SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR …€¦ · Complaint as Does 1 through 100,...

COMPLAINT FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF - 1

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Grant, Pro Se [filed 12-1-10]

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

GRANT, ) Case No.: [SC 110555] ) Plaintiff, ) COMPLAINT ) (1) Violation of Article I, Sections 7(a) ) and 15 of the CA Constitution. vs. ) ) (2) Violation of the CA Vehicle Code.

) MOUNTAINS RECREATION AND ) (3) Unlawful, Unfair and Fraudulent CONSERVATION AUTHORITY, JOSEPH ) Business Practices in Violation of CA EDMISTON (In his Capacity as Executive Director ) Business & Professions Code of the MRCA), REDFLEX TRAFFIC SYSTEMS ) §§ 17200 et seq. and 912. (CALIFORNIA), INC., AND DOES 1-100 ) ) (4) Violation of CA Govt. Code § 11145. . Defendants. ) ) (5) Violation of CA Civil Code § 52.1

Plaintiff Grant (“Mr. Grant”) alleges upon personal knowledge as to his own acts, and as

to all other matters upon information and belief, the following:

INTRODUCTION

1. This lawsuit concerns the administrative citation (“Citation”) that Defendants

Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority (“MRCA”) and Redflex Traffic Systems

(California), Inc. (“Redflex”) issued to Mr. Grant on July 26, 2010. The Citation, which alleges

that a vehicle owned by Mr. Grant failed to come to a complete halt at a stop-sign on July 5,

2010, is based on a videotape recorded by Redflex cameras pursuant to Defendants’ Photo

Enforcement Program (the “Photo Enforcement Program”).


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2. The Citation was issued pursuant to a 2005 MRCA Ordinance (“Ordinance”) that

conflicts with and contradicts portions of the California Vehicle Code (“CVC”), the California

Business & Professions Code (“BPC”) and the California Government Code. The Ordinance and

all citations issued thereunder are therefore illegal and unenforceable.

3. Every element of Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program is designed to meet

one of two purposes: (1) to collect the maximum amount of administrative fees possible, and (2)

to discourage, prevent and even obstruct the recipients of Defendants’ citations from challenging

the legality of the Photo Enforcement Program in court. To this end, Defendants have adopted

rules and procedures without regard to the fact that they violate CA statutory law and legislative

policy, rise to the level of unfair business practices, and even demonstrate a clear pattern of fraud

by both Defendants.

4. The MRCA’s procedure for contesting the Citation violates Mr. Grant’s Fifth

Amendment right to due process, as it requires payment of an administrative penalty in full

before an opportunity to be heard.

5. The Photo Enforcement Program also decriminalizes traffic violations recorded

by Redflex cameras, which deprives Mr. Grant of his rights as a criminal defendant pursuant to

Article I, Section 15 of the California Constitution. By treating the alleged violation as a civil

matter, Defendants unlawfully reduce their burden of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to

the preponderance of the evidence.

6. The MRCA’s revenue report for the fiscal years 2008-2009 shows that the agency

collected $1,874,914 in administrative fines during this time period. The agency’s proposed

revenue budge for 2010-2011 estimates the total amount of these fines to be $1,990,000.


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7. Mr. Grant seeks injunctive and equitable relief to end Defendants’ Photo

Enforcement Program and relieve Mr. Grant of the “civil penalty” to which Defendants believe

they are due. He is also seeking reimbursement for his attorneys’ fees and costs, plus treble

monetary damages from Defendant Redflex only.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant

to the CA Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10.

9. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants named

herein because the MRCA is a governmental entity, created by a

partnership between the Santa Monica Mountains Conservatory, the

Conejo Park District and the Rancho Simi Recreation Park

District. The Santa Monica Mountains Conservatory is a state

agency established by the CA Legislature, while the Conejo and

Rancho Simi Recreation and Park Districts are local park

agencies established by popular vote of the residents in those

communities. All three parklands are located within Los Angeles

County. The MRCA can be found on the web at

http://www.mrca.ca.gov, confirming that it is a local government

public entity.

10. Jurisdiction is also proper because Mr. Grant resides

in this County, and the MRCA and the Photo Enforcement Program

run by the MRCA maintain their principle places of business in

this County. The post office address of the MRCA is listed as


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570 West Avenue 26, Suite 100, Los Angeles, CA 90065, while the

“MRCA Stop Sign Photo Enforcement” is located at 2600 Franklin

Canyon Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90210.

11. Defendant Redflex Traffic Systems (California), Inc.

is a California corporation that maintains an office in Los

Angeles County, located at 6401 Bristol Parkway, 1st Floor,

Culver City, CA 90230.

12. Moreover, the transaction that is the subject of this

litigation occurred in Los Angeles County, at 15601 Sunset

Boulevard in Temescal Canyon Park.

13. Venue is proper in this Court because all of the

parties reside in this County and the transaction that is the

subject of this litigation occurred in this County.

THE PARTIES

14. Plaintiff Grant is and was a resident of ----, CA in

Los Angeles County at all times relevant to this Complaint. He

resides at -------.

15. Defendant MRCA is a local partnership established in

1985 pursuant to the Joint Powers Act provided by Government

Code § 6500. The MRCA is dedicated to the preservation and

management of local open space and parkland, watershed lands,

trails, and wildlife habitat. The MRCA manages and provides

ranger services for almost 60,000 acres of public lands and

parks that it owns and that are owned by the Santa Monica


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Mountains Conservancy or other agencies. It works in cooperation

with the Conservancy and other local government partners to

acquire parkland, participate in vital planning processes, and

complete major park improvement projects.

16. Defendant Joseph Edmiston is the Executive Director of

the MRCA and is being sued in his official capacity.

17. Defendant Redflex Traffic Systems (California), Inc.

is a California corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of

Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc. Since 1999, it has participated in

substantial business dealings in California on behalf of Redflex

Traffic Systems, Inc., which is the self-proclaimed largest

provider of red light and stop sign speed enforcement cameras in

the United States. It operates traffic enforcement cameras in

over 240 communities in 21 states throughout the country,

including many in the State of California. As of 2009, the

company operated over 1660 automated traffic enforcement cameras

in the United States.

18. Defendant Redflex, Defendant MRCA, and Defendant

Joseph Edmiston are collectively referred to as “Defendants.”

The true names and capacities of Defendants sued in this

Complaint as Does 1 through 100, inclusive, are currently

unknown to Mr. Grant, who therefore sues such Defendants by

these fictitious names. Each of the Defendants designated herein

as a Doe is legally responsible in some manner for the unlawful


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acts referred to herein. Mr. Grant will seek leave to amend this

Complaint to reflect the true names and capacities of the

Defendants designated herein as Does 1 through 100 when such

identities become known.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. THE MCRA

19. Defendant MRCA is a public agency born of a local

partnership between three other public entities: the Santa

Monica Mountains Conservancy, the Conejo Recreation and Park

District and the Rancho Simi Recreation and Park District. As

part of its duties, the MRCA manages several parklands,

primarily those owned by the Santa Monica Mountains Conservatory

including, but not limited to, Temescal Canyon Park, Franklin

Canyon Park, Topanga State Park, the Hollywood Bowl Overlook,

and Topanga Overlook, among others.

20. On November 19, 2004, the Joint Exercise of Powers

Agreement (“JPA”) was executed reestablishing the MRCA. The

avowed purposes of the JPA was, among others, to:

a. Establish a legal entity, separate from the

parties to the JPA, as a local agency pursuant to

applicable State law, to acquire, develop, and

conserve additional park and open space lands with

special emphasis on recreation and conservation


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projects, the protection and conservation of

watersheds, and the development of river parkways;

b. Provide for the utilization of the benefit

assessment method of financing capital acquisitions

and improvements, and the maintenance, servicing, and

operation thereof, to the greatest extent permitted...

(2004 Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement, attached at

Exhibit A.)

21. In 2005, the MRCA enacted an “Ordinance Amending the

Park Rules and Regulations and the Penalty for Violation

Thereof” (“Ordinance”). It provides, in relevant part:

a. § 1.2(b): To protect the parks and other

property of the Authority and preserve the peace

therein. MRCA rangers enforce state law, local

ordinances, and conditions of use pursuant to Public

Resources Code Sections 33211.5 and 33211.6 for

properties owned or subject to the management of the

Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy …

b. § 1.1 (g) defines “Park” to include any

land, building, park improvement, roadway, public open

space owned or subject to the Authority's management

authority.

c. § 4.0(a) Traffic control. No person shall

drive any vehicle, as defined in the California

Vehicle Code, upon any MRCA owned or managed parkland,

roadway or parking areas except upon, and subject to,

any posted traffic control signs and/or pavement

markings. Traffic control signs include, but are not

limited to, stop signs, speed limit signs, directional

signs, turning signs, road closure signs, road hours

of operation sign, commercial truck restrictions, and

signs limiting vehicle use on trails. Traffic control

pavement markings include curb markings, limit lines,

lane dividing lines and parking stall lines. The speed


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limit for vehicles operating on property owned or

managed by the Authority is 15 miles per hour, unless

otherwise posted. Radar enforcement is authorized on

roadways in which a traffic engineer has determined

the safe maximum speed limit.

d. § 4.2. Automated motor vehicle enforcement.

(a) “Automated motor vehicle enforcement”

is any photographic or video equipment linked to

any violation detection system that synchronizes

the taking of a photograph, video, or digital

image with the occurrence of a violation of §

4.0.

(b) “Currently registered vehicle owner” is

the person identified by motor vehicle

registration as the registered owner of the

vehicle.

(c) “Citation” is the administrative

citation and shall include the following: (I) The

name and address of the currently registered

owner of the vehicle; (2) The registration plate

number of the motor vehicle involved in the

violation; (3) The violation charged; (4) The

time and location of the violation; (5) The

amount of the administrative penalty imposed and

the date by which the administrative penalty

should be paid; (6) A sworn statement signed by

the officer or employee of the Authority that

based on inspection of the recorded images, the

subject motor vehicle was being operated in

violation of § 4.0.

e. § 4.2.1. Offense. (a) No currently registered owner of a motor vehicle shall

permit his or her vehicle to be operated in violation of § 4.0 and shall be liable for an administrative penalty as set forth in Chapter 6.

(b) Park Rangers or other employees of the Authority may examine the photographic or video equipment recordings authorized under this Ordinance to determine whether an offense has occurred. If the Park Ranger or other employee of the Authority determines that an offense has occurred and the license plate number or other source of identification of the ownership of the offending vehicle can be established, the Ranger or employee shall, within thirty (30) days of the offense, issue an administrative citation to the registered owner.


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(c) Imposition of liability under this

section shall not be deemed a conviction as an

operator and shall not be made part of the

operating record upon whom such liability is

imposed. No points authorized by the California

Motor Vehicle Code (“Point System for License

Suspension”) shall be assigned to the owner or

driver of the vehicle for violation of § 4.0.

(2005 Amended MRCA Ordinance, attached at Exhibit

B.)

22. The operating Ordinance has been subject to multiple

amendments over the past several years. Upon information and

belief, prior to 2007, the Ordinance provided for neither the

use of photo enforcement nor the use of administrative

citations. Rather, any traffic infractions such as failing to

come to a complete stop at a stop sign were violations of the

California Vehicle Code and were prosecuted thereunder.

23. Indeed, amendments to the Ordinance were necessary

because on March 22, 2007, the MRCA entered into a contract

(“Redflex Contract”) with Redflex to install, maintain and

provide services for a digital photo speed and stop sign

enforcement system, ostensibly to be used pursuant to the

freshly minted provision the MRCA passed to allow itself to use

a such a system. The Redflex Contract provides that Redflex will

install and maintain enforcement systems at 10 fixed locations

in exchange for payment of $20.00 per image for every photo


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stop, photo speed and mobile photo stop image. 1 The Redflex

Contract sets forth Redflex’s obligations as follows:

a. 3.3. SERVICES. Violation Processing. During the Operational Period, Violations shall be processed as follows:

3.3.1. All Violations Data shall be stored on the Redflex System; 3.3.2. The Reflex System shall process Violations Data gathered

from the Designated Equipment Locations into a format capable of review by the Authorized Officer via the Redflex System;

3.3.4. Redflex shall provide the Authorized Officer with access to the Redflex System for the purposes of reviewing the pre-processed Violations Data…

3.3.6. With respect to each Authorized Violation, Redflex shall print and mail a Citation within six (6) days after Redflex’s receipt of such authorization…

3.3.7. Redflex shall provide a toll-free telephone number for the purposes of answering citizen inquiries;

3.3.9 …Redflex shall provide, without cost to the Customer, reports regarding the processing and issuance of Citations, the maintenance and downtime records of the Designated Intersection.

b. Exhibit B. Construction and Installation Obligations.

1.1.5. Develop the Speed and Stop Sign Violation Criteria in consultation with the Customer;

1.6. Develop the Enforcement Documentation for approval by the Customer, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld;

1.7. Complete the installation and testing of all necessary Equipment…

1.9. Install and test the functionality of the Designated Equipment Locations with the Redflex System and establish fully operational Violation processing capability with the Redflex System…

c. Exhibit C. Maintenance.

1 On March 22, 2008, the MRCA and Redflex amended their contract to, inter

alia,: (1) change the compensation formula from a per image fee to a fixed

monthly fee; and (2) delete all references to “Photo Speed Enforcement.”

(Amended Redflex Contract, attached at Exhibit D, §§A, E.) Despite the

modification of the Redflex Contract, the photo enforcement system in use is

still based on the assessment of a vehicle’s speed.


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1. All repair and maintenance of Photo Speed and Stop Sign Enforcement systems and related equipment will be the sole responsibility of Redflex…

(2007 MRCA-Redflex Contract, Attached at Exhibit C.)

24. On information and belief, in May 2007, Redflex

installed the first stop sign camera in Temescal Gateway Park

and began photo enforcement a month later.

25. Pursuant to the Redflex Contract, Redflex is

responsible for administering the program, which includes

monitoring all videos taken of vehicles proceeding through the

photo enforced stop-signs. When the cameras indicate a potential

violation, Redflex supposedly notifies the MRCA, and one of its

officers reviews the photographic violations data provided by

Redflex. The system photographs only the rear of the vehicle,

which captures an image of the vehicle’s license plate number

but not its driver. Once an MRCA officer has reviewed the

Redflex data and authorized a citation, Redflex coordinates with

the Department of Motor Vehicles to identify the registered

owner of the vehicle and issue the citation.

26. The Redflex Contract expressly states that “whenever

there is a conflict between any term, condition or provision of

this Agreement and any present or future statute, law, ordinance

or regulation contrary to which he parties have no legal right

to contract, the latter shall prevail…” (Ex. C, 11.14.)

27. As a result of the Enforcement Program, the MRCA has

Formatted: Bullets and Numbering


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issued thousand of citations and collected millions of dollars

worth of fees. Between 2008 and 2009, the MRCA’s revenue budget

reveals that the agency received $1,874,914 in fines from

citations.

II. MR. GRANT AND THE MRCA

28. Mr. Grant is a small business owner who resides in the

city and county of Los Angeles. On July 5, 2010, at

approximately 4:04 p.m., the Toyota ------ registered to Mr.

Grant was videotaped driving through Temescal Canyon Gateway

Park, which is operated by the MRCA.

29. Because the Toyota is Mr. Grant’s second vehicle and

not his primary means of transportation, he often allows other

drivers to borrow the vehicle when necessary. As such, it is

unclear who was driving the Toyota through Temescal Canyon Park

on July 5, 2010.

30. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Grant received a Citation

from Defendants2 by U.S. Mail, which claimed that his Toyota was

photographed in violation of § 4.0 of the MRCA Ordinance, for

failing to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. (See

Citation, attached at Exhibit E.) Curiously, the Ordinance does

not apply to the actual driver of an offending vehicle, but

2 It is unclear whether the Citation and other letters/forms Mr. Grant

received regarding the Citation were drafted and sent to him by the MRCA or

Redflex. As a result, this Complaint attributes the letters and forms he

received regarding the Citation to both Defendants.



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extends to any “currently registered owner of a motor vehicle

[who] shall permit his or her vehicle to be operated in

violation of § 4.0(a).” (Exhibit B, § 4.2.1(a).) This is the

justification Defendants provided for fining Mr. Grant,

regardless of who was actually driving his Toyota at the time of

the alleged violation.

31. The Citation was issued pursuant to §§ 4.0/4.2.1 of

the Ordinance. It included two black and white photocopied

images of the Toyota, and it indicated that the videotape of the

alleged violation could be viewed at www.photonotice.com.

Neither image included a picture of the driver. (See Stop Sign

Photos, attached at Exhibit F.)

32. The Citation stated that the “civil penalty” for

violating the MRCA Ordinance was $175.00, which was payable by

August 30, 2010. (See Ex. E.) It further provided that Mr. Grant

was not entitled to an administrative hearing on the matter

unless and until he paid the fine. “Failure to pay the civil

penalty in order to contest the civil liability,” it stated,

“will constitute an admission of liability and will waive your

right to contest the imposition of the civil penalty.” (Ex. E,

p. 2.)

33. For this and many other reasons, Mr. Grant believed

that the Enforcement Program was illegal and declined to pay the

Citation. Instead, on July 28, 2010, Mr. Grant sent a letter to


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the MRCA setting forth some of the Citation’s flaws and

requesting an administrative hearing. (See July 28 Letter,

attached at Exhibit G.)

34. On August 5, 2010, Mr. Grant received a form letter

from Defendants. Instead of acknowledging Mr. Grant’s request

for a hearing, the document informs Mr. Grant that because he

has failed to pay the $175 penalty within the proscribed 35 day

period, he has therefore waived his right to contest the

Citation. It further states that if Mr. Grant does not make a

timely payment, late fees will be assessed and the matter turned

over to a collections agency.

35. On August 25, 2010, Mr. Grant sent a second letter to

the MRCA requesting, at the least, an extension of time for him

to determine his best course of action. (See August 25 Letter,

attached at Exhibit H.)

36. Defendants have failed to address Mr. Grant’s good

faith dispute. Instead, the MRCA has used its authority to

enforce the Citation without any adjudication of Mr. Grant’s

claims. By ignoring Mr. Grant’s request for an administrative

hearing and exhausting his administrative remedies, the MRCA has

opened itself to this lawsuit pursuant to California Business &

Professions Code § 954.4.

37. On September 8, 2010, Mr. Grant responded to

Defendants’ letter denying him a hearing. Mr. Grant, having


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exhausted all of his administrative remedies, informed

Defendants of his intent to appeal its decision. The letter

continued, “[L]et this letter serve as notice that this is a

good faith dispute and I would expect the MRCA to suspend any

collection activity to allow enough time for me to retain

counsel and file a complaint.” (Sept. 8 Letter, attached at

Exhibit I.)

38. On October 6, 2010, three full months after Defendants

issued Mr. Grant the Citation and after they had ignored each of

Mr. Grant’s three reasonable requests for a hearing under the

law, the MRCA itself put the final nail in its coffin. The

October 2010 “DEFAULT LETTER” he received from the MRCA stated,

in no uncertain terms, that “your failure to respond within 35

days to the Citations from the MRCA Photo Stop Sign Enforcement

Program may constitute a waiver of your right to contest the

violation…” The MRCA correspondence further threatened Mr.

Grant with increasing fines, turning the matter over to

collections, and “that it could result in a civil count against

you.”

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA, J. Edmiston, and Redflex for Violating California

Vehicle Code §§ 21, 210, 21100.1, 21450, 21455.5-.6, 40518)

39. Mr. Grant realleges and incorporates herein by reference each of the foregoing

paragraphs, and further alleges as follows:


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40. The California Vehicle Code represents the policy of the State of California to

create and enforce laws relating to the illegal operation of vehicles, including the failure to obey

traffic control signs and signals. See, e.g., CVC § 22450 (requiring drivers approaching a stop

sign to bring their vehicles to a complete halt before crossing the intersection). Section 21 of the

CVC requires the uniformity of these laws and procedures in the regulation of traffic offenses

throughout California:

…[T]he provisions of this code are applicable and uniform throughout the State and in all counties and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly authorized herein.

CVC § 21; see also CVC §§ 21400; 21100.1 (Local regulations

“shall conform to the uniform standards and specifications

adopted by the Department of Transportation…”). Both the Photo

Enforcement Program and the MRCA Ordinance on which it is based

are in clear violation of this mandate, as the CVC specifically

covers the use of and limitations to automated enforcement

systems such as the one operated by Defendants.

41. The MRCA hired Redflex to take over “traffic

enforcement activities” at its parks so that the resources of

the agency’s park rangers could be reallocated. (See 12/6/06

Edmiston Memo to MRCA Board, attached at Exhibit J, p. 1.)

Redflex operates the Photo Enforcement Program by exercising the

MRCA’s police powers on behalf of the agency. As such, it is an

agent of the MRCA liable for violating the CVC.

42. The streets and roads on the properties where


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Defendants utilize their Photo Enforcement Program are subject

to the California Vehicle Code. The MRCA is a public agency that

manages public parkland in Los Angeles County for the use and

enjoyment of residents of the community. (See supra, ¶¶ 9, 15,

19.) The “streets” that run through these properties are

“publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for

purposes of vehicular travel.” See CVC § 590; contra, CVC §

21107.7(c) (“Privately owned and maintained roads…are not

dedicated to use by the public or are not generally held open

for use of the public.”)

43. Because the MRCA roads are public in nature, including

at the intersection where Mr. Grant’s Toyota was captured on

camera, the statutory provisions of the CVC are applicable. In

fact, before Defendants implemented the Photo Enforcement

Program in 2007 the MRCA prosecuted all traffic infractions,

including the failure to a complete stop at a stop sign, as

violations of the California Vehicle Code. The MRCA has no

authority, either in and of itself or through the JPA, to

countermand any article of the California Vehicle Code. To the

extent that Defendants seek to enforce traffic violations, they

are obligated to comply with the CVC.

44. At almost every opportunity, the Ordinance amended by

the MRCA in 2005 conflicts with and contradicts well-established

provisions of California law. Additionally, the MRCA/Redflex


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Photo Enforcement Program violates dozens of provisions of the

CVC, including but not limited to the following:

a. CVC § 21: “Except as otherwise expressly

provided, the provisions of this code are applicable

and uniform throughout the State and in all counties

and municipalities therein, and no local authority

shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly authorized herein.” (Emphasis added.)

b. CVC § 210: An “automated enforcement system”

is any system operated by a governmental agency, in

cooperation with a law enforcement agency, that

photographically records a driver's responses to a

rail or rail transit signal or crossing gate, or both, or to an official traffic control signal described in Section 21450, and is designed to obtain a clear

photograph of a vehicle's license plate and the driver of the vehicle. (Emphasis added.)

c. CVC § 21100.1: “Whenever any city or county,

by ordinance or resolution, permits, restricts, or

prohibits the use of public or private highways

pursuant to this article, any traffic control device

erected by it on or after January 1, 1981, shall

conform to the uniform standards and specifications

adopted by the Department of Transportation pursuant

to Section 21400.”

d. CVC § 21450: The CVC defines “official

traffic control signals” where an automated

enforcement system may be properly located as signals

“showing different colored lights, color-lighted

arrows, or color-lighted bicycle symbols,

successively, one at a time, or in combination…”

e. CVC §§ 21455.5(a)(1-2): Automated enforcement systems are permitted if, among other requirements, the public entity:

(1) Identifies the system by signs that clearly indicate the system's presence and are visible to traffic approaching from all directions, or post signs at all major entrances to the city, including, at a minimum, freeways, bridges, and state highway routes; (2) If it locates the system at an intersection, and ensures that the system meets the criteria specified in Section 21455.7. (Emphasis added.)


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f. CVC § 21455.5(c). Only a governmental agency, in cooperation

with a law enforcement agency, may operate an automated enforcement system. As used in this subdivision, “operate” includes all of the following activities:

(1) Developing uniform guidelines for screening and issuing violations and for the processing and storage of confidential information, and establishing procedures to ensure compliance with those guidelines. (2) Performing administrative functions and day-to-day functions, including, but not limited to, all of the following:

(A) Establishing guidelines for selection of location. (B) Ensuring that the equipment is regularly inspected. (C) Certifying that the equipment is properly installed and calibrated, and is operating properly. (D) Regularly inspecting and maintaining warning signs placed under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a). (E) Overseeing the establishment or change of signal phases and the timing thereof. (F) Maintaining controls necessary to assure that only those citations that have been reviewed and approved by law enforcement are delivered to violators.

(d) The activities listed in subdivision (c) that relate to the operation of the system may be contracted out by the governmental agency, if it maintains overall control and supervision of the system. However, the activities listed in paragraph (1) of, and subparagraphs (A), (D), (E), and (F) of paragraph (2) of, subdivision (c) may not be contracted out to the manufacturer or supplier of the

automated enforcement system. (Emphasis added; see also CVC § 21455.6(b)(1).) g. CVC § 21455.6(c): The authorization in

Section 21455.5 to use automated enforcement systems

does not authorize the use of photo radar for speed enforcement purposes by any jurisdiction. (Emphasis

added.)

h. CVC § 40518(a): “Whenever a written notice to appear has been

issued by a peace officer or by a qualified employee of a law enforcement agency…for an alleged violation of Section 22451, or, based on an alleged violation of Section 21453, 21455, or 22101 recorded by an automated enforcement system pursuant to Section 21455.5 or 22451, and delivered by mail within 15 days of the alleged violation to the current address of the registered owner of the vehicle on file with the department…”

I. Defendants Do Not Photograph the Drivers of Offending

Vehicles


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45. CVC § 210 requires all automated enforcement systems

to obtain clear images of both a vehicle’s license plate and its

driver. Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program, however, does not

photograph the drivers of allegedly offending vehicles; instead,

the Redflex cameras only take images of an offending vehicle and

its license plate number. (See Ex. F.) In essence, Defendants

have rewritten CVC § 210 to replace the requirement of a driver

photograph with one of only the vehicle. As is demonstrated by

Defendants’ own photographic “evidence” against Mr. Grant, (see

id.,) their cameras were not programmed to, and thus did not,

capture any images of the actual driver of his Toyota, a clear

violation of CVC § 210.

46. Defendants have implemented these policies despite the fact that the California

Legislature has already considered and rejected them. Senate Bill 780, which would have created

a civil system of administrative adjudication for traffic violations issued pursuant to automated

enforcement cameras, included a provision “delet[ing] the requirement that the automated traffic

enforcement system be designed to take a photograph of the driver of the vehicle.” (Senate Jud.

Committee Bill Analysis, 6/19/2003, p. 3, attached at Exhibit K.) Had SB 780 passed, the

relevant text of CVC § 210 would read as follows: An “automated enforcement system”…is

designed to obtain a clear photograph of the vehicle and that vehicle's license plate.” (Proposed

SB 780, § 210, attached at Exhibit L.) The Senate, however, ultimately rejected 780 and the

driver photograph requirement was not deleted from CVC § 210. In light of this legislative

history, Defendants’ failure to take a photograph of the driver of Mr. Grant’s vehicle at the time

of its alleged violation is indefensible.


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II. Defendants’ Use of Cameras at Stop-Sign Intersections

Violates the CVC

47. Unlike the dozens of other automated enforcement

systems in operation throughout California, Defendants’ Photo

Enforcement Program is not intended to reduce the number of red-

light violations and associated traffic accidents. If that were

the case, Defendants would have placed their cameras at

intersections regulated by red-lights and other traffic signals,

as is permitted under the CVC. Instead, the MRCA hired Redflex

to operate their Photo Enforcement Program using cameras

installed at stop-sign intersections, a far more lucrative type

of location. (See Ex. J, p. 2.) To this end, Redflex designed,

implemented and continues to oversee the country’s first stop-

sign photo enforcement system. (See Redflex Website,

http://www.redflex.com/html/usa/solutions/REDFLEXstop, attached

at Exhibit M.) The photographic “evidence” against Mr. Grant

demonstrates Defendants’ use of the Photo Enforcement Program at

a stop-sign. (See Ex. F.)

48. The CVC, however, does not permit the use of automated

enforcement systems at intersections regulated with traffic

signs. It limits systems such as Defendants’ to intersections

with traffic control signals, defined as “a rail or rail transit

signal or crossing gate, or both, or to an official traffic

control signal described in Section 21450.” CVC § 210. Section

Field Code Changed


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21450 identifies “official traffic control signals” as those

“showing different colored lights, color-lighted arrows, or

color-lighted bicycle symbols, successively, one at a time, or

in combination…” CVC § 21450.

48. Section 21455.5 of the CVC reiterates this limitation

on the use of automated enforcement systems by providing that

such systems are permitted only if the governmental agency

“locates the system at an intersection, and ensures that the

system meets the criteria specified in Section 21455.7.” CVC §

21455.5(a)(2). The Photo Enforcement Program operated by

Defendants, however, does not meet the criteria specified in

Section 21455.7, which includes the following:

(a) At an intersection at which there is an

automated enforcement system in operation, the minimum

yellow light change interval shall be established in

accordance with the Traffic Manual of the Department

of Transportation.

(b) For purposes of subdivision (a), the minimum

yellow light change intervals relating to designated

approach speeds provided in the Traffic Manual of the

Department of Transportation are mandatory minimum

yellow light intervals.

CVC § 21455.7(a-b).

Clearly, the “mandatory minimum yellow light intervals” required

at intersections with automated systems has no application to

intersections with traffic signs, such as the stop sign at which

Mr. Grant’s Toyota was photographed.

50. Additionally, pursuant to CVC § 40518, a governmental


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agency may only issue citations based on photographic evidence

recorded by an automated enforcement system for the alleged

violation of CVC §§ 22451, 21453, 21455 or 22101. See CVC §

40518. None of these provisions, however, have anything to do

with the failure to obey a traffic sign. In fact, the CVC

Section for stop-sign violations, CVC § 22450, is notably absent

from this list.

51. The CVC does not contemplate the use of an automated

enforcement system such as the Photo Enforcement Program at

intersections that are regulated by traffic signs. When

Defendants videotaped the vehicle at 15601 Sunset Boulevard,

Temescal Canyon Park, an intersection marked only by a stop

sign, they did so in violation of CVC § 21455.5.

III. The Photo Enforcement Program is Operated and

Controlled by Redflex

52. Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program further violates the CVC by transferring

“overall control and supervision of the system” from the MRCA to Redflex, allowing the

company to carry out activities that the CVC specifies “may not be contracted out to the

manufacturer or supplier of the automated enforcement system.” CVC § 21455.5(d). For

example, the CVC lists “[d]eveloping uniform guidelines for screening and issuing violations” as

one of the activities that the MRCA cannot contract out to Redflex. CVC § 21455.5(c)(1). The

Redflex Contract, however, does exactly that. It states that is the responsibility of Redflex, not

the MRCA, to “[d]evelop the Speed and Stop Sign Violation Criteria,” to “[d]evelop the

Enforcement Documentation for approval by Customer,” and to “[s]ubmit to Customer a public


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awareness strategy.” (Ex. C; “Exhibit B,” §§ 1.1.4-1.1.6.). Over and over again, the Contract

assigns roles and responsibilities to the MRCA and Redflex that are opposite those required by

law.

53. The CVC lists installation, testing, and repair as activities that a governmental

agency may outsource, but only if the agency maintains overall control and supervision. See

CVC § 21455.5(c)(2)(b-c).3 The Redflex Contract, however, provides that the company is

responsible for both carrying out and for supervising/overseeing all such activities. (See Ex. C,

§§ 3.1, 3.2, “Exhibit B” at §§ 1.7-1.9, “Exhibit C” at § 1 (“All repair and maintenance of Photo

Speed and Stop Sign Enforcement systems and related equipment will be the sole responsibility

of Redflex…”).) The Contract leaves no room for the type of meaningful control and

independent decision-making that CVC §§ 21455.5(c)-(d) requires of the MRCA.

54. Similarly, the CVC mandates that it is the obligation

of the MRCA, not Redflex, to “[m]aintain[] controls necessary to

assure that only those citations that have been reviewed and

approved by law enforcement are delivered to violators.” CVC §

21455.5(c)(2)(f). Once again, the Redflex Contract simply

ignores this provision of the CVC and designates Redflex as the

party responsible for maintaining such controls. Redflex

collects, stores and “pre-processes” the violations data that it

has obtained from the cameras it has designed, installed and

3 The Photo Enforcement Program is so defunct that two of the activities that the MRCA cannot outsource pursuant to CVC §21455.5(c)(2) are not even applicable to Defendants’ present system. The MRCA obviously cannot “[r]egularly inspect[] and maintain[] warning signs” if Redflex has not posted such signs in the first place. CVC §21455.5(c)(2)(D). Similarly, the fact that Defendants have installed cameras at stop signs rather than traffic signals renders the CVC requirement that the agency “[o]versee[] the establishment or change of signal phases and the timing thereof” completely extraneous. CVC §21455.5(c)(2)(E).


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tested, using the criteria it has established. (See Ex. C, §§

3.3.1-3.3.6.) Once it has identified a possible traffic

violation, it is up to Redflex to “provide the Authorized [MRCA]

Officer with access to the Redflex System for the purposes of

reviewing the pre-processed Violations Data” for that incident.

(Id. at § 3.3.4.) In essence, the MRCA’s only involvement is to

rubber-stamp whatever pre-selected, pre-processed data Redflex

has deemed appropriate for review. The agency does nothing to

ensure that Redflex is issuing citations in accordance with the

law. If Redflex were to begin issuing citations without agency

authorization, the MRCA would be the last to know.

55. On information and belief, the only data that MRCA

Park Ranger “DTHOLUND,” Badge No. 536H, actually reviewed prior

to authorizing Mr. Grant’s Citation are the two images that

Redflex included with the Citation. (See Ex. E.)

56. Not only does the MRCA leave it to Redflex to ensure

the accuracy and completeness of the “pre-processed Violations

Data” on which MRCA Rangers rely in authorizing citations, but

the MRCA also has no obvious role in the actual issuance of such

citations. The Contract indicates that it is Redflex who is

responsible for ensuring that only authorized citations are sent

out, Redflex who must “print and mail a Citation[s] within six

(6) days after Redflex’s receipt of such authorization,” (Ex. C,

§ 3.3.6,) Redflex who processes and re-issues citations, (Id. at


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“Exhibit B,” § 1.1.16,) and Redflex who “provide[s] a toll-free

telephone number for the purposes of answering citizen

inquiries.” (Id. at § 3.3.7.).

57. Other provisions of the Redflex Contract lay to rest

any doubts that the MRCA oversees and controls the functioning

of the Photo Enforcement Program. The Contract, for example,

makes the Redflex Project Manager “responsible for overseeing

the construction and installation of the Designated Equipment

Locations and the implementation of the Photo Speed and Stop

Sign Enforcement Program…”( Id. at § 1.20.) It also obligates

Redflex to train up to15 MRCA peace officers and personnel

assigned to the Program “regarding the operation of the Redflex

System and the Speed and Stop Sign Photo Enforcement Program…”

(Id. at “Exhibit B,” § 1.13; Id. at § 3.3.12.) The relationship

between Redflex and MRCA personnel is supervisory in nature,

with Redflex held out as the authority on all photo enforcement

matters.

58. The Contract envisions little involvement by the MRCA.

The agency cannot “make any modifications to the Redflex System,

including but not limited to any Equipment,” (Id. at § 4.3), and

it has no continuous access to or involvement in the day-to-day

operations of the Program. In fact, the MRCA must submit a

written request to Redflex just to obtain basic reports

“regarding the processing and issuance of Citations, the


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maintenance and downtime records of the Designated Intersection

Approaches and the functionality of the Redflex System…” (Id. at

§ 3.3.9.) The MRCA does not even have the right to terminate

the contract (other than for cause) without paying Redflex a

monetary penalty of up to $40,000 for each of the 10+ locations

where Redflex cameras have been installed. (See id. at § 6.3.)

59. The Redflex Contract assigns roles and delegates

authority between Redflex and the MRCA in such a way that

Redflex is vested both with specific task-completion

responsibilities and broad powers of supervision and control

regarding Defendants’ Photo Enforcement System. At the same

time, the Contract also sets up a system that contemplates

minimal involvement by the MRCA, allowing the agency to refocus

its time, attention and manpower elsewhere. Unfortunately for

Defendants, this delegation of authority violates CVC §§

21455.5(c)-(d), which prohibits the MRCA from outsourcing

specific administrative functions and activities to Redflex and

requires the agency to “maintains overall control and

supervision of the system.” CVC § 21455.5(d). Defendants,

however, have opted not to adopt and integrate these

requirements of the CVC, as if such an option even existed.

Defendants’ approach to the CVC— ignoring it, avoiding it, and

wishing that it did not exist—is simply indefensible.

IV. Defendants’ Use of Photo Radar for Speed Enforcement


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Purposes is Illegal

60. Pursuant to CVC § 21455.6(c), any photo radar that is

used for speed enforcement purposes is manifestly prohibited by

the CVC. The photo radar system used by Defendants pursuant to

the Redflex Contract does exactly that; in fact, the 2007

Contract actually labels the Photo Enforcement Program the

“Photo Speed and Stop Sign Photo Enforcement System.” (Ex. C, §

1.23.)4 The Contract defines “Photo Speed & Stop Sign Violation

Criteria” to include “the speed of travel required or the

absence of a complete stop at a location where a stop sign is

located.” (Id., emphasis added.) In order to determine the speed

at which a vehicle is traveling, the cameras measure the time it

takes the vehicle to go from one point to another. When the

vehicle’s speed exceeds a certain threshold, it triggers the

Photo Enforcement Program that results in a citation.

The data recorded on the top of the images Defendants

recorded of Mr. Grant’s Toyota confirms that the Photo

Enforcement Program uses photo radar for speed enforcement

purposes. The data on page 2 of Exhibit F, for example, states

that at July 5, 2010 at 16:04:11 (the time when the Toyota was

photographed going through the MRCA stop sign at Temescal Canyon

Park,) the speed of the vehicle was 8mph. (Ex. F, p. 2.) The

4 A subsequent amendment to the Contract deleted all references to “Photo

Speed and Stop Sign Photo Enforcement” and replaced them as “Photo Stop Sign

Enforcement.” (See Ex. D, ¶A.)


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CVC expressly prohibits Defendants from using their Photo

Enforcement Program in this manner.

V. Defendants Fail to Post the Requisite Signs at

Intersections with Cameras

61. With respect to allowable photo enforcement systems (e.g., at red lights), CVC §

21455.5(a)(1) requires the posting of signs that indicate their presence. These signs must

conform to the uniform standards and specifications adopted by the California Department of

Transportation. See CVC §§ 21400, 21100.1 (“Whenever any city or county, by ordinance or

resolution, permits, restricts, or prohibits the use of public or private highways pursuant to this

article, any traffic control device erected by it on or after January 1, 1981, shall conform to the

uniform standards and specifications adopted by the Department of Transportation pursuant to

Section 21400.”)

62. The California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”) clearly

specifies that “[t]he Traffic Signal PHOTO ENFORCED (SR56(CA)) sign…shall be placed at

all traffic signals where an automated traffic enforcement system is being used.” (2010 CA

MUTCD, § 2B.46 at p. 2B-52, attached at Exhibit N.) This sign must appear as follows:

63. The Manual also sets forth a number of optional traffic signs of relevance. For

example, a TRAFFIC LAWS PHOTO ENFORCED (R10-18) sign may be installed at a

jurisdictional boundary to advise road users that some of the traffic regulations within that

jurisdiction are being enforced by photographic equipment, or a RED LIGHT VIOLATION


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$___ FINE (SR58(CA)) sign may be used in advance of intersections where a local agency has

adopted an ordinance setting a specific fine amount for red light violations within its jurisdiction.

(See id.) These signs must appear as follows:

64. When Mr. Grant inspected the area of his alleged

violation, however, he did not see any evidence revealing the

existence of the Photo Enforcement Program as required by CVC §

21455.5(a)(1) or the MUTCD. The signs were non-existent.

VI. Additional CVC Provisions Violated by Defendants

65. As discussed below, (infra, ¶¶ 67-82, 103-108,)

Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program violates numerous other

provisions of the CVC, including but not limited to Sections

12810 (Violation Point Count), 40310 (Uniform Traffic Penalty

Schedule), 42001 (Infractions and Special Misdemeanors) and

40520 (Notice to Appear: Affidavit of Non-Liability).

VII. Conclusion

66. For these reasons, Mr. Grant respectfully requests

that this Court enjoin Defendants from continued enforcement of

the Photo Enforcement Program, which violates California Vehicle

Code §§ 21, 210, 21100.1, 21450, 21455.5-.6 and 40518, among

others. Mr. Grant also requests that this Court enter an Order

finding that he is not legally responsible for the $175.00 fine


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to which Defendants believe they are due, and reimbursing him

for all of the attorneys’ fees and costs he has incurred in

bringing this lawsuit pursuant to California Code of Civil

Procedure § 1021.5.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA, J. Edmiston and Redflex for

Decriminalizing State Traffic Laws in Violation of Article I, §

15 of the CA Constitution and CVC §§ 12810, 40310, 42001)

67. In the State of California, traffic violations are

considered matters of criminal law, to be adjudicated either as

criminal misdemeanors and/or infractions pursuant to the CVC.

See CVC § 40000.28 (defining criminal misdemeanors versus

infractions in the context of motor vehicle violations); see

also Cal. Penal Code § 16. As such, the due process protections

afforded criminal defendants pursuant to Article I, Section 15

of the California Constitution extend to individuals like Mr.

Grant who have been accused of violating State traffic laws. See

CA Const., art. I, § 15 (Relevant protections include the rights

to due process, to compel attendance of witnesses on one’s

behalf, to confront one’s accusers, and against self-

incrimination.)

68. Defendants have grossly exceeded their authority by implementing a system that

decriminalizes certain traffic violations, removing them from the realm of criminal law (and all

of the associated due process protections) and into matters of civil law, subject only to

administrative adjudication. As a result, Defendants unlawfully reduce their burden of proof


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from beyond a reasonable doubt to the preponderance of the evidence. Defendants’ Photo

Enforcement Program also fails to adhere to the reporting requirements of the State, requires

fines that exceed the maximum standards established by the Legislature, and replaces standard

sentences from community service, traffic school and/or fines to the mere imposition of “civil

penalties,” cash payments that go directly into the pockets of the MRCA and Redflex. See CVC

§§ 12810, 40310, 42001.

69. The MRCA hired Redflex to take over “traffic enforcement activities” at its parks

so that the resources of the agency’s park rangers could be reallocated. (See Ex. J, p. 1.) Redflex

operates the Photo Enforcement Program by exercising the MRCA’s police powers on behalf of

the agency. As such, it is an agent of the MRCA liable for violating the CVC.

70. Defendants’ actions, in addition to conflicting with literally dozens of provisions

of California State and Constitutional law, are even more inexplicable in light of the failure of

2003 Senate Bill 780, which would have decriminalized traffic violations issued pursuant to

automated enforcement systems. (See Ex. L.) The bill, which was introduced by Senators

Torlakson and Speier and sponsored by the California Police Officers' Association, would have:

Delet[ed] the requirement that a red light camera (automated traffic enforcement) system be designed to take a photo of the driver of the vehicle, impos[ed] a civil penalty of not more than $200 for a red light camera violation, exempt[ed] the violation from the point count system currently used for tracking drivers' moving violations, and establish[ed] an administrative procedure for the adjudication of a red light camera violation, similar to a parking ticket. (Ex. K at p.1.)

71. Under the proposed legislation, violations recorded by automated systems would

no longer be subject to criminal adjudicative procedures and reporting requirements. Instead,

Senate Bill 780 provided that “[a] vehicle…that is recorded by the automated enforcement

system shall be cited as a civil violation, subject to a civil penalty,” (Ex. L at § 21455.5(h),) and


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“[n]o violation point count may be given for a violation…that is cited as a civil violation under

Section 21455.5.” (Id. at § 12810.3.) Despite the fact that the CA Senate ultimately rejected SB

780, the MRCA Ordinance and Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program adopt the substance of

the proposed legislation as if it were valid and binding law. In light of this legislative history,

Defendants’ actions amount to an unconstitutional grab of State power by an agency.

72. The CA Legislature has specifically regulated the use

of automated photo systems to issue notices of alleged

violations of traffic laws. See §§ 40518-40522. Section 42001.16

sets forth the statutory scheme for punishing individuals who

have been convicted of such violations:

(a) Every person convicted of an infraction for a

violation of subdivision (c) of Section 21752,

subdivision (c) of Section 22526, or Section 22450,

involving railroad grade crossings, or Section 22451

or 22452 shall be punished as follows:

(1) For the first infraction, by a fine of one hundred dollars ($100). (2) For a second infraction of any of the offenses described in this

subdivision occurring within one year of a prior infraction that resulted in a conviction, by a fine not exceeding two hundred dollars ($200).

(3) For a third or any subsequent infraction of any of the offenses described in this subdivision occurring within one year of two or more prior infractions that resulted in convictions, by a fine not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars ($250).

(b) In addition to the fine imposed pursuant to subdivision (a), a court, in a county in which Section 369b of the Penal Code applies, may require the person to attend a traffic school as described in Section 369b of the Penal Code. CVC § 42001.16(a)-(b).

73. In addition, in order to protect the public from the

dangers posed by habitual offenders of these vehicle code

infractions, the California Legislature has established a system

under which individuals with too many citations have their


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driving license privileges suspended for a set period of time.

See CVC § 12810.

74. The California Secretary of State has assigned a point

value of 1-point to any

“traffic conviction involving the safe operation of a motor

vehicle.” CVC § 12910(d).

75. If an individual driver accumulates 4 or more points

within one calendar year, 6 or more points on 24 months, or 8 or

more points in 36 months, he/she is presumed to be a negligent

operator and loses the right to drive for a set period of time.

CVC § 12810.5. This is the schema agreed on and enforced by the

State of California Legislature, the Department of Corrections,

the Secretary of State, the State Highway Patrol, and the local

police departments, among others.

76. Moreover, the CVC provides that “[a]ny offense which would otherwise be an

infraction,” such as traffic violations issued pursuant to an automated enforcement system such

as Defendants, “is a misdemeanor if a defendant has been convicted of three or more violations

of this code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this code within the 12-month period

immediately preceding the commission of the offense and such prior convictions are admitted by

the defendant or alleged in the accusatory pleading.” CVC § 40000.28. If one thing is clear from

the above provisions of the CVC, it is that the State of California regards traffic violations as

matters of criminal, not civil, adjudication.

77. Defendants, however, apparently believe that they are

not subject to the State’s long held principles and laws


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governing traffic control. The Ordinance passed by the MRCA and

implemented by Redflex as the Photo Enforcement Program flaunts

the decriminalization of traffic violations on its roads and

flat-out rejects the mandate of the CA State Legislature that

every driver found violating a traffic control law must be

reported to the California DMV for the accurate assessment of

point(s) against his driving privileges. On these points the

Ordinance is unambiguous:

§ 4.0(c) Imposition of liability under this section shall not be deemed a

conviction as an operator and shall not be made part of the operating record upon whom such liability is imposed. No points authorized by the California Vehicle Code (“Point System for License Suspension”)shall be assigned to the owner or driver of the vehicle for violation of § 4.0. § 5.4. Automated motor vehicle enforcement. Any violation of § 4.0 which is enforced by means of automated motor vehicle enforcement pursuant to § 4.2

shall be deemed a noncriminal violation for which no points authorized by the California Vehicle Code (“Point System for License Suspension”) shall be

assigned to the owner or driver of the vehicle.

(Ex. B, §§ 4.0(c), 5.4 (emphasis added.)

78. The intentional effort by Defendants to avoid the

reporting requirement mandated by California law conflicts with

the plain language of the CVC as well as the public policy of

this State, which aims to protect the public from habitual

traffic offenders. The CA Legislature has already expressly

considered and rejected SB 780, which would have allowed local

agencies to adjudicate traffic violations recorded by automated

photo systems as civil offenses. (See, supra, ¶ 70, 71.) On this

point especially, Defendants’ blatant refusal to abide by the


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decision of the Senate and the laws of this State is simply

indefensible.

79. Defendants have also failed to adhere to the uniform traffic penalty schedule

specified in the CVC, which states that “[n]o penalty shall be established for any infraction in an

amount…in excess of the amount of the maximum fine pursuant to Section 42001 or 42001.5.”

CVC § 40310; see 42001(d) (“A fine…shall not exceed the maximum fine, including penalty

assessment and court costs, otherwise authorized by this code for that violation.”) As set forth

above, the CVC authorizes fines of no more than $100 for a first-time traffic infraction issued

pursuant to an automated enforcement system. See CVC § 42001.16(a)(1). Mr. Grant, however,

was fined $175.00 when his vehicle was photographed allegedly failing to obey a traffic signal.

(See Ex. E.)

80. In addition to ignoring the maximum fine provisions

and reporting requirements of the CVC and decriminalizing

traffic violations, Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program also

conflicts with the CVC by permitting significantly different

procedures to be used to prosecute the same conduct. See CA.

Const., art. 11, § 7(a). For example, all throughout the State

of California, the failure to come to a complete halt at a stop

sign results in the same consequences. The driver of the

offending vehicle will be stopped, cited, made to sign a ticket

in lieu of posting bail, and assigned a court date if he decides

to contest the ticket. He will face criminal adjudication that

could result in fines, traffic school, community service, or

probation. See generally CVC §§ 42003-42005.


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81. At stop-signs with Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program, however, drivers of

vehicles who commit identical violations face consequences of significantly less severity. “The

only penalty for a violation of § 4.0 that is enforced by means of automated motor vehicle

enforcement,” the Ordinance declares, “shall be by imposition of an administrative penalty

pursuant to § 5.4, as authorized pursuant to Government Code § 53069.4.” (Ex. B § 4.2.1(a).) In

the case of Mr. Grant, Defendants were willing to resolve the alleged violation against him in

exchange for $175.00.

82. Because the regulation of traffic offenses is a matter of statewide uniformity, see

CVC § 21, Defendants have no authority to pass or implement local traffic ordinances that

conflict with the CVC. In an arrogant affront to CA statutory law and legislative policy,

Defendants have decriminalized certain traffic violations, refused to adhere to the maximum

fines or reporting requirements of State law, and reduced the consequences of serious traffic

violations to administrative fines that go directly into their financial coffers. With no authority

whatsoever, Defendants’ policies dramatically limit the constitutional rights of individuals who

receive citations pursuant to the Photo Enforcement Program, including Mr. Grant.

83. Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court enter

an Order: (1) finding Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program in

violation of Article I, § 15 of the California Constitution and

California Vehicle Code §§ 12810, 40310, and 42001; and (2)

declaring Section § 4.0 et seq. of the MRCA Ordinance to be

void; and (3) enjoining Defendants from the continued

enforcement of the Photo Enforcement Program; and (3) awarding

Mr. Grant all of the attorneys’ fees and costs that he has

incurred in bringing this lawsuit pursuant to CA CCP § 1021.5;


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and (4) finding that Mr. Grant is not legally responsible for

the $175.00 fine to which Defendants believe they are due.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA and J. Edmiston for Violating Due Process Pursuant to

Article 1, § 7(a) of the California Constitution)

84. Mr. Grant realleges and incorporates herein by

reference each of the foregoing paragraphs, and further alleges

as follows.

85. The MRCA is a state agency created by a partnership between the Santa Monica

Mountains Conservatory, the Conejo Park District and the Rancho Simi Recreation Park District.

It is a governmental agency whose actions are subject to the requirements of Due Process as set

forth in the California Constitution.

86. Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program violates Article 1, § 7(a) of the

California Constitution, which provides that “[a] person may not be deprived of…property

without due process of law.” Here, the MRCA seeks to deprive Mr. Grant of his property, $175

of his money, without the possibility of a pre-deprivation hearing.

87. The private interest that is affected by the program is significant. The scheme set

up by Defendants, which requires Mr. Grant and others similarly situated to pay the $175 fine

before being able to request a hearing, makes the payment of citations easy but hinders the

ability to dispute them. As shown by the rental car exclusion, (see infra, ¶¶ 103-108,) Defendants

target private individuals who would rather pay the fine and resolve the issue than battle a state

agency over $175.

88. Moreover, there is a huge risk, almost a guarantee, of an erroneous deprivation

occurring through these procedures. As set forth above, (see supra ¶¶ 44-46, 61-64,) the


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safeguards that the California Vehicle Code requires for automated photo enforcement programs,

including the photographing of both the vehicle’s license plate number and its driver, (see CVC

§ 210,) and the posting of signs indicating the presence of the automated system, (see CVC §

21455.5(a)(1),) are nonexistent in the analogous MRCA Ordinance. Because Defendants’

cameras do not capture an image of the person driving an allegedly offending vehicle, the

MRCA cannot actually establish the liability of the vehicle’s registered owner. What it can prove

is that it has no proof of the identity of the vehicle’s driver. As a result, it is in the financial

interest of the agency to make it difficult for the recipients of its citations to obtain administrative

hearings, and the MRCA does just that by limiting hearings to those who have already paid the

fine. The more people that take the time to contest the citations, the more cases the MRCA will

be forced to dismiss for lack of evidence and the less money it will make.

89. Requiring the MRCA to provide the option of a pre-deprivation hearing would

impose additional administrative burdens on the agency only because the citations are not legally

sustainable. If Defendants are permitted to continue their money-making scheme, requiring the

MRCA to provide the recipients of its citations with an easily available, open-ended and

impartial means of dispute should not be too much to ask.

90. By depriving Mr. Grant of his property interest in $175.00 of his money before

giving him the opportunity to be heard, the MRCA’s Ordinance violates Article I, § 7(a) of the

California Constitution. Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court declare that the post-

deprivation hearing provided for in the MRCA Ordinance is illegal, and require the MRCA to

hold pre-deprivation hearings on all future citations. Mr. Grant also requests that this Court enter

an Order finding that he is not legally responsible for the $175.00 fine to which Defendants

believe they are due.



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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA, J. Edmiston, and Redflex for Unlawful

Conduct in Violation of CA Business & Professions Code §§ 17200,

et seq.)

91 Mr. Grant realleges and incorporates herein by


as follows.

92. The California Business & Professions Code (the “BPC”)

defines unfair business to include any “unfair,” “unlawful,” or

“fraudulent” business practice. (BPC §§ 17200, et seq.)

93. Defendants have violated the “unlawful” prong of the

BPC by implementing and enforcing Section 4.0 of the MRCA

Ordinance, particularly as it relates to the use of automated

motor vehicle enforcement as defined therein. (See Ex. B, §

4.2.) Its provisions conflicts with, duplicate and contradict

portions of the California Vehicle Code. For the reasons set

forth above, (see supra, ¶¶ 40-82,) Defendants’ Photo

Enforcement Program violates CVC §§ 21, 210, 12810, 21100.1,

21450, 21455.5-.6, 40310, 40518, and 42001, among others. As an

“unlawful business act or practice,” Defendants’ Photo

Enforcement Program is independently actionable under BPC §

17200.

94. By enforcing these unlawful practices, Defendants will

be unjustly enriched at the expense of Mr. Grant, who is guilty

of nothing other than being the registered owner of the Toyota


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that was illegally captured on camera,. This is not to mention

the unjust enrichment of Defendants from thousands of other

vehicle owners from whom they have already collected millions of

dollars in unlawful fines.

95. Through their unlawful business acts and practices,

Defendants believe they are legally entitled to a monetary fine

from Mr. Grant. Thus, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this

Court enter an Order: (1) declaring the MRCA judgment against

Mr. Grant to be an illegal and unenforceable pursuant to

California BPC §§ 17200, et seq.; (2) finding Defendants’ Photo

Enforcement Program to be an “unlawful business practice”

prohibited by California BPC §§ 17200, et seq.; (3) enjoining

Defendants from the continued enforcement of the Photo

Enforcement Program; (4) ordering Redflex to pay Mr. Grant three

times the amount of his actual monetary damages pursuant to

California BPC § 17082; (5) awarding Mr. Grant all of the

attorneys’ fees and costs that he has incurred in bringing this

lawsuit pursuant to California BPC § 17082; and (6) ruling that

Mr. Grant is not legally responsible for the $175.00 fine to

which Defendants believe they are due.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA, J. Edmiston and Redflex for Unfair


et seq.)



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as follows.

97. The BPC defines unfair business competition to include

any “unfair,” “unlawful,” or “fraudulent” business act or

practice. A business practice is “unfair” if the reasons,

justifications and motives of the wrongdoer are outweighed by

the gravity of the harm to the victim(s). Alternatively, a

business practice is “unfair” if it violates a legislatively

declared policy. (See BPC §§ 17200, et seq.)

98. Both the MRCA Ordinance and the Redflex Contract (on

which Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program is based) violate

the legislatively declared policies of this State regarding

automated photographic enforcement systems. (See id.) For

example, Defendants’ practices of adopting illegal procedures

and ignoring binding legal authority contravene California

policy regarding the need for uniform laws and standard

procedures in the effective regulation of traffic offenses

statewide. See CVC § 21 (“…no local authority shall enact or

enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless

expressly authorized herein”); see also CVC §§ 21400; 21100.1.

Because Defendants’ practices violate the legislatively declared

policies of this State, they fall within the definition of

“unfair” pursuant to BPC § 17200.


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99. It does not take an economist to figure out that Defendants’ motives are primarily

financial in nature. But no amount of money justifies Defendants’ enactment of an Ordinance,

negotiation of a Contract, and implementation of a Photo Enforcement Program that conflict with

the plain language of the California Vehicle Code. The harm caused by the Photo Enforcement

Program is serious; the process not only deprives private citizens of their constitutional property

interests before a hearing, it sets a precedent that allows the ordinances of a state agency to trump

California statutory law and legislative policy. This harm has long-reaching implications and

consequences that far outweigh the fiscal benefits that Defendants receive from the program.

Defendants’ actions, therefore, fall within the meaning of “unfair” as provided in the BPC and

are independently actionable pursuant to BPC § 17200.

100. By enforcing these unfair practices, Defendants will

be unjustly enriched at the expense of Mr. Grant, an innocent

vehicle owner. This is not to mention the thousands of other

vehicle owners from whom Defendants have already collected

millions of dollars in unlawful fines.

101. Through its unfair actions and practices, Defendants

believe they are legally entitled to a monetary penalty from Mr.

Grant. Thus, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court

enter an Order: (1) declaring the MRCA judgment against Mr.

Grant to be illegal and unenforceable pursuant to California BPC

§§ 17200, et seq.; (2) finding Defendants’ Photo Enforcement

Program to be an “unfair business practice” prohibited by

California BPC §§ 17200, et seq.; (3) enjoining Defendants from

the continued enforcement of the Photo Enforcement Program; (4)


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ordering Redflex to pay Mr. Grant three times the amount of his

actual monetary damages pursuant to California BPC § 17082; (5)

awarding Mr. Grant all of the attorneys’ fees and costs that he

has incurred in bringing this lawsuit pursuant to California BPC

§ 17082; and (6) ruling that Mr. Grant is not legally

responsible for the $175.00 fine to which Defendants believe

they are due.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA, J. Edmiston and Redflex for Unlawful

and Unfair Conduct in Violation of CA Business & Professions Code

§§ 17200, et seq.)



as follows.

103. Both the CVC and the MRCA Ordinance allow the registered owners of vehicles

to be held liable regardless of whether or not they were the actual drivers at the time their

vehicles were photographed in violation. (See Ex. B, § 4.2.1.) On this point, the Instruction Page

of each citation issued by Defendants is unambiguous: “As the registered owner…of the vehicle

as described in this Notice, we have no choice but to hold you responsible for paying this civil

penalty.” (Ex. E, p. 2.)

104. To allow registered owners who receive citations a means of escaping such

liability, CVC provides the following:

A notice to appear issued pursuant to Section 40518 for an alleged violation recorded by an automatic enforcement system shall contain, or be accompanied by, an affidavit of non-liability, and information as to what constitutes non-liability, information as to the effect of executing the affidavit, and instructions for returning the affidavit to the issuing agency.


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CVC § 40520. If the registered owner of a vehicle has received a citation but was not driving the

vehicle at the time of the alleged offense, he or she may be able to avoid liability by executing an

“affidavit of non-liability” and identifying the actual driver. See id.

105. Defendants’ conduct has unlawfully and unfairly deprived Mr. Grant of the

opportunity to execute an “affidavit of non-liability” and invalidate the Citation against him.

First, Defendants have never provided Mr. Grant with the forms and instructions necessary to

execute such an affidavit. Pursuant to CVC § 40520, Defendants were obligated to send Mr.

Grant an “affidavit of non-liability” with, or accompanied by, his original Citation. (See, Ex. E

(failing to mention any such affidavit in the context of individual vehicle owners).) Had Mr.

Grant received such a document, he may have been able to identify the actual individual driving

his vehicle at the time the violation was recorded, rendering this lawsuit moot.

106. Second, Defendants’ failure to send Mr. Grant an

“affidavit of non-liability” was not a one-time mistake but the

practical result of an unscrupulous, discriminatory and unfair

policy enacted by Defendants in violation of State laws.5

Although the CVC states that affidavits of non-liability must be

sent to and accepted from all types of registered vehicle owners

without distinction, Defendants only allow businesses like car

rental agencies to escape liability by executing non-liability

affidavits. MRCA citations issued by Defendants, for example,

provide rental car agencies, and only rental car agencies, with

5 One of the ways an “unfair” business practice may arise under the BPC is

when it offends an established public policy, is unethical, oppressive,

unscrupulous, discriminatory or substantially injurious to consumers. See BPC

§§17200 et seq.


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the following option:

Indentify another Driver, ONLY if you are a rental

Agency or the vehicle was sold or stolen. It is

sufficient evidence of the 4.0/4.2.1-Stop Sign of the

MRCA Park Ordinance, that the person registered as the

owner of the vehicle or driver authorized by a rental

car agency was operating the vehicle at the time of

the violation.

(Ex. E, p. 2. (emphasis in original).)

107. Defendants know that rental agencies have the means to

and will contest every citation if they are not given the

opportunity to shift liability to the individual(s) who rented

their vehicles.6 They do not, however, provide the same

protections to ordinary individuals, as Defendants count on the

majority of vehicle owners to simply pay the fines Defendants

demand of them rather than engage in a protracted legal battle

with a CA State agency and a well-funded private corporation.

Moreover, it is in Defendants’ interests to automatically fine

the easily identifiable owners of vehicles rather than

investigate the identity of each driver.

108. Defendants’ practice of allowing rental agencies a

means of avoiding liability but denying private individuals the

same right is both unlawful and unfair under Section 17200 et

seq. of the CA Business & Professions Code. Yet again,

Defendants have taken what they like from the CVC and ignored

6 What happens when a rental agency identifies multiple individuals as drivers

of the offending vehicle? Does the MRCA issue citations to every person

listed as a driver or do they just pick one person to hold responsible?


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the rest, allowing car rental companies but not individuals to

execute affidavits of non-liability pursuant to CVC § 40520.

This practice is more than just unlawful—it is unscrupulous,

unethical, discriminatory and unfair. There is no legitimate

reason for Defendants to afford private individuals fewer

protections than rental companies, particularly when the CVC

treats both groups equally.

109. By enforcing these unlawful and unfair practices,

Defendants will be unjustly enriched at the expense of Mr.

Grant, an innocent vehicle owner. This is not to mention the

thousands of other vehicle owners from whom Defendants have

already collected millions of dollars in unlawful fines.

110. For these reasons, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court enter an

finding Defendants’ Photo Enforcement Program to be an “unfair

business practice” prohibited by California BPC §§ 17200, et

seq.; (2) enjoining Defendants from the continued enforcement of

the Photo Enforcement Program; (3) ordering Redflex to pay Mr.

Grant three times the amount of his actual monetary damages

pursuant to California BPC § 17082; (4) awarding Mr. Grant all

of the attorneys’ fees and costs that he has incurred in

bringing this lawsuit pursuant to California BPC § 17082; and

(5) finding that Mr. Grant is not legally responsible for the

$175.00 fine to which Defendants believe they are due.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION


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(Against Defendants MRCA, J. Edmiston and Redflex for Fraudulent


et seq.)



as follows.

112. The BPC defines unfair business competition to include

any “unfair,” “unlawful,” or “fraudulent” business act or

practice. A business practice is “fraudulent” if it deceives or

is likely to deceive members of the public. (See BPC § 17200.)

114. Defendants have deceived members of the public by

enforcing the MRCA Ordinance and representing the legality of

provisions that violate California statutory law. California

residents driving through the parks managed by the MRCA have

every reasonable expectation that the laws of the State are in

full force and effect on the roads where Defendants employ their

Photo Enforcement Program. No reasonable driver would expect the

directives of an administrative ordinance to trump the normal

rules of the road, as delineated in the California Vehicle Code.

115. Defendants have engaged in a systematic pattern of

deceiving park-goers by demanding payment of a civil penalty

unauthorized by and in violation of CA statutory law. Their

efforts to convince the recipients of citations that the civil

penalty they seek is lawful and required under CA law


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constitutes a “fraudulent business act or practice” under BPC §

17200. For example, the photographic evidence collected by

Redflex does not warrant the issuance of these citations, as no

images are taken of the drivers of the vehicles, a clear

violation of CVC § 210. That the citations are likely to deceive

the average driver is confirmed by the $1,874,914 in

administrative fines that was collected by the MRCA between 2008

and 2009.

116. Additionally, Defendants’ use and imposition of a

speed-based photo radar system in a manner prohibited by the CVC

constitutes a “fraudulent practice” likely to deceive the

average driver. No reasonable driver would expect to drive into

a speed trap prohibited by California law simply because he or

she is driving on roads owned or operated by a state agency such

as the MRCA. As such, it is independently actionable under BPC §

17200.

117. By enforcing these fraudulent practices, Defendants

will be unjustly enriched at the expense of Mr. Grant, an

innocent vehicle owner. This is not to mention the thousands of

other vehicle owners from whom Defendants have already collected

millions of dollars in unlawful fines.

118. Through its fraudulent acts and practices, the MRCA

believes it is legally entitled to a monetary penalty from Mr.

Grant. Thus, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court


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enter an Order: (1) finding Defendants in violation of

California BPC §§ 17200, et seq.; (2) enjoining Defendants from

the continued enforcement of the Photo Enforcement Program; (3)

ordering Redflex to pay Mr. Grant three times the amount of his

actual monetary damages pursuant to California BPC § 17082; (4)


has incurred in bringing this lawsuit pursuant to California BPC

§ 17082; and (5) finding that Mr. Grant is not legally

responsible for the $175.00 fine to which Defendants believe

they are due.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA and Edmiston for Violating CA

Government Code § 11145)



as follows.

120. Section 11145 of the CA Government Code provides: “No

state agency shall adopt or enforce any rule or regulation a

violation of which can result in the imposition of a fine or

imprisonment, or both, unless a statute specifically authorizes

the imposition of such fine or imprisonment, or both, for a

violation of the rule or regulation.”

121. There is no statute authorizing the MRCA to use its


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Photo Enforcement Program to impose civil penalties on the

registered owners of allegedly offending vehicles without regard

to the identities of the actual drivers of those vehicles. To

the contrary, as set forth above, (see supra, ¶¶ 39-82, 103-

108,) the MRCA Ordinance establishing its Photo Enforcement

Program actually violates CA statutory law, including but not

limited to California Vehicle Code §§ 21, 210, 12810, 21100.1,

21450, 21455.5-.6, 40310, 40518, 40520 and 42001, and the

California BPC §§ 913, 17200, et seq..

122. Because the fines imposed by the MRCA Ordinance

are not authorized by statutory law, Mr. Grant respectfully

requests that this Court find the MRCA in violation of CA

Government Code § 11145 and enjoin Defendants from the continued

enforcement of the MRCA Photo Enforcement Program. Mr. Grant

also requests that this Court enter an Order finding that he is

not legally responsible for the $175.00 fine to which Defendants


NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendants MRCA and J. Edmiston for Violating

California Business & Professions Code §§ 912, et seq.)



as follows.


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124. Pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 912.4, the MRCA “shall

act on a claim… within 45 days after the claim has been presented.” BPC § 912.4(a). “If the

board fails or refuses to act on a claim within the time prescribed by this section, the claim shall

be deemed to have been rejected.” (Id. at 4(c).)

125. Although Mr. Grant set forth his claims and repeated

requests for an administrative hearing as early as his July 28,

2010 letter to the MRCA, (see Ex. G,) the MRCA has never

responded and the time frame for action by the MRCA has long

since expired. Therefore, it is presumed that the MRCA has

rejected Mr. Grant’s claim.

126. Under Section 913(a) of the CA Business & Professions Code, the MRCA was

required to give Mr. Grant written notice of the “inaction which is deemed [a] rejection” of his

claim. This notice should have included a warning in substantially the following form:

WARNING Subject to certain exceptions, you have only six (6) months from the date this notice was personally delivered or deposited in the mail to file a court action on this claim. See Government Code Section 945.6. You may seek the advice of an attorney of your choice in connection with this matter. If you desire to consult an attorney, you should do so immediately. BPC, § 913(b).

127. Neither the Citation sent to Mr. Grant by Defendants nor any other MRCA

correspondence contains this warning. The MRCA has simply ignored the statutory requirement

that it provide this warning to the recipients of its citations whose claim has been rejected or

deemed rejected. This provision provides for recourse in a court action, which is inconvenient to


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and not in the fiscal interests of the MRCA. Because the MRCA has proof that it has no proof of

the identity of the drivers of offending vehicles, review by a court will almost certainly end in

favor of the individuals cited by the MRCA.

128. Because the MRCA has failed to provide this

statutorily required notice to Mr. Grant, as well as the

thousands of other registered owners of the vehicles it has

cited, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court find the

MRCA in violation of California BPC § 913 and enjoin Defendants

from the continued enforcement of their Photo Enforcement

Program without providing the written notice required. Mr. Grant

also requests that this Court enter an Order finding that he is

not legally responsible for the $175.00 fine to which Defendants


TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Against Defendant Redflex for Violation of CA Civil Code § 52.1)

129. Pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.1, civil liability exists:

(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state…

(b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of

rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, or of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of this state, has been

interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with,

as described in subdivision (a), may institute and

prosecute in his or her own name and on his or her own

behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not

limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive


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relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to

protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the

right or rights secured.

Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a)-(b).

130. Redflex has repeatedly used threats, intimidation and coercion to attempt to

interfere with Mr. Grant’s constitutional right to access the courts. This is a right “arising from

the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances…also protected

by article I, section 3 of the California Constitution.” Jersey v. John Muir Medical Center, 97

Cal. App. 4th 814, 821 (1st Dist. 2002).

131. Redflex designed the Photo Enforcement Program to

discourage, prevent and even obstruct the recipients of

Defendants’ citations from challenging the legality of the

Program in court. To this end, Redflex uses the police powers

and authority of the MRCA to create a façade of legality that

allows it to issue unlawful citations to unsuspecting members of

the public. Acting under the color of law, Redflex intimidates

and coerces the recipients of its citations into paying the

fines immediately and without contest, lest they be subject to

additional fines, negative credit report ratings, and other

penalties and consequences.

132. Redflex has attempted to interfere with Mr. Grant’s

right to access the courts in the following ways:

• Attempting to coerce Mr. Grant into paying the Citation by

representing the legality of procedures that violate

California statutory law and legislative policy.


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• Attempting to coerce Mr. Grant into paying the Citation immediately and without contest by threatening to impose late fees of 10-25% per month, plus interest. (See Ex. B, § 6.9.)

• Attempting to coerce Mr. Grant into paying the Citation

immediately and without contest by threatening to turn the

matter over to collections and claiming “that it could

result in a civil count against you.” (Ex. K.)

• Threatening to deny Mr. Grant the right to an

administrative hearing to contest the Citation unless he

paid the “civil penalty” sought by the Citation prior to

any adjudication of liability. (See Ex. E, p. 2. (“Failure

to pay the civil penalty in order to contest the civil

liability…will constitute an admission of liability and

will waive your right to contest the imposition of the

civil penalty.”).)

• Actually denying Mr. Grant the right to an administrative

hearing for failure to pay the $175 fine within the

proscribed 35 day period. (See Ex. H, n. 8.)

• Attempting to coerce Mr. Grant into paying the Citation by

unlawfully denying him the right to submit an affidavit of

non-liability pursuant to CVC § 40520. (See Ex. E, p. 2.)

The Citation issued by Redflex limits this right to rental

car agencies, which have the means to and will contest

every citation if they are not given the opportunity to

shift liability to the individual(s) who rented their

vehicles. Redflex denies this right to individual vehicle

owners such as Mr. Grant, whom the company counts on to

simply pay their fines without contest.

• Attempting to intimidate Mr. Grant into not contesting his

Citation by stacking the decks against him: teaching MRCA

park rangers “strategies for presenting Violations Data in

court and judicial proceedings,” (Ex. C, “Exhibit B” at §

1.13; see id. at § 3.3.12,) “provid[ing] expert witnesses

for use by the [MRCA] in prosecuting Violations,” (Id. at §

3.3.11,) and “interact[ing] with court and judicial

personnel” to develop “a subpoena process timeline that

will permit the offering of Violations Data in court,” (Id.

at “Exhibit B,” § 1.14.)

• Attempting to coerce Mr. Grant into paying the Citation and foregoing any challenge to its legality by failing to include the “Warning” required by BPC § 913(a) in the Citation


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or any other correspondence Redflex sent to him on behalf of the MRCA. This notice would have informed Mr. Grant of his right to seek recourse in a court action.

133. Redflex undertook all of these actions in furtherance of the Photo Enforcement

Program’s overall purpose: to make the payment of citations easy while simultaneously

hindering the ability to dispute them. It has attempted to threaten, intimidate and coerce Mr.

Grant into paying his Citation by interfering with his right to access the courts pursuant to Article

I, Section 3 of the California State Constitution.

134. As a result, Mr. Grant respectfully requests that

this Court enter an Order: (1) finding Redflex in violation of

California Civil Code § 52.1; and (2) enjoining Redflex from the

continued operation of the Photo Enforcement Program; and (3)


has incurred in bringing this lawsuit pursuant to California

Civil Code § 52.1(h); and (4) finding that Mr. Grant is not

legally responsible for the $175.00 fine to which Defendants


PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Mr. Grant prays for judgment and relief on all

Causes of Action as follows:

1. A declaratory judgment finding that Mr. Grant is not

legally responsible for the $175.00 fine to which Defendants

believe they are due;

2. A temporary, preliminary and/or permanent order (a)

enjoining Defendants from the continued enforcement of the Photo


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Enforcement Program; and (b) enjoining the above-described

wrongful acts and practices of Defendants;

3. Mr. Grant’s reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to,

inter alia, California Code of Civil Procedure, § 1021.5,

California Business & Professions Code § 17082, and California

Civil Code § 52.1(h);

4. Treble monetary damages according to proof pursuant to

California BPC § 17082 from Defendant Redflex;

5. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem

necessary and appropriate.

Dated: November 29, 2010 ------- Grant


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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR …€¦ · Complaint as Does 1 through 100,...

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