IRumb. 38296 3103

SUPPLEMENTTO

The London GazetteOf FRIDAY, the 2ist of MAY, 1948

byRegistered as a newspaper

•MONDAY, 24 MAY, 1948

THE BATTLE OF CRETE

The following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty on4th August, 1941, by Admiral Sir Andrew B.Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O., Cymmander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Mediterranean,qth August, 1941.

Be pleased to lay before Their Lordships,the attached reports of naval operations indefence of Crete between I5th May and 27thMay, 1941. Reports on the evacuation of troopsfrom Crete will be forwarded later.

2. The object of the operations was the pre-vention of enemy seaborne landings on thecoast of Crete.' It was known that airborneinvasion of the island was impending; but itappeared almost inconceivable that airborneinvasion alone could succeed against forewarnedtroops, that seaborne support was inevitableand that the destruction of troop convoys wouldwin the day.

3. The Navy succeeded in its object but paida heavy price for this achievement. The fleetwas operating within easy range of enemy airbases and beyond the reach of any protectionfrom our own air force. The fleet fighters ofH.M.S. FORMIDABLE were reduced to onlyfour as a result of casualties and unservice-ability arising from the recent operation" Tiger."* It was, therefore, useless to sendH.M.S. FORMIDABLE to assist.

* Footnote : Operation " Tiger " was the passageof naval reinforcements and a convoy containingurgent military stores through the Mediterranean,covered by Force H as far as the Sicilian Narrowsand thence by the Mediterranean Fleet to Alexandria.It took place between the 4th and gth May, 1941.

So, without air support of any sort, the fleethad to be exposed to a scale of air attack whichis believed to have exceeded anything of thekind yet experienced afloat.* >

4. The air attack on Crete started on the 2othMay, 1941. The sweeps of the Light Forces onthe night 20th/2ist and during daylight 2istwere uneventful except for heavy air attacksand the unlucky loss of H.M.S. JUNO (seeparagraphs 14 to 20). f As far as the Navy wasconcerned, the real Battle of Crete began onthe night of 2ist/22nd May, with the success-ful encounter of Force D with an enemy convoy(see paragraph 23). This encounter was. skil-fully and thoroughly exploited, was a heavyblow to the Germans and an encouragement forour hard pressed troops in Crete.

* Footnote : Air Ministry comment: The R.A.F.in the Middle East had suffered severe losses duringthe Greek campaign and in Cyrenaica, and fighterstrength was so reduced as to be barely sufficient forthe defence of the Middle East base itself. Thestrength of the bomber force was scarcely better. Inthe face of pressing commitments it had only beenpossible to spare resources for the construction oftwo airfields in Crete and these were but moderatelyequipped. From these airfields, before the loss ofGreece, it had been possible to operate a handful ofR.A.F. and F.A.A. fighters for the occasional pro-tection of shipping, but now confronted with theGerman Air Force operating in overwhelming num-bers from ample bases in Greece and the adjoiningislands, and. in view of the dangerous depletion ofMiddle East air forces as a whole, decision reluctantlyhad to be taken that the maintenance of fighterforces in Crete merely invited destruction and couldnot be justified. With this view, the Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East were in agreement.

Though every possible effort was made by aircraft'based in Africa and in Malta to attack enemy air-fields they could make little impression on the over-whelming strength of the G.A.F. Shore based fightercover to our ships operating to the north of Crete

•was clearly out of the question.t Footnote: References are to paragraphs in the

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's narrative.

3104 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948

5. It was on the morning of the 22nd. May,that things commenced to go awry. The enemyconvoy sighted by For.ce C was almost, cer-tainly a large one (see paragraph 27). TheRear Admiral Commanding, .fifteenth CruiserSquadron was presented with a unique oppor-.tuniry of effecting its destruction but unfor-tunately, in the face of heavy air attacks, andw^th H.A. ammunition stocks beginning to runlow, he decided that he would not have beenjustified in pressing on to the northward andgave the order to withdraw. The situationwas undoubtedly a difficult one for him, as this

, attack was certainly on a majestic .scale but itappears that no diminution of risk could have,been achieved by retirement and that, in fact,the safest place for the squadrpn would havebeen among the enemy ships. The brief actiondid, however, have the effect of turning back'the convoy, and the troops, if they ever didreach Crete, were not in time to influence the.battle. . .

. 6. In the meantime; a further unlucky deci-sion had been taken (see paragraphs 25 and26). DIDO, wearing the flag of the RearAdmiral (D), Mediterranean; had expended70 per cent, of her A.A. ammunition. Thedestroyers were also running low; but AJAXand ORION had 42 and 38 per cent, respec-tively remaining. The Rear Admiral (D),Mediterranean, correctly decided that DIDOmust withdraw from the Aegean; ibut, fromyery natural reluctance td leave other ships ofhis squadron to face the music after -he himselfhad retired, he took AJAX and ORION withhim. This decision, .although such resultscould hardly have been foreseen, deprived thehard pressed Force. C.of their assistance at atime 'when the weight of their A.A., fire wouldhave been an invaluable support.

7. The junction of Forces A and C on theafternoon of the 22nd May, -left the RearAdmiral Commanding, Fifteenth CruiserSquadron, after a gruelling two days, in com-mand of the combined force. Before he hadreally'time to grasp the situation of his force,a series of disasters occurred, the loss ofGREYHOUND, GLOUCESTER and finallyFIJI. . , . \ •

8. Past experience had gone to1 show thatwhen under -heavy scale of air attack it is'essential" to keep ships together for mutual,sup-,port. The decision to send KANDAHAR andKINGSTON to the rescue of GREYHOUND'Speople cannot 'be cayilled at but in the light ofsubsequent events it would probably have beenbetter had the whole force closed' to their sup-port. The Rear Admiral Commanding, i5thCruiser Squadron-was however not aware ofthe shortage of A.A. ammunition in.GLOUCESTER and FIJI. As a final mis-fortune, when rejoining after the loss ofGLOUCESTER, FIJI steered a course diverg-ing from that of the fleet, which she could nolonger see.

9. Late on the -22nd .May, a "Most Imme-diate " message was received by the Coxn-man<der-in-Chief,- Mediterranean, from theRear Admiral Commanding, Seventh CruiserSquadron, from which it appeared, owing tocalligraphic error, that . the battleships ofForce Ai had no i pom-pom ammunition left.In fact they had plenty. It was. on thisaccount that orders were given at 0408/23rd

May for all forces to'withdraw to1 the eastward..Had this error not occurred the battleshipswould not have been ordered back toAlexandria and would have been available asa support and rallying point for the 5thDestroyer Flotilla on the morning of the 23rdMay, so that the loss of KELLY .and KASHMIR^might well have been avoided (see .paragraph46).

10. that the fleet suffered disastrouslythis encounter with' the unhampered Germ|Air Force is evident but it has- to be remebered on the credit side that the Navy's diitywas achieved and no enemy ship whether \^ar-ship or transport succeeded in reaching Qreteor intervening in the battle during thesecritical days. Nor should the losses sustainedblind one to the magnificent courage' andendurance .that was displayed throughout. Ihave never -felt .prouder of .the MediterraneaniFleet than at the close of these particularoperations, except perhaps, at the fashion inwhich it faced up to the • even greater strainwhich was so soon to1 be imposed upon it.

11. Where so much that was meritoriouswas performed it is almost invidious to1 particu-larise, (but I feel that I must draw" the attentionof Their Lordships to two outstanding.examples. These are • the conduct ofKANDAHAR (Commander W. G. A. Robson,Royal Navy) and KINGSTON (LieutenantCommander P. Somerville, D.S.O., RoyalNavy) during, the whole period of the opera-tion and, in particular, the rescue of the crewsof GREYHOUND-and FIJI (see paragraphs 34to 39). KANDAHAR has recorded that be-tween 1445 and 1930 she was subjected to 22separate air attacks and''all the,rescue, workduring daylight, was carried''Out .in face ofheavy bombing and machine gunning. Theother story is that of the gallantry and devotionof Commander W. R. Marshall A'Deane, RoyalNavy, of GREYHOUND, whose self sacrificestands out'even amongst this record of finedeeds. <, -

After the loss of his own ship he was pickedup by KANDAHAR. Whilst . KANDAHARwas engaged in rescuing the crew of the FIJI,Commander Marshall A'Deane dived overboard,in the darkness, to the assistance of a man someway .from 'the. ship. He was not seen again.

12. Rear Admiral H. B. Rawlihgs, O.B.E.;in the WARSPITE, had a particularly anxioustime. He handled a series of difficult situationsin a determined and skilful manner and by histimely support undoubtedly did air possible toextricate Forces C and D from their awkwardsituation on the evening of the 22nd May.

13. The skilful"operation of the forces underthe Rear Admiral (D), Mediterranean, whichled to the destruction of the first enemy convoyhas already been mentioned.. 14. The Naval Officer-ih-Charge, Suda, Cap-tain J. A. V. Morse, D.S.O., "Royal Navy, fol-lowed up his excellent work in organising theporf at Suda by consistently presenting a clearand concise picture of the situation by hissignals during' the battle. His presence at Sudawas invaluable.

- (Signed) A. B. CUNNINGHAM.Admiral.

' t * ' * *

Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948 3105

THE BATTLE OF CRETE

NARRATIVE BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,MEDITERRANEAN

The narrative of the Battle of Crete is dividedinto four phases: —

Phase I—Building up Suda into. a portcapable of supplying the needs of the Army.

Phase II—Naval dispositions to meet the(expected attack.

Phase III—The attack on Crete.Phase IV—The evacuation of the Britishid Imperial forces from the island.

Phbjse IBUILDING.UP SUDA'INTO A PORT.CAPABLE OF

SUPPLYING THE NEEDS OF THE ARMY.Operation " Demon,!' dniring which over

. 50,000 troops had been evacuated from Greece,was completed on agth April, 1941. Some25,000 of these troops, the majority of whomhad no equipment other than rifles, were beingre-organised in Crete. A large number was use-less for defence purposes and were awaitingremoval.

2. The facilities for unloading supply ships inSuda Bay were poor. The harbour was beingsubjected to frequent air attack which causedheavy casualties among the ships unloading.The problem of keeping up supplies was causinganxiety, but strenuous efforts on the part ofthe Naval Officer-in-Charge, Suda, were goingsome way towards solving the various localdifficulties.

3. During the period from 2gth April to 20thMay, some 15,000 tons of Army stores were off-loaded from 15 ships, whilst eight ships weresunk or damaged in the harbour by air attack.The scale of enemy air attack was so heavy,and our fighter protection so thin, that therunning of convoys in and out of Crete wasbeing carried out at considerable risk.

4. It had been intended to set up the com-plete M.N.B.D.O:* in Crete. The M.N.B.D.O.A.A. guns had been installed at Suda but thedanger of losing ships through enemy air actionwas considered too great to allow any furtherM.N.B.D.O. storeships to be sent to. Crete.

5. On. the night I5th/i6th May, GLOUCES-TER and FIJI embarked the 2nd Battalion ofthe Leicester Regiment, with their full.equip-ment, at Alexandria, and landed them at Herak-lion. During the night iSth/igth May, GLEN-GYLE, escorted by COVENTRY, WATER-HEN, VOYAGER and AUCKLAND took 700men of the Argyle and Sutherland Highlandersfrom Alexandria to Tymbaki.

Phase II.NAVAL DISPOSITIONS TO MEET THE

EXPECTED ATTACK.*6. Although intelligence suggested that an

attack on Crete was very likely,, the exact dateof the attack could not be forecast. It was

.thought that the most probable date for theattack to begin was about the I7th May. Theuse of Suda Bay as an anchorage by day waslimited, on account of heavy air raids. It was,therefore, necessary to operate forces from

* Footnote: M.N.B.D.O.—Mobile Naval BaseDefence Organisation, the personnel of which wereRoyal Marines.

58154

Alexandria, which is 420 miles from Suda. Aforce was to be held in reserve at Alexandriaas an attack might-start at a time when ourforces at sea were getting short of fuel. Althoughthe first airborne attack on Crete did not takeplace until .the 20th May, naval forces had tobe kept ready at sea from the i4th May on-wards.

7. The object of the Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean, was to prevent the enemy land-ing in Crete from the sea.' The most likelyplaces for an enemy, seaborne landing werethought to be Canea, Retimb and Heraklionwhilst Kissamo Bay and Sitia were possibilities.On 'the I5th May forces were at sea, to thesouth of Crete, ready to move to any threatenedpoint. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-ranean signalled his intentions as follows: —

(a) Force C (R.A.D. in DIDO with KAN-DAHAR, NUBIAN, KINGSTON, JUNOand COVENTRY) was to be available to dealwith Heraklion and Sitia.

(6) Force D (NAIAD, PHOEBE and twodestroyers) would deal with any Banding westof Retimo. .

(c) Force B (GLOUCESTER and FIJI). would deal with enemy forces north west of

Crete, or support Force D.(d) Force A (Vice Admiral ist Battle

Squadron, ins QUEEN ELIZABETH WithBARHAM and five destroyers) was to take upa position to the westward of Crete so as to

- act as coyer to the other forces.(e) In reserve at Alexandria. WARSPITE,

VALIANT, FORMIDABLE, ORION andAJAX and remaining available destroyers.

(/) The general idea was for night sweepsto be carried out as follows:— ' .

(i) Force B to sweep the west coast of- Greece from Matapan;

(ii) Force D to sweep from Anti Kitherato Piraeus;

(iii) Force C to sweep from Kaso towardsLeros.(g) All forces were to retire from their

sweeps so as to be close north of Crete bydawn. Subsequently they were to retire to

. the south of Crete.(h) The submarine RORQUAL was to

operate in the vicinity of Lemnos. .(i) A flotilla of M.T.B.s was based at Suda

Bay..(f) ABDIEL was to lay a minefield between

, Cephalonia and Levkas, to interrupt enemycommunications through the Corinth Canal.

(k) Appropriate .air reconnaissance wasarranged, but it was very thin.

(/) The Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-ranean, would control the ..operation fromAlexandria but the Senior Officers of thevarious •forces were informed that they wereexpected to take independent action to inter-cept any enemy forces reported.8. FORMIDABLE was reduced to-only four

aircraft serviceable and was unable to providefighter protection to our. forces until the 25thMay. This shortage of aircraft in FORMID-ABLE was due to losses and wear and tearduring the recent operations " Tiger " and theTripoli bombardment. There were still a fewshore-based fighters, in Crete but they werebeing rapidly reduced by enemy air action andcould not be of any assistance to the fleet. The

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON (GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948

fleet was thus compelled to' operate close toenemy air .bases without any fighter protectionwhatsoever. -

. 9. The sweeps referred to in paragraph 7above were carried out on the night i6th/i7thMay, without result and the forces taking partwithdrew to the south of Crete. On the i8thMay, arrangements were made to relieve forces-at sea. The re-distribution of forces was effected'as follows: —' . ... (a) .C.S:7 shifted his flag to WARSPITE" and left Alexandria at 2000/i8th May with" Force Ai (WARSPITE, VALIANT, AJAX,

NAPIER, KIMBERLEY, JANUS, ISIS,HEREWARD, DECOY, HERO and

• GRIFFIN). '.'(£>) Force A was to .return to Alexandria

on relief by Force. Ai. When these two forcesmet, HOTSPUR and IMPERIAL were, tobe transferred from Force A to Force Ai.

(c) C.S.is in NAIAD, with PERTH,KANDAHAR, NUBIAN, KINGSTON andJUNO was to return to Alexandria, fuel his

• ships and leave again early on the iQth May.(d) R.A.D. in DIDO was to return to Alex-

, andria and then leave early on the igth May. with ORION, GREYHOUND and HASTY.

He was to be joined by AJAX, HERO andHEREWARD from Force Ai.

(e) GLOUCESTER-and FIJI, who were• getting short of fuel, were to return to Alex-

- andria, fuel and sail again to join Force Ai.

10. During the night igth/aoth May, Tanjc.Landing Craft-number A.2 escorted by KOSiQ*landed three " I'" tanks at Tymbaki. Thesetanks were to make their way to Heraklion forthe defence of the aerodrome.

Ptifcse III.THE ATTACK ON CRETE.

2pth May, 1941.11. The position of 'our naval forces at sea

.at daylight on the 20th May, was: —(a) Force Ai about 100 miles to the west

of Crete and shortly to be joined by theforce with R.A.D.

. (fc) The force with C.S.I5 had reached theKaso Strait during the previous night andwas now withdrawing to the southward.

1 (c) The force with R.A.D. had reachedthe Anti Kithera Strait during the night andwas now proceeding to join Force Ai.

(d) Force B (GLOUCESTER and FIJI)• having fuelled at Alexandria, were on their

way to join Force Ai.

12. At 0800 on 2Oth May, 1941, only threeweeks after the British withdrawal from Greece,the Germans began their attack on Crete. Thistook the form of intense bombing of thevicinity of Maleme'aerodrome closely followedby the landing of troops by parachute, gliderand troop-carrying aircraft. The enemy'smain objective appeared .to be Maleme. butlater in the day similar attacks' developed atHerakliori and Retimo.

13. As regards .our Air Force, the increased' scale of enemy air attacks on aerodromes since.the* I3th May had imposed a very heavy strainon the fighter force in'Crete. This force byithe igth .May had been reduced to only seven

* Footnote: KOS—an armed Norwegian trawler.

fighter aircraft fit 'for operations. No rein-forcements .were available in Egypt. It had,therefore, been decided to fly 'all serviceableaircraft back to Egypt on the igth May, untilthe scale of enemy attack lessened or reinforce;ments became available. From the igth Mayto the 26th' May naval forces operating in the,vicinity of Crete were without fighter protec/tion.

14. On learning that the attack on,Cretestarted, ' the Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-ranean, at once .ordered .forces at sea to move /up towards Crete, but failing further develop- N^ments they were to keep out of sight of. land. jDuring the forenoon of the 20th May, \ theCbmmander-in-Chief, Mediterranean signalledhis intentions as follows: — ,

(a) Force D consisting of R.A.D. in DIDOwith ORION, AJAX, ISIS, KIMBERLEY,IMPERIAL and JANUS, was to pass theAnti Kithera Channel by 2200 /2Oth May,sweep Capes Malea—Hydra—Phalconera and i

• be off Canea at 0700/2ist.(6) Force C consisting of C.S.I5 in

NAIAD with PERTH, KANDAHAR,• NUBIAN, KINGSTON and JUNO, was to f

pass Kaso Strait at 2200 /2Oth, sweep roundStampalia and be off Heraklion at 0700/2ist.

(c) Force B consisting of GLOUCESTERand. FIJI was to pass close off Cape Matapan

. at 0400/2ist and then j oih' Force Ai about50 miles west .of Crete (position 35 °2o' N.,

• 22° 25'E.) at 07oo/2ist. . •"'(d) CALCUTTA was to pass through the

Kaso Strait after Force C which she was tojoin off Heraklion .at 0760/2ist.

(e) A new Force E (0.14 in JERVJS withNIZAM and ILEX) was to bombard Scar- *

. panto aerodrome during the night 2Oth/2istMay, withdrawing to the southward before

• daylight.(/) CARLISLE who was at Alexandria

would, sail as soon as ready so .as to joinForce E 50 miles south east of Crete (position

' 34° 3°' N., 27° po' E.) at.o700/2ist May. . ̂

15. As a result of air reconnaissance reportsof caiques sighted in the Aegean, Forces C andD were ordered at 1800 to move to the northof Crete, at once. It was then thought thatif our -forces carried out the sweeps that hadalready been arranged there was a danger of /their missing southbound enemy convoys inthe darkness. . The night sweeps for Forces Cand D were accordingly cancelled. InsteadForces C and D were ordered to establishpatrols north of Crete to the west arid eastof longitude 25° E. respectively. Force C wasto cover the vicinity .of Heraklion,. whilst ForceD was to guard the Maleme—Canea—KissamoBay area. The Retimo area was to be lookedafter by local craft from Suda Bay.

16. At nightfall on the 20th May, the situa-tion at Maleme and Canea was reported to bein hand, though about 1,200 of the 3,000 enemywho ha'd landed by air were unaccounted for.In the Heraklion and Retimo area it was knownthat parachutists had landed, but details werelacking. Boats carrying troops had beenreported off Heraklion.

17. During the night 2Oth/2ist, . Force C; encountered about sixM.A.S.* boats in the Kaso ,

* Footnote: Italian motor • boats, operating asM.T.B.s.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON. GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948 3107

Strait. After being engaged by JUNO, KAN-DAHAR and NAIAD, the M.A.S: boats retired,four of them having been damaged. Force Ebombarded Scarpanto aerodrome. Resultscould not be observed but intelligence reportslater indicated .that two D.O.I7 aircraft had| been damaged.

fcist May, 1941.18. At daylight on the 2ist May the position

olj our forces was: —(a) C.S-7 with Force Ai was 60 miles

rest of the Anti Kithera Strait steering to theSouth east to meet Force D which was re-naming from the Aegean patrol.! (6) .R.A.D. with Force D had sighted

nothing during his patrol in the Maleme-Canea-Kissamo Bay areas and was now onhis way to join Force Ai.

(c) C.S.I5 with Force C had encounteredM.A.S. boats during the night, but apart fromthat had nothing to report. He was nowwithdrawing through the Kaso Strait to thesouthward, having ibeen joined by CAL-CUTTA at 0600.

(d) D.I4 with Force E, after bombardingScarpanto, was on his way to join Force C.

(e) Force B had sighted nothing duringtheir patrol up to Cape Matapan and werenow joining Force Ai.

(/) CARLISLE was on her way fromAlexandria with orders to join Force C.

(g) ABDIEL was returning to Alexandriafrom her minelaying operation.It was intended that forces should remain

to the south of • Crete by day. After dark' thenight sweeps were to.be repeated.

19. During daylight on the 2ist May ournaval forces were subjected to heavy air attacks.Force Ai was attacked once during the fore-noon and for two and a half hours during theafternoon. Force C was bombed continuouslyfrom 0950 to 1350. At 1249 JUNO was hit by

\ bombs and sank in two minutes. CARLISLE* joined Force C at 1400. Force D was heavily

attacked during the forenoon, AJAX beingdamaged by near misses. After two and a halfhours of bombing during the afternoon, whenin company with Force Ai, they were again at-tacked in the evening. During these attacks onForces A and D at -least three aircraft werecertainly, and two more probably, shot down.The attacks on Force C were so incessant thatno reliable estimate can be made of the casual-ties inflicted on aircraft; at least two were seento be damaged and in difficulties, and one shotdown.

20. During the day Force Ai remained to thesouth west of Kithera where it was joined byForces B and D.

21. The airborne attacks on Crete on 2istMay continued with great intensity and Malemewas captured by the enemy.

22. No seaborne landing had yet taken placebut air reconnaissance reported groups of smallcraft, escorted by destroyers,. steering towardsCrete from Milo. Forces B, • C and 1} accord-ingly closed in through Kithera and Kaso Straitsin order to prevent a seaborne landing duringthe night .2ist/22nd May. If there were nodevelopments during the night Forces C andD were to commence workingr northwards at053O/22nd on a wide zigzag to locate/convoys.

23. At 2330/2ist, Force D (now consisting ofR.A.D. in DIDO, " with ORION, AJAX,JANUS, KIMBERLEY, HASTY and HERE-WARD) encountered an enemy troop convoyof 'caiques escorted by one or two torpedo boats18 miles north of Canea. The caiques, whichwere crowded with German soldiers, were en-gaged for two and a half hours. R.D.F. andA.S.V.* proved invaluable in leading pur forceson to fresh targets. In all, one or two steamers,at least a dozen caiques, a small pleasuresteamer and a steam yacht were either sunk orleft burning. One of the escorting torpedoboats, after firing torpedoes at our cruisers, wasdamaged by gunfire from DIDO and finallyblown up by a broadside from AJAX. It isestimated that the vessels sunk carried about4,000 German troops.

24. After taking a further sweep to the eastand north, R.A.D. turned1 west at 0330/22ndgiving his force a rendezvous for 0600/22ndabout 30 miles west of Crete. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's intentions had beenfor Forces C and D to work to the northward,commencing 05307 22nd, if there were no de-velopments during the night (the Commander-in^Chief, Mediterranean's signal timed 1843 of2ist 'May). The - Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean later amplified this by orderingForces C and D to join company and sweep towithin 25 miles of Milo to locate convoys (theCommander-m-Chief, Mediterranean's signaltimed 0402/22nd May). The latter messagedid not reach R.A.D. until after he had with-drawn outside the Aegean. R.A.D. only tookthe decision to withdraw after careful considera-tion. DIDO had expended 70 per cent, of herA.A. ammunition (22 per cent, having beenused up (between 0600 and 0930 on the 2istMay). ORION had expended 62 per cent, andAJAX 58 per cent. R.A.D. felt that his forcemight well find itself unable -to deal with thefurther expected scale of air attack. He re-ported the result of ,his .attack on the cotivoyto the Commander-uvChief, Mediterranean,adding that in view "of the serious shortage, ofA.A. ammunition he was joining Force Ai (theRear Admiral (D), Mediterranean's signaltimed 0405 of 22nd May).

25. On receipt of R.A.D.'s 0405 of 22iidMay, reporting the A.A. ammunition shortage,the Commander-'in-Chief, Mediterranean,ordered Force D to return to Alexandria withall despatch (the Commander-in-Chief, Medi-terranean's signal timed 0716/22nd May):

22nd May, 1941. • •26. At daylight on the 22nd May the position

was as follows:— .(a) Force Ai was about 45 miles south

west of "the Kithera'Channel steering towardsthe north west.

' (&) Force B was joining Force Ai.(c). Force C, haying reached a position

off Heraklion at '0400 was now sweeping tothe north westward in search'of convoys of'caiques. ' ' \

(d) Force D was about 30 miles west ofthe Kithera Channel steering to join ForceAi, but were shortly to receive orders fromthe Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to 'return to Alexandria with all despatch.

* Footnote: R.D.F.—Radio Direction Firiding.A.S.V.—Radar equipment in aircraft.*1'

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, .24 MAY, 1948

(e) D.5 in KELLY with KASHMIR,.KIPLING, KELVIN and JACKAL had .left Malta at 2130/2ist May and had orders

. to join Force- Ai to the west of Crete atiooo/22nd May.

(/) D.I4 in JERVIS with NIZAM andILEX had returned to -Alexandria to refueland were now steering for the Kaso Strait. .,

(g) D.io in STUART with- VOYAGERand VENDETTA had left Ale^xandria on the2ist May with orders to join Force Ai.

27. At .0830 Force C was.steering towardsMilo when a single caique was sighted. Thiscaique, which was carrying German troops,was sunk by PERTH whilst NAIAD engagedlarge numbers of aircraft who were bombing.At 0909 CALCUTTA reported a small merchantvessel ahead and destroyers were ordered tosink her. At. 1600 Force C was 25 miles southof the eastern corner of Milo. PERTH hadrejoined after sinking the caique but NAIADwas still some way astern. Ten minutes lateran enemy destroyer with four or five smallsailing vessels was sighted .to1 the northward..Our destroyers immediately gave chase, whilstPERTH and NAIAD engaged the enemydestroyer, causing her to retire under smoke.KINGSTON, engaged an enemy destroyer at7,000 yards, claiming two hits. . She- also rerported sighting a large number of caiques be-hind the smoke screen, which the enemydestroyer was now making. Although in con-tact with the enemy convoy, C.S.I5 consideredthat he-would jeopardise his whole force if heproceeded any further .to the northward.H.A. ammunition was beginning to run low.The speed of his force, which he consideredmust be kept together in face of the continuousair attacks, was limited to 20 knots, on accountof CARLISLE'S maximum speed being'21 knots; C.S.I5, therefore,-decided to with-draw and ordered the destroyers to abandonthe- chase.- The Commander-in'-Chief, •Medi-terranean's message timed 0941 of 22nd May,which showed 'that this convoy was of con-siderable size, was not seen by C.S;I5 untilafter noo. • - '

28. Force C was bombed practically con-tinuously fro'm. 0945 for three and a half hours.NAIAD was damaged by near misses whichput two turrets out of -action, flooded severalcompartments and reduced 'her speed to16 knots; CARLISLE was hit but not seriouslydamaged. At 1321 Force AI was sightedcoming up to the Kithera Channel from thewestward, in response to an appeal for supportfrom C.S.I5.

29. During the night 2ist/22nd-May, ForceB (GLOUCESTER and FIJI- with GREY-HOUND and GRIFFIN) had been patrollingoff Cape Matapan. Instructions from the Com-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean to proceed toHeraklion with all despatch reached them, toolate to be carried out; but they entered theAegean, and, at daylight, were about 25 'milesnorth of Cahea. Whilst withdrawing towardsForce Ai, -Force B was "attacked by divebombers almost continuously from' 0630 forone and a half hours, 3*IJl received slightdamage and 'GLOUCESTER superficial damageduring .these attacks. Force. B joined ForceAi at 0830/22nd May.

30. Force Ai .had been 45 miles south west (of the Anti Kithera Channel at daylight on 22nd .May and was joined by Forces D andr B at (

.'0700 and • 0830 respectively. The H.A. /ammunition situation was giving cause for Janxiety, the amount remaining at 0930 being: — /

GLOUCESTER 18% FIJI 30% jDIDO 25% ORION 38% /AJAX 40% ' ' ' WARSPITE 66°4

. .VALIANT 80% . ^31. C.S-7 had decided that he would me^et

Force C in the Kithera Channel about 1530. vMeanwhile he.continued to patrol with ForcesA, B and D between 20 and 30 miles to .thewest of the channel; apparently, to use his ownwords, " serving a useful purpose by attractingenemy, aircraft."

32. At 1225, C.S.7 heard from G.S.I5 thatNAIAD was .badly damaged and in rieed ofsupport. C.S.7 immediately decided to enterthe Aegean and increased to 23 knots.

33.'C.S.7 sighted A.A. shell bursts fromForce B at 1312. Twenty minutes later WAR-SPITE, in.which C.S-7 wa's wearing his flag,was hit by a bomb which wrecked the star-board 4" and 6" batteries.

34. At. 1326 GREYHOUND was detachedfrom Force Ai to sink a large caique betweenPori and Anti Kithera Islands. She success-fully accomplished this and was returning toher position on the screen when at 1351 shewas hit by two bombs and 15 minutes latersank stern first in approximate position 270°Pori Island 5 miles. C.S.I5 (who was thesenior officer. of forces present) orderedKANDAHAR'and KINGSTON to pick up sur-vivors from GREYHOUND. At 1402 C.S.I5ordered FIJI, and, five minutes later, GLOU-CESTER, to give KANDAHAR and KINGS-TON A.A: support and to stand by GREY-HOUND until dark. These rescuing ships andthe men swimming in the water were subjectedto almost continuous bombing and machine gun <attacks. C.S.I5 did not realise -at first howlittle A.A. ammunition was left in GLOU[-CESTER and FIJI. At 1413 C.S..I5 askedC.S.,7 for close support as his force 'had prac-tically no ammunition left. Force Ai closedForce C at WARSPITE's best speed (18 knots)and C.S-7 who. was feeling uneasy about theorders given .to GLOUCESTER and FIJI, in-formed C.S.is about the state of their H.A;ammunition. At 1457 C.S.I5 ordered GLOU-CESTER and FIJI to withdraw, with ships incompany, at their discretion.

35. At 1530 GLOUCESTER and FIJI weresighted coming up astern of Force Ai at highspeed, engaging enemy aircraft. At about1550 GLOUCESTER was. hit by several bombsand immobilised in approximate position 294°Pori 9 miles. She was badly on fire and herupper deck was a shambles. In-view of thecontinuous air attacks, FIJI reluctantly decidedthat she must leave GLOUCESTER. FIJIreported .the situation to C.S.I5. After, con-sulting C.S-7, C-.S.I5 decided that to take thebattlefleet back in support of GLOUCESTERwould only be risking more ships.

36. Air attacks on Force Ai had continuedintermittently from .1320 until 1510. At 1645further high" level attacks were, made andVALIANT was^hit'aft by two medium bombsbut no serious "damage was done.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24. MAY, 1948 3109,

.37- By this time Force C was ne,arly out ofH.A, ammunition and both forces were with-drawing to the south westward. Course wasaltered to the southward at 1830 and to the

^eastward at 2100: At 1700 FIJI, who had)AHAR and KINGSTON in company,

Reported her position as 305° Cape ElaphonisiI- miles, steering 175° at 27 knots. This posi-?n was 30 miles due east from Forces Ai and

who were then steering 215°.

I. At 1845 FIJI, who had survived some 20bonfibing attacks by aircraft .formations during,theljpast four hours, fell a victim to a singleM.Ej-iog. This-machine flew out of the cloudsin a, shallow dive and dropped its bomb veryclose to the port side, amidships. The shiptook up a 25° list and soon came to a stopwith her engines crippled. Half an hour lateranother single machine dropped three bombswhich landed over " A " boiler room. Thelist soon increased to 30° and at 2015 the shiprolled right over. KANDAHAR and KINGS-TON lowered .boats and rafts 'and withdrew toavoid almost certain damage from air attack.They returned after dark to pick up more menand finally succeeded in rescuing a total of523. They had been subjected to no less than22 air attacks between 1445 and 1920 and werenow getting short of fuel. At 2245 they pro-ceeded at 15 knots to join C.S:i5.

39. At 1928 C.S.7 learned from KANDAHARthat FIJI was sulking. C.S.7 immediatelyordered D.io, who was to join him on thefollowing day, to proceed with VOYAGER andVENDETTA to Fiji's position. At 2030, inaccordance with instructions received from theCornmaiider-in-Chief, Mediterranean, C.S-7 de-tached DECOY and HERO to the south coastof Crete to embark the King of Greece.

40. During the day .the casualties to shipshad been, two cruisers and one destroyer sunk,with two battleships and two cruisers damaged.The only casualties to enemy aircraft whichcould be claimed, with certainty amounted .totwo shot down, six probably shot down and fivedamaged. It is probable that enemy losses inaircraft were greater than this.

41. Captain (D), Fifth Destroyer Flotilla, inKELLY, with KASHMIR, KIPLING,KELVIN and JACKAL :had left Malta at2i3O/2ist May and joined C.S-7 at i6oo/22nd.At 2030/22nd KELLY, KASHMIR and KIP-LING were detached to look for survivors fromFIJI and half an hour later, KELVIN andJACKAL were sent to try and pick up anyof GLOUCESTER'S crew who could be found.C.S-7 however, subsequently ordered the searchto be abandoned and sent the 5th D.F. to patrolinside Kissamo. and Canea Bays. On arrivalat the Anti Kithera Channel, KIPLING de-veloped a steering defect and 0.5 ordered herto join C.S-7- Continuing into Canea Bay,KELLY and KASHMIR encountered a troop-carrying caique, which they damaged badly bygunfire. These two ships then carried out ashort bombardment of Maleme. ' Whilst with-drawing they encountered another caique whichthey engaged and set on fire. KELVIN andJACKAL weie detached to investigate' somelights which the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Suda,had reported being seen in Cane'aeBay. 'Theseproved to be shore lights so KELVIN and

JACKAL withdrew independently and informedthe Commander-in-Chiefi Mediterranean ,bysignal (KELVIN's signal timed 0300C of 23rdMay).

42. Force E (0.14 in JERVIS with ILEX,NIZAM and HAVOCK) patrolled off Herak-lion during the night 22nd /23rd May withoutincident and then withdrew to Alexandria.During the afternoon the Commandef-in-Chief,Mediterranean, gave orders for AJAX andORION, who were returning with R.A.D. toAlexandria, to join D. 14.about 80 miles southwest of Kaso. The intention was for Ithis forceto cover Heraklion during the night 22nd/23rdMay. R.A.D. detached these two ships, at1730/22nd when about 150 miles from the KasoStrait. In the meantime,. Jhe Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean had ordered 0.14 to pass,the Kaso Strait at 2100/22nd (the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's signal timed 1312 pf22nd May). AJAX> realising that she could notpossibly join10.14 in- time, decided to rejoinR.A.D. and informed the Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean accordingly (AJAX's . signaltimed 1843 of 22nd May)..

43. At Alexandria, GLENROY embarked'900 men of the Queens Royal Regiment, theHeadquarters of the i6th Infantry Brigade and18 vehicles. She sailed' for Tymbaki p.m. 22ndMay escorted by COVENTRY, AUCKLANDand FLAMINGO. JAGUAR and DEFENDER;after embarking ammunition urgently requiredby the Army, left Alexandria to join Force -Ai'and then proceed so as to arrive Suda during,the night 23rd /24th May.

44. Minefields were successfully laid byABDIEL between Cephalonia and Levkas andby RORQUAL in the Gulf of Salonika.

45. Meanwhile, in Crete, the enemy was con-centrating on the Maleme area, where his troopcarriers continued to arrive and depart on 22ndMay at the rate of more than 20 per hour. Aplan to counter attack Maleme had to beabandoned and our troops commenced to with-draw to a new line.

46. At 2230/22nd May a " Most Immediate "message was received from C.S.7 reportingthe loss of GLOUCESTER and FIJI and givingthe ammunition situation in the battleships and.destroyers. It appeared from this signal thatthe battleships had run right out of pom pomammunition. The .Commander-in7Cnief,Mediterranean, accordingly decided to with-draw all forces to Alexandria (the Com-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's signal timed0408 of 23rd May). - / -

23rd May, 1941.47. The naval position at daylight on 23rd.

May was as follows: —(a) At 0408 the Gommander-in-Chief, Med-

' iterranean, had ordered all forces to withdrawto Alexandria, with the exception of GLEN-ROY and escort.

(b) Forces Ai and.C, about 25miles apart,were joining each other and returning to Alex-andria. KANDAHAR and KINGSTON,were joining Force C.

.(c) D.5-in KELLY, with KASHMIR and _KIPLING had just' cleared Canea Bay and;,was' returning .to Alexandria. KELVIN and

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948

JACKAL were returning independently andwere south west of Crete.

(d) Force E was returning to Alexandria.(e) DECOY and HERO were joining Force

Ai, having embarked the King of Greece,' H.B.M. Minister and .other important person-

ages from Agriarumeli (south coast of Crete)during the previous night. >

(/) Force D were on their way to Alex-.' andria, DIDO was just outside the harbour," AJAX and ORION were some way astern of'. DIDO as they had not had time to rejoin.

(g)- Captain (D) loth Destroyer Flotilla; in: STUART, with VOYAGER and VEN-. DETTA, was off Gavdo Island, having re-

". ceived orders from C.S.7 to search for FIJIsurvivors.

(h) JAGUAR arid DEFENDER had beendetached from Force Ai and were south westof Gavdo, making for Suda Bay, with ammu-nition urgently required by the Army.

48. Captain D.5- with his flotilla had .beenretiring at full speed from Canea since dawn.After surviving ,two air attacks without beingdamaged they were attacked at 0755 -by 24JU.87 divebombers. KASHMIR was hit andsank in two minutes.. KELLY was doing 30knots, under full starboard rudder, when shewas hit by a large bomb. The ship took up anever-increasing hst to port, finally turning turtlewith considerable way on. After floating upsidedown for half an hour she finally sank. Thedive bombers, before leaving; .machine gunnedthe men in the water, killing and woundingseveral.

49. KIPLING immediately closed to pick upsurvivors from KELLY and KASHMIR. Forthree hours KIPLING continued with her rescuework, in which she was.considerably hamperedby six high level bombing attacks. After pick-ing up 279 officers and men from the waterKIPLING .left the scene, at noo, for Alex-'andria. She. estimated that between 0820 and1306 no less than 40 aircraft attacked her, drop-ping 83 bombs, but she emerged from thisordeal unscathed. C.Siis reluctantly decided.that he could send her no help from Force C orForce Ai. It was necessary to send PROTEC-TOR to meet her at 0800 the next day, 50 milesfrom' Alexandria, as she had run right .out offuel. In these engagements the 5th D.F. shotdown at least two, and .damaged at least four,enemy aircraft.

50. In view of the intense scale of air attackof? Crete, -the Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-r.anean,: after consulting the 'Co'mmander-in-Chief, Middle East, ordered GLENROY andescort, at 1127, to return to Alexandria. TheCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, then madea further plan for the reinforcement of Crete,using ABDIEL and/or destroyers. 'The Ad-miralty, at .1559, ordered: GLENROY to turnnorthwards,' pending instructions. At' 1651 theAdmiralty urged the Commander-in-Chief, Med-iterranean, to land. the reinforcements fromGLENROY in Crete, if it could be done thatnight.. At 1837 . .the Commander-in-Chief,

. Mediterranean, informed the .Admiralty that itwas much too late for GLENROY'to reach.Tymbaki that night (23rd/24th May).- 'At 2237the Admiralty was informed that the GLEN-ROY; had she continued northward, would have

'- been in the worst .possible position for enemyair attacks at • daylight. Disembarkation of

troops by day was out of the question. • Shehad, therefore, been ordered to Alexandria*

- 51. .In Crete the Army formed a new line.inthe Maleme-Canea sector. .Very heavy air*attacks were being made "on our troops, whcwere without fighter cover/ and the enemy kepdup a steady flow of reinforcements .with 'troop carriers. The five M.T.B..S of the. itM.T.B. Flotilla in Suda Bay were singledfor attack by aircraft and all were sunk. Durjiigtheir operations off the Cretan coast and whilein harbour, the M.T.B.s accounted for two'air-craft for certain and two probably shot down.The Naval Officer-in-Charge,. Suda Bay,, de-cided that the time had come to consider plansfor evacuation. At Heraklion, an ultimatumwas received from the enemy, calling forHeraklion to surrender but this was rejectedby the British and Greek Commanders.

52. During the night 23rd /24th - May,.JAGUAR and DEFENDER disembarkedammunition in Suda Bay and returned toAlexandria via the Kaso Strait.

24th May, 1941...53. The. naval situation at daylight on-'the24th May was': — , .

i-a) Forces Ai, C and E had arrivedAlexandria during the previous night.

. . (6) PROTECTOR had- gone out to meet'- KIPLING who • was .about 70 miles from• Alexandria. • .. /

':-. (c) GLENROY-. escorted by COVENTRY,AUCKLAND arid FLAMINGO had returned

; to Alexandria during'-the night 23rd/24th• May without landing their troops.

•(d) JAGUAR arid DEFENDER havingdisembarked ammunition in Suda Bay werereturning to Alexandria via the Kasq Strait.They had on .board 250 naval officers- andratings not required in Crete.

(e) ABDIEL had left Alexandria during' the night of 23rd /24th and was on her way

to Suda, with ammunition and stores for theArmy.

54. There had been indications that a landingmight take place at Sitia during the night24th/25th. In order to deal with this landing,a force consisting of AJAX (Senior Officer),DIDO, KIMBERLEY and HOTSPUR leftAlexandria at 0800 on .the 24th May, withorders to pass .through the Kaso Strait andsweep the north coast of Crete during the night24th/25th May. If nothing was sighted aridtime allowed, this force was also to. bombardMaleme aerodrome.

55.. ISIS (Senior Officer), HERO and NIZAMsailed from Alexandria at 0930 with the Head-quarters and two battalions of Special ServiceTroops (Layforce) who were to be landed atSelinos Kajstelli on the south coast of Crete.

/ '56. The weather was too bad fot.ISIS and

•her force to land-their troops and they wererecalled to Alexandria. The force with AJAXpassed through the Kaso Strait and swept alongthe north of Crete, but they did not encounterany enemy .convoys.- As they were unable 'toreachiMalemegfor -the .bombardment in time -tobe well'clear-by daylight,, they, withdrew tothe southward via Kaso.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, J MAY, 1948 3111

\ .57. In Crete, the enemy changed his tacticsI in the western sector and made a very heavyS bombing attack on Canea. The Army force\ headquarters had to be withdrawn to the naval) headquarters at Suda. In the Heraklion area,V our troops were still holding out but the Greeks/ in this sector were getting short of ammuni-\tion. The A.A. defences of Suda were by this

;ime seriously reduced 'by enemy air attacksi casualties in the P9rt to small craft hadin heavy.

5. In reply to a request from the Chiefs ofSfeff ((Number 113) for an appreciation, the

ider-in-Chief, Mediterranean, said thatthe1 scale of air attack now made it no longer'possible for the Navy to operate in the Aegeanor vicinity of Crete by day. The Navy couldnot guarantee to prevent seaborne landingswithout suffering losses, which, added.to thosealready sustained, would very seriously preju-dice our command of the Eastern Mediterranean(MIDEAST to TROOPERS 0/67119 of 24thMay—time of origin 1815 of 24th May).. TheChiefs of Staff (Number 116) replied that unlessmore drastic naval action was taken than thatsuggested in the Commander-in-Chief, Medi-terranean's appreciation the enemy would beable to reinforce the island to a considerableextent. The Chiefs of Staff added that it wasessential that the Commanders-in-Chief shouldconcert measures for clearing up the situation'without delay. In so doing the Fleet andRoyal Air Force were to accept whatever riskwas entailed in preventing any considerableenemy reinforcement reaching Crete. If enemyconvoys were reported north of Crete the fleetwould, have to operate in that area by dayalthough considerable losses might be expected..Experience would show for how long that situa-tion could be maintained. To this the Com-mander-in-Ghief, Mediterranean, replied (on26th May) that the determining factor in operat-ing in the Aegean was not the fear of sustaininglosses but the need to avoid crippling the fleetwithout commensurate advantage to ourselves.He pointed- out that so far the enemy hadapparently not succeeded in landing any con-siderable reinforcements by sea. With regardto the last part of the Chiefs of Staff message,he pointed out that in three days, two cruisersand four destroyers had been sunk, one battle-ship had been put out of action for several

. -months, whilst two cruisers and four destroyershad ibeen considerably damaged. Since start-ing to write this message '"he had heard thatFORMIDABLE p and NUBIAN had beendamaged. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-ranean, also referred to the strain, both to per-sonnel and machinery, in the light craft, whohad been operating to the limits of their

f endurance since the end of February (the Com-' inander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's message, tothe Admiralty timed 18340 of 26th May, 1941).

25th May, 1941.59. The naval situation at daylight on the

• 25th May was: —(a] ABDIEL had left Suda at 0240 with

some 60 walking wounded and was on herway back to Alexandria.

(b) The force with AJAX had sighted, nothing to the north of Crete. There was no

. time to carry out .the bombardment of:.. ' 'Maleme, so the force was now withdrawing

.through the Kaso Strait. ', ••- 58154 .

(c) The fore \ with ISIS were on their wayto Alexandria) Slaving been unable to landtroops in Crett, \wing to bad weather.

60. Our informal*^\showed that'Scarpantoaerodrome was being t^tensively used by theenemy in his operations against Crete. It was,therefore, decided to attack the aerodrome withFleet Air Arm aircraft* from FORMIDABLEwho had now built up her fighter strength to12 Fulmars, though some of them were ofdoubtful reliability. Vice Admiral ist BattleSquadron was given charge of the operationwhich was to be known as M.A.Q.3. At 1200on 25th May, Vice Admiral ist Battle Squadronin QUEEN ELIZABETH, with BARHAM,FORMIDABLE, JERVIS, JANUS, KANDA-HAR, NUBIAN, HASTY, HEREWARD,VOYAGER and VENDETTA (Force A) leftAlexandria to carry out.M.A.Q..3.

61. During the .evening GLENROY sailedagain for Tymbaki, taking the same troops thatshe had set out with on 22nd May (see para-graph 43). She was escorted by D.io in•STUART, with COVENTRY and JAGUAR.

62. AJAX, with her force, had retired to thesouth-of Crete and was to carry out a repetitionof her sweep, during the night 25th/26th May,•and if time allowed, bombard Maleme.NAPIER, KELVIN and JACKAL leftAlexandria to relieve the destroyers withAJAX.

'63. ISIS, HERO and NIZAM had been un-able to land their troops on the south coast ofCrete owing to bad weather. On arrival back inAlexandria, the troops in ISIS and HEROwere transferred to ABDIEL, who sailed earlyon 26th May with HERO and NIZAM for SudaBay. In addition to these troops, ABDIELtook about 150 tons of ammunition and storesfor the Army.

64. Late that night (25th May) the new linewhich had been formed in the Maleme—Caneasector in Crete was broken by the enemy, after,several attacks had been repulsed.

26th May, 1941.65. The position of naval forces at daylight

was: —(a) Force A was about 100 miles south

south west of Scarpanto. AJAX's force wasabout to join.

(b) ABDIEL, HERO and NIZAM had leftAlexandria during the night 25th/26th Mayfor Suda with troops and stores.

(c) GLENROY, escorted by STUART,COVENTRY and JAGUAR had leftAlexandria at 2000/25th May and was on herway to Tymbaki, with troops.

(d) AJAX and her force had repeated thesweep she had carried out on the previousnight and had again sighted nothing. Thisforce now consiste'd of AJAX, DIDO,NAPIER, KELVIN and JACKAL and wasabout to join Force A. • HOTSPUR,IMPERIAL and KIMBERLEY having beenrelieved, were now returning to Alexandria.

66." Between 050.0 and 0600', when Force Awas about 100 miles south south west of Scar-panto, four Albacores and four Fulmars fromFORMIDABLE attacked Scarpanto aerodrome.

* Footnote: A few R.A.F. Wellingtons also•attacked this target.

A 3

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, .24.MAY, .1948

Of. four' other aircraft intended to take, partin the attack, two could not be flown off andtwo returned to the carrier pwing to unser-viceability. The Albacores achieved completesurprise, destroying two aircraft and damagedothers while the Fulmars ̂ attacked a number ofC.R.42S and JU.Sys .and .damaged, a numberof them. During the forenoon enemy aircraftwere continually being detected. The eightremaining serviceable aircraft in FORMID-ABLE made 24 flights in the course of the fore-noon during which 'there were 20 combats. Two •enemy aircraft were shot down for certain andtwo were probably destroyed. One Fulmar waslost. At 1320 Force A was attacked by 20 air-craft which approached from the African coast.In dive bombing attacks FORMIDABLE washit twice. Her starboard side was blown outbetween 17 and 24 bulkheads and '' X " turret,cable and accelerator gear were put out ofaction. During the same attack NUBIAN washit right aft and had her stern blown off butshe-was still able to proceed at 20 knots.

67. Intelligence had shown that the Ger-mans were using Melos harbour as an assemblypoint for craft to invade Crete. Orders hadbeen given, to Vice Admiral ist Battle Squadronto detach 0.14 with NUBIAN, KANDAHARand JANUS to' raid Melos harbour during thenight .of 26th/27th May. AJAX and DIDOwere also to have been detached from ForceA to make a feint as though intending to passKaso Strait at 2200/26th and then returnto Alexandria after dark. The signal from theCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, orderingthese movements reached Vice Admiral istBattle Squadron during a bombing attack andat a time when he was occupied with thedamage to FORMIDABLE. When the ViceAdmiral saw the signal he considered it was too•late for 0.14 to attack Milo and be clear southof Crete by daylight. He, therefore, cancelledboth the operation and the feint. At 1719 theCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean sent asignal, which also cancelled the Melos operation.

68. After dark FORMIDABLE with VOY-AGER, VENDETTA, HEREWARD andDECOY' (who1 had joined at 2000) weredetached from Force A so as to arrive Alex-andria at daylight 27th May. The remainderof the force operated during the night to thenorth westward of Alexandria, and at daylight27th May, proceeded towards Kaso to meetABDIEL.

69. Although it was realised that there wouldbe considerable risk in sending slow merchantships to Crete it was so important to maintainsupplies .to the island that it was. thoughtthe attempt should be made. Convoy A.N.3I,consisting of two ships, escorted by , AUCK-LAND, left Alexandria at 0500/26th May. Itwas arranged for CALCUTTA and DEFENDERto join the convoy at 0600/27.

70. GLENROY, escorted by STUART,COVENTRY and JAGUAR-had left Alexandriaat, 2000/25th May with a Battalion of theQueens Regiment. The force was subjectedto bombing attacks by reconnaissance aircraftduring the forenoon of 26th.May. At 1820 therewere two heavy dive bombing attacks by air-craft formations. One aircraft was shot downa,nd one appeared to be damaged during theseattacks. A final attack by low flying torpedo

bombers occurred.at 2050.. GLENROY avoidedthe. torpedoes but. received slight damage andli casualties from near misses and machine gunattacks." Three of. her landing .craft were holedand a large dump "of cased petrol on the upperdeck caught fire. The fire lasted for one' and a ,half hours, during which time the ship had to Jsteer south in.order to bring the wind aft. .One./of the. landing craft at the davits had to becut adrift owing to the proximity of. the flames.With 800 troops on board and a large, cargo of.petrol, GLENROY was in a nasty situatiop,but the fire was put but by 1950, -when a north-erly .course 'for Crete was resumed. Halfan -hour later GLENROY decided that 4heoperation of landing the troops at Tymbaki mustbe cancelled owing to shortness of time, reduc-tion in. available landing craft and unsuitableweather for landing on a beach.- GLENROYand 'escort were accordingly turned back forAlexandria at 2115.. •

71. In Crete pur troops were compelled towithdraw still further towards Suda and it wasfelt that" it could not be long before the wholefront in that sector collapsed.

• Our troops in the Heraklion sector had faredbetter. ' Two of the ." I " tanks landed by^'A"Lighter Number 2 at Tymbaki and the Argyleand Sutherland Highlanders landed at the sameplace by GLENQYLE had broken through fromthe south. The enemy had landed large num-bers "of men 'by parachute and troop carrierbut had been, successfully .held a;t nearly allpoints.

-. 72. During the night 26th/27th May,ABDIEL, 'HERO and NIZAM landed 750Special Service Troops and Army stores in -Suda•Bay. .This was the last reinforcement that -wassent .into the island. These ships left for Alex-andria with-930 men who were-not required inCrete. . -

27th May, 1941.73. The naval situation at daylight on the

27th. May was: —(a) Force A, now consisting of QUEEN

ELIZABETH, BARHAM, JERVIS, JANUS,KELVIN, NAPIER, KANDAHAR andHASTY, were about 250 miles south east ofKaso. (AJAX and DIDO were detached at0660 to. Alexandria).

(fc) ABDIEL, HERO and NIZAM had dis-embarked troops at Suda and were on theirway back to Alexandria via the Kaso Strait,carrying 930 personnel not wanted in Crete.

(c) AJAX and DIDO had been detachedfrom Force A at 0600 and were returning toAlexandria "in accordance, .with the Com-

' mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's original in-tention (see paragraph 67)'.

(d) AUCKLAND with Convoy A:N.3i wasabout 150 miles north west of Alexandria,

• 'making for Crete. . .(e) GLENROY .and escort were returning

. to Alexandria. . . •, • •

74. From messages received from the General.Officer Commanding, Crete, and the NavalOfficer-in-Charge', Suda Bay, it was clear thatthe enemy had broken through our line defend-ing Suda with great. suddenness. Four daysearlier the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Suda, hadforeseen that this .might happen and had taken

1 a .number of. precautionary, measures whichwould facilitate arrangements for evacuation.

J

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948

. 75. Early in the forenoon, Convoy A.N.3I,which was making for Suda Bay was orderedto turn back, as it was realised that it had nochance of reaching Crete under present condi-tions of air attacks.

76. .Vice Admiral ist Battle Squadron withForce A, less FORMIDABLE and escort, had

VJ>een operating north west of Alexandria during"le night 26th /27th May and at daylight on

tSie 27th May were steering towards Kaso Straitto cover the return of ABDIEL, HERO andNiZAM. Vice Admiral ist Battle Squadron'sfofrce now consisted of QUEEN ELIZABETH,B^RHAM, JERVIS, JANUS, KELVIN,NAPIER and HASTY. At 0858 this forqe wasattacked by 15 JU.88s and H.E.ins whoappeared from the direction of the sun.BARHAM was hit on " Y " turret and two ofher bulges were flooded by near misses. A firewas started in BARHAM and this necessitatedthe force steering down wind to the south untilthe fire was extinguished two hours later. .Twoaircraft were shot down and one was seen to bedamaged by gunfire. At 1230, on receipt ofinstructions from the Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean, Vice Admiral ist BattleSquadron shaped course for Alexandria, arriv-ing there at 1900.' 77. In a message timed 0824 of 27th May(0/67808 of 27th 'May), General Wavell in-formed the Prime Minister that he feared wemust recognise that Crete was no longer tenableand that troops must be withdrawn as far aspossible. The Chiefs of Staff (No. 118) repliedthat Crete was to be evacuated forthwith. Ourtroops in the Heraklion sector were still holdingout, though it appeared only a matter of timebefore the enemy launched a major attackagainst them.

78. The Navy could claim to have preventedany seaborne invasion of Crete and to havekept the Army supplied with essential reinforce-ments of men and stores. The Royal Air Force,owing to circumstances beyond their controlhad so far been unable to give any direct helpto the Navy. The fleet had inflicted consider-able losses pn the German troop-carrying con->voys and had destroyed a number of enemyaircraft. Twenty enemy aircraft had been shotdown for certain, with n probables. At least15 aircraft appeared to have been damaged.But the losses and damage sustained by thefleet had been severe. Officers and men hadbeen subjected to prolonged strain from theconstant bombing. Little rest could be given,as a formidable task lay before the Fleet—theevacuation of some 22,000 men from Crete toEgypt.

The following Despatch was submitted to theLords Commissioners of the Admiralty on theiqth September, 1941, by Admiral Sir Andrew

. B. Cunningham, G.C.B., D.S.O,, Com-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Mediterranean.i^th September, 1941.

THE BATTLE OF CRETE.PHASE IV—THE EVACUATION OF BRITISH AND

IMPERIAL TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND.Be' pleased to lay before Their Lordships

the attached reports of the Evacuation of Crete,

carried out between 26th May and ist June,1941. .

2. The evacuation followed without inter-mission on the Battle of Crete when the fleethad sustained such severe losses and threw afinal and almost intolerable strain on the lightforces, most of whom had been operating atsea almost continuously since the 'beginning ofOperation " Lustre "* on 4th March, 1941:

3. Only one of the evacuations, that fromHeraklion (paragraphs 6 and 7)f, could bemade from a port with -any facilities at -all.All the remainder had to be taken from thesmall open beach at Sphakia (paragraphs 18to 24, 31, 33, 34, 45 and 46) to which accessfrom the land was difficult and slow. This;together with the disorganisation resulting fromthe events previously described, led to a con-stant fluctuation in the forecast of 'numbers to1

be embarked and made both the organisationand performance of the evacuation mostdifficult.

4. In view of the confusion and uncertaintyof the situation in Crete and the extemporarynature of the arrangements for the embarka-tion, Major General J. F. Evetrfcs, C.B., C.B.E.,M.C., was sent from the General Headquarters,Middle East, to act as Military Liaison Officeron my staff. His judgment .and co-operationwere invaluable.

At the same time an organisation was set upin the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean'soffices for thej co-ordination of fighter protec-tion at sea. Group Captain C. B. R. Pelly,Royal Air Force, was sent from the Head-quarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East, toundertake this organisation • which, under hisable management, pulled rapidly into shapeand undoubtedly saved us many casualties. J

5. The first day of the evacuation was" notencouraging. In the evacuation of Heraklion,Rear Admiral H. B. Rawlings, O.B.E., theRear Admiral Commanding, Seventh CruiserSquadron, was faced with, many .difficultdecisions. It was unfortunate that H.M.S.AJAX was not retained with Force B andmuch overcrowding thereby avoided, but theslight nature of her damage was not apparentto the Rear Admiral Commanding, SeventhCruiser Squadron. Subsequent examination inharbour of damage sustained by H.M.S. AJAXrevealed that the reports given to the Com-manding Officer at the time were exaggeratedand the ship could have well carried on withForce B,

- 6. The actual embarkation from Heraklionwas most expeditiously carried out and reflectedcredit on all concerned both ashore and afloat.

* Footnote: Operation " Lustre " was the trans-port of the Army to Greece.

t Footnote: References are to paragraphs in theCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's narrative.

I Footnote : Air Ministry comment:—The generalair situation remained much'the same with one im-portant difference. The bulk of the troops wereevacuated from bays in southern Crete during thehours of darkness and it was possible to provide somelimited fighter cover to sliips which, by first light, hadproceeded some way. towards the Egyptian mainland.Even then, the ranges from our airfields and the smallnumber of aircraft available allowed no margin inhand to deal-w-ith changes in the routeing or timing ofnaval operations which weie necessitated by enemyaction.

3ii4 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON, ..GAZETTE,. 24 MAY, 1948

7. The breakdown pf H..M.S. IMPERIAL'Ssteering gear was a bitter misfortune which car-ried ..disaster in its train. The handling' ofH:M:S: HOTSPUR in embarking 'and carry-ing ' a total 'of 900 men must' have ' beenadmirable.' * " ' '

.8. (As a. direct, result, of this idelay, ForceB and tfie Royal Air Force fighters failedto make contact at dayjig'ht..' The force wasconsequently exposed,, starting only a fewmiles from the enemy's air. base in Scarpanto,to the full -weight of enemy air attack withoutany air support, until the first of our fighterseventually 'gained contact at 1200.

The' consequence of this unhampered on-slaught of aircraft .was the .loss of H.M.S.HEREWARD and the damage to H.M.S.ORION and H.M.S;'DIDO (paragraphs 10 to15). The difficult decision to leave H.M.S.HEREWARD to her fate was undoubtedlycorrect, and it is at least some consolation thata large proportion of those on board survived.

9. This disastrous voyage left the Cpm-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in a most un-pleasant. quandary. Of the 4,000 troops em-barked in Force B ;no less than 800 jiadbeen killed, .wounded or captured, after leavingCrete. If this was to be the scale of casualties,' itappeared that, quite apart from our own pros-pective losses of ships and men, who could ill bespared, our efforts to rescue .the Army fromcapture might only lead to the destruction ofa,large proportion of the troops.. It was onlyafter long and anxious consideration that thedecision to continue the evacuation .could betaken. ,

10. The decision to continue, once taken; wasamply justified, for the remainder of the1 evacua-tion proceeded almost without casualty .to -per-sonnel. Fighter protection became steadilymore effective and the enemy less enterprising:his failure to interfere with the nightly embarka-tion at • Sphakia was niost surprising, " andreminiscent of the Greek evacuation. • .

• u: Vice Admiral E. L. S. King, C.B.,M.V.O., the Vice • Admiral Commanding,Fifteenth Cruiser Squadron, carried-.out twosuccessful evacuations, embarking large num-bers of troops each-time on'the nights .of29th/30th May and the-final night 3ist May/,ist June - (paragraphs 31, 45 :and: 46): ' On thefirst-occasion we. were fortunate that, althoughH.M.A.S. PERTH -was- hit .and ^damaged,H.M.S. GLENGYLE escaped unscathed, withher load of some 3,000 men. .The landing craftshe carried to Crete on this occasion were in-valuable at this and subsequent embarkations.

12: The achievement pf Captain. S. H. T.Arliss,' Royal Navy, the Captain'(D), SeventhDestroyer Flotilla, in H.M.A.S. NAPIER inembarking 700 men each in-H.M.A.S. NAPIERand -H.M.A.S. NIZAM on the night 3otiiMay/3ist May'was noteworthy (paragraphs 33:and 34). He had been deprived; "by. defects anddamage, of two of his force, but accomplishedhis task without any. reduction in the numbers,t o b e embarked. . " , - , . - -

13. The loss of. H.M.S: CALCUTTA on the.ist June, only a hundred miles from.Alexandria, came! as a final blow, (paragraph;49). . This" fine little shijfr had.'-a -record -of-arduous service and gallant • endeavour in the

face of air attack .which must be almost unsur-passed, in;tjie Royal .Navy.. She fell, it. mayalmost.be said,'to.'.'. a bow drawn at a venture "and, the Mediterranean.IFleet is the.poorer by.her loss. * . .

'Captain W. P. Came,1 Royal Navy, inH.M.S..COVENTRY had an anxious.time ie-.covering' her survivors and did well toso many. : .' .

14;' The decision :tb attempt no furthe/revacuation on the' night ist/2nd June (par?t-graph 51) was made 'with the greatest 'relu<4t-ance, but with dwindling forces and men andmachinery at' the point of exhaustion, a furtherattempt when' the forces had already beenordered to surrender could not be justified. Itwas particularly galling that a large propor-tion of the men left to surrender consisted ofthe Royal Marines, who had fought so gallanta" rearguard action. . . .

15. .Where so much fine service was per-formed it is difficult, as ever, to pick out:indivi-dual acts of merit. Reference must be madehowever to. the fearless judgment" and gallantbearing of Rear Admiral "H. B. .Rawlings,O.B.E., the Rear Admiral Commanding,Seventh Cruiser Squadron in extricating hisshattered squadron on the. 29th May and inbringing it safely to harbour.

The .co-operation and understanding of MajorGeneral J. F. Evetts, 'C.B., C.B.E., M.C., whowas attached to me for the evacuation period,,were a source of 'great strength at this time..Group Captain C. B. R. Felly's untiring zealwas of the .utmost value. •

16. The bearing and discipline of officers andmen of all services in this ordeal was a sourceof inspiration. In particular (the behaviour ofmen in the crowded ships of Force B onthe 29th May was most notable in the face ofthe hammering they endured.

17. I had occasion-to remark at the con-clusion of my despatch on the first phases of.the Battle of.Crete, that I never felt prouderof the Mediterranean Fleet except -during thosetrials 'which ft was about to undergo.. The-trialsin question are described in this narrative :of the

• final phase.It is not -easy to convey how heavy was the

strain that men and ships sustained. Apart,from the cumulative effect of prolonged sea-going over extended periods it has to beremembered that in this last instance ships' com-panies had none of the inspiration of battle withthe enemy to bear them up. Instead they .had theunceasing anxiety '6f the task of trying .to bringaway in safety, thousands of their own country-men, many of whom were in an exhausted anddispirited condition, in ships necessarily so over-crowded that even when there was opportunityto relax conditions made this impossible. Theyhad started the evacuation already over tiredand they had to carry it through under.condi-tions of savage air attack such as had only re-cently caused grievous losses in the fleet.

There is rightly little credit or glory to beexpected in these operations: of retreat but Ifeel.that the spirit of tenacity shown-by thosewho. took part should not go unrecorded.

More than once I felt that the,stage had beenreached when no more could be asked of officersand "men, physically and mentally 'exhausted bytheir: efforts and by the events of. these fateful

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAX 1948

PHASE

weeks. It is perhaps even now not realisedhow nearly the breaking point was reached, butthat these men struggled through is the measureof their achievement and I trust that it will notlightly be forgotten.

(Signed) A. B. CUNNINGHAM.Admiral.

Commander-in-Chief,. Mediterranean..

\ THE BATTLE OF CRETENARRATIVE BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

MEDITERRANEAN. .IV—THE.EVACUATION-OF THE BRITISH

'AND IMPERIAL FORCES FROM THE ISLAND.After a battle which had lasted eight days, it

was decided that our troops were not any longerin a position to resist effectively and must beevacuated. So far, .the Mediterranean Fleet hadalready lost two cruisers and four destroyers be-sides having the aircraft carrier/two battleships,one cruiser and one destroyer virtually out ofaction. Another five cruisers . and fourdestroyers had suffered minor damage, whichdid not, however, greatly affect their steamingpowers or fighting efficiency. The fleet was nowgiven the task of attempting to evacuate some22,000 men, mostly from an open beach on thesouth "coast of Crete, 360 miles from the fleetbase at Alexandria.

2. Up to date the fleet had been required tooperate without fighter protection (except forthe brief period on the 26th May, when FQR-MIDABLE's fighters were available). On the27th May, a message was received from the AirOfficer Commanding-in-Chief, Royal Air Force,Middle East, stating that the Royal Air Forcewould do all possible to provide some fightercover for ships but 'owing to the distance fromour bases, the cover would only be meagre andspasmodic (H.Q.R.A.F., M.E. A.458 of 27thMay, time of origin 1718 of 27thMay). Group Captain C. B. R. Pelly fromR.A.F.H.Q., M.E. was attached temporarilyto the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean'sstaff at Alexandria, in order to co-ordinatefighter protection with the movement of fleetunits.

'3.. Throughout the evacuation, great diffi-culty was experienced in finding out the exactnumbers to be removed on each night. Thissometimes resulted in the ships not being quitefilled to capacity and sometimes in not enoughships being sent.

4. The method adopted in allocating shipswas as follows: —

The numbers.to be taken off and the em-barkation-points would generally be signalledby " CREFORCE", the General OfficerCommanding, Troops in Crete. The initialestimate of numbers, which proved to besubstantially correct, was given by the NavalOfficer-in-Charge, Suda Bay. The Com-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, after con-sulting Major General J. F. Evetts, C.B.,C.B.E., M.p. (who was acting as his MilitaryLiaison Officer) would decide pn the numberof ships to be sent.

The original plan for .bringing off troops wasas follows: —

jj^a) Troops from the Maleme-Suda Bayarea were to come off from Sphaki".

(&). Troops from the Retimo area were. . to come off from Plaka Bay. . . .

(c) Troops from the Heraklion area wereto ibe. taken off from Heraklion harbour. .. (d) A small number of troops who werecut off to the south of Heraklion wereexpected to make their way to Tymbaki.

(e) Evacuation was invariably to becarried out at night, usually between thehours of midnight and 0300. This allowedships to be as far as possible from enemy

- . air bases during daylight hours.(/) Ashore in Crete, the evacuation was

to be covered by troops fighting a rearguard-action from the Suda Bay area to the southcoast. Major General E. C. Weston,Royal Marines, was placed in charge of•the rearguard.

5. It was decided that the -main evacuationon the night of 28th /29th May should be fromHeraklion. It will be recalled that on the23rd May the enemy had delivered an ulti-matum to the Heraklion garrison to surrender,but this had been rejected by the British andGreek Commanders. During the ensuing daysthe enemy were re-inforced continuously bytroop-carrying planes. In spite of this thegarrison held out, delivered counter attacksand inflicted severe losses on the enemy rightup to the time of evacuation. •

May, 1941.6. At 0600 on the 28th May, Force B, con-

sisting of C.S.7 in ORION with AJAX, DIDO,DECOY, JACKAL, IMPERIAL, HOTSPUR,klMBERLEY and HEREWARD, leftAlexandria to evacuate the Heraklion garrison.Force" B was about 90 miles from Scarpanto at1700 and from then until dark was subjectedto a series of air attacks, consisting of highlevel ibombing, dive bombing and torpedoattack. At 1920 IMPERIAL was near missedbut at the time appeared to be undamaged. At2100 AJAX had a close miss which started asmall fire, -seriously wounded twenty men andcaused slight damage to the ship's side.- Inview of the need for ships to be fully efficientto carry out the night evacuation and to copewith the almost certain air attacks on thefollowing day, C.S-7, after receiving a reportof the damage from AJAX, decided that sheshould return to Alexandria. Shortly after2100, C.S.7 gave orders accordingly.' 7. After passing through the Kaso Strait and

turning to the westward, Force B was attackedby a torpedo plane, without result. The forcearrived off Heraklion at 2330. The destroyersimmediately entered hanbour to. embark troopsfrom the jetties and ferry them to the cruiseroutside. By 0245 the ferrying was completeand by 0300 KlMBERLEY and IMPERIALhad embarked the rearguard. At 0320 the forceproceeded at 20 knots, having embarked thewhole of Heraklion garrison, amounting tosome 4,000 troops. Twenty-five minutes laterIMPERIAL'S" steering gear failed and she nar-rowly missed colliding with both cruisers. Thiscould scarcely have happened- at a more in-opportune time since it was essential to be asfar from enemy air, bases as possible by day-light. C.S-7 was faced with the difficult' deci-sion whether to wait in. the hope that thesteering gear g, ould b^r repaired or to sink theIMPERIAL and canry on.

3ii6 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON: GAZETTE, 24 MAY, ̂ 948

. .8.. On, hearing thaMMPERIAL. w.as quiteunable to steer, C.S.7 reduced speed of- hisforce to 15 knots and gave HOTSPUR ordersto .take off all. IMPERIAL'S troops, and crewand. then sink her. . This was successfully

. 15. ORION was out of control until the aftersteering wheel could be connected and a chainof men arranged to pass orders from the .Emer-gency Conning Position to the wheel.' Owingto. contamination of the oil fuel with salt water,

accomplished at .0445 and, 'HOTSPUR, whox ORION'S speed .varied between 12 and 25now had a total, of gfbo .men onboard, rejoined knots but she was able to average about 21the squadron just after/daylight. . . , , knots.

.'. 9. The delay over IMPERIAL had causedForce B to be an hour and a half late on theirtime liable and it was not until sunrise thatthey turned to the southward through the KasoStrait. Air attacks began at 0600 and.continuedat intervals until 1500 when Force B was withiniop miles of Alexandria.

10. At 0625 HEREWARD was hit by abomb which caused her to reduce speed andfall away from her position on the screen. Theforce was now. in the middle of Kaso Straitand C.S.7 again Had to1 make .the. difficult deci-sion whether to wait, in order to assistHEREWARD or to leave her behind. He de-cided that to wait would be .to invite furthercasualties. As HEREWARD could then :beseen making for Crete, which was only fivemiles away, C.S-7 proceeded on his way.HEREWARD was last seen, making slowly to-wards the island, with her guns engagingenemy aircraft.

u. Arrangements had been made for fighterprotection to be provided at 0530 in the KasoStrait' and 'C.S.7 na-d corrected, by signal/histime of arrival in the Strait to 0630. It Jsbelieved that the fighters did reach .the Straitat the corrected time but they were unable tomake contact with .the ships. " .

- 12. At 0645 DECOY reported fracturedturbine feet and circulator damage, as theresult of a near miss. This caused the speed ofthe squadron to be reduced to 25. knots. At0700 a very close, miss on ORION caused afurther reduction to 21 knots. ' .'.

13.. The Commander^in-Chief,. Mediterranean,realised from C:S.7's signals that our fightershad not yet appeared and every endeavour wasmade to put this right. It is probable, how-ever, that the "aircraft had navigational difficul-ties as they'Were unable to make contact withthe ships until 1200. By this time the forcehad suffered severely. At'0735 the Flag Captainin the. ORION (Captain G. R. B. Back, RoyalNavy) had been severely wounded by an explo-sive bullet from a JU.87. and he died two hourslater. At 0815 DIDO was hit on ." B " turretand three quarters of an .hour later ORIONwas hit on "A" turret, both by bombs fromJU.87S. In each .case the turrets were put outof action. At 1645 ORION was again attackedby ii JU.87S and a bomb passed through herbridge putting the lower conning tower out ofaction. The force was then about 100 milesfrom Kaso and this was the last .attack to bemade by ihe.JU.87s.

' 14. The'ORION had nearly 1,100 troops onboard and the-casualties on the crowded mess-decks were very.heavy. Three of the EngineerOfficers were killed, all nbrmal communicationbetween bridge and engine room was destroyed,the steering gear was' put out of action aridthree 'boiler rooms were djanaged,/,It is believedthat a total of 260 were killed andVSo wounded.

16. There was a Jull in the air attacks untabout 1300 when there was a high level attacfollowed by another at 1330 and a final one1500. t The first and only friendly fighters to/Deseen were two Naval Fulmars which appezat noon. Royal Air Force squadrons had mh.deseveral attempts to find our ships and in 'thecourse of a number of engagements, had shotdown two JU.88s for the loss .of one Hurricane.One JU.87 was sn°t down by ships' gunfire.

117. The force arrived at Alexandria at 2000on the 29th May, ORION having only ten tonsof fuel and two rounds of 6" H.E. ammunitionremaining.

18. Whilst.the troops were being .taken offat' Heraklion, .destroyers were. withdrawing a Ismaller party from Sphakia on the south coastof Crete.

19. Sphakia is a small fishing village with oneshingle beach, • of which a stretch less than a 4cable in extent could be used for embarkingin boats. The road over the mountains fromSuda to .Sphakia finished up with a series ofacute hairpin bends and came to an abrupt ter-miriation at the top of a 500 foot high escarp-ment. From this point a precipitous goat trackled down to the village. It was necessary forthe troops to remain hidden from air observationuntil actually called forward to embark. Touchbetween the beach area and the top of theescarpment had. to be maintained on foot asthere was no signal communication. The climbrequired at least two hours to complete. v

20. The Headquarters of the.General OfficerCommanding, Troops in Crete and the NavalOfficer-in-Charge, Suda, had been shifted to .acave near Sphakia". The'portable W/T sets andnaval cyphers, which the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Suda, had previously sent in M.L.ioiifrom Suda to Sphakia, had gone down with theship on the 24th May, as a result of air attack.A second W/T set was sent by lorry to Sphakiabut as-this set was damaged, the Royal Air >Force W/T set at the Sphakia Headquarters Vwas used for outside naval communications.

21. Force C consisting of D-7 in NAPIERwith" NIZAM, KELVIN and KANDAHAR hadleft Alexandria, at. 0800 on the 28th May afterembarking. additional whalers and some pro-visions and small arms for the troops .ashore.After, an uneventful ^passage,. the force arrivedoff Sphakia and started the embarkation at0030/29^1 May. .*..,"

22. The embarkation. was completed by ..0300/'29th .May byi1' which time the fourdestroyers had embarked rffearly 700 troops andhad'landed badly needed rations for'15,600.Soon after '0900 oh*the'29th May, Force C wasattacked by four JU.88s.and NIZAM 'sufferedminor damage from a near miss. Fighter' pro-..tection for Force C had been arranged from0545/29th May and at 0940 a crashed;.enemyri,aircraft'was sighted, probably shot down, by"

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948

fighters. The remainder -of .the passage wasuneventful, Force C arriving Alexandria at 1700on the 2gth May.

' 23. At 2100 on the 28th May, Force D, con-- sisting of C.S.I5 in PHOEBE, with PERTH,\ GLENGYLE, • CALCUTTA, COVENTRY,

JERVIS, JANUS and HASTY left Alexandriafor Sphakia, where they were to embark troopsxduring the night 29th/30th May.

24. During the night 28th/29th May a mess-e was received from the Naval Officer-in-

Charge, Suda at Sphakia saying that-up toidj,ooo troops would be available for evacuationon the following night but another message wasreceived from CREFORCE staring that it wasunlikely that the troops could hold out untilthe night 3oth'/3ist May. CREFORCEthought that " an optimistic view " of the fight-ing troops which could be evacuated, was under2,000 but. there would be a number of stragglers(CREFORCE 0.672 timed 1310 of 28th May).It was deduced from these two signals that thesituation in Crete was very bad but that 10,000troops remained to be evacuated. Of these,only 2,000 would be in organised bodies. • Thenight 29th/30th May, would have to be thelast night for evacuation.

< . 29thYsoth May, 1941.25. A Royal Air Force aircraft had been

sent to drop a message over Retimo orderingthe garrison to withdraw to Plaka Bay on thesouth coast. This aircraft, however, did notreturn and CREFORCE reported that he couldnot guarantee that the troops had received the'message. . As 'they had no supplies it was doubt-ful whether they would be able to reach thecoast. It was, therefore, decided to send ships'to Sphakia only for the evacuation but 1,200rations were dropped by air on Plaka Bay.. 26. On the 29th May, Major General J. F.Evetts, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., flew to Cairo fromAlexandria to explain the naval situation arid

'to discuss the question of further evacuation. with General Wavell. After consulting General•Blarney and .Air Marshal Tedder, General.Wavell sent a personal message to the Com-•mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, saying that itwas thought that " GLEN " ships and cruisersought not to be risked any more but that des-troyers should continue the evacuation (MID-EAST o/18491 of 29th May).

27. In a " Most Immediate " message to theAdmiralty the Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-ranean, summarised the situation regarding theevacuation up to date. Three cruisers and onedestroyer had already been damaged andcasualties to the closely packed troops on boardamounted to some 500. Further heavycasualties to men must be expected on the

- following day, especially if GLENGYLE washit with 3,000 troops on board. The Com-

' mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, • asked if hewas justified in accepting a scale of loss anddamage.to his already weakened fleet. He was,

, however, ready and willing to continue theevacuation as longtias a ship remained to do so,

\ realising that 'it was against all tradition toleave troops, deliberately in enemy,hands (theCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's message.timed 1305 of 29th-May, to .Admiralty). .

J 28. A reply from the Admiralty was receivedat 2026/29th ordering GLENGYLE to turnback and the remaining ships to .proceed (Ad-

miralty message timed. 1900 of the 29th Mayto the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)-.The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, how-ever, considered that it was then too late to turnthe GLENGYLE back and he informed theAdmiralty accordingly, adding that three extradestroyers, with no troops on board, were-beingsent to meet GLENGYLE (the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's message timed 2147 of29th May to Admiralty). The Admiralty ap-proved the Commander-in-Chief, Mediter-ranean's action (Admiralty message timed 0105of 3Oth May to the • Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean).

29. Captain (D), Tenth Destroyer Flotilla inSTUART, with JAGUAR and DEFENDERleft Alexandria p.m. 'on the 29th May to joinForce D. These destroyers had no troops andthe intention was that in addition to providingextra protection to Force D they would beavailable to take troops off from any ship whichmight be damaged by air attack (see paragraph2,8). . • •

30. During the course of the day, GeneralEvetts' Staff Officer, Colonel R. B. Jennings,had been able to interview a number of seniorofficers recently returned from Crete. As a re-sult of these interviews coupled with the morehopeful signals which had recently come fromOREFO'RCE and the Naval Officer-in-Charge,

' Suda, it became clear that the situation in Cretewas not so desperate as had been thought. TheCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, therefore,decided to send four destroyers to embark menon the night of 3oth/3ist May.

31. Meanwhile Force D, under C.S.I5 wereproceeding to Sphakia. At 1003 on the 29thMay, a single JU.88 dropped a stick of bombsclose to PERTH without result. GLENGYLEand the cruisers of Force D were anchored offSphakia by 2330/291!! whilst the A.A. cruisersand destroyers patrolled to seaward. The A.A.cruisers were not required to embark any troopsbut the destroyers closed in one at a time toembark their quota. The troops were ferriedfrom the beach to the .ships in GLEN-GYLE's landing craft, assisted by two AssaultLanding Craft which had been carried inPERTH. The beach was too small .for ships'boats' to be used in addition. By 0320/30^ atotal of about 6,000 men had been embarkedand Force D proceeded towards Alexandria.Three motor landing craft were left behind, foruse on subsequent nights.

• 30th/3ist May, 1941.3,2. At 0645 /30th May, STUART; JAGUAR,

and DEFENDER joined Force D to act asadditional escort. There were three air attackson the force during the passage to Alexandria.In the first of these at 0930, PERTH was hitarid heir foremost boiler room put out of action..In the second arid third attacks there was noresult although bombs fell very close to PERTHand JAGUAR. Some of our fighter patrolsfailed to make contact with Force D-but theforce was covered by two or three Royal AirForce fighters during most of the day. Thesefighters, on one occasion, drove off 20 JU.87S

-and JU.88s, arid, in various engagements, shotdown two H.E.iiis and 'damaged a numberof other enemy 'aircraft. ' In addition, oneJU.88 was seen "to be damaged by ships' gun-fire. •

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948

. 33. At 0915/30th May, Force C consisting ofD.y in NAPIER, with NIZAM, KELVIN andKANDAHAR, left Alexandria for Sphakia,where they were to embark troops during thenight 3Oth/3ist May (see paragraph 31 above). .At 1245, KANDAHAR developed a mechanicaldefect and was ordered to return to Alexandria.At 1530 three JU;88s" carried out an unseendive from astern of Force C causing damageto KELVIN from a near miss, reducing herspeed to 20 knots. Captain (D)," SeventhDestroyer Flotilla, therefore, ordered KELVINback to Alexandria. Half an hour..laterForce D was sighted returning to Alexandria.C-S.I5 was prepared to augment D-7's reducedforce by detaching JAGUAR, (but found thatshe was too short of fuel.

34. Force C arrived 'off Sphakia. at 00307..3ist May and commenced the embarkation oftroops using the three motor landing craft whichhad been left behind .on .the previous night,supplemented by ships' boats. By O30o/3istMay, NAPIER and 'NIZAM had embarkedabout 700 troops each and started on theirreturn journey to Alexandria.

35. The usual fighter protection had -beenarranged and 0.7 reports sighting friendlyfighters at 0625. These Royal Air Forcefighters claim to have shot down three. JU.88sand one1 Cant 1007 during the day. One'JiU.88 was shot down by gunfire and threewere damaged. From 0850 to 0915 Force Cwas attacked by about 12 JU.88s which werenot seen before they dived in to. the attack.As a result of the air attack, NAPIER sustaineddamage in the engine and boiler rooms fromnear misses, reducing her speed to 23 knots.

The force arrived at Alexandria at 1900 /3istMay. . . '

36. Ashore, in Crete,, our , troops had ah..anxious period when the enemy threatened to.cut ofE-their line of retreat, by placing himselfastride .the Stilos—Sphakia road.' From the29th May onwards, it appeared that the rear-guard^ under Major General E. C. Weston,Royal'Marines, was managing to carry out anorderly retreat. On the 3oth May CREFORCE,whose Headquarters were at Sphakia, asked,for one last lift to be taken off on the night3ist May/ist June, numbering up to 3,000.This represented a large increase over previousestimates. After consultation between theCommander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, GeneralWavell and Major General Everts, it was de-cided to inform .GREFORCE that all avail-able ships would be sent on the night 3ist May/ist June but the maximum number that' couldbe lifted would not exceed 2,000.

37. During the night 3oth/3'ist MayCRiEFORCE (Major General B. C. FreybergiV.C., C.B., C.M.Gr, D.S.O.) acting on instruc-tions from.the General Headquarters, MiddleEast, embarked in a Sunderland flying boat atSphakia and returned to Egypt. He was•accompanied by the Naval Officer-in-Charge,Suda Bay (Captain'J. A. V. Morse, D.S.O.,Royal Navy), who' had received similar instruc-tions from the Commander-in-Chief, Medi-terranean. Major General Weston, RoyalMarines', was left in command of the troops in

-Crete. . ".

38* A number of small, naval craft had beenemployed 'on, local defence, duties in Crete.When the evacuation commenced all small craftfit to move were sailed to Alexandria. Thosewhich had to be destroyed or beached in SudaBay were KOS 23, WIDNES and Tank Land-"ing "Craft' A. 16. Craft sunk by air attackon passage to Alexandria were M.L.ioii,KOS 22 and SYVERN. Nothing is known ofythe fate of MX. 1030 and Tank Landing CraitA. 6 and A. 20, and it is- presumedthat they were sunk by enemy air action onpassage. The only vessels of the original local-defence flotilla to reach Alexandria were,KOS 21, LANNER and M.L. 1032. [

3ist May/ist June, 1941,39. At o'6oo/3isf May, C.S.I5 in.

"PHOEBE, with ABDIEL, KIMBERLEY,HOTSPUR and JACKAL left Alexandria tocarry out the final evacuation from Sphakia'.

40. During the forenoon of the 3ist May,the Commander-in-Qiief, Mediterranean, re-ceived a message from Captain D.7, which indi-cated that there were roughly 6,500 more mento come off from Crete: The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, accprdingly authorisedC.S.I5 to1 increase the maximum number tobe brought off to 3,500.

41. The Commander-in-Chief, -Mediterra-nean, held a consultation on .the 3ist May with

tthe Right Honourable * Peter Fraser, P.C.'{Prime Minister of New Zealand), GeneralWavell, Major General Freyberg 'and GeneralEvetts. ,As a result of this consultation, itappeared that the force under C.S.I5 now onits way to Sphakia would be able to .bring awaythe majority of troops assembled there. Amessage was therefore'sent to G.S.I5 orderinghim. to fill up his ships to capacity. The Com-'mander-in-.Chief, Mediterranean, informed theAdmiralty that he had called, a halt to evacua-tion after the night 3ist May/ist June. 'Even ifC.S.is's force suffered no damage on the returntrip, the' Commander-in-Chief, Mediterraneanwould be left with a fleet of only two battleships,one cruiser, two A.A. cruisers, ABDIEL andnine destroyers, fit for service.

42. At' about 2000 on the 3ist May, the" Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean receiveda, message from the General Headquarters,Middle East, which he was asked to pass on toMajor.'General Weston in Crete. It was. a per-sonal message from General Wavell to MajorGeneral Weston.informing him that this was thelast night "that evacuation could take place andauthorising the capitulation of any troops whohad to be left behind. As the transmission ofthis message would mean an irrevocable decision,to cease the'evacuation, it was given carefulconsideration before the Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean finally decided to send it on.i

43. At about 2030 on the 3ist Ma^ the Com-mander-in-Chief, Mediterranean .received amessage from General Blarney, who was per-turbed at the small number of Australians so fartaken out of Crete and asking for a ship to besent to Plaka where he believed a number ofour troops had assembled. The Commanderrin-Chief, Meditertanean, replied that at this latehour it was not possible to alter the destinationof the ships.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 24 MAY, 1948 3119

44. During the passage to Sphakia, C.S.is'sforce was attacked by aircraft on three occa-sions between 1825 /3ist May and 1905 /3istMay. None of the bombs fell very close andit was believed that one JU.88 was damaged.Many bombs were seen to- be jettisoned on thehorizon, indicating successful combats by ourfighter aircraft.

45. .C.S.I5 arrived at Sphakia at 2320/315!'Three fully loaded M.L.C.s which had been leftbehind from the previous evacuation, imme-diktely went alongside the ships, thus saving avaluable 40. minutes.* The embarkation pro-ceeded so quickly that for a time the beach wasem'pty of troops. This was unfortunate, as itcaused a last minute rush of troops, some ofwhom had necessarily to be left behind.

46. Some medical stores were landed by theships and finally the three M.L.C.s were sunkor disabled. The force sailed at 0300 on -theist June, having embarked nearly 4,000 troops.

47. During the night 3ist May/ist June,Major General Weston, acting on instructionsfrom the Comanander-in-Chief, Middle East,embarked in a Sunderland flying boat atSphakia and returned to Egypt.

48. Before leaving Sphakia, General Westonhanded written orders to the Senior BritishArmy Officer remaining behind, to come toterms with the enemy. Among those leftbehind were many who had taken part in agallant rearguard action, which had enabledothers to get away from the island. Includedin the rearguard, who were left behind, werea large number of the Special Service Troopslanded as a final reinforcement at Suda andmany Royal Marines of the M.N.B.D.O. Ofthe 2,000 Royal Marines employed in Crete,only 1,000 got back to Egypt.

49. In order to provide additional pro-tection to C.S. 15*8 force, the A.A. cruisersCALCUTTA and COVENTRY were sailedfrom Alexandria early on the ist June torendezvous with the returning ships." At 0900aircraft were detected by R.D.F. approachingfrom the north, and at 0917 the ships hoistedthe red warning. It was unfortunate that an" up sun " barrage was not then fired as fiveminutes later two JU. 88s dived on the cruisersfrom the direction of the sun. A stick ofbombs from the first machine just missedCOVENTRY but two bombs from the secondmachine hit CALCUTTA, who settled fast andsank within a few minutes. COVENTRY wasable to pick up 23 officers and 232 men withwhom she at once returned to Alexandria.

50. The force with C.S. 15 had an unevent-ful1 passage to Alexandria where they arrivedat 1700 on the ist June.

51..In the early hours of the ist June theCxmimander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, receiveda message from the First Sea Lord, .stating thatH there was a reasonable prospect of embarkingany substantially formed body of men on thenight ist/2nd June ihe thought the attemptshould ibe made. The Commander-in-Chief,Mediterranean, replied that General Weston hadreturned with the report that the 5,000 troopsremaining in Crete were incapable of furtherresistance owing to strain and lack of food.The troops had, therefore, .been instructed tocapitulate. In the circumstances, no moreships.would be sent.

52. The Commander-in-Cihief, Mediterranean,later sent a subsequent message to the Ad-miralty in which he pointed out that the onlyships available for an evacuation on the nightist/2nd June were two battleships and fivedestroyers. The remaining ships were either•damaged or too slow. Fighter protection forthe ships was thin and irregular.. In view ofthe situation developing in 'the Western Desertand Syria any further reduction in the strengthof the fleet was out of. the question.

53. The Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,informed the Admiralty that with C.S. 15*5arrival, the evacuation had terminated. Hedrew attention to the fact that owing to theinevitable confusion, the figures given to himfor evacuation varied very greatly. Up tolate on the 30th May, he had hoped that thelast trip, that of C.S. 15, would result inalmost everyone being brought off. Thefigures, however, suddenly increased by 5,000on that day.

54. The Battle of Crete was now ended, andthe Mediterranean Fleet could claim to haveplayed a worthy part. The Royal Air Forcehad given what little protection was possibleto the fleet; operating their aircraft far out tosea to the limit of their endurance. Whilstthe land fighting was in progress, the fleet hadlanded reinforcements for the Army and hadprevented any seaborne invasion from takingplace. When orders were given for the troopsto be withdrawn, some 17,000 British andImperial troops were brought safely back toEgypt and provisions and stores were landedfor those who had to be left fcehind. TheRoyal Marines, after manning the island'sdefences, fought gallantly with the rearguardand had to leave half their number behind.The Mediterranean Fleet paid a heavy price forthis achievement. Losses' and damage weresustained which would normally only occurduring a major fleet action, in which the enemyfleet might be expected to suffer greater lossesthan our own. In this case the enemy fleetdid not appear '(though it had many favour-able opportunities for doing so) and the battlewas fought between ships and aircraft.

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