Supreme Court en Banc as Presidential Electoral Tribunal

7/29/2019 Supreme Court en Banc as Presidential Electoral Tribunal

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Supreme Court en banc as Presidential Electoral Tribunal Sole judge of all contents relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and maypromulgate its rules for the purpose

NOTA BENE:

No pre-proclamation controversy is allowed against Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidates, EXCEPT: thecorrection of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns or State of Votes

Only the candidate who garners the second or third highest number of votes may question the proclamation of awinner.

COMELEC has no jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial andcongressional elections; Correction of Manifest Error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with COMELEC enbanc

Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000

The case involves the elective office of congressman of one legislative district, which is contested on the ground ofmanifest error arising from the non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, thus making the same incomplete.

While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies, the exception to the general rulecan be found under sec. 15 of RA 7166 which prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial andcongressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.

The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuumin these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Sec. 15allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even inelections for president, vice-president and members of the House for the simple reason that the correction of manifesterror will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.

Correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc (rule 27, sec. 5,1993 Rules of the COMELEC). This is another exception to the rule that pre-proclamation controversies must first beheard and decided by a division of the Commission.

In determination of the case, the COMELEC must observe due process of law since this involves the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.

Protestant cannot be substituted by widow in case of death of the former pending resolution of election protest; Substitutemust be a real party in interest

Poe vs. Arroyo, PET Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

FACTS:

GMA and FPJ both ran for President in the May 10, 2004 elections. GMA obtained the highest number of votes, with FPJat second place. On July 23, 2004, after GMA took her Oath of Office, FPJ seasonably filed an election protest but while

case was pending, FPJ died of cardio-pulmonary arrest. Mrs. FPJ, through counsel, filed a petition for substitution,substituting herself for her deceased husband.

ISSUE: Whether or not the window of a deceased candidate is a proper party in an election contest

RULING:

...only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers havein effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, ifthe declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or 3rd highestnumber of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.


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Suppletory application of the Rules of Court

Rule 3, Sec. 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. Itcan be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legalrepresentative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said Sec. 16. However, in our application of this rule to anelection contest, we have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a propertytransmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substation by the widow or the heirs in electioncontests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest. In Vda. De De Mesa vs. Mencias, we recognizedsubstitution upon the death of the protestee but denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the realparties in interest. Similarly, in the later case of De la Victoria vs. Commission on Elections, we struck down the claim ofthe surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in analogous casesbefore other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a deceased protestant, in cases where the widow isnot a real party in interest, we denied substitution by the wife or heirs.

Who may question: Real Party in Interest

...We have held...that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest isnot purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court ofall authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention by only by a realparty in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party whois entitled to the avails of the suit. In Vda. De De Mesa vs. Mencias and Lomugdang vs. Javier, we permitted substitutionby the vice-mayor since the vice-mayor is a real party in interest considering that if the protest succeeds and the protesteeis unseated, the vice-mayor succeeds to the office of the mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected cannot

assume office. In contrast, herein movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President.Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to thiselection protest.

Effect of resumption of old post on the election protest

Santiago vs. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, Feb. 13, 1996

In assuming the office of Senator, the protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her election protests, therebymaking it moot.

The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with

the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would beProtestant Santiagos term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or atthe very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interestinvolved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to rendermoot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the auraof uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-to crucial political stability of thenation during this period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential ElectoralTribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implicationsthereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond theperiods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof; (3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4)The cash deposit, or the first P 100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) Thepetition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion

to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded asaffirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on suchgrounds. In sum, if an election be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if ithas become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.

The protestant abandoned her election protest when she waived the revision of the remaining ballots and failed to informthe tribunal whether she still intends to present additional evidence after the completion of the revision of the ballots fromthe pilot areas

This Tribunal cannot close its eyes to the fact that the Protestant has decided to waive the revision of the remainingunrevised ballots from 4,017 precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilot areas. This is anunabashed reversal from her original stand in her Motion and Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Taking this intoaccount, this Tribunal declared in its resolution of 21 October 1993: After deliberating on the foregoing pleadings and the


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arguments of the parties, the Tribunal rules for the Protestant insofar as the revision of the remaining ballot boxes fromher pilot areas are concerned, and against the immediate application of Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal to theProtestee in respect of the Counter-Protest. At this stage of the proceedings in this case it cannot be reasonablydetermined whether the revised ballots are considerable enough to establish a trend either in favor of or against theProtestant as would justify an appropriate action contemplated in Rule 61 of the Rules of the Tribunal, or whether theunrevised ballots from said areas would not, in the language of the Protestant, materially affect the result of therepresentative sample of the ballot boxes so far revised. As to the 1,300 ballot boxes from Makati, the proper time toraise the objections to the ballot boxes and its contents would be during the revision stage. Consequently, we resolvedtherein to: A. ORDER the revision of the remaining unrevised ballot boxes enumerated in the aforequoted paragraph A tothe 5 October 1995 Resolution and for the purpose to DiRECT the Acting Clerk of Court of the Tribunal to collect saidballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia from their respective custodians in the event that theirrevisions in connection with other election protests in which they are involved have been terminated, and if such revisionsare not yet completed, to coordinate with the appropriate tribunal or court in which such other election protests arepending and which have already obtained custody of the ballot boxes and started revision with the end in view of eitherseeking expeditious revisions in such other election protests or obtaining the custody of the ballot boxes and relatedelection documents and paraphernalia for their immediate delivery to the Tribunal; and B. REQUIRE the Protestant toinform the Tribunal, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from herpilot areas she would present evidence in connection therewith. Until the present,however, the Protestant has notinformed the Tribunal whether after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still intends topresent evidence in connection therewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifest indication that she no longerintends to do so.

Sec. 6: Privilege and Salary

PRIVILEGES:

1. Official residence (Malacanang Palace)2. Immunity from suit not provided in the Constitution; to prevent distraction from performance of duties

SALARY

Fixed by law

Cannot be decreased during tenure (actual time he held office) and cannot be increased during his term (only

upon expiration of the term) Shall not receive during tenure any other emolument from Government or any other source

Sec. 7 and 8: Assumption of Office and Succession WHEN: before noon of June 30

If President-elect fails to qualify, dies or is permanently incapacitated, Vice-President-elect becomes the President

If the President-elect becomes incapacitated temporarily, the Vice-President-elect will act as President until sucha time that the President can assume office

If there is failure to elect the president, the Vice-President will assume or act as President

If the President, during his term, dies, gets disabled permanently, is removed from office, or resigns, the Vice-President becomes the President

SUCCESSION IN CASE OF VACANCY:

1. Vice-President2. Senate President3. Speaker of the House

Sec. 9: Vacancy of Vice-PresidencyThe President shall nominate one from the Senate and the House of Reps who shall assume office upon confirmation bya majority vote of all the Members of the Houses, voting separately


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Sec. 10: Special Election in Case of VacancyWHEN: 10:00 a.m. of the third day after the vacancyCongress will convene without need of a call and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to be held notearlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from time of such call

Sec. 11: Acting PresidentGROUND: inability to discharge the powers and duties of the officeHOW: written declaration of the President or majority of his CabinetVice-President shall assume office as Acting PresidentRESUMPTION OF OFFICE: also through written declaration of the President; if majority of Cabinet denies suchdeclaration, Congress shall decide the issue (if not in session, Congress will convene within 48 hrs) within 10 days (12days if not in session), by 2/3 vote

Sec. 12: Illness of the PresidentPublic shall be informed of the state of his healthMembers of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forcesshall not be denied access to the President during such illness

Sec. 13: Prohibition

1. Cannot hold any other office or employment during tenure2. Cannot, during tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession, participate in any business or be financially

interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government3. Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office4. Presidents spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil degree be appointed as members

of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including GOCCs and subsidiaries

WHO CANNOT HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE DURING TENURE:

1. President2. Vice-President3. Cabinet Members4. Deputies and Assistants

EXCEPTIONS:

1. When Vice-President is appointed as member of the Cabinet2. When Vice-President acts as President3. When Secretary of Justice is also a member of the Judiciary

Q: Does the President have the same prohibition as Congress? A: No, because Congress is only prohibited from holding offices in GOCCs and any other government instrumentality,

agency or subsidiary during term while Executive is prohibited from holding any other office, whether public or privateduring tenure.

Q: What is ex officio capacity?A: When an official holds other duties for the same office where he does not receive additional compensation and theoffice is required by his primary function.

Sec. 14 and 15: Appointments extended by Acting President

Effective unless revoked by the elected President within 90 days from his assumption or reassumption of office


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Acting President shall not make appointments 2 mos immediately before the next presidential elections and up tothe end of his term, EXCEPT: temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies thereinwill prejudice public service or endanger public safety

Sec. 16: Appointing Power

TYPES OF APPOINTMENT:

1. Regular2. Ad Interim3. Temporary

Acting Appointments, effect and validity (See Pimental vs. Executive Secretary)

Q: When is Congress considered to be in recess? A: Recess it not the time between the adjournment of Congress and the start of its regular session. The recess referred tohere is the times of interval of the session of the same Congress.

Q: How long will ad interim appointments last?A: Such appointments will last until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of

Congress.

WHO ARE APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT:

1. Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forcesfrom the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in thisConstitution requires confirmation from Commission on Appointments

2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone

Nature of Ad Interim Appointment; Rights of Ad Interim Appointee; How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated; Effect of

Ad Interim Appointment as to Reappointment

Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

FACTS:

COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as Acting Director IV of the EID. Such appointment was renewed in temporarycapacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim,Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. Thethree took their oaths of office and assumed their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not acton said appointments, PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interimappointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art.IX-C

Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra andTuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequentassumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art.IX-C

RULING:


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Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer bewithdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmation by theCommission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interimappointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or untilthe next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary orcompulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or untilthe next adjournment of the Congress.

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can nolonger be withdrawn or revoked by the President. xxx

...the term ad interim appointment means a permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime thatCongress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The termalthough not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

Rights of an Ad Interim Appointee

An ad interim appointee who has qualif ied and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee andtherefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitution protection that [n]o officer or employee in the civil service

shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment ispossible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocationthereafter is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the officewhich is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice andhearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

How Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is thedisapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment ofCongress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutoryconditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in

effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is theConstitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or designationin a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary oracting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that theConstitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including theCOMELEC xxx

Was the renewal of appointment valid?

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no longer beextended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in the exercise of itschecking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusalby the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since theConstitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee aswell as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not because of theconstitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments towithhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments toorganize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by theCommission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission onAppointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the


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President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived by another ad interimappointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because areappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment canbe revived by a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of theConstitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

Appointment Power of President; Power of Control

Rufino vs. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006

Appointment Power of President

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first grouprefers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armedforces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by theConstitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third grouprefers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by lawvest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of

Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers.

The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The Presidentappoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The Presidentappoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of adepartment, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under thethird group of officers.

Scope of Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions or Boards

The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-rankedofficers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word inferior to the less disparaging phrase lower in rankpurely for style. However, the clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of theheads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The expresslanguage of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the headsof departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with thepower to appoint.

Congress may vest the authority to appoint only in the heads of the named offices

Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the heads of departments,agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. xxx

In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, actingas such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vestedin the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is thechairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, thelaw may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-rankedofficers.

The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace.Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power toappoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislativedelegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of thecommission or board.


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This is in contrast to the Presidents power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself andthus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on theSupreme Court en banc and on the Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to legislativelimitations or conditions.The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the heads of thespecified offices, and in no other person. The word heads refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards andnot to their members xxx.

Presidents Power of Control

The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from theDepartment Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does notrequire any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch.xxx

The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of theindependent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCPmust fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not placed by law ororder creating them under any specific department falls under the Office of the President.

Since the President exercises control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, the President necessarilyexercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have

control of all executive x x x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive offic e one performing executive functions outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents power ofcontrol. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.

The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or decision s of all officers in the Executive branch. This is truewhether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Thepower of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exerciseof discretion.

In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises control of all the executive departments,bureaus, and offices. There can be no instance under the Constitution whe re an officer of the Executive branch is outsidethe control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive powerexercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the

President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis.

The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of thePresident in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executivebranch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of hisconstitutional power of control over all the executive x x x offices. If the Legislature can do this with the Executivebranch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions ofcertain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balancesfinely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches.

Of course, the Presidents power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and decisions arejudicial in nature and subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrativesupervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are merely under the generalsupervision of the President.

Sec. 17: Power of Control

Power to Reorganize

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001

FACTS:

Pres. Estrada issued EO 191, deactivating the EIIB and transferring its functions to the BOC and NBI. As a result, the EIIBpersonnel were deemed separated from service.


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RULING:

Deactivation vs. Abolition

At first glance, it seems that the resolution of this case hinges on the questionDoes the deactivation of EIIB constituteabolition of an office? However, after coming to terms with the prevailing law and jurisprudence, we are certain that theultimate queries should be a) Does the President have the authority to reorganize the executive department? And b)How should the reorganization be carried out?

Surely, there exists a distinction between the words deactivate and abolish. To deactivate means to render inactive orineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, wh ile to abolish means to do away with, to annul,abrogate or destroy completely. In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly andpermanently. Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the officecontinues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and abolition are bothreorganization measures.

GR: Congress has power to abolish

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceedsfrom the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public officeis either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by theConstitution itself, may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, thePresidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant himthe broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.

What law gives President power to reorganize?

In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his authority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999 General Appropriations Act), a provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin,thus;

Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the President of the Philippines, nochanges in key positions or organizational units in any department or agency shall be authorized in their respective

organizational structures and funded from appropriations provided by this Act.

We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the President to effectorganizational changes in the department or agency under the executive structure. Such a ruling further finds support inSection 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and otherentities in the Executive Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates,missions, objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify activities which areno longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased-out or abolished; and (c)adopt measures that will result in the streamlined organization and improved overall performance of their respectiveagencies. Section 78 ends up with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agencyorganization and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of thePresident. The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to sustain.

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executivebranch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes anexpress grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the AdministrativeCode of 1987), the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economyand efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. InCanonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, orabolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of theexisting structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility betweenthem. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it issubject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize.

Was the reorganization valid?


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It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch or agency ofthe executive department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction,reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out ingood faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil serviceemployees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions inthe new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performingsubstantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status ofappointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concernedand the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removalviolates the order of separation.

While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we find the latter to have additionalnew powers. The Task Force Aduana, being composed of elements from the Presidential Security Group (PSG) andIntelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), has the essential power to effect searches, seizures andarrests. The EIIB did not have this power. The Task Force Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of anydepartment, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations;and to use their personnel, facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did not have this power. And, the Task Force Aduanahas the additional authority to conduct investigation of cases involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly granted tothe EIIB.

Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil Sevice Commission, we ruled

that a reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the bureaucracy and institute economy and greaterefficiency in its operation.

Valid abolition of office is not separation

Lastly, we hold that petitioners right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in our law than that theabolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. Validabolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents.

Alter Ego Doctrine or Qualified Political Agency

Sec. of DOTC vs. Mabalot, 378 SCRA 129 (2000)

FACTS:

The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman MO 96-735, transferring the regional functions of that office to DOTCCARRegional Office, pending creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued DO 97-1025, establishingthe DOTCCAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in theCAR subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.

ISSUE: W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on thepowers of the legislative department

HELD:

SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.

In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders,Court upholds. The President, through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, may legally and validly decree thereorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of the DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office of CARwith the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office ofthe LTFRB.

There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and (3) by authority of law.This case falls under the third category.

The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and establish the LTFRB-CAR RegionaOffice. This is anchored on the Presidents power of control under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.


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Control

By definition, control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had donein the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. It includes the authorityto order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.

Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers, stating that unless Congress providesotherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided forunder the laws xxx

What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. These decrees expressly grantthe President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the powerto group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of DOTCCAR valid?

In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, areorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Thereorganization in the instant case was decreed in the interest of service and for purposes of economy and moreeffective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region. It thus bear the earmarks of goodfaith.

Power of President to Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans may be delegated to Secretary of Finance but must firstsecure Prior Consent; What Powers May Not Be Delegated

Constantino vs. Cuisia, .G.R. No. 106064, Oct. 13, 2005

Power of President to contract or guarantee foreign loans (Sec. 20, Art. VII)

For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes do not constitutethe loan contract or guarantee contemplated in the Constitution and are consequently prohibited. Sec. 20, Art. VII ofthe Constitution provides xxx

The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee

foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debtinstruments are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions thatwould unduly burden the powers of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution shouldbe construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of judiciallegislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act.

The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that theloans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard, we note that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amendedby Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet PublicExpenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of, inter alia,bonds.xxx

Under the foregoing provisions, sovereign bonds may be issued not only to supplement government expenditures but alsoto provide for the purchase, redemption, or refunding of any obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the PhilippineGovernment.

On the Buyback Scheme

In their Comment, petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with Congress and was deliberately withheldby the Constitution from the President. It is true that in the balance of power between the three branches of government, itis Congress that manages the countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending powers. However, the law -makingauthority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing by virtue of which thePresident is empowered to execute debt payments without the need for further appropriations.xxx


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Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power. Every statute is understood,by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to makeeffective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequencesas may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The President is not empowered to borrow money from foreignbanks and governments on the credit of the Republic only to be left bereft of authority to implement the payment despiteappropriations therefor.

On Delegation of Power

Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreigndebts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which theexercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. Theysubmit that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country.

Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional and legal imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualifiedpolitical agency.

The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing thegovernments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise therequired amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.

If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power,he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailedactivitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may betaken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of theMonetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreedplace of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence ofcabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper thePresidents effectivity in running the government.Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency xxx

What powers may not be delegated

xxx There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve

the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over thoseexercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeascorpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fallwithin this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The listis by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas andexceptional import.

We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the sameexceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin toany contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from theestablished functions of governance.

Secretary of Finance must get prior consent of President

Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of the President isbound to secure the latters prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting orguaranteeing foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this regard by the alter ego willdefinitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein succeeded in demonstrating that the President actually withheldapproval and/or repudiated the Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the acts of respondents.Notably though, petitioners do not assert that respondents pursued the Program without prior authorization of thePresident or that the terms of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents authorization. Congruent with theavowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure existing foreign debts, the lack of showing that shecountermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude that said acts carried presidential approval.

Sec. 18: Commander-in-Chief Powers of the President:


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Power to call on the military or armed forces

Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus

Power to declare martial law

CALLING OUT POWER

Conditions for calling out the armed forces:

To suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion

Whenever it becomes necessary

MARTIAL LAW

Conditions for declaration of Martial Law:

When there is (1) rebellion or (2) invasion (grounds)

Public safety requires the declaration

NOTA BENE: There must be actual rebellion or invasion. Differ this from the calling out power which does not requireactual rebellion or invasion but only that whenever it (the exercise of the calling out power) becomes necessary tosuppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion. (See Sanlakas vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004 )

What happens when Martial Law is declared:

No suspension of operation of the Constitution

No supplanting of the functioning of the civil courts and legislative assemblies

No conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function

No automatic suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

Constitutional guards against the power to declare Martial Law:

Will last only for 60 days, unless sooner revoked by Congress

Within 48 hours after declaration, President is required to submit a report to Congress

Congress shall revoke or extend the period by jointly voting with an absolute majority and President may notreverse such revocation

If Congress is not in session, they shall convene within 24 hours from such declaration without need for call

Supreme Court may nullify the declaration on the ground of lack of factual basis, judgment to be rendered within30 days from its filing by any ordinary citizen

SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(NOTE: the conditions and effect of the suspension of the writ is similar to declaration of martial law)

Restrictions to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:

Apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion

Apply only to persons judicially charged for offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion


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The person arrested must be judicially charged within 3 days from arrest, otherwise he shall be released

Sec. 19: Executive Clemencies

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES:

1. Amnesty2. Pardon3. Reprieve4. Commutation5. Remit fines and forfeitures

Amnesty an act of grace by the Chief Executive as a result of the grant of amnesty, the criminal liability of the offenderand all the effects of the crime are completely erased. It is a blanket pardon given to a class of persons who committed

crimes that are political in nature. To be valid, Congress has to concur with a majority vote (thus, it is a public act) and theaccused must admit his guilt.

Pardon a private act of the President granted after judgment by final conviction for ordinary offenses. It may be absoluteor condition, in which case, acceptance of condition if burdensome to the accused is necessary. The effect is torelieve the accused from further punishment, thus, if given after sentence has been served, its effect is to extinguish theaccessory penalties. In case of administrative cases, effect is reinstatement but no payment of backwages.

Reprieve discretionary upon the President to suspend the enforcement of judgment

Sec. 20: Power to Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans

Scope of Power (See Constantino vs. Cuisia)

Sec. 21: Treaty-making Power

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all theMembers of the Senate.

Power to enter into and ratify treaties is sole prerogative of the Executive (SeeAKBAYAN vs. Aquino)

Power to Ratify by President vs. Senates Power to Concur

Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, Oct. 10, 2000

Sec. 21, Art. VII vs. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII

One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the Constitution applies, with regardto the exercise by the senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA. Petitioners argue that Section 25, ArticleXVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basingarrangement but an agreement which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in jointmilitary exercises.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties orinternational agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all theMembers of the Senate.


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Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:

After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of Americaconcerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under atreaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by thepeople in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.

Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at leasttwo-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, validand binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or internationalagreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extraditionor tax treatise or those economic in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines,regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate tobe valid and effective.

In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreignmilitary bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of therequisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on thePhilippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed i n thePhilippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a nationalreferendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.

It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually share somecommon ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitoryin mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause No treaty x x x, and Section 25 contains thephrase shall not be allowed. Additionally, in both instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render thetreaty or international agreement valid and effective.

To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senateextended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VIIor Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to complywith the strict constitutional requirements.

On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting thePhilippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the

United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, orfacilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votesrequired to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.

Sec. 21, Art. VII should be read together with Sec. 25, Art. XVIII

At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with whenthe Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditionsare sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when sorequired by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized asa treaty by the other contracting state.

There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by theSenate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the generalrequirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in thelatter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary sinceCongress has not required it.

As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be validand effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly concurred in by the Senate.


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Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is clearly required sothat the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25,Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by theSenate, it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied inSection 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement,be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated inisolation to section 21, Article, VII.

As noted, the concurrence requirement under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to the provisions ofSection 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25,Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-theVFA in the instant case.

Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24) Senators. Withouta tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, favorably acting on the proposal isan unquestionable compliance with the requisite number of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact thatthere were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made, will not alter in any significantway the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA, even ifthe two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this regard, the fundamental law is clearthat two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to render compliance with the strictconstitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the subject treaty.

What constitutes a treaty

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts oracknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case,to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning tothe phrase. xxx

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, underinternational law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses theelements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.

Ratification by President vis--vis Concurrence of Senate

Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the Senate should betaken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant dutyto uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.

Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the casemay be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislationthe process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:(a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratificationshould be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention ofthe State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressedduring the negotiation.

In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The roleof the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.

With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between thePhilippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principlesof international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution,declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the landand adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

Who has power to ratify treaties?

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ andauthority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nations foreignpolicy; his dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded. Wielding vast powers an influence, his conduct


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in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether."

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation ofthe VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in thelawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Intothe field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts orjudgment calls of the President involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and thosenecessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of his constitutional powersand thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of graveabuse of power or discretion.

Senates Power to Concur

As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus, once the Senateperforms that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrencecannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power, much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senatein the exercise of its discretion and acting within the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simplyperformed a task conferred and sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.

For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent bodypossessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whateveraction it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In

this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and ofchecks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democraticgovernment such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthysystem of checks and balances indispensable toward our nations pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough,rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province ofthe courts to inquire.

Power of President to Reclassify Public Lands and Sell the Same

Reclaimed Lands vs. Submerged Lands; When invalid sales may no longer be invalidated

Chavez vs. PEA & AMARI, G.R. No. 133250, May 6, 2003

FACTS:

The government through the PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI, a private corporation, in order to reclaim 157.84hectares of lands comprising the Freedom Islands and 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay. The JVAprovides, among others, the transfer of ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the JVA is valid

RULING:

Reclaimed Lands are Alienable Lands of the Public Domain

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name

of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell ortransfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject tothe ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

Submerged Areas are Inalienable

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain untilclassified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. Thegovernment can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Onlythen can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources thegovernment can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside thecommerce of man.


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JVA is invalid

The prevailing doctrine before, during and after the signing of the Amended JVA is that private corporations cannot hold,except by lease, alienable lands of the public domain. This is one of the two main reasons why the Decision annulled theAmended JVA. The other main reason is that submerged areas of Manila Bay, being part of the sea, are inalienable andbeyond the commerce of man, a doctrine that has remained immutable since the Spanish Law on Waters of 1886.Clearly, the Decision merely reiterates, and does not overrule, any existing judicial doctrine.

Even on the characterization of foreshore lands reclaimed by the government, the Decision does not overrule existing lawor doctrine. Since the adoption of the Regalian doctrine in this jurisdiction, the sea and its foreshore areas have alwaysbeen part of the public domain. And since the enactment of Act No. 1654 on May 18, 1907 until the effectivity of the 1973Constitution, statutory law never allowed foreshore lands reclaimed by the government to be sold to private corporations.The 1973 and 1987 Constitution enshrined and expanded the ban to include any alienable land of the public domain.

Exceptions to Invalid Sales: When they may be upheld

There are, of course, decisions of the Court which, while recognizing a violation of the law or Constitution, hold that thesale or transfer of the land may no longer be invalidated because of weighty considerations of equity and social justice.The invalidation of the sale or transfer may also be superfluous if the purpose of the statutory or constitutional ban hasbeen achieved. But none of these cases apply to Amari.

Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to aFilipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who

buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale is validated since the purpose of the constitutionalban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification ofthe buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualifiedparty. In the instant case, however, Amari has not transferred the Freedom Islands, or any portion of it, to any qualifiedparty. In fact, Amari admits that title to the Freedom Islands still remains with PEA.

The Court has also ruled consistently that a sale or transfer of the land may no longer be questioned under the principle ofres judicata, provided the requisites for res judicata are present. Under this principle, the courts and the parties are boundby a prior final decision, otherwise there will be no end to litigation. As the Court declared...once a judgement hasbecome final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it may be. In the instant case, there isno prior final decision adjudicating the Freedom Islands to Amari.

Properties of the Public Domain are outside the commerce of man; Abandonment does not amount to conversion;

Congressional enactment needed to convey lands of the public domain

Laurel vs. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, July 25, 1990

FACTS:

The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under theReparations Agreement, as part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and theirsuffering during WWII. The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferredto another site when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to providenecessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. After many years, the Aquinoadministration advanced the sale of the reparation properties, which included the Roppongi lot.

RULING:

Roppongi Property belongs to the Public Domain, hence outside the Commerce of Man

The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of theReparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government andthe Japanese government, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself wasspecifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy. There can be no doubt that itis of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial; which respondents havefailed to show.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership isa special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and


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resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended forthe common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.

But since Roppongi Property has not been used for any public purpose, was there abandonment amounting to conversionof said property as patrimonial?

The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automaticallyconvert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (CebuOxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, notavailable for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government towithdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]) An abandonment of the intention to usethe Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must bedefinite. Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to thegovernment's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (SeeHeirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based oncorrect legal premises. In the present case, the recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the status andconditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clearintention to dispose of the properties. Further EO 296 does not declare that the properties lost their public character, butmerely intends to make the properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or otherdisposition.

Conveyance effected by Congressional Enactment

Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is aparty) provides that in cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or otherinstrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of P100,000, therespective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations,shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shallbe executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the Philippines unless theGovernment of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer." Therequirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292; Official authorized toconvey real property), which provides that Whenever real property of the Government is authorized by law to beconveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following: (1) for propertybelonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor isexpressly vested by law in another officer; (2) for property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in thename of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or

instrumentality." Thus, it is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own solewill. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive andlegislative concurrence.

Who is authorized to reclaim foreshore and submerged land; Power to order reclamation of land is reposed in thePresident

Chavez vs. NHA, G.R. No. 164527, Aug. 15, 2007

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare null and void the JVA entered into by NHA and the R-IIBuilders, Inc.

Pursuant to a Memorandum Order on waste management issued by then Pres. Aquino, NHA undertook the SmokeyMountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP) for the purpose of converting the Smokey Mountain dumpsite,inclusive of foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay, into a low cost medium rise housing complex andindustrial/commercial site. A public bidding was held and R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) was declared the winning bidder.Subsequently, NHA and R-II builders entered into a JVA implementing the Project. MO 415 of Pres. Aquino and P.O. 39of Pres. Ramos, coupled with Special Patents issued by the DENR in favour of NHA, classified the reclaimed lands asalienable and disposable.

ISSUES:

Whether or not NHA and RBI may validly reclaim foreshore and submerged land

Whether or not RBI can acquire the reclaimed foreshore and submerged land areas


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Whether or not RBI, being a private corporation, is disqualified from being a transferee of public land

RULING:

Who has authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged land?

Petitioner contends that the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain is exclusively vested in the PEA.Thus, neither NHA nor R-II builders may validly reclaim foreshore and submerged land.

But under EO 525, the requisites for a legal and valid reclamation project are:1. Approval by the President;2. Favourable recommendation of PEA; and3. Undertaken by any of the following:(a) By PEA(b) By any person or entity pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA(c) By the National Government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands subject to consultation withPEA

Thus, while PEA under PD 1084 has the power to reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for integrating,directing and coordinating reclamation projects, such authority is NOT exclusive and such power to reclaim may begranted or delegated to another government agency or entity or may even be undertaken by the National Governmentitself, PEA being only an agency and a part of the National Government.

While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is challenged by petitioner, we find that the NHA had more than enoughauthority to do so under existing laws. While PD 757, the charter of NHA, does not explicitly mention "reclamation" in anyof the listed powers of the agency, we rule that the NHA has an implied power to reclaim land as this is vital or incidentalto effectively, logically, and successfully implement an urban land reform and housing program enunciated in Sec. 9 ofArticle XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has express and implied powers based onits charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to agovernment agency or office by express provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can beinferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or fair implication in the enabling act In Angarav. Electoral Commission, the Court clarified and stressed that when a general grant of power is conferred or dutyenjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred bynecessary implication. It was also explicated that when the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or

used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt anyreasonable method to carry out its functions.

The power to reclaim on the part of the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3-A.

Is the DENRs authorization needed before a reclamation project in Manila Bay or in any part of the Philippines can beundertaken?

...[t]he NHA is still required to procure DENR's authorization before a reclamation project in Manila Bay or in any part ofthe Philippines can be undertaken. The requirement applies to PEA, NHA, or any other government agency or officegranted with such power under the law.

Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, we nevertheless find petitioner's position bereft of merit.

The DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the following reasons:

1. Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution provides that "the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureausand offices." The President is assigned the task of seeing to it that all laws are faithfully executed. "Control," inadministrative law, means "the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer has donein the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."[71]

As such, the President can exercise executive power motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of a subordinatewith the President's own. The DENR is a department in the executive branch under the President, and it is only an alterego of the latter. Ordinarily the proposed action and the staff work are initially done by a department like the DENR andthen submitted to the President for approval. However, there is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the President decideson the implementation of a certain project or activity and requires said department to implement it. Such is a presidential


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prerogative as long as it involves the department or office authorized by law to supervise or execute the Project. Thus, asin this case, when the President approved and ordered the development of a housing project with the correspondingreclamation work, making DENR a member of the committee tasked to implement the project, the required authorizationfrom the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed satisfied. It cannot be disputed that the ultimate power over alienable anddisposable public lands is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not the DENR Secretary. To still require aDENR authorization on the Smokey Mountain when the President has already authorized and ordered the i

Supreme Court en Banc as Presidential Electoral Tribunal

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