Stuart Hall - Culture Gap

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18 January 1984 Marxism Today

Be it jogging or TV, aerobics or video, the cultural face of Britain has been

revolutionised since the 50s. The only problem is that the Left,

by and large, hasn't seen it as particularly important.

Stuart Hall

The Culture GapORWELL WAS WRONG about manythings. But one thing he did get right wasthe general relationship between cultureand social change. 1984 turns out, what-ever its other faults, to be an uncannyanticipation of some major cultural trendsin modern society. And the essay he wroteabout 'Socialism and the English Genius'in the early years of the war — entitledThe Lion And The Unicorn — was a bril-liant attempt to ground the prospects fora genuinely indigenous British socialism ina reading of the tensions within Britishnational-popular culture. In the actualyear, 1984, this is a theme worthreturning to.

There are sectors of the Left —especially those touched by the alternativecurrents of the 1960s — which dounderstand the relevance of culturalpolitics to the present conjuncture. Theysee the connection between cultural

questions and the task which socialism has— to become part of everyday life, to makeitself 'the common sense of the age'. Butthe Left as a whole has not distinguisheditself in this area. Indeed, one major butneglected factor in the crisis of renewalwhich faces the Left today is the difficultyit has had keeping pace with the enormouscultural changes which have occurred sincethe 1950s. This has implications for theLeft's ability to relate itself to the societyaround it as it is. It also has consequencesfor the Left's ability to renew its own visionand perspectives on the future — to

imagine the future of socialism in wayswhich are in touch with the culturalcategories the mass of ordinary people useto imagine theirs, as we approach theclosing decades of the twentieth century.

The fifties debateThere was a debate along these lines in thedark days of the 1950s when, face to facewith the massive consumer boom whichflourished under the aegis of HaroldMacmillan (remember 'You've Never HadIt So Good'?), and after a second defeat at

the polls, Labour entered one of its earlier

nights of travail. Can it be, Mr Gaitskellinquired at the Blackpool Conference, thatthe whole culture on which the labourmovement rests — the 'cloth cap'communities of traditional working classareas and occupations — was being erodedby the telly, the fridge, the new car, thewashing machine and the glossy magazine.

It is instructive now to recall how thatdebate went. The Gaitskell view was part of the whole revisionist attack by the Right—the attempt to shift the labour movementinto more centrist, 'post-capitalist' paths. Itwas predicated on the 'embourgeoisement'

consumer capitalism did refashion and reshape social

relations

thesis— the belief that, with affluence, theworking class was becoming middle-class,

and that class itself was a fast disappearingphenomenon. Put that way the propositionwas patently absurd, as well as politicallydangerous. Class relations do not disappearbecause the particular historic culturalforms in which class is 'lived' andexperienced at a particular period, change.On the other hand, because of its resistanceto the political strategy and analysis inwhich the proposition was embedded, theLeft was largely driven into an equallyuntenable — but 'correct' — corner: thedefence of 'Clause 4' of the Labour PartyConstitution and the denial that anything

had changed or could change undercapitalism. (Clause 4 remains enshrined;though that piece of formalism has actuallycontributed precious little to deepeningthe concept of social ownership: the statistform of nationalisation has, meanwhile,continued to decline into widespread un-popularity, even amongst socialists).

A cultural revolutionFailing to think the thing through, becausethey did not accept the categories of analysis which the Right provided, the Left

too found itself boxed in. For, in fact, as we

all know now, the slow, uneven, contradtory impact of consumer capitalism drefashion and reshape social relations acultural attitudes quite widely and irrevoably. Contrary to the popular view on tLeft, there is nothing 'un-Marxist' abothat proposition. Capitalism, throughout history, has constantly restructured itseand the cultural relations in which we aall netted. The fact that it is a deepexploitative system has never preventedfrom continuing, even in the midst crisis, to be a dynamic system, constanrevolutionising the ground off which it liv

British society — and thus the labomovement which is part of it — wextensively reshaped, culturally, by long postwar boom, the most sustainperiod of expansion certainly this centuAnd, though the rhythm of capitadevelopment since then has been muneven, the consequences of this reshapi

have not disappeared. Nor, indeed, hasdynamic. The new technologies have nfailed to emerge because the old technologare falling apart. The growth in mconsumption, though it did not destroyoverturn the barriers of class dividsociety, did profoundly modify everydlife-patterns, the social experience aexpectations and the lived universe of majority of ordinary people. One can fievidence of this in a hundred everyday w— in the new kinds of modern conviences which found their way into ordinhomes; in the changes in patterns

leisure, entertainment, holidays; in shiftpatterns of drinking and entertainmentfood consumption. The areas most visito public comment at the time — aimpossible to deny — lay in the new yoculture — the revolution in musical tasstyles of dress and modes of behaviour

A transformation in livingIt is, of course, perfectly true tparticipation in the new mass consumculture was and is very one-sided, andno means a universal experience.

distribution was highly skewed — often



January 1984 Marxism Today 19

predictable class ways. Certainly, thesystem has not been able to sustain thislevel of popular consumption — though, asa result of the bargaining strength of theunions, money wages were maintained for along period, into at least the early 1970s.The 'splurge' was one-sided in another,deeper sense. It was 'mass participation'

principally through personal consumptionin the mass market — a feature whichundoubtedly strengthened the dailyexperience of 'the market as provider',running counter to, and often at theexpense of, more socially responsible,welfare-oriented, common provision. Thismay well have also strengthened modernforms of 'possessive individualism' andprivatisation. That is certainly the negativeside.

On the other hand — to take but onearea only — it transformed the immediate

lives of many working class (and other)women, who would never have come intothe labour market or broken some of theleading-strings of domestic drudgery with-out modern appliances in the home; andwho may therefore be forgiven for refusingto regret their appearance simply becausethey bought these appliances, when theycould afford them, from Rumbelows rather

social labour itself has matured anddeveloped, are still not available insufficient amounts to the working peoplewho produced them and need them!

Trolley warfare at TescoThe foundations of class society were notdestroyed by the high wage, high spendmarket-oriented consumer society whichcame into existence in this period — itwould be absurd to overestimate the shiftswhich occurred. But it would also be quitewrong to imagine that its effects culturallyhave been totally eroded by the fact that thesystem is now in deep depression or thatpeople can't afford all the new goods andservices they would like to be able to buy.The new trends helped to remould habits,patterns, the models of everyday life. Andthese have a profound impact on whatpeople now expect; on the threshold of

their aspirations and expectations, on howthey lead their daily lives.

This underlying drift of cultural change,producing a more loosely-textured, morediffuse and diverse daily experience (not,for that reason, a less exploited one), hasnever been properly analysed or drawn intothe political calculations of the Left. Ibelieve, myself, that over time it made a

than the Co-op. As an aside: there is,sometimes, in the reaction of the Left tothese matters, an inverted puritanismwhich hardly bears inspection. Middleclass socialists, heaving under the weight of their new hi-fis, their record collections,their videos and strip pine shelving, cheapprints and Chinese lanterns sometimesseem to prefer 'their' working class poorbut pure: unsullied by contact with themarket. Yet the only tenable position for atrue cultural materialist must be a deepsense of outrage that the fruits of modern

industry, technology and know-how, which

Kids in Hamleys computer department

considerable contribution to the resistanceto the more statist features of welfare-statesocialism. It strengthened what RalphMiliband has called the trend towards'de-subordination'. I mean the loss of deference of an older and more paternalistkind which, in its modern form, was astrong feature of welfarism. Clients of thewelfare state were expected, by Labour andTory councils alike, not to push and shovefor their rights, but to be grateful for whathas been done for and to them. What didnot change was the numbers of people who

could not survive without the crutch of

state welfare benefits. What did change inthe 1960s and 1970s was this rhythm of gratitude and deference. There is nothing'respectful' about Tesco's or Sainsbury's. If you want a trolley, you had better bustle onin there, pay your money and take yourchoice. Of course, if the consumer sharks orthe bargain-today boys could rip you off, sothey would. No one could have anyillusions — or require any monetaristinstruction — about the character of trading in the mass market. But at least youaren't required to tug your forelock andlook 'deserving' as you approach the till.

Double-sided and contradictoryThe resistance on the Left arose in partfrom a failure to predict the possibility of capitalism's postwar recovery—against thebackground of the 30s depression and theinfluence of a sort of Leninist law of inevitable capitalist crisis and decline; andpartly from a failure to understand thedouble-sided and contradictory nature of mass capitalism. The Left was not in-correct in seeing the massive manipulation,the advertising hype, the ballyhoo, the lossof quality, the up- and down-marketdivision, which are intrinsic to commercialconsumerism. The difficulty was that thismanipulative side was all that was seen.But, of course, since the inception of commercial capitalism and the drawingof all relations into the net of markettransactions, there has been little or no

'pure' culture of the people — no whollyseparate folk-realm of the authentic-popular, where 'the people' existed intheir pure state, outside of the corruptinginfluences. The people have always hadto make something out of the things thesystem was trying to make them into.People therefore used some of the oppor-tunities opened up to widen their area of experience and choice, at the same timeand in the same moment as their hard-earned wages circulated back through thetills and the ad markets into the coffers of the new entrepreneurs.

Consumer capitalism works by workingthe markets; but it cannot entirelydetermine what alternative uses people areable to make of the diversity of choices andthe real advances in mass production whichit also always brings. If 'people'scapitalism' did not liberate the people, itnevertheless 'loosed' many individuals intoa life somewhat less constrained, lesspuritanically regulated, less strictlyimposed than it had been three or fourdecades before. Of course the market hasnot remained buoyant and expansive in this

manner. But the capacity, for a time, of the



20 January 1984 Marxism Today

system to pioneer expansion, to drive anddevelop new products and maximise newchoices, while at the same time creamingoff its profit margins, was seriouslyunderestimated. Thus the Left has neverunderstood the capacity of the market tobecome identified in the minds of the massof ordinary people, not as fair and decent

and socially responsible (that it never was),but as an expansive popular system.

Trends of tomorrowAnother reason for the Left's resistance to"cultural change probably derives from thebelief that the market has delivered most—as it usually does — only to those whoalready have the market advantages of wealth, power, status and influence: thesense that what we have been talking aboutis, for the majority of ordinary people besetby the harsh necessities of life, a minorityexperience. But is it? It certainly wasn't inthe long boom. And while the recessionprevents the mass of people fromparticipating to the same degree on a regularor stable basis, it certainly does not preventthem, when they can, from wanting — andoften having — not yesterday's but today'sgoods, both for themselves and theirchildren. Television is now a majorityinterest and video could soon be. Britainis the largest market in Western Europefor the sale of personal computers, just as,for better or worse, the move to computerlanguages and thinking through video

games is a mass, not a minority privilegedinterest, for children and young people.In part, of course, this is the product of amassively capitalised swamp advertisingcampaign. But more importantly it is alsoa perfectly correct perception that this iswhere modern technology is, these arelanguages of calculation of the future.

We must not confuse the practicalinability to afford the fruits of modern

they bought these appliancesfrom Rumbelow's rather than

the Co-opindustry with the correct popular aspira-tion that modern people know how to useand master and bend to their needs andpleasures modern things. Not to recognisethe dialectic in this is to fail to see wherereal people are in their heads. A labourmovement which cannot identify with whatis concrete and material in these popularaspirations, and expropriate them fromidentification with the private market andprivate appropriation, will look, increas-ingly, as if it is trapped nostalgically in

You pay your money and you take your choice

ancient cultural modes, failing to imaginesocialism in twentieth century terms andimages, and increasingly out of touch withwhere real people are at. What the Leftoften sees only as minority trends havelong since become majority aspirations.The question is, in what political environ-ment are these aspirations to be developedand realised? Is it really only the capitalistmarket and consumerism as a way of lifewhich can connect with them?

The style of the LeftThe Left's resistance to cultural change isreflected in our everyday practices andlanguages. The style of propaganda, partypolitical broadcasts, of much educationaland agitational material locks us into verytraditional and backward-looking associa-tions. Our political imagery is even worsein this respect. We virtually fought the1983 election on the 1945 political pro-gramme. I am not suggesting that the Leftcan survive without a sense of history.Our own people know too little, not toomuch history. But developing a real

popular historical consciousness on theLeft is not the same thing as thinking thepresent in the language and imagery of the past.

Of course, there are many exceptions tothis — I am deliberately exaggerating. Thealternative left currents of the 1960s weremarkedly different in their willingness toexpropriate to the uses of the Left thelanguage, imagery and technologies of thepresent. And they did use these, witheffect, to project, if not a hegemonic visionof the future, then certainly a powerfullyalternative vision to what already existed.

Many of those who pioneered these newmodes of communication remain committed to the Left, willing and anxious to putheir talents and services at the disposanot just of small campaigns and one-issucauses, but of the whole movement. Theare a key sector of modern intellectuals thmass labour movement needs to bring ove

to its side and harness to a popular politicaproject. Organisations pioneering a newrelationship between power and the peopllike the GLC, have demonstrated what cabe achieved in the course of this kind omobilising of new sectors and new skills

From the NHS tothe Marathon and AerobicsWhat is at issue here isn't a matter simplof goods, commodities, and technology. Iis also a matter of attitudes and practicesCulture has never consisted of things —

only of the particular pattern of relationestablished through the social use of thingand techniques. Here again, it is a generafailure of the Left to see and make contacwith the popular and democratic elementin daily life, because of the forms in whichthey are presently packaged or observedTake, for example, the current craze fobody maintenance, the widening concerabout questions of health, exercise, anunpolluted environment and the influencof ecological considerations. This appearas a spontaneous popular movement in civsociety, ahead of rather than sponsored b

'the authorities'. It can look rather like mere personalised fad — biological Do-ItYourself: very apolitical and retreatistAnd yet, they touch very popular attitudeindeed, and form part of a distinctivelycontemporary consciousness. These attitudes arise, in part, from an awareness thathe ecological environment is as much of social enterprise as other, more mundanaspects; that social irresponsibility arises amuch in the exploitation of communityhealth as it does in the exploitation olabour power. They may take a morpersonal form — and that, in itself, tells u

something about the disillusionment witstatism and the idea of the providing state athe bearer of socialism. But they belong texactly the same complex which led to thfoundation of the National Health Servicin the 1940s and its massive populadefence in the 1980s. It represents aimportant ideological current: not threfusal of the welfare state as such but thcorrect view that state-provided sociaprogrammes only become part of a mordemocratic movement when matched byequivalent movements of self-activity icivil society itself. Raymond William



January 1984 Marxism Today 21

once remarked that the 'long revolution'consisted in the slow reach for popularcontrol.

From smoking to Mother EarthThe ecological and environmental impulsehas, in addition to its own intrinsic

democratic potential, links with muchwider, and more obviously 'political'trends. It has a powerful link with thepro-abortion movement, and with femin-ism and its commitment to enlarge thefreedom of women to control their ownlives. But it also has connections to thegrowth of health and safety legislation, a

highly significant advance in trade unionwork in recent years, and one where theunions can clearly be seen, not simply asdefensive, but as advancing into and layingdown the conditions of work and life inmodern industry. To take another smallexample, it has links with the taking of responsibility for the public environmentof others in the anti-smoking campaign.To take a very large instance, the wholethrust has clear links with the peacemovement and the deepening sense of ourinterdependence in survival and the finitenature of 'Planet Earth'.

Yet — because of the more personalised

and apolitical form of this ecologicaland environmental impulse — this is acultural movement from which the Leftand the labour movement have remained,until now, largely insulated. But the forgingof links is not inconceivable, especiallyagainst the background of other countries.

Whatever one may say about the 'historiccompromise' policies of the Italian CP, ithas remained a mass, popular force — ascompared, say, with the disastrous andunderstandable drop in popularity of theFrench Party. And one of the reasons forthis is that the PCI understands that itmust maintain a popular presence. That



22 Janua ry 1984 Marxism Today

there is no popular occasion, no popularfestival, no issue or cause about whichthe masses feel and no emergent move-ment in mass society where the Left canafford not to be present. Why shouldsocialism be a popular political force whenit is not a force in the popular culturesand aspirations of the masses? Again, the

fact that things can be done, even in morereticent Britain, along these lines isevidenced by the popular identificationswhich CND and to a lesser extent GLC,have begun to forge. We need more not less;across a wider spectrum of activities; and aspart of the building of a self-active,democratic popular force, not as merefancy opportunism.

Thatcherism and the marketHorrendously, the Right has been far moresuccessful in recent years than the Left in

connecting with some of these popularmovements and trends in civil society. Of course, they have connected with them intheir own populist way. The intention of the radical Right, which has been mostpenetrative, has not been the conversionof masses to the religion of the market andunemployment. Rather, it has been thesubtle capacity to identify the positiveaspirations of people with the market andthe restoration of the capitalist ethic, and topresent this as a natural alliance. Thatcher-ism has been remarkably successful atmoving the counters around so as to forge a

connection between the popular aspirationfor greater freedom from constrainingpowers and the market definition of freedom. It has created a chain of equivalences between the reaction againststate bureaucracy, so deeply inscribed inthe Fabian version of social democracy, andthe quite different passion for self-sufficiency, self-help and rampant individ-ualism. But, like all ideological and politicalinterventions — which is what Thatcher-ism is — these connections are neither'natural' nor necessary. They represent anattempt to inflect and expropriate and

It is part of the Right projectto turn the tide on every front

absorb what are often democratic currentsinto free market channels. We havesuggested already how and why in theearlier period the market came to be apopular mass experience. The Right, afterall, has no hang-ups about making moneyand stimulating the instinct for moneymaking as the driving force of society. Insimple terms, that is what the capitalist

system is. So to address itself to isolatingand developing the competitive side of that contradictory experience was anobvious and natural way for the radicalRight to align itself with popular aspira-tions or, to put it another way, make itself populist. This is one feature of the widerphenomenon we have seen in this decade of

the Right showing itself once again capableof recuperating itself, renewing itself,taking on the challenge of the social demo-cratic consensus and eroding its basis, and

whom the labour movement now needforge real alliances in action at grass-roots level. But it is an argumentnot seeing these existing constituencieanachronistic cultural terms. Blacks, example, in addition to being massivunemployed and socially oppressed hconstructed a whole culture of resista

around the appropriation of modsounds and advanced technological equment. It is patronising to imagine them they only just came down from

Exercise has become more popular — the London mar

learning once again to address the people

in accents which seem to groove morenaturally with life as they live and ex-perience it. This is the naturalisation of the Right which has prove the real changedground on which the Left in the 1980s hasbeen forced to operate. It is part of theRight project to turn the tide on everyfront — in civil society and moral life asmuch as in economic habits and expecta-tions. Its project, in short, is to becomehegemonic, to address the common ex-perience, to speak to and for 'the nation'.

After 1984

The question is whether the Left can alsooperate on the same ground, turn thesepopular experiences and emergent attitudesand aspirations to its advantage. Or whetherits only alternative is to become alignedwith important but increasingly minorityand traditional constituencies which needdefence in the face of the current onslaught,goodness knows, but which are not wherethe mass experience of the common peopleany longer is at. This is not an argument forabandoning either the traditional Labourconstituencies or those particularly hard-pressed and disadvantaged minorities with

technological tree. Also, it is an argum

for recognising the complexity and diveof cultural experience in Britain today developing strategies which address mass common experience, which projeprogramme on behalf of the majority begin to conceive the future in ways whwill connect with the perspectives of whole society. The approach which takrather patronising tone to where ordinpeople are at, and addresses them as if know better — by no means unknowlabour movement circles and, in sectaform, in the Left as a whole — oserves to marginalise the Left from

parameters and circumstances of everylife which ordinary people inhabit as a of daily modern existence. The democisation of the labour movement's opractices is the point from which broader movement will stem. It wouldfatal if the Left became so disconnecfrom what that daily existence is really — not just in Brixton or Clydeside buless depressed areas of the south east oLondon — that it appeared too outouch to speak pertinently to anyabout how things might be for sociaafter 1984.

Stuart Hall - Culture Gap

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