Study Guide - LIMUN1!! Tableof&Contents& TableofContents&.....&1&

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Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)

Study Guide

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Table of Contents Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Welcome Letters .......................................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction to DISEC ................................................................................................................................. 3 Topic A: Re-‐negotiation, Expansion and Implementation of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) ................................................................................................................ 4

Topic B: Considering Solutions to the Security Risks of De Facto Independent Territories ......................................................................................................................................................................... 19

1 © London International Model United Nations 2015 LIMUN | Charity No. 1096197 www.limun.org.uk

Welcome Letters Hello! I’m Richard Haslam and I will be your Director of DISEC for this conference. Apparently

everyone knows that I am excited to be chairing LIMUN (and I am!) but what is really true is that I

look forward to seeing people as excited by MUN as I am. I am in my third year of my degree at the

University of Leeds, studying Classical Literature and Philosophy – which I hope demonstrates there

is no one “MUN degree”. Outside of MUN I’m a keen member of the Real Ale society – so I’m also

looking forward to the socials, inside of MUN I shall be easy to find due to my, ahem, colourful

waistcoats you shall be witness to during the conference. To experienced and first-‐timers alike,

from me and my Assistant Directors, I’ll see you soon!

Dear delegates, I’m Yuji Develle and it is my distinct pleasure to be your Assistant Director of DISEC

for this prestigious and internationally acclaimed conference. Tap yourselves all on the back

because getting through DISEC at LIMUN will be no small feat, especially with the two challenging

topics our team have prepared for you. I am a second year War Studies student at King’s College

London and have been through my 15th conference (10 of which were in DISEC). Having

represented Best Delegate in the UK and being President of KCL UNA, I am ready to answer any of

your questions regarding the specificities of the UK scene. Outside MUN, it is my firm belief that life

could not be the same without techno & house, champagne bubbles, and skiing. To all delegates…

See you soon!

Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears! No but in all honesty, I sincerely greet you all whom are

taking the time and effort to go through the fruits of our labour. I am Olaf Soff, the second Assistant

Director to this year’s DISEC at LIMUN. An unbelievable honor which has been bestowed upon me

and which I hope to fulfill in a noteworthy manner. I am currently a second year Bachelor student

of International Studies with a focus on Russia and Eurasia at the Leiden University Campus in The

Hague, which also happens to be my current city of residence. I am Dutch and I have lived in The

Netherlands all my life, which has lasted for over 20 years so far. I haven’t got as many fancy

achievements as my fellow directors, but after participating in 13 MUN conferences and having


organised two, I believe I can still be called experienced. What else can I say but: A guitar,

badminton, poetry and varied alcohol filled life is definitely working for me. I look forward to meet

all likeminded people and the not so likeminded equally and I trust we will have unforgettable and

forgettable memories the plenty!

Introduction to DISEC

The committee for Disarmament and International Security – DISEC, is the 1st committee of the

United Nations General Assembly. All 195 full member and full observer-‐status States are allowed

to attend and participate.

DISEC came into being with the creation of the UN, so first met shortly after the first UNGA session,

in January 1946 – with representatives of just 51 nations. To give you an idea of how long DISEC

have been confronting certain issues, their first ever resolution, adopted on the 24th January was to

form a commission on the issues raised by atomic energy.

DISEC possess a crucial mandate: to consider disarmament and international security issues across

the world, in order to ensure peace and the progress of disarmament. They will attempt to form

agreements between states on both these issues, in order to form consensus to confront those

issues on their mandate.

That they cover both disarmament and international security gives them quite a wide remit,

meaning the resolutions they construct can vary quite widely. Here are a few of the topics covered

in 2014: African Nuclear-‐Weapons-‐Free-‐Zone; measures to prevent terrorists acquiring weapons of

mass destruction; preventing an arms-‐race in outer space and…the convention on certain

conventional weapons.

Vital to consider once you start writing resolutions is that of Scope, remember at all times that

your resolutions are non-‐binding on member nations, ensuring you respect their sovereignty at all


times -‐ so you may demand or require other nations to act in any particular fashion. Instead clauses

must be non-‐binding (e.g. suggests or urges). Most notably concerning scope, you must stay within

the mandate of the committee – solving ecological problems is not for DISEC to confront.

This is even more prevalent with regard to the United Nations Security Council, the only UN body

that may interfere with a member State’s sovereignty to ensure international security, including the

deployment of peace-‐keepers and sanctions. As DISEC is the body with the most interaction with

the UNSC’s mandate, specific care must be taken not to interfere with their actions. If need be, the

committee may refer concerns over certain issues to the UNSC for them to consider.

DISEC is a beginner-‐level committee at LIMUN (though I know there will be many experienced

delegates amongst you), so I and my assistant-‐directors will always be happy to answer any

questions you may have for us, both before and during the conference.

With that, the ball is in your court, delegates…Good Luck


Topic A: Re-‐negotiation, Expansion and Implementation of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Summary of the CCW Below is a one line summary of each protocol and the amended article 1. A State must accept at

least two protocols to be counted as a ratifying member.1 (ref treaty)

Protocol I restricts weapons with non-‐detectable fragments (glass, plastic etc)

Protocol II restricts landmines and booby traps

Protocol III restricts incendiary weapons

Protocol IV restricts blinding laser weapons

Protocol V sets out requirements and guidelines for the clearance of “explosive remnants of

war,”

Amended Article 1 accepts that the protocols apply to internal, as well as international,

conflicts

Timeline

The following is a rough timeline for relevant events pertaining to the CCW. When two dates are

given, the former indicates the original formation of the treaty or annex, and the latter when the

altered form came into force.2 (ref UN CCW timeline page)

1900 – The initial Hague Convention, the first truly global attempt at standardising the laws of war

comes into force, including several prohibitions against certain types of weapons, both non-‐

conventional (poison gas) and conventional – such as bullets that expand or tumble on impact

(sometimes known casually, more recently, as “dum-‐dums”)3 (ref see source)


1991/1983 – The original CCW treaty was formed/created, establishing the first three protocols, of

which at least 2 were ratified by each country

1995/1998 – An adaptation of Protocol II (concerning landmines) was altered, and protocol IV,

concerning blinding laser weapons was added.

1997/1999 – The Ottowa treaty, or anti-‐personnel mine ban convention is formed, for the specific

purpose of eradicating the existence of all anti-‐personnel mines (it doesn’t mention other forms),

as well as the clearing of them from all countries.4 (ref see source)

2001/2004 – Additionally the scope of the treaty as a whole was altered, from purely being an

international treaty to also concerning conflicts that happen within the borders of a country.

2003/2006 -‐ Protocol V came into being, concerning the explosive fragments of war, to combat the

negative legacies of any armed conflict.

2008/2010 – The convention on cluster munitions is created, heavily by those States displeased

with the lack of progress on the topic elsewhere. The USA (amongst many other States) refused to

sign, and has also stated a refusal to even consider the topic unless it was considered as part of the

CCW.

2014 – An informal meeting on autonomous weapons occurs, to start consideration of additional

regulation of them, future annual meetings have also been arranged.

Current Situation

Included within is a consideration of the current status of the convention itself, the current

effectiveness of the convention, its problems and any region where the treaty is having a notable

effect.


There are currently 119 State parties to the treaty, which means that they have ratified at least two

protocols of the convention. The current signatory level is especially worthy of consideration.

Unlike almost every other arms reduction/limitation treaty, the CCW has not grown rapidly. It was

only when its first review conference was announced that it finally started to grow (at the time of

announcing it had only 29 signatories, and in three years grew to 56 by 1995) . However now, 2

decades on, it has only doubled that – the cluster munitions treaty is doing almost as well after just

six years. The Ottowa treaty has 162 parties. 5 (ref see ratified sources)

As such, gaining the support of the numerous non-‐signatories is a serious concern for the CCW. The

primary reasons for this seem to be a mix of reasons: some countries view it as a “defunct” treaty,

others have the view that other treaties they have signed (notably the Ottowa treaty) remove the

need to ratify the CCW and, more recently, many important NGOs push developing countries to

ratify certain treaties, but neglect the CCW. 6 (ref see excellent critique)

The CCW, however, does however possess one notable benefit, concerning signatories over other

arms treaties – every P5 member (UK, USA, PRC, Russia and France) has signed every protocol,

which is almost unheard of in other weapons treaties. Other military significant countries such as

Brazil and India have also signed, the primary non-‐signatories are smaller or developing countries.

As such, the most recent review conference in 2011 instituted a number of methods, with a

significant focus on the larger countries promoting the convention via their bi-‐lateral links. It is to

be debated whether this has proved successful, as only 4 members have joined since then.

The other facet of the convention’s nature – that of its actual protocols is more positive. The treaty

itself promotes its flexible nature, and it is well-‐suited to add additional protocols as technology

changes. There would appear to be two major changes currently being considered at this time.

The first is whether cluster munitions could be included into the convention – there is clearly

general support for the current treaty on it, and it would appear reasonable to include it in the


CCW. The support would also transfer (as was seen when the protocol V on landmines was bought

in), promoting both. Additionally, the USA has also shown a willingness to negotiate on the matter

(and encourage its allies) if added to the CCW.7 (ref cluster mines wiki, find true source)

The second is that of autonomous weaponry, an area just starting to be developed. At the moment

there is significant use of autonomous robotics in combat, but primarily for reconnaissance and

other non-‐directly hostile uses. Any robot carrying weapons is tele-‐operated, so does not kill

autonomously. However it is not unreasonable that the day where this occurs may come, and

perhaps not too far in the future (it is technically possible, though unwise, now). As such the CCW

has just started consideration over whether it should bring in additional protocols concerning

autonomous weaponry. If it does act, then it will have done so before their deployment in battle, as

was the case with blinding laser weapons (protocol IV).

Next to be considered is the effectiveness of the CCW, including breaches and compliance.

There have been and are some significant benefits of the CCW, with certain protocols proving much

more successful than others.

The most successful protocol has been protocol IV (on blinding laser weapons) – created before

their use in combat this addition has prevented these weapons from ever entering war, and in

doing so could be considered completely successful. The suggestion of its addition alone proved

valuable – its upcoming consideration at a review conference led to the consideration of a ban in

numerous countries. For example, nearly a hundred US congressmen argued for its ban, leading in a

complete U-‐turn in the US policy in the immediate run-‐up to the review session. With the backing

of the countries most capable of creating such weaponry, the ban has remained in force and

effective.

Also successful has been protocol I (banning weapons with non-‐detectable fragments), originally


added since it was feared that the US had used glass-‐filled shards in Vietnam, this later turned out

to be incorrect. However there seems to have been little violation of this – primarily believed to be

due to there being no military benefit of such a system. Some parties would like to see this protocol

extended to any fragmenting weapons, however this seems far less likely to gain common approval. 8(ref Flechette book)

Protocols II and V, on landmines and their consequences, have had mixed success, but are generally

less considered as part of the success of the CCW, or even its nature. With almost all countries

signing the Ottawa treaty aiming to ban the weapons outright, it is harder to measure the more

moderate requirements required under the CCW. Additionally, protocols II and V have the least

agreement of all States who have signed up to any of the CCW.

By far the area of most concern of the CCW is that of Protocol III – Incendiary weapons. This is

heavily due to the number of loopholes present in the full protocol. The main ones are: the number

of incendiary sources not considered so – light and smoke generating sources amongst them; the

ban against air-‐deployed use of weapons against forces amongst civilians (thereby implicitly

supporting use by surface means) and that authorizing non-‐directly hostile use (i.e. not aiming it at

the enemy).

These have led to a constant onslaught of acts either considered to be some to be a breach or true

breaches of the protocol. Incendiary weapons are known to have been used in Syria (which is not a

signatory) but also in Ukraine – where both Ukraine and Russia are full signatories (remember, the

signing by Ukraine binds any faction in internal-‐conflict to the same rules). Even Western forces

have come in for complaints over the last decade for use in Iraq and Afghanistan, primarily for

claims the US were using it as a weapon rather than for illumination as claimed. 9(ref memo on it

and independent newspaper)

The CCW signatories are well aware of the problem, demands by some countries and many NGOs

for removal of loopholes in protocol III were made before the 4th review session and since then, but


little direct improvement seems imminent, as many powerful signatories are against it. 10(ref memo

again)

One benefit of the protocol has been to fasten attention on countries that do overtly use incendiary

weapons, such as Israel (which has not signed protocol III), which in their most recent attack into

Gaza did not use their weapons, due to a mix of public and state disapproval.

Also of note, with the current situation, is that there is progress being made on a cluster munitions

protocol, a crucial aspect currently missing from the convention. 11(ref 4th review agenda)

Compliance

However, the current state of affairs concerning compliance is thus: in the 3rd review conference in

2006, a system of self-‐monitoring was set-‐up, with countries being required to submit reports on

the level of compliance within their country and armed forces.

This of course has received multiple complaints from both certain members and numerous other

external parties that there is no external compliance and monitoring group (as was suggested in the

1st and 2nd review conferences, but failed to gather sufficient support). (ref CCW compliance)12

Summaries of Past Resolutions

Previous resolutions on the CCW have come from the UN General Assembly, usually with no

dissenting votes. However these resolutions are quite similar in format, with a desire to expand

membership, number of protocols and occasionally a summary of the most recent meeting or

review conference. The best example of this would be the 2012 resolution.13 (ref 2012 resolution).

There are also resolutions that link tangentially to specific protocols of the CCW. The most relevant

work relating to the CCW (but not part of it) by the UN concerns that of landmines. 14 different

organisations work towards removing the risk posed by them towards civilians. There is a

comprehensive UN organized plan to help resolve the problem14 (ref mine plan).


Concerning actual resolutions on the matter, there is an annual GA resolution encouraging the

banning of landmines. The most recent resolution (68/30) calls for members to sign the Ottowa

treaty [n.b. The Chair does encourage you to read this treaty, it is a vital document to understand

the concerns remaining about landmines in the CCW], as well as humanitarian calls to aid those

affected by landmines and assistance in removal of landmines after conflict. No state voted against

and many who refuse to sign the treaty still vote in favour (in support of the humanitarian

clauses).15 (ref Landmine resolution) Of additional interest concerning resolutions is that many

Security Council resolutions (which are binding) concerning peace-‐keeping resolutions set out land-‐

mine clearing as a task to be carried out.

There are also annual meetings of the group of governmental experts (GGE) – reports on these are

only announced at each review conference, but the Secretary-‐General does give a summary of

what was discussed. 16(ref GGE 2011 meeting) These do vary somewhat more than the resolutions,

with there being no specific summary – they change depending on what is deemed to be of

consideration to the CCW. They also consider topics that will be discussed at the Review

conference, including for possible inclusion in the treaty, including a heavy prevalence on cluster

munitions at the moment, as well as, most recently, autonomous weaponry.

Bloc Positions

P5 – All permanent Security-‐Council members have signed every protocol in the CCW, and have at

least stated their desire for other members to sign it. The western members have encouraged

firmer diplomatic pressure on other States to sign it, as opposed to the PRC and the Russian

Federation. The USA, Russian Federation and China have all been accused by human rights groups

of using incendiary weapons in breach of either the letter or the spirit of the convention. The USA,

UK and France have all condemned their use, including in Syria, as well as general statements about

their use in the Crimean region/Ukraine civil war. The P5 would likely be willing to at least consider

adding weapons to the prohibited list, but may try and place exemptions into the official wording.

The USA, PRC and Russia would likely be against any stronger form of compliance monitoring


(although the USA has shown signed of softening under the current administration). 17(ref HRW

report)

Western Bloc – The other Western nations would generally be willing to consider the addition of

additional weapons, including cluster munitions – with one or two exceptions, usually those who

replaced the use of landmines with them. Many Western nations have condemned breaches of the

CCW, including in Syria, Lebanon, Ukraine and elsewhere – by numerous parties, including

signatories.

Eastern Europe – Most Eastern European states have also signed it (likely due to the treaty

predating USSR break-‐up). These members are generally quite happy with the status quo,

additionally they have not been especially active concerning consideration of possible breaches

(although this may change with the accusations being made in Ukraine). They are also likely to

follow their political allies, possibly encouraging a split between East/West power blocs, were one

to occur. A few states within the bloc have not signed the convention, but are generally considered

likely to do so in time. Often the weapons banned/considered for banning are those which these

nations would not have the ability to construct and use in any case (with the notable exception of

landmines, and possibly cluster munitions), which makes it easy to consider banning them. Due to

this, those members who have signed the convention have almost always signed every protocol.

Middle East – Almost no country within the Middle East has signed the CCW. Those that have, have

not signed key protocols. Were these States to have signed the CCW, they would have been guilty

of multiple breaches, concerning both landmines and incendiary weapons. Most of these nations

are unlikely to sign the convention (though some may support the goals included, and would be

happy to see it expanded for other nations). It may be possible for certain states that have partially

signed to expand their agreement. Any additional compliance agreement would, however, almost

certainly prevent signing by these members.

Central Asia – These countries have a curious nature, with most signing, but excluding certain


protocols. There is no particular consistency in which protocols each country exempts itself from

either. There is a general trend of many nations accepting the minimum two protocols over a

decade ago, then slowly accepting more protocols (usually in the run-‐up to each review

conference). As such, these States may well agree to additional protocols. Agreement to additional

protocols/alteration of current ones is likely to be neither be heavily for or against, with willingness

to negotiate with a mind to future ratification. There is likely to be at least some disagreement with

compliance, with some significant negotiation needed on its exact nature to encourage support.

South-‐East Asia – Very few countries in this region have signed the Convention and one who has,

Vietnam, has not ratified it. These countries are not generally fundamentally against the CCW, and

would likely take up at least partial signing if more encouraged too. Incendiary weapons have a

heavy history of use in the region, most notably in Vietnam with the USA deploying them – it is hard

to tell whether this would encourage or discourage ratification of protocol 3. Many of these

countries have a poor human rights record, but no worse than some who have signed the

Convention. Discussing what is needed to bring such a big power bloc into agreement could be of

key discussion. These countries possess some of the largest military forces not subject to the

convention, with Indonesia perhaps the greatest globally.

Central America – The continental countries within Central America have mostly signed the CCW,

with countries generally signing 4 out of 5 protocols (again, with no one particular protocol not

being signed). These nations are likely to be willing to negotiate with the west on both ratification

and additional protocols possible topics. Compliance is a harder issue to consider, with some not

wanting it while others would like some form of check against the larger powers in the region.

South America – Almost every country within South America has signed the CCW (Guyana and

Suriname the two exceptions) to at least some degree. As a continent it shows strong support for

the Convention – 5 years ago only one country accepted the CCW without reservation. Now the

majority does and almost every country has accepted additional protocols. Complete support for

the CCW within a decade seems likely within South America. Support for additional protocols on


cluster munitions and autonomous weapons is also likely to be strong here, with consideration of

compliance mechanisms the only remaining issue – as a group they weren’t that supportive when

the idea of independent monitoring was originally suggested 20 years ago, but it is possible that the

region may be convinced of the benefits now.

Africa – Africa is the area of greatest concern for the CCW. It is both scarcely supported and there

would be numerous breaches were it to be accepted. It should be noted that almost all of Africa

has accepted the Ottawa treaty (some with reservations) – landmines are clearly the greatest

concern to the region, and so signing the CCW may not seem of additional benefit to many.

Improvement on protocols on landmines would have to be made for many to agree to signing.

Additionally some of the most powerful countries in Africa have not fully accepted the CCW, Nigeria

has signed but not ratified and South Africa has not fully accepted the Convention. Without the

most powerful local nations agreeing it may prove difficult to get more developing countries to

spend their time on it. Support for various proposals may be rather ad hoc, with each country doing

what seems best to it or its trade partners.

Developing/Island Nations – As with Africa, most small island nations have not signed, considering

the treaty to have little relevance to them, as well as possibly incurring additional costs. Without

these concerns being allayed, the treaty is unlikely to spread to them, but if they can, there is no

reason for these nations not to sign. They are also likely to support compliance, as it is unlikely to

incur additional problems for them.

Israel – Israel is worthy of special mention, as it has signed the treaty but has not signed the

protocol on incendiary weapons. It has used them in the past and was condemned for it, and it was

this condemnation that led to them not deploying them in the most recent Gaza invasion18 (ref

report on incendiary weapons). Israel also used cluster weapons in the Lebanon conflict, and so

would only support such a protocol if they felt that they would not have use of them again in the

future. Also of note is that they have not signed Amended Article 1 – which makes the protocols in

force in non-‐international conflicts. If Israel deems combat against Hezbollah (for instance) not to


be international, then it can deem itself not bound by any restrictions.

Issues to be Resolved

There are several key aspects that must be resolved for the CCW to truly come into its own and be

globally respected. You must consider how to best to ascertain country’s concerns and desires, how

to find an acceptable middle ground and how to place these methods in an effective and viable

resolution. Within each overriding issue are some aspects to consider and some suggested

questions about each one – it isn’t required to try and answer every single question – perhaps pick

one or two as the issues that you are going to resolve – remember, one delegate cannot make a

resolution.

Expansion of Treaty Signatories

A great starting issue of the treaty is that so few (relatively) States have signed up to it, and so few

in the areas where the weapons are most likely to be used in the first place. The following aspects

of this issue should be looked before making your suggested solutions. It also makes a good

underpinning for any resolution – since if no-‐one agrees to sign up to the protocols, there is no

point in creating them.

-‐ Conflict Zone signatories – crucially, Africa and the Middle East.

-‐Why have these countries not signed?

-‐Is/are there any specific reasons why?

-‐Why (or why not) have they signed up to other similar treaties?

-‐What would it take to have these countries sign up?

-‐Have any other similar countries signed up, and what did it take them to do so?

-‐ Inactive Regions – Island nations and South-‐East Asia

-‐What are the reasons for the Island nations not signing?

-‐If it is not just insufficient attention, what can be provided to help?

-‐Is there any firm reason to prevent South-‐East Asia from signing?


-‐Why did Vietnam sign but never ratify, is this discouraging neighbours?

-‐ Partial Signatories

-‐Are there any particular protocols not being signed as frequently?

-‐Why is this the case? Is it use or just not signing later protocols?

-‐Why do some regions have such a scattered mix of unsigned protocols?

-‐How can South America’s example of increased signing be spread?

Re-‐Negotiating the Convention

Here is where the true negotiation will come into play, with even those who fully agree with the

spirit of the Convention disagree over the future course of action. There is more room to find a

middle path, and several different ideas can be added at once. For every change to the treaty, look

at the world as it is and see where your changes would be applicable – this might be multiple

conflicts (with cluster weapons) or none (with autonomous weaponry), there is precedent for both.

Would anyone sign the changes? Would the signatories comply?

-‐ Additional Protocols

-‐Cluster Weapons has been on the agenda as a suggested additional protocol for years now,

for a starting place, this is where to look.

-‐ Take a look at the pre-‐existing cluster-‐munitions treaty, can parts of it be adapted and

moved to the CCW?

-‐ Look at the countries who signed and did not? Why? What can be done?

-‐Autonomous weaponry is not currently in place (but could quickly be) – as was the

case with blinding laser weapons. Could a grave problem be avoided, or is it moving too fast?

-‐Don’t feel limited to these two, look at past ideas and other weapons coming into their

own, fuel-‐air bombs, flechette weapons, see if you can find other possibilities

-‐ Amended Protocols

-‐Landmines. Ottawa treaty. Did they go far enough?


-‐Who signed the CCW protocols but not the Ottawa treaty? Why?

-‐Can the protocols be further extended without losing major signatories?

-‐Can anything be done to attract the Ottawa signatories to sign the CCW (either unchanged

or altered?)?

-‐Is there any actual middle ground left? Or is it time to go all the way?

-‐Do any of the other protocols need fundamental changes?

-‐ Closing Loopholes/Specific Amending

-‐Each protocol has a number of details and exemptions, should any be changed?

-‐Protocol III has the most controversial loopholes, how can they be resolved?

-‐Would any support be lost by closing these loopholes?

-‐How can any problems the loopholes were created to avoid be alleviated?

Compliance

By far and away the hardest part of any negotiations, yet perhaps the most crucial – the convention

is often deemed ineffective as it has no formal compliance method. Worth a critical look again is

the independent experts’ panel mooted in the first 2 review conferences. Deciding to what degree

compliance is critical for any resolution and how to bridge any divides will be a tricky decision for all

parties. A compliance body is also tricky as it would alter the base convention itself (so any

incoming State would have to accept it) and there is also a heavy risk of the convention being split

between states accepting a compliance body and those who don’t.

-‐ Compliance Body

-‐Should anything at all replace the current self-‐checking system?

-‐Should the replacement be the suggested panel or is there another method?

-‐What would be the exact make-‐up of any compliance panel?

-‐The hardest question, how to bring parties on board?

-‐What thought should be given to the divide between signatories who ratify an altered

compliance system and those who don’t?


So, there are a lot of questions to be answered, pick what you think is the most important, and look

to it. Remember you are representing your country, not yourself, so what would your country want

from each issue to be resolved?

References and Bibliography

I would read up on the CCW full treaty text (at a minimum, the parts of the controversial protocols,

such as III). Additionally, parts, or summaries, of the Ottawa and Cluster Munitions treaties would

be advisable if you plan on arguing for their inclusion. The International Red Cross text, while a little

out of date, is an excellent basis, and represents a common outlook on the CCW – excellent in

concept, but with several notable flaws (indeed, it is this outlook that has led to this topic being

selected).

1 United Nations. “CCW Treaty Text”. Accessed Dec 2014, http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/(httpPages)/BE5FA935703D981BC12571DE0062261C?OpenDocument&unid=4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30 2 United Nations. “CCW Timeline”. Accessed Dec 2014. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4F0DEF093B4860B4C1257180004B1B30?OpenDocument 3 International Red Cross. “Hague Treaty Text”. Accessed Dec 2014. https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/150?OpenDocument 4 United Nations. “’Ottowa’ Treaty Text”. Accessed Jan 2015. http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm 5 International Red Cross. “CCW, a useful framework”. Modified 2008. Accessed Dec 2014. P1011. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-‐844-‐mathews.pdf 6 P1005 (see footnote 5) 7 US State Department. “US Position on Cluster Munitions”. Modified 2011. Accessed Jan 2015. http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/177280.htm 8 Eitan Barak. Deadly Metal Rain. (2011. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers). Online. http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/177280.htm . Pp91-‐94 9 Peter Poper. “US Forces “Use Chemical Weapons” in Fallujah”. Independent. http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/177280.htm


10 P 996 (see footnote 5) 11 United Nations. “4th Review Conference Documents”. http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/43fd798e7707ce5ac12578b20032b630?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=2%2C3#_Section2 (see draft protocols on cluster munitions) 12 United Nations. “CCW Compliance Mechanism”. Accessed Dec 2014. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/23D654504C840A07C125726C0061BAAF?OpenDocument 13 United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 67/74. http://daccess-‐dds-‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/483/04/PDF/N1248304.pdf?OpenElement 14 United Nations Inter-‐Agency Co-‐ordination group on Mine Action. “The Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action”. 2012. http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/mine_action_strategy_mar15.pdf 15 United Nations General Assembly. 68/30. “Ottowa” Treaty Resolution. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/30 16 United Nations Secretary-‐General. “GGE Report 2011”. http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6AA76081E589E2A6C12578370073475E?OpenDocument 17 Human Rights Watch. “Report on Incendiary Weapons and Opposition to them”. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Incendiary%20Weapons_Recent%20Use%20and%20Growing%20Opposition_Nov2014_final.pdf . pp15-‐16 18 P1 (see endnote 17)


Topic B: Considering Solutions to the Security Risks of De Facto

Independent Territories

Introduction to the topic De Facto is a Latin expression and is literally translates into “in fact, whether by right or not”1 This

means that it is used as an adjective construction stating the subject is what it is in practice, but not

according to law, or not officially established. It is in this context we see the territories that are

deemed De Facto Independent territories. The remainder of this study guide will therefore also

follow this specific meaning. What is further important to note, is that De Facto territories are not

necessarily a bad thing, they can function well as they are and even be beneficial as opposed to

completely recognized states.

De Facto states typically arise from political instability in their nation. Most often, this instability

leads to a revolution which, whether violent or non-‐violent, results in the creation of an alternative

governing entity. Various De Facto states can be created in these situations. Either the entire nation

in distress can become a De Facto state, or a small region within the previous border can become

one. The issues that arise with these type of states are different in every case. In modern history,

there are many cases out of which De Facto states originated. One of these cases will be discussed

in later in this guide.

Current situation Throughout history, the format of international territory has changed considerably. As it is in the

world of today, territory on an international scale, is a Nation State. These Nation States all have an

established governing entity, whether deemed legitimate or not. The prime characteristic of a De

Facto state in the current international society is the lack of international recognition of said state.

This lack of recognition results in fewer economic opportunities and thus holds back development

of a De Facto state. The reason the recognition is so lacking, is that the De Facto state has been

established in a time and or a manner of chaos. Thus, the proper code of conduct for establishing a

new state or governing entity was non-‐existent. De Facto States have a significant impact, though


mostly in their respective regions, its effects can spread further when their conflicts and political

economic interests are larger than just the region of which they are a part. The results can come in

the form of refugees, fatalities, wounded and disabled victims. Even those who have not physically

been touched or have had to move their lives away, the economic repercussions can be dire. All

these issues also affect the governments of the region and thus their respective people. Their

ability to trade internationally as before will not be present and hence a De Facto state can

eventually cause a demeanor of global economic growth due to the increasing level of

globalisation.

As previously mentioned, there are multiple cases of De Facto states in the present international

community. The examples include Somaliland, Taiwan, Tamil Eelam. However, since every case is its

own, there is no possibility to fully include every single one of these cases. Even two case studies

will already decrease the level of depth that could be achieved. Therefore, the choice has been

made to focus on one case that is particularly interesting since it is a very enlightening one when

touching upon this subject. Thus, in the following sections, the case of the Pridnestrovian

Moldavian Republic, or Transnistria, will be discussed.

Case study: The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) At the end of the twentieth century, the phenomenon that was the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR) came to an end. This left the then former members of the Union in a state of

distress and resulted in many a conflict. No different was the situation in the small Nation State of

Moldova. In the end of 1988, the seed for the Transnistria War was planted. The Moldovan SSR was

deciding on making Romanian the official language of its territory and usage of the Latin script. A

movement called "Interdvizheniye" (Inter-‐movement) was established to counter the

implementation of this and protect the interests of Russians and Ukrainians living in Moldova.

According to Roper, the population of Transnistria consisted of 55% ethnic Russians and Ukrainians.

“The Transnistrians refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 1989 language law, and in January

1990, a referendum on territorial autonomy was held in Tiraspol and passed by 96% of the

population.”2 After the dice had been cast, there have been a number of conflicts between pro-‐

Transnistria forces, including the Transnistrian Republican Guard, militia and Cossack units, and


supported by elements of the Russian 14th Army, and pro-‐Moldovan forces, including Moldovan

troops and police. On 1 March 1992 the violence intensified and, with temporary ceasefires, did not

stop until a ceasefire was declared on 21 July 1992. This ceasefire has not been broken until this

day.

It seems rather extreme for such a conflict to start over a language issue. It is naturally a more

historical issue. During the Soviet era, Russian was the lingua franca in all respective countries that

were a part of the USSR. For multiple purposes, there were many Russians that moved throughout

the separate nations, however due to this lingua franca, they had no need to learn the language of

the regions they migrated to. After the dissolution, it became clear that they could not function in

their positions and locations as they could before, therefore a significant number of ethnic Russians

repatriated or moved to nations that still used Russian as a major language, like Ukraine or Belarus.

Since 1989 the demographics of Transnistria have only changed in favour of the separatist

movement. Nowadays Transnistria has roughly 550.000 inhabitants.3 When looking at the conflict

in a geopolitical setting, one can argue that the conflict regarding Transnistria is in fact not at an

end. There are only a handful of nations that acknowledge its status as an autonomous nation and

these nations are mostly in a similar position of having no recognition. The European Union has

taken it upon itself to try and resolve the issue through the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), however many forums, talks, and much more effort later, there is no

clear sign of change visible. In this respect, the self-‐proclaimed nation of Transnistria looks to be

keeping its independence for the foreseeable future. For this very reason, this case and others need

to be further discussed by the United Nations (UN) and a solution needs to be found to deal with

situations already in existence as well as the possibility of more arising. In the next section, the past

dealings of the UN in the case of Transnistria to give an example of what can be done to solve such

an issue. However, one must keep in mind that these solutions have not necessarily been effective.

Summaries of Past Resolutions

Taking the Transnistrian region as the case-‐study for the much wider-‐ranging issue of the existence

of De-‐facto and other types of diplomatically unrecognized states, the relative lack of international

action, especially from the United Nations General Assembly since the 1992 Transnistrian War,


sheds light on the difficulty the international community has had in removing all the strings

attached to this complicated and interest-‐filled issue.

Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus the end of the Cold War, the conceptual shift

of the UN, which had been occurring over the last three decades, from privileging the order and

stability of states to a clear commitment to its “Responsibility To Protect” the rights of individuals

within states, has given the United Nations an increased ability to deny states legal recognition,

should the latter fail to abide by some basic principles of the UN Charter. The UN Security Council

has traditionally taken the role of exercising this activity, and has denied recognition in a number of

notable instances.4 5

The first instance of this occurred relatively early in the UNSC’s history, when Resolution 216 & 217

were voted upon (10 in favor, 1 abstention from France) to condemn and refuse the unilateral

declaration of independence of Southern Rhodesia (run by the UDI). This decision was made on the

basis of the UDI regime’s apparently “racist” or discriminatory habits and on the declaration’s

proclaimed lack of support amongst the majority of the local population.6 7

In Resolution 541 (1983), the Security Council resolved that Northern Cyprus’s declaration of

independence was legally invalid and condemned the latter’s decision to do so.8 Similarly in

November 1992, the creation of an Ethnic Serbian state called Republika Srpska (literally the

Serbian Republic) in the geographic region of the Northern Balkans was condemned and denied by

UNSC resolution 787.9 In this instance however, the condemnation was justified within the logic of

regional stability; following the ethnic violence of the Yugoslavian war, it was vital to create a stable

and multiethnic state in the Northern Balkans that would be called Bosnia-‐Herzegovina.

In an interesting turn of events however, the International Court of Justice’s decision to

decriminalize the act of declaring independence with regards to Kosovo in 2010 created a

precedent in international law for the survival and sustainability of de-‐facto and diplomatically

unrecognized states today.10


The recent recognition of the state of Kosovo has created major shockwaves, particularly with

regards to Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-‐Karabakh, all de-‐facto states that are

predominantly Russo-‐phone and with large Russian minorities. The Russian military interventions

against Georgia in 2008 and more influentially the present annexation of Crimea and situation in

Eastern Ukraine, have all been justified by recalling the ICJ and NATO’s actions vis-‐a-‐vis Kosovo.11

Concerning the Transnistrian crisis itself, two agreements are of note. The Russia-‐NATO

Agreements of 2002 in Rome, where the Russian government indicated a commitment to “observe

in good faith our obligations under international law, including the UN Charter, provisions and

principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security.”12, These

commitments have yet to be fulfilled by Russia in Transnistria as Russia’s specific commitment to

establish “Arms Control and Confidence Measures” has been thwarted by rumors of arms

production and trade in SALW (Small Arms and Light Weaponry) between Russia and the

Transnistria authority13. The second key agreement is the role of the OSCE Conventional Arms in

Europe Treaty in promoting the disarmament of the Transnistrian region. What used to be a key

Soviet weapons depot for the Soviet 14th Army during the Cold War, Cobasna and other weapons

depots in Transnistria were often seen (especially in Europe) as a fundamental cause for the status

quo, funding and supplying the Transnistrian forces and preventing Moldova from fully acceding in

the European Union. The OSCE Conventional Arms in Europe Treaty has, however, had a difficulty in

terms of its implementation due to the fact that many of the important composite issues

surrounding the De Facto regime in Transnistria have not been addressed.

Bloc Positions

Russia and members of the “EEU”

While it may be perceived by the international community that the so-‐called “EEU countries” and

especially Russia would be favorable to a reintegration of Transnistria in Russia, this is quite far

from its current position. On the contrary to the rhetoric coming out of the Transnistria de facto


government, Russia is primordially interested in maintaining a strong geopolitical influence over the

region as a whole. Russia, driven by a need to stimulate its down turning tertiary sector, is also

interested by the prospect of the economic integration of Moldova into its so-‐called “Eurasian

Economic Union”. The Russian authorities see Transnistria, a piece of land de jure part of Moldova,

as a bargaining chip in the struggle against Moldova’s integration into the European Union. Another

issue, perhaps more compelling in the current situation vis-‐à-‐vis the Ukrainian Crisis, is the strategic

value of the 2,000 Russian troops were never taken away since the break up of the USSR. At

Ukraine’s flank, it serves to not only apply pressure to its neighbors (Ukraine, Moldova, Romania)

but also to protect the large Russophone minority in the region. Russia will more likely work with

the OSCE and the UN, than with NATO and the European Union directly.14

European Union and the Western Bloc –

This bloc composed of the sponsors and signatories of the Council Common Position

2009/139/CFSP15: Members of the European Economic Area, Turkey, Georgia, Macedonia, Croatia,

Liechtenstein, and Norway has expressed its commitment to “renewing restrictive measures

against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova”. In majority

interested by the prospect of Moldovan EU membership and the disarmament of one of the last

Soviet weapons stockpiles in Europe (Cobasna), this bloc’s priority is still to render the region

peaceful. Furthermore, as the United States has also mentioned, many of the authorities within the

De Facto state have been accused of denying fundamental human rights to their people and of

engaging in corruption.

Moldova & Ukraine–

Very similar to that of the “Western Bloc”, Moldova and to a lesser extent Ukraine’s position comes

from the urgent need to politically reintegrate Transnistria into the Moldovan fold while assuring

the safety of all the cultural minorities present. The wording used by Moldova is of course much

stronger, and calls for the persecution of Transnistrian officials that are “illegal”. However, Moldova

is treading on thin ice, as its second largest political faction is Communist (favoring a union between

Transnistria and Moldova under the Soviet bastion), and must assure a majority in parliament when


the decision to step up European Integration comes. Also, the Russian military station and the

presence of some alleged branches of the Russian intelligence agency, the “FSB”, is deeply

troubling to these two countries who would like to see it replaced by an international civil security

force that would keep the peace while Moldova and possibly Ukraine oversee Transnistria’s

transition. 16

Romania–

While Romania’s stance is marked by a commitment to stay within the European Union’s common

position, it is important to note that Transnistria and Moldova are subject to strong Romanian

influence both politically and culturally. Some political fringes calling for the reunification of

Moldova/Transnistria with Romania, Romanians see this region as part of historic Romania and

much of its people as part of their common historical narrative. Denouncing the “Russofication” of

Transnistria, Romania pays special attention to the ethnic and cultural divides present between the

Latin (Moldovans and Romanians) and the Slavic (Russians and Ukraines). Moldova, working with

the Latin alphabet and speaking Romanian, is certainly closer in this regard to Romania than with

Transnistria, which decided to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet and have Russian as the official language.

China –

Not dissimilar to China’s diplomatic situation with regards to Ukraine, China is placed in a

particularly difficult position. While diplomatically aligned with Russia and denouncing the allegedly

expansionist policies of the European and American bloc, China historically frowns upon the

existence of such De Facto and Autonomous states. The Republic of China (Taiwan), being in their

eyes a De Facto state, and the Tibetan and Xinjiang autonomous regions posing occasional

problems to China, China seeks a swift end to the status quo and a political transition of

Transnistria either with Russia or with Moldova. Furthermore, China stresses the need for this

political transition so as to assure stability and order in a region that has already seen violence.


Other bloc delineations – While the case study for this topic may be Transnistria, the need to address the issue of De Facto

and Autonomous states of course spans much further afield. When researching your country’s

position, keep in mind your state’s geopolitical priorities and what De Facto states in your

neighborhood need to be addressed most urgently. This may be for instance: The Republic of

Abkhazia, The Republic of Kosovo, Palestine, Western Sahara, Somaliland, etc.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA) Any approach to resolving the question of de facto states must be broad and creative. As one

observes each case study, it is clear that each side is often unwilling to make many concessions. It is

thus of prime importance to pay close attention to why certain countries have certain positions and

how their vested interests can be replaced with a viable alternative in concordance with

international law. Furthermore, it is important for delegates to remember the scope of DISEC and

address issues solely in the framework of Disarmament and International Security. Nevertheless,

this does not preclude one for using more creative approaches to assuring security such as seeing

the issue(s) in an economic, social, or political perspective.

The following are a set of Questions a Resolution Must seek to Answer:

-‐ Should Transnistria be given de juro status?

-‐ What criteria must a state have before acquiring de facto and/or de juro status?

-‐ What is the scope of the Transnistrian issue? Is it local, national, or regional?

-‐ How does one address the disarmament of Transnistria’s armed forces and weapons

stockpiles?


-‐ Who should be responsible of such an endeavor?

-‐ How does one find and disarm the rumored “dirty bombs” found in Transnistria?

-‐ How do we address the political transition (if any) of Transnistria’s politics?

-‐ What actions does DISEC want to call for with regards to Transnistrian heads of state and

the presence of an autocratic regime?

-‐ What are we to do with the Russian military and intelligence presence/infiltration in the

region?

-‐ How (if ever) do we create a viable alternative to the stabilizing force (at least locally) of the

Russian military in Transnistria?

-‐ What Regional solutions can one create to avoid the reemergence of such De Facto states?

-‐ What can be done with the 100,000 refugees from the Transnistria War of 1992?

-‐ How do we address the language divide present between Moldova and Transnistria and

protect cultural minorities in both areas?

References and Bibliography In the interest of getting a more rounded view on De Facto states and their place in the international community and law, please read the following piece: http://www.liu.xplorex.com/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp21.pdf For more general information on the current obstacles faced by the OSCE in the Transnistrian region make sure to take a look at this document: http://www.osce.org/moldova/42308?download=true


Also at this following link for a certain European position on the issue. The article is relatively biased but gives a great outlook on the ideological position from which the “Western Bloc” is coming from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/transnistria-‐soviet-‐leftover-‐or-‐russian-‐foothold-‐in-‐europe-‐a-‐965801.html

1 Oxford University Press, The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 2 Steven D. Roper, The politicization of education: Identity Formation in Moldova and Transnistria (Charleston: Elsevier, 2005) pages 501-‐514 3 Migration Policy Centre, Moldova: Migration Profile. (Florence: Migration Policy Centre, 2013) 4 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) pages 1-‐4 5 Tohzun Bahcheli, The Quest for Sovereignty (London & New York: Routledge, 2004) https://www.questia.com/read/108515019/de-‐facto-‐states-‐the-‐quest-‐for-‐sovereignty 6 UNSC Resolution 216 (1965) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/216(1965) 7 UNSC Resolution 217 (1965) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/217(1965) 8 UNSC Resolution 541 (1983) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541(1983) 9 UNSC Resolution 787 (1992) http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/787(1992) 10 Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010. Reports on Judgments , Advisory Opinions and Orders: Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence with Regards to Kosovo (International Court of Justice, 2010) http://www.icj-‐cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf 11 ibid. 12 NATO-‐European Summit, Rome 2002 Outcome Document: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-‐rome/rome-‐eng.pdf


14 (In Russian) http://www.unian.net/politics/1000039-‐ne-‐suschestvuet-‐gosudarstva-‐pmr-‐suschestvuet-‐lish-‐pridnestrovskiy-‐uchastok-‐granitsyi-‐poroshenko.html 15 Russia defies Moldova’s EU Pact by Boosting Transnistria Trade (Web: Euractiv.com, Accessed on Jan 8th 2015) http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-‐east/russia-‐defies-‐moldovas-‐eu-‐pact-‐boosting-‐transnistria-‐trade-‐ 16 Council of the European Union Press 59. Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (Brussels 13 March 2009) p. 31 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/106648.pdf

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