded in or about January 2007 which
was approximately $275,000.
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EIGHTY-NINTH: Plaintiff was obligated to pursue any dispute with respect to the
2007 Agreement in an arbitration.
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM: BREACH OF CONTRACT
NINETIETH: Plaintiff was obligated to adhere to the 2007 Agreement.
NINETY-FIRST: For the reasons stated above, plaintiff violated the 2007
Agreement by initiating this meritless litigation in lieu of an arbitration as is required by the
2007 Agreement.
NINETY-SECOND: Plaintiff has breached the terms of the 2007 Agreement Morgan .
& Finnegan has suffered damages thereby in an amount that has not been quantified.
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM: BREACH OF CONTRACT
NINETY-THIRD: The 2007 Agreement recites that a partner may withdraw from
Morgan & Finnegan at any time upon not less than 30-days written notice.
NINETY-FOURTH: Plaintiff breached his obligation to provide 30-days notice of his
intent to withdraw.
NINETY-FIFTH: Under the terms of the 2007 Agreement, because of his breach in
failing to provide sufficient notice of hs intent to withdraw as a partner, plaintiff must return
the $275,000 bonus awarded in January 2007.
NINETY-SIXTH: For his failure to provide notice and failure to return his $275,000
bonus, plaintiff has breached the 2007 Agreement causing damages to Morgan & Finnegan in
an amount that has not been quantified but is at least $275,000.
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM: MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED
NINETY-SEVENTH: Plaintiffs refusal to return the $275,000 bonus awarded to him is
a violation of his contractual, fiduciary and legal duties to Morgan & Finnegan.
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NINETY-EIGHTH: Accordingly, plaintiff is liable for his breaches to Morgan &
Finnegan and has caused damages to Morgan & Finnegan in an amount that has not been
quantified but is at least $275,000.
WHEREFORE, defendants demand judgment against plaintiff as follows:
(a) Dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety;
(b) Relief on the first, second and third counterclaim causes of action;
(c) For damages in the s u m to be determined at trial but believed to be in excess of
$275,000;
(d) Interest, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as permitted by law or statute; and
(e) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.
Dated: New York, New York November 21,2008
By:
Richard B. Porter Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant Morgan h Finnegan, LLP 150 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017-5639
File No. 01846.00044 (212) 490-3000
TO: FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiff 488 Madison Ave. New York, NY 10022 212-980-0 120
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) ) ss.:
JOHN SWEENEY, being duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
I am member of Morgan & Finnegan, LLP and I have read the foregoing
Verified Answer and know the contents thereof; and the same is true to my knowledge except
as to the matters therein stated upon information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe
them to be true. The grounds for my belief as to all matters not stated upon personal
knowledge is a review of the file in my possession.
Sworn to before me this A
3 /,& day of November, 2008
BEITINA MARIA MIRAGUA Notary Publlc, State of New York
No. 034974913 Qualified In Bronx County
Certfficate flled In New York County Commission Expires November 26, +W. 9 6 16.
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I . , ’
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF NEW YORK )
COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) )ss.:
ANN MARIE COUGHLIN, being duly sworn, deposes and says: that deponent is not a party to the action, is over 18 years of age and resides in Kings County, New York.
That on the 21st day of November, 2008, deponent served the within Answer upon:
FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN & SELZ, P.C. Attorneys for Plaintiff 488 Madison Ave. New York, N Y 10022 2 12-980-0 120
at the address designated by said attorney(s) for that purpose by depositing a true copy of
same enclosed in a properly addressed wrapper via Rabbit Messenger Service
Ann Mane Coualin fl
Sworn to before me this 2 1 st day of November 2008
Notary Public
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Index No. 602979/08 Thomas W. Hyland and Richard B. Porter 01846.00044
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK I COUNTY OF NEW YORK
CHRISTOPHER A. HUGHES, ESQ.
Plaintiff(s),
-against-
MORGAN & FINNEGAN, LLP ’
Defendant(s).
ANSWER
WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER LLP
Attorneys For Defendant
150 East 42nd Street New York, NY 10017-5639
2 12.490.3000
Dated, New York, New York tdn\ramhar 91 qnnn
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