IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

___________________________________________________________

RECORD NO. 150769 ___________________________________________________________

SWEET BRIAR INSTITUTE, and JAMES F. JONES, JR.,

Petitioners,

v.

JESSICA CAMPBELL, BRITTANY BEHRENS, DONNA BEHRENS, JOHN BEHRENS, MOLLY PHEMISTER, ALEXIA REDICK BARTLETT, LELIA DUNNING, ANDREW C. BENJAMIN, JANICE I. BENJAMIN,

MAKAYLA B. BENJAMIN and CATHERINE PEEK, Respondents.

_______________________

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR REVIEW

_______________________

Filed on behalf of the Respondents: Counsel of record for this party: Elliott Schuchardt, Esq. VA Bar # 86721 SCHUCHARDT LAW FIRM 541 Redbud Street Winchester, VA 22603 Phone: (412) 414-5138 Facsimile: (412) 428-9080 E-mail: elliott016@gmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND..........................................................................................1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY ..........................................................................4

ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................5

I. Defendants have not obtained authority under Virginia law to shut down. .........................................................................................5

A. UPMIFA requires operation of the college. ...............................6

B. The 1901 Enabling Act requires operation of the college..........7

C. Case law indicates that it is proper to enjoin the Defendants for violating state law. ............................................7

II. The trial court had a reasonable basis for issuing an injunction. (Assignment of Error 1)......................................................................9

A. The trial court had a reasonable basis for finding the existence of a four year contract.............................................10

B. Defendants objection to the contract on grounds of mutuality has no merit. .........................................................12

C. The trial court did not use the incorrect standard for granting the injunction.............................................................12

III. The trial court properly found Defendants are subject to an implied duty to act in a workmanlike manner. (Assignment of Error 2). ...........................................................................................13

III. The trial court properly found Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. (Assignment of Error 3). ...........................................................................................17

IV. The injunction properly defines its scope and operation. (Assignment of Error 4)....................................................................18

V. The injunction is not a prejudgment attachment. (Assignment of Error 5). ...........................................................................................20

CONCLUSION..........................................................................................20

ii

EXHIBITS Exhibit A - Assessed Value of Sweet Briar Land Exhibit B - Zehner v. Alexanders, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin

County, Pennsylvania, Case No. 56 of 1979, O.C.D., Vol. 89, Page 262 (1979).

Exhibit C - 1901 Sweet Briar Enabling Statute.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Andersen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 22 Cal. App. 3d 763, 769-770, 99 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535, 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 1294, 8 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1972) ....................................................................................10

Basch v. George Washington University, D.C.App., 370 A.2d 1364, 1366 (1977)........................................................................................10

Beukas v. Board of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson University, 255 N.J. Super. 552, *564; 605 A.2d 776, *783-84; 1991 N.J. Super. LEXIS 495, *24-25 (N.J. Super. 1991)..........................................14, 15

Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). .................................................................................................12

Charles E. Brauer Co. v. NationsBank of Virginia, N.A., 251 Va. 28, 466 S.E.2d 382, 386 (Va. 1996). ........................................................16

Christian Defense Fund v. Stephen Winchell & Assocs., 47 Va. Cir. 148, 149, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 290, 3 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998) ...................17

Enomoto v. Space Adventures, Ltd., 624 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18641, 12 (E.D. Va. 2009) .......................................15

Kashmiri v. Regents, 156 Cal. App.4th 809, 840 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2007) ..................................................................................................12

Penn. Life Ins. Co. v. Bumbrey, 665 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (E.D. Va. 1987); .................................................................................................15

Peretti v. Montana, 464 F. Supp. 784, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14576 (D. Mont. 1979) ..................................................................................10

Seniors Coalition v. Seniors Foundation, Inc., 39 Va. Cir. 344 (Fairfax 1996). .................................................................................................17

Town of Vinton v. City of Roanoke, 195 Va. 881, 896 S.E.2d 608, 617 (1954).................................................................................................12

University of Texas v. Babb, 646 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App. 1982)................12

b

Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 156 F.3d 535, 541-42 (4th Cir. 1998) ...........................................................................................15

West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 28-29, 138 A.2d 402 (1958)............14

Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 349 S.E.2d 125 (1986) ............................17

Zehner v. Alexanders, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Pennsylvania, Case No. 56 of 1979, O.C.D., Vol. 89, Page 262 (1979)............................................................................................... ii, 8

Statutes

Pa. Not-for-Profit Corporation Code, 7549(b) (1979)................................8

Va. Code 8.01-534 (2015) .....................................................................20

Va. Code Ann. 64.2-1102(A)(2)(2015) ...................................................15

Va. Code Ann. 64.2-1104(B) (2015).....................................................6, 9

Treatises

Corbin on Contracts, 19 (1952). ............................................................14

BACKGROUND This case involves a dispute over at least $340 million of assets -- the

assets of Sweet Briar College.

Sweet Briar owns -- what could be -- the last colonial-era parcel of land

in Virginia. The land is a five-square mile parcel of property conveniently

located next to highways in a densely-populated region. App. 971.

Sweet Briars 3,250 acres are thirty times larger than Disneys Magic

Kingdom theme park in Florida (107 acres) and about one-sixth the size of

Manhattan. In 2010, a developer proposed a $2 billion project for the area,

which would have included nearly 1,000 housing units, shopping, riding trails

and restaurants. App. 971.

Plaintiffs raised the issue of Sweet Briars land with the trial court.

App. 971. According to the Amherst County Assessors Office, the land is

worth at least $250.5 million. A print-out of the assessment is attached as

Exhibit A, for purposes of judicial notice.1

Collectively, Sweet Briar's assets exceed $340 million, after including

the $84 million endowment, and the value of the college's rare art and

documents. App. 468, 971-72.

1 The assessment at Exhibit A can be obtained online at http://amherstgis. timmons.com/flex/index.html.

2

All of these assets are in danger of being sold at fire sale prices --

possibly to Sweet Briar insiders -- while the attorney general looks the other

way. On May 5, 2015, the Plaintiffs counsel asked Defendants to agree that

none of the above assets would be sold to any entity in which a Sweet Briar

insider had an interest. Defendants have refused to enter into such a

stipulation. App. 972.

Defendants Gain Control of the Board

It is possible to determine the Defendants motives by looking at their

actions. On July 12, 2011, Paul Rice, a real estate developer, became

chairman of the board of Sweet Briar. App. 388, 479-81. Since that date,

Rice has assiduously sought to close the college.

The following year, in 2012, Rice began talking about selling the Sweet

Briar campus. Initially, the idea was to merge Sweet Briar with Hollins

University, located over an hour away. App. 388. After the merger, the

students would be transferred to Hollins so that the Sweet Briar land worth

a quarter billion dollars could be sold. Id.

The Hollins merger fell through because of lack of support on the

Sweet Briar board. Rice therefore took action to gain control of the board.

Between 2011 and 2014, Rice reduced the size of the board from 35 seats

to 23 seats, and filled vacancies with persons loyal to him. All of the

3

members of the board were then asked to sign confidentiality agreements

an unusual action in a non-profit.

Meanwhile, the college didnt bother staffing the Director of

Admissions, Director of Development, or the Alumnae Director. App. 389-

90, 498-500. Defendants intentionally allowed enrollment to drop, so that

the land could be sold.

Instead of seeking to cut costs, Rice and his hand-picked board threw

care to the wind. In 2014, Sweet Briar spent $1 million on consulting fees.

App. 345, 347 & 389, 482-84. Most of this amount was paid to a single

consultant, who did not even provide a written report. That consultants

recommendation was to close the school.

Defendants Seek to Make their Decision Irreversible

On February 28, 2015, the board voted to close the college.

Astonishingly, directors were not told in advance that closing the school

would be considered during the meeting. Shortly thereafter, Rice told

several persons that there would be a number of buyers looking to acquire

Sweet Briar's assets. App. 479-80.

Immediately, Defendants took action to make their decision

irreversible. Defendants shredded information relating to the incoming

class, instantly destroying 25% of tuition revenue. They sought to sell the

4

colleges prize-winning collection of 56 horses and the prestigious study

abroad programs, so that these assets could not be used in future

operations. App. 924, 971.

Since March 3, 2015, Defendants public statements show that they

have no interest in saving the college. Defendants have no interest in

implementing co-education; they also have no interest in fundraising, cutting

costs, or valuing their assets. Defendants also refused to work with a

renowned debt restructuring expert, who offered to help restructure the

college's small debt at no charge. App. 493-98.

Meanwhile, Defendants claims of poverty do not hold up under

scrutiny. The colleges assets actually increased over the last five years. In

addition, the college could pay off most of its debt from unrestricted assets.

App. 468.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiffs are a group of Sweet Briar students, parents and

alumnae. On April 17, 2015, the Plaintiffs commenced this case by filing a

complaint for breach of contract with the Amherst Circuit Court. App. 1. On

that same day, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction

preventing Defendants from selling, encumbering or disposing of assets.

App. 35, 49, & 284.

5

On April 29, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the Plaintiffs

injunction motion. App. 72 & 385. During the hearing, the Plaintiffs

presented evidence showing that the college had made representations that

it would provide education and financial aid for four years, provided that the

Plaintiffs agreed to attend Sweet Briar College. The Plaintiffs also cross-

examined James F. Jones, Jr., the colleges interim president. During his

testimony, Jones simply could not remember any details concerning the

colleges financial statements, even though he initially claimed to be very

familiar with the June 30, 2014 financials. App. 487-89, 492, 501-04, 507,

527-28.

At the end of the hearing, Judge Updike found that the college had

entered into a contract to provide education to the Plaintiffs, and granted a

six-month injunction against the college selling, destroying, encumbering or

disposing of assets outside the normal course of business. App. 533-549.

ARGUMENT

It is proper for this Court to sustain the trial courts injunction.

I. Defendants have not obtained authority under Virginia law to shut down.

Defendants are presently in violation of two different state laws

requiring them to operate a college until they obtain court approval.

6

A. UPMIFA requires operation of the college.

As a non-profit corporation, Sweet Briar is subject to the Uniform

Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, codified in Virginia at Va.

Stat. Ann. 64.2-1100 et seq. (2015) (the UPMIFA or the Act).

UPMIFA establishes requirements for the investment and spending of

charitable funds in Virginia. Va. Code Ann. 64.2-1102(A)(2) (2015).

According to UPMIFA, Defendants are not allowed to hoard or

accumulate restricted endowment funds. They are required under the

Act to spend such funds for their designated purposes until Defendants

obtain approval from a court to do otherwise. Va. Code Ann. 64.2-

1102(A)(2) & (B) (2015). App. 458-59, 465-66, 470. Va. Code Ann. 64.2-

1104(B) (2015).

During the hearing, Jones testified that Sweet Briar had neither sought

-- nor obtained -- a court order releasing it from the affirmative covenants in

its donor documents. App. 391-92, 465-66, 470-72, 475-76, 526-27.

In addition, where a charity argues that its purpose is obsolete, the

charity is required to comply with a cy pres analysis. In other words, the

restricted funds must be used in a manner consistent with the charitable

purposes expressed in the gift instrument. Va. Code Ann. 64.2-1104(C)

7

(2015). Defendants cannot simply go from 100 to 0, without first seeking to

implement 98. App. 392-93.

B. The 1901 Enabling Act requires operation of the college.

In addition to UPMIFA, the Defendants have an obligation to operate a

womens college according to applicable state law. On February 9, 1901,

the Virginia General Assembly passed an Act which states as follows:

That the said Sweet Briar Institute shall have power, and it is hereby made its duty, to . . . maintain and carry on . . . a school or seminary to be known as the Sweet Briar Institute.

App. 569. Defendants have not requested a waiver. App. 390, 475-76.

Until Defendants obtain a court order authorizing them to deviate from

UPMIFA and the Enabling Act, Defendants are required to continue

operating Sweet Briar as a college.

C. Case law indicates that it is proper to enjoin the Defendants for violating state law.

The facts of this case are similar to those in the Wilson College case.

In 1979, Wilson College was a small womens college located in

Pennsylvania. When the college suffered declining enrollment, the Board of

Directors for the college voted to close the school.

A group of alumni, students, parents and faculty sued the college in

state court, seeking an injunction to keep the college open. The court

8

refused to allow the college to shut down because, as here, the Board had

failed to obtain court approval to do so. See, Ex. B., App. 324, Zehner v.

Alexanders, Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, Pennsylvania,

Case No. 56 of 1979, O.C.D., Vol. 89, Page 262 (1979).

The Pennsylvania law had the same effect as Virginias UPMIFA

statute. Both statutes required court approval before diverting charitable

funds. Specifically, the Pennsylvania statute stated as follows:

Property committed to charitable purposes shall not . . . be diverted from the objects to which it was donated, granted or devised unless and until the board of directors or other body obtains from the court an order . . . specifying the disposition of the property.

Id. (citing Pa. Not-for-Profit Corporation Code, 7549(b) (1979)).

The Wilson College court found that the defendant college was

seeking to impose a fait accompli on the court, by not seeking court

approval. The court explained its reasoning as follows:

The legislature has clearly indicated that no change in the use of assets committed to charitable purposes can be made unless and until the . . . Court grants approval to the trustees. Otherwise, in the instance of the proposed closing of a functioning college, the Court would be presented with a fait accompli.

By implementing the decision to close Wilson College, the Trustees attempted to essentially deprive the Court of its power to review the recommendation of the Board and to approve or disapprove the proposed diversion of college assets from a teaching institution to some other charitable use. In addition, the implementation of the

9

decision to close Wilson College without prior public approval of the Court attempted to deprive the public, represented by the Attorney General as parens patriae, of an opportunity to comment upon or protest the decision.

Ex. B, Zehner, at 81-82 (emphasis added).

The Court therefore concluded that the Wilson board had no lawful

right to set a termination date for [its] non-profit activities . . . until Court

approval had been secured. Id. at 84 (emphasis added). Wilson College

later went co-ed, and continues to operate today. The school currently has

triple the number of students it had in 1979.

Virginia law is identical in this case. Va. Code Ann. 64.2-1104(B &

C) (2015). In the case at bar, Defendants have neither sought nor

obtained authority from any court to redirect charitable assets by not

spending them on education. Without such authority, the Defendants are

acting in flagrant disregard of donor intent, and in violation of Virginia law. It

is therefore proper for this Court to sustain the trial courts injunction.

II. The trial court had a reasonable basis for issuing an injunction. (Assignment of Error 1).

In their petition, Defendants ask this Court to reverse the trial courts

finding of a four-year contract in this case.

As explained below, the trial court had a reasonable basis for finding a

four-year contract in this case.

10

A. The trial court had a reasonable basis for finding the existence of a four year contract.

The case law indicates that a contract is created between a student

and a college when a student matriculates at the college. See, e.g.,

Andersen v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 22 Cal. App. 3d 763, 769-770, 99 Cal.

Rptr. 531, 535, 1972 Cal. App. LEXIS 1294, 8 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1972)

([B]y the act of matriculation, together with payment of required fees, a

contract between the student and the institution is created); Basch v. George

Washington University, D.C.App., 370 A.2d 1364, 1366 (1977) (It is a

general rule that the relationship between a university and its students is

contractual in nature. It is also accepted that the terms set down in a

university's bulletin become a part of that contract."); Peretti v. Montana, 464

F. Supp. 784, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14576 (D. Mont. 1979) (students could

enforce contract where aviation program was cancelled after they obtained

course credits), reversed on other grounds, 661 F.2d 756, 1981 U.S. App.

LEXIS 16020 (9th Cir. Mont. 1981).

During the injunction hearing, Plaintiffs produced form documents

used by Sweet Briar from February 2012 through January 2015. App. 551-

65. The form documents show that the college promised four years of

financial aid to the students and their parents, if the incoming students would

11

agree to study at Sweet Briar. App. 551-65. The typical language was as

follows:

I am pleased to inform you that you have been selected to receive the Founders Scholarship in the amount of $17,000. The four-year award totalling $68,000 represents our strong belief and investment in your ability to be a successful Sweet Briar student, and it is contingent upon maintaining satisfactory academic progress and good citizenship.

App. 554 (emphasis added). See also App. 560-61, 563, 565.

The plaintiff students and their parents testified that they relied upon

this express promise when they agreed to accept at Sweet Briar. App. App.

403, 407-10, 413-14, 426, 429-33, 441, 443.

In addition, each letter of acceptance stated the student was being

admitted to a particular graduating class, four years in the future. App. 551-

65; see also App. 413-14, 423-24, 429-32, 451. During the hearing,

numerous students and parents testified that they relied upon Sweet Briars

promise to offer a degree at the end of four years of study, when the

students agreed to attend the college and pay tuition.

When a college makes a promise that extends for the entire length of a

student's enrollment, courts have not limited the agreement to a single term

or semester. Kashmiri v. Regents, 156 Cal. App.4th 809, 840 (Cal. App. 1st

Dist. 2007) (where university makes a promise "to last for the duration," that

12

"promise does not expire at the end of the academic year"); University of

Texas v. Babb, 646 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. App. 1982) (student could enforce

upon degree requirements in existence when accepting at college).

The trial courts finding of a four-year contract is therefore proper.

B. Defendants objection to the contract on grounds of mutuality has no merit.

Defendants next object to the contract on grounds of mutuality.

This doctrine does not apply in this case because it only applies when

the consideration is mutual promises, which is not the case here. Town of

Vinton v. City of Roanoke, 195 Va. 881, 896 S.E.2d 608, 617 (1954).

The Plaintiff students have paid tuition, attended classes, complied

with the honor code, and generally uprooted their lives. Plaintiffs have

provided consideration for the contract. See also supra, at 10-12.

C. The trial court did not use the incorrect standard for granting the injunction.

Finally, Defendants argue that the trial court used an incorrect

standard for granting the injunction, claiming the court relied upon

Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).

Brief, at 12. The trial court did not cite Blackwelder in its opinion, or use its

test for granting an injunction. App. 533-49.

13

III. The trial court properly found Defendants are subject to an implied duty to act in a workmanlike manner. (Assignment of Error 2).

Defendants next object to the trial court's ruling that Defendants are

subject to implied duties to act in good faith and in a "workmanlike

manner." Defendants brief, at 13-14. See App. 187-90 (court's opinion).

It is proper to reject this argument because the court's opinion is

supported by case law. At least two courts have held that a college has an

implied duty to act in good faith when it makes a decision to close.

For example, in Galton v. College of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 70

Misc. 2d 12 (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct. 1972), a group of students and alumni sued

to prevent the closing of the College of Pharmaceutical Sciences in the City

of New York. The court held that the college had a duty to act in good faith

with respect to its decision to close:

There is no merit to the contention that the students have no standing. Students presently attending the College should not be peremptorily cast out of the College, and their education interrupted for an indefinite time, perhaps forever, if such action is arbitrary. Students are entitled to consideration from educational institutions who invite them to pursue their education in the halls of learning of such institutions. Upon admission of a student to a college there is some obligation upon the part of the college to permit the student to continue his studies to graduation if willing and eligible to continue (Matter of Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc 2d 319, supra; Matter of Ryan v. Hofstra Univ., 67 Misc 2d 651, 68 Misc 2d 890, supra). Of course, if circumstances beyond the control of the College, such as

14

lack of finances, prevent the College from continuing, the issue is concluded. But there must be an opportunity to inquire into the basis of the determination. The court must provide it.

Id., 70 Misc. 2d at 14-15, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (emphasis added).

In 1991, the Board of Fairleigh Dickinson voted to close its College of

Dental Medicine. The decision affected a group of students, who had spent

time and money earning credits from the dental school, which were not

accepted elsewhere.

The New Jersey court applied a quasi contract theory, and held that

the college was subject to an implied duty of good faith:

The "true" university-student "contract" is one of mutual obligations implied, not in fact, but by law; it is a quasi-contract which is "created by law, for reasons of justice without regard to expressions of [**784] assent by either words or acts." West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 28-29, 138 A.2d 402 (1958), quoting from Corbin on Contracts, 19 (1952). A quasi-contract is not a true contract but arises because of considerations of equity and morality and is distinguished from an express contract or even one implied in fact which arises from mutual agreement and intent to promise. Id. This theory is the most efficient and legally consistent theory to resolve a university-student conflict resulting from an administrative decision to terminate an academic or professional program. The inquiry should be: did the university act in good faith and, if so, did it deal fairly with its students?

Beukas v. Board of Trustees of Fairleigh Dickinson University, 255 N.J.

Super. 552, *564; 605 A.2d 776, *783-84; 1991 N.J. Super. LEXIS 495, *24-

25 (N.J. Super. 1991).

15

The Court continued its analysis as follows:

In sum, this court concludes that applying quasi-contract theory to resolving university-student conflicts over an administrative decision to terminate a college or program for financial reasons is the most effective way to avoid injustice to both the university and its students. The judicial inquiry should be directed toward the bona fides of the decision making and the fairness of its implementation: whether the institution acted in good faith and dealt fairly with its student body should be the polestar of the judicial inquiry. . . . This approach will give courts broader authority for examining university decision making in the administrative area than would a modified standard of judicial deference and will produce a more legally cohesive body of law. . . .

Id., at 255 N.J. Super. at 568; 1991 N.J. Super. LEXIS 495, *28.

The New York and New Jersey law of good faith tracks the language

of the Virginia UPMIFA statute, which requires Defendants to act in good

faith in connection with their management of funds and expenditure of the

endowment. See Va. Code Ann. 64.2-1102(A)(2)(2015).

In Virginia, many contracts are also subject to an implied duty of good

faith and fair dealing. See Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 156

F.3d 535, 541-42 (4th Cir. 1998) (In Virginia, every contract contains an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.); Penn. Life Ins. Co. v.

Bumbrey, 665 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (E.D. Va. 1987); Enomoto v. Space

Adventures, Ltd., 624 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18641,

12 (E.D. Va. 2009) (In every contract there exists an implied covenant of

16

good faith and fair dealing.); Charles E. Brauer Co. v. NationsBank of

Virginia, N.A., 251 Va. 28, 466 S.E.2d 382, 386 (Va. 1996).

The good faith analysis used by the New York and New Jersey courts

is therefore directly applicable to the case at bar.

During the injunction hearing, Plaintiffs presented evidence showing

evidence of bad faith: Defendants refused to work with a national debt-

restructuring expert who offered to restructure the colleges debt at no

charge. App. 493-98. The colleges assets actually increased over the last

five years. App. 487-89, 492. Defendants did not hire a Dean of

Admissions, a Marketing Director, Alumnae Director or a Development

Director. App. 389-90, 498-500. Defendants did not tell alumnae about the

plan to close, even though the last capital campaign raised over $110

million.

The list goes on and on. Instead of fiscal prudence, Defendants

grossly overspent. According to a former board member, Defendants spent

$1 million on consulting contracts, when similar services could have been

purchased for a fraction of the cost. App. 345 & 347; 482-84.

Judge Updike referenced this evidence in his opinion, when he found

that there is a basis for finding that [Defendants] treatment was hard, and a

basis for finding, not in legal terms, [that] this aint right. App. 544.

17

It is therefore proper for the Court to find a reasonable basis for the

trial courts injunction.

III. The trial court properly found Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. (Assignment of Error 3).

The principle inquiry regarding "irreparable harm" is whether an

adequate remedy exists at law. Christian Defense Fund v. Stephen Winchell

& Assocs., 47 Va. Cir. 148, 149, 1998 Va. Cir. LEXIS 290, 3 (Va. Cir. Ct.

1998); Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 349 S.E.2d 125 (1986).

In this case, there is no adequate remedy at law for the Plaintiffs loss.

If Defendants close Sweet Briar, the Plaintiff students will suffer harm

that cannot be compensated by monetary damages. This is because the

Plaintiff students will not receive credit for all of their Sweet Briar course

work. App. 407-10, 413-14, 426, 429-33. As a result, the Plaintiff students

will be forced to repeat between six months and two years of college

education. Id. As a result, some students may not be able to graduate from

a college at all. App. 432-33.

During the hearing, interim president Jones refused to respond when

asked whether he would sue for an injunction, if he was forced to repeat his

last year of work. App. 155.

However, the gravest loss will be the loss of Sweet Briars beautiful

century old college community. Over the past century, thousands of people

18

have contributed their time and money hundreds of millions of dollars to

make Sweet Briar a place of beauty and education. The library alone has

over a quarter million volumes, which Jones is proposing to sell by the

pound. Much of the campus itself is an historic district because of its

architectural features and beauty. If Sweet Briar is allowed to shut down,

even for a semester, then this asset to the Amherst community could be

forever lost.

If Defendants succeed in shutting down Sweet Briar's operations, it will

be difficult or impossible to restart those operations. The college has

already lost the incoming freshman class. A shutdown will destroy the

revenue from the upper three class years. Even worse, the faculty will be

scattered across the United States.

When the Sweet Briar was founded in 1901, it took five years before

the college started operations in 1906. A gap in operations now would likely

cause a similar delay in fulfilling the intent of the donor documents.

Thus, if the preliminary injunction is not sustained, it is highly likely that

the Plaintiffs will be forever denied relief.

IV. The injunction properly defines its scope and operation. (Assignment of Error 4).

Defendants claim that the trial courts injunction is not properly defined

in scope and operation. They are mistaken. The injunction order provides:

19

Defendants . . . shall not convey, destroy, dispose of, or encumber any assets or property of the college, outside of the ordinary course of business consistent with past practices prior to January 1, 2015, for six (6) months from April 29, 2015, and shall engage in no such act during the period of this injunction that has as its goal facilitating the closing of the College unless such act is authorized by further order of this Court.

App. 982-83. See also App. 984-85. The order then provides specific, non-

exclusive examples of types of assets that are subject to prohibitions.

Under the plain language of the order, Defendants are not required to

operate the College (e.g. teach classes), but neither are they permitted to

take action intended to "facilitat[e] the closing of the college." App. 982.

There is nothing contradictory about these requirements.

If Defendants are in any doubt about the scope of the injunction, they

are expressly permitted to return to the trial court for clarification.

Defendants did this shortly after the circuit courts ruling from the bench, and

obtained a second order (entered the same day as the first) permitting the

sale of certain assets. App. 984. Notably, however, Defendants have not

filed any motion alleging any confusion about their obligations under the

existing orders. This omission, alone, should preclude them from attacking

the orders on these grounds on appeal.

v. The injunction is not a prejudgment attachment. (Assignment of Error 5). Finally, Defendants argue that the injunction IS "prejudgment

attachment" subject to Va. Code 8.01-534.

They are mistaken. The injunction does not "seize" the property of the

College. The injunction is not "extraordinary," but instead is a traditional

injunction meant to maintain the status quo, so that the College cannot

destroy its assets in order to render the underlying proceeding moot. To

credit Defendants' argument would turn every domestic relations case, in

which a spouse is ordered not to waste marital assets, into an "attachment"

proceeding.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court

sustain the preliminary injunction in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

ByJLLII~ Elliott J. Schuchardt Schuchardt Law Firm 541 Redbud Street Winchester, VA 22603 Phone: (412) 414-5138 Fax: (412) 428-9080 E-mail: ellioU016@gmail.com

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Elliott Schuchardt, hereby certify that I served a true and correct

copy of the foregoing brief on the following persons on this 28th day of May

2015 bye-mail and express (overnight) mail, postage prepaid:

Calvin W. Fowler, Jr. Esq. Williams Mullen Clark Dobbins 200 S. 10th Street Richmond, VA 23219 E-mail: wfowler@williamsmullen.com Co-Counsel to Sweet Briar Institute & James F. Jones, Jr.

N. Thomas Connally Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP Park Place II 7930 Jones Branch Drive, 9th Floor McLean, VA 22102 E-mail: tom.connally@hoganlovells.com Co-Counsel to Sweet Briar Institute & James F. Jones, Jr.

William E. Phillips Edmunds & Williams, P.C. 829 Main Street, 19th Floor Lynchburg, VA 24504 E-mail: bphillips@ewlaw.com Co-Counsel to Sweet Briar Institute & James F. Jones, Jr.

Elliott J. Schuchardt

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l m

ade

by p

rofe

ssio

nal

consu

ltant

s to

&

tteng

then

the

prog

ram

s o

f th

e co

lege

and

to

deleg

ate a

uth

ority

to th

e CO

Dege

's ad

IQinl

strati

ve st

aff.

coup

led w

ith th

e fa

ilure

of t

he P

resid

ent t

o pr

ompt

ly a

nd

regu

lady

shar

e w

ith th

e Bo

ard

or Tr

ustees

. adm

inist

rativ

e st

aff,

facu

lty J

stud

ent

body

and

alu

mna

e th

e se

ven

pro

blem

s o

f th

e co

llege

as

they

wer

e de

velop

ing c

onst

itute

d a g

roq

abus

e of a

uth

ority

and

diacre

tioD

Und

er se

ctio

n 17

26{e)

of th

e N

ot-fo

r-Pro

fit C

orpo

ratio

n Co

de.

o. Th

e ga

vent

ing

body

ot a

coll

ege,

oper

ating

as a

Don

-pro

fit co

rpor

ation

, be

tore

Im

plem

entin

g an

y de

clsio

n to

ter

mht

at.t,

must

, In

add

itIon

to

secu

ring

co

urt

app

rova

l. do

w th

e pu

blic,

!epr

esen

ted b

y th

e At

torn

ey

Gen

fl'll

as p

aren

s patr

iae, a

n opp

ortu

nity

to c

omm

entu

pon

orp

rote

at th

e .....

L

Ole

r, Jr

., Es

q., A

ttorn

ey fo

r Pet

ition

ers

~ ~

I McQ

uaide

. Esq

., A

ttorn

ey fo

r Pet

ition

ers

'-1J

~ 18 M

enak

er, E

sq.,

Atto

rney

for R

espo

nden

ts

eU}

J. D

eLuc

a.

Jr.,

Dep

uty

Atto

rney

Ge

neNl

I, ,

, fo

r the

Com

mon

wea

l'7

,

o t f t "t)

""

ADJU

DICA

TION

AN

D D

EC

REE

NIS

I

OL

LE

R, J

' t M

ay 2

5, 1

979:

On

Mar

ch 2

7, 1

979,

co

un

sel

tor

the

petit

ione

rs, i

n th

e pr

esen

ce o

f co

un

sel

for

resp

onde

nts.

her

eina

fter

TR

UST

EES,

p~

nted

a

petit

ion

for

a cita

tion

to

issu

e to

. th

e re

spon

dent

s-tru

stee

s o

t W

ilson

CoR

ege,

here

inaf

ter

COLL

EGE,

to

app

ear

an

d sh

ow c

ause

why

tbe

ysbo

uld

no

t be

rem

ov

ed

imm

edia

tely

as

trus

tees

; su

cess

or

trus

tees

app

oint

ed. t

he C

ourt

ther

eaft

er

to

exer

cise

its

supe

rvis

ory

pow

ers

over

th

e adm

inis

tratio

n o

f th

e Co

Rege

in

co

njun

ction

with

the

new

tru

stee

s; t

hat t

hey

be p

enna

nent

ly en

joine

d fro

m im

plem

entin

g th

e cl

osin

g o

f th

e Co

Rege

; an

d fu

rthe

r re

lief

incl

udin

g th

e aw

ardi

ng o

f co

un

sel

fees

an

d co

sts

of

suit

to p

etiti

oner

s be

gr

ante

d. T

he p

etiti

oner

s al

so s

ou

ght a

n in

juncti

on pe

nden

te li

te

to r

estr

ain

furth

er a

ctio

n im

plem

entin

g th

e cl

osin

g o

f th

e Co

llege

to

prev

ent

was

te.

Tbis

Cou

rt d

eclin

ed t

o gr

ant

the

prel

imin

ary

injun

ction

pra

yed

for

by th

e pe

titio

ners

. A d

ecre

e w

as e

nte

red

the

sam

e da

te d

irect

ing

the

issu

ance

of t

he cl

tatio

ns

to t

he T

rust

ees

an

d se

ttin

g M

ay 7

, 197

9, a

t 9:

30 A

.M. a

s th

e da

te th

ey w

ere

retu

rnab

le a

nd

for b

earin

g o

n t

he m

atte

r. O

n th

e sa

me

date

a p

retri

al c

on

fere

nce

was

sche

dule

d fo

r 1:3

0 P.

M. o

n

Apr

il 30

, 197

9. O

n A

pril

5, 1

979,

J. T

hom

as M

enak

er, E

sq.,

of

McN

ees,

Wall

ace

& N

uric

k ad

vise

d tb

e C

ourt

tha

t he

was

en

terin

g a

gene

ral a

ppea

ranc

e o

n b

ehal

f of t

he p

rope

rly

serv

ed

resp

onde

nts.

O

n A

pril

30,

1979

, th

e pr

oper

ly

serv

ed

resp

onde

nts'

answ

er c

on

tain

ing

new

matt

er a

nd

obje

ction

s was

fil

ed.

On

the

sam

e da

te B

arth

olom

ew D

eLU

ca,

Jr.,

Dep

uty

Atto

rney

Gen

eral

, en

tere

d a

n

appe

aran

ce o

n

beha

lf o

f th

e C

omm

onw

ealth

of P

enns

ylva

nia,

Dep

artm

ent o

f Jus

tice.

On

Apr

il 30

, 19

79,

at

1:30

P.M

. th

e C

ourt

met

with

co

un

sel f

or th

e pa

rties

an

d th

e D

eput

y A

ttorn

ey G

ener

al f

or a

pr

olon

ged

in d

epth

pre

tria

l co

nfe

renc

e. P

ursu

ant t

o th

e C

ourt

's re

ques

t, co

un

sel f

or th

e pa

rties

subm

itted

exte

nsiv

e m

em

ora

nda

o

f la

w o

n d

ispu

ted

issue

s, an

d th

e D

eput

y A

ttorn

ey G

ener

al

subm

itted

a m

em

ora

ndu

m li

mite

d. to

the

issue

s o

f juri

sdict

ion

of

the

Cou

rt, t

he C

ourt

's su

perv

isor

y ,.u

thor

ity,

an

d w

beth

er

trust

ees

of a

no

n-p

rofit

corp

orat

ion

mu

st se

cure

Orp

hans

' Cou

rt

appr

oval

be

fore

im

plem

entin

g th

eir

deci

sion

to

en

d o

r fu

ndam

enta

lly a

lter t

he sa

id co

rpor

atio

n.

On

May

1,

1979

. co

un

sel f

or p

etiti

oner

s pr

esen

ted

thei

r m

otio

n to

am

en

d th

e o

rigin

al p

etiti

on to

incl

ude

an a

llega

tion

that

WiJs

on C

aReg

e be

mad

e a

party

1 an

d th

at th

e Co

llege

be

joine

d as

a n

eces

sary

or

indi

spen

sabl

e pa

rty

to t

he p

roce

edin

g.

On

the

sam

e da

te a

n

Ord

er w

as e

nte

red

gran

ting

petit

ione

rs

leav

e to

am

en

d, an

d joi

ning t

he C

oReg

e as

a pa

rty.

28

CUM

ULAT

IVE

Tabl

e o

f Cas

es

Ale

Dnd

er, e

t aI.,

Zeh

ner.

et a

t. v.

(The

Wils

on C

olle

ge C

ase)

2.7

Com

mon

wea

lth e

x r

eI ..

Leed

y v.

Sha

ffer

Cu

stody

Pr

ior C

ondu

ct. fe

ruler

Year

" D

octr

ine.

Chil

d' 4 P

refer

ence

.14

Com

mon

wea

lth e

x r

et.

Rai

dout

v.

Shaf

fer

.ht

ititm

I" V

ocat

e Ju

clpe

nt. P

a. R

ep 20

34(d}

Jli

nDr

.. 8

CUm

berla

nd V

alley

SaV

ings a

nd

Loan

Ass

ociat

ion

v. H

asan

, et a

l .M

orls

ale

F"re

closu

re -

Prio

rity

of L

iens

"Er

ectio

n a

nd

Cons

trucc

ilm"

SecU

on,12

01 0

1 th

e M

echt

mic

', Li

en L

aw 0/

196

3 -Co

nstit

utio

nalh

y . 1

Gre

enca

stle-

Ant

rim S

choo

l Dis

tric

t, et a

l v.

Pete

rson

, et

aI.

-Sc

hool

Dire

ctor"

R

emov

al I

rom

Ol/i

ce I

nJuJ

/i.cien

CY to

Sla

te a

Ca

use

01 Aa

iDA

....... " '"

........

II "" ............

"

/I> .....

'"

..

"

.....

I> ....

,

.............

"

..

""

'"

$ .... ,,10

Hasa

n, C

Umbe

rland

Vall

ey S

avin

gs Il

D:d L

oan

Ass

ociat

ion

v. . .... 1

In re

: M

yers

Nam

e Ch

ange

Pet

ition

,C

hans

e 01

Nom

e. U

nmar

ried

Paret

tJ.$

Cl

UtM

Y ill

Gra

ncipa

rents

.. 2S

Peters

o~ et a

I . G

reen

castl

e-A

ntrim

Sch

ool D

istric

t. et

aI. v

. , ... 10

Shaf

fer,

Com

mon

wea

lth, e

x r

et

Lee

dy v

. . ................... 14

Shaf

fer,

Com

mon

wea

lth, e

x r

et

Re1d

out v

.................... 8

The

Wils

on C

olle

ge C

ase:

Zehn

er, e

t al

. v.

Ale

xand

er, e

t at

..... 27

Zeh

ner,

et a

t v

. A

lexa

nder

, et a

I. (T

he W

ilson

Col

lege

Case

) .()r

plum3

COl

I.rt

Juris

dict

ion

Cor

pora

tion.

Not-!

or-P

rop!

Cod

e (A

llele

CIM

ins.

Cy P

r. D

odrm

e ~ Cr

oss A

buse

of A

Ulko

rity a

nd

Disc

redo

n. 27

i

main

tain

the

ulti

mat

e go

al o

f co

ntin

uing

Wils

on C

olle

ge a

s an

edu

catio

nal

inst

itutio

n.

As

to t

hose

Tru

stees

. th

ough

the

ir

cu

lpab

ility

be

of v

aryi

ng de

gree

s, th

ey w

ere

serio

usly

mis

led

an

d m

ean

t on

ly w

eD fo

r Wds

on C

oneg

e.

DIS

CUSS

ION

It

is u

ndi

sput

ed

that

Wils

on

Colle

ge i

s a

no

npr

ofit

co

rpor

atio

n an

d is,

the

refo

re. s

ubje

ct to

regu

latio

n u

nde

r th

e C

orpo

ratio

n N

ot,.f

or-P

rofit

Cod

e, A

ct o

f N

ovem

ber

15. 1

972

P.L.

106

3. N

o. 2

71, 1

5 Pa

. C.S

. Sec

t. 71

01 e

tseq

.. Ju

risdi

ctio

n o

ver

the

inst

ant p

roce

edin

g is

gran

ted

to t

he O

rpha

ns' C

ourt

u

nde

r R

ule

2156

of t

he R

ules

of J

udic

ial A

dmin

istra

tion

whi

ch

stat

es in

ter a

lia:

In a

dditi

on

to o

ther

mat

ters

whi

ch b

y la

w ar

e to

be

heam

an

d de

term

ined

by

the

orp

hans

' co

urt

div

islon

of

co

urt

of

com

mo

n

plea

s, th

e di

visio

n sb

aI b

ear

an

d de

term

ine

the

follO

Wing

mat

ters

:

(1) N

onpr

ofit

corp

orat

ions

: Th

e .dm

in11

lmtlo

n an

d pr

oper

ap

plica

tion

of p

rope

rty c

om

mitt

ed to

ebuU

able

pur

pose

s bel

d o

r co

ntro

lled

by

any

dom

estic

o

r fo

reig

n n

on

prof

it co

rpo:

ratio

n an

d aU

m

atte

rs a

rising

un

der

Title

15

of

the ~n

nsyJ

vani

a Con

solid

ated

Sta

tute

s ....

Rec

ent d

ecis

ions

hav

e in

terp

rete

d th

is p

rovi

sion

as

givin

g th

e O

rpha

ns' C

ourt

broa

d jur

isdict

ion ov

er t

he a

dmin

istra

tion

of

prop

erty

he

ld

by n

on

prof

it co

rpor

atio

ns f

or c

harit

able

pu

rpos

es.

In

Be

Penn

sylv

ania

H

ome

Teac

hmg

8oci

ety,

15

Fidu

c. R

ep. 5

56 (P

hil. 1

975)

; The

Mus

ic Fu

nd S

ocie

ty, 7

3 D

&C

2d 1

15 (P

hiL

1975

); W

omen

's Ch

ristic

m T

empe

ranc

e U

nion

of

Penn

sylu

ania

v.

Bear

halte

r. 6

Dil

e 8r

d 20

'7 (B

ucka

1977

). Th

ese

deci

sions

indi

cate

that

"th

e sc

ope

of t

he ru

le c

on

tem

plat

es th

at

jurisd

iction

exte

nds

to

all

inte

rnal

matt

ers

of n

on

-pro

fit

co

rpor

atlo

ns f

or c

harit

able

pur

pose

s. e

ven

to

m

att

ers

no

t di

rect

ly b

earin

g u

pon

such

fund

a,"

Wom

en's

Chr

ittia

n at

212.

This

juris

dictio

n, ap

plic

able

to

all

matt

ers

aris

ing

un

der

Title

14

. is

made

par

ticul

arly

rel

evan

t to

the

hea

ring

of

petit

ions

to

re

mo

ve

trust

ees

by

Sect

ion

'1726

o

f th

e C

orpo

ratio

n N

ot-f

or-P

rofit

Cod

e an

d to

hea

r an

d de

term

ine

the

val

idity

of c

orp

orat

e actio

n by

Sec

tion

7783

. Mos

t im

port

antly

, Se

ctio

n 71

49 o

f the

Cod

e req

uire

s the

appr

oval

of t

he O

rpha

ns'

Cou

rt .b

efor

e an

y pr

oper

ty c

om

mitt

ed t

o cha

ritab

le p

urpo

ses

can

be

dive

rted

from

its p

urpo

se.

The

Cou

rt in

In B

e Pe

nnsy

lvan

ia H

ome

Teac

hing

Soc

iety

. su

pra.

, at

567

dete

rmin

ed t

hat:

uth

e pr

ovis

ions

of t

he E

stat

es

80

Act

of 1

947,

no

w 2

0 Pa

. C.S

. Sec

t. 61

01 e

taeq

., do

app

ly [i

n ca

ses

arisi

ng

un

der

Penn

sylv

ania

R

ules

o

f Ju

dici

al

Adm

inis

tratio

n N

o. 2

156]

an

d es

pecia

l1y t

he C

'Y pr

es d

octri

ne as

de

linea

ted

in 2

0 Pa

. C.

S. S

ect.

6110

. We

have

ar

rived

at

this

co

ncl

usio

n be

caus

e w

e

are

sa

tisfie

d th

e le

gisla

tive

inte

nt

expr

ease

d in

15

Pa.

C.S.

Sec

t. 75

49(b

) is

to r

equ

ire

co

urt

ap

prov

al f

or a

ny

fund

amen

tal

chan

ge a

s to

the

dis

posi

tion

of

prop

erty

com

mitt

ed t

o ch

arita

ble

purp

oses

whi

ch a

ffec

ts t

he

basic

co

ndi

tions

un

der

whi

ch

such

prop

erty

was

do

nate

d.

gran

ted.

or

devi

sed .

.

U

Ther

efor

e, a

lthou

gh t

he C

orpo

ratio

n N

ot-f

or-P

rofit

Cod

e u

nde

r Pe

nnsy

lvan

ia

Rul

e o

f Ju

dici

al

Adm

inis

tratio

n 21

56

auth

oriz

es

the

Orp

hans

' C

ourt

to

be

ar a

ctio

ns

invo

lvin

g n

on

prof

it co

rpor

atio

ns,

this

doe

s n

ot

depr

ive

the

Cou

rt o

f jur

isdict

ion u

nde

r th

e Pr

obat

e. Es

tate

s an

d Fi

duci

arie

s Co

de.

Act

of

June

30.

1972

, P.L

. 508

as

amen

ded,

20

Pa. C

.S. S

ect.

711.

The

situ

atio

n pr

esen

ted

by th

e pr

opos

ed cl

osin

g o

f Wils

on

Colle

ge is

un

ique

. Pro

perty

hel

d by

a s

tand

ard

cha

ritab

le tr

ust

gene

rate

s an

nu

al

inco

me,

an

d al

tera

tions

or

att

empt

s to

alte

r th

e pu

rpos

es o

f the

trus

t do

no

gen

eral

ly d

amag

e th

e tr

ust.

its

prin

cipa

l. o

r its

inco

me-

earn

ing

capa

city

. Th

e as

sets

of W

ilson

Co

llege

, how

ever

, are

hel

d fo

r the

char

itabl

e pur

pose

def

ined

by

Wils

on,

cha

rter,

the

esta

blis

hmen

t an

d m

ain

tena

nce

of

an

in

stitu

tion

of

high

er le

arni

ng a

s a

teac

bing

inst

itutio

n. A

s an

o

ngo

ing

en

tity.

a c

oneg

e is

signi

fican

tly a

ffec

ted

by an

y ch

ange

in

its

st

ruct

ure.

A

ttem

pts

to

impl

emen

t su

ch

chan

ges

can

sev

erel

y da

mag

e th

e co

rpor

atio

n, th

e en

tity

of t

he c

oneg

e. in

way

s whi

ch m

ay b

e diff

icul

t to

repa

ir.

It

is fo

r th

is

reas

on

that

Sec

tion

7549

(b)

of

the

Cor

pora

tion

Not.

fot~

Prof

it C

ode

mu

st b

e re

ad

by t

he C

ourt

to

requ

ire t

hat t

he tr

uste

es o

f a n

on

prof

it co

rpor

atio

n m

ust

seek

Orp

hans

' C

ourt

app

rova

l be

fore

cha

ngin

g th

e n

atu

re o

f th

e in

stitu

tion.

Sec

tion

7549

(b) s

tate

s:

Prop

erty

com

mitt

ed to

chJ

!itab

le p

uJpOS

es sb

IU n

ot,

by a

ny

prO

Cftd

lng

un

der

Chap

ter

79 o

t th

is

title

(m

ating

to fu

ndam

~nta

l ch

ange

s) o

r o

ther

wis

e, b

t di

verte

d l'r

om

the

obje

cts to

whi

ch It

was

don

ated

, gra

nted

or

devi

sed.

unhlS

l en

d u

ntil

the

boa

rd o

f di

rect

ors

or

oth

er b

ody

obt

ains

from

~

eo

urt

an

ord

er u

nde

r th

e Es

tate

s A

ct o

f 194

7 sp

ecify

ing

the

disp

osltl

on o

f the

pro

perty

. (emp

hasis

adde

d)

The

legi

slatu

re h

as c

lear

ly in

dica

ted

that

no

cha

nge

in th

e u

se o

f as

sets

co

mm

itted

to

char

itabl

e pu

rpos

es c

an b

e m

ade

"u

nle

ss a

nd

un

til,.

the

Orp

hans

-C

ourt

gran

ts ap

prov

al t

o th

e 81

f ,0

trus

tees

. O

ther

wis

e, in

the

inst

ance

of t

he p

ropo

sed c

losi

ng o

f a

func

tioni

ng c

olle

ge,

the

Cou

rt w

ou

ld b

e pr

esen

ted

with

a fa

it ac

com

pli.

By i

mpl

emen

ting

the

deci

sion

to c

lose

Wils

on C

oneg

e th

e Tr

uste

es a

ttem

pted

to e

ssen

tially

depr

iVe

the

Cou

rt o

f its

pow

er

to re

vie

w th

e re

co

mm

en

datio

n o

f the

Boa

rd a

nd

to a

ppro

ve o

r di

sapp

rove

the

pro

pose

d di

vers

ion

of

coU

ege

asse

ts f

rom

a

teac

hing

inst

itutio

n to

so

me

oth

er c

harit

able

use

. In

add

ition

, th

e im

plem

enta

tion

of

the

deci

sion

to

clo

se W

ilson

CoU

ege

with

out p

rior

app

rova

l o

f th

e C

ourt

atte

mpt

ed to

dep

rive

the

publ

ic, r

epr

esen

ted

by th

e A

ttorn

ey G

ener

al a

s pa

rens

pat

riae

, o

f an

opp

ortu

nity

to c

om

men

t upo

n O

l" pr

otes

t the

dec

isio

n.

We t

here

fore

co

nclu

de:

1. T

his

Cour

t bas

juris

dictio

n of t

he su

bject

matt

er h

ere

in

litig

atio

n.

2. D

ue t

o th

e u

niq

uene

U o

f a

co

nege

an

d th

e pr

oble

ms

pecu

liar

to

the

co

ntin

uing

via

bilit

y o

f su

ch

an

o

ngo

ing

inst

itutio

n, w

e co

nclu

de a

gov

erni

ng b

ody

may

no

t im

plem

ent

an

y de

cisi

on t

o te

rmin

ate

a co

llege

un

less

an

d u

ntil

Cou

rt

appr

oval

has

bee

n se

cure

d.

The

trus

tees

o

f a

cha

ritab

le

trus

t o

r a

non~

prof

it

co

rpor

atio

n m

ay

no

t div

ert t

rust

or

co

rpor

ate

asse

ts to

pur

pose

s o

ther

than

thos

e pr

ovid

ed b

y th

e sett

lor o

f a t

rust

or

the

cha

rter

o

f a

non~

prof

it c

orp

orat

ion

un

less

an

d u

ntil

the

fulfi

llmen

t of

thos

e cha

ritab

le p

urpo

ses h

as b

ecom

e im

poss

ible

or

impr

actic

al.

The

evid

ence

in

the

case

at

bar d

oes

no

t es

tabl

ish

eith

er t

he

impo

ssib

ility

o

r th

e im

prac

ticab

ility

o

f W

ilson

Co

llege

co

ntin

uing

as

a te

achi

ng c

oD

ege

-o

nly

tha

t its

co

ntin

uatio

n w

iD b

e di

fficu

lt an

d de

man

ding

of

mu

ch

time,

eff

ort.

and

dedi

catio

n.

Whi

le w

e re

cogn

ize.

as

we

mu

st.

the

dist

inct

pos

sibi

lity

that

a tim

e w

ill c

om

e w

hen

the

co

ntin

uatio

n o

f Wils

on C

oUeg

e as

a

teac

hing

ins

titut

ion

m

ay

beco

me

eit

her'

impr

actic

al o

r im

poui

ble

of

fulfi

llmen

t. th

e to

talit

y o

f th