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Strategy for Facilitating, Enabling and Sustaining a Mutually Agreed

Transitional Framework in Sudan

Dr Jeremy Ive and Dr Edward A. Christow

2

A road map for peacemaking

The aim of this paper is to sketch out a road map to outline the different forms

of peacemaking, both informal and international,

In order for them not to undermine one another, but to re-inforce one another

and work together, it is necessary to show both their distinctness and their

inter-relation

Intermediate-level facilitation

•The facilitation of peace and good governance can take place at different levels:

–High-level facilitation moving towards formal mediation

–Intermediate-level facilitation operating on a low profile basis

–The development of inter-communal consensus: people to people

Informal Peace-makers

•Consensus-builders: Build a principled community of understanding

•Catalysts: Address sticking-points behind the scenes and suggest constructive ways

forward.

International Third Party Support for a Settlement

•Intermediaries: Operates as a go-between or mediator

•Sponsors: Put together and deliver linked packages

•Underwriters/Guarantors: Ensure transitional conditions are met

Role of the International Community in the Reconstruction of Sudan

•Embrace and nurture long-term goals

•Ensure provision of resources

•Long-term development assistance

Conclusion

•Informal peace-makers can operate as consensus-builders and catalysts

•International third parties can operate as intermediaries, sponsors and underwriters of

the settlement, which needs to be tightly constructed, phased and linked

•The achievement of peace needs to be seen as a multi-dimensional process

proceeding at different levels and involving the whole range of stakeholders

3

Part Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1

SUMMARY 3

I. INTRODUCTION 4

II. INFORMAL PEACE-MAKERS: CONSENSUS-BUILDERS

AND CATALYSTS 6

A. THE PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE 6

1. Consensus Builders:

The formulation and development of a common framework for peace 7

2. Catalysts: Pre-negotiation confidence-building and the creation of negotiating

space 7

B. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS IN THE NEGOTIATION

PHASE 9

1. Consensus Builders: Putting a common framework at the disposal of the principals 9

2. Catalysts: Acting as an informal facilitating during the negotiating process 9

C. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE SETTLEMENT 10

1. Consensus Builders: Helping to sustain the common ethos and moral framework 10

2. Catalysts

Defusing tensions and misunderstandings 10

D. CONCLUSION 10

III. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT FOR A

SETTLEMENT 14

4

A. SUPPORTIVE INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY ROLES IN

THE PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE 14

1. Intermediaries:

Developing channels as a potential mediator or ‘honest broker’ 14

2. Sponsors:

Assembling packages to provide incentives for negotiations 14

3. Underwriters:

Building up syndicates of potential underwriters for a settlement 14

B. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT DURING

NEGOTIATIONS 15

1. Intermediaries:

Facilitating negotiations as mediator or in proximity 15

2. Sponsors:

The placing of packages on the table by the sponsors 16

3. Underwriters:

The dual role of the underwriters during negotiations 17

C. SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTIES DURING

THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 17

1. Intermediaries: The informal continuation of the intermediary’s role after negotiations 18

2. Sponsors:

The delivery of packages in phases by the sponsors 18

2. Guarantors:

The underpinning of the transitional arrangements by the guarantors 18

D. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUDAN 26

IV. CONCLUSION 29

BIBLIOGRAPHY 31

5

SUMMARY

I. There is a need to initiate, enable and sustain the process both internally and

externally. This can be done fruitfully at an intermediate level.

II. Within the country there needs to be a process of catalysis: that is, a behind the

scenes identification of sticking points and ways to resolve them; and consensus-

building: that is an informed, cross-cutting process of education on the basis of

common principles and the movement towards an agreed goal.

III. Outside of the country, the process needs to be supported by the work of

international third parties operating as guarantors (sponsors, underwriters and

intermediaries). These actions need to be distinguished, but it needs to be presented

and implemented as a package in order to achieve the greatest effect.

IV. The two processes are complementary, but a fine balance needs to be struck

between the independence and integrity of the catalysts and consensus-builders on the

one hand, and the concerted action of the international community on the other

6

I. INTRODUCTION

Peace and governance are both intra- and inter-state, and it is not possible entirely to

separate the two. A start can be made with those societies in an acute state of conflict.

Both negatively to limit the harm arising out of that situation, and positively, to build

up models of what is possible ("plausibility structures" as Peter Berger calls this) and

to disseminate the values to inform this and other situations. This process can be

conducted in the public arena, as consensus is built up on issues of common concern.

It can however, also be promoted behind the scenes, especially in situations where the

rhetoric and reality of the conflict precludes clear listening and mutual acceptance, or

the recognition of common values which the adversarial nature of debate does not

always make possible. These common values need to be of a transcendent nature, that

is, they need to be able to transcend particular ethnic, cultural, ideological and indeed

party political divisions.

The issue of peace and governance is not something that can be tacked on to the

material assistance of the people, but is an integral prerequisite for development. This

is not something that has been fully taken into account in the West, where, if is it

taken at all seriously, it tends to take the form either of military intervention or

alternatively sanctions or externally imposed conditionality. This is not to deny the

place of these; but as instruments to promote peace and governance they tend to take

up a disproportionate share in the already meagre resources allocated to peace and

governance. Further, even the most benignly intended military intervention, or the

imposition of external sanctions is profoundly ambiguous in nature; and this

ambiguity is heightened if the action is taken in isolation from a more broadly

constructed package (See Section III or a suggested framework for third-party

intervention).

A virtuous cycle of confidence building needs to be set in train, whereby the good

relations achieved at one stage provide a secure platform for the achievement of good

relations at another. The dynamic cycle, which operates on an individual level can be

seen as operating at a social level as well: acceptance leads to sustenance, which

flows out as status and results in achievement. In a social and political context this

means that the parties involved need to accept the credentials of the others as equal

and valid negotiating partners as the first step in process. This needs to then result in

proximity in a safe and secure location where the issues are explored on an open basis

freed from the pressure of the ongoing struggle for power. The outflow of this is that

the parties are given status on an equal and multi-lateral basis with the common

purpose of implementing these common deliberations. The implementation is thus

not the vindication of a particular party's position, but the working out of a culture of

negotiation, which all can celebrate equally.

In the process, there are internal as well as external factors. Internally, there is the

nurturing of crosscutting affiliations especially through encouraging the development

of mediating structures (that is the range of institutions across the nation that can

operate as bridges between individuals and groups). This needs to be opened up by a

vision of the centrality of relationships shared across the different groups, as the

bedrock of a free and dynamic society. The emphasis on individual rights is

important in ensuring that all have a stake in society and are able to enjoy the benefits

7

of its overall well being. However, an exclusive emphasis on individual rights without

putting it in the context of the need to nurture the richness and diversity of

relationships and their development can intensify divisions rather than build a stable

but dynamic consensus. Externally, the process can be facilitated by both

governmental and inter-governmental agencies as well as informal bodies acting on a

neutral basis.

The facilitation of peace and good governance can take place at least three levels:

(a) High-level facilitation, which moves towards formal mediation. This of

necessity operates confidentially while in process, but is also high profile,

and therefore still in the public and media gaze. This may also be preceded

or accompanied by secret preparation of the modalities between the

protagonists. The way for this needs to be opened by:

(b) Intermediate-level facilitation, which operates on a low-profile basis. This

is confidential rather than secret, and is an informal process to which the

protagonists do not make overt commitments, and is deniable by them at

any point. Nevertheless it is important in helping to develop ideas and

create space for both (a) as well as:

(c) The development of inter-communal consensus. This can take place

nation-wide or within a particular region. It takes place publicly.

A considerable amount of work has been done in various contexts at level (c) and

there is also a body of emerging accounts of level (a). Level (b) has been much less

practised or understood but is a vital link in the chain of facilitation at various levels.

It is much more flexible than those of the others, but by its nature is invisible in its

process and intangible in its effects. Yet, it is capable of drawing on the experience of

(c) and creating the conditions for (a) to succeed. This can happen without the high-

risk nature of (a) (since should it come to nothing, or becoming public knowledge, it

is not itself a negotiation; and therefore does not bear the political freight of the

negotiation process itself). It is also freer to explore the overarching value framework

that is necessary for any soundly based process of negotiations to succeed.

8

II. INFORMAL PEACEMAKERS: CONSENSUS-BUILDERS AND

CATALYSTS

While all are called to be peacemakers, there is a sense, as has been suggested in the

previous section, that there is also a special task of peacemaking. This consists of

building on a common basis for peace for the future, even at the same time as others,

and the peacemakers themselves, are calling prophetically for the eradication of

present evils and injustices. It is this ‘track’ which we shall be exploring is this

section.

We shall talk of “catalysts” and “consensus-builders”. The catalysts operate largely

behind the scenes. They address and suggest ways to deal those sticking points that

need to be overcome in order for peace to be achieved. The consensus-builders build

on the foundations of common relational principles and develop a principled

community of understanding within which a culture of negotiation can be developed.

A. THE PRE-NEGOTIATING PHASE

There are two parallel, and mutually supportive, aspects to the peacemaking process

in the pre-negotiation phase. The first is that of what can be called a ‘consensus-

builder’, namely, the exercise of developing and disseminating a common framework

which can be accepted as right by all the parties. The other ‘catalytic role’, is the

building up of a network and a continuing process of consultation in a confidential

way. This enables contacts to be established across the political divides, and

agreements to be obtained among the principals (that is the major players or political

groupings in Sudan) in order that the peacemaking process should be continued.

1. Consensus Builders: The formulation and development of a common

framework for peace: A framework of principles needs to be developed and

disseminated both nationally and in the communities in order to form a consensus

about the structures of a future dispensation along lines which all can agree. The

framework needs to based on values which bridge the party political divides, and yet

is specific enough to provide a concrete basis for a new and just dispensation. This

alone can serve as a foundation upon which diverse groupings can build together in

order to promote peace in the Sudanese situation.

The consensus-builders need to be able to bear public witness to the fact that a

framework, such as one built on relational principles, can transcend ethnic,

confessional and ideological barriers. Such a framework can at once offer a radical

and transforming critique of injustices in the present order, and yet suggest ways

forward on which all groups can agree.

The aim of the consensus-builders during this phase needs to be twofold. On the one

hand, they are helping to create a climate, through a groundswell of public opinion, so

that there can in fact be a basis on which negotiations between, or among, the

principals can take place. At the same time, they are setting in motion a public debate

9

on the issues, with implications for, and contributions from, the principals, so that

when negotiations do take place, there will be a general acceptance in the public

mind, about the sort of outcome there needs to be. Above all, the concept that any

government must rule under the law within an accepted framework of values needs to

be well established.

2. Catalyst: Pre-negotiation confidence building and the creation of negotiating

space

While public opinion is being nurtured and educated, the principal actors, both inside

and outside the country, need to be contacted by the catalysts to gain their

acquiescence for the process to take place. No specific endorsement can be or should

be sought from these actors at this time, for the catalysts merely desire to sow seeds

for the future; and it is vital that the process should not bear too particular a stamp of

any of the principals. The efforts during the pre-negotiation phase must be to establish

direct or indirect contacts with the principals to demonstrate to the parties that an

eventual settlement is in their interest, for it could further their goals. The catalysts

need to suggest to the principals, ways of dealing with sticking points which might

otherwise impede negotiations, thus opening the door for the first steps towards the

respective parties coming to the negotiating table.

The following are examples of the areas that might need to be explored:

(a) Water: The issue of water needs to be addressed in such a way that it is seen how

all the respective interests, Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western, can be promoted

and protected; as well as those of the riparian neighbours.

(b) Oil: The division of oil revenues, as well as the mode and mechanisms for the

exploitation of oil for the whole country need to be assured.

(c) The dominance by any one grouping of the public sector, either nationally or

regionally: There is a need to ensure access by all groupings to positions within the

public sector to guarantee equitable treatment of all. Those groups not represented

need to be equipped with the necessary skills for this purpose. At the same time, the

fears of those who are presently employed within that sector that their positions and

livelihood could be under threat should access to the public sector be widened needs

to be met. Those who may be displaced in this way could be assured of

unemployment gratuities or pensions, or technical education programmes could be

encouraged so that the persons currently working in the public sector would learn new

skills to assist them in supporting themselves in the future.

(d) Problems of political fragmentation

Political fragmentation is highly problematical in achieving a political settlement.

(i) The problem of political fragmentation of the North

The opposition umbrella, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) has

attracted a number of the Northern parties, but is itself in the process of

disintegrating, not least with the distancing of Umma Party (UP) from NDA.

This is coupled with the process of fragmentation within the northern

Sudanese parties with UP, Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and National

10

Congress (NC) splitting into two or more factions.

(ii) The problem of regional institutional breakdown: Darfur West, Nuba and

Beja

Umma is both a party with widespread support throughout the North, as well

as specific regional interest in the West focussed around the former sultanate

emirate of Darfur. Their respective Parties represent Nuba and Beja regions.

(iii) The problem of political fragmentation of the South

Antagonism created by differences of interest, ideology or strategy often

supersede the Southern people’s common bonds and shared values; and this

is strained further by the degree of accommodation with or opposition to the

structures and policies of the Government of Sudan (GOS).

In the light of the escalation of the war it can appear that the only options

currently available to the Southerners in general and the SPLM in particular

are to either come to the table on terms set for them by the GOS or else to

keep enunciating ‘all-or-nothing’ claims.

(e) Addressing issues of State and Religion

These need to be addressed to ensure the confidence of all concerned. If a regional or

two-systems option were taken, this could involved an appropriate framework for

each region acceptable to those in that region.

The aim of the catalysts with respect to the respective groupings is to foster agreement

within the groupings themselves so that unity might be restored. Communication

between the different groupings needs to be encouraged, with an emphasis placed

upon discerning common needs and desires. Catalysts can help to focus energy into

the creation of a broad agenda and into the selection of strategies that would promote

rather than undermine political unity. Disabling hostilities towards one another need

to be overcome, so that the respective political groupings can come to the negotiating

table as a united front. At the same time, confidence needs to be built with the GOS to

encourage the normalisation of the political situation so that leaders and organisations

can re-establish contact with their respective constituencies, as well as with one

another. This would enable them to negotiate with the North on a basis of equality and

thus by acting as genuine representatives of their Southern constituencies, be in a

position to ‘deliver’ peace with justice for the common good. Similarly, greater

consensus in the North and the other regions would enable the process to take place

more smoothly and with more hope of whatever is arrived at staying in place.

The catalysts need to gain the trust of all the principal actors as one clearly guided by

an agenda which is not itself determined by the existing political dynamic, but which

takes its bearings most fundamentally from a concern for the basic principles of

justice itself. They must listen attentively to all disputants, showing concern to each of

them equally. During the first stages of contact they must establish their bona fides

with the principals as they come to recognise their commitment to truth, peace, and

justice in their relationship. Their next step would be to suggest ways forward which

would accommodate their respective concerns in a just manner. Should these terms

not be found acceptable, they must return to their first principles and then work out in

consultation with all the parties concerned how an alternative accommodation might

develop.

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B. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS IN THE NEGOTIATION PHASE

As in the pre-negotiation phase, the peacemakers have a parallel role during the actual

conduct of negotiations. They need to have available the common framework which

they have been disseminating in the pre-negotiation phase. At the same time, they

need to be in touch with the principals behind the scenes to help act as informal

channels of communication. They also need to be willing to offer ideas and

suggestions, even if it runs the risk of rejection and even hostility. Unlike the

principals, the peacemakers are not bound by a constituency, only by the bounds of

truth, integrity and the search for peace. As such, there is a freedom of action

motivated by a universal concern, on a non-partisan basis.

1. Consensus Builders: Putting a common framework at the disposal of the

principals: It can be taken as generally true that the National Congress Party together

with Umma, the DUP, the Popular National Congress Party and the Sudan

Communist Party represents the views and interests of the majority of the North.

Similarly, the regional based parties, representing the Beja, Darfur and Nuba areas,

and the range of Southern groupings alongside the SPLM, can be said to reflect the

interests and views of their respective regions.

These are the ‘principals’, and any set of proposals put forward by one will almost

inevitably be denounced and pilloried by the others. This will either be because it is

slanted too much (despite whatever disclaimers may be made) to the interests of one

particular constituency at the expense of others; or the constituency concerned needs

to rally its constituency to demonstrate its political power vis a vis the others. The

simplest and most effective way to do this is to attack or pillory the ‘enemy’.

The consensus-builders, from the work they have done in the pre-negotiation phase,

now have a set of ideas to offer to the principals, which yet does not bear the

imprimatur of any one of them, and thus can be used as the common basis of

discussion. Of course, the principals will be making use of a diversity of ideas, but

their prime aim would be to represent their respective constituencies in the best way

possible. The advantage of such a framework is that in accepting it, neither, or none,

of the principals would have to ‘climb down’ to the others, but can find ways to work

together with their former opponents for the common good.

2. Catalyst: Acting as an informal facilitator during the negotiating process:

During the course of negotiations, stalemates and misunderstandings arise. The

catalysts, as independent agencies trusted by all the principals, can work informally

behind the scenes to help, perhaps on a shuttle basis, to clarify misunderstandings.

They also suggest creative ways around stalemates, taking the risk for failure upon

themselves without prejudice to the bargaining positions of the respective principals.

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C. THE ROLE OF PEACEMAKERS DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE SETTLEMENT

The role of peacemakers does not end with the agreement on a settlement. The

peacemakers need to continue to uphold and secure the settlement in both a public and

a private way.

1. Consensus Builders: Helping to sustain the common ethos and moral

framework: The framework developed in the pre-negotiation phase, and which

helped to inform the principals in coming to a settlement, must continue to be the

basis on which the consensus necessary to sustain the process can be built up. As this

process continues, so must the process of public understanding and debate, so that a

constant sense of living under the protection of law within a constitutional order is

maintained and developed in the consciousness of the public at large.

The framework must also be the basis for developing a proper system of checks and

balances in all areas of life, so that the functions of all institutions: state, and family,

as well as all voluntary associations can function according to their proper role. The

‘covenant’- that is, the authority under which the government is placed in power -

needs always to be brought to the mind of the people as a whole, so that all breaches

of the constitution can be remedied in the courts.

2. Catalyst: Defusing tensions and misunderstandings. The implementation phase

is likely to be full of difficulties and misunderstandings. The catalysts need to be on

hand to help clarify these and build a climate of general confidence and good will. At

the same time they should be drawing attention to those areas where the principles of

the settlement have been moved away from, or where further and subsidiary

settlements need to be reached between conflicting parties.

E. CONCLUSION

Negotiations for the achievement of a new political dispensation may come about in

Sudan in at least one of two ways: either as a result of worsening domestic or

international situations; or as is argued for in this paper, as a result of the parallel pre-

negotiation efforts of the informal peacemakers described here, and concerted

international third-party initiatives (described in Section 3. below); or, most likely, as

a combination of the two scenarios!

The key element of the process described and advocated in the paper is the coming to

agreement on ways to deal with issues, on the one hand, by the principals and on the

other, by the public at large. This will enable a basis to be laid for peace rather than

mutual destruction.

For consensus-building, the backing of a number of key leaders and other public

figures will be needed from across the racial, social, ideological and religious divides.

Just as vital, if not more so, will be the building upwards from within the communities

13

themselves, of a general, and easily-grasped set of concepts to inform the debate.

Common frameworks of values and applied to specific areas of the political,

economic and social structures, will need to be widely agreed to as being the right

basis for a future dispensation. Thus when negotiations take place, they will not be

doing so in a vacuum, but there can be a set of basic concepts, of sufficiently non-

partisan character to be adopted by the respective principals without undermining

their bargaining positions.

At the same time, a catalytic process needs to be undertaken, whereby the trust and

confidence of the principal actors is obtained and space within which free discussion

can take place is created. This space takes the form of a general approbation that the

consensus-building process should take place, without any one principal or specific

groupings giving that process their specific imprimatur (since that night prejudice the

approbation of that process by their opposite numbers). It is vital that the catalysts be

well-informed and in touch with the dynamic of the domestic and international

situation, and have close touch with and entree to the principals. The catalysts also

need to be pro-active in addressing the basic concerns of the respective principals and

indicating to them ways in which they might be met. It cannot be a clinical process,

and the catalysts need also to be closely connected to, and deeply empathetic with, all

the major constituencies. At the same time they would retain their credibility as a

genuinely non-partisan contributor to the overall process, guided throughout by a

fundamental concern for truth and justice in the achievement of peace.

The peacemakers, both catalysts and consensus-builders need to gain the trust of all

the principals as being clearly guided by an agenda which is not itself determined by

the existing political dynamic, but which takes its bearings most fundamentally from a

concern for the basic principles of justice based on the prime value of human

relationships.. By seeking peace and by addressing different aspects of an unjust

situation they will come step by step towards their goal. The peacemakers must

attentively listen to all disputants, showing concern to each of them, even to those

with whom they disagree. While they cannot remain morally neutral, indeed they

must not, they must be careful not to allow themselves to be co-opted into the political

strategy of any one political grouping. During the first stages of contact they must

develop trust and credibility as the conflicting persons recognise their commitment to

restoring truth, peace, and justice to the situation. Their next step will be to suggest

ways forward, which will accommodate their concerns in a just manner. Should these

terms not be found acceptable, they must return to their first principles and then work

out in consultation with all the parties concerned how an alternative accommodation

might develop.

Throughout, however, the peacemakers need to be well aware of the limitations of

their role, and that international support may well be necessary if the principals are to

come together (see Section III below). But the final decision and shape of what

ensues must remain with those in Sudan itself. The transformation of thought and

action within a framework of values shaped and worked-out in a considered and

thorough way needs to take place among those within the country.

At present, a negative spiral towards the continuation and escalation of the conflict

exists in Sudan. This spiral needs to be counteracted in a positive way, in that those

issues that lie at the heart of the anger and frustration of the Southern community need

14

to be addressed in a radical way. This must involve all groupings working out

together the sort of structures that need to be put into place. For this to happen,

channels need to be created by individuals and informal groups working together to

establish networks of confidence and trust between those representative of the

respective communities. The individuals concerned must do this within terms of a

basic commitment to truth and justice. At the same time a public consensus needs to

be built up about the urgency of reaching a constitutional settlement and the sort of

principles which will establish a new order within which all can live together in

freedom and justice. Both aspects of this peacemaking task are needed now to create

a positive movement towards a just and lasting peace in Sudan.

15

CATALYSTS

CONSENSUS-BUILDERS

P

H

A

S

E

S

:

GAIN TRUST OF THE

PRINCIPALS AND HELP TO

‘CREATE SPACE’ FOR THE

CONSENSUS-BUILDER

DEVELOP AND

DISSEMINATE A COMMON

FRAMEWORK

P

R

E

-

N

E

G

COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

BE AVAILABLE AS A

COMMUNICATION CHANNEL

AND ‘SCAPEGOAT’ AS

NECESSARY

PUT THE COMMON

FRAMEWORK AT THE

DISPOSAL OF THE

PRINCIPALS

N

E

G

O

T

I

A

T

I

O

N

IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENT

HELP TO DEFUSE TENSION

AND BUILD COMMON

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN

THE PRINCIPALS

HELP TO BUILD A COMMON

ETHOS ON THE BASIS OF THE

COMMON FRAMEWORK

T

R

A

N

S

I

T

I

O

N

A

L

IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL CONSTITUTION

HELPING TO DEVELOP THE

COMMON UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN THE PRINCIPALS

HELP TO BUILD ON THE

COMMON ETHOS IN TERMS

OF THE COMMON

FRAMEWORK

F

I

N

A

L

16

III. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT

The position of either other states or of international organisations as international

sponsors allows them to play a key role in encouraging a peaceful settlement to the

Sudanese crisis.

No matter what international organisations, states, or individuals take part in securing

a final settlement for Sudan, the significant decisions concerning the outcome must be

made by the Sudanese. Although a third party may open doors that formerly were

closed, the people of Sudan - through their respective leaders - must themselves select

the paths that they wish to take. An outsider cannot dictate the future, but can serve to

stimulate the taking of positive steps towards a settlement, and the securing of such a

settlement on a sound footing.

A. SUPPORTIVE INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY ROLES IN THE

PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE

There are three ways in which international third parties can prepare the way for the

negotiation process: -

1. Intermediaries: Developing channels as a potential mediator or ‘honest

broker’: The independent status of the third party can allow it to provide a venue for

negotiations and will therefore assist in developing a solid framework for a

constitutional settlement in Sudan.

Such an intermediary will encourage trust and recognition of mutual bonds by

opening channels of communication without public exposure. The intermediatory will

promote creative options for the principals and act as an intermediary so that they

might eventually come together for negotiations.

2. Sponsors: Assembling packages to provide incentives for negotiations: Since

economic pressures could affect the success of a negotiated settlement, economic

support at crucial points will be necessary for persons in need. The objective is to

assure eventual stability and physical security of all Sudanese by working to put

together packages that would go into effect following successful negotiations.

Financial assistance will both encourage them to come to the negotiating table as well

as assist in promoting a smooth transition by relieving some of the apprehension

change will bring. Programmes providing for technical re-training, guaranteed civil

servants’ pensions and unemployment gratuities, as well as the promise of investment

in key sectors in order to facilitate more rapid advancement for Southerners with

alternative employment for Northerners, are potential methods of assuring the support

of the respective principals. Such efforts will help to reduce tension and encourage

communication and understanding, for they will be positive measures with

symmetrical effects. They will be a concrete demonstration of the promises offered by

the facilitator, one that will foster good will between the parties by meeting their basic

17

concerns.

3. Underwriters: Building up syndicates of potential underwriters for a

settlement: There needs to be a syndicate of third-party underwriters to agree to

uphold the settlement once it is agreed upon. The greater the number and the broader

the range of third parties forming the syndicate, the more likely the guarantees will be

acceptable to the principals (especially if the syndicate is well balanced with the

respect to the principals concerned). The promise of such a syndicate will not only

encourage all parties to adhere to the agreement, but will also help to uphold stability

within the region as a whole.

Although the Sudanese themselves must agree upon the actual social, economic, and

political structures that they wish to construct, the third party syndicate can play a

significant role during the early stages of implementation as the guarantor of the

settlement (that is one charged with the specific task of ensuring that the settlement is

implemented in full and with effect on all parties to the settlement; and that none

defaults and so negates the understanding which brought the settlement about).

Effective and verifiable procedures for the implementation of the final agreement

need to be identified: such as the need for an internationally-recognised interim

government overseeing a timed process of transition, the supervision of free elections,

monitoring forces, and an appropriate evaluation process. While the syndicate may

not be able, and should not attempt to underwrite the entire process of transition, or to

implement all of the details, it can help to shape and guide the process by careful

specification of parameters for the implementation of the settlement.

C. INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT DURING

NEGOTIATIONS

If and when the principals choose to ‘turn the corner’ and enter into discussions, the

pre-negotiation work of the international third-parties will have set the stage through

the developing of channels, the assembling of packages of incentives, and the

formation of international syndicates to make possible the transitional process.

1. Intermediaries: Facilitating negotiations as mediator or in proximity: Once the

principal actors decide to come together, the method of locating a mediator is flexible.

Either the peacemaker of the pre- negotiation stage or a trusted party may serve as

mediator. If the participants find it more acceptable, a third party could fill this

position as could of status or a statesman of note. Whoever is selected may or may not

actually chair the negotiations, but will guide the over-all phase according to the

framework and principles set out earlier.

The mediator needs to gain the respect of the parties at the negotiating table, for his

credibility is the key to opening discussions. He or she must demonstrate equal

concern for all sides, creating legitimacy for each by attentively listening to their

anxieties as well as to their desires. A successful settlement hinges upon the

mediator’s ability to gain the trust of the principals. A notable example of this being

President Jimmy Carter’s success in the negotiation of the Camp David accord

between Israel and Egypt in 1978 in which Egypt agreed to recognise Israel’s right to

18

exist in return for the restoration of territory conquered by Israel.

In addition, the mediator must listen so as to take account of the fears and objectives

of each party, allowing each to express themselves within the framework established

to guide negotiations. A successful mediator will create room within which the

parties can manoeuvre, in order to release tension. He will, therefore, allow them to

take credit for any progress made while accepting any blame or negative responses

himself. By acting as a scapegoat, the mediator can reassure and preserve the

integrity of the negotiators.

The rights of all persons and interest groups must be addressed during the first stages

of negotiations. One group must not dominate another either during the negotiations

or in the final agreement. Indeed, the implementation of an extensive bill of rights

and the protection of private property should be considered as a prior step in order to

bring the principals to the negotiating table. The key at this stage is to appeal to the

leaders and to thus gain their commitment to the process, for without their

commitment it will be impossible to carry out a constitutional settlement.

The aim of the mediator is to bring the principals together, to foster communication

and to ensure that plans for discussion are widely canvassed. Creative options for

mutual advantage ought to be promoted by the mediator as well. The mediator will

serve as the link between the principals so that they might eventually come together

and he will initiate movement through both influence and intervention.

As a first step, the mediator needs to contact the leaders, build trusting relationships

with them, lessen misperceptions, build confidence, and set a positive tone to the

proceedings. The next phase involves helping to define the basic issues before the

negotiators and setting a broad agenda. Anything, which is merely peripheral, is to be

disregarded, for the negotiations will address primary issues alone. Specifics will be

dealt with later on, for they tend to stimulate debate and dissension. Strict guidelines

of both behaviour and of procedural matters must be agreed upon at this stage, as

must the method of reaching the final settlement.

Once a broad agenda has been accepted, the mediator needs to work on discovering

common ground and on generating possible measures for mutual advantage. These

measures need to be created and developed in an uncritical atmosphere by the

participants as well, for then they will begin to 'own' the process themselves. Once all

possibilities are suggested, each will be evaluated according to its costs and benefits,

with only those found acceptable remaining before the negotiators. Although each

side must abandon some of its demands, the final settlement must be one in which no

one is defeated - in fact, all will ‘win’ from the stable Sudan which they have assisted

in creating. By indicating how the basic needs of the people can be met (freedom to

have control of their own lives, physical security, the right to well-rounded education,

recognition of basic dignity, and economic well-being) as well as by participating in

discussions, each party is assured that the particular concerns of its constituents will

be addressed and that it will have an assured stake in the outcome.

The mediator must then construct a detailed agenda and a timetable to guide through

every step of negotiations. From the first contact with the principals to the signing of

the final settlement to the implementation of the agreement, a plan of action must be

19

strictly adhered to. The structure of the negotiation must be in such a manner that a

chain-linkage from one agreement to another is formed. This is so that agreement on,

for example, the final constitution will lead naturally to the consideration of the

transitional arrangements and then to the resolution of the present conflicts; and once

agreement is reached on one point, none of the principals must be allowed to

backtrack from it.

As the participants recognise their own particular stakes in the settlement, they will

more easily accept each point discussed. By participating in each step, the parties will

become more involved in the process and are thus less likely to renege on earlier

promises. Carefully worked-out plans for discussion, clear goals, and a strong

chairman who will maintain momentum of the process are essential. The chairman’s

task is to break the issues down so they are more attainable as well as to move the

talks ahead with the help and support of the key external parties, to conduct tough

one-on-one bargaining, and strictly to allocate discussion time.

2. Sponsors: The placing of packages on the table by the sponsors. A package of

aid and assistance can be assembled and placed on the table, or at least made known

to the principals either definitely or by implication, as an inducement to begin and

continue the negotiation process. However, as is the case with the guarantors, the

sponsors of the resulting settlement need to be able to restructure their package of

assistance so that it can be applied specifically to overcome possible sticking points in

the negotiation or implementation of the agreement, or be planned so that its delivery

in phases be linked to the successful implementation to crucial provisions of that

settlement.

3. Underwriters: The dual role of the underwriters during negotiations: The

syndicates of underwriters, which have been built up during the pre-negotiation phase

can be brought into play in two ways. Individual states or groupings of states need to

be brought together with an interest in encouraging and sustaining the negotiation

process itself. These intermediate guarantors need to be ready to bring pressure on the

respective principals so that the parties can be encouraged to come to the table in the

first place, and that obstacles encountered at the different stages of the process can be

overcome. Underwriters also need to be at hand to guarantee the implementation, in

stages, of the settlement itself.

The pressures on the principals before they may take part in negotiations needs be

structured in such a way that each of them will face equally negative measures should

they decide to obstruct or unilaterally withdraw from the agenda and timetable agreed

upon by the principals in commencing the negotiations. There will need to be a

symmetry of penalties applicable to the principals, so that all have an equal interest in

the success of the talks; so that none of the principals will, for the sake of tactical

advantage, be tempted to stall or break off the negotiation process. All the principals

need to be equally committed to avoid the collapse of the discussion or a reneging on

either the intermediate agreements or the final settlement. In the case of a deadlock,

the chairman may find it necessary to threaten the parties that he will settle for a

‘second best’ option and the intermediate guarantors need to be at hand to help him

put this contingency plan into effect.

The prospective guarantors of the settlement itself need to be close at hand during the

20

course of the negotiations, so that they can be ready to underwrite the provisions of

the settlement as they are agreed upon. Modern communications mean that the

consent of the underwriters to the guarantees can be obtained quickly and at the

highest possible level. The leading underwriters will have their representatives in

close proximity to the discussions; but their brief should be defined in such a way that

the guarantees which the underwriters provide can be tailored to fit the successive

provisions of the settlement as they are shaped by the principals.

C. SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTIES DURING THE

IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

In many African countries where there has been a far-reaching transfer of power, this

has been preceded by a transitional period to allow this to take place in an orderly

way. Arrangements need to be agreed upon which allow the power-holders to move

towards a thoroughgoing transfer of power without losing face, or allowing a

breakdown of law and order or the rise of an order which is directly antithetical to

their fundamental concerns.

Although a dramatic transformation is desired in Sudan, those involved must be

willing to adopt a realistic strategy to ensure that the new situation is an improvement.

Once a settlement is reached, the question of how to implement, monitor, enforce, and

evaluate it comes into play. Rigid control by the interim government and the division

of the agreement into short-term goals rather than long-tern objectives may make the

accommodation more obtainable. Such a plan, which prepares for the transitional

changes which the future might bring, provides for further options for peace and for

guaranteeing the success of the actual settlement itself.

The transition period may begin with a cease-fire monitored by outside forces, the

establishment of an interim government and fair elections. The final phase

commences with the transfer of sovereignty to the new state and its government. The

transition in Sudan will be one of developing and accepting a framework, and then

implementing it with the backing of guarantors and sponsors dedicated to ensure the

full and scrupulous implementation of the settlement.

The achievement of a constitutional settlement does not guarantee the elimination of

conflict, for it does not abolish all conflict but simply reduces and channels it. Two

basic factors, however, will add to the chances for maintaining peace within Sudan:

constructing a firm foundation for the settlement and creating a climate of good will

amongst the parties agreeing to the plan. The establishment of a solid, just and

balanced structure will especially help make for a peaceful transition, as will the

participation directly and indirectly by all parties involved internally or externally in

the present conflict. All participants will need to make sacrifices, so that all may ‘win’

and none may suffer total defeat. Such an accommodation will prepare the people of

Sudan for a peaceful and prosperous future.

1. Intermediaries: The informal continuation of the intermediatory’s role after

negotiations: The intermediatory’s role strictly ends with the signing of the

21

agreement by the principals, and the support for the implementation of the settlement

then passes to the guarantors of the settlement. However, the intermediatory can

remain on hand in an informal capacity by maintaining informal contacts with the

transitional government and the guarantors in order to clarify any misunderstanding

which may arise in the implementation of the settlement.; and They will thus help to

suggest, by a process of informal representations to the parties concerned, ways in

which the terms of the settlement can be upheld and enhanced, say, by the application

of further aid to overcome obstacles in the implementation of the settlement, which

might not have been foreseen during the negotiation process.

2. Sponsors: The delivery of packages in phases by the sponsors. Packages of aid

need to be delivered in phases and linked as far as possible to the implementation of

the settlement. This is to encourage and support the working out of the terms of the

settlement by all the principals, and the strict honouring of both its spirit and letter by

the transitional government. Unlike the trusteeship of the settlement by the

guarantors, which ends strictly with the completion of the transitional phase, the

sponsors need not cease their delivery of aid with the ending of the transitional period.

Although, the strict rationale for continued assistance, namely as an incentive to carry

out the terms of the settlement, would no longer apply. In fact, aid can be targeted

specifically to follow the achievement of the final stage, and further delivery of aid

can, explicitly or implicitly in terms of the settlement, be negotiated in order to

overcome any unforeseen obstacles in either the transitional or final stages of the

implementation of the settlement.

The following areas are those in which the international sponsors can promote the

implementation of the interim settlement.

(a) Resettlement and Re-integration of combatants

Once the combatants have been discharged they would be transported to their

destination of their choice and they would be provided with financial and technical

assistance in the form of cash, food, clothing and medical care for a period ranging

from several months to one year. Since this effort requires large amounts of money,

the sponsors would have to ensure that adequate financial and material resources as

well as technical assistance are made available to all former combatants on an equal

basis and for a uniform duration.

Once the combatants have settled in at their destination, the international community

and the interim authority would have to ensure that the local community is made

aware of the special needs of these individuals. In order for the combatants to become

fully integrated into their society they would have to become actively involved in

their community and be able to contribute economically. The success of this process

would depend both on the skills that the combatant might have acquired through the

training programme during the re-insertion period and also on the macro-economic,

political and social stability of Sudan.

Throughout the de-mobilisation process special attention must be paid to child and

women soldiers, as well as to the wives of ex-combatants who would require special

counselling, and support. In some of these cases, women and children would require

access to special medical facilities. Children might have to undergo special vocational

training courses and they should also have access to learning facilities. The

22

international sponsors have a vital role to play throughout the whole process through

the extension of financial resources and technical assistance to the institutional

structure of the interim authority.

(b) De-mining

According to the UN, in 1998 there were two to three million landmines in the Sudan

covering some 800,000 square kilometres or 32 percent of the country.1 These

landmines have generated three basic problems for the Sudanese population. They

are responsible for the increased civilian and military death toll as well as the loss of

livestock and wild animals. The mine survivors have been directly affected by the

pain and cost of their treatment and the loss of employment opportunities, which in

turn has affected the livelihood of their families.

During the interim period the international community could support the interim

authority in three ways. Firstly, the international sponsors could help increase the de-

mining capacity of the Sudanese military. Currently, the Sudanese military have

engineer units that are used in de-mining but they are not used in large-scale de-

mining operations. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNAMIS) could train

Sudanese combatants in de-mining actives and act as a central point for co-ordinating

all mine clearance activities by Sudanese and international bodies.

Secondly, the international sponsors could help the interim authority in running mine

awareness programmes with the help of International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC), the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the

HALO Trust and other non government organisations (NGOs). These activities

would alert the Sudanese people of the dangers of mines and would inform

communities of mined areas to be avoided.

Thirdly, the international sponsors could provide victims’ assistance to people in need

of medical and psychological rehabilitation so that they could become productive

members of their communities. One of these activities might include the

establishment of artificial prosthetics and limbs factories in every affected Sudanese

State.

(c) Military Conversion

After the conflict has ended the international sponsors could assist Sudan to convert

some its military industries into civilian manufacturing facilities. This would not only

reduce the cost of military spending in the country but would direct scarce resources

to more productive uses. Military conversion is an expensive task that requires careful

planning, prior experience and knowledge of the military conversion process. The

international sponsors could assist the Sudanese interim authority in retraining people

and in converting the military facilities to peaceful use. For example, the mechanical

ammunition factories could be converted into agricultural machinery facilities.

1 Landmines Magazine. Sudan: conflict and development, De-mining News from the United Nations,

Vol. 2, No. 3, October 1997 and US State Department. Hidden Killers: 1998: The Global Landmine

Crisis, Washington, 20 January 2001.

23

(d) Reintegrating War-affected Population

After the Sudan Peace agreement has been signed, the international sponsors would

need to assist the Sudanese interim authority with the repatriation, resettlement and

reintegration of the four million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 478,427

Sudanese refugees, and the qualified Sudanese nationals who are abroad.2

(e) Repatriation and Resettlement

The repatriation and resettlement of the Sudanese population would require immense

financial, logistical and technical resources and capacities. This effort would need to

involve at least three UN agencies. The UNHCR would be responsible for repatriating

Sudanese refugees who are based abroad, the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) would be responsible for the resettlement of IDPs, and the

International Organisation for Migration (IOM) would be responsible for the return of

qualified Sudanese nationals. This repatriation and resettlement programmes would

require the close involvement and co-ordination of all concerned stakeholders, the

interim authority, international organisations, domestic and international NGOs and

representatives of the three groups to be resettled. Prior to repatriation and

resettlement all IDPs, refugees and returnee-qualified nationals should receive

orientation and be briefed thoroughly.

(f) Economic and Social Integration

Once people have been repatriated to the location of their choice, the Sudanese

interim authority and the international sponsors should aid their economic and social

integration. The process of economic reintegration would entail assisting all returnees

to become economically self-sufficient and productive members of their communities.

If the returnees are engaged in agriculture then the international community would

have to assist the interim authority in establishing a land-tenure framework which

would resolve any outstanding land rights issues. The international community could

also provide a number of agricultural extension services in the form seeds and tools.

Other methods would include the provision of micro-credit services to enable people

to start-up small enterprises and the extension of training courses to provide or

augment specialised skills. If the returnees are highly qualified nationals, the IOM

could assist both the individuals and their family in finding jobs as well as the

institution that would employ them. This assistance could be in the form of grants to

individuals, who would receive salary supplement for 12 months, and institutional

grants that would provide further resources to the employing institution.

The process of social integration would entail assisting all returnees within their

social, religious and ethnic communities. This process would involve both the

returning individuals and the communities to which they are returning. During this

period the interim authority would have to be aided by the international community in

the community building efforts, which must involve everyone. These community

building efforts might include the resolution of ethnic or communal disputes, the

restoration of trust through equitable access to resources and power, and the

elimination of social exclusion.

2 United Nation’s High Commission for Refugees, Provisional Statistics on Refugees and Others of

Concern to UNHCR for the year 2000, Geneva, 2001.

24

In some regions this would entail the establishment or expansion of new services or

facilities which could follow-up this whole process on the ground and act as a source

of advice and confidence amongst all stake holders.

During the re-integration of the war-affected population special attention must be paid

to the needs of three vulnerable groups: women, children and the elderly. Each of

these three groups would have their own particular needs that the interim authority

and the international sponsors must meet. For example children may need

psychological counselling and access to special medical facilities. The elderly would

need to be repatriated with care, assisted in finding their family and relatives and

provided with social benefits and community support. Women may need to take on

non-traditional roles and become the bread earners so as to ensure the economic

security of their families.

(g) Assisting the Interim Authority(ies)

During its work the interim authority would face challenges as it seeks to fulfil its

mandate. Some of the biggest challenges would be consequences of the past conflict

and would include impaired socio-economic structures and institutions, and damaged

physical infrastructure. These factors would prove a challenge to the interim authority

as it seeks to carry out its programme of resettlement, re-integration and referendum.

The role of the international sponsors in the socio-economic reconstruction during the

interim period could not be overstated. Some of the most important areas in which the

interim authority would require assistance are listed below.

(i) Institution and Infrastructure (Re)building

The interim authority(ies) capacity would determine to a large extend how

effective and efficient it would be discharging its duties. That is why it would

be essential that the institutional capacity of the interim authority be (re)built

and the physical infrastructure be rehabilitated. The international sponsors

could rebuild the institutional capacity of the interim organs by identifying the

various skill shortages as well as the frameworks, processes and equipment

which need to be put in place. Once the above task is completed, the

rehabilitated interim institutions would be able to perform their functions

effectively, efficiently and sustainably.

The Sudanese civil war has impaired the country’s health, water, sanitation,

transportation, communication, education and utility networks. Some of these

projects such as the rehabilitation of damaged roads, bridges, hospitals,

schools and dams might be beyond the financial means of the interim

administration because they require large capital investments and specialist

know-how. The international sponsor could help the interim authority to

resolve this dilemma by prioritising and sequencing of projects and by co-

ordinating, directing and concentrating resources to the most urgent

programmes.

25

(ii) Debt Relief

According to the World Bank, in 1998, Sudan’s debt stood at $15.9 billion.

Out of this total, $6.3 billion was short-term and outstanding debt.3 If the

interim authority is to have the means to implement its interim programme it

should not be constrained by the country’s large debt. The international

sponsors could help the interim authority by writing-off some of Sudan’s debt.

They could also help reschedule and reduce the country’s debt through the

Paris Club and provide new loans for the interim authority to use in servicing

its debt.

(iii) 0fficial Development Assistance (ODA)

Throughout the 1980s, Sudan received high levels of official development

assistance (ODA), which peaked in 1985 at $1.9 billion. By 1996, ODA

dropped to $100 million with 80 percent of donor resources going to relief and

emergency operations and only 20 percent to development. This, coupled with

the servicing of the national debt, has curtailed national development

programmes and has generated such a situation whereby 90 percent of

ongoing development programmes are financed by the UN system.4

In order to rectify this situation, the international sponsors must increase the

levels of their relief and development assistance and help the interim authority

in three ways. Firstly, the international sponsors would have to ensure that the

interim authority would have enough resources to deal with any ongoing

emergency operations arising from droughts, floods and famines. Secondly,

they would have to assist the interim authority’s food security programmes

through their support for sustainable rural development. Thirdly, they would

have to strengthen the authority’s capacity in planning, resources mobilisation,

implementation, monitoring and review of relief and rehabilitation

programmes.

(iv) Restructuring the Economic Sector

Another important area in which the international sponsors can play a vital and

active role would be in the area of the economic reconstruction of the Sudan.

The assistance that the partners would provide to the interim authority must be

tailored to the specific strategy, devised by the authority. This strategy would

have to seek to balance the macro-economic restructuring of the country with

its political stability. The areas in which the interim authority could receive

financial, material and technical assistance are as follows: fiscal, monetary and

inflation planning and policies, foreign exchange policy, savings and

investment strategy, foreign and domestic trade, regional economic integration

and structural adjustment.

For example, the IMF could help the interim authority to reduce Sudan’s

inflation, stabilise the exchange rate and renew debt servicing. The World

Bank and the African Bank for Development could assist the interim authority

in establishing and streamlining its regulatory framework, push forward with

privatisation and accelerate the implementation of export promotion policy.

3 World Bank, Country Profile -- Sudan, Washington, 2000.

4 UNDP, First Country Co-operation Framework for the Sudan: 1997-2000, New York, 23 June 1997,

p.3.

26

The principal challenge of the restructuring of the economic sector would be

to create a stable economic environment that is conducive to local and foreign

investment under political and social pressure. The restructuring of this sector

would be accomplished if the interim authority has the necessary capacity to

plan, implement and co-ordinate its economic adjustment programme.5

(h) Promoting Good Governance

During the interim period one of the challenges of the interim authority would be to

promote good governance through transparency, accountability, rule of law,

participation and combating corruption. These actions would strengthen public

institutions, legitimise the interim authority in the eyes of the people and build

confidence in the interim process.

In each of these cases the international sponsors could provide technical know how

and resources to encourage interim officials to disclose all information so that it

would be known by the public. This could be achieved either through press releases or

through yearly statistical reports. Furthermore, the interim authority should be

accountable to ombudsmen, to ensure that it would be operating within a legal

framework and would be involving the private sector and civil society. The

international sponsors could help in the review of the existing mechanisms,

institutions and capacities before deciding on what package could best augment the

current capacity. This could take the form of the establishment of new institutions like

ombudsmen, training of government officials and the introduction or enhancement of

powers of specialist bodies.6

The interim administration could also be aided in tackling government corruption

through the review of the existing structures and regulations and the introduction and

enhancement of new guidelines, policies, procedures for reporting, provisions for

disclosure of financial or other interests as well as training and assessment of

government officials. The international sponsors could provide technical expertise to

the interim administration to strengthen its capacity to monitor the awarding of public

contracts, the allocation of subsidies, licensing, levying fees, privatisation and cross-

border transactions.7

(i) Creating an enabling Environment for the Private Sector and Civil Society

According to the CIA World Factbook 2000 -- for Sudan, in 1996 only 6% of the

country’s labour force was employed by the government, whilst the unemployment

rate during 1992/93 was estimated at 30%.8 This underlies the fact that although the

Sudanese government is the biggest economic force in the country; it is not the only

one. Once the peace agreement has been signed, the private sector could play an

important role in the development of the Sudan by generating employment, wealth,

tax revenue and hard currency for the interim authority. In order for this to happen the

international sponsors would aid the interim authority in fostering sustainable private

5 Carbonnier, Giles, Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy, United Nations Research Institute

for Social Development, 1998. 6 Overseas Development Council, Making Peace Work -- Lessons for the International Development

Community, ODC Conference Report, 1996. 7 OECD/PUMA, Survey on Anti-corruption Measures in Public Sector in OECD Countries, Paris,

1997. 8 CIA, The World Factbook 2000 -- Sudan, Washington, 2000, pp. 6-7.

27

sector development through a number of activities. Some of these activities would

include the following:

Establishing a stable micro-economic environment through balanced financial,

monetary, and fiscal policies

Ensuring that the private sector has easy access to credit with low interest rates

Providing incentives for domestic and foreign investment through tax breaks and

elimination of red tape

Encouraging and co-ordinating the work of foreign and domestic NGOs in

establishing micro-credit and vocational training facilities in the country

Enforcing the rule of law through anti-corruption programmes

Developing the country’s physical infrastructure

The above mentioned programme would need to go hand in hand with a broader

policy of nurturing the institutions of civil society, including a free and responsible

press, voluntary associations and free civic interaction. This would help to promote

social and economic initiative and dynamism and build a positive network of

relationships for the future prosperity of the country as a whole.

According to the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), 213 non- government

organisations (NGOs) operated in the country in 1994. In 1997, the Sudan Council of

Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA), published a directory which listed 101 Sudanese and

72 foreign NGOs working in northern Sudan.9 In addition, there are more than 40

foreign NGOs working in southern Sudan. These agencies have been playing a vital

relief, rehabilitation and development role in the country.

During the interim period, the international sponsors could aid the HAC and the

Sudanese NGOs, financially and technically. On the one hand, the international

sponsors could strengthen HAC’s regulatory framework by providing consultants to

work alongside and/or advice the commission, as well as through briefings, training

seminars and physical facilities. On the other hand, the international sponsors could

develop the capacity of local NGOs through the provision of necessary office and

field equipment, and through the development of their human resource capacity.

The development of civil society would not only augment the development of Sudan,

but would also provide checks and balances on government power and monitor

government corruption. The international sponsors could also aid the work of

Sudanese human rights organisations that could assist the ombudsmen in collecting

information about human rights violations. For example, the international sponsors

could help Sudanese NGOs in running human rights training for police, military and

judiciary.

3. Guarantors: The underpinning of the transitional arrangements by the

guarantors: During the implementation phase, the guarantors must be available to

intervene to the exact extent as has been agreed upon by the principals in reaching the

settlement. To that extent, the principals will have chosen to limit the sovereignty of

the successor state established by the settlement for the length of time agreed to in the

settlement.

9 SCOVA, Directory of the NGOs Working in Sudan, Khartoum, July 1997.

28

There are two key areas that the international guarantor would need to underpin: that

of the holding of the referendum and that of the implementation of the cease-fire.

These need to be put in place at the same time as the monitoring elements, be it

specified observers at times of elections, or the presence of an international force to

oversee the re-organisation of the army. They must be of such a nature that it is

genuinely balanced and non-aligned with respect to all the principals at the time of

reaching the settlement. De facto checks and balances, as well as de jure limitations

must be built into the terms under which any intervention to uphold the settlement is

to take place. For example, any monitoring force could be of a balanced nature, half

comprised of elements nominated by one set of principals, and half nominated by the

other, each being able to veto nominations made by the other.

(a) Monitoring the Referendum

The international guarantors have an important role to play before, during and after

the referendum. Their support and involvement in this process could be a powerful

confidence-building force that would help enhance the legitimacy of the interim

authority. The support of the international guarantors could take two forms. The first

could be in the form of technical support prior to the referendum. The second wcould

be the monitoring and reporting of the referendum.

The Sudanese referendum would be an expensive and challenging undertaking,

requiring political and financial support from both the transitional authority and the

country as a whole. The vastness and destruction of the country’s transportation and

communication networks would complicate the task even further.

First, the international guarantors could aid the transitional authority to assess whether

the interim treaty and electoral system are clearly and adequately framed so as to

ensure the free and popular participation of the electorate. If this is not so then the

international guarantors, through the United Nations, could provide assistance to the

interim authority to draft such legislation.

Second, the international guarantors would have to work with the transitional

authority in the establishment of an independent Referendum Commission, in

accordance with the interim regulations. If this is not the case the international

guarantors could extend financial assistance to the interim authority and train its staff.

The Referendum Commission must also be provided with the necessary equipment

for the referendum, which would primarily include, ballot boxes, ballot papers,

polling booths, etc.

Third, the international guarantors could assist in the registration of the political

parties and voters. This could take in the form of direct financial assistance to the

Referendum Commission that would have to be provided with the resources and

capacity to undertake this effort throughout the whole country. This process would be

particularly challenging for Southern Sudan and some areas in the Eastern, Western

and Central Sudan which would not have in place the same administrative structures

and capacity. The international guarantors would also be challenged by the four

million internally displaced people and by one million Sudanese refugees.

Fourth, the international guarantors could assist the Referendum Commission and

civil society organisations in their endeavours to familiarise the electorate with the

purpose of the referendum as well as ensuring that they would know how to vote. If

29

this is not the case the international guarantors should extend financial and technical

assistance to the Referendum Commission and the civil society organisations. They

would also have to ensure that those vulnerable groups such as the internally

displaced people, the illiterate, women and the demobilised soldiers would be able to

fully participate in the referendum.

Fifth, the international guarantors must ensure that all political parties would be able

to get their message across to all voters. This effort might entail the organisation of

training seminars and the extension of financial and technical assistance to all parties.

The international guarantors could also organise training seminars for the media

personnel and ensure that all parties would have an equal access to the radio,

newspapers and television

In order to ensure that the Sudanese referendum would take place in a free and

unbiased environment, the international guarantors could send a team of observers to

make an impartial assessment of the referendum, train the Referendum Commission

and other bodies in monitoring and reporting on the referendum process.

After the international observer team has established its presence on the ground they

would begin reporting on the whole referendum process, how registration is

proceeding in each region, whether all parties have access to the media and how the

Referendum Commission is coping with the process. Concurrently, the observer team

would train local referendum observers to supervise the referendum.

During the referendum the international and national observer teams would visit

different locations to assess voting procedures and the security of the ballot. They

would also monitor to see whether there is intimidation at the polling booths and

whether the referendum officials have been impartial. Once the voting is completed,

the observer team would issue its report that would declare how the process took

place and whether there should be re-voting. The observer team could also forward its

recommendations to be followed up by the Referendum Commission and other

interested organisations.

(b) Policing the Cease-fire

Re-establishing security throughout Sudan would be the second major task of the

guarantors. The multiplicity and number of armed groups and the proliferation of

small arms throughout the country would compound this problem. According to the

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in 1997 Sudan’s armed forces

numbered 79,700 troops, some 85,000 reservists and 15,000 active irregulars in the

paramilitary People’s Defence Forces militia. In 1997, IISS estimated the SPLA to

number 20,000-30,0000 troops, Sudan Allied Forces less than 2,000 and 500 Beja

Congress combatants 500. In addition to these armed groups, there are a number of

other forces operating in Southern Sudan such as the South Sudan Defence Forces

which is under the South Sudanese Co-ordinating Council and a number of southern

trial militias which are either allied to the government or to the rebels.10

Once the Sudan Peace Treaty is signed, a joint Cease-fire Commission would be

established, from the representatives of all armed movements in the country. This

10

International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1997-1998, London, 1998, p. 260.

30

commission would be under the interim authority and would liase with the

international peacekeeping force, which could be sent to the Sudan at the request of

the interim authority. In line with UN doctrine and the size of Sudan, the UN force

should not be less than 5,000 and it should have a clear and limited mandate with a

defined exit strategy and adequate resources to discharge its responsibilities.

Once the cease-fire treaty takes effect, the belligerent forces should be accommodated

in separate barracks in designated regions and out of range of one another. At this

point the armed forces would transfer control of their weapons and military arsenals

to the UN peacekeeping force. The UN peacekeeping forces would maintain control

of all or part of these weapons either throughout the whole time or for a limited period

only. Prior to being discharged combatants would undergo medical examination and

orientation sessions, to inform them about the reinsertion segment.

The period of trusteeship of the settlement by the guarantors falls away with the

ending of the transitional period.

D. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE

RECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUDAN

Peace building is a comprehensive and integrated process made up of a myriad of

relationships, roles, goals, structures and functions rather than a single activity. The

work of the international sponsors would not end with the publication of the

referendum report but would be transformed to meet the new challenges of the new

polity. Whilst the time dimension of the interim period would be quite short, the long-

term reconstruction of the Sudan would be much longer.

As a first step the international sponsors would have to embrace and nurture the long-

term desirable structural, systemic and relational goals, articulated by the Sudanese

people. These goals might include for instance, sustainable peace and development,

self-sufficiency, equitable social structures that meet basic human needs, and

respectful and interdependent relationships.

As a second step the international sponsors would have to ensure that the provision of

resources for the reconstruction and transformation of Sudan is not just a matter of

giving money, but also involves an interactive partnership between all stakeholders in

a strategic commitment.

As a third step, the international community would have to aid Sudan in not only

meeting people’s basic needs but also in beginning to replace relief and rehabilitation

assistance with long-term development assistance to restore and (re)build local and

national capacities and the human, physical and financial infrastructure of the country

into an infrastructure of peace.

31

IV. CONCLUSION

The roles of the informal peacemakers and those of international third parties are

complementary and mutually re-inforcing, but it is vital that they be kept distinct.

The informal peacemaker needs to be free from institutional links both with the

principals within the situation in question, and also with the international third-parties

involved. The strength of an informal peacemaker lies in its freedom from such links,

since any association will tend to compromise the neutrality which is key to its

success.

The informal peacemakers operate as either catalysts or consensus-builders, or a

mixture of both. For the purpose of clarifying the different ways in which

peacemakers operate, the two roles need to be distinguished, but they are inter-

dependent and mutually re-inforcing.

International third-parties can operate in one or more of three roles: underwriters,

sponsors and intermediaries. As with informal peacemakers, these roles take different

forms in each of the different phases of the negotiation process. These roles can either

be exercised directly or through intermediate actors, agencies or associations.

The achievement of peace cannot be done exclusively at any one level or be achieved

by any one actor or agency. Rather, it needs to be seen as a multi-dimensional

process, proceeding at many different levels and involving the whole range of

stakeholders at the same time. The key is that the different roles and agencies should

not be seen as in competition, but each needs to re-inforce the other according to the

distinctive contribution which each can make. They need to be co-ordinated diffusely

by a process of careful consultation across the network of different actors and

agencies, including both the informal peacemakers: the international third party actors

and the principals themselves. By this cumulative and diffuse process, based on a

foundation of common relational principles, true and just peace can be achieved.

32

SPONSORS

UNDERWRITERS

INTERMEDIARIES

P

H

A

S

E

S

:

F

i

g

u

r

e

2

:

ASSEMBLE

FINANCIAL

PACKAGES AS

INCENTIVES TO

THE PRINCIPALS

AND TO

OVERCOME

OBSTACLES IN

THE

IMPLEMENTATION

OF THE

SETTLEMENT

FORM

SYNDICATES TO

GUARANTEE THE

NEGOTIATION

PROCESS AND

THE FINAL

SETTLEMENT

KEEP CHANNELS

OF

COMMUNICATION

OPEN

P

R

E

-

N

E

G

O

T

I

A

T

I

O

N

COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

PUT FINANCIAL

PACKAGES ON

TABLE AS

INCENTIVES TO

REACH

AGREEMENT

PROVIDING

SYMMETRICAL

GUARANTEES

FOR THE PROCESS

AND TAILORING

THE

GUARANTEES

WITH THE

AGREEMENT OF

THE PRINCIPALS

AS CONVENOR /

CHAIRMAN OR TO

BE IN PROXIMATE

SUPPORT

N

E

G

O

T

I

A

T

I

O

N

IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENT

DELIVERING OF

AID IN PHASES

POLICING THE

IMPLEMENTATIO

N OF THE

SETTLEMENT

ENDS HERE

T

R

A

N

S

I

T

I

O

N

A

L

IMPLEMENTATION OF FINAL CONSTITUTION

FURTHER AID AS

NECESSARY TO

HELP OVERCOME

OBSTACLES

ENDS HERE

F

I

N

A

L

33

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Carbonnier, Giles, Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy, United Nations

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Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000 -- Sudan, Washington, 2000.

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