Support to HQ ISAF , Kabul, Afghanistan, Spring 2002 Presentation to 19 ISMOR John Sharpe
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Transcript of Support to HQ ISAF , Kabul, Afghanistan, Spring 2002 Presentation to 19 ISMOR John Sharpe
Support to HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, Spring 2002
Presentation to 19 ISMORJohn Sharpe
Head OA HQ Land Command
Timeline
Campaign v Taliban & AQ
ISAF Planning
ISAF Deployment
Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul
Analyst 1Analyst 2
Analyst 3Analyst 4
Handover
to Turkey
Bonn
•Dealing with extreme climatic conditions•Basic wash facilities•Worse food than mess food•Bottled water•Keeping fit•Motivation•Having fun!
Living Conditions 1.
Living Conditions 2
Working Conditions
Reachback
Historical Analysis Team QinetiQ
OA CellIn-Theatre
Initial Response & Coordination of Reachback Tasks
HQ LandBase Team
Dstl
Frontline “PCS (was HLS)Air Systems
- Farnborough- Portsdown- Farnborough- Farnborough
Mortar School Army
RAF Waddington AWC
Summary of Work
Pre-Deployment
Deployed Team 1 (Feb-Apr)
Deployed Team 2(Apr-Jun)
• Measures of Success • Target Audience Analysis (TAA)» Loya Jirga Delegates Arrival Model• J2 Database• APOD Threat Analysis• Medical Statistics and Blood Data
» Measures of Success» Target Audience Analysis (TAA)• Fuel Utilisation Calculator (FUC)• Blood Donor Analysis• APOD Threat Analysis• ISAF News• Statistical Advice and Explanation• Data Collection and Canvassing of Cells
• Historical Analysis Review• Troops to Task» Strategic Lift• Sustainment
Strategic Lift
Strategic Lift Few a/c equippedFew Aircrew trained
Air routes under threat
Nighttime flying
Evasive routing
Sanitise approach & transit routes
Teeth
Runways constrained
Little offload space
EngineersAirfields damaged & Contaminated
EODClear
Repair
Move material Transport
Roads under threat
Movement Constrained
Teeth & Transport
Escorted Convoys
HQ areas Contaminated
Little living & storage space
Clear
Construct Engineers
EOD
Political Imperative TeethVisible
Presence Patrol
EOD and Lift Model
Engineering Capacity
Aircraft HandlingCapacity
Aircraft Arrival
Rate
Storage Capacity
Transport Capacity
Onward Movement
Rate
Materiel at Airhead
Materiel at Destination
Storage Capacity
Sustainability Lift Model
Sustainment Requirement
Aircraft Arrival
Rate
Forces in Theatre
Force Arrival
Rate
DEPLOYMENT TIMES
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Day
s Base Case
Generic a/c per day
Resupply Flights (Generic a/c)
Measurement of Success
Schematic Overview of Campaign PlanSchematic Overview of Campaign PlanPHASE II - FOC
Security Assistance
ISAF Coherence
Infrastructure/
Humanitarian Sp
DP4
DP5
DP9
DP11
DP16DP8
DP1 DP15
DP10 DP21
DP19Strategic CofG
Coherence of IA
OPEndstate
StrategicEndstate
PHASE III - Further Assistance
DP1 Reassurance Patrolling/Deter DP1 Reassurance Patrolling/Deter ViolenceViolenceDP2 Force Protection/SustainmentDP2 Force Protection/SustainmentDP3 ContractorisationDP3 ContractorisationDP4 International Sp for ISAF/DP4 International Sp for ISAF/JCB for IA/ISAF CohesionJCB for IA/ISAF CohesionDP5 De-Militarised KabulDP5 De-Militarised KabulDP6 Factional and Tribal ToleranceDP6 Factional and Tribal Tolerance
DP7 ISAF acceptance(IA/Pop)DP7 ISAF acceptance(IA/Pop)DP8 Open KIADP8 Open KIADP9 Power/Water/Sanitation/MedDP9 Power/Water/Sanitation/MedDP10 DPs relocatedDP10 DPs relocatedDP11 Sp Neutralisation of anti-IADP11 Sp Neutralisation of anti-IAFaction ThreatFaction ThreatDP12 Functioning Judiciary DP12 Functioning Judiciary DP13 New Afghan Security StructuresDP13 New Afghan Security Structures
DP14 Local Sp for ISAFDP14 Local Sp for ISAFDP15 DDR ProgrammeDP15 DDR ProgrammeDP16 Structural Development DP16 Structural Development DP17 Manage ExpectationsDP17 Manage ExpectationsDP18 Force Transition to FOFDP18 Force Transition to FOFDP19 Reformed Armed ForcesDP19 Reformed Armed ForcesDP20 Functional Police ForceDP20 Functional Police ForceDP21 Inter Theatre Land LOC SpDP21 Inter Theatre Land LOC SpDP22 Loya JirgaDP22 Loya Jirga
DP3
Political /Legal
Security
of Kabul
DP7
DP6
DP14 DP18
DP20
DP2
DP12 DP13 DP17 DP22
Financial
Data Types & SourcesPatrolling - Numbers - Patrol Reports
- Duration
Policing - Number of patrols - HQ KMNB
Crime - Numbers - RMP- Types - IA Police- Rest of World - Reachback
Military - Sightings- Vehicle Movements - HQ KMNB- Barracks in use- EOD data
Medical - DNBI - HQ ISAF- Types - Clinic data
CIMIC - Projects Completed - HQ KMNB
Use of KIA - Flights - Airfield Staff
Commerce - Vehicle Movements - HQ KMNB
Crime by Time (as at end of APR 02)
Reported Crime Statistics for Kabul
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
23-Jan 30-Jan 6-Feb 13-Feb 20-Feb 27-Feb 6-Mar 13-Mar 20-Mar 27-Mar 3-Apr 10-Apr 17-Apr 24-Apr
No.
Of R
epor
ted
Offe
nces
Murders
Armed Robberies
Serious Crimes
Felonies
Perceived fall in reported crime since the implementation of ISAF/IA Police Joint Patrols
Lack of reporting
Week Beginning (2002)
Fall in murder and robbery
Unexplained increase
Headline Murder Rate
62 3
27
51
5
18 18
27
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Kabul(CurrentEstimate)
London Berlin Chicago WashingtonDC
Ankara Karachi Moscow Pretoria
Afghanistan Europe United States Asia & Africa
Average Annual Reported Murder Rate per 100,000 Population
Data from UK Home Office 97-99 and UN HABITAT Global Urban Indicators98
Extrapolated from IA Central Police Records
Target Audience Analysis
Info OpsInfo OpsMedia products to convey ISAF’s message to the people of Kabul :
• ISAF Newspaper• ISAF Radio• ISAF TV• ISAF Loudspeakers• ISAF Leaflets
They wished to measure to measure Kabuli’s attitudes and the penetration of these ISAF media products.
Dropboxes For & AgainstDropboxes For & AgainstFor:
• can use to distribute other material - leaflets & newspapers• questionnaires available to all• no pressure or time limits for completion• cheap & easy to make collections• facilitates comparison of police districts• potentially large samples
Against:• security & safety issues• multiple entries by individuals• collusion• problems with illiterate people• possible access problems (location vital)
1st ISAF Info Box, Spin Kalay, Police District 9
Summary of Conclusions:• Presence of ISAF soldiers & ISAF media products well received by the majority of
Kabulis.
• Most Kabulis believe the security situation has improved.
• There is a good understanding of the ISAF mission.
• Gaps in knowledge have been identified.
• TAA is enabling targeting of Info Ops products.
Loya Jirga Delegates Arrival Model
Initial Reception
• Wow! Great! Brilliant!• Must show this to the COS• “Mentioned in dispatches”• You guys don’t have anything
better to do?• Is this another game?
Concluding Remarks
Lessons• Simple is good, speed of response is paramount• The earlier OA is involved the better the payoff:
• Need to get the MOS-type studies underway early in order to shape them and establish data collection
• Expect the utility of OA to continue throughout the operation - providing analysts are on-hand
• Reach back is great but still need deployed OA • OA team often of value to HQ as source of semi-expert IT:
• Continues to be the case even with increased “IT literacy” in HQ• Many tasks IT-based rather than true OA• OA standalone PC kit often in demand• Expertise with MS Office applications underlies much of our utility• Standalone nature demands IT ability within the team
Use of OA Outputs• GOC/COS
• Interim Administration• Foreign Ministers• Visiting Senior Military
• Media Ops• Info Ops / Psy Ops• UK – longer term
campaign monitoring• Pte Bloggs!