S T R A T E G I C I M P L I C A T I O N S O F T H E

JAPANESE S S M - I C R U I S E M I S S I L E

John O'Conneli

Japan's Defense Agency has an ongoing weapon system research and development program which by about 1995 can give Japan the capability of interdicting surface ship traffic to and from the Sea of Japan. That capability, combined with mining of the straits to interdict submarine passage, can drastically alter the balance of power in the Far East.

Not since World War I1 has Japan had the capability to control Russian access to the Sea of Japan. At that time Japan was the primary maritime power in the western Pacific Ocean. The Soviet Union was fearful of a possible Japanese attack on her eastern provinces. The Soviet Navy was relatively powerless even though it possessed the largest submarine fleet in the world. However, the events of World War II led to the destruction of the Japanese military machine and the unprecedented occupation of Japan by the United States. The subsequent Cold War saw the Soviet Union discard its previous inhibitions against maritime development. The growth of So- viet maritime power under the leadership of Admiral Gorshkov marked a fundamental change in the world power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the size of the American naval presence de- creased throughout the world during the 1970s, Soviet naval presence was increasing. Where the U.S. Navy had ruled the Sea of Japan during the Korean War as if it were an American lake, by the early 1970s it would have been a very rash American admiral who would lightly have contemplated attempting to enter the Sea of Japan in wartime in the face of Soviet submarine, air, and surface ship opposition. The new strength of Soviet naval and air forces, and their proximity to the theater of potential opera- tions, created a situation where American air and naval strength might be at a distinct disadvantage in the event of hostilities.

The significance of the development of a Japanese capability to interdict surface traffic lies in the possibility that in a war between the U.S.S.R. and the West, Japan can bottle up Soviet Pacific Fleet surface units based at Vladivostok and Sovetskaya Gavan in the Sea of Japan (SO J). That leaves only Soviet naval surface units based at Petropavlovsk, on the eastern side

John E O'Connell, Captain, USN (Ret.), former Defense and Naval Attache in Japan, is cur- rently an Associate with Burdeshaw Associates Limited of Bethesda, Maryland. His publications include "'Needed: An Innovative Joint Naval Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1983.

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of the Kamchatka Peninsula, with free access to the Pacific Ocean. Vladivostok might wither on the vine, its usefulness as the largest Soviet naval base in the Far East eliminated by Japanese control over the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits. The development of the SSM-I anti- ship missile by the Technical Research and Development Agency (TRDI) and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is the key to the new capability, which has the potential for a significant change in the strategic balance in Asia and the Pacific Ocean area during the 1990s.

Recently Admiral James A. Lyons, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, spoke about Soviet naval use of the permanent Soviet air and naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. He stated that it has significantly affected the bal- ance of power in the western Pacific Ocean2 His evaluation is certainly correct--if all other things are equal. However, the future effectiveness of Cam Ranh Bay as a naval operating base for the U.S.S.R. is open to question if the exits from the Sea of Japan can be closed to the Soviet Navy. Stocks of weapons and repair parts and POL (Petroleum, Oil and Lubri- cants), located there at the beginning of hostilities, will be difficult if not impossible to replenish if the Soviet Pacific Fleet is severely limited in its operations. Cam Ranh Bay itself would be vulnerable to air strikes and aerial mining operations. Its usefulness therefore may be sharply reduced or eliminated.

SSM-1

The SSM-I surface-to-surface missile is a purely Japanese development, related to the ASM-1 (Type 80) air-to-surface missile which is currently carried by Japanese support fighters like the F-l. The ASM-I, built by MHI for the Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF), is a 50-kilometer range, roughly Mach 1 speed, air-to-surface missile intended for attacks against surface ships., It employs inertial mid-course guidance and active radar homing in its terminal phase. MHI was designated as prime contractor for the ASM-I in 1973. Development was completed in 1979, and production began in 1980.

Development of the SSM-I began eight years ago. (Technically the new missile is the XSSM-I, since it has not completed development, but I will refer to it as the SSM-I throughout this article because I believe it most likely to become operational on schedule.) According to JPE Aviation Report-Weekly, the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) con- ducted demonstration research for the SSM-I from fiscal year 1979 to 1981 jointly with TRDI. 2 TRDI, and MHI, designated the prime contractor for the development program, began full-scale fabrication of the missile in fiscal year 1982. Contracts awarded to MHI in FY 82 allowed the fabrica- tion of dummy missiles and command and control systems. In FY 83 MHI

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assembled full-scale missiles for guidance tests, along with launchers, target search and acquisition radars, guidance relay systems, and supporting equipment. Although the earlier ASM-1 missile used rocket propulsion, a microturbojet engine (TJM-2) was selected for propulsion of the SSM-1. 3 It uses a booster rocket for ground launch.

Although development has proceeded without fanfare, a limited amount of information has been published. In a February 18, 1985 Japan Times article, a Japan Defense Agency spokesman was quoted as saying that the SSM-1 was "still at the drawing board stage." He declined to identify the Japanese company involved in its development. 4 Some months later Avia- tion Week & Space Technology carried a picture of an SSM-1 missile being launched from a testing site at Nii Jimar

The following year more information was released. The Japan Defense Agency's Defense White Paper included information about plans to take development of the Mitsubishi SSM-I ground-to-ship cruise missile into its final phase. 6 The article stated that TRDI would conduct the fifth series of firing tests in the Sea of Japan using six prototype missiles. Two of the missiles are to be fired with live warheads against an old destroyer. These tests are to be funded within Japanese fiscal year 1987 (April 1987 through March 1988). 7 If the final development tests proceed smoothly, the Ground Self Defense Force reportedly plans to procure a total of 56 SSM-ls during the FY 1986-90 Defense Program.

The range of the SSM-1 has been reported to be about 100 kilometers (62 statute miles), which would put it into the Harpoon missile class as far as range goes. It also is said to have a radar absorbent material covering which will reduce its radar cross section down to 0.01 square meter. The SSM-I system will be mobile and will consist of a number of vehicle mounted equipments, including a search and acquisition radar, radio relay units, a fire control center, and one or more launchers. In 1985 the prototype launcher was a heavy MHI truck with six missile cannisters, arranged three over three, with a fixed elevation of about 30 degrees, pointing forward over the truck cab. The mobile search and acquisition radar vehicle will be located to scan the ocean area to be searched, while the fire control central vehicle and launchers are remotely located and interconnected by the radio relay units. When a target is detected, target position, course and speed will be provided to the fire control central, which will compute firing data, and generate missile firing orders. Each missile will be programmed to use terrain clearance maneuvers until it crosses the coastline outbound to- wards the target. Thereupon it will dive to a low altitude and close the ship target as a sea skimmer missile. 8

The development of the SSM-1 is a natural outgrowth of MHI's work on the ASM-I missile for JASDF to use in anti-invasion defense, and of the JGSDF mission to help repel invasion forces using land based weapons.

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Heretofore the JGSDF capability has been limited to short-range weapons originally designed as anti-tank systems, such as the KAM-3D (Type 64) and the KAM-9 (Type 79) missiles. The deployment of the SSM-1 will provide the JGSDF a much longer range and greater role in anti-invasion efforts. It will also provide the JGSDF with a high technology weapon system, which may compete with Air and Maritime Self Defense Force weapons systems for funding in the future.

JDA has previously announced plans to significantly reorganize the JGSDF to increase its deterrent power in the northern part of Japan. The plan calls for improvement of JGSDF offshore and coastal defense ca- pability through the deployment of 110,000 personnel in Hokkaido and northern Honshu, and formation of anti-ship and anti-air units. This plan has been adopted in reaction to the perceived threat from increased Soviet buildup in the Far East, and by the U.S. Forces' limited ability to respond in an emergency. 9

While in the author's view, the development and pending deployment of the SSM-1 missile is entirely defensive in nature, the inherent capability of the system opens the door to speculation about the future. Strategic thinkers and military planners should concern themselves with capabilities rather than relying solely upon perceived intentions as guidelines for future possibilities. It is in this light that I have chosen to discuss the far-reaching strategic implications of the SSM-I missile system.

JAPAN AND THE S T R A I T S

Japan's geographical position clearly provides it the potential to control the three straits which are the only useful exits from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean. At the northern exit is the Soya (La Perouse) Strait, about 40 kilometers (25 statute miles) in width at its widest point. It lies between the northern coast of Hokkaido and the Soviet island of Sakhalin. The waters are relatively shallow with maximum depths of about 30 fathoms. The Tsugaru Strait lies between southern Hokkaido and northern Honshu. Its maximum width is about 16 kilometers (10 statute miles). Its waters are much deeper, in the range of 150 fathoms.

Finally, at the southern end of the Sea of Japan is the Tsushima or Korea Strait. The Western Channel separates the Korean Peninsula and Tsushima Island, and the Eastern Channel lies between Tsushima Island and western Kyushu, the southernmost Japanese main island. The West- ern Channel is 46 kilometers (28.5 statute miles) in width, and the Eastern Channel 48 kilometers (29 statute miles) wide. Depths in the Tsushima Straits are around 34-110 fathoms in the Western Channel, and about 55 fathoms in the Eastern Channel.

All the navigable waters of these straits are within range of the SSM-1

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even if the launchers are positioned well inland for protection. With Jap- anese SSM-I missile firing batteries located in northern Hokkaido covering the Soya Strait, in southern Hokkaido and northern Honshu covering the Tsugaru Strait, and in western Kyushu and Tsushima Island covering the Tsushima Strait, the capability to interdict all surface ship traffic into and out of the Sea of Japan will exist. The mobility of the SSM-1 units will make them difficult to target based on their electronic emissions or on aerial or satellite photography. The new Patriot air defense missile system is scheduled to enter JASDF service in about 1990. The combination of SSM-1 missiles which can attack surface ships and the Patriot's high al- titude, long range, and air defense missile will make it very difficult for an enemy to pass surface ships through the straits. Ships attempting to force the straits without air support will have to rely solely upon electronic jamming or deception, chaff rockets, and close-in weapons to decoy or destroy incoming SSM-I missiles. Even with air support the defense prob- lem remains major. The Patriot air defense system is capable of handling multiple engagements, with a number of missiles in the air at the same time engaging different targets. Only in the vicinity of the Soya Strait does it seem possible for the U.S.S.R. to be able to bring enough air assets to bear to have a possibility of success in penetrating a Patriot air defense envelope and suppressing the SSM-1 batteries.

All three straits are shallow enough for mining. During World War II the Imperial Japanese Navy laid defensive minefields in them in an attempt to keep American submarines out of the Sea of Japan. ~~ Therefore, mines can certainly be used to exert attrition against Soviet submarines which might attempt to use one of the passages to go to or from patrol areas outside the Sea of Japan. Under normal circumstances Japanese-laid mines might be swept by Soviet mine sweepers with some acceptance of loss to themselves. However, if SSM-1 missile batteries control the straits, Soviet minesweep- ing efforts could become very costly and might have to be abandoned as losses of mine sweepers mount. Not only does the SSM-I potentially give Japan direct control over the straits as far as surface traffic goes, but it also provides a needed complement to mining efforts directed against Soviet submarines. While it may be more difficult to mine the Tsugaru Strait because of the strong currents experienced there, that passage is narrow enough that ASW forces can be concentrated to make any attempted sub- marine passage foolhardy.

The famous 1904 Battle of the Tsushima Straits, in which the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Togo defeated the Russian Fleet under Admiral Rozhestvenskiy, has been described as the first battle in which electronic warfare played a role. On the morning of May 28, 1904, a Japanese picket ship used its radio to signal the location of the Russian Fleet entering the Tsushima Straits from the South, en route to Vladivostok. Radiomen on

58 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / SUMMER 1987

board the Russian ships intercepted the crude communications, and Admi- ral Rozhestvenskiy's advisors recommended that jamming be employed to block the Japanese transmissions. Admiral Rozhestvenskiy declined to do so. His reluctance to engage in electronic warfare resulted in the loss of his fleet and his own capture."

If there is a second battle of the Tsushima Straits it will be fought almost entirely with electronics. It is unlikely to be a fleet against fleet action. It could pit Soviet warships, and aircraft, against Japanese land based missiles and sea mines, as the Soviet Pacific Fleet Commander attempts to pass some of his surface units out of the Sea of Japan for operations against Japanese commerce and U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups in the western Pacific. In this respect it would somewhat resemble the situation in World War II where Nazi Germany held the mainland of Europe and attempted to bring its naval and air forces into action to force Britain's surrender. Japan, however, in this modern scenario, holds an even more advantageous geographical position and has the potential to shut off the pathways to the open ocean.

SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND JAPAN'S SEA LANES

That the Soviet Union will attempt to use its naval and air power to sever the sea lines of communications of the United States and its allies in wartime is a certainty. Admiral Gorshkov has stated that "the disruption of the ocean lines of communications, the special arteries feeding the military and economic potential of those (the enemy) countries, has continued to be one of the most important of the Navy's missions? '~2

The Soviet Pacific Fleet is the largest of the four Soviet fleets, with roughly 121,000 officers and men. It includes about 127 submarines and 466 surface combatants and support ships. Vladivostok is its headquarters and major operating base in the Sea of Japan. Although none of the stand- ard reference books about the Soviet Navy attempt to provide a breakdown of Soviet ships by base, it is probably a reasonable assumption to say that the Soviet Pacific Fleet is split with about 60% of its units in the Sea of Japan and 40% based at Petropavlovsk. The SSBNs are probably based at Petropavlovsk to assure their access to the ocean so that they can carry out their strategic missile attacks if directed. A breakdown of ship types and numbers is as follows (numbers are approximations taken from two sources); 13,14

Type Number Type Number

SSBN 24-25 DD 10-11 SSB 7 FF/FFL 50 SSGN 20-21 FAC(M) & Missile Corvettes 45 SSG 4 Light Forces 130

Type Number Type

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Number

SSN 24-25 MCM Forces 90 SS 40-48 LPD 1 Aviation Ships 2 LST 13 CGN 2 LSM 9 CG 11 Depot/Repair/Support Ships 27 DDG 11 U/W Replenishment Ships 11 FFG 11 Support Tankers 8 CL 4 Hovercraft 25

With unhampered access to the western and north Pacific from the Sea of Japan and Petropavlosk, the Soviet Pacific Fleet can pose an enormous threat to Japanese seaborne trade. Just about everything Japan needs ex- cept rice must be imported. While it is commercially profitable to ship electronic components by aerial freighter, raw materials for Japan's facto- ries must come by way of the sea. Similarly, most of her exports leave by ship. All of the oil which allows her industries to operate comes in on tankers. During World War II, American submarines, operating at great distances from their bases, were eventually able to cripple Japanese mer- chant shipping. The effects upon Japanese seaborne trade of a determined Russian surface ship and submarine effort directed from its much closer bases within the Sea of Japan would be devastating.

C U R R E N T JAPANESE DEFENSE STRATEG Y

Until fairly recently, Japan's efforts to improve its defenses were oriented solely towards trying to deter a Russian invasion of Japanese territory, or if that were unsuccessful, to hold the Russian forces until U.S. forces can intervene to assist. About 1980 it became apparent to the Japanese govern- ment that the naval balance of force between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in the western Pacific, had shifted in favor of the U.S.S.R. The U.S., facing global responsibilities with reduced numbers of ships, encouraged Japan to begin to undertake the defense of its own sea lanes. In May 1981 the Suzuki government agreed to expand air defense and protect Japan's sea lanes out to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles. ~5 That change in strategy is being implemented slowly but surely. The decision by JMSDF to attempt to acquire the Aegis air defense system rests on the need to protect Japanese convoys from forays by Soviet air-to-surface missile firing Backfire bomb- ers. JMSDF is also acquiring underway replenishment ships to support sea lane defense operations of its escort flotillas. The Japanese Air Self Defense Force will probably begin to acquire aerial tankers in a few years in order to allow its F-l 5 aircraft to participate in sea lane defense. Just as JMSDF and JASDF are extending the range of their operational capabilities to improve Japan's posture, the JGSDF is improving its capability to defend against

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seaborne invasion, The SSM-I missile will provide that improved ca- pability. It also can provide the capability to close the various straits to passage of all but the most capable and heavily protected warships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. At some point in time, yet to be determined, it will become clear to the Japanese public that Japan is in almost as much danger from the disruption of its seaborne trade as it is from invasion. That disruption can only come at the hands of the U.S.S.R. At that point Japan may move to translate the theoretical capability, resulting from possession of a limited number of SSM-I units, to an effective capability, A decision to increase SSM-I units in Hokkaido, and to station SSM-I units on Tsushima Island and in southwestern Kyushu will mark the event.

EFFECT OF STRAITS' CLOSURE

Currently there are only two Kirov class Rocket Cruisers in the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Kirovs are the most heavily armed, and armored, surface combatants in the world. In addition, they employ a combined nuclear and steam propulsion plant which makes them capable of conducting independent operations. However, all the remaining Soviet surface comba- tants are dependent upon underway replenishment of fuel to allow any lengthy operations at sea. Soviet depot, repair, and support ships, including underway replenishment oilers, are lightly armed and thin skinned, and would be unable to survive much battle damage. While Kirov and some other surface combatants could survive an attack by SSM-I missiles and get out of the Sea of Japan, the probable loss of support ships, particularly the replenishment oilers, would cripple Soviet surface combatant opera- tions. Unescorted support ships would almost certainly be destroyed or badly damaged during a breakout attempt. Wartime losses of the Israeli Destroyer Eilat, and HMS Sheffeld, point out the danger of cruise missiles even to combatant ships. Mining the Soya and the two Tsushima Straits and then engaging surface ships with SSM-I missiles would make even a major breakout effort very hazardous. The threat to Japanese ocean com- merce stems from aircraft, submarines, and surface combatants. While land based aircraft would remain a threat, closure of the straits would sharply reduce the threat from Soviet submarines and surface combatants based on the Sea of Japan.

In the scenario envisioned, Japan and South Korea would cooperate in blocking the western Tsushima Strait. Without South Korean cooperation, or if South Korean territory were under Soviet bloc control, an escape route down the western edge of the western Tsushima Strait would exist.

Assuming the straits are under Japanese control, the battle in and around the Sea of Japan might proceed as follows. Communications intel- ligence and/or satellite indications of a Soviet breakout attempt would

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cause alerting of Japanese SSM-I units and the air defense network. The actual passage would be detected by radar despite intense jamming efforts. SSM-1 batteries would engage the ships while the air defense command would deal with Soviet aircraft attempting to locate and suppress the cruise missile units. U.S. carrier task forces would provide the backstop to Jap- anese mines and SSM-I missiles. However, the U.S. area of operations would be outside the Sea of Japan, against Soviet units which were able to break out. Soviet support ships would normally be awarded top target priority since their loss would limit combatant ships' operating radius and weapon replenishment. Of course a Soviet combatant ship with long range surface-to-surface missiles, posing a direct threat to the carrier task force, would be given the highest priority as a target.

DE TERRENCE

The existence of a Japanese combined mining and SSM-I capability ought to serve as a deterrent to Soviet aggressive action. However, that will be true only if the capability is both real and perceived as such by the Soviet Union. In 1941 the United States reversed its previous position of writing offthe Philippines as indefensible against a Japanese attack. The new B-17 bomber appeared to be capable of fulfilling a major role in a 1939 concept of Philippine defense based upon bombers and submarines. In October 1941 General H.H. Arnold allocated all but 16 of 111 B-17s available, to the Philippine command. It was hoped that the potential threat to the expected Japanese axis of attack against Southeast Asia would deter Japanese aggres- sion. In the event the B-17 proved useless, both as a deterrent and as a weapon system. Suitable tactics for use against shipping had not been developed, and logistic support was inadequate. The Japanese were not deterred by the threat of the B-17, and it proved an ineffective weapon system early in the war. ~6

Neither will the Soviet Union be deterred by a mere technical capability. Japan will have to acquire enough SSM-I systems and missiles to sustain more than a few days of combat. Similarly, in mine warfare Japan will have to have adequate mine planting resources and mines to maintain effective mine fields in the areas to be controlled. The potential threat from Jap- anese mines and SSM-1 missiles will only be viewed seriously by the Soviet Union if adequate stocks of ready munitions and means of delivery are available and tested. To date, inadequate ammunition stocks continue to be a major problem with all three Japanese Self Defense Forces. Large numbers of SSM-Is will be needed. They will have to be expanded lavishly, if the targets are Soviet combatants, in order to saturate their defenses.

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P O T E N T I A L CHANGE I N S T R A T E G I C B A L A N C E

At present the United States has lost the overwhelming strategic advan- tages it held in the Pacific at the end of World War II, during the Korean War, and up through the Vietnam War. The growth and increasing profes- sional capability of the Soviet Navy has made a significant change in the Far East as elsewhere. Although the strength of the U.S. Navy in its attack aircraft carriers has still to be contested directly, the development and deployment of long-range cruise missiles has produced a significant change in the equation. In addition, the employment of long-range naval Backfire bombers carrying ASMs threatens our ability to employ our carriers as freely as we could previously. Normally the strategic equation tends to be weighted in favor of the force which is closest to its own bases. The U.S.S.R. has the ability to concentrate its forces in the area around Japan with much less difficulty than does the United States. And yet, the U.S.S.R. has some potentially major problems. One of them, geographic in nature, has been discussed in detail earlier--the potential for Japan to close offthe Sea of Japan and isolate surface ships and submarines based there. The second one is logistic in nature and stems from the need for oil fuel to operate surface ships and aircraft. Although Petropavlovsk can not be iso- lated, its ships and aircraft are dependent upon a steady supply of black oil and jet fuel. All that fuel must be brought in by tanker and stored on shore for future use. There are no pipelines nor railway links between the eastern Soviet Union and the rugged Kamchatka PeninsulaJ 7 There are refineries at Khabarovsk and at Komsomol'sk, and they are connected to a port facility at Okha, in the northeastern part of Sakhalin, by pipeline. Fuel can be provided to Petropavlovsk by tanker across the Sea of Okhotsk. That route would be relatively safe, but ice formation in the Sea of Okhotsk during the cold months limits its usefulness. The other tanker routes are through the Soya strait, or a much longer route, exposed to air and sub- marine attack throughout its length, from its origin in the Persian Gulf to Petropavlosk. Various reference books on merchant ships credit the U.S.S.R. with around 450 tankers. These will be very high on the U.S. submarine target priority list. Given their slow average speed, about 14-15 knots, and opposing SSN capabilities, it is difficult to conceive that many would survive the longer journey.

So, while the U.S.S.R., by virtue of its development of modern air and naval forces, has improved its ability to influence events in the Far East, it still has some serious disadvantages inherent in its geography. SSM-1 mis- siles and mines can neutralize Soviet bases in the Sea of Japan. Pe- tropavlovsk is only useful as long as it can supply fuel to its ships and aircraft, and that supply seems vulnerable.

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OTHER FACTORS

In order for the potential closure capability I have been describing to become a reality, several things must occur. First and foremost, Japanese defense spending must increase. At present the defense budget is slightly over 1% of gross national product. Although Japan ranks about eighth in the world in defense spending, current defense budgets are somewhat il- lusory. The Japan Defense Agency is busily buying first line defense equip- ment, but not in adequate numbers of units to meet its needs, and JDA is not procuring adequate stocks of ammunition and other supplies for sus- tained combat.

An example is the acquisition of the Patriot surface-to-air missile system by the JASDF during FY 85. JASDF staff studies showed a requirement for about 44 fire units. The final Japanese cabinet decision to acquire the Patriot system only called for 26 fire units. The difference came about because of an economic determination between JDA and the Ministry of Finance that the defense budget simply couldn't accommodate the number required--26 fire units equal six groups of four fire units each, plus two training fire units. Since the force levels stipulated by the 1976 National Defense Program Outline calls for six high altitude surface-to-air missile groups, the apparent need is filled and everyone is happy. The reality is that some number approaching 44 fire units of long-range surface-to-air mis- siles are probably needed to assure a reasonable defense of vital industrial targets. The Japanese government is betting that a war won't take place in the next few years and that the shortage won't be exposed. However, the Japanese populace appears ignorantly pleased with this state of affairs, and so it continues. Although the weaknesses in Japanese defense posture are no secret to experienced American observers, there are limits to what can be done to attempt to change the situation. Japan is a sovereign nation and as such is sensitive to continued prodding, even from an ally.

Although I mentioned the Patriot system in some detail because of my familiarity with its acquisition, there are other problem areas. Ammuni- tion of various types is not stocked in enough quantities to sustain combat operations for more than a few weeks. This includes artillery ammunition, surface-to-air missiles, and air-to-air missiles. Not to slight the naval arm, it should be noted that the Japanese submarine fleet is severely limited by the lack of an adequate anti-submarine torpedo. The current weapon is the Mk 37, a U.S. torpedo which was designed in the early 1950s to deal with a six knot snorkeling W class Soviet SS. It fills that requirement very well, the only problem being that the threat has long since changed. In wartime Japanese submarines on patrol will be up against modern Soviet SSNs. JMSDF needs to either put adequate funding into torpedo development,

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which it has not yet done, or it should arrange to purchase or license produce a modern U.S. or European ASW torpedo. Otherwise, in wartime its submarine fleet will be quite ineffective in an ASW role.

These are just a sampling of problem areas. Japan could probably well spend up to 1.5% of GNP without expanding her forces beyond what a reasonable person would say is necessary for the defense of Japan, and without acquiring any overseas power projection capability, a possibility which worries some countries in Asia. In the process Japan could procure enough SSM-1 missiles and air defense capability to make her potential capability to close the Sea of Japan a reality. But at present defense spend- ing rates, that is highly unlikely. The 56 SSM-I missiles which the JGSDF plans to procure during the 1986-90 period would hardly be enough for one engagement during a large scale breakout attempt.

Internally, within the defense forces, there are some problems to be solved. If Japan is to develop a capability to close the exits from the Sea of Japan to surface traffic, SSM-1 batteries must be afforded adequate air defense so that they can carry out their intended function. At present the JGSDF has only medium range Hawk surface-to-air missiles. Although JGSDF wanted to acquire long-range Patriot missiles also, JDA could not seem to find a way to let both the JASDF and JGSDF have Patriot. Since JASDF operated the older long-range air defense missile system--Nike J h it was given the replacement long-range system--Patriot. It should be pos- sible to allow JGSDF to acquire and operate Patriot systems also, in order to provide maximum protection to the SSM-I missile units. Operational and maintenance training and logistic support could be centralized under JASDF for economy. Whether JDA is capable of finding a bureaucratic solution to this problem remains to be seen.

An alternative to JGSDF Patriot units in support of SSM-1 units would be assignment of JASDF Patriot units. However, as noted earlier, the JASDF has not obtained authorization for enough units to fill the needs it identified in its staff studies supporting initial acquisition. Patriot units to support JGSDF SSM-I units would be in excess of the 26 fire units cur- rently planned and approved.

CHANGES IN SDF ROLES AND MISSIONS

If Japan eventually decides that the potential Soviet naval threat to its sea lines of communications is serious enough to warrant development of a meaningful capability to close the SO J, the role of the Ground Self Defense Force in Japanese defense strategy will increase. At present the JGSDF is in an unusual position. It is blessed with the largest share of the defense budget, but at the same time it is in the position of being last in line for a share of major equipment purchases. The JASDF has a number of pro-

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grams like Patriot, F-15, and in the future--FSX. The JMSDF has Aegis waiting in the wings, t8 All of these programs are expensive and involve high technology. The closest the JGSDF comes to high technology is in a tank program. Most of JGSDF funds go for personnel since it is naturally more personnel structured than the other two services.

Up till now the defense of Japan against invasion has been seen to rest upon the efforts of JASDF and JMSDF to prevent landings on Japanese soil. JGSDF forces would only come into play when invasion forces ap- proached their intended landing beaches or helicopter insertion sites. However, if closure of the SOJ is perceived to be an essential element of Japanese defense and deterrence strategy, the role of the JGSDF will in- crease in importance.

A decision to adopt such a strategy will necessitate very close coopera- tion among all three self defense forces under Joint Staff control. The strategy will only be effective if mining (a JMSDF responsibility), SSM-I cruise missiles (a JGSDF responsibility) and air defense (responsibility split between JASDF [Patriot] and JGSDF [Hawk]) are integrated into an effec- tive combination. This is much easier to discuss than to implement. It will call for integrated weapon system acquisition planning as well as opera- tional coordination, and an unprecedented display of leadership by JDA and the Joint Staff.

SSM-1 POSITIONING OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE

Although the cruise missile is not brand new, it has seen only limited operational use. The sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat, off Port Said, by Styx missiles in 1967 was the first use of the cruise missile in a hostilities situation. It put naval authorities on notice that a potentially significant new weapon existed. It was used again during the 1971 Indian-Pakistan War, and in the Israeli-Egyptian fighting in 1973. During the 1982 Falklands fighting the loss of HMS Sheffeld to an Argentinian-fired Exocet missile indicated that the threat was quite formidable. This year the severe damage done to USS Stark by an Iraqi fired Exocet missile reinforced the lesson. The Japanese SSM-1 cruise missile is not a revolutionary weapon system. As cruise missiles go it may not necessarily be the most advanced when it enters service. Its potential for significant strategic impact lies in the roles which it may be assigned by the Japanese government. There is no doubt in my mind that the only intended role is entirely defensive at present, and that it is solely intended for anti-invasion efforts. But things have a way of changing, and so do policies. The future positioning of the SSM-I will be of great interest not only to the Japanese, but also to the Soviet Union and the United States.

66 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES / SUMMER 1987

N O T E S

1. Brendan M. Greeley, Jr. "Soviets Extend Air, Sea Power With Buildup at Cam Ranh Bay," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 March 1987, p. 76.

2. "GSDF To Seek Funds For XSSM-1 Tests in FY'87," JPE Aviation Report-Weekly, 19 May 1986, pp. 8, 9.

3. "Japanese Self-Defense Forces Expand Modernization Programs," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 May 1987, p. 67.

4. The Associated Press, "Japan Eyeing Its First Anti-Ship Missile System," The Japan Times, 18 February 1985.

5. "Japan Tests Antiship Missile," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 July 1985, p. 20. 6. "Japan Plans to Increase Defense Spending 6.3% Over Current Year," Aviation Week &

Space Technology, 18 August 1986, p. 26. 7. "GSDF To Seek Funds For XSSM-I Tests in FY'87," JPEAviation Report-Weekly, 19 May

1986, p. 9. 8. Extracted from notes of briefings provided to author during February 1985. 9. "*JDA Planning Sweeping Reorganization of GSDE" JPE Aviation Report-Weekly 26 May

1986, pp. 5, 6. 10. Clay Blair, Jr., Sih'nt Victory (New York: Lippincott, 1975), p. 857. 11. Mario de Arcangelis, Electronic War/are (Poole Dorset: Blandford Press, 1985), pp. 12-18, 12. Polmar, Norman, ed. Tire Modern Soviet Navy. (London-Melbourne: Arms and Armour

Press, 1979), p. 10. 13. ,lanes Fighting Ships, ed. Captain John Moore (London: Jane's Publishing Company Lim-

ited, 1986). 14. Combat Fleets of the Hbrld 1986/1987, ed. Jean Labayle Couhat (Annapolis: U.S. Naval

Institute Press, 1986). 15. Michael W. Chinworth, "Japanese Defense: Underpinning and Constraints," Japan Eco-

nomic Institute Report No. 40A, 31 October 1986, p. 14. 16. Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery C. Meigs, U.S. Army, "This Must Mean the Philippines,"

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1985, pp. 73-78. 17. USSR Energy Atlas, Central Intelligence Agency, January 1985, p. 32. 18. "MSDF Hopes To Get Aegis Ships, DEs After FDY'91," JPE Aviation Report-Weekly, 19

May 1986, pp. 8, 9.