Support to Mutiny communicating change

FROM SUPPORT TO MUTINY: SHIFTING LEGITIMACYJUDGMENTS AND EMOTIONAL REACTIONS IMPACTING THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF RADICAL CHANGE

QUY NGUYEN HUYINSEAD

KEVIN G. CORLEYArizona State University

MATTHEW S. KRAATZUniversity of Illinois

Based on a three-year inductive study of one organizations implementation of radicalorganizational change, we examine the critical role played by middle managersjudgments of the legitimacy of their top managers as change agents. Our analysisrevealed middle managers shifting judgments of the change agents legitimacy thatarose with their emotional reactions and produced rising resistance to the changeeffort. Our inductive model illustrates the dynamic, relational, and iterative relation-ships among change recipients legitimacy judgments of change agents and arisingemotional reactions in various phases of planned change, which explain recipientsemergent resistance to the change effort. Our model allows us to contribute to theoryon radical organizational change, resistance to change, and legitimacy judgments.

Organizational scholars have long recognized thesevere challenges involved in organizational trans-formation efforts and the necessary role that indi-vidual agents play within them (Amis, Slack, &Hinings, 2004; Hinings & Greenwood, 1996; Huy,2002; Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). Planned rad-ical organizational change (PROC), which funda-mentally alters the power structure, culture, rou-tines, and strategy of the entire organization, oftenappears to be the only option available in direcircumstances (Miller & Friesen, 1980; Tushman &Romanelli, 1985). As such, scholars have generallytreated radical change as an inherently volitionalphenomenon and placed change agents at the cen-ter of their theories and empirical research (Bar-tunek, 1984; Pettigrew, 1985). These agents can, in

principle, emerge from anywhere inside the organ-ization (e.g., Plowman, Baker, Beck, Kulkarni, So-lansky, & Travis, 2007); however, top managers(TMs) have been the conventional focusand for un-derstandable reasons. These actors play a readily vis-ible and public role in many change initiatives andare often hired for the express purpose of transform-ing failing organizations. In addition, they appear topossessmany of the resources that aremost necessaryfor this task, such as formal decision authority, con-trol over resources, and centrality (e.g., Denis, Lang-ley, & Cazale, 1996; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).Over the last two decades, scholars have exam-

ined many different instances of radical change andpresented ample evidence that supports an agenticview of the process. They have also provided manyuseful insights about change agents role withinthis process and some prescribed requirements forsuccess in the job (e.g., Tushman & Romanelli,1985; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Despite its manyimportant contributions, a closer examination ofthis literature reveals at least one fairly systematicand seemingly significant oversight: existing theoryand research seem to have mainly focused on theearly stages of the radical change process and giveninsufficient attention to the challenges that change

This research was funded by the Social Science andHuman Research Council of Canada and INSEAD Re-search. We would like to thank Alex Bitektine, ChristianeDemers, Ann Langley, Henry Mintzberg, Leigh Tost,Frances Westley, Spencer Harrison, as well as audiencesat Harvard Business School, Wharton Business School,IE Business School, and IESE for helpful comments onprevious versions of this article. We would also like toacknowledge the exemplary editorial guidance we re-ceived from Jason Colquitt.

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Academy of Management Journal2014, Vol. 57, No. 6, 16501680.http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amj.2012.0074

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agents face during its later stagesespecially im-plementation. This striking imbalance is likely duein part to the opacity and complexity of implemen-tation processes, especially in light of the difficultyresearchers have in gaining deep access into organ-izations to study the PROC process closely andlongitudinally (Van de Ven, 1992; Ford, Ford, &DAmelio, 2008). It may also reflect, however, amore basic misunderstanding about the nature ofthese laborious processes, or, even, a bias towardan overly strategic perspective of them.Regardless of the causes, though, there does seem

to be a clear need (and opportunity) for researchand theory that delve into the implementation ofradical change and illuminate the role that changeagents play therein. This need becomes all the moreapparent when one considers implementation as acritical dimension within the larger process of rad-ical change and the inherently agentic nature ofthis process itself. Radical change efforts frequentlyfail as a result of implementation problems (Beer &Nohria, 2000; Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007), yet thereis no logical reason to believe that change agentsshould suddenly lose their ability to facilitate theprocess as it passes into this critical stage. Thispaper reports a study designed to examine thispuzzle and meet the need (and opportunity) formore theory in this area.Our qualitative, inductive study followed a rad-

ical change initiative undertaken at Tekco, alarge and historically successful company that fellinto a deep performance crisis in the wake of de-regulation and associated changes in its competi-tive and technological environments. Given ourgeneral interest in implementation and executivechange agents, we followed Tekcos change effortover its full three-year course and conducted mul-tiple waves of interviews with its new top manage-ment team (TMT) (which had been recently hiredfrom outside), as well as with a large number of thecompanys middle managers (MMs). We ap-proached these MMs as if they were the lieuten-ants who would execute the TMTs orders, and thelynchpins of the larger radical change process(two metaphors common in the literaturee.g., Ba-logun & Johnson, 2004; Huy, 2002).Over the course of our time at Tekco, we ob-

served a fairly remarkable turn of events. Within ashort time after their arrival, the companys newTMT successfully formulated a plan for change andrallied substantial internal support. This plan soonlost momentum, however, and ultimately failedduring its implementation phase. This overall pat-

tern of events clearly affirmed our orienting beliefsabout the critical importance of implementation, and,as we will later suggest, represents a contribution inits own right. Its main function, however, was toprovide a foundation for our inductive analyses toexplain this critical stage of the process and developa grounded theory about the aspects that changeagents (continuously) influence within it. Our datarevealed thatMMs frequently seemed to analyze theirsuperiors statements and actions as if theywere look-ing for clues about their motivations, intentions, andcapabilitiesthat is, engaging in continuous judg-ment of Tekcos senior change agents. These judg-ments were interlaced with emotional reactions thatoften influenced their actionresponse to those judg-ments. Over time, these perceptions seemed to co-alesce into more holistic, person-centered judg-mentsones that had important implications for thelarger change process. Specifically, we found thatMMs beliefs about their bosses were closely associ-ated with their beliefs about the larger change effortand the nature of their participation therein. The ex-istence of this relationship became most apparent inthe final days of Tekcos radical change initiative,when a final affront from the TMT caused MMsemotions to boil over and to stage an open revolt thatcollectively rejected the authority of their bosses.This led to the TMTs rapid departure and brought anabrupt end to the change effort.These findings were not easily interpretable

through the lens of existing theory on PROC. Inaddition to under-examining implementation, rad-ical change scholars have not investigated deeplyenough the more general problem of change agentsobtaining and maintaining support from changeparticipants. We came to realize that our findingscould be explained with a clearer focus when weturned to the large, multidisciplinary literature onlegitimacy. Scholars dating back to Max Weberhave recognized that power stands in constant needof legitimation, and also emphasized that the for-mer is apt to quickly disappear in the wake of thelatter (as with political uprisings and mutinies).Legitimacy scholars have also assembled a largebody of theory and evidence that illuminate thevarious sources of legitimacy and hypothesizeabout the process through which it is amassedand depleted (e.g., Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011; Ty-ler, 2006). The inductively generated theory ofchange agent legitimacy that we present in thispaper emerged as we delved into this literature andbrought its various insights to bear on our qualita-tive data about Tekcos PROC efforts.

2014 1651Huy, Corley, and Kraatz

Our studys main theoretical contribution is tohighlight the importance of change agent legiti-macy within the process of PROC, which ulti-mately provides a relatively detailed mechanism toexplain shifting resistance to change via evolvinglegitimacy judgments. A key theoretical insightconcerns the multiple and shifting bases of changeagent legitimacy. Drawing from the legitimacy lit-erature and our data, we identify several aspects oflegitimacy judgment content and explain why theyare apt to shift over the course of a PROC effort.Evolving judgments of change agent legitimacy pro-vide a much-needed theoretical mechanism to sup-port a dynamic (rather than static) and pluralistic(rather than single-sided) explanation of shifting re-sistance to change (Ford et al., 2008). Another impor-tant insight concerns the holistic and actor-centerednature of these judgments. Though judgments ofchange agents may involve various types of content,we posit that these typically congeal into a summaryjudgment of legitimacy that has significant influenceon change participants behaviors.Additionally, our emergent insights add empirical

texture to emerging conceptual work on legitimacyjudgments (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011). Specifically,we empirically demonstrate that legitimacy judg-ments of human agents exist and can change rap-idly, in part because they can be highly emotion-laden (in contrast to legitimacy judgments of moreimpersonal forms and structures that tend to beslow-changing and unemotional). Emotional reac-tions can trigger fast and abrupt changes in legiti-macy judgments and influence the information thatbecomes noticeable to evaluators. These insightsextend the nascent literature on legitimacy judg-ment (which is dominantly cognitive) with an af-fective dimension, showing how both cognitionand emotion can co-arise and influence evaluatorssubsequent interpretation and behaviors. Our studythus bridges several key literaturesradical organ-izational change, resistance to change, institution-alism, and emotional reactions to changewith apluralistic and relational perspective to providedeep insight into the implementation of PROC.

THEORETICAL GROUNDING

Planned Radical Organizational Change

The PROC process is generally characterized bysudden and intense change actions that fundamen-tally disturb various groups roles, identities, andinterests that have co-existed for a long time (Bar-

tunek, 1984; Pettigrew, 1985). While agents ofPROC can, in principle, emerge from many placesin and around organizations (Battilana, 2006; Plow-man et al., 2007), TMs often appear to be the mostsuitable candidates for the job. These individualsoccupy positions that provide many of the materialand symbolic resources most necessary to the taskof radical transformation, including the formal au-thority to alter structure, reallocate capital, hire andfire personnel, and publicly proselytize for culturalchange (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Tushman &Romanelli, 1985; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). It isnot surprising, then, that a significant portion of thelarge and theoretically diverse literature on PROChas focused on the role that top managementchange agents play in initiating and directing it(Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Kraatz &Moore, 2002; Miller, 1991; Pettigrew, 1987; Ro-manelli & Tushman, 1994).Nearly all forms of major change pose implemen-

tation challenges and require some degree of sup-port and participation at lower levels (Sonenshein,2010). These challenges are particularly severe inthe case of PROC, which involves simultaneouschange in multiple core organizational elements.Moreover, external constituencies such as inves-tors, regulatory agencies, and customers hold highexpectations for rapid performance improvement(e.g., Amis et al., 2004; Romanelli & Tushman,1994). All these factors impose severe constraintson change agents facing both high time pressureand reduced resources to address challenging ten-sions (e.g., Huy, 2002; Sastry, 1997); failure to ad-dress these tensions could exacerbate organization-al decline and even cause organizational mortality(Singh et al., 1986).Intriguingly enough, the PROC literature has

tended to assume that TMs authority to leadchange is largely unproblematic and that they typ-ically perform a beneficial change agent role. Tush-man and Romanelli (1985: 173180), for instance,contend that only executive leadership can medi-ate between forces for convergence and forces forchange and implement the set of discontinuouschanges inherent in radical change efforts. Eventhough the literature onMMs has documented theiractive contribution to innovation in incremental orcontinuous change contexts (Kanter, 1983; Floyd &Wooldridge, 1992), the PROC literature tends tode-emphasize the role of MMs and to portray themin a self-effacing role (for an exception, see Huy,2002). Likewise, most normative models of strategytend to accord MMs a supporting role at best

1652 DecemberAcademy of Management Journal

(Shrivastava, 1986); executives are advised to re-duce equivocality and establish control systems(Simons, 1994) so that MMs can comply with andact on executives clear directives.Coincidentally, the resistance to change litera-

ture has tended to assume a favorable view of TMchange agents and treats resistance to change bylower-level employees as dysfunctional (Ford et al.,2008). In fact, resistance to change is often seen asproblematic to PROC (Hinings & Greenwood,1996). Thus, this stream of research tends to focuson what change agents can do to overcome resis-tance. Relatedly, resistors tend to be construed asindividuals with constrained psychological or so-cial attributes, or motivated by narrow self-intereststhat inhibit them from seeing and accepting thereasons for and benefits of the proposed change.Implicit in this literature is a largely static, one-sided (agent-centric) and judgmental view of resis-tance to change.Likewise, the prescriptive PROC literature has

suggested relatively simple, generic prescriptionsto aid change agents, such as creating a sense ofurgency and a compelling vision, performing pro-cedural and interactional justice, participation andcooptation of lower levels, and project leader cred-ibility and trustworthiness to overcome resistanceto change (e.g., Bartunek, Balogun, & Do, 2011;Kotter, 1995). As intuitively commonsensical asthese prescriptions may appear, empirical researchhas underexplored and even questioned how feasi-ble or realistic it is for change agents to act success-fully on these prescriptions, particularly in the con-text of PROC (Furst & Cable, 2008).Because of challenges inherent to PROC, success

often depends in part on employees voluntarilycooperating with TMs to realize radical change.Adherence to the spirit of the change goals, ratherthan just the letter, is necessary to overcome un-foreseen complications (Huy, 1999). Since discre-tionary cooperation, rather than mechanical com-pliance, is necessary to creatively addressdifficulties that emerge during the implementationprocess (Amason, 1996), even a modest amount ofresistance or passive apathy can harm the successof PROC. Studies have shown that MMs often func-tion as linking pins who play a critical role ininterpreting and implementing top-down changesand fostering discretionary cooperation (e.g., Floyd& Wooldridge, 1992; Huy, 2002). Thus, MMs canserve as a decisive force in making or breakingradical change efforts. Unfortunately, few empiri-cal studies have taken an in-depth look at the exe-

cution challenges faced by TMs in enacting theseseeming straightforward prescriptions, and, moreimportantly, their interactions with and depen-dence on MMs for assistance in implementing rad-ical change.

Resistance to Change

In light of the complexities of PROC and thefertile conditions for the emergence of resistance toPROC (e.g., Bartunek, 1984; Ford et al., 2008; Furst& Cable, 2008), it should not be surprising thatresearch on resistance to change has blossomedover the years. This literature has explored variousstrategies that managers can use to reduce em-ployee resistance to organizational change, such assanction, persuasion, participation, or communica-tion (e.g., Kotter & Schlesinger, 1979; Nutt, 1986).Unfortunately, after decades of research, findingsabout their effectiveness remain inconclusive (seeBartunek et al., 2011; Furst & Cable, 2008). Forinstance, inviting employees to participate in plan-ning a change has been found to increase employeesupport for change (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro, 1999) andto reduce support for change (e.g., Bruhn, Zajac, &Al-Kazemi, 2001). Similarly, using sanctions andedicts to force employee support for a change hasbeen effective in some cases (Poole, Gioia, & Gray,1989) and ineffective in others (e.g., Nutt, 1986).As many scholars reviewing this literature have

noted (Bartunek et al., 2011; Ford et al., 2008; Pid-erit, 2000), research on resistance to change hastended to take (a) a favorable view of change andchange agents and (b) a dominantly individualisticand cognitive view of change resistors. Indeed, thisliterature has tended to take the unquestionedstance that change is good and resistance to changeis bad (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003), and, thus, thatchange agents occupy a legitimate and beneficialorganizational role. Consequently, this stream ofresearch takes the implicit stance that resistance tochange is dysfunctional and explores what changeagents can do to overcome it. Second, and relat-edly, resistors tend to be construed as individualswith constrained psychological or social attributes.Thus, they resist change because of personal cog-nitive and social limitations such as cognitive ri-gidity, conflicting schemas, low openness tochange, risk aversion, and protection of self-inter-ests (see Ford et al., 2008, and Piderit, 2000, foroverviews).Ford et al. (2008) have challenged this traditional

line of thinking and argued for a relational perspec-


tive on resistance to change (see Bartunek, Rous-seau, Rudolph, & DePalma, 2006), one that advan-tages neither change agent nor change recipient,but, instead, focuses on their interactions. In thisview, the presence of resistance to change is neitherinherently good nor bad, nor is it solely to beblamed on either change recipients or agents. Thekey is to understand how the reciprocal actions ofboth agents and recipients work together to fosteror inhibit resistance to change. Employees may re-spond differently to similar managerial actions de-pending on how they interpret the change agentsmotives. Thus, some scholars have started examin-ing how the quality of interpersonal managerem-ployee relationships could influence whether em-ployees judge the information conveyed by theirmanager as supportive and credible, or as manipu-lative and selfish (e.g., Ferris & Judge, 1991; Furst &Cable, 2008). How employees make positive or neg-ative attributions about leaders motives, or experi-ence positive or negative emotional reactions to-ward their bosses, could impact their behaviorstoward the proposed changes, irrespective ofwhether these proposals are intrinsically beneficialor harmful. The resistance to change literature hastended to confound resistance to the change con-tent (what is to be changed) with resistance tochange agency (leaders or agents of change) (seeFord et al., 2008). Thus, there is a need to distin-guish resistance to the change agent from resistanceto the proposed change content. Whether employ-ees accept a controversial change might depend onthe extent to which they evaluate the change con-tent and/or the change agent as legitimate or not.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy is widely recognized as a critical so-cial phenomenon, and scholars across the socialsciences have evinced a longstanding concern withunderstanding its nature, origins, and conse-quences (Beetham, 1991; Jost & Major, 2001; John-son, Dowd & Ridgeway, 2006; Deephouse & Such-man, 2008). Integrating the vast institutional andpsychological literatures on the topic (e.g., Such-man, 1995; Tyler, 1997), Tost (2011: 688) defineslegitimacy as the judgment that an entity is appro-priate for its context.1 One critical outcome of

such judgments is the decision to accept existingpower structures and obey managerial directives.When people believe that their superiors are enti-tled to their positions, they will also generally feelobligated to follow their orders and requests (Sel-znick, 1969; Tyler, 1997; Weber, 1978).Recent conceptual advances in the literature on

legitimacy judgments (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011)have stressed the importance of looking at the con-tent of legitimacy judgments; that is, the substan-tive perceptions and beliefs that underlie the judg-ment of an entity as legitimate or illegitimate(Tost, 2011: 687). Synthesizing the large and frag-mented literature on legitimacy content, Tost(2011: 693694) argues that there are three maindimensions of content underlying active or eval-uative legitimacy judgments: (1) instrumental, (2)relational, and (3) moral. Instrumental legitimacy ispresent when the entity (in our study, the TMchange agent) is perceived to facilitate the indi-viduals or groups attempts to reach self-defined orinternalized goals or outcomes such as percep-tions related to the effectiveness, efficiency, or util-ity of the entity. Relational legitimacy exists whenthe entity is perceived to affirm the social identityand self-worth of individuals or social groups andto ensure that individuals or social groups aretreated with dignity and respect and receive out-comes commensurate with their entitlements,such as perceptions of fairness, benevolence, orcommunality. Finally, an entity is perceived aslegitimate on moral grounds when it is perceived tobe consistent with the evaluators moral and ethicalvalues. She also notes that these three dimensions

1 In the fragmented literature on organizationalchange, we note concepts that are close to legitimacy,such as credibility, trustworthiness, or fairness. For ex-

ample, credibility has been defined as the quality ofbeing believable or trustworthy. This concept has re-ceived very little scholarly attention relative to legiti-macy. Because legitimacy also portrays dimensions ofbelievability or trustworthiness, we thus focus on themore encompassing legitimacy concept. Moreover, a fewstudies have looked at how top teams experience de-clined credibility due to their inability to achieve polit-ical support or substantive change outcome, but in theeyes of constituencies who have power equal or superiorto that of the top team, such as the board of directors,rather than subordinating MMs (see Denis, Lamothe, &Langley, 2001; Denis et al., 1996). As for fairness, Tost(2011: 690) argues against some scholars tendency toconflate legitimacy with fairness, which is only one di-mension of the content that underlies legitimacy judg-ments. Other dimensions of legitimacy exist, and fairnesscan be an antecedent or outcome of legitimacy judgment(see Tost, 2011).


are not mutually exclusive, in that they may over-lap and that an entity could be evaluated simulta-neously on all three dimensions or some subset ofthe dimensions.In addition to making active legitimacy judg-

ments based on these three dimensions, Tost (2011:695696) also suggests that people often assess le-gitimacy in a more passive mode. These judg-ments occur through some combination of twoother proposed cognitive processes. In the first,people use validity cues as cognitive shortcutsand base their own judgments entirely on the en-dorsements of other observers. In the second, theysimply accept entities that display appropriatesymbols and conform to cultural expectations. Be-cause people tend to approach judgment tasks inways that minimize effortful cognitive processing,this more passive mode is expected to be operativemuch of the time (Lieberman, 2003). This form oflegitimacy judgment is also present in situationswhere an entity is accepted merely because it be-longs to a generic category that is culturally takenfor granted as good, familiar, or non-problematic(irrespective of its behaviors, outputs, or demon-strated competenciesBitektine, 2011).Legitimacy has long been recognized as a vital

resource for power-holders looking to develop andmaintain authority and extract high-quality com-pliance from their subordinates (Beetham, 1991;Tyler, 2006; Zelditch, 2001). In its absence,would-be authorities are unable to elicit voluntarycooperation from their subjects, and are, instead,forced to rely on costly and self-limiting coercivetactics. In more extreme circumstances, the loss oflegitimacy can destabilize existing structures andlead to a wholesale loss of power itself (as in mu-tinies and political uprisings). Though previoustheory and research on PROC has said very littleabout the legitimacy of radical change agents, itspotential role within the radical change processis not difficult to recognize. Attention to changeagent legitimacy seems all the more importantgiven the significant problems that change agentsare likely to face in gaining and maintaining it.Because these individuals must generally ask theirsubordinates to make significant and often disrup-tive changes in their identities and routines, and toaccept significant sacrifices on behalf of the organ-ization, their legitimacy is likely to be rather prob-lematic and subject to ongoing scrutiny.Another key benefit of bringing legitimacy theory

to bear on PROC is that it provides a more encom-passing, nuanced, and ideologically balanced lens

through which to explore resistance to change andagentrecipient interactions. In particular, it opensa window into factors that are external to the or-ganization, and provides a way to integrate macro,institutional considerations alongside micro, socialpsychological insights (e.g., Tost, 2011). It also avoidsthe managerial bias that is evident in much of theprior research on resistance to change (Ford et al.,2008). When the relationship between change agentsand change recipients is approached from a legiti-macy perspective, managers are not inevitably thegood guys and resisting employees are not neces-sarily irrational, selfish, or obstructionist (Bitektine,2011; Tost, 2011). Finally, the legitimacy framing alsoinvites needed attention to the role of interpersonaldynamics and emotional reactions (both of whichhave received insufficient attention in the extantPROC literatureHuy, 1999; Lazarus, 1991).

Emotional Reactions

Emotion refers to a feeling state with an identi-fied cause or target that can be expressed verballyor non-verbally (Elfenbein, 2007). The question ofwhat is an emotion and what is a borderlineemotion is still debated by emotion scholarsthrough various terms such as anger, excitement,hope, compassion, frustration, disappointment, orsurprise (for an elaborate discussion, please seeLazarus, 1991: 8283); thus, we use the term emo-tional reactions to include both emotions and bor-derline emotions. Lazaruss (1991, 1993) emotiontheory suggests that people typically experienceemotional reactions as they evaluate the signifi-cance of an event in relation to their own goals andconcerns. If they appraise the consequence as ben-eficial, pleasant feelings arise. They experience un-pleasant feelings if they appraise the consequenceas (potentially) harmful. Thus, to the extent thatpeople appraise the legitimacy of their superiorswho have an important say about the nature of theirjobs or who lead change that is potentially impor-tant to the realization of peoples important goalsand values, engaging in legitimacy judgment canarouse strong emotional reactions.Emotional reactions often generate a change in

readiness to act that prepares people to take action(Frijda, 1996). People determine a potential actionresponse as they evaluate their own abilities to dealwith the event. If they determine they have ade-quate resources to deal with the event, they aremore likely to respond actively. Otherwise, theymay adopt a passive/avoidance approach, which


could be interpreted as a form of resistance tochange. As emotional reactions can impact boththinking and behavior (Elfenbein, 2007), they couldinfluence subsequent legitimacy judgments and re-sistance to change. Research has under-exploredhow exactly emotional reactions emerge during theimplementation of PROC, or how they interact withlegitimacy judgments and resistance to change tohelp steer the course of PROC implementation. Ourinductive study seeks to explore these critical gapsin our understanding.

METHODS

Research Setting

Our data collection efforts focused on radicalchange at Tekco, a large information technology(IT) company that enjoyed a dominant market po-sition for more than 50 years.2 Starting as a smallventure more than a century ago, by the 1990s,Tekco had become a large provider of IT and com-munication services, with more than 50,000 full-time employees and a market value of more than$12 billion dollars. Over time, its growing marketpower attracted the attention of governmental reg-ulatory agencies that required the quasi-monopoly toprovide universal and affordable service in the mar-kets it dominated. The companys strength relied on ahighly skilled engineering staff that provided com-plex, reliable, and state-of-the-art services. The com-pany enjoyed decades of revenue and profit growth,and could thus provide employees with generouscompany benefits, life job security, and well-estab-lished career development paths.While the company had been historically profit-

able and stable, it faced an increasingly threateningcompetitive, technological, and institutional envi-ronment in the years leading up to our study. Bythe late 1990s, advancements in computing powerand IT posed a severe threat to Tekcos establishedbusiness model and suggested a need for funda-

mental change. The government, acting in responseto changes in technology and the political environ-ment, also made a decision to deregulate the indus-try. This deregulation paralleled changes that tookplace in many other industries and countries dur-ing the 1980s and 1990s as market logics gainedincreasing influence. As a result of these converg-ing technological and ideological changes, Tekcofaced more new competitors, including both denovo firms and foreign technology companies.These contextual changes also exerted pressure

on Tekcos established culture. The company hadhistorically been engineering dominated and in-ward focused. A number of government officialsand major customers felt that Tekco had not beenresponsive enough in terms of innovation and pric-ing, while some of its executives were becomingtoo arrogant, yet risk averse. These new pressuresmanifested themselves in the companys decliningmarket share and profits, and also subjected it toharsher criticism and scrutiny from investors andsecurities analysts.In response, the board of directors appointed a

new CEO from outside of the companyJohn Max-well, who had held several senior management po-sitions with high-technology firmsand directedhim to turn Tekco around. Maxwell began by mak-ing sweeping changes to the TMT, splitting themonolithic bureaucratic structure into multiplebusiness units with profit-and-loss accountability,changing the companys incentive system, reduc-ing its cost structure by shedding 25% of the work-force, and recruiting large numbers of new manag-ers to quickly develop new sales and marketingskills for competitive markets (see Table 1 for atimeline of Tekcos change efforts).To enact these changes, the new TMT enlisted an

initial group of about 40 veteran senior MMs in theformulation of radical change plans to generatewhat specifically should be changed to restore prof-its. MMs are generally important in organizationaltransformation processes (e.g., Balogun & Johnson,2004; Huy, 2002), and occupy a particularly impor-tant role in the case of Tekco. At the request ofthese MMs, TMs contracted a prestigious externalconsulting firm, Binary, famous for quantitativeanalysis. Binary consultants helped MMs performextensive quantitative analyses and bring externalbenchmarking information to them, so as to deter-mine the best areas for work reengineering. Thisinitial group of championing MMs then enlistedmore than 500 other MMs across a wide array ofwork unitsselected because of their work experi-

2 The names of the organization and its members, eth-nic origins, geographical locations, and specific technol-ogies have been disguised to protect the confidentialityof this publicly traded organization. The exact names ofchange programs have also been modified, although wetried to convey the spirit of the disguised names. In thesame spirit, some numbers and calendar dates have beenaltered. These adjustments in the presentation of the datado not affect how the data have been interpreted to ex-plain the proposed theoretical concepts.


ence and high influence with their respective peergroups. The goal was to propose various changeinitiatives that would allow the company to in-crease revenues and cut costs quickly, with a targeteconomic payback of three years as a key criterionfor obtaining funding. MMs suggested about 250change projects to improve Tekcos operations andprofit, of which about 150 were funded. These proj-ects were collectively referred to as the CorporateTransformation (CT) program and involved reengi-neering work processes and the heavy use of IT (formore details on these CT projects, see Huy, 2002,2011). To fund these projects, the company setaside $1.2 billion of restructuring costs over thenext three years, with a goal to achieve a pre-taxannual cash flow of $700 million by December31, 2006.

Data Collection

As part of a three-year research project examin-ing Tekcos three-year radical change, which in-

cluded the first author having unfettered access toobserve meetings and interact with employees, weconducted both formal and informal conversationswith employees at all levels of the company. For-mal interviews consisted of semi-structured discus-sions about the general change effort and instancesof change management specific to the informant;interviews lasted for about an hour. Following thetenets of purposeful sampling (Lincoln & Guba,1985), these interviews often ended with suggestionsfor at least two other employees considered influen-tial in one or several aspects of the change effort. Ofparticular interest were those who might have a dif-ferent viewpoint, so as to help maximize diversityand depth of perspectives, although our techniquesalso sought confirmatory data (Charmaz, 2006).Perspectives were included in our analysis whenprovided by at least two informants (Laumann &Pappi, 1976).This process resulted in the first author inter-

viewing the incumbent CEO 3 times, the two pre-vious CEOs once each, 12 executives 26 times, and114 MMs3 192 times, in addition to many lower-level employees and union officials. About half ofMMs interviewed belonged to the change champi-oning group, and the other half belonged to thechange recipient group (although this categoriza-tion is a rough one in practice, because a MM couldbe a change agent of a particular change projectwhile being the recipient of another change proj-ect). To get a more general perspective, we typicallyinterviewed senior MMs who supervised other ju-nior MMs. As Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) sug-gest, interviewing informants from diverse groupsand perspectives reduces the risk that all theseinformants would engage in biased, convergent ret-rospective sensemaking and/or impression man-agement. The real-time data collection used in thisstudy also mitigated rationalization biases. Re-search in real time is recommended for longitudi-nal research because it allows researchers to seeevents in a way that is closer to that actually expe-rienced by the participants, and that is sensitive tocurrent activity and concerns.In addition to these formal interviews, the first

author conducted informal conversations with

3 MMs are two levels below the CEO and one levelabove first-line supervisors. There are many levels ofmiddle management at Tekco, so one senior MM in theline groups could be in charge of 2,0005,000 frontlineworkers. TMs include the CEO and the level of execu-tives above MMs.

TABLE 1Key Events in Tekcos CT Program

Year 1 Market share: 76%January John Maxwell becomes CEO and starts replacing

senior executive team.March Strategy formulation phase begins.

Select group of MMs and consulting firm toanalyze and quantify proposed change projects.

December Complete new senior executive team in place.Year 2 Market share: 70%January [Data collection begins.]March Strategy implementation phase begins.

Announcement of CT plan to reduce workforceby 13,000 in parallel with 150 change projectschampioned by MMs.

June Announcement of terms of voluntary separationprogram and support mechanisms. Downsizingbegins.

Year 3 Market share: 64%June Major decline in customer service known

throughout the company.December Implementation challenges have caused

concerns about major delays andunderperformance of various major changeprojects, in turn causing concerns that financialand customer service improvement targetsmight not be met.

Year 4 Market share: 59%August Change evaluation phase begins.

Implementation challenges continue to surface,causing concerns that originally forecastedfinancial targets will not be met. TMT thendecrees involuntary layoff of 3,000 people.

September CEO Maxwell resigns. TMT dissolved. New CEOappointed.


close to 200 employees. These informal discussionswere useful in corroborating what he saw andheard in the formal interviews and observations, aswell as in triangulating various processes ofchange. The informal conversations also allowedhim to screen potential new informants for addi-tional formal interviews who had been suggestedby previous informants; those informal conversa-tions that raised new insights, or potentially diver-gent viewpoints led to requests for formal, recordedinterviews. Finally, the first author also gatheredinternal documents related to change project status,employee surveys, and internal HR efforts. Thesesecondary data sources, as well as the results ofobservations and the perusal of confidential archi-val data, allowed the triangulation of findings fromdiverse sources to build stronger interpretations(Charmaz, 2006).

Data Analysis

Initially, narratives of the change effort were de-veloped from the perspective of both TMs andMMs. Key dates and milestones were placed intoflow diagrams so that the dynamics of TM and MMactions and interactions could be better modeled(Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999). Initially, these di-agrams looked very complex, because we tried notto discard too prematurely any factor that mightturn out to be consequential and that might berepeated across narratives (pattern matching). Twoconsistent themes that began to emerge from theMM change narratives were (1) the waning accep-tance and support for the TMT over time and (2) acorresponding increase in descriptions of resis-tance to change. As we delved into the literature tounderstand these emerging themes, it became ap-parent that, while scholars understand each phe-nomenon individually, we have almost no theoryon their interrelationship.We then began open coding (Corbin & Strauss,

1990) individual interviews for perceptions of le-gitimacy and resistance to change on the basis ofin vivo descriptionsor those offered by the in-formantsas the basis for establishing first-ordercodes (see Van Maanen, 1979). Legitimacy judg-ments of the change agents are manifest in whatrespondents said (expressing their thoughts andfeelings) when they evaluated TMs actions andnon-actions; resistance to change is coded in termsof what respondents said (expressing their thoughtsand feelings) and what they did (or did not do) inregards to acceptance or support of the change

agent or the change effort. Building from these first-order codes, we then coded for similarities anddifferences within and across our informant groupsto detect conceptual patterns (Glaser & Strauss,1967), as well as with the extant literature to ensurethat themes previously discussed in the literaturewere correctly attributed (e.g., legitimacyTost,2011; resistance to changeFord et al., 2008; emo-tional reactions to changeHuy, 2002) and newthemes were properly specified.One of those new themes was the presence of

various emotional reactions to the change and ac-tions of the top team. Following prior empiricalexaminations of emotional reactions to change(e.g., Huy, 2002), we initially relied on the cir-cumplex model of emotions (Larsen & Diener,1992) to explore the wide range of emotional reac-tions people can experience during change. Ac-cording to this model, emotions share two basicdimensions: one dimension reflects the hedonicvalence (pleasantunpleasant) while the second re-fers to the intensity of arousal (high versus lowintensity). Together, the four dimensions capturealmost the full range of emotional reactions (Bartel& Saavedra, 2000). Thus, the hybrid category ofpleasant, high-intensity emotional reactions in-cludes enthusiasm and excitement, while pleasant,low-intensity emotional reactions include calmand comfort. Unpleasant, high-intensity emotionalreactions include anger, anxiety, and fear, whileunpleasant, low-intensity emotional reactions in-clude disappointment, shame, or dejection.Beyond noting explicit emotion terms such as

afraid or excited for coding emotional reac-tions, we also identified implicit emotional reac-tions by relying on Lazarus (1991) core relationalthemes and cognitive appraisal theory of emotion(e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). These scholars ar-gue that the experiences of specific emotions (e.g.,anger, disappointment) are reliably associated withparticular core relational themes (Lazarus, 1991) orappraisals (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For ex-ample, when people feel disappointed (unpleasant,low intensity), they tend to report thinking that thesituation is unpleasant, that results are below ex-pectations, and that they are certain about what ishappening (e.g., outcomes). When people reportperceiving the situation as harmful, they perceivehaving some control over others who intend tocause harm, anger (unpleasant, high intensity)could be inferred (Roseman, 1991; Tiedens & Lin-ton, 2001). Ultimately, though, we aggregated theseemotional reactions into higher-order constructs,


positive and negative emotional reactions, whichare sufficient to explain the key elements of ourinductive model.With a rich set of emergent themes in hand, we

went back to our initial narratives and began map-ping those themes on to the dynamics we had un-covered in the TM and MM descriptions of thechange effort (Langley, 1999). This mapping af-forded us the opportunity to compare dynamicssuch as legitimacy judgments, emotional reactions,and resistance to change behaviors across differenttime periods or stages of planned change, as well ascontextual factors (e.g., cultural norms, staffchanges, unexpected internal events, external po-litical and economic developments) surroundingthese dynamics. Ultimately, this allowed us to be-gin establishing the boundaries of a longitudinalmodel for how legitimacy of change agents, emo-tional reactions, and resistance to change interre-lated over time. Figure 1 represents our emergentdata structure of MM responses to the change effort,illustrating the first-order concepts, second-orderthemes, and aggregate dimensions that serve as thefoundation for our theorizing (Gioia, Corley, &Hamilton, 2013). In this way, Figure 1 provides astructured illustration of the links between our rawdata and the emergent theorizing that forms thecornerstone of our theoretical contribution. The fol-lowing sections detail those themes and dimen-sions, and begin tying them together into a coherentunderstanding of how judgments of change agentlegitimacy judgments, emotional reactions, and re-sistance to change interrelate in PROC.

FINDINGS

As Tekcos change effort unfolded, it became in-creasingly evident to us that the initial acceptanceof the change effort and positive regard the newleaders enjoyed in the first months of their tenure(during the change formulation phase) would notlast. Near the end of Tekcos self-declared imple-mentation phase, our data provided such a clearpicture of growing resistance to the change programthat a single empirical question stood out for us:What happened to alter the initial acceptance ofradical change into resistance to change among theMMs in this organization? We attempted to empir-ically answer this question by tracking the status ofthree emergent dimensions (legitimacy judgments,emotional reactions, and resistance to change) overthe course of Tekcos PROC effort. As our datarevealed, MMs evolved in the extent to which they

judged TMs as legitimate change agents. Our cod-ing revealed, for each phase of PROC (formulation,implementation, evaluation), shifts in MMs legiti-macy judgments that coincided with (a) shifts inthe emotional reactions MMs had toward TMsand the change program and (b) a growing resis-tance to the change that culminated in open defi-ance of the TMs directives.Figure 2 represents a summary of how the key

aspects of our emergent data story interrelated dur-ing each phase, and thus provides a structure forour telling the story of Tekcos PROC effort. Foreach phase, we list TMs attributes and/or actionsand change outcomes (descriptive aspects of ourcase), along with MMs judgments and emotionalreactions to TMs and the resulting shifts in theiracceptance/resistance to the change (from our induc-tive analysis). We begin with a brief, albeit important,examination of the formulation phase to establish thehigh level of legitimacy and low levels of resistancethat existed early in the PROC effort. We then spendconsiderably more time examining the interrelateddynamics found in the implementation phase, andconclude our data story with the dissolution of thePROC effort in the evaluation phase.

Change Formulation: Favorable LegitimacyJudgments and Low Resistance

Our informants marked the beginning of thechange formulation phase with Maxwells pro-nouncement of the need for a radical change. Max-well and his new team not only had to sell the needfor change, but also the need for change quickly,due to fast-declining market share (from close to90% only three years earlier down to 75% anddropping) and profits (a projected decline of approx-imately 70% the following year). As one executiveexplained, The financial markets were clamoring forblood. As a result, time scarcity underpinned MMsfelt urgency to improve the companys financial sit-uation and reduce its cost structure, as well as thedecision to forego lengthy detailed strategic planningto achieve major restructuring quickly in three years.Table 2 provides data examples for this phase (as away to save space for the theoretically more interest-ing implementation phase).Legitimacy judgments: Dominantly cognitive.

As the quotes in Table 2 illustrate, MMs assessedtheir new leaders as desirable, legitimate agents ofPROC dominantly on the basis that new TMs be-longed to a generic category of people who arepresumed to be appropriate for leading radical


FIGURE1

DataStructure

ofChange

RecipientResponsesto

Change

Effort

change. This category can be described by severalattributes: as newcomers, they were not tied to theold regime and they had experience in relevantindustry sectors. These attributes were seen byMMs as conforming to cultural expectations set byexternal consultants and industry analysts, thussuggesting cognitive legitimacy judgment. Manyveteran MMs noted disruptive changes occurring inthe broader environment and conceded that radicalchange was unavoidable, and that it was more ap-propriate for outsiders to lead radical change thanincumbent executives. The old guard suffered asevere and precipitous loss in status while outsid-ers, in contrast, were taken for granted to be desir-able leaders of radical change and were presumedto have skills to fight competition successfully.MMs cognitive legitimacy judgment was alsoaligned with the thinking of Maxwell himself; inhis first year alone, he replaced about half of the

companys top 27 executives, in effect establishinga new symbolic basis of authority within Tekco.In addition to MMs forming cognitive legitimacy

judgments, they also actively interpreted the in-strumental and relational legitimacy of specific ac-tions taken by TMs. Newcomer TMs also performedseveral additional symbolic actions (Pfeffer, 1981;Zott & Huy, 2007) that reinforced MMs prior pos-itive judgment. These actions included involvingMMs in defining the content of the CT programchanges (which can be interpreted as enhancingTMs relational legitimacy). Additionally, the topteam was seen as effectively handling the firstplanned layoff in the long history of Tekco, a pro-posed downsizing of 13,000 positions that repre-sented around 25% of the workforce. It was fearedthe consequences would be devastating to employ-ees who had what amounted to lifetime job secu-rity. Yet, this proposed change won the acceptance

FIGURE 2Interactions between TMs and MMs through Three Phases of Planned Radical Change


TABLE2

DataExamplesforFormulation

Phase

Legitim

acyJudgm

ents

Emotional

Reactions

Resistance

toChange

Cognitivejudgm

ent

M

ostman

agem

entgu

rushaveaffirm

edthat

themajority

ofseniorman

agersin

protected

firm

slike

ours

were

unable

toman

agein

thenew

competitivecontext

and

shou

ldbe

replaced...Man

yveteranexecutiveswillbe

replaced,bu

tthis

isOK.

[Prior

executives]yearsof

experience

wereallunder

onesetof

ruleswithon

esetof

orientation

and,fran

kly,

avery

narrow

view

oftheworld.Soitwas

rather

[new

]experience

that

wewen

tto

buyin

themarketplace.

Ifyo

ubelievetheexperts

oncorporatetran

sformation,

mostwou

ldaffirm

that

incu

mbentexecutiveswou

ldbe

unlikely

tomakethetran

sition

,so

theon

lyviable

solution

isto

replace

them

.I

believethat

experts

whocanteachushow

tobecome

morecompetitivedonot

comefrom

theinside.

W

ewan

tedto

chan

getheoldTekco

mon

opolistic

culture

...Mostof

thenew

executiveswhocamein

did

not

comefrom

mon

opolies,so

thatsgood

.Mostof

them

camefrom

free

market,free

enterprise

industries

like

GEan

dIBM.

Relational

judgm

ent

I

truly

believetheway

Tekco

dow

nsized[show

sthe

organization]has

been

avery

good

corporatecitizen.If

youlook

arou

nd,theirterm

inationpackagesareas

good

asan

ybod

ys.

I

like

very

much

that

topman

agershavegiven

metheop

portunityto

show

what

Iam

capable

of,

this

isvery

excitingan

dIwas

recogn

ized

bymy

colleagu

es.Ireally

likedthefact

that

Iam

valued

bythecompan

y,by

mybo

sses,so

Iam

very

excitedan

dmotivated

todrive

this

chan

ge[also:

implicitpositivehighactivation

emotioninferred

through

appraisal

ofpersonal

welfare,benefits

from

beingvalued

bysuperiors]

T

henew

CEOhas

don

ehim

selfsomereally

good

serviceby

gettingou

tpublicly,show

ingpeople

whoheisas

presidentof

Tekco

...H

ealso

visited

somelocation

sandmet

lineem

ployees

...People

likedhim

andtrust

that

hesgoingto

dotherigh

tthing

[also:

implicitpositiveem

otioninferred

through

appraisal

ofpoten

tial

benefitforthefirm

withalikablean

dtrustworthyCEO]

I

thinkman

yof

usherewereselected

forou

rability...ou

rinterest

inmakingch

anges,

and

achievingach

allenge

andbeingvery

goal

focu

sed...Wehaveseen

theim

portance

oftheseinitiativesforthefuture,an

dwehavebeen

recogn

ized

[bytopman

agers]

fordoingthat.So

that

feed

sman

yof

us...because

wearegoal

focu

sedan

dachievemen

toriented[implicit

positiveem

otioninferred

through

appraisal

ofpersonal

benefitsfrom

beingvalued

bysuperiors]

W

earegettingincreasinglyconfiden

tthat

wecan

overcomemostthings

that

cangetthrownat

us.

Wehavesufficientdeterminationto

dealwithit

[implicitpositiveor

neu

tral

emotioninferred

through

appraisal

ofnopersonal

harm,an

deven

someop

timisticconfiden

cein

takingrisk

and

overcomingch

allenges]

I

truly

believetheway

Tekco

dow

nsized[giving

competitivebenefits]

tobe

areal

tribute

toa

caringorganization[implicitpositiveor

neu

tral

emotioninferred

through

appraisal

ofcaringor

noharm]

P

eople

simply

trust

the[new

]CEO

that

hes

goingto

dotherigh

tthingan

dwillfollow

him

.W

ebelievewedohaveexcellen

tch

ange

initiativeshere,

they

aretherigh

tsolution

sto

improve

ourop

erations.Wehave

develop

edthem

andbelievein

them

.These

chan

gesaregoingto

makeadifference

[to

thequ

alityof

ourservicean

dreduce

our

cost].Wewan

tto

makethesech

anges

hap

pen

andseethem

through

.I

wou

ldhavethou

ghtthat

itwou

ldbe

harder

tobringpeople

alon

g.But,to

my

greatsurprise,Iseepeople

goalon

gwith

chan

ge.Ithou

ghtthat

mom

entum

wou

ldbe

slow

atthebeginning,

onehad

toshow

positiveresultsformom

entum

toslow

lypickup.

W

eareextrem

elyconvincedabou

ttheneed

foracomprehen

sive

tran

sformationof

the

compan

y,weunderstan

dvery

wellou

r[dire]

finan

cial

situation.

W

earenow

facingnew

marketconditions,

theen

tryof

international

competitors,new

clientexpectation

s,so

wedon

thavemuch

choice

abou

tnot

chan

gingdrastically.

W

efeel

thean

xietyan

dtheurgen

cyfor

chan

gein

this

highly

competitive

environmen

t.Webo

ugh

ten

tirely

into

the

needforch

ange

andwan

tto

helpit

succeed.

and support of MMs, thanks, in large part, to pro-mulgated symbolic principles by the CEO and histop team (again, see Table 2 for data examples). Inaddition to offering relatively generous compensa-tion to the victims of the downsizing, Maxwell alsodecreed: We are going to remove the work beforewe remove the job. This symbolic pronouncementalso helped generate support among MMs, whowere involved in designing their own cost-cuttingprojects based on promised new IT and believedthat the CEOs promise that work would be re-moved before people would not materially reducethe quality of customer service, a key component ofTekcos identity to this point (which could be in-terpreted as enhancing instrumental legitimacy).An HR survey of employees reported that manyaffected employees viewed the downsizing rules tobe fair and kind, even though the implicit psy-chological contract of lifetime job security had beenviolated (relational legitimacy). TMs additionalsymbolic actions thus conveyed various types oflegitimacy in addition to the dominant cognitivelegitimacy.Emotional reactions. As could be expected in

the wake of positive judgments, MMs emotionalreactions toward TMs were largely positive to neu-tral. More specifically, for MMs who championedchange projects, collective emotions were largelypositive, including such emotions as excitement torealize new projects that they proposed and hopefor a better future for their professional develop-ment and for the improved performance of the com-pany. Other MMsin particular, those in the oper-ating line groups who would implement thechanges proposed by their colleagues while tryingto maintain the quality of customer servicedis-played calm (positive), resignation, and neutralemotions (neither positive nor negative) towardTMs. Overall, MMs emotional reactions towardTMs were positive or neutral, with very little neg-ative emotions toward TMs or the PROC effort.Actions. Contrary to intuitive expectations and

research about MMs resisting major change due toself-interest (e.g., Biggart, 1977; Tichy & Sherman,1994), there was little discernible resistance tochange, even from MMs who did not belong to thechange formulation groups. A company studyshowed that more than 80% of the surveyed em-ployees agreed that Tekcos financial performancehad to improve if it was to survive in a competitiveenvironment. A veteran senior MM in HR summa-rized the results of her companys employee surveynear the end of the formulation phase thus: The

[new CEO] has done a very good job as our leaderand external ambassador. Hes doing extremelywell and employees in [Tekco] look to him as beingtheir leader.Despite these positive judgments and actions

from MMs, two critical commitments were madeduring this formulation phase that would proveproblematic in later phases: (1) Maxwells very vis-ible pledge to remove work before removing jobsand (2) TMs promise to deliver to the board ofdirectors (and shareholders) $700 million annualnet income at the end of a three-year change effort.When asked why the three-year implementationperiod was chosen, CEO Maxwell explained:

Two years is too fast to go from implement andachieve; five years is too long. You had to be pres-sured by time schedule. You could only put in thewindow the period of time you could sell to yourshareholders. So everybody accepted the three-yearplan, and that becomes the base around which wemeasure ourselves to the outside world and to theshareholders and investment community.

Change Implementation: Shifting LegitimacyJudgments and Increasing Resistance

Ironically, many of the same factors that pro-duced high legitimacy and low resistance duringthe formulation phase came back to haunt execu-tive change agents in the implementation phase.Our analysis suggests that emerging and protractedchallenges related to the implementation of variousradical change projects led MMs to reassess theiroriginal legitimacy judgments in the face of mount-ing implementation problems and heightened neg-ative emotional reactions. Over the course of theimplementation phase, these negative emotionsand modified legitimacy judgments fueled a grow-ing resistance to the change that eventually led tothe downfall of the PROC program.Interim change outcomes. Despite positive feed-

back from external analysts and an increase instock price from $28 to $39 in less than a year,employees began to see cracks in Maxwells changeplans: a random telephone survey of about 1,800employees showed that only 38% of employees feltthat the company had a sincere interest in theirwellbeing, 61% rated their morale from fair to verypoor, and only 34% believed that customer focuswould be better off at the end of the three-yearchange effort. Underlying this internal concern wasthe realization among MMs that many CT projectswere meeting delays or producing lower than ex-


pected benefits. Recall that the design of the changeprojects was done very quickly and superficiallyduring the formulation phase. MMs now blamedTMs for not giving them adequate face time andsupport to resolve these difficulties effectively andquickly.As one operations MM championing a number of

change projects reported:

My [senior executive] stayed at a very high level,wanted to manage the numbers, to understand someof the solutions, but really did not provide time todo that. It was very difficult . . . He would always tellus that hes available anytime, but he was so busythat youd get a half an hour here, and, two weekslater, youd get an hour there . . . We sensed that hereally didnt understand, not because he wasnt ca-pable of understanding, but that he wasnt focusingon some of the more detailed [aspects].

Another operations MM added:

We did not succeed in getting our bosses to go out torally our employees. Most of their communicationwas written, formal communication. We were think-ing of a training package to help them improve face-to-face communication.

Rapid launch of change projects that generatedMMs favorable judgment of TMs as competentchange agents during the formulation phase thusbegan to hinder the smooth implementation of var-ious change projects, foreshadowing real prospectsof underperformance and threatening MMs senseof self-worth. MMs needed to regularly justify toother colleagues that their championed projects re-mained economically and operationally viable, andthey blamed TMs for having created this undesir-able time scarcity and performance pressure envi-ronment. Rapid launch in the formulation phasedesirable in the eyes of both TMs and MMsnowbecame a source of disappointment and anxiety.Failure in not an option (a line from the movieApollo 13) was often repeated in MMs project re-view meetings. As one MM in the control groupobserved:

When these targets were set, there was nothing leftwe could do except to try to make things work, todeliver these projects while we were locked in somekind of a time box, with unrealistic schedules and[financial] benefits. This immediately created muchtension between the [recipient line] groups whomust endorse these benefits and [the change agentgroups who proposed these benefits].

Project MMs tried desperately to realize theirchange projects, and any suggestion to evaluate the

interim results in mid-course, to re-prioritize re-sources, or to re-adjust plans was unwelcome. Asone manager, analyzing the evolution of the port-folio of change projects, said:

Its like 155 lottery tickets all winning on December31, 2006 . . . Theres now a huge organizationalresistance to [re-adjustment]. We dont like to goback and say we made a mistake. Were going towaste valuable company time, dollars, and skills.People are dedicated to just doing their own proj-ects, and they worry about whether their initiativewill get [enough resources to be] implemented, asopposed to [asking themselves], Have I got the rightinitiative?

This lack of engagement with MMs was also rec-ognized by TMs. After having initiated CT andputting a control structure in place, CEO Maxwelldevoted most of his time on external stakeholders.He described his focus in a private interview asfollows:

I expect that [people below] will deliver. My rolenow becomes one of managing from altitude thework, explaining to the public what Tekco is allabout and where its going. Explaining to the gov-ernment, talking to investors, and trying to keepmyself up to date with where the industry is going.That keeps me fairly well employed.

While Maxwell assumed that other senior exec-utives would spend much of their time champion-ing and selling the change efforts inside Tekco, thisdid not take place. These executives reported inprivate interviews that they were also over-whelmed with tasks similar to those of the CEO.To make matters worse, the generous downsizing

compensation terms planned in the formulationphase also generated unintended effects on the op-erations groups: 16,000 employees opted to leave,3,000 more than planned. Remaining employeesfelt overly burdened, especially supervising lineMMs who were responsible for customer service.Even though top executives were not directly re-sponsible for this unexpected event, MMs still heldthem responsible as heads of the company and forforcing them to cut employees and costs to meet thefinancial targets as per the initial time schedule.TMs promise not to remove people before workhad not been respected. All this caused a growingchange fatigue among employees from having towork so hard, so fast in such a compressed timeframe. As one customer service representative la-mented on behalf of her colleagues: Theres somuch information that weve become saturated.


Weve become so saturated that weve become stu-pid. So very simple things become difficult. Asenior project manager in charge of many projectsthat required major IT development also noted theeffect this fatigue had on the implementation effort:

There is a lot of fatigue, the problems are enormous,I dont know many people who work less than 70 to80 hours a week . . . People in [IT] Systems Devel-opment work very hard, for long hours, and many ofthem fell sick physically and mentally. Many de-pleted their energy because they could not sustainsuch an intense level for such a long time.

Some MMs in HR and operations knew the grav-ity of such actions and had been pleading with thetop team to issue a public and honest explanation,but this did not take place (moral judgment).Emotional reactions: Shifting to negative.

These mounting implementation problems resultedin MM emotional reactions shifting from positive/neutral to negative emotions such as disappoint-ment, anxiety, and frustration. There were subtledifferences in MMs emotional reactions dependingon the dominant role they performed, however.MMs as change project champions felt disap-pointed because they were not getting adequateinteraction and support from TMs (relational judg-ment). MMs attributed their mounting difficultiesin implementing their change projects to insuffi-cient TMs support. This anticipation of underper-formance, which could have negative identity andcareer consequences, also led to anxiety in dealingwith TMs. One MM described the emotional reac-tions of the change group as follows:

People are so scared not to deliver. They are nolonger asking the real questions, not only becausethey dont know what they are, theyd rather notthink about them . . . we are playing a little bit theostriches . . . people will try to deliver at all costs.

In aggregate, there was mounting shared frustra-tion that their company was going in circles andwasting resources in the change process, especiallyin the wake of the top teams inability to articulatea meaningful change goal for the organization afterthe first years learning grace period had elapsed.As an MM in operations voiced in frustration:

Theres a lack of understanding [about] what thefuture is going to hold, and how were going to dealwith it. Theres a big void . . . People are frustrated.Like, are we just doomed?

Meanwhile, MMs in the role of pure change re-cipientstypically, in operations groups charged

with customer servicefelt disappointed by TMsnot keeping their promise of not removing employ-ees before work was first streamlined. These lineoperations MMs were under intense pressure todeliver good customer service while managing thecollective anxiety and resentment of their line em-ployees who were learning new competencieswhile at the same time subject to downsizing. Forinstance, a business unit composed of about 3,500customer service representatives had to go througha major downsizing and geographical consolidationeffort. One MM in charge of about 800 of thoserepresentatives reported:

Our customer representatives are getting tired fromall this long traveling [due to centralization of cus-tomer service centers in major metropolitan areas]and this situation will not be sustainable in the longrun. Many are mothers with young children. As aresult, sales revenues are going down: senior man-agement asked me to put the screws on them evenmore. I feel stuck . . . I have to sell this change to myemployees but they dont believe me.

As one line MM described her employees emo-tional reactions:

Employees told us to stop saying that change wouldbe faster, we were making their lives more difficultby moving them around, yet they did exactly thesame job as before, they answered the customers thesame way as before, so nothing important in theirwork has changed . . . They only see that they haveless resources, less time to devote to customers, lesstime for training . . . We had tremendous difficultyin delivering good service this year.

These employees emotional reactions clearlyhad an emotional effect on their supervising MMs.These MMs, who were emotionally neutral andaccepted the need for radical change during thechange formulation phase, became increasinglycritical of both TMs and other MMs who promotedradical change. Their emotional reactions could bebest described as resentment. As one MM said,They say that the greatest priority is our custom-ers. Yet all the actions demonstrate that the highestpriority is short-term financial results . . . Peopleare not that nave.Collective anxiety also prevailed among these

recipient line MMs, as one MM made very clear:Everybody right now is feeling highly insecure,they are wondering if they would continue to havea job in a year from now; and, again: This createsa very high level of stress. Some of us are stressed,de-energized, fed up . . . We are in hell. Another


senior HR MM validated this widely shared emo-tional reaction of MMs toward TMs: Im disap-pointed on a lot of counts. Im disappointed be-cause the leadership of this company, at the verysenior levels, has not delivered on its responsibili-ties. These MMs negative judgments and emo-tions were validated by the CEO himself in a pri-vate interview toward the end of the second yearof CT:

Over the last three months, I went out and begantouching some of the people and I didnt like what Iwas hearing. It showed me that the senior executivesin this company didnt stay in touch with the peo-ple. I didnt stay focused enough with the seniorexecutives . . . We left the employees on their own.I think thats a huge mistake.

Emotional censorship. MMs moderately nega-tive emotional reactions were exacerbated by thetop teams deliberate and public banning of anyexpression of doubt and cynicism by MMs (as thosenegative emotions were deemed too high a risk fordemoralizing lower-level workers). An executivememo was circulated to MMs decreeing that Cyn-icism will not be tolerated; we are in a position ofleadership and must project hope and confidencein difficult times. This formal articulation of anorm that was already intuitively known by manyMMs puzzled them, but effectively served to shutoff any legitimate outlet for expressing negativeemotions to the top team. At the lower-worker lev-els, the feeling of emotional censorship was lessacute because many MMs organized venting ses-sions. However, such sessions were consideredrisky. Those who had managed to survive the lay-offs thus far dared not express their true feelingslest they be taken advantage of one day. As one MMin operations described, You have to show enthu-siasm for a new idea even if you dont believe in it,so you have to fake your enthusiasm. This, in turn,reduced dialogue for understanding between thetop team and MMs.Legitimacy judgments: Dominantly relational

and moral. The shift to more moderate negativeemotional reactions fostered mounting unfavorablejudgments about the top teams legitimacy to leadchange. For instance, disappointment about theprogress of the change projects and anxiety abouttheir underperformance caused MMs to start mak-ing negative attributions about TMs motives, suchas when they expressed concerns that TMs werefocused on short-term mandates to make a lot ofmoney or acted as mercenaries of change. These

attributions were so prevalent that even the CEObecame aware of them: he mentioned these phrasesin a private interview. These attributions marked ashift in MM legitimacy judgments, from the domi-nantly cognitive base of the formulation phase tomore of a concern with the relational and moralaspects of legitimacy.Relational legitimacy. Judgments involving how

a social entity communicates with others in a waythat accords them respect, dignity, and statuswithin their social milieu constitute the basis ofrelational legitimacy (Tyler & Lind, 1992). If peopleperceive that their self-worth and identity are en-hanced in this interaction, they will perceive rela-tional legitimacy to be high (Tost, 2011). MMs whowere co-opted by top executives to design the con-tent of radical change felt well supported by theirsuperiors during the formulation phase and thushad assumed this high level of support to continueduring the implementation phase. But top execu-tives lack of engagement and implementation mis-cues reduced MMs sense of support and graduallyimpacted the sense of respect and status felt ac-corded to them by senior change agents. Disap-pointment with change project progress and per-ceived insufficient TMs support also led someMMs to make harsh attributions of the top teamsmotives. One MM shared this negative appraisal:[Executives were] jerking them around all thetime, and that, they are here just for the shortterm . . . [they] appear ready to do anything toachieve short term results. Relational and moraljudgments can blend: If people feel they are treatedwith disrespect, they can make an additional judg-ment that the disrespectful person is low in moralcharacter. Not fully aware that TMs were over-whelmed with external constituencies such as gov-ernment agencies and major customers, MMstended to attribute insufficient two-way, authenticcommunication either to TMs personal reluctancefor honest dialogue or to their under-appreciationof the importance of communicating about change.As one MM from HR conveyed harshly:

[Executives] will tell you over and over again, Youcant communicate enough. But, here they are,these champions of change, and, for whatever rea-sons, they dont have the time to share their per-sonal thoughts with employees on the state ofchange. I think its defensive. Their fear of exposingthemselves. Its fascinating that over 70% of theemployee body believes that they have enough in-formation, yet they still feel disconnected and saythey dont trust [senior management].


Moral legitimacy. Judgments of moral legiti-macy involve the extent to which a social entityconforms to moral values and ethical principles(Scott, 2001). Early symbolic pronouncements thatconferred high legitimacy to top executives duringthe change formulation phase would come back toconstrain them in the subsequent implementationphase. The strongest example of this involved theprinciple removing work before people, a princi-ple heavily supported by change agents and recip-ients because it enabled recipient groups to acceptcost cutting associated with downsizing on the as-sumption that customer service would not be sig-nificantly affected (Tekcos values revolve aroundthe belief that the customer is king, avowed oneHR MM). While many change initiatives involvedreengineering of work processes, in which tradi-tional routine work was first streamlined then au-tomated with the introduction of new IT systems(meaning less employees would be needed for thesame quality of work output), several issues aroseduring implementation. Remember that the designof change projects was done quickly and superfi-cially during the formulation phase. High-levelagreements made during the formulation phase be-came points of conflict during implementation.That is, when it came down to agreeing with eachsmaller unit manager on the specific employees tobe cut in their units, disagreement surfaced aboutthe number of employees and timing of their de-parture, resulting in lengthy negotiations as opera-tions unit managers were concerned about the im-pact of their employee cuts on customer service. Tomake matters worse, unexpected events occurred.For instance, the IT infrastructure on which manynew productivity improvements were supposed tobe implemented was found to have serious capacityproblems and needed to be fundamentally rede-signed with unplanned investment of hundreds ofmillions of dollars and years of development. Thisdiscovery sent a chill throughout the operationsgroups, as this implied that employees would needto be cut to meet the scheduled cost-reduction ob-jectives while the customer service groups had nonew IT technologies, as promised, to alleviate thework burden of remaining employees.Under pressures of time scarcity and meeting

interim financial targets on time, oftentimes coer-cion was ultimately used to arbitrarily cut a certainnumber of employees to meet the cost-cutting ob-jectives, whether the new IT system was in place ornot. This increased the burden of work on the re-maining operations employees, de-energizing them

and causing decline in customer service. As oneoperations MM said, The company had to forcethe customer service groups to accept a changeinitiative [and cut their personnel]. This is verydifficult and creates a very high level of stress formany of us. These coercive actions led to employ-ees complaining to their MMs that top executivesinitial promise of removing work before peoplehad not been respected. The expression do notwalk the talk often arose in interviews as a reasonfor the loss of the TMTs credibility in the eyes ofoperations and HR MMs. As one senior MM inoperations reported, I received a lot of letters fromemployees that we were not walking the talk . . . Weare saying that customer service is [our] numberone priority while we are cutting [employees] andservice is deteriorating. Then he added, Thechange program does not match the companysmission statement. We are focused only on costreduction, not on improving customer service. Weare sending out conflicting signals to both [employ-ees and customers].Much of the top teams rhetoric seemed well

intended but not acted upon in the eyes of thesubordinates, such as the CEOs well-accepted ini-tial mission statement that emphasized customerservice being followed by an almost exclusive focuson financial results by arbitrarily downsizing ser-vice employees. Another senior MM made the fol-lowing harsh judgment about TMs motivation inkeeping words and actions aligned:

Because [executives] were being judged on the basisof their cost reduction, not on the basis of keepingtheir word. Nobody called them in for their perfor-mance appraisal and asked, Have you kept yourwords in the last twelve months? They were [mea-sured] on reducing headcount and cost. The otherstuff is just noise.

A MM in charge of 300 customer service employ-ees summed up the views of many MMs we spokewith this way: I think the top team has a short-term restructuring mandate. I have no confidencethat they will make long-term decisions.When asked about this issue a year after it took

place, the CEO claimed ignorance but seemed torealize its deleterious effect: I should stand up andaddress that . . . you do lose credibility if thathappens. I havent heard it before, by the way,because I am removed from the people who do thework right now. However, neither he nor the topteam ever publicly addressed the issue of why peo-ple were removed before work, which caused their


legitimacy to decline even further. As one seniorMM monitoring communication inside Tekco de-plored, They should have conceded that theymight have got it wrong, that some things have beendone in zeal, inappropriately, and that they will befixed. Youve got to rekindle the trust. Another topexecutive privately noted that, It was a mistake forthe CEO to have made this promise. Removingwork before people would have never worked be-cause human beings by nature would create otherwork for themselves. In this way, the top teamslegitimacy was damaged twice by the same deci-sion: first, for violating their espoused principle,and then again for failing to explain or even ac-knowledge the obvious inconsistency (despite sub-ordinates expressed concerns about it).Emergence of instrumental legitimacy judg-

ments. Negative relational and moral judgmentsand co-arising negative emotional reactions alsomade salient to MMs the protracted inability of thetop team to produce a meaningful strategic vision,which exacerbated MMs judgments of the topteams low change competence: judgment of instru-mental legitimacy started to emerge. Informationthat was not salient in prior MMs judgments ofTMs suddenly became a major point of concern. Asone HR MM described, Employees feel that topexecutives dont know what they are doing . . . [Wedont have] a sort of driving thrust that people canall sort of anchor themselves to. In addition, dis-appointment with the progress of their change proj-ect and attributed insufficient TMs support (rela-tional legitimacy) made salient to MMs that the topteam did not acquire sufficient operating knowl-edge as their tenure progressed. Such detailed op-erating knowledge, including the importance ofcustomer service and what it takes to deliver it(instrumental legitimacy), could have been devel-oped by frequent interactions with MMs. Instead,the top team remaining invisible to a large majorityin the organization increasingly bothered MMs. Asone MM in operations complained, Theyre notlistening to customers. Theyre not listening to em-ployees who serve customers. How can they listenwhen they dont even come out of their offices tomeet with us and talk to us? How can they knowanything? As an HR MM reported: Employeesfeel as if the executives are completely discon-nected from them and from the reality of the worldof customers and employees. Thus, negative emo-tional reactions co-arising with emerging negativerelational and moral judgments prompted MMs toreevaluate their early positive cognitive judgment

of newcomers as more competent to lead radicalchange than incumbent executives, ironically fo-cusing on TMs not having an adequate operatingknowledge of the company and not appreciatingthe companys distinctive competence: customerservice. Judgments of TMs instrumental legitimacystarted to emerge, and to reach its peak in the nextevaluation stage, as we will describe.MMs growing unfavorable evaluation of TMs

seemed to reflect the large-scale dissatisfaction oftheir employees about radical change and TMs. Arandom sample survey of about 2,000 employees(conducted by the company) reported that only40% of employees felt that senior management wasopen and honest; only 22% felt that leadership waswell known and visible; 46% felt valued as em-ployees; less than 25% of employees believed thatthe quality of customer service would improve atthe end of the transformation program, and 47%believed it would be worse; and only 36% agreedthat the changes made today would make the com-pany a better place to work in the future.Actions: Growing resistance to change. Under

the combined weight of all these factors (MMsshifting negative emotional reactions, unfavorablejudgments of top executives actions and non-ac-tions, attribution of unfavorable motivesall ofwhich could not be discussed openly due to emo-tional censorship), it is not surprising that subtleresistance to change began to surface. As an MM incorporate communications who monitored the sit-uation described, Explicit resistance to change ishardly visible . . . People just take no initiative, theyfollow instructions to the letter, they are not realpartners to change, they express no objection be-cause it is taboo in this new culture. MMswere not just questioning the competence and mo-tives of the top team, and feeling disappointedabout this situation; they were not actively comply-ing and supporting top executives in implementingtheir change directives. One MM reported foot-dragging by his colleagues:

One (newcomer) [TM] wanted a certain change to beimplemented in the company, so all the [MMs]around the table said, Yes, no problem. [Several]months later, when he asked [Why it is not doneyet?], they just told him, Well, its not quite inplace yet . . . They privately chuckled, We saidyes, but we did not promise when we will do it.

Many MMs thus reduced their support and ac-ceptance of the top team by delaying implementa-tion of change directives they disagreed with. As


one MM noted: When people dont agree with adirective, they just ignore it. Its faster to ignore[than to argue with the decision]. The seeds ofbehavioral disobedience from the middle manage-ment rank had started to grow and contributed to alegitimacy deficit that ultimately proved insur-mountable for the top team.

Change Evaluation: Delegitimation and IntenseResistance to Change

Thedeadline for delivering economic andopera-tional benefits at the official end date of thethree-year CT program made evaluation of con-crete outcomes of radical change imperative toboth external (e.g., investors) and internal stake-holders (e.g., TMs and MMs). From the top exec-utives perspective, they had no choice but to putpressure on the organization to deliver the com-mitted profit and cost-reduction targets. A topexecutive explained:

If you dont deliver the three-year plan, you losecredibility . . . Boards are willing to let you do thingsas long as you deliver your commitments. As long asyou do that, they will give you the benefit of thedoubt. If the board loses confidence in your abilityto deliver, they will second-guess you constantly.They will stop you from doing things you wantto do.

Change outcomes. Unfortunately, this unrelent-ing pressure to deliver on the financial goals withdecreasing resources exacerbated a sense of changefatigue among employees, straining their ability todeliver quality customer service, as we describedpreviously. In addition, the expected underperfor-man

Support to Mutiny communicating change

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