Struggle for Marawi...7 Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 15 Upsurge in Violent Extremism Abu Sayyaf...

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Struggle for Marawi

Steven Rood, Fellow-in-Residence

Kapihan sa SWSMarch 8, 2018

Social Weather Stations

Struggle for MarawiMarch 8, 2018 2

War for Hearts and Minds

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Philippines Special Operations

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Nasheed:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QOG5A-uvTlY

Islamic State: “Brothers in Marawi”


https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SWSFebMarJun2015Surveys.pdf



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MUSLIMS CHRISTIANS

Net Gainers +7 +19

Net Optimists +30 +41

Net Sat. with Life +25 +36

Net Happy +15 +39

Jobless (% of adults) 15.8 20.1

SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF MUSLIMS VS.

CHRISTIANS, PHILIPPINES, 2017Q1-Q4

Third Quarter 2017 Social Weather ReportSeptember 23-27, 2017 National Survey

READINESS TO HELP THE VICTIMS OF THE MARAWI CITY

CRISIS, PHILIPPINES, SEP 2017

Q87. Gaano po kayo ka-handang tumulong sa mga naging biktima ng krisis sa Marawi City? Kayo po ba ay… (SHOWCARD)

Ready, 60%

Undecided, 20%

Unready, 20%

+40

Net*

* Net readiness= % Ready minus % Unready correctly rounded. Don’t know/Refuse responses are not shown.

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Third Quarter 2017 Social Weather ReportSeptember 23-27, 2017 National Survey

THINGS ONE CAN DO IN ORDER TO HELP THE VICTIMS OF THE

MARAWI CITY CRISIS, PHILIPPINES, SEP 2017(Base: Those who are ready to help the victims of Marawi City Crisis)

Pray for/offer mass for the victims 54%

Donate relief goods 51

Donate clothes 49

Donate money 16

Work personally in packing/

delivering relief goods 13

Keep/protect victims in own house 4

Give free transportation/rides 2

Give free medicine 0.1

Q88. KUNG TALAGANG/MEDYO HANDA: Alin po sa mga sumusunod ang inyong kayang gawin upang

makatulong sa mga biktima ng krisis sa Marawi City? Alin pa po? (SHOWCARD, ALLOW MULTIPLE

RESPONSES)


Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago – Mainstream Moro Fronts

MILF heartlandMNLF heartland

Moro National Liberation Front Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Islamic City of

Marawi

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Area of Operation of Selected Groups

Parang, Barira, Buldon, Matanog-- Camp Abubakar MILF)

Sulu (ASG KFR)

Basilan (ASG,Hapilon)

SPMS Box,,BIFF

Butig, Marawi (IS-Ranao; Maute)

Proposed territory ofthe Bangsamoro


Formal Conflict Management–MNLF & MILF

1976 – Tripoli Agreement – MNLF–Marcos ▪ Marcos unilaterally re-interpreted it

1987 – Jeddah Accord – MNLF – Aquino ▪ Overtaken by 1987 Constitution under Cory Aquino

1996 – “Final Peace Agreement” (FPA) – MNLF – Ramos▪ Integration of MNLF into PNP & Army (actually, MNLF sons & nephews)▪ “Arms to Farms” in reality was Arms AND Farms

2001 – Start of serious progress in MILF talks 2008 – MOA-AD debacle, near-agreement with MILF▪ Declared unconstitutional, violent upsurge, 750,000 IDPs

2014 – Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB) w/ MILF2015 – Mamasapano incident (44 PNP-SAF killed) so no Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) to implement CAB

2016 – Joint Communique on conclusion of Tripartite (OIC-MNLF-GPH) Review of the Implementation of the 1996 FPA

2017 – Expanded Bangsamoro Transition Commission revises draft BBL2018 – Draft Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) again before Congress

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Upsurge in Violent ExtremismAbu Sayyaf (1991 breakaway from MNLF in Sulu [Tausug] and Basilan [Yakan])

– Abdurajik Janjalani fought in Afghanistan, got funding from Osama bin Laden

– Beginning late 1990s, mostly known for kidnapping and piracy– But in particular, Basilan ASG retained Islamic thrust (Isnilon Hapilon)

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (in Maguindanao/North Cotabato)– In 2008, Umbra Kato as MILF commander attacked (MOA-AD)– In 2011 declared “bughat” by MILF after long process (died 2015)

▪ Beginning 2014, reports of recruiting on college campuses in Mindanao

Maute brothers (“Islamic State—Ranao”), middle-eastern trained (Maranao, based themselves in Butig, LdS)

– Beginning 2016, frequent clashes with AFP, culminating in November in Butig, LdS


Islamic State

Islamic City of Marawi, July 2014

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared Caliphate June 27 2014)– July 2 Taguig inmates; July 23 Hapilon swear “bay’ah”– 2016 – ISIS names Hapilon Amir, releases video urging militants to go to PH– December 2016 – Hapilon goes to Lanao del Sur– May 2017 – plan to seize Marawi at beginning of Ramadan – prematurely set

off by arrest attempt on Hapilon

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Urban Warfare in Mindanao Conflict▪ Jolo, February 1974, 8 days to wrest control from MNLF

– City burned as the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) retook it

■ Zamboanga, September 2013 – 20 days– 208 MNLF killed – 20 AFP & 5 PNP – 12 civilians– 119,000 displaced

▪ Marawi, May-October 2017– 919 militants killed, – 165 AFP & PNP, 47 civilians– 460,000 displaced, mostly home-based


Dress Rehearsal – Butig, Lanao Sur (26 Nov 2016)

6 days63 militants killed; 2 AFP killed, 35 injured“They have been decimated.

The capability to sustain and get back to the fight is no longer there” – AFP, Dec. 1, 2016

Mautes ‘said that they will go down upon Marawi to burn the place. And I said, “Go ahead, do it.”’(Du30, Dec 12)

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Troubled Maritime Region

Samal Island – PatikulSeptember 2015

Indanan-InabangaApril 2017

“Back Door”Via SangiheChain

Lahad Datu

Sulu

Basilan

Marawi

February 2013 invasion of Sabah by Sulu Sultanate

Money smuggling via Tawauto finance #MarawiClash

Troubled Maritime Region

Findings from Fieldwork(The Asia Foundation)

Understanding Violent

Extremism in Mindanao

Photo courtesy of the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict,

The “East Asia Wilayah’ and Indonesia

(21 July 2017: IPAC Report No. 38)

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Mutually reinforcing push factors:

Frustration borne out of continuing perceived and actual marginalization of Muslims in Mindanao.

■ Anti Muslim bias; sense of persecution

■ Unaddressed historical injustices

■ Experiences of human rights violations; need for revenge

■ Military operations seen as willful destruction of Muslim communities

Dire political and economic situation

■ Corrupt officials and overall bad governance

■ Poverty, illiteracy, unemployment

Frustration with the MNLF and MILF leadership and the peace process

■ Non–passage of the BBL as evidence of government treachery

■ Nationalist Moro fronts cooperation with the “enemy”

Mutually reinforcing pull factors:

■ Emotional and spiritual appeal of extremist ideology

■ Extremist ideology as compelling response to the present

situation

■ Power and social prestige in the community

■ Belonging to a select group of young Muslim heroes and

warriors

■ Adventure and romantic appeal of youthful idealism

■ Financial reward

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Who are the likely recruits?

■ In mainland Mindanao (urban)

▪ Usually college students

▪ Higher level students of madrasah

▪ Young, idealistic and with leadership potential

▪ Many belong to the middle class families

■ In the islands

▪ Young, poor with low education

▪ Usually children and relatives of MNLF fighters

▪ Personally suffered loss of family members due to conflict

The extremist narrative; their spiel

■ Singularity of aqeedah: “this is the correct way of practicing Islam. All others are innovation and unacceptable”

■ Islam is under attack globally and locally

■ Muslims will always be deceived by non-Muslims

■ Khilafa is the answer to the problems of Muslims

■ Peace process is a deception

■ MNLF and MILF are traitors; turned their backs to true jihad

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Recruitment process? (Basilan & Sulu) (ASG)

Financial

enticements

Guerilla

training

and

swearing of

allegiance

Initial offer

to learn

Arabic

Feeds

those who

come for

religious

education

Indoctrinati

on on

kidnapping

and

violence

Recruitment process (Mainland) (DawlahIslamiya, Ansar Al-Khilafa Philippines)

Recruitment

from among

family

members

Guerilla

training

and

swearing

of

allegiance

mubaya

Interpersona

l

discussions;

long intimate

car rides

Islamic

study

circles

called

halaqa

Public

displays of

ISIS flags

to project

popularity

Social

media

Short

wave

radio

channel

s

Financial

Enticemen

t

Student

organization

s

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What makes the extremist groups resilient?

Community and family support

▪ Not necessarily because of shared belief

▪ Social obligation to help family members in need

▪ Cultural obligation to help a Muslim who is fighting a non-Muslim

▪ Government seen as the common enemy

Community tolerance and silence due to fear of reprisal from extremists

Communities also benefit financially (Sulu & Basilan)

Foreign support

▪ Aside from regular payments to members, $600,000 for Marawi

▪ Coordination of different elements – ASG and Maute, or Dr. Mahmud

for Indonesians


Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

▪ Bangsamoro Basic Law to implement peace agreement▪ Faces rough ride in Congress, particularly House of Representatives▪ The “Bangsamoro narrative” is counter to that of the caliphate

▪ Community resilience interventions▪ Space for community-based dialogue; management of localized conflict▪ Positive messaging with the religious (note: some local ulama threatened)

▪ Security sector reform on Countering Violent Extremism ▪ Rethinking of present security sector approach to VE

▪ Governance Issues▪ Work to improve accountability of local officials▪ Legal framework (Bank Secrecy, Money Laundering, Human Security Act –

5 year 2010-2015 to declare ASG terrorist group)

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Role of Mainstream Moro FrontsMILF: ▪ BBL “best vaccine against the ISIS virus” (won’t convince those dedicated to a

caliphate, but can present a positive Bangsamoro narrative)▪ 2010/2011 – process to declare Umbra Kato and his (BIFF) “Bughat”▪ 2015-2016 – Study Group on violent extremism, but reluctant to endorse anti-CVE▪ June 25, 2017 – issued a fatwa against (unnamed) violent extremist elements

– Meanwhile, Commander Bravo has cooperated with CCCH in operations against Mautes; issued YouTube video in June 2017 (“your jihad is not ours”)

– Twice MILF forces have repelled ISIS-linked militants trying to enter Maguindanao

– Similarly, action against BIFF in central Mindanao has had MILF cooperation since 2011

– Joint Peace and Security Teams (AFP/PNP/BIAF) held open Marawi Peace Corridor

MNLF (Misuari) has recently intervened to help release Abu Sayyaf hostages in Sulu– In February 2013 his forces launched offensive, suffered casualties (including

4 beheadings)


Pathologies of Marawi Reconstruction▪ “Military Reservation” as declared in 1957

– “the military will not claim any land that it does not need”

– New camp to take 10 of the 250 hectares

▪ Total Uncertainty with regard to land

– 11,000 buildings, 3000 “informal”

– 7,000 parcels as per Land Management Bureau, overlapping,

conflicts

▪ Plans for the “Modern” Marawi City

– Wide boulevards, promenades, etc.

– President Duterte wants just low structures to prevent sniping

▪ All local sectors – NGOs, Sultans, LGUs say lack of consultation

Residents have lost everything, are not able to return and have a

very murky future — a situation that could easily lead to

discontent.

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#52 Malingap Street, Sikatuna Village, Quezon CityTels: 926-4308, 924-4456, 924-4458, 924-4465

E-mail: [email protected]

Struggle for Marawi...7 Struggle for Marawi March 8, 2018 15 Upsurge in Violent Extremism Abu Sayyaf...

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