FOREWORD

"Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge" has been developedby our two staffs to provide a long term vision of the way inwhich we expect future Alliance operations will be conducted,and, therefore, guide the transformation of forces, conceptsand capabilities in the coming decades. It looks beyondcurrent initiatives out to 15 years and considers the changesthat will be needed to face evolving threats and new chal-lenges. In this timeframe, the continued effectiveness of theAlliance in meeting future military challenges rests upon itsability to transform its capabilities in order to prevail in thecomplex future environment.

In "Strategic Vision", we describe a new way of planning andconducting operations that concentrates more directly on theultimate ends we wish to achieve. This approach to opera-tions will involve the integrated application of all instrumentsof Alliance power to create effects which will achieve thedesired outcome. We also set out the capabilities that will berequired to maintain a competitive advantage in the 'informa-tion age' and prevail in any future crisis or conflict. Finally, wepresent a framework for transformation that clarifies the majorareas of development needed to produce the necessaryforces together with new concepts and capabilities.

The importance of this document cannot be overstated. Itprovides the Alliance a consolidated military view of futureoperations drawn from our analysis of changes in the natureof the threat, lessons from recent conflicts, research papersand other national vision efforts. "Strategic Vision" forms anintegral part of the Alliance's transformation effort. The con-cepts and capabilities described in this paper will be trans-lated into requirements and plans through the Defence Plan-ning process, and will guide the development of the NATOResponse Force. It will therefore provide a context withinwhich nations can plan the development of their own futurecapabilities.

"Strategic Vision" is not a directive, but is intended to inform,educate and stimulate debate within the Alliance and thenations. While providing a view of future forces, concepts andcapabilities, we recognise that this view will evolve over time.Therefore, "Strategic Vision" will be updated to remain currentwith continuing concept development and experimentation,and, thereby, serve as the beacon to guide Alliance forces tomeet the military challenges of tomorrow.

General J. L. JonesSupreme Allied CommanderEurope

Admiral E. P. GiambastianiSupreme Allied CommanderTransformation

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreward i

Table of Contents ii

Executive Summary iii

Part 1: Introduction 1

Part 2: The Future Strategic and Military Environment 2

Part 3: Future Operations, Forces and Concepts 7

Part 4: Capabilities 12

Part 5: Framework for Transformation 17

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The aim of “Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge” is to providea vision of the way in which future Alliance operations will beplanned and conducted and thereby guide the transformation offorces, concepts and capabilities in the coming decades.

2. The objectives of this paper are to:• Describe the nature of future conflict and the forces, concepts andcapabilities that the Alliance is likely to need to plan and conductsuccessful operations in the next 15 years.• Assist transformation by providing broad guidance for the long-term development of Alliance forces, concepts and capabilities.• Provide a conceptual framework to assist in the overall defenceplanning processes and reinvestment decisions within both theAlliance and nations.• Provide a context for experimentation with new concepts andcapabilities and a focus for research and development.• Provide a capstone document from which future conceptual workwill cascade.• Inform and stimulate the transformational debate within theAlliance and the nations.

3. The key drivers that will effect the future strategic environmentare globalization, the increasing sophistication of asymmetricwarfare, the effects of changing demography and environment,failing states, radical ideologies and unresolved conflicts. TheAlliance will respond militarily more frequently in addressing globalthreats to its interests within this strategic environment. To besuccessful, a more holistic approach to future operations involvingpolitical, military, civil, and economic means must be adopted.Further, a broad, multi-dimensional concept of security must includeroles such as conflict prevention, crisis and consequencemanagement, peacekeeping, support to peacemaking, disasterresponse and humanitarian assistance. Intelligence collection,analysis, dissemination and sharing will be critical in reducing thedecision time between recognising a security risk and executing thedesired course of action. Greater political accountability, and acontinuing requirement to maintain public support, will demand swiftsuccess with minimal collateral damage. Military forces must berapidly tailorable to respond to challenges with speed, precision andflexibility and be deployable wherever they are needed. Althoughasymmetric threats from state and non-state actors may constitutethe most immediate security risk, the Alliance must retain thecapability and interoperability to conduct high intensity operations.Finally, the Alliance should structure for the most likely operationsand adapt these structures for the most demanding.

4. Future operations will be more complex and multidimensional.The planning and execution of operations will be an increasinglyjoint and multilateral effort requiring truly interoperable forces. Tosupport this end, the use of Alliance forces must change from apattern of deconfliction to one of integration where emergingtechnologies and concepts, like the network-enabled capability, areincreasingly used to improve the competitive advantage of theAlliance. Further, the Alliance must maximise the contributions ofPartners and coalition members while ensuring that its strategicmilitary policies and activities complement those of otherinternational and regional organisations. The requirement for

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sustained military dialogue, consultation and co-operation in regionsof strategic interest will be of critical importance. Finally, doctrineand procedures to operate in post-combat and post-conflictenvironments must be further developed, as these areas become anongoing part of Alliance operations.

5. Future military forces must be agile, joint and expeditionary incharacter and design. They must be capable of operating acrossthe spectrum of conflict, rapidly deployable and sustainable forwhatever duration and tempo of operations, technologically superior,supported via an integrated logistics system and capable ofoperating in a networked environment. These forces must berapidly tailorable and fully interoperable with other military forcesand capable of interacting seamlessly with civil authorities, non-governmental organisations and other agencies in the jointoperations area. Success in such a complex environment willrequire a highly educated and trained force that possesses a fullarray of specialist skills.

6. Given the emerging environment, future Alliance operations willbe more efficiently conducted by adopting an effects-basedapproach. An effects-based approach involves the comprehensiveintegrated application of all instruments of Alliance power, bothmilitary and non-military, to create campaign effects which willachieve desired outcomes. This approach can be adopted at alllevels of command and across the spectrum of conflict.

7. The capabilities required to be successful in the futureenvironment and to adopt an effects-based approach to operationsinclude: improving intelligence and information sharing as well asthe ability to anticipate and react, developing network-enabledcapabilities based on a robust and flexible CIS foundation,increasing the number of deployable forces that possess theflexibility to rapidly transition between warfighting andpeacekeeping, improving the ability of forces to co-ordinate and co-operate with civil authorities and agencies during operations at alllevels, improving the ability of forces to conduct post-conflictoperations, and investment in interoperable logistics systems.

8. To achieve the widespread integration necessary to conducteffects-based operations will require forces and capabilities that arecharacterised by the achievement of three goals: DecisionSuperiority, Coherent Effects, and Joint Deployment andSustainment. Furthermore, concepts and capabilities will bedeveloped in a series of transformation objective areas linkedthrough a concept for future joint operations. These areas provide alogical basis for organising and linking the many concepts,applications, capabilities and programs necessary to transformforces.

9. “Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge” provides the basis forfuture conceptual work. It provides a context for experimenting withnew forces, concepts and capabilities, and establishing anenvironment that provides funding and direction for research anddoctrine. In conclusion, this paper is offered to stimulate thetransformational debate within the Alliance and be part of theiterative process of transformation. As a living document, it will beupdated to reflect the views of the Strategic Commanders as theyevolve over time.

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PART 1: INTRODUCTION

1. The Alliance core mission of providing collectivedefence to protect the security interests of its membersremains as relevant today as it was in the past. Thenature of the mission, however, has changed and willcontinue to evolve as the Alliance adapts to the newsecurity environment. The global threat of terrorism, thepotential use of WMD and regional instability are pro-found security challenges of the 21st Century. Combat-ing those threats will change the nature of conflict andrequire the continual adaptation of forces, concepts andcapabilities over the coming decades. The Alliancedecision to meet threats "from wherever they may come"will demand a more global outlook in response to crisesand a requirement to project security wherever directedby the North Atlantic Council. To prepare now for anuncertain future, necessitates a strategic vision to guidethe continuing transformation of Alliance forces, conceptsand capabilities.

2. The aim of "Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge"is to provide a vision of the way in which future Allianceoperations will be planned and conducted and therebyguide the transformation of forces, concepts and capa-bilities in the coming decades.

3. The objectives of this paper are to:

• Describe the nature of future conflict and the forces,concepts and capabilities that the Alliance is likely toneed to plan and conduct successful operations in thenext 15 years.• Assist transformation by providing broad guidance forthe long-term development of Alliance forces, conceptsand capabilities.• Provide a conceptual framework to assist in the overalldefence planning processes and reinvestment decisionswithin both the Alliance and nations.• Provide a context for experimentation with newconcepts and capabilities and a focus for research anddevelopment.• Provide a capstone document from which futureconceptual work will cascade.• Inform and stimulate the transformational debate withinthe Alliance and the nations.

4. This document provides a strategic vision out to 15years. It considers the key factors in the strategic envi-ronment that are likely to drive changes in the globalsecurity situation and identifies the likely future risks andchallenges. It highlights the acceleration in technologicaldevelopment and assesses what effects this will have onthe nature of military operations for both the Alliance andits adversaries. The paper identifies the implications for

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the Alliance and, in particular, for military forces, con-cepts and capabilities. Finally, it provides a frameworkfor transformation that establishes goals and objectivesto guide the process of change that will help the nationsdeliver more capable future forces.

PART 2: THE FUTURE STRATEGIC AND MILITARYENVIRONMENT

Strategic Considerations

5. With the requirement to meet threats from whereverthey may come, the Alliance will operate in a wider stra-tegic environment that is influenced by several keyfactors and drivers for change. Foremost among theseare: globalisation, the increasing sophistication of asym-metric warfare, the effects of changing demography andenvironment, failing states, radical ideologies and unre-solved conflicts. These factors are liable to lead toshocks to Alliance security interests over the next 15years, particularly as tensions, crises and conflicts willcontinue to occur with little warning. In those caseswhere the interests or security of its members are threat-ened, to include state versus state conflict, the Alliancemust be prepared to act.

6. Continuing globalisation will make the nations of theAlliance more dependent on broad stability elsewhere inthe world. Furthermore, the impact of regional unrest willbe magnified as the 'information age' network provides aconduit through which public information can pass andunrest can be observed globally. Terrorists and extremistgroups can use these networks to foster unrest anddiscontent through targeted information campaigns thatexert pressure upon Allies. The Alliance can expect tooperate for an extended period of time in regions wheresophisticated indigenous media competes for influenceover the perceptions of local and international audi-ences. Those best able to influence effectively theunderstanding of a crisis or conflict will likely gain theinitiative.

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7. Asymmetric warfare is becoming increasingly sophisti-cated, and, enabled by access to technology, it canachieve disproportionate effects. As access to currentand emerging technology becomes more widespread,there will be greater opportunities for potential adversar-ies to develop effective unconventional means, includingthose of mass effects and disruption, for direct and indi-rect attack on Alliance nations. This approach providesadversaries with new avenues to pursue their causes,especially when some are prepared to undertake suicideattacks. Given these trends, proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction by a growing range of state and non-state actors is cause for increasing concern.

8. Demographic differences related to the differences inlife span and population growth between the developingand developed world will continue. This condition maylead to significant migratory pressures from one to theother, thus increasing ethnic tensions and putting stresson employment and welfare systems. Environmentalfactors, in particular increasing energy demands, contin-ued reliance on fossil fuels and the increasing demandfor water and food cannot be ignored. Impoverishmentand inequitable distribution of these resources fostersgrievances, provokes extremists and offers an opportu-nity for organised crime to further threaten security.Poverty, hunger and disease prevail in much of thedeveloping world and contribute to the increasing stressin the security environment.

9. Fragmenting and failing states resulting from eco-nomic collapse, competition for resources, bad gover-nance, and failed infrastructure will continue to besources of crisis and instability. Failing states raiseserious security concerns due to their lack of internalcontrols or border security. An increase in the prolifera-tion of weapons and the entry of non-state actors, includ-ing criminals and terrorists, may result. Under suchconditions, failing states may become sanctuaries forgroups supporting transnational terrorism and organisedcrime. These entities have the potential to underminethe security of the Alliance in a world where concern forpersonal and collective security is gaining prominenceover traditional defence of territory. Thus, failed statesthat have little significance in the traditional sense ofstrategic resources or geographical position, can take onstrategic value by virtue of the potential base for opera-tions they offer to powerful non-state actors.

10. Groups supporting radical ideologies and theirwillingness to use any measure of force to bring aboutchange will continue to threaten the security interests ofthe Alliance. Unresolved conflicts in several areas of theworld can generate support for some of these extremistgroups. The complexity of these unresolved conflicts will

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continue to require the involvement of Alliance nations.

Military Implications

11. The Alliance has adopted a more holistic approachthat deals with a full range of potential missions spanningthe spectrum of conflict from crisis prevention to humani-tarian operations through to high intensity warfare. Thisreinforces the need for a concerted and co-ordinatedpolitical, military, civil and economic approach. Themilitary forces of the Alliance will operate in a multilateralenvironment alongside forces of other countries in closeco-operation and co-ordination with a wide array ofinternational, national and non-governmentalorganisations. Future military operations linked to otherinformational, economic, social, legal and diplomaticinitiatives will need to be implemented in a measured,co-ordinated and co-operative fashion.

12. Although large-scale conventional aggressionagainst the Allies is unlikely, the possibility of such ademanding threat emerging over the longer term cannotbe discounted. The Alliance also may choose to respondto attacks on security interests outside the Euro-Atlanticregion or intercede in conflicts between nations requiringthe conduct of high intensity operations. Therefore,although asymmetric threats from state and non-stateactors may constitute the most immediate security risk,the Alliance must retain the capability to conduct highintensity operations in order to cope with more demand-ing conventional threats.

13. A broad and multi-dimensional concept of securityhas military implications that go well beyond traditionalpreoccupations with territorial defence, and places anincreasing focus on roles such as conflict prevention,crisis management, consequence management, peace

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keeping and peace enforcement, support to peacemak-ing, disaster response, and humanitarian assistanceroles. This concept will enable the Alliance to take anincreasingly active role in crisis management. Intrastateconflicts can expand rapidly into wider conflagrations thatthreaten the security interests of the Alliance. Becausethe complexity of developing security threats only in-creases with time, efforts to anticipate impending crisesand timely actions taken to prevent or avoid crises willimprove the Alliance's ability to respond effectively.

14. Intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination andsharing will be critical to anticipating and, possibly, pre-venting or containing conflicts. A full understanding ofthe operational environment and a proactive approach inthe earliest stages of emerging crises will be required.This assessment will support increased situationalawareness for decision-makers and will be supported bya secure information network for enhanced intelligencesharing and collaboration in rapidly evolving situations.Improvements in all aspects of the decision cycle mustbe made so that the time between the anticipation of arisk or threat, and the definition and execution of acourse of action can be shortened.

15. A growing public awareness and impatience broughtabout by the greater accessibility of information coupledwith the political necessity of maintaining public supporthave led to mounting political constraints on militaryoperations, while at the same time, increasing the needto achieve rapid success. Additionally, a sensitivity tocasualties and the need to limit collateral and environ-mental damage to the lowest possible levels, despitefacing adversaries who are less constrained, will forcethe Alliance to conduct operations at higher levels ofeffectiveness with more precisely targeted lethal andnon-lethal weapons. Thus, these factors and their legalcodification will increasingly influence military operationsas well as reinforce the need for accountability andproportionality. Within this context, the military forces ofthe Alliance must be capable of operating under closemedia and public scrutiny requiring greater transparencyand openness.

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16. The Alliance must adapt its military posture to re-spond to challenges with speed, precision and flexibility,so that forces can be effectively deployed wherever theyare needed. The posture must provide the Alliance witha broad set of capabilities that will project stability, as-sure nations and Partners, dissuade adversaries, deteraggression and, if necessary, defeat an adversary acrossthe spectrum of conflict. In particular, the Alliance mustbe capable, in concert with other organisations, ofcountering weapons proliferation and asymmetric threatsfrom terrorism. The Alliance should structure for themost likely operations and adapt these structures for themost demanding. The command and force structuremust be expeditionary in character and design and becapable of conducting a higher number of smaller, con-current operations at some distance from home bases aswell as sustaining operations over long periods of time.A greater proportion of Alliance forces will have to bedeployable and usable, and have the flexibility to transi-tion rapidly between warfighting to peacekeeping. Theoverall numbers of Alliance forces may decrease, but thisreduction must be met with a corresponding investmentin quality.

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PART 3: FUTURE OPERATIONS, FORCES ANDCONCEPTS

Operations

17. Meeting the military challenges outlined in the previ-ous section will require a fresh approach to preparing forand executing Alliance operations. The planning andexecution of future operations will require an increasinglyjoint and multilateral approach. Not only will there begreater coordination between all components of the jointforce, but also greater involvement of international,governmental and non-governmental organisations in amultilateral effort. The challenge of ensuring that multi-national forces are truly interoperable goes beyondmatching equipments; it requires closer links betweenpeople, a systematic program of joint training, and acommon understanding of joint concepts and doctrine.

18. Future operations will be more complex and multi-dimensional, as forces adapt rapidly to changing opera-tional scenarios from high intensity, lethal combat tostabilisation and peacekeeping operations. Militaryactivities in future theatres may occur simultaneously atmany points along the spectrum of conflict. Advances ininformation systems, collaborative tools, situationalawareness, space systems and military hardware, willallow military operations to be planned and executed at ahigher tempo. Information operations will be increasinglyapplicable as the extensive use of and reliance uponinformation and its associated processes and systemscreates both vulnerabilities and opportunities for theAlliance and its adversaries.

19. The Alliance must derive full benefit from emergingtechnologies to maintain its technological and opera-tional advantage. Technology can act as a force multi-plier. It can provide the Alliance with the ability toreconfigure forces and equipment rapidly to delivercritical effect at the right moment. In addition, collection,management and sharing of intelligence through a network-enabled capability based on robust Alliance

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command and control systems will drive changes in theorganisational structure of combat units, formations andheadquarters. Research and development should focuson the exploitation of nano-technology, power sources,space, advanced sensors, information and bio technol-ogy and robotics.

20. In order to maximise their contributions, the forces ofPartners and other coalition members will have to beincorporated into operations as quickly and asseamlessly as possible. The challenge will be to recon-cile any interoperability gap by finding ways to integrateless advanced forces. This will require technologicalresources and a continuous, deliberate programme oftraining and education. Achieving this will increaseoperational effectiveness and promote a more equitabledivision of risk and burden within the limitations of thecontributed military forces. The development ofspecialist capabilities may provide avenues for somenations to provide valuable contributions.

21. The Alliance will have to continue to ensure that itsstrategic military policies and activities complementthose of other international and regional organisations,particularly the United Nations, the Organisation forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe and the EuropeanUnion. This will require that military operations areconducted under a sound legal basis and enjoy wide-spread legitimacy within the international community.Close co-operation and co-ordination between the Alli-ance and international organisations in all phases ofoperations will be especially important. The commonobjectives of peace and stability will be attained morerapidly by maximising the effective use of the political,military, civil and economic strengths of eachorganisation. Military dialogue, consultation and co-operation with military forces and other organisations inregions of strategic interest will be an ongoing require-ment.

22. In the coming decades, military forces will engage inpost-combat activities to promote stabilisation, recon-struction and reconciliation as part of an integratedstrategic approach. The emphasis in these circum-stances will likely be less on the use of combat forcesand more on combat support and combat service supportforces. The Alliance also may become involved by pro-viding command structures and nuclei for larger forces tosupport post-conflict management. The transitionthrough combat to post-conflict operations will posesignificant challenges to the forces involved and willrequire increasing emphasis in training, doctrine andplanning. In the time between the draw down of combatoperations and the restoration of civil authority, numer-ous civil tasks may require support from military forces.

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Forces

23. Future forces will need to be agile, joint and expedi-tionary in character and design. They will need to becapable of operating across the spectrum of conflict, berapidly deployable and be sustainable for whateverduration and tempo of operations is required. Theyshould be technologically superior, supported by inte-grated, multinational logistics and be able to operatewithin a networked environment. They will need to beable to adapt to changing circumstances and rapidlyreconfigure, calling upon a diverse range of skills to meetmission requirements. They must be fully interoperablewith other military forces and capable of interactingseamlessly with civil authorities, non-governmentalorganisations and other agencies in the joint operationsarea. There will be greater call on specialist skills inareas such as engineering, communications, radiologi-cal, biological and chemical defence, special operations,civil-military cooperation, logistics and medical services.In the future, the individual joint elements of Allianceforces will be integrated rather than deconflicted.

24. Highly educated and trained officers and Non-Com-missioned Officers (NCO) will be essential to operate incomplex environments and will require higher and morespecific levels of training. Over time, this may necessi-tate a transition within some nations to a more profes-sional force. Reserve forces also will be crucial to theconduct and sustainment of long-term operations and,provided genuine readiness levels can be maintained,may also provide an avenue to address important spe-cialist tasks.

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Concepts

25. Complex and uncertain challenges in the strategicenvironment will demand new ways of thinking, planningand acting. Driven by political constraints, legal influ-ences, and with the availability of new technologicalcapabilities, the focus will increasingly be on the effectsthat need to be created in order to achieve the strategiccampaign objectives. Given these factors, future Allianceoperations will be more efficiently conducted by adoptingan effects-based approach.

26. The individual elements that comprise an effects-based approach are not new, rather it is a philosophicalchange in the way to plan and conduct operations. Itputs a stronger focus on cause and effect versus target-centric attrition. It involves the coherent planning andexecution of actions by all involved organisations, to-gether with the use of modern technology, that bringsnew possibilities to the way future operations will beconducted. This approach can be adopted at all levels ofcommand and across the spectrum of conflict. At thestrategic level, it would involve the application of militarycapabilities in conjunction with all instruments of Alliancepower - political, civil and economic. At the operationaland tactical levels, it involves the selective combination

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of lethal and non-lethal, kinetic and non-kinetic means tocreate campaign effects.

27. An effects-based approach to operations concen-trates on the achievement of a strategic endstate,throughout all phases of an operation, from pre-crisis,through high-intensity to post-conflict activity. In highintensity environments, for example, effects-based op-erations focus on the creation of effects that reduce anadversary's operational coherence, neutralise his capa-bilities, shape his perceptions and break his will to fight.Thus the adversary is viewed from a holistic perspectivewhere key vulnerabilities are identified in order to beengaged by the most appropriate means. Under thisconstruct, the emphasis is no longer just on numbers, buton quality forces achieving overmatching power throughthe combination of knowledge, speed, precision, andlethality applied in a joint context. Thus, the aim wouldbe for warfighting operations to be executed with unprec-edented tempo, fewer forces, minimal casualties and lesscollateral damage.

28. From an analysis of the elements of an effects-based approach to operations, the conduct of suchoperations will require forces and capabilities that arecharacterised by the ability to achieve decision superior-ity, coherent effects and joint deployment and sustain-ment.

a. Decision Superiority. The state in which better-in-formed decisions are made and implemented faster thanan adversary can react, allowing the future joint forcecommander to shape the environment to best fit hisneeds and objectives. Decision superiority is criticallydependent on achieving and maintaining a position ofinformation dominance and shared situational awarenessduring all phases of an operation. It enables a better

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understanding of the operational situation than the ad-versary, which means that the pace, coherence andeffectiveness of operations can be dramatically im-proved. Decision cycles once measured in days willreduce to hours and perhaps minutes.

b. Coherent Effects. The state in which military forcesare able to integrate their capabilities with all the instruments of Alliance power to rapidly produce desired ef-fects. Greater operational coherence will be achieved bymore closely harmonising military efforts with interna-tional, national, and non-governmental agencies operat-ing in the theatre of operations. Coherent military effectsare dependent on the ability to effectively locate, ob-serve, discern, and track objectives or targets; generatedesired effects; assess results; and, reengage withdecisive speed. More effective engagement at the earli-est stages of a crisis will require better situational aware-ness and be achieved through continuous analyses,dialogue and consultation with nations and militaries inpossible conflict areas.

c. Joint Deployment and Sustainment. The state inwhich the Alliance can deploy mission-tailored militaryforces in a timely manner wherever they are needed andconduct continuous, distributed, non-contiguous opera-tions throughout an area of operations. Once deployed,the Alliance will be able to sustain these forces overdistance for as long as required across the spectrum ofconflict.

PART 4: CAPABILITIES

29. The Alliance's continued effectiveness in meetingfuture military challenges rests upon its ability to trans-form its capabilities in order to prevail in the complexfuture environment. Legacy capabilities must continue tobe judged against their utility in future operations. It isclear that the relevance of capabilities, such as thoserequired for territorial defence against large-scaleaggression and certain in-place non-deployable assets,will reduce. All new and enduring capabilities shouldoffer multiple advantages if possible, be capable of being

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networked if appropriate, and must be configured for jointoperations.

Capabilities Required to Achieve Decision Superiority

30. As the Alliance moves into the 'information age', newcommand and control systems must be developed toallow superior information to be translated into action-able knowledge, and so facilitate faster planning, betterdecisions and more decisive effects. Decision superior-ity depends on accurate and timely information and themeans to securely exchange and interpret it in a com-monly agreed way. Intelligence collection, analysis,dissemination and sharing among nations provide theessential framework upon which decision superiority isbuilt. The Alliance must develop the capability to acquireintelligence persistently, and carry out surveillance,reconnaissance and target acquisition activities at alllevels of command in order to identify evolving threats asearly as possible. Furthermore, it must develop theability to gather and exploit all-source intelligence, in-cluding that derived from space-based systems, on acomplex, mobile and elusive set of targets. Decisionsuperiority necessitates a force that is organised, trainedand equipped to operate in a collaborative, globallyintegrated common operational network. This networkmust link military forces, government and non-govern-ment agencies, and others in a seamless planning,assessment and execution environment. The provisionof enabling technology to provide for the seamless ex-change of information is critical. Interoperability andinterconnectivity will be key enablers to achieving deci-sion superiority.

31. Effective decision-making requires a net assessmentcapability that harnesses the current political, military,economic, civil, information and infrastructure factors thataffect all actors. It also must provide a centralised

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repository from which links can be identified betweenobjectives and effects. Decision-support tools, knowledge fusion, and horizontal and vertical integration ofsituational awareness will improve clarity and assistdecision-makers. In order to facilitate this assessment,national and Alliance intelligence sharing processes andprocedures will be essential.

32. Network-enabled capability is critical to the rapiddelivery of military effects and will allow powerful newcombinations of combat power. It provides an ability todeliver precise and decisive military effects with unparal-leled speed and accuracy through linking sensors, deci-sion makers and weapons systems. When implemented,it will allow commanders to conduct operations acrossthe spectrum with greater awareness, confidence andcontrol. It relies upon the ability to collect, fuse andanalyse relevant information in near real time so as toallow rapid decision making and the rapid delivery of themost desired effect.

From the foregoing discussion, two transformation objec-tive areas can be derived: Information Superiority andNetwork-Enabled Capability.

Capabilities Required to Achieve Coherent Effects

33. The achievement of coherent effects is supported bythe integration of political, military, civil and economicprocesses that are needed to bring all instruments ofpower of the Alliance into focus. In a multilateral envi-ronment, this requires multinational interagency collabo-ration and civil-military co-operation. Effective engage-ment including lethal and non-lethal means that can beprecisely and rapidly targeted on developed threats willbe crucial. Enhanced interoperability throughout amilitary force structure that is organisationally flexible isrequired. These components will be increasingly com-prised of flexible and ready, deployable forces able toperform combined and joint manoeuvre to maximise theireffect. To further enhance these forces, the ability tointegrate the partners and members of coalitions will beimportant, as will a mechanism for the Alliance to extendmilitary co-operation and consultation to areas of pos-sible conflict.

34. Effective engagement and joint manoeuvre can bedescribed as the prosecution of the right target, in theright manner, at the right time, for the right reason toachieve the right effect. Increasingly, accurate weap-ons, supported by precise targeting, will be used tocreate the desired effects by lethal or non-lethal means,causing minimal damage to civilian infrastructure or lossof life. A high priority in Alliance research and develop-ment, procurement and training must be given to

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accurate weapons and precise targeting methods. Byleveraging knowledge and decision superiority witheffective engagement and joint manoeuvre, the Alliancewill significantly increase the speed and efficacy of itsoperations. Importantly, this capability will also facilitaterapid post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction.

35. New capabilities required to succeed in low-intensityconflicts must be acquired, as it is likely that peacesupport, stabilisation and reconstruction operations willbe the most frequent actions undertaken in the future.The harmonising of military activities with those of civilorganisations will be of particular importance. Toachieve this, forces must have the tools and trainingrequired to conduct enhanced civil-military co-operationin all phases of an operation and across the spectrum ofconflict.

From the foregoing discussion, three transformationobjective areas can be derived: Effective Engagement,Joint Manoeuvre and Enhanced Civil-Military Co-opera-tion.

Capabilities Required to Achieve Joint Deployment andSustainment

36. Since risks and conflicts outside the Euro-Atlanticarea will dominate future military operations, Allianceforces must be increasingly expeditionary in characterand design. Improved deployability of tailored, mission-ready forces will allow greater flexibility in decision-making, the creation of desired effects and a reduction inthe footprint of the deployed force. This includes im-provements in speed, range, volume and equipmentdesign which will likely focus on strategic and theatre lift.Deployability will be a key element in unit organisation,logistics support and conduct of training and exercises.

37. Integrated logistics, enabled by seamless, adaptive,joint multinational logistics capabilities, will be the coreelement of collective support to operations. Futurelogistics systems will remotely monitor the condition andusage of equipment, issue spares and initiate new requi-sitions. This process will allow military logistics assets tobe more effectively assigned and prioritised across thespectrum of military and non-military logistics providers.Forces must be initially self-sufficient in order to reduceearly demands on logistic systems and to operatethrough interruptions in normal support. Further supply-chain integration will be enhanced through increasingcompatibility, interchangeability, commonality, reliabilityand serviceability of equipment. Finally, the balancebetween combat, combat support and combat servicesupport units must be constantly monitored and adjustedto efficiently meet changing mission requirements.

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From the foregoing discussion, two transformation objec-tive areas can be derived: Expeditionary Operations andIntegrated Logistics.

Enduring Capabilities

38. Force protection and survivability will continue ascritical force enablers, especially in a chemical, biologi-cal, radiological or nuclear environment. Continuedresearch, concept development and procurement inthese areas are important. The Alliance must maintain atechnological advantage by developing new capabilitiesto out-pace potential threats created by the proliferationof new technologies. These include countering weaponsof mass effect and other asymmetric threats linked to theinformation age.

39. Alliance military forces must retain the ability toconduct high intensity conflict, halt inter-state warfare,restore peace where there is regional instability, andcomply with the collective defence requirements of Article5. This includes maintaining an Alliance nuclear capabil-ity as a deterrent against a threat of weapons of massdestruction from states or other actors that may use themas leverage to gain advantage. Capabilities to deal withthe weapons proliferation and the consequences of theirpossible use must gain priority.

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PART 5: FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSFORMATION

40. The military challenge for the Alliance will be todevelop future forces capable of undertaking an effects-based approach to operations. Nations and the Alliancewill need to adapt current forces, concepts and capabili-ties which will affect all aspects of planning and prepar-ing, generating, training, deploying, employing andsustaining military forces. This will require a frameworkfor transformation.

Framework for Transformation

41. As part of this framework, the characteristics re-quired to conduct an effects-based approach to opera-tions can be expressed as three goals: achievingdecision superiority, achieving coherent effects, andachieving joint deployment and sustainment. Further-more, concepts and capabilities will be developed in aseries of transformation objective areas linked through aconcept for future joint operations. These areas providea logical basis for organising and linking the many con-cepts, applications, capabilities and programs necessaryto transform forces.

42. Research and development will be focused oncapabilities to better enable an effects-based approach.This, coupled with a targeted programme of experimenta-tion, will test the most promising transformationalconcepts and will be accomplished early in the develop-ment process. Spiral development will allow those

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elements of emerging concepts with the most potential tobe fielded as they are validated. These concepts will betranslated into requirements and plans through thedefence planning process and incorporated into trainingprogrammes set within the context of an effects-basedapproach to operations across the spectrum of conflict.

WAY AHEAD

43. This paper will provide the basis for future concep-tual work. It will provide a context for experiments withnew concepts and capabilities, and a focus for develop-ment of research and doctrine. It also will stimulate thetransformational debate within the Alliance and be part ofthe iterative process of transformation. Finally, it will beupdated to reflect the views of the Strategic Commandersas they evolve over time.