Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic...

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Strategic Commitment

Transcript of Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic...

Page 1: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Strategic Commitment

Page 2: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Introduction

• Firms make at least two sets of decisions– strategic commitments

• long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse

– tactical decisions• short-term and easily reversed

• Strategic commitments can significantly affect competition– Schelling: Constrain an adversary by binding your hands

• Firms must be foresighted in the commitments they make– anticipate rivals’ reactions

• An example

Page 3: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Commitment

• Commitment needs to exhibit three properties– visibility

• must be observable by those it is intended to influence

– understandability• must be comprehensible by those it is intended to influence

– irreversibility• must be expensive to reverse:

– “talk is cheap”

– only irreversible actions really affect outcomes

Page 4: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

How to Commit

• Install capacity– particularly if this is in the form of specialized assets

• Sign contracts– to install capacity

– on advertising expenditures

– clauses that weaken willingness to cut prices

• Commit to new product introduction– if non-introduction adversely affects reputation

Page 5: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Strategic Commitment and Competition

• A commitment need not be tough to be effective– need to consider the strategic context

• when to be tough and when to be soft?

• Depends upon relationship between strategies– strategic substitutes

• aggressive action induces passive response

– strategic complements• aggressive action induces an aggressive response

Page 6: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Strategic Incentives to Commit

• Strategic relationship between firms is important– indicates how rivals will react

– determines whether a firm should make a tough or soft commitment

• Strategic commitment has two effects– direct

• impact on profitability if rivals do nothing

– strategic• impact on competitive responses of rivals

• Both are important

Page 7: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Tough and Soft Commitments

• Some commitments make a firm tougher– invest in new capacity

– R&D to reduce costs

– potentially bad for competitors

• Others makes a firm softer– offer most favored customer clauses

– open new markets that increase current costs

– potentially good for competitors

• Both can increase profitability

Page 8: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

An Illustration

• Two firms• Firm 1 contemplates making a strategic

commitment– might make firm 1 tougher

• new process innovation

– might make firm 1 softer• entry to a new market that increases production costs in the

existing market

Page 9: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

A Commitment Taxonomy

Strategic

Substitutes

Complements

Type of Commitment

Soft Tough

Situations in whichstrategic commitmentshould be undertaken

Situations in whichstrategic commitmentshould be undertaken

Top DogTop Dog

Fat CatFat Cat

Situations in whichstrategic commitment

should be refused

Situations in whichstrategic commitment

should be refused

Lean & HungryLean & Hungry

Puppy Dog PloyPuppy Dog Ploy

Page 10: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Interpreting the Taxonomy

• Commitment is beneficial if:– makes rivals behave less aggressively

• detrimental if– makes rivals behave more aggressively

• Distinguish – existing rivals

• soften price competition to increase profits

– potential rivals• toughen price competition to deter entry

Page 11: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Commitment

• The failure to commit is itself a commitment– Pepsi’s failure to commit to its Venezuelan bottler

• Commitment’s effects also depend upon– capacity utilization

• excess capacity is more likely to induce aggressive response

– product differentiation• high degrees of product differentiation weaken price

competition

Page 12: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Flexibility and Option Value

• Commitment may be less valuable if there is uncertainty about future events

• Flexibility gives the firm options– and so has option value

• An example

Page 13: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Option value example

Invest $500 million in a market with uncertain

demand

High Acceptance

Low Acceptance

Profit $1500 million Profit $250 million

Probability 0.5 Probability 0.5

Expected profit = 0.5x1500 + 0.5x250 - 500

= $375 million

Suppose that one period’sdelay removes the

uncertainty

Suppose that one period’sdelay removes the

uncertainty If acceptance is low then

choose an alternative“normal” investment

If acceptance is low thenchoose an alternative“normal” investment

This changes theexpected profit of the

investment

This changes theexpected profit of the

investment

(0.5(1500 - 500) + 0.5(0))/1.1(0.5(1500 - 500) + 0.5(0))/1.1

= $455 million= $455 million

Assuming a 10%discount rate

Assuming a 10%discount rate

The option value of delayin this case is $80 Million

Page 14: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Flexibility and option value (cont.)

• There are exceptions– delay leads to possibility of preemption by a competitor

• particularly if competitors are as well informed

• Commitment usually involves irreversible investment– durable, specialized assets that are untradeable

– once committed cannot easily redeploy

– involves risk

• Need a framework to analyze commitment

Page 15: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

A Framework for Commitment

• Suggests four elements– positioning analysis

• direct effects of the commitment

– sustainability analysis• strategic effects of the investment:

– potential responses, analysis of competitive advantage created

– these generate a financial analysis of the commitment• impact on revenues and likely time horizon

Page 16: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Framework (cont.)

– flexibility analysis• incorporates uncertainty

• identifies option value– determined by speed with which the firm learns and the rate at

which it must invest: the “learn-to-burn” ratio

– high learn-to-burn ratio creates flexibility

– option value of delay is low because the firm is learning rapidly about the true situation

– judgement analysis• assessing managerial and organizational factors that distort

decision-making– Type I error: reject good investments

– Type II error: accept bad investments

Page 17: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.

Framework (cont.)

– Errors in judgement are related to organizational structure

• hierarchical firms tend to make Type I errors– tend to screen out more investment projects

• decentralized firms tend to make Type II errors– tend to accept more investment projects

– Thus how to make decisions is important• be aware of incentives created by organizational architecture

Page 18: Strategic Commitment. Introduction Firms make at least two sets of decisions –strategic commitments long-term and difficult/expensive to reverse –tactical.