Summer 1999 -...

Summer 1999

Published by the JointTechnical Coordinating

Group on AircraftSurvivability (JTCG/AS)

Aircraft Survivability • Summer 19992

Aircraft Survivability is published by theJoint Technical Coordinating Group onAircraft Survivability (JTCG/AS). TheJ TCG/AS is chartered by the JointAeronautical Commanders Group.

V i e ws and comments are welcome and m ay be addressed to the Editor at the f o l l owing address.

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C over Design —Christina P. McNemarThe cover depicts the real threat posed byM A N PADS such as the SA-14 Gremlinagainst U.S. aircraft, including transports,fixed-wing and rotorcraft. Theaircraft shown are the Lockheed C-130H e r c u l e s, the McDonnel Douglas F-15E a g l e, and the AH-64 Apache helicopter.

ContentsAircraft Vulnerability to MANPADS Weapons 4by Mr.Ronald “ M u t z ”M u t ze l b u rg

Losing Low Altitude BattlespaceThe MANPADS Challenge 6by Rear A d m i ral Robert H.G o rm l ey, U. S .N avy (Ret)

EO/IR SAM’s—A Pilot’s Perspectiv e 8by Major Kevin Iiams, USMC

National MANPADS WorkshopA Vulnerability Perspectiv e 10by Mr.G reg Czarnecki

MANPADS Combat History 12by Mr.Kevin Cro s t h waite

Low Vulnerability Technologies Building a Balanced Approach 14by Mr.A n t h o ny Lizza and Mr.G reg Czarnecki

National MANPADS Workshop Addresses Three Key Topics 16by Mr.D ave Hall, M r.To ny Lizza, and Col. S t eve Cameron A rt i cles Compiled by Mr.D ave Legg

MANPADS Survivability Depends on Aircraft Design and Type 20by Mr. Jamie Childre s s , M r.R o b e rt To m a i n e and Mr.Michael Meye rs

Defense Acquisition Deskbook and Aerospace Systems Survivability 24by Mr.Hugh Dra ke and Mr.D ave Hall

Pioneers of SurvivabilityJames “Jim” Foulk 26by Mr. Je ff rey Foulk

Joint Live Fire Program Tests Full-Up Stinger Missile Against F-14 Tomcat 28by Mr.Thomas Julian

NDIA Combat Survivability Annual Awards 30by Mr.Dale Atkinson

Calendar of Events 31

DoD Photo by SRA Jeffrey Allen, 1ST Combat Camera Sq.

Aircraft Survivability • Summer 1999 3

Editor’s NotesImportant changes are taking place that affect the

J TCG/AS. On 7 June 99, the Secretary of Defense signedan action memorandum transferring, "key test and eva l-uation (T&E) functions" to OSD/DOT&E. Included inthe transfer were the JTCG/AS and the JTCG/ME. Thestated purpose was to streamline the T&E function and“strengthen the role of the DOT&E to support seriousT&E with a view toward operations early in the life cyc l eof a program.” OUSD(A&T) DTSE&E, which previouslyhad oversight of the JTCG/AS, was disestablished by thesame memorandum.

We’ve also recently experienced personnel changeson the Principal Member Steering Group, in our OSDsponsors’ offices and in the Central Office. Dr. StevenMesservy is the new Army Principal Member. Dr.Messervy is Project Manager of the $2.4M Tri-ServiceAdvanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures/CommonMissile Warning System Joint Program Office located atRedstone Arsenal, Alabama. Prior to assuming his cur-rent position, he served as chief of program manage-ment of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense(THAAD) missile project office. We welcome Dr.Messervy to the JTCG/AS.

Col Steve Cameron, OUSD(A&T)DTSE&E/SA, whoprovided outstanding support to the JTCG/AS, wasreassigned in June. His new assignment isCommandant of the Air Force Test Pilot School atE d wards AFB, CA. In addition, Dr. Al Ra i n i s,OUSD(A&T)DS&TS/AW, another strong supporter ofthe JTCG/AS, retired in June. Dr. Rainis plans to remainin Northern Virginia for a year. The JTCG/AS acknowl-edges the strong support and contributions made byboth Col Cameron and Dr. Rainis and wishes them suc-cess in their future endeavors.

In the Central Office, we welcome two additions tothe staff since our last newsletter. Navy Capt DaleStoehr is filling the Navy military officer position as acollateral duty. Capt Stoehr is assigned to the Naval AirSystems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland to codeAIR-4.10.7, Health of Naval Aviation (HONA) office. Inaddition, we are glad to welcome Ms. Phyllis Drum tothe staff as Administrative Assistant.

This issue of Aircraft Survivability is devoted to air-craft survivability against the Man Portable Air DefenseSystems (MANPADS) threat. The focus is on vulnera-

bility reduction—designing a more damagetolerant aircraft. We know that MANPADSare highly proliferated around the world,are relatively inexpensive, difficult to count-er, easy to use and highly lethal. The Missileand Space Intelligence Center calls MAN-PADS, “The Real Threat”. Survivability risksare influencing how and if aircraft areemployed in combat. Battlespace is lost.Avoiding the threat is always preferred,however, to complement threat avoidancetechniques, vulnerability reduction featuresdesigned into the aircraft offer a final line ofdefense. And history shows that MANPADShits are survivable.

The JTCG/AS will soon be publishing theresults of a study conducted at the request ofthe OUSD Office of the Deputy for AirWa r f a r e, Strategic and Tactical Sys t e m s(OUSD(A&T) S&TS/AW). The study focuseson aircraft vulnerability to MANPADS threatsand assesses combat and test data to deter-mine if aircraft survivability can be enhancedthrough improved vulnerability reductiondesign techniques. The articles in this issuewere derived from a MANPADS wo r k s h o pheld in December last year where vulnerabil-ity reduction techniques, methodologies andtest facilities were topics of concern. Theworkshop was a part of the study.

We commend the articles on this impor-tant subject to your reading and welcomeany feedback.

ingful fix can save the aircraft, why bother to mini-mize damage to an aircraft hit by a MANPADS mis-s i l e ?

C u r r e n t l y, we emphasize avoiding hits to the air-craft. We are pursuing susceptibility reduction in avariety of ways :

• Radio frequency (RF), infrared (IR) and acousticsignature reduction to minimize lock-on of themissile sys t e m

• Speed and super-agility to outpace a missile

• Standoff attack capability to minimize opportuni-ties for the threat system to engage the aircraft

• Countermeasures to spoof the in-flight missile.

These are great efforts: don’t stop! Howe ve r, what-e ver our smart folks do, other smart folks seek toundo. Maybe we can stay ahead of them, maybe not. Ifeel that we would be wise not to neglect vulnerabili-ty reduction, just in case our aircraft gets hit.

Working with the Deputy Director, Resources andRa n g e s, I asked the Joint Technical CoordinatingGroup on Aircraft Surviva b i l i t y ( J TCG/AS): What canbe done, in aircraft design or retrofit, to reduce thelethality of a striking IR missile?1 The corollary to thisquestion is, are current vulnerability reduction tech-

rather tired word puzzle bears thetheme of my article: If a tree limbcrashes in the center of a forest, andno living creatures are around, does

it make a sound? The answer depends on thedefinition of sound. The dictionary says :“sound (n) is the sensation perceived by thesense of hearing.” Clearly, according to thed i c t i o n a r y, the limb that crashes does notmake a sound, even though it would ifsomeone were listening.

If we are to meaningfully decrease the vul-nerability of manned aircraft against ManPortable Air Defense Systems (MANPA D S )we a p o n s, we have to make sure someone islistening, not just in the room when we talk.Oratory and zealotry—while sometimesn e e d e d — h ave been known to “turn off” thel i s t e n e r. The crash and boom are still there,but no meaningful results.

M A N PADS Threat to Manned Airc r a f tM A N PADS weapons are becoming the

threat of choice against aircraft, but the vul-nerability community has focused on bulletand fragment threats to aircraft since theSoutheast Asia (SEA) conflict—with goodr e a s o n :

• SEA losses were largely due to bulletsand fragments.

• M A N PADS testing facilities had not beend e ve l o p e d .

• Methodologies to handle the MANPA D Saircraft damage were inadequate.

• M A N PADS aircraft hits were perceived toequal aircraft kills.

The last bullet is perhaps the most impor-tant. If the threat is so lethal that no mean-

Aircraft Survivability Summer 19994

A i rcraft Vu l n e r a b i l i t yto MANPADS We a p o n s

by Mr. Ronald “Mutz” Mutzelburg

AAn A-10 Thunderbolt II and F-16 Fighting Falcon flyin formation. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt.Rose Reynolds.)

niques adequate, or are new ones needed given thelarge kinetic energy of the missile body, or some sy n-ergistic effect? The answers to these questions willprobably depend on the specifics of a given aircraft or,at least, on the class of aircraft—as requested in thetasking memorandum.

What Is a Solution?As always, the solution is probably more money

and people. We need new methodologies to assess air-craft MANPADS vulnerability, testing data to va l i d a t ethe models, and—perhaps most important—designguidelines so that the developer can “hear” what thecommunity is say i n g .

The environment for new programs—money andpeople—is v e r y h o s t i l e. Starting a new initiative is ve r ydifficult. If the community concludes, in answer to myq u e s t i o n s, that appropriate work must be done, thefunds will come only at the expense of stopping, ors l owing, something already under way. The affectedfunction probably has constituents. To overcome ther e s i s t a n c e, arguments will have to be strong.

How Should We Address the Pro b l e m ?The expert group convened by the JTCG/AS must

d e velop compelling—and concise—arguments toexpand MANPADS vulnerability reduction efforts, ifwarranted. The last phrase is important: What is thepotential payoff? Why should a resource sponsor care,g i ven his or her other needs in a very constrained envi-r o n m e n t ?

And we must be complete and fair! Options toreduce aircraft vulnerability seldom are without someside effect. The identification of vulnerability reduc-tion design or retrofit options should include the costsof exercising the options. This practice would help theuser make informed choices during the tradeoff analy-ses of cost as an independent va r i a b l e2 that accompa-ny a new design or major retrofit.

C o n c l u s i o nWe must make sure that our results can be commu-

nicated, and understood, by folks outside of the tech-nical vulnerability community. Assuming that thestudy now under way s t ro n g l y justifies more efforts toreduce aircraft MANPADS vulnerability, we mustpackage the results appropriately. The final product ofthe study must clearly say to nonspecialists—

• What is the benefit (roughly) of reducingaircraft MANPADS vulnerability

• What is the cost (roughly) to do this?

We can work together to make sure thatthe design process hears our (good!) story.We need buy-in from a variety of folks.P r ovide the good story, and I will walk thebriefing trail with you to increase the likeli-hood that the results are “sound.” ■

E n d n o t e s1 . Memorandum for Chairman, Principal

M e m b e r s, Joint Technical CoordinatingGroup on Aircraft Surviva b i l i t y, from DeputyD i r e c t o r, Air Wa r f a r e, February 11, 1998.

2 . USD(A&T) Memorandum, “Reducing LifeC ycle Costs for New and Fielded Sys t e m s, ”December 4, 1995.

About the AuthorM r. Mutzelburg received a B.S.I.E. from Wa y n eState University in 1968 and M.S. in Industrialand Systems Engineering from Ohio StateU n i v e rsity in 1974. He is currently the DeputyD i rector for Air Wa r fa re within the Office ofS t rategic and Tactical Systems, Under Secre t a r yof Defense for Acquisition & Te c h n o l o g y. As suchhe is responsible for acquisition oversight for theB-1, B-2, C-17, F-22, F-18, JSTA RS, numero u sair-to-air and air-to-ground weapons and numer-ous other aeronautical pro g ra m s. He may bereached at mutzelre @ a c q . o s d . m i l .

Aircraft Survivability Summer 1999 5

A USAF F-117A Nighthawk on it’s wayhome. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech Sgt.Jack Braden.)

air support, urgent priority strikes under cloud cove r,armed reconnaissance, helicopter operations? Thisprospect conflicts with the apparent trend, noted above,of ceding the battlespace, below say 15,000 feet, to thee n e my during the day. And it brings to mind questionsthat merit answe r s :

• Are our future aircraft to be wholly dependent fortheir combat survivability on hit avoidance measuressuch as low signatures, countermeasures, stand-offwe a p o n s, and smart tactics? Or should some or all bemade more damage-resistant in the event they are hitby enemy fire?

• Are vulnerability reduction features and technologiesbeing given appropriate consideration during thedesign of new combat aircraft?

• If damage resistance is not to be a design imperativeand we anticipate only stand-off attacks launchedfrom outside low altitude battlespace, are supersonicspeed and agility needed in future tactical fighters?Or should we buy lower cost, subsonic “a e r i a lt r u c k s,” in essence, long endurance platforms thatcarry big loads of stand-off we a p o n s, both air-to-airand air-to-surface?

• What is the impact of the seeming abandonment ofl ow altitude battlespace on the manned ve r s u sunmanned aircraft debate? Should unmanned pro-grams be accelerated?

• What are the prospects in future conflicts for theinherently slow, low-flying rotorcraft on which bothA r my and Marine Corps operational concepts areh e avily dependent? Can land forces be effective ifd aylight air operations, including troop lift, aresharply constrained by MANPADS and AAA? Are thet wo services facing up to this awesome challenge?

• And finally, will we continue to “own the night” atl ow altitudes? Is there any prospect that the now -

peration Allied Fo r c e, the NATO aircampaign against Yu g o s l avia, remind-ed us just how much operational con-cepts and employment of new

weapons technology have evo l ved since the1 9 91 Gulf Wa r. And also, how political con-straints on military commanders, combinedwith the anticipated lethality of an enemy ' sintegrated air defense system and large numbersof man-portable air defense systems (MAN-PADS), can dictate U.S. tactics and influenceo u t c o m e s.

The reality today seems to be that, absent apressing need to risk Vietnam-level aircraft attri-tion rates (1% in NE Sector) and attendant air-crew losses, we are electing to relinquish day-time air battlespace below 15,000 feet to anye n e my possessing a significant number ofM A N PADS and rapid fire AAA we a p o n s. Thiswas certainly so during Operation Allied Fo r c e.W hy? Because low altitude operations were notseen as essential to achieving mission successand, more importantly, support for the bomb-ing by the public in Europe and the U.S. wo u l dlikely have eroded sharply had we lost three orso aircraft a day, even for a brief period.

Fo r t u n a t e l y, laser and satellite (GPS)-guidedweapons enabled our strike aircraft to remain athigher altitudes and still deal very effective l ywith fixed targets, subject, in the case of laser-guided we a p o n s, to constraints imposed bycloud cove r. On the other hand, attacks againstmobile units and armed reconnaissance patrolsseeking targets of opportunity were limited, aswere operations of Apache attack helicopters.Only the A- 10, an old, but nevertheless robust,l ow-vulnerability design, was said to be suitablefor flight at lower altitudes during day l i g h th o u r s.

But what about situations where operationsin MANPA D S / A A A-protected low altitude bat-tlespace cannot be avoided or, indeed, may bemandated during a critical engagement—close


Losing Low Altitude BattlespaceThe MANPADS Challenge

by Rear Ad m i ral Robert H. Gormley, U.S. Navy (Re t )

O

ubiquitous daylight MANPADS threat may spread tothe night hours?

A n s wers to these and related questions turn on whatcan be done about the MANPADS threat and how it wille vo l ve. Avoiding a missile hit is clearly the preferablec o u r s e, but the solution here is proving to be costly andtechnically challenging. So, it makes sense to explorewhat might be done to improve the survivability of air-craft hit by MANPADS missiles. In this regard, the limit-ed combat and test data available suggest that a hit doesnot always equate to a kill, but that the outcome is heav-ily contingent on the type of aircraft and its design. Here,the A- 10 and F/A-18 at the top, and the AV-8B at the bot-tom, are examples at opposite ends of the fixed-wing vul-nerability scale.

The Combat Survivability Division of the NationalDefense Industrial Association (NDIA) has long main-tained a position that both susceptibility reduction (hitavoidance) and vulnerability reduction (damage resist-ance/tolerance) merit equal consideration during formu-lation of operational requirements and subsequent air-craft design and development. Re c e n t l y, in response toworries of some association members about what theyp e r c e i ve as a general lessening of appreciation for vulner-ability reduction, the Division's Executive Board commis-sioned a study to inquire into the matter. This study hasbeen completed and its findings will be forwarded toG overnment officials later this ye a r.

NDIA has, for some time, been concerned about theincreasing MANPADS threat. For this reason, we arepleased to note, and strongly support, the current DoD-directed MANPADS project being conducted by the JointTechnical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Surviva b i l i t y,which is looking at how vulnerability of an aircraft to aM A N PADS missile hit might be reduced. And to giveadded emphasis to this crucial subject, NDIA's surviv-ability symposium program in the year 2000 will focuson the theme of combat air operations in low altitudeb a t t l e s p a c e.

In summary, the MANPADS challenge is about battle-space—both using it and losing it! Clearly, the threat isserious and has already begun to degrade tactical flexibil-ity and the overall combat effectiveness of U.S. air andland forces. Erosion of low altitude battlespace must bearrested and lost space restored. Ye s, this challenge isindeed formidable, but it is one that must be met. ■


RADM Gormley at recent symposium. He isChairman of NDIA's Combat SurvivabilityDivision and may be reached at 650-854-8155.

exploit these systems and to enhance the survivabilityof the aircraft and aircrew. Whereas our aircrew per-ception of radar SAM engagement is based primarilyon electronic radar warning receivers, our perceptionof the EO/IR SAM is based mainly on the visual spec-trum. As pilots we use our eyes, or our wingman’s eyes,and situational awareness to determine our engage-ment status. Since current EO/IR systems provide lit-t l e, if any, warning of engagement, it is paramount forthe aircrew members to be visually aware of their envi-ronment and critical for them to acquire any threats ofthis type. Visual acquisition combined with a compre-h e n s i ve knowledge of the threat will allow the aircrewto accurately assess the status of a threat missile inflight and determine the appropriate response. This,h owe ve r, can be an almost impossible task at times,g i ven the growing competition inside the cockpit forthe pilot’s attention.

Tactics against the EO/IR SAMthreat vary based on type of aircraftand its capabilities but generallyfall into one of three categories:avo i d a n c e, maneuve r, or counter-m e a s u r e / e x p e n d a b l e s. Each ofthese categories can be furtherdivided into preemptive and reac-t i ve tactics. Re a c t i ve tactics aremeasures taken by the aircrew todefeat a system that is in flight.These tactics have mixed success.Although a timely response to anacquired threat is typically success-ful, we know from statistics that itis the unseen shot that will be thefatal one. You can’t react to whatyou don’t see, and with cockpit

tasking growing with each new heads down we a p o nor subsystem, aircrews are seeing less and less of whatis outside the cockpit. That is where preemptive tac-tics—tactics designed to prevent weapon employ m e n tor possibly defeat an engaged system—come intop l ay. For those critical portions of the flight in whichthe aircrew are heavily tasked, and thus more likely to

s a tactical pilot, I have changed myview over the years of the EO/IR SAMfrom seeing it as a planning nuisanceto seeing it as a formidable, reputable

threat. Early versions of the weapon sys t e mwere few in number and did not possess thekinematics or the IRCCM capability to engagea modern fighter attack aircraft. This situationobviously changed, as the EO/IR SAM’s capa-bilities grew and the demand for this inexpen-s i ve yet highly effective form of air defensecaused dramatic increases in production andproliferation. From an attack pilot standpoint,the EO/IR SAM has become, to quote theEO/IR SAM division at DIA/MSIC, “The Re a lThreat.”

An aircrew’s perception of the threat andtheir response to it are based on the efforts to


EO/IR SAMs—A Pilot’s Perspectiveby Major Kevin Iiams, USMC

A

Combat loaded F/A-18 Hornet from StrikeFighter Squadron Nine Four (VFA-94). Theaircraft carries AIM-9 Sidewinder shor trange, and AIM-7 Spar row medium rangeair-to-air missiles, and one laser guidedbomb. (U.S. Navy Photo by LieutenantSteve Lightstone.)

miss a visual acquisition, preemptive tactics provide ameasure of protection.

Without a doubt the EO/IR SAM is an extremelypotent weapon system. So why would supposedly intel-ligent aviators purposely expose themselves to thisthreat? Well, if we don’t have to, we won’t. Howe ve r, forthe majority of the missions that tactical bombing plat-forms perform (close air support and armed reconnais-sance), we are likely to be forced into aportion of the threat enve l o p e. This isinevitable for a number of reasons.When employing ordnance in closeproximity to friendlies, or in anu n k n own target environment, targetacquisition is vital. But given the limitsof the human eye, aircrew cannot expectto detect and acquire tactical sized tar-gets beyond about 2 nautical miles(12,000 feet). Target recognition willoccur at even shorter ranges. Thus, itwould be necessary to get closer to thetarget than safety concerns alone wo u l dd i c t a t e. In addition, the professionalismof aircrews, not to mention real world rules of engage-ment (ROE), don’t tolerate much error or risk of“friendly fire” casualties. So, aircrews will do what ittakes to kill the bad guys and not our Marines and sol-d i e r s. That may mean aircrew members must risk theaircraft and their lives by going into the threat enve l o p ;if so, it’s time to earn the flight pay.

This commitment to the mission is all that mucheasier to sustain when the aircrew feel that the majori-

ty of the risk to self and aircraft has been mit-igated, and that aircrew performance is theonly remaining factor. Against the EO/IRSAM threat, aircrews count on detailedexploitation and system knowledge of thethreat to develop viable preemptive and reac-tive tactics. We also depend on the robust sur-vivability engineering of our aircraft since weknow that we will be engaged, that the likeli-hood of seeing every SAM will be small, andthat we will take hits. ■

About the AuthorMajor Iiams, USMC is head of the F/A-18Division of Marine Aviation Weapons and TacticsSquadron One at MCAS Yuma, Arizona, and isthe EO/IR SAM and AAA Instructor. Major Iiamsgraduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with aB.S. in General Engineering. He has flown 2300flight hours in the F/A-18, F-5, and training air-craft. He is credited with 41 combat missions inthe F/A-18 during Desert Storm, and sustainedcombat damage due to EO/IR SAM. He may bereached at [email protected].

Editor’s Note: Major Iiams has recentlybeen reassigned and is attending professionalmilitary education in residence.


Battle damaged F/A-18. This aircraft flew250 nm to home base and was returned toservice in under 48 hours.

Post flight assessment of EO/IR SAM damage duringDesert Storm.

2A MANPADS hit does not equal a kill. For militaryand commercial aircraft, the probabilities of a kill

given a hit (PK/H) are 51 percent and 70 percent, respec-tively. Given hits, most kills result from subsystem vul-nerabilities.

3M A N PADS survivability lessons learned fromDesert Storm include:

• Fly at night and at very high altitudes

• Keep flight control hydraulics away from likely hitlocations

• Separate fuel systems from likely hit locations

• Incorporate fluid shutoff mechanisms in the aftportions of engines

• Use extended nozzles.

4Helicopters have a more difficult time avoidingdetection and outmaneuvering the MANPA D S

threat than do fighter aircraft. Pilots must fly at lowaltitudes to identify targets and successfully completetheir mission with substantial certainty. Of all factors,the engine's location and critical subsystems redun-dancy in current aircraft designs influence survivabilitythe most. Single engine aircraft can be made survivableif vulnerability reduction features are incorporatedearly in the design stage.

5MANPADS weapons offer an economical means ofdestroying high-value targets, making them the

weapon of choice in Third World countries and terror-ist organizations. Terrorists armed with MANPADS rep-resent the number 1 threat to transport aircraft. Largesignatures (visual and IR), slow speed, and lack ofmaneuverability, make transport aircraft easy MAN-PADS targets. Vulnerability reduction features areneeded to enhance survivability.

he National MANPADS Workshopwas held 15–17 December 1998 atthe Redstone Arsenal, Alabama tobring the nation's talents to bear on

a i r c r a f t - M A N PADS (Man Portable AirDefense System) vulnerability issues. Theworkshop was cohosted by the JointTechnical Coordinating Group on AircraftS u r v i vability (JTCG/AS) and the DefenseIntelligence Agency's Missile and SpaceIntelligence Center (MSIC). Workshop objec-tives were to: 1) gather and exchange infor-mation concerning aircraft-MANPA D Sencounters, 2) compile a roadmap of currentMANPADS vulnerability reduction activities,and 3) identify MANPADS-capable vulnera-bility reduction solutions.

D r. Patricia Sanders, OUSD(A&T)DTSE&E, presented the keynote address.Among the workshop highlights were presen-tations by three Desert Storm pilots whoseaircraft were hit by MANPADS missiles. Eachdiscussed their low altitude operations(required for target identification) and theexperience of being hit without wa r n i n g .Throughout the 3-day workshop, governmentand industry speakers described MANPADSproliferation and lethality, susceptibilityreduction limitations, and the need to incor-porate a rational measure of vulnerabilityreduction into aircraft designs. Briefing topicsand breakout sessions concentrated on vul-nerability reduction techniques, assessmentmethodologies, and test facility capabilities.Whatever the subject, discussions throughoutthe workshop emphasized the follow i n gcommon messages:

1MANPADS threats are lethal and haveproliferated worldwide in large numbers.

This shoulder-launched weapon system rep-resents the most prolific SAM threat to mod-ern aircraft.


National MANPADS WorkshopA Vulnerability Perspective

by Mr. Greg Czarnecki

T

6Participants in the vulnerability reduction tech-niques breakout session called for expanded test

databases and improved assessment methodologies tosupport development of many MANPADS-capable fea-tures. In addition, they said vulnerability reductiontechniques required input from the susceptibilityreduction community to ensure attainment of optimalsurvivability without detracting from stealth or coun-termeasures. They emphasized that all proposed MAN-PADS-capable vulnerability reduction techniquesoffered the prospect of improved aircraft survivabilitythrough implementation of currently available tech-nologies. Examples included:

• Incorporating sacrificial nozzles and structure

• Locating IR sources in less vulnerable areas

• Locating flight control systems away from IRsources

• Hardening or shielding critical componentsaround IR sources

• Thermally managing engines (having outboardengines run hotter than inboard engines)

• Thermally managing IR sources to direct seekers tothe least vulnerable location

• Using material systems that reduce the probabili-ty of a fuse functioning as intended

• Increasing the engine's compressor stall marginbefore missile impact

• Decreasing vulnerabilities associated with ram,fire, and explosion

• Developing engine rotors capable of rebalancingafter sustaining damage

• Developing fail-safe structure.

7Participants in the vulnerability assessmentmethodologies session added they needed an

enhanced MANPADS test database to support develop-ment of improved assessment methodologies. They


reported that models were incapable of pre-dicting surface-to-air missile hit locations andcalled for specific improvements in target IRsignature models and threat-in-the-loop soft-ware. They stressed that modeling require-ments need to drive tests performed and datacollected. Participants in the vulnerability testfacilities and capabilities session stated thatcurrent MANPADS test facilities were general-ly adequate and no major investments wererequired. They noted exceptions relative toshotline control and handling of large, trans-port-sized aircraft as targets.

In summary, MANPADS have become ahighly proliferated and lethal threat to alltypes of aircraft. Countermeasures are diffi-cult to achieve and may not keep up with thisevolving threat. The prospect of MANPADShits has curtailed battlespace, particularly ford aytime and low altitude operations.Nevertheless, all aircraft (even stealth andhighfliers) remain susceptible to MANPADSpositioned near airfields. To remedy this situ-ation and improve overall surviva b i l i t y,M A N PADS-capable vulnerability reductionfeatures must be integrated into aircraftdesigns along with countermeasures.Designing in a proper mix of susceptibilityreduction and vulnerability reduction fea-tures, will ensure aircraft an optimal level ofsurvivability at the lowest possible cost. ■

About the AuthorM r. Czarnecki received his B.S. in CivilEngineering and his M.S. in MaterialsEngineering from the University of Dayton. He isa civilian with the Air Force Research LaboratoryAir Vehicles Directorate, Survivability & SafetyBranch. Mr. Czarnecki specializes in Aircraft sur-vivability, concentrating on impact physics ofcomposites, projectile-induced hydrodynamic ram,and aircraft vulnerability reduction to the MAN-PADS shoulder-launched missile threat. He is amember of the JTCG/AS Vulnerability ReductionSubgroup and Chairman of that organization'sStructures & Materials Committee. He may bereached at [email protected].

A f g h a n i s t a n — In 1979, the Soviets inva d e dAfghanistan with several airborne and armored divi-s i o n s, and were soon able to establish a local puppet gov-ernment. Howe ve r, a guerrilla war with nativeMujahideen could not be won quickly in the roughmountainous countrys i d e, despite superior Soviet air-p owe r.

In 1986, modern MANPADS (Blowpipe and Stinger)were supplied to the Afghan rebels, and it was reportedthat 340 Stingers shot down 269 aircraft. Although theS oviets employed IR jammers, engine exhaust suppres-s o r s, and flares, the MANPADS threat greatly influencedS oviet tactics. For example, TU-16 and SU-24 bomberpilots had become accustomed to delivering their ord-nance from relatively low altitudes of 2,000 to 4,000 feet.Considering the new MANPADS threat, pilots began tofly at about 10,000 feet, decreasing their accuracy.L i k e w i s e, the Mi24 and Mi25 pilots engaged in directcombat less often, and when they did, they flew low andfast over their targets. Also, to avoid the low-altitude dan-ger posed by MANPADS, Soviet pilots began makinghigh-gradient climbs at takeoff to reach safe flight leve l sq u i c k l y. Although combat losses dropped by using thesenew takeoff procedures, accident rates rose.

Desert Storm— In 1991, U.S. air power was usedd e c i s i vely against Iraq. Aircraft were sent on a wide va r i-ety of missions, and overall aircraft losses were much lessthan expected. Figure 1 shows a breakdown by threat ofall aircraft damaged in combat and also the subset ofthese aircraft that were lost.

It is obvious that IR SAMS killed the most aircraft.When the relative probability of kills given a hit is plot-

he first MANPADS, the U.S. Re d e ye,became operational in 1967. The Sov i e tS A-7 followed in 1968. Both we a p o n srelied on IR tracking, a small warhead, and

contact fuzing and were employed by teams oft wo soldiers. MANPADS quickly became a suc-cessful new class of air defense threats.

Incident HighlightsS o u t h east Asia (SEA)— Allied operations

in SEA relied heavily on air powe r, and the U.S.lost thousands of aircraft of all types. The pri-mary threats were small arms, AAA, and RFSAMS. In 1972, as U.S. invo l vement wa n e d ,S A-7 MANPADS were introduced as a newthreat. SA-7s hit and damaged 26 U.S. aircraft,killing 20. Only three of the 26 aircraft we r ej e t s, which gave rise to the theory that SA- 7 scould engage only slow - m oving targets. As acountermeasure against the MANPADS threat,U.S. Forces deployed flares, both preemptive l yand after seeing SA-7 rocket plumes. The flaresworked effectively against early MANPA D S ;h owe ve r, later versions of the SA-7 used asmokeless propellant, which made the flaremethod less effective.

Yom Kippur— In 1973, Egypt and Syriaattacked Israel. The Israelis quickly launcheda counterattack, but were repelled with heavylosses. Eighteen days later, the Israelis pre-vailed. MANPADS caused only a small por-tion of the Israeli losses in the Yom Kippurwar. MANPADS were not a dominant factorin this conflict because of a simple but effec-t i ve countermeasure. The Israelis correctlydetermined that their primary ground attackaircraft, the A4, was the most susceptible toSA-7 attacks. Their simple fix was to attach atailpipe extension on the A4, which effective-ly moved the likely SA-7 impact point awayfrom the single engine and other flight-criti-cal components in the aircraft’s tail.


M A N PA D S Combat Historyby Mr. Kevin Cro s t h w a i t e

TFigure 1. Desert Storm Damage by Threat

ted, the IR SAMS and RF SAMS stand out as the mostlethal threats encountered in Desert Storm.

O t her Conflicts— M A N PADS have also been usedin smaller conflicts. The British Blowpipe was creditedwith killing eight light attack Pucara aircraft during theFalklands wa r. MANPADS have been used against U.S.,French, and Israeli aircraft in Lebanon. They have beenused in Eriteria against Ethiopians, by Kurds againstTu r k e y, and by all sides in Bosnia. North Korea allegedlyused a MANPADS against a U.S. helicopter stray i n gacross the DMZ. Even during Urgent Fury in Grenada,where the U.S. held air supremacy, Stinger teams we r ed e p l oyed with the U.S. ground forces for additional airdefense protection.

C i v i l — In November 1975, a MANPADS wa slaunched at and damaged a Skyvan aircraft over Angola;this was the first recorded engagement of a civil aircraft.The most recent incident was the 10 October 1998 shootd own of a Boeing 727 in Congo. The intervening ye a r sh ave witnessed 34 such incidents. Twenty four of theseaircraft were lost, with more than 585 casualties. Most ofthese incidents occurred in hot war zones, and the air-craft were engaged in quasi-military missions, such as fly-ing in aid or supplies, evacuating civilians, or transport-ing troops.

These 34 incidents invo l ved many types of aircraft andM A N PADS. SA-7s were the most common we a p o n sused, but SA-16s and Stingers were also used. Controlledtests in the U.S. have shown that each of these MAN-PADS is fully capable of tracking and locking onto com-mercial aircraft at reasonable distances while they arelanding or taking off.

M A N PADS have not been used against commercialairline traffic, but this is a real possibility. It is difficult toestimate the tragic consequences that could result if acivil aircraft is shot down by MANPADS. To illustrate, on6 April 1994 an aircraft carrying the President of Rwa n d a

was shot down, killing all passengers. This actignited a genocidal civil war in which morethan 500,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus we r emassacred. Several thousand survivors becamer e f u g e e s. Such awful consequences are a realdanger of MANPA D S .

Combat Data AnalysisS U R V I AC has data on each MANPADS inci-

dent in SEA and Desert Storm, including air-craft type and serial number, date, time, loca-tion, aircraft speed, altitude, mission, andthreat engagement geometry. Attack aircraftand helicopters were most often engaged byM A N PADS during these conflicts because theirm i s s i o n s, such as close support and air inter-diction, brought them to lower altitudes.Because the type of aircraft that perform suchmissions face the greatest risk of attack byM A N PADS, these aircraft should be the focusof vulnerability reduction efforts.

As Figure 2 shows, MANPADS attacksoccurred predominately during the day,although the systems are not technically limit-ed to daytime use. In fact, the IR seeker shouldwork best at night, given the greater contrastb e t ween a hot target and a cool background.

The limitation, therefore, appears to stemfrom the MANPADS teams’ inability to seetheir targets at night. In comparing day andnight attacks across all threat types duringDesert Storm, the aversion to night operationswas peculiar to MANPADS. One reason mightbe that the MANPADS teams were disbursedand isolated, often with only a radio for com-mand and control and early warning. Theseteams also usually acquire their targets by eye-sight, and usually do not have night vision gog-g l e s. Increasing availability of night visiondevices could significantly enhance MANPA D Snight operations. Howe ve r, improved sys t e m -wide command and control and early wa r n i n gmight still be necessary for the these teams toreach full effective n e s s.

To determine the frequency of MANPA D Se n g a g e m e n t s, it is important to follow theaction on the battlefield. In the early phase ofan air campaign, missions can be well planned


Figure 2. Day vs. Night MANPADS Incidents.

c o n t i nued on page 2 5


awareness and timely knowledge of the inbound threat.Ad vanced guidance systems make the MANPADS threatextremely difficult to detect, allowing virtually no timefor the pilot to react. In fact, Desert Storm events demon-strated that most often a pilot’s first indication of beingtargeted occurred after the aircraft was hit. In addition,a d vanced missile seekers may detect aircraft oncethought “invisible” to these sys t e m s.

Tactical mis-sion doctrinealready dictatesthat combatoperations arebest conductedat night—on thepremise that “ifyou can be seen,you can be hit.”D aytime “battlespace” is therefore being relinquished because evo l v i n gthreats pose unacceptable risks. Extending well above10,000 feet, the present threat enve l o p e, MANPA D Sthreats have forced air operations to ever-higher altitudes,and made weather and clouds an increasing factor inmission planning. Moreove r, regardless of the threatavoidance measure, aircraft of all types remain highlysusceptible to these portable, shoulder-launched, heat-seeking threats during takeoffs and landings.

The Need for Low Vulnerability Te c h n o l o g yIncreasing proliferation and lethality of MANPADS

and growing concern that existing susceptibility reduc-tion techniques alone may not provide adequate pro-tection raise the question, “What LV features couldenhance aircraft survivability and regain battle space?”

LV techniques and designs can provide a necessaryline of protection and contribute immensely to ove r a l ls u r v i vability of aircraft of all types. Unfortunately, beforethese life saving technologies can be considered, the LVcommunity must overcome two false perceptions: 1) ahit equals a kill, and 2) nothing can lower aircraft vul-n e r a b i l i t y. Many events prove that aircraft can and do sur-v i ve MANPADS hits. LV technologies and design features

eal world experiences highlight theimportance of aircraft surviva b i l i t y. The5,000+ U.S. fixed and rotary wing air-craft lost during Vietnam made it clear

that survivability had not always been give nsufficient emphasis—especially during design.

In the years since Vietnam, the JTCG/ASand others have made significant progress indeveloping a host of technologies, from firedetection and suppression to ballistic-toler-ant structures. Most of these low vulnerabili-ty (LV) technologies have focused on design-ing aircraft to survive hits from AAA and sin-gle missile-fragment threats.

Over the same period, the introduction ofstealth technology turned the survivabilitycommunity’s attention toward the benefit ofsusceptibility reduction (i.e., low observables[LO] and countermeasures [CM]). These rev-olutionary technologies, so clearly demon-strated in Desert Storm, have made it possiblefor LO aircraft to go virtually undetected dur-ing combat operations, significantly reducingthe likelihood of hits from RF-guided threats.

M A N PADS Thre a tYet today, a host of emerging missile threats

present new and significant challenges to cur-rent aircraft designs. Among them, the MAN-PADS threatens not only combat aircraft (fight-ers/bombers/helicopters), but also vital militaryt r a n s p o r t s, tankers, and command-and-controlassets traditionally thought to operate out ofh a r m ’s way. MANPADS are a hit-to-kill threatthat has now proliferated wo r l d w i d e. MAN-PADS ready availability to all comers with cashin hand increases the survivability challenge.Peacetime survival capabilities are becoming asimportant as those required in wa r.

Avoiding the threat through the use of sig-nature reduction, CM, and tactics is the pre-ferred solution. No pilot wants to get hit! Still,t o d ay ’s CMs depend heavily on situational

Low Vulnerability Te c h n o l o g i e sBuilding a Balanced Appro a c h

by Mr. Anthony Lizza and Mr. Greg Czarnecki

Desert Storm AV-8B loss due to MANPADS

R


often contributed critically to a damaged aircraft’s suc-cessful return.

Determining which onboard LV features lend them-s e l ves to aircraft survival after a hit requires full under-standing of the threat. Hit-to-kill MANPADS we a p o n sdiffer greatly from bullet and single missile fragments—and the community has yet to fully characterize the dif-f e r e n c e s.

Compared with AAA, MANPADS delivers perhaps 20times the explosive charge weight and orders-of-magni-tude more mass. Combined with the large variety ofM A N PADS missile types and fuses ava i l a b l e, these factorsmake it extremely difficult to predict potential damage—a critical component in developing LV technologies.

S e c o n d l y, the community must analyze which“zones” (structural, fuel system, propulsion, flight sys-t e m s, etc.) are most prone to failure by aircraft type(transport, tactical, rotary) and mission (first strike, airs u p e r i o r i t y, and CAS).

Desert Storm results provide the opportunity to learnl e s s o n s, because some aircraft designs proved less vulner-able than others. What built-in LV techniques preve n t e dlosses? Which features were lacking in aircraft that we r elost? This analysis may be simplified by the historicallyhigh probability of MANPADS strikes at specific hot-spotl o c a t i o n s. Because most fielded MANPADS we a p o n sincorporate older technologies, the LV communityshould concentrate its attention on and around the com-mon hit locations. Knowledge of likely hit locations mayreduce the need for full LV protection of the entire aircraft.

H owe ve r, as improved seekers are developed, theyincrease the randomness of hit locations. M o r e ove r, thecommunity cannot ignore future threats. D i r e c t e de n e r g y, once tomorrow ’s threat, is already being used insome applications. As its use evo l ve s, and new threatse m e r g e, the community must not limit its view simply toimmediate issues.

S u m m a ryA combination of susceptibility reduction

and LV features optimizes surviva b i l i t y.Susceptibility reduction features reduce thenumber of potential hits and remain an essen-tial element of aircraft defense. But even if sus-ceptibility reduction techniques work perfectly,hits will still occur. LV features plug holes in theprimary defense and prevent hits from beingk i l l s. LV provides a necessary second line ofd e f e n s e, and remains viable as threats evo l ve.The mix of aircraft survivability features is not50 : 50. It depends on aircraft type and mission.Achieving the proper mix requires a candidassessment of each feature’s measure of effec-t i ve n e s s, coupled with its cost, weight, andoperational penalties. ■

About the AuthorsM r. Anthony Lizza is a graduate of the NationalDefense Univers i t y ’s Industrial College of theArmed Fo rc e s, the University of Dayton and Purd u eU n i v e rsity Schools of Engineering. He has over 18y e a rs experience in airc raft survivability and safetyrelated re s e a rch. He currently serves as tri-serviceChairman of the JTCG/AS Vu l n e rability Re d u c t i o nS u b g roup. He has authored numerous technicalpublications and been an invited speaker for a vari-ety of S/V related cours e s, symposiums, and confer-e n c e s. He may be reached at [email protected].

M r. Czarnecki received his B.S. in CivilEngineering and his M.S. in Materials Engineeringf rom the University of Dayton. He is a civilian withthe AFRL Air Vehicles Dire c t o ra t e, Survivability &Safety Branch. Mr. Czarnecki specializes in Airc ra f ts u r v i v a b i l i t y, concentrating on impact physics ofc o m p o s i t e s, projectile-induced hydrodynamic ra m ,and airc raft vulnerability reduction to the MAN-PADS shoulder-launched missile threat. He is amember of the JTCG/AS Vu l n e rability Re d u c t i o nS u b g roup and Chairman of that org a n i z a t i o n ' sS t r u c t u res & Materials Committee. He may bereached at gre g o r y. c z a r n e c k i @ v a . w p a f b. a f . m i l

Desert Storm F/A-18 survives MANPADS hit.


in one area of the aircraft may have little or no effect ifthe aircraft is hit elsewhere.

To determine hit point accuracy in modelingengagement dynamics, several issues need attention.Target signature models do not typically have thefidelity required to determine where the missile is like-ly to hit; very few targets have been modeled as ani m a g e, as opposed to a point source. In addition, tar-get infrared (IR) signatures can vary considerably as afunction of environmental parameters, making it diffi-cult to predict where final impact of any given shotwill occur.

A n a l yses comparing the output of all-digital fly-outsimulations with actual flight test data have indicatedthat the terminal intercept velocities and angles pre-dicted by the models are relatively accurate, but themiss distances and impact points on the target usuallyare not. The threat Signal Processor in the Loop (SPIL)is a promising technique for predicting hit location forthese sys t e m s, and it should provide validation data toi m p r ove digital simulations. This technique has beens h own to predict accurate hit locations for U.S. IR-guided missile sys t e m s.

Target Vulnerability to MANP A D S —Lack ofsufficient historical MANPADS combat data is animpediment to determining exact MANPADS damagem e c h a n i s m s. Combat data also are inconclusive inaddressing the multi-engine versus single engine issue.

he National MANPADS Wo r k s h o pwas held 15–17 December 1998 atthe Sparkman Center, Re d s t o n eArsenal, Alabama. The wo r k s h o p

brought together more than 100 experts for atechnical exchange about how to make air-craft less vulnerable to Man Portable AirDefense System (MANPADS) threats. Threebreakout sessions addressed vulnerabilityassessment methodologies, vulnerabilityreduction techniques, and vulnerability testfacilities and capabilities. Dave Hall (NAW-CWD), To ny Lizza (AFRL) and Col. SteveCameron (OUSD [A&T]) respective l y,chaired the sessions. The sessions used openand active dialogue to promote this technicali n t e r c h a n g e.

M A N PADS Vulnerability AssessmentM e t h o d o l o g i e s

M r. Dave Hall

The MANPADS vulnerability assessmentbreakout session focused on two areas, oneon target engagement dynamics and theother on target vulnerability to MANPA D Sg i ven a hit. Both sessions included seve r a lbriefings and followup discussion to answe rthe questions posed in the workshop hand-o u t s. A notional roadmap was developed foreach of the two assessment areas.

Target Engagement Dynamics— T h epurpose of the engagement dynamics assess-ment session was to determine the capabilityto predict where MANPADS weapons arelikely to hit the target, as a function of launchc o n d i t i o n s, countermeasures employ m e n t ,and aircraft maneuve r s, given the environ-mental conditions at the time of launch. Thisassessment is critical to evaluating the effec-t i veness of vulnerability reduction featuresfor MANPADS hits, because what is effective

National MANPADS Workshop Addresses T h ree Key To p i c s

by Mr. Dave Hall, Mr. Tony Lizza, and Col. Steve Camero nArticles Compiled by Mr. Dave Legg

T

A-10 survives MANPADS hit and lives to fight again.


S U R V I AC conducted a literature search to identifyand evaluate previous MANPADS vulnerability assess-m e n t s. All assessments were conducted manually,using drawings and threat templates. A standardapproach to manual assessments is ava i l a b l e, and theM A N PADS project ongoing at SURVIAC is taking thatapproach to evaluate MANPADS threats to several air-c r a f t .

H owe ve r, MANPADS analysis techniques are onlyas good as the data available to support them. Inputsrequired for MANPADS vulnerability assessmentsinclude threat characterization data, damage data, andtest data to support model verification and va l i d a t i o n(V&V). Data for V&V activities include static anddynamic tests of actual aircraft structures and criticalc o m p o n e n t s. Dynamic shots are required to determinedamage mechanisms from the kinetic energy in themissile and evaluate combined warhead and kineticenergy effects. The shortage of test data required toconduct vulnerability analyses is critical.

U n a n s wered to date is the question of how accu-rate the hit point prediction must be for vulnerabilityassessment. If the choice of vulnerability reductiontechnique depends on precisely where the missileh i t s, then experts probably need to improve the accu-racy of engagement analys e s, as well as consider othermore robust vulnerability reduction techniques. Arequirements analysis needs to be done to determine,for a number of aircraft types, how sensitive vulnera-bility reduction effects are to the assumed hit point.Those studies could also contribute to deve l o p m e n tof “rules of thumb” to estimate vulnerability reduc-tion effective n e s s.

Ro a d m a p — Workshop participants proposed thef o l l owing projects:

• Perform a hit location prediction accuracy require-ments study, based on analysis of vulnerabilitysensitivity to variations in hit location and orien-tation, to determine what effect errors in hit loca-tion have on the assessed effectiveness of vulnera-bility reduction features.

• Use of the SPILs as they are developed to va l i d a t ethe digital MANPADS fly-out simulations for hitlocation prediction.

• L e verage ongoing activities under theAd vanced Joint Effectiveness Model(AJEM) project. Some work in the vul-nerability assessment methodology areais already partially funded, mostly as partof the AJEM-funded tasking. These effortsinclude improved penetration method-ologies and component response model-ing. Approximate milestones for interimcapabilities are available for viewing inthe National MANPADS Workshop: AVu l n e rability Pe rspective Pro c e e d i n g s,Volume I, pages 538–39.

• Conduct dynamic and static tests andd e velop an improved test database tosupport generation of input datarequired for MANPADS vulnerabilitya s s e s s m e n t s. This work includes deve l o p-ing data on fuse functioning and missiledebris characterization and effects.

M A N PADS Vulnerability ReductionTe c h n i q u e sM r. Tony Lizza

The session began with seve r a lG overnment and industry briefings on classicHEI/API projectile and conceptual MAN-PADS vulnerability reduction (VR) tech-n i q u e s. The following group discussionexplored what VR techniques had wo r k e d ,what other potential VR techniques existed,and, finally, what should be done to reducethe vulnerability of current and future aircraftto this lethal threat.

The group discussion identified additionaldata sources that might be available to helpaddress the MANPADS threat, known dam-age mechanisms and typical damage statescaused by MANPADS threats, and the certainkill areas on current aircraft from the MAN-PADS threat.

The group then looked at what built-invulnerability reduction techniques had pre-vented losses in combat. The principal exam-ple was extended nozzles like those on theF / A-18. In Desert Storm, at least four F/A- 1 8 s



Vulnerability Test Facilities and Capabilitiesfor MANPA D S

Col. Steve Camero n

The purpose of this session was to assess the practi-cability and affordability of MANPADS testing byreviewing the current DoD test and evaluation capabil-ities for MANPADS vulnerability testing. The groupbegan by summarizing the desired test conditions interms of engagement geometry, target realism, anddata expected to be required by the methodologygroup.

For realistic lethality, the group agreed that theMANPADS missile would require a live warhead, natu-ral fuzing, and a realistic missile/motor body. A realis-tic target would involve target orientation for normalforces (right side up), application of flight loads, air-flow, tactical loading of fuel and munitions, pressur-ization of the aircraft (most important for cargo air-craft), and, finally, a running aircraft.

Taking these considerations into account, the groupdetermined that the most important items in conduct-ing MANPADS vulnerability testing were geometry,velocity, blast location, warhead function, and testasset recovery. The group noted that the last factorexplained why actual live firings of missiles at flyingaircraft, although important demonstrations, were notthe optimum method for vulnerability testing. Controlof shot lines and recovery of the test asset were para-mount, participants emphasized, for gathering thedata necessary to construct vulnerability models.

The group placed aircraft configuration at the nextlevel of importance, with pressurization being more

that were hit by MANPADS returned to base.Most returned to battle after engine replace-ment and relatively minor repair wo r k .G e n e r a l l y, the group agreed that current VRt e c h n i q u e s, although designed to HEI dam-age effects, had demonstrated some effective-ness against MANPADS threats. A majorityargued that two engines would be better thanone; howe ve r, the group also agreed that asingle engine aircraft could survive a MAN-PADS hit if the hit point on the engineexhaust were well aft of any flight-criticals u b sys t e m s. Other VR techniques believed toh ave potential were also identified.

The session identified the need for MAN-PADS threat performance characterizationdata; data on static and dynamic MANPA D Stest on actual aircraft; data on current vulner-ability reduction technique performanceagainst MANPADS; a low-cost, repeatableM A N PADS test technique; and models thatcan assess MANPADS vulnerability reductiont e c h n i q u e s. These were deemed essential tosupport vulnerability reduction techniqued e velopment and eva l u a t i o n .

Ro a d m a p — Workshop participants pro-posed the following projects:

• L e verage ongoing activities under the F-16 Joint Live Fire (JLF) Program andother ongoing test programs

• Undertake a MANPADS JLF Program toassess in detail the vulnerability of cur-rent fleet aircraft

• Perform MANPADS Vu l n e r a b i l i t yReduction, Phase I, testing to assess thee f f e c t i veness of vulnerability reductiontechniques developed as a result of theM A N PADS Characterization Te s t i n g ,M A N PADS JLF, and other related testing

• Perform MANPADS Vu l n e r a b i l i t yReduction, Phase II, testing to refinetechniques or develop additional tech-n i q u e s.

c o n t i nued from page 1 7

Every F/A-18 that was hit by a MANPADS survivedand was returned to combat in short order .


important for civil aircraft and munitions loadingmore important for military aircraft. Of lesser impor-tance were air flow, especially for slow-flying aircraftsuch as helicopters, g-loading, and the choice of a mis-sile that was the actual threat or a surrogate.

One surprise occurred in discussion of data collec-tion requirements. Participants noted the need for thestandard information required for vulnerability modeldesign and verification. In addition, a member of thelaw enforcement community pointed out that infor-mation gathered from test sites could aid in the foren-sic efforts to investigate future terrorist uses of MAN-PADS. Not only might this information help locate theperpetrator; it might also allow determination of theexact missile used, leading to use of the data to validatevulnerability models.

The group concluded that DoD facilities had sub-stantial capability to conduct MANPADS testing, andonly relatively minor investment, depending on themethodology required, might be needed to increasecapability.

Roadmap—Workshop participants proposed thefollowing projects:

• Some sled track durability enhancements might berequired if a large number of shots is necessary andfacilities might require modification if more thanjust sections of large aircraft must be used.

• Also, if the magnetic induction gun at China Lakeis used instead of a sled track, gun modificationwould be required to impart fewer g’s to the threatmissile.

• Development and procurement of surrogate mis-siles would be required if a large number of shotsis required, and airflow facilities would requiresome upgrades for fast-moving targets.

In summary, the breakout sessions accomplishedthe chief objective of the National MANPA D SWorkshop by promoting the open and active technicaldialogue necessary to develop cost-effective vulnerabil-ity reduction techniques for the MANPADS threat. ■

About the AuthorsM r. Hall has 30 years experience in missile ordnance systemdesign analysis, weapons systems re q u i rements definition,mission effectiveness analysis, survivability analysis, technical

c o n t ract monitoring and model and simulation ver-ification, validation and accreditation (VV&A).Dave is currently Chief Analyst and Head of theAnalysis Branch of the NAWCWD SurvivabilityDivision; Co-Director of the Joint Ac c re d i t a t i o nSupport Activity (JA SA); Chairman of theMethodology Subgroup in the JTCG/AS; andChairman of the NAWCWD Science andTechnology Network for Analysis Re s o u rc e s. Hemay be reached at halldh@navair. n a v y. m i l .

M r. Anthony Lizza is a graduate of the NationalDefense Univers i t y ’s Industrial College of theArmed Fo rc e s, the University of Dayton andP u rdue University Schools of Engineering. He hasover 18 years experience in airc raft survivabilityand safety related re s e a rch. He currently serves astri-service Chairman of the JTCG/AS Vu l n e ra b i l i t yReduction Subgroup. He has authored numero u stechnical publications and been an invited speakerfor a variety of survivability/vulnerability re l a t e dc o u rs e s, symposiums, and confere n c e s. He may bereached at [email protected].

Col Cameron has served as an experimental testpilot on several programs, most notably the B-2bomber program, and various staff positions dur-ing two previous tours at the Pentagon. As thePrincipal Assistant for Systems As s e s s m e n t ,OUSD(A&T) he provided financial and techni-cal oversight of the JTCG/AS and ME, develop-mental test oversight of the 207 major programson the OSD Test and Evaluation Oversight list,and oversight of the Joint Test and EvaluationProgram. He may be reached at [email protected]. Editor’s Note: Col Cameron hasbeen re-assigned to the Air Force Test Pilot Schoolat Edwards AFB, CA. OUSD(A&T)DTSE&E/SAwas disestablished on 7 June 99.

M r. Legg has 16 years of experience in airc raft sur-vivability re q u i rements definition and missioneffectiveness analysis. He is currently a SeniorEngineer with the SURVICE EngineeringCompany supporting ground and air system surviv-ability evaluations. Dave is also a member of theAIAA Survivability Technical Committee. He maybe reached at dave@survice. c o m


Transport Signature Makes Them an Easy Target • E n g i n e s – Transports have large engines, which

p r ovide a correspondingly large thermal signatureto IR MANPADS seekers operating in both the 3 to5 micron and 8 to 12 micron IR bands. The ther-mal signature of transports is generally more thansufficient to allow targeting of the aircraft we l lb e yond the kinematic range of the missile.

• N avigation Lights– N avigation lights are excel-lent IR emitters and can prove very attractive toM A N PADS from certain angles.

• Local Hot Spots– Transports may have air condi-tioning or auxiliary power units that operate forthe duration of the flight, creating additional IRsignature sources.

• Visual Signature– The large size of transportsmakes them much easier to acquire visually thansmall fighter jets. This large visual signature allowstransports to be tracked and targeted beyond themaximum range of most MANPADS.

Tactical Employment of Transports MakesAvoiding MANPADS Difficult

• Speed and Maneuv e r i n g – The limited maneu-vering capability and subsonic speed of transport

bility to survive attack by the MAN-PADS varies greatly, depending on thetype of aircraft and its design features.H e r e, three authors—Jamie Childress,

Robert To m a i n e, and Michael Meye r s — e x a m-ine the MANPADS survivability of large trans-p o r t s, rotorcraft, and fighters, respective l y.

L a rge Tr a n s p o rt Survivability Againstthe MANPADS Thre a t

M r. Jamie Childre s sBoeing Phantom Wo r k s

S e a t t l e, WA

“ For the airc rews of large military transport air-c raft, the thought of being shot down by a shoul-d e r - f i red, heat-seeking missile while flying at low

altitude is probably their worst nightmare. ”Armed Forces Journal International, October 1996

Transports have been the targets of MAN-PADS missile attacks in the past, and many ofthose encounters resulted in the loss of theaircraft. Of the thirty-four confirmed attacksby MANPADS on civilian transports betwe e n1975 and 1998, twenty-four resulted in theloss of the aircraft and its passengers.1 This isin contrast to four MANPADS hits on F/A- 1 8 sin the Gulf Wa r, without the loss of a singlea i r c r a f t .2 If we were to use only this data tod e r i ve the MANPADS Probability of Kill give na Hit (PK / H) of both transports and moderntwin engine fighter aircraft, we would con-clude that unprotected transports had a PK / H

of 0.7 and twin engine fighters a PK / H of zero.This example shows that transport aircraft aremore vulnerable to MANPADS hits than twinengine fighters.

The military needs to consider the surviv-ability of all transport aircraft, even those notintended for frontline combat. The follow i n glist identifies some of the issues inherent inM A N PADS survivability of transport aircraft.

M A N PADS Surv i v a b i l i t yDepends on Aircraft Design and Ty p e

by Mr. Jamie Childre s s, Mr. Robert To m a i n eand Mr. Michael Meyers

A

Figure 1. The C-130 Hercules is the prime transpor tfor paradropping troops and equipment into hostileareas. (Photo by Tech. Sgt. Howard Blair.)


aircraft provide a very simple firing solution and ahigh probability of intercept for most MANPADSengagements.

• Airport Operations– The time of greatest riskfrom a MANPADS attack is during departure orarrival at an airport. The transport is low, slow, andmay be flying on a known schedule. A number ofterrorist and rebel MANPADS attacks on transportshave been launched from uncontrolled civilianareas around airports.

Transport Structures Ha ve Limited Redundancy• Wings–Transport wings are generally two spar

wings and are not capable of sustaining flight afterthe loss of a spar. A MANPADS impact near a sparcould cause severe damage from direct blast orhydrodynamic ram pressures.

• F u s e l a g e – M a ny transports are pressurized.Testing has shown that even the relatively smallwarhead of a MANPADS can cause catastrophicdamage to a pressurized hull, resulting in the com-plete rupture of the fuselage. Fortunately, thiseffect is greatly reduced at lower altitudes whereMANPADS encounters are most probable.

Systems Separation and Fire Suppression areKey to Transport Survivability

• Engine Redundancy and Separation–Multiple engines with wide separation make theloss of all aircraft propulsion an unlikely eventfrom a single MANPADS hit. However, this posi-tive survivability feature has limited value if anuncontrolled fire or catastrophic structural/systemdamage ensues from an engine hit.

• Flight Control R e d u n d a n c y – M u l t i p l ehydraulic systems and flight controls prov i d eimproved survivability. However, many non-front-line transports do not have sufficient hydraulic sys-tem separation to prevent catastrophic flight con-trol loss if a critical area is hit.

• Fire and Explosion Suppression– The two pri-mary kill mechanisms of a MANPADS hit ontransports are ullage explosion and fire. Mosttransports have very limited fire suppression sys-tems. A sustained fire would ultimately result ineither loss of critical systems or structural failure.Non-frontline transports do not have ullage inert -ing systems. An ullage explosion initiated by a

fragment or high explosive blast wouldmost likely result in an instantaneousstructural kill of the aircraft.

Countermeasures on Transports areLimited or Non-Existent

• Warning Systems– Few transports carrymissile launch warning detectors. MAN-PADS missile launches are difficult todetect from the air, especially from thetarget aircraft. In the Gulf Wa r, onlyabout 10 percent of the combat pilots hitby MANPADS were aware that they wereunder attack or that a missile had beenlaunched.

• IR Counter Measures (IRCM)– Flaresand other active IRCM systems are onlycarried on frontline transports or highvalue aircraft. When IRCM is available, itis often used proactively, by dispensingflares in a preset schedule during landingor takeoff.

Transports have not traditionally receive dthe attention to vulnerability hardening com-pared to tactical aircraft. Hardening transportaircraft against MANPADS attacks is no simpletask and must be weighed against the aircraftmission, cost, and weight implications of mores u r v i vable sys t e m s. Howe ve r, the proliferationof these lethal weapons to all corners of theworld necessitates that we recognize militarytransport vulnerabilities. Warfare is changingfrom the entrenched battlefields of our past, tothe remote and vague battle-lines of futurec o n f l i c t s. If we can’t protect our transports wem ay never get to the wa r.

E n d n o t e s1. Crosthwaite, Kevin, “Combat History” in

National MANPADS Workshop: A VulnerabilityPerspective Proceedings, Vol. I, December15–17, 1999, Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville,AL.

2. Meyers, Michael, “Fighter MANPADS Issues”in National MANPADS Workshop: AVulnerability Perspective Proceedings, Vol. II,December 15–17, 1999, Redstone Arsenal,Huntsville, AL.


twin engines, run-dry drive sys t e m s, and ballisticallytolerant main rotor actuators are examples of the bal-listic tolerance design for the Comanche. These sys t e m sare examined and tested against specific threat caliberwe a p o n s. Analysis and testing against MANPADS wa r-heads is seldom performed. It is logical to assume thatthese measures will provide at least limited protectionagainst MANPADS hits. Historically, analysis and wa rgaming exercises seldom attempt to account for thisprotection. In terms of analys i s, modeling and designfor survivability of modern Army helicopters againstM A N PADS threats, several questions remain. Howe f f e c t i ve are classical ballistic vulnerability reductiontechniques against MANPADS warheads? Given strictweight and cost constraints, are there feasible addition-al/unique vulnerability features? Do potential vulnera-bility reduction approaches provide equal/greater sur-v i vability than susceptability reduction featurese m p l oyed in today ’s designs?

Tactical Aircraft Surv i v a b i l i t yAgainst the MANPADS Thre a t

M r. Michael MeyersTechnical Fe l l o w

The Boeing CompanySt. Louis, MO

F / A-18 experience in Desert Storm provides va l u a b l einformation for assessing fighter aircraft vulnerabilityto MANPADS. Additional information is ava i l a b l efrom F/A-18 joint live fire (JLF) tests conducted about1 9 90 at China Lake, California. Combining these datap r ovides insight into the vulnerability of fighter aircraftand helps identify potential vulnerability reductionc o n c e p t s.

R o t o rcraft Survivability Against theM A N PADS Thre a tM r. Robert To m a i n e

Air Vehicle Technical ManagerComanche Pro g ram Managers Office

Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL

U.S. Army Aviation doctrine calls for Nap-of-the-Earth (NOE) operation for all helicop-ter assets. In addition, Army Aviation mis-sions of close troop support, armed recon-naissance and attack of ground forces andground vehicles are therefore normally con-ducted near or within hostile territory.Therefore Army helicopters have a high prob-ability of encountering MANPADS threats.Design philosophy for helicopter survival inthis environment is to avoid detection andengagement by providing susceptibilityreduction, and ballistic tolerance consistentwith the primary threat and consideringweight constraints similar to any aircraft, andas a last resort provide crew survival withc r a s h worthiness even if the aircraft does nots u r v i ve. The Army ’s next generation helicop-t e r, the RAH-66 Comanche utilizes this designp h i l o s o p hy with an unparalleled emphasison susceptibility reduction. This includes sig-nificant signature reduction in RF, IR,acoustics and visual signatures. Combinedwith an advanced technology target acquisi-tion system and much improved situationalawa r e n e s s, the signature reduction prov i d e sstandoff capability that generally allowsengagement of threats before Comanche canbe detected.

Ballistic tolerance for Army helicopters isdirected primarily at the high density individ-ual small arms and threat vehicles with arma-ment ranging from 7.62mm up to 30 m m .Individual crew protection, parasitic armorfor crew and flight critical components, fuelinerting sys t e m s, fire detection and suppres-sant sys t e m s, design redundancies and struc-tural sizing to withstand ballistic hits are com-mon means of providing ballistic tolerancefor these ve h i c l e s. Triple redundant fly by wireflight control system, physically separated


Boeing-Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche Ar m e dReconnaissance Helicopter

In Desert Storm, four Marine F/A-18s were hit byM A N PA D s, and all returned to base safely. All impactswere in the engine bay, on or near the “turkey feathers”of the exhaust section. One aircraft with severe damageto both engines’ exhaust sections was able to fly 125miles to a recovery base. Two of the aircraft lost onee n g i n e, demonstrating the survivability of a twin-engine design. By contrast, four single-engine AV- 8 Baircraft were hit, and all four were lost .

The F/A-18 JLF tests of statically detonated MAN-PADS warheads showed that aircraft subsystems we r ethe most vulnerable components. Since then, F/A- 1 8s u b systems have been designed to meet vulnerabilityrequirements for countering high explosive incendiaryt h r e a t s. The design separates fuel tanks, flight controls,and hydraulics from the engine bays. Engine design fea-tures can also improve survivability against MANPA D S .

Exhaust nozzle fuel lines can be shut off by using leakdetection systems that minimize the fuel feeding a fire.This system is being employed in the F/A-18E/F design.

Countermeasures that bias MANPADS impacts to avertical tail or outer wing can greatly improve the sur-v i vability of single- or twin-engine fighter aircraft. Areview of F/A-18 midair incidents showed that one ofthe two vertical tails or a complete outer wing couldbe severed without affecting get-home and landingc a p a b i l i t y.

A n a l ysis of Desert Storm incidents and JLF testss h ows that the F/A-18 twin-engine design is highly sur-v i vable against the MANPADS threat. Single-engine air-


This F/A-18 Hornet was damaged by a SAM in thePersian Gulf.

craft may also be able to survive, given a hit,but to a lesser extent. ■

About the AuthorsM r. Childress received his B.S. in Ae ro s p a c eEngineering from University of Colorado, Boulder.The Boeing pro g rams he has supported include theA-6, F/A-18, AV-8B, and V-22. In addition he hasalso supported pro g rams with the AT F, F-22, JSF,A-X, Decoupled Fuel Cells, CompositeA f fo rdability Initiative, IR&D, Muzzle Blast,Advanced Composite Armor, Nitrogen InflatedBallistic Bladder, z-pinned skin fusing, and vari-ous classified pro g ra m s. He may be reached atJ a m e s. C h i l d ress@PSS. Boeing.com.

M r. Tomaine received his B.S. in Ae ro s p a c eEngineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute &State University and his M.S. in MechanicalEngineering from George Washington Univers i t y.He is currently Chief of the Air Vehicle Branch inthe Comanche Pro g ram Managers Office, PEOAviation, with technical and pro g ra m m a t i cresponsibility for the design and development ofthe Comanche airfra m e, rotor systems, flight con-t rol system, environmental control system, and alla i r f rame subsystems. He also has system re s p o n s i-bility for survivability including low observables,handling qualities, weight, flight performance andsystem safety. He may be reached att o m a i n e r @ c o m a n c h e. re d s t o n e. a r m y. m i l .

M r. Meyers has been a Boeing Company employ-ee for 37 years. He is currently leading the F/A-18E/F vulnerability team. He is responsible for thep ro g ram vulnerability assessments, trade studiesand live fire testing plans and reporting. Pre v i o u sa reas of responsibility included vulnerability andsurvivability evaluations on the A-12, F-15, F/A-18A/B as well as advanced design configura t i o n s.M r. Meyers is a member of the Ad v i s o r yCommittee for the Airc raft Vu l n e rability to MAN-PADS Study and is a Senior Advisor for the ADHOC Committee on Airc raft Vu l n e ra b i l i t y. Hemay be reached at michael.meyers @ b o e i n g . c o m .


Chapter 1 of the revision of the Surviva b i l i t yTextbook is almost completed and is available forreview on the Web ( w w w. a i r c r a f t - s u r v i va b i l i t y. c o m ).The entire 800-page second edition will be issuedboth as a compact disk and in hard copy [publishedby the American Institute of Aeronautics andAstronautics (AIAA)]. The intent is to “hot reference”sections of Chapter 1 in the Defense Ac q u i s i t i o nDeskbook. The full second edition of the textbook isplanned for completion by the end of 20 0 0 .

The Defense Acquisition Deskbook Survivability Section

The deskbook addresses what to do in a surviva b i l-ity program, the handbook series addresses how to doit, and the textbook addresses the entire surviva b i l i t yd i s c i p l i n e. The pertinent parts of the DefenseAcquisition Deskbook will provide hotlinks to theAerospace Systems Survivability Handbook Series andthe Survivability Textbook. These documents will beused by defense acquisition programs that need tod e velop survivability program plans for the centers,l a b o r a t o r i e s, and contractors responsible for aero-space systems survivability project management, engi-neering, analys i s, and test and evaluation. We willwork with the Acquisition Deskbook Joint ProgramOffice (JPO) to determine whether placing the hand-book series both in the deskbook's library and on theJ TCG/AS Web site ( h t t p : / / j t c g . j c t e. j c s. m i l : 9101 / ) is ane f f e c t i ve way to proceed.

The Handbook SeriesThe Aerospace Systems Survivability Handbook

series is designed to document the elements of the sur-vivability process, how they relate to other defenseacquisition activities, and how the associated surviv-ability activities are accomplished. It is being organ-ized from a pre-acquisition and program managementperspective. A work breakdown structure (WBS) formatwill be used for each technical volume in the series.

n fiscal year 1999, the JTCG/AS initiateda task updating the survivability sec-tions of the DoD Acquisition Deskbook( DAD) to address the needs of the Tr i -

Services and industry's survivability commu-n i t y. The existing survivability sections of theDAD are based on MIL-STD-2069, which hasnot been updated in 16 ye a r s.

A new approach was established that willp r ovide: 1) an update to the DAD, 2) anAerospace Systems Survivability handbooks e r i e s, and 3) the second edition ofDistinguished Professor Ball's Surviva b i l i t yTextbook (in progress). These products willoverlap somewhat, but they basically addressthe needs of different customers.

There has been some activity within theservices in the recent past on survivabilitystandards and handbooks. When acquisitionreform removed most military standardsfrom the inventory, there were no survivabili-ty industry standards for the DoD to fall backon, as there are in other functional areas.

The Survivability Te x t b o o kIn examining the relationship between the

DAD, the handbook series and the textbook,along with the role each would play inaddressing surviva b i l i t y, it was determinedthat three elements should be covered:

• Intellectual construct• Examples of design practices• S u r v i vability and the DoD acquisition

p r o c e s s

The handbook, in conjunction with amodification to the deskbook, will addressthe third element, walking the user throughthe bureaucratic maze to develop an effectives u r v i vability program. The textbook address-es the first two elements, the intellectual con-struct and examples of design practices.

Defense Acquisition Deskbook and Aerospace Systems Survivability

by Mr. Hugh Drake and Mr. Dave Hall

I


All activities and functions performed in aerospacesystems acquisition, including surviva b i l i t y, fall intoone of four major categories

1 . M a n a g e m e n t2 . E n g i n e e r i n g3 . Test and eva l u a t i o n4 . S ystems analys i s.

The handbook series will correlate the surviva b i l i t yprocess and its activities and functions with all ele-ments of defense acquisition.

P l a n sFY99—A version of the deskbook and handbook

will be drafted for community review by 30 October1999. This draft will have holes, but it will integrate rel-e vant portions of various existing materials, plus somenew material, into the WBS table of contents for thedeskbook. It will also have references to sections ofChapter 1 of Dr. Ball’s textbook. This will be a stand-alone version of the deskbook survivability section(2.6.6) for review.

FY00—Pertinent parts of the DAD will be updatedwith hotlinks to the Aerospace Survivability Handbookseries and the Survivability Textbook. The HandbookSeries will thoroughly document current surviva b i l i t yproject engineering, analys i s, and test processes andprocedures in a how to format and correlated withrelated acquisition processes and procedures. ■

About the AuthorsMr. Drake received his B.S. in Mathematics from CaliforniaState Polytechnic College (Cal Poly) in 1961. He is one ofthe recognized Pioneers of Survivability and is credited withplaying a major role in the establishment of the JTCG/ASand the Survivability Division at NAWCWPNS ChinaLake, CA. He retired from the NAWCWPNS in 1988 andis presently Vice President of ASI Systems International, awholly owned subsidiary of SRS Technologies. He may bereached at 760.375.1442.

Mr. Hall currently serves as Chief Analyst and Head of theAnalysis Branch of the NAWCWD Survivability Division;Co-Director of the Joint Accreditation Support Activity(JASA); Chairman of the Methodology Subgroup in theJTCG/AS; and Chairman of the NAWCWD Science andTechnology Network for Analysis Resources. He may bereached at [email protected].

MANPADS Combat History

and paced for surviva b i l i t y. In this phase,Desert Storm pilots operated at higher alti-tudes and at night to protect aircraft fromM A N PADS. As the ground war grew closer,the Allied forces began to “prep” the battle-field. Pilots were ordered to fly as low as nec-e s s a r y, increasing the risk. Finally, when the

ground war started, close air support offriendly troops was imperative. Figure 3s h ows the frequency of MANPADS engage-ments throughout Desert Storm.

M A N PADS were not a significant threatearly in the wa r, with an average of one dam-age incident every 3 days. This frequencyincreased to one every other day while thebattlefield was being prepared. During theground wa r, MANPADS incidents jumped toan average of 2.5 per day.

Fo r t u n a t e l y, Desert Storm saw so few com-bat incidents that no one type of aircraftr e c e i ved a statistically significant number ofh i t s. Although this lack of data makes it diffi-cult to calculate the relative survivability ofaircraft types, some observations can bed r awn from the success of the F/A-18 aircraft.Four F/A-18s were damaged by MANPA D S ,and all four landed safely, were repaired, andreturned to combat. The extended rear tailfeathers on the F/A-18 appear to move MAN-

c o n t i nued from page1 3


Figure 3. Operational Necessity’s Effecton MANPADS Incidents in Desert Stor m


set about finding practical solutions for the currentA r my fleet. Jim turned the BRL range facilities into adedicated proving ground for actual gunfire experimentswith operating helicopters and components under sci-entifically controlled conditions. Existing subsys t e mf l aws were demonstrated and diagnosed, and candidatesolutions were subjected to trial. The results, combinedwith threat-specific interpretations, formed a com-pelling case for practical, flight-weight vulnerabilityreduction (VR) in aircraft, using armor only as a lastresort.

Jim and his group, in collaboration with other Armys a f e t y / s u r v i vability activities, organized a relentless, suc-cessful effort to lobby the Army aviation specificationwriters and decision makers. At the same time, these pio-neers went to great lengths to show their results toindustry deve l o p e r s, traveling to their facilities to edu-cate their designers. Several unprecedented deve l o p-ments occurred: current fleet aircraft began to receive VRm o d i f i c a t i o n s, the industry assigned employees to VRi s s u e s, VR emerged as a recognized discipline andbecame a weighted evaluation factor in new aircraftc o m p e t i t i ve programs, and military and industry VRspecialists joined together into what is now a perma-nent, cooperative mode of operations.

M a ny innova t i ve ideas resulted from Jim’s 12 years ofaircraft vulnerability efforts working with other BRL sur-v i vability pioneers, such as Don Mow r e r, Walt Vikestad,Walt Thompson, and Branch Chief, Roland Bernier. Onekeypoint was the need for a vulnerability informationcenter that could sustain and expand on the good wo r kthat group accomplished in educating and helpingindustry to reduce aircraft vulnerability. This idea eve n-tually became Jim’s vision for a Surviva b i l i t y /Vulnerability Information Analysis Center.

In 1974 Jim moved to Stratford, CT, where he joinedthe Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United Te c h n o l o g i e sCorporation, as head of the Safety and Surviva b i l i t yProgram. In this position, he planned, directed, andcoordinated research on and development of sys t e ms a f e t y, detectability, threat avo i d a n c e, vulnerability, and

ne of several unheralded pioneers ofaircraft survivability is James Fo u l k .Jim is known today as president ofthe SURVICE Engineering Company,

which he founded 18 years ago to prov i d ea n a l ysis support to the surviva b i l i t y / v u l n e r a-bility community. Along the path that led toSURVICE, howe ve r, he contributed significant-ly to aircraft survivability evaluation, testingand design. Most notable was his influenceand leadership in developing the UH-60ABlack Hawk, still considered one of the mores u r v i vable helicopters in the fleet today.

Jim graduated from the University ofD e l aware in 1959 with a B.S. in MechanicalEngineering. After graduating, he moved toOhio and went to work for the Standard OilC o m p a ny, specializing in development andexperimental evaluation of fuels and lubri-cants for automotive applications. In 1962 hetook a job as an automotive engineer for theU.S. Army Materiel Test Directorate at theAberdeen Proving Ground, MD. There he con-ducted experimental tests of surface ve h i c l e sunder laboratory and field conditions, acquir-ing experience in propulsion, drive sys t e m s,and application of fuels and lubricants.

In 1963, one might say, Jim’s career in air-craft survivability began to take flight. Duringthat year he accepted a position with the U.S.A r my Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL),k n own today as the Army Research Laboratory(ARL). He spent the next 12 years immersed innumerous aircraft vulnerability projects withwhat is now the Experimental Design,Conduct & Analysis Branch of the Ballistics &NBC Division.

Early in this period, Jim and a small groupof coworkers collected and carefully studiedthe increasing volume of aircraft combat dam-age reported from Southeast Asia and urgently

Pioneers of SurvivabilityJames “Jim” Foulk

by Mr. Jeffrey Foulk

O


c r a s h worthiness technology.By 1976 he was promoted

to System EngineeringM a n a g e r, responsiblefor all UH-60 helicop-ter system engineeringa c t i v i t i e s — r e l i a b i l i t y,m a i n t a i n a b i l i t y, we i g h tcontrol, aerodynamics,

d y n a m i c s, acoustics,handling qualities, sur-

v i vability/ vulnerability,human factors, and sys t e m

s a f e t y. At Sikorsky, Jim’s leader-ship and innova t i ve design

approaches helped ensure that substantial vulnerabilityreductions and improved safety features were integratedinto the UH-60A Black Hawk helicopter.

In 1978 Jim moved to an aircraft survivability start upgroup at Science Applications, Inc., (SAI) inA l b u q u e r q u e, New Mexico. At SAI he set out to build avulnerability business. After serious marketing and con-stant travel, he recruited his former BRL boss, Ro l a n dB e r n i e r, and his own wife Nancy and established a smallvulnerability office in Bel Air, Maryland. During thist i m e, he performed various vulnerability studies for theA r my, antiship missile high energy laser weapon vulner-ability studies for the Nav y, combat damage analyses forthe Air Fo r c e, and a vulnerability study for Agusta, result-ing in innova t i ve VR design solutions for the A129attack helicopter. After 3 years at SAI, he decided to pur-sue the dream of his own vulnerability business.

In 1981 Jim and Nancy acquired the SAI office assets,m oved everything to their house, and started the SUR-VICE Engineering Company. The name resulted fromJ i m ’s continued vision of a Surviva b i l i t y / Vu l n e r a b i l i t yInformation Analysis Center (IAC), hence the “servicewith a U in it.” Jim’s vision persisted and with muchwork and coordination on the part of Jim, even at theexpense of his new business, SURVIAC was established,and awarded in 1984 to the team of Booz·Allen &Hamilton and SURVICE. In the years that followe d ,J i m ’s dedication and hard work in the field of aircrafts u r v i vability helped establish both a very successful IACand a survivability business at SURVICE.

Jim is most proud of bringing talented vulnerabilityexperts together with bright young engineers and ana-l ysts to allow them to grow and mature in the vulnera-

bility field. As a result, SURVICE now offersone of the most experienced group of aircrafts u r v i vability/vulnerability engineers and ana-l ysts found any w h e r e.

Throughout his career Jim has been a“behind the scenes” person, participating in anumber of professional societies, nationalcoordinating groups, joint working groups,and other organizations. He was one of thefounding members of the National DefenseIndustrial Association (NDIA) CombatS u r v i vability Division. His work on the UH-60A Black Hawk was instrumental inS i k o r s k y ’s earning the American HelicopterS o c i e t y ’s Grover E. Bell Award for outstandingcontributions to helicopter deve l o p m e n t .Without question, howe ve r, Jim’s most impor-tant reward is knowing that lives and aircraftm ay be saved as a result of his efforts toenhance aircraft surviva b i l i t y.

Jim and Nancy, married for 40 ye a r s, haveraised three children—Jeff, David, and Cindy.When not working, as occasionally happens,they spend time playing golf, talking aboutb u s i n e s s, and fixing up their home. The recentaddition of three grandchildren has also give nthem the opportunity to babysit occasionally.

During this period, Jim was responsible foranalytical and experimental studies in ballistics u r v i vability of aircraft and related studies forapplication to surface ve h i c l e s. He led effortsto develop design criteria to increase surviv-ability of aircraft sys t e m s, including engine,d r i ve, rotor, control, fuel, hydraulic, electrical,structural, and crew station. He was alsoresponsible for developing new and improve danalytical methodology for determining andpredicting aircraft surviva b i l i t y.

M a ny of the military aircraft seen operatingt o d ay, new or modernized, are endowed withat least a few tangible products with Jim andhis coworkers’ imprimatur. Some rely on liter-ally dozens of such VR measures to achieve thebattle toughness for which they are touted. ■

E d i t o r ’ s Note: Jim and Jeff are father andson, respective l y. Jeff is employed by SURVICEE n g i n e e r i n g .


he Director, Operational Test andE valuation (DOT & E ) - s p o n s o r e dJoint Live Fire (JLF) Program per-

formed a live fire test shot of a Stinger missileagainst a recently retired F-14 Tomcat onWe d n e s d ay, July 14, 1999. The test was the firstin a series of tests with complete aircraft toassess the vulnerability of our aircraft to shoul-

der-fired, man-portable missiles. The test wa sconducted by the Navy's Weapons Surviva b i l i t yL a b o r a t o r y, at the Naval Air Warfare Center,China Lake. The missile was shoulder-launched by Marine Corps personnel, flew freeflight, guided itself to the target, and detonatedon impact with the aft portion of a static F-14aircraft. Analys t s, who are developing model-ing and simulation capabilities for predictionand assessment of aircraft vulnerabilities toM a n - Portable Air Defense Systems (MAN-PADS), are evaluating the damage to the testa r t i c l e. Re p r e s e n t a t i ves from DOT&E, the serv-i c e s, and industry witnessed the test first-hand.

This test demonstrated that, by working as ateam, we have the ability to accomplish seve r a l

different objectives with one test. The U.S. Marine Corps'Third Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion, from CampPendleton, provided the fire team and basic Stinger mis-s i l e. For them, this test was a realistic training exercise—an example of one of the SECDEF themes, namely com-bining testing and training opportunities. It also served tod e velop test techniques for JLF, provided realistic lethali-ty data for the Stinger Program Office, and realistic datafor aircraft vulnerability assessment and future vulnera-bility reduction efforts.

The China Lake MANPADS program is just one of sev-eral closely coordinated activities currently underway inDoD to examine the MANPADS issue. The JTCG/AS, JLF,and the Services are sponsoring efforts in the area, andworking as a team to quantify the threat, and deve l o psusceptibility and vulnerability reduction approaches.Examples of this work include a JTCG/AS MANPA D Sstudy (see Editor’s Notes on page 3 and “A i r c r a f tVulnerability to MANPADS Weapons” on page 4), an AirForce Research Laboratory (AFRL) evaluation of thelethality of several threat weapons against US sys t e m s(with testing at the Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground),and JLF's evaluation of the F-16 vulnerabilities, which ismanaged at AFRL with testing at Eglin AFB's ChickenLittle Joint Program Office. By working as a team, thedata, resources, and lessons learned are shared by all thes e r v i c e s.

In addition to evaluations of aircraft and threat inter-a c t i o n s, work is underway to assess the best way to assurerealism in an investigation, yet retain the ability to collectpertinent threat and damage data. China Lake's We a p o n sS u r v i vability Laboratory (WSL) has been conducting free-flight autonomous guidance and detonation of actualweapons against complete aircraft. The WSL also deve l-oped and operates, as part of the DOT&E/LFT funded JLFProgram, the MIKES gun—the Missile Intercept KineticEnergy Simulator. MIKES is a gas gun, capable of launch-ing an entire missile, or just the warhead, at realisticvelocities and close ranges. This test technique is beingd e veloped to obtain impacts under controlled conditionsdescribed in terms of impact location, angle, and ve l o c i-t y. It also allows a stationary target aircraft to be operatingat combat powe r, while positioned in an airflow envi-

Joint Live Fire Program Tests Full-Up Stinger Missile Against F-14 To m c a t

by Mr. Thomas Julian

T

INCOMING! Stinger missile fired by USMarines of the Third Low Altitude AirDefense Battalion (Camp Pendleton, CA)homes in an F-14 Tomcat in a Joint Live Fir etest at the Naval Air W a rf a r e CenterWeapons Division, China Lake, CA.

ronment from China Lake's High-Velocity AirflowS ystem (HIVAS).

An Air Force MANPADS investigation, also sponsoredby JLF, invo l ves launching a MANPADS missile down asled track to evaluate (and develop the potential toreduce) threat effects on single engine aircraft. The F-16is being used for this evaluation, with targets salva g e dfrom crashed systems or retired aircraft from Dav i sMonthan AFB. AFRL's Survivability and Safety Branch atWright Patterson is managing the program, with testingperformed at a track facility operated by the 46th Te s tWing's Chicken Little Program Office at Eglin AFB.S e veral shots have been successfully launched against F-16 wings. This MAN-PADS rail launch methodh a s, howe ve r, highlighteda fuzing problem thatmust be solved prior torail launches againstcomplete F-16's. In freeflight testing, the ChickenLittle Office recently launched a Stinger missile at an F-16wing (another effort combining Stinger Program Officeo b j e c t i ves with those of the aircraft survivability enhance-ment community).

The Aberdeen Test Center (ATC), located at AberdeenP r oving Ground, also has a capability for conducting sledtrack tests. The ATC recently adapted its track to launchM A N PADS against aircraft. As part of AFRL's Air DefenseLethality Program, ATC is currently perfecting its method-ology for conducting launches of MANPADS missilesagainst transport and other large aircraft.

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) recently com-pleted a study, sponsored by DOT & E / L F T, to assess thebest way to conduct MANPADS testing. It addressed the


question: “What is the best launch method touse in order to collect realistic MANPADS vul-nerability data.” The study takes into accountcost, realism, target fidelity, attack angles, pay-load weight, etc. Early indications are that the“best” way may well be a combination of differ-ent approaches, depending on the program'so b j e c t i ve s, budget, and required realism.

A number of DoD elements are wo r k i n gtogether to assure our ongoing programs arec o m p l e m e n t a r y, sharing resources and data, toassess this threat to our aircraft, and come upwith ways to counter it. ■

About the AuthorMr. Julian is a staff action officer in the Live FireTesting office of the Office of the Secretary ofD e f e n s e, working for the Deputy Dire c t o r,O p e rational Test and Evaluation, Live FireTesting, Mr. Jim O’Bryon. Most his 20 yearcareer has been spent working on Live FirePrograms. The last 7 years he has worked in theOSD Live Fire office at the Pentagon. He waspreviously with Chicken Little Project Office atEglin AFB and also Aberdeen Proving Groundworking on vulnerability programs for the Army.He is primarily a Land Combat Systems expert,but has expanded his area of knowledge into bothfixed and rotary wing aircraft. He may be reachedat [email protected].

DIRECT HIT! Stinger missile warhead deto -nates after striking the F-14. The smokering came from the warhead detonation.Photographs by Danny Zurn.


he National Defense Industrial Association’s(NDIA) Combat Survivability Division recog-nizes superior achievement in the combat sur-

v i vability field through two annual awa r d s. The NDIA issoliciting nominations for these awa r d s, which will bepresented at the NDIA “Aircraft Survivability 1999:Challenges for the New Millennium” Symposium at theN aval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, onN ovember 16-18, 1999.

The awards cover the entire spectrum of surviva b i l i-t y, including susceptibility reduction, vulnerabilityreduction, and related modeling and simulation. TheCombat Survivability Division Awards Committeescreens candidates and recommends honorees to theE x e c u t i ve Board for final approval. The criteria for theawards are shown below.

S u r v i v ability Leadership Aw a r d . This award ispresented to an individual who has made major contri-butions to enhancing combat surviva b i l i t y. The individ-ual selected must have demonstrated outstanding lead-ership in furthering combat survivability overall or havep l ayed a significant role in a major aspect of surviva b i l i-ty design, program management, research and deve l o p-ment, modeling and simulation, test and eva l u a t i o n ,education, or the development of standards. This awa r dis based on demonstrated leadership of a continuingn a t u r e.

S u r v i v ability Technical Aw a r d . This award is pre-sented to an individual who has made a significanttechnical contribution to any aspect of surviva b i l i t y. Theaward will be presented for either a specific act or con-tribution, or for exceptional technical performance ove ra prolonged period. Individuals at any level of experi-ence are eligible for this awa r d .

Submission of Award Nominations— Awa r dnomination may be submitted by fax, mail, or via theAward Nomination Web page, located ath t t p : / / w w w. n d i a . o r g / e ve n t s / b r o c h u r e / 09 4 / 09 4 . h t m .Submit nominations by mail to Charles Wilkins, NDIAE vent #094, 2111 Wilson Blvd., Suite 400, Arlington, VA2 2 201 - 30 61, via the internet at the address above, via faxto 703.522.1885 or via E-mail to [email protected].

by Mr. Dale At k i n s o nNDIA Combat Survivability Division

Executive Board Member

TA I R C R A F TS U RV I VABILITY

1 9 9 9

Challenges forthe New

Millennium

Challenges forthe New

Millennium

A Symposium inMonterey, CA

16–18 November 1999For Information Call

730.522.1820

A I R C R A F TS U RV I VABILITY

1 9 9 9

http://www.ndia.org

Combat Surv i v a b i l i t yAnnual Aw a rd s


calendarof events13–15 — Washington, DCA e rospace Technology Exposition A FA Annual ConventionContact: 800.727.3337w w w. j s p a rg o . c o m / a f a / s t a rt . h t m

28–30 — Albuquerque, NMAIAA Space Technology Conf. & Expo.Contact: 703.264.7500w w w.vs.afrl.af.mil/AIAA/

5–7 — Albuquerque, NMAir Ta rgets and UAV sContact: [email protected]

26–28 — Fort Wo rth, TXDIME, ESAMS Users Group MeetingContact: 937.255.4840, Geri Bowling

7–10 — Arlington, VADTIC Annual Users Meeting and Training Confere n c eContact: 703.767.8236, Julia Foscue

16–18 — Montere y, CAA i rcraft Survivability 1999 SymposiumContact: [email protected]

30–2 Dec — Nellis AFB, NVAIR-TO-AIR MeetingContact: 937.255.4840, Geri Bowling

14–16 — Charlottesville, VARADGUNS, ALARM, BLUEMAX MeetingContact: 937.255.4840, Geri Bowling

937.431.2707, Mike Bennet

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

Information for inclusion in the Calendar ofEvents may be sent to:

SURVIAC Washington Satellite OfficeAttn: Christina McNemar3190 Fairview Park Drive, 9th FloorFalls Church, VA 22042

PHONE: 703.289.5464FAX: 703.289.5 4 6 7

PADS impacts away from flight-critical components. As avulnerability reduction technique, this design holdsp r o m i s e.

I m p l i c a t i o n sCombat history demonstrates that aircraft will be hit

by MANPADS, in spite of such vulnerability reductiontactics as flying high, flying at night, and using counter-m e a s u r e s. Operational necessity usually forces pilotsl ower and into daylight as a conflict progresses. Aircraftperforming critical missions during the Desert Stormground wa r, for instance, suffered the most from MAN-PADS attacks.

Although MANPADS are lethal, a hit does not equal akill. Some aircraft survive MANPADS hits; some, like theF / A-18, have survived very well. F/A-18s use featuresdesigned originally to improve their survivability againstn o n - M A N PADS threats, but these basic survivability fea-tures have also helped against MANPADS. A close exam-ination of these vulnerability reduction features shouldr e veal the techniques that will best limit MANPA D Sd a m a g e.

History also shows that MANPADS teams have tradi-tionally operated during daylight. As night vision devicesbecome more readily ava i l a b l e, MANPADS teams will nodoubt use them. U.S. Forces’ recent demonstrated prefer-ence for night operations will surely compel opponentsto improve their night operations. If these teams canoperate effectively day and night, MANPADS couldbecome even more effective against U.S. operations.

F i n a l l y, history shows that MANPADS can track, inter-cept, and bring down civil aircraft. This capability couldpresage a much wider MANPADS threat if these we a p o n sfall into the wrong hands. It seems likely, therefore, thatvulnerability reduction solutions might appeal to thelarge commercial market. Across the board, the light,c a p a b l e, economic MANPADS have proven to be a realthreat. ■

About the AuthorM r. Crosthwaite is director of the Survivability/Vu l n e ra b i l i t yI n formation Analysis Center (SURV I AC). He has worked ons e v e ral technical analyses and test pro g rams involving a widevariety of weapon systems. Mr. Crosthwaite has a M.S. innuclear physics from Ohio State and is a licensed pro f e s s i o n a le n g i n e e r. He serves on the ADPA Combat SurvivabilityDivision Executive Board and on the AIAA SurvivabilityTechnical Committee. He may be reached at 937.255.4840.

MANPADS Combat Historyc o n t i nued from page 2 5

COMMANDERNAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (4.1.8 J)47123 BUSE ROADPATUXENT RIVER, MD 20670-1547

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