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An Elemental Definition ofDemocracy and its Advantagesfor Comparing Political RegimeTypesLise StormVersion of record first published: 18 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Lise Storm (2008): An Elemental Definition of Democracy and itsAdvantages for Comparing Political Regime Types, Democratization, 15:2, 215-229

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An Elemental Definition of Democracy and itsAdvantages for Comparing Political Regime

Types

LISE STORM

The way democracy is studied today is confusing due to the many definitions applied. Moreimportantly, it is also flawed in that several cases are excluded as they suffer from the unfortu-nate circumstances that they have undergone a particular sequence of democratic developmentsaccording to a pattern not recognized. This article attempts to spark a debate that will hopefullylead to a new definition of democracy – one that is neutral in its view of the different elementsof democracy, can be applied to regimes across the globe, and which also facilitates compara-tive studies of all kinds. To begin the debate, the article examines previous definitions – andparticularly the use of diminished subtypes – before putting forward an alternative: theso-called ‘elemental definition’.

Key words: democratic elements; democratization; political regime types; neutrality

Liberal democracy, delegative democracy, industrial democracy, western democracy,

Islamic democracy, semi-democracy, facade democracy, and so the list goes on.

At present, the definitions of democracy available for scholars to choose when eval-

uating a particular country or groups of countries are numerous, and the list appears to

be growing.

With hundreds of different definitions of democracy in use today, it has become

almost impossible to gauge what is meant by the termwhen it is applied in the academic

literature, unless, that is, the author specifies exactlywhat democracy denotes in the pub-

lication in question. In academic publications appearing over the past few decades, the

term democracy has come to describe such different circumstances as a situation where

there are competitive, free and fair elections; one where elections are not only free and

fair, but there is also respect for basic civil liberties; and a situation where the cabinet has

effective power to govern (i.e., is not subordinate to a non-elected elite), where elections

are free and fair, and basic civil liberties are respected and protected.1

As a solution to the problem of confusion over what democracy is actually taken

to mean, and in an effort to provide academics with an easily accessible tool for expli-

citly stipulating what democracy means to them, several scholars have come up with

models of classification. The perhaps best researched – and one of the most easily

applicable – is that created by Collier and Levitsky.2 According to this model, it is

possible to place most definitions of democracy within six categories: non-democratic,

Dr Lise Storm, Lecturer and holder of a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship, Department of Politics,University of Exeter, England.

Democratization, Vol.15, No.2, April 2008, pp.215–229ISSN 1351-0347 print/1743-890X onlineDOI: 10.1080/13510340701846301 # 2008 Taylor & Francis

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electoralist (ED), procedural minimum (PM), expanded procedural minimum (EPM),

prototypical conceptions of established industrial democracy (PCEID), and maximalist

definitions.

Collier and Levisky devised these six categories largely on the basis of what they

labelled underlying ‘conceptual benchmarks’, of which they identified the following

four as of particular relevance:

. RCE: reasonably competitive elections, devoid of massive fraud, with broad

suffrage.. BCL: basic civil liberties: freedom of speech, assembly, and association.. EP: elected governments have effective power to govern.. AF: additional political, economic, and social features associated with industrial

democracy.

What makes these four conceptual benchmarks stand out from others such as socio-

economic equality and high levels of popular participation in social institutions is the

role they have played – and arguably continue to play – in the construction of defi-

nitions of democracy. According to Collier and Levitsky’s research, four of the

categories of conceptions and definitions – ED, PM, EPM, and PCEID – can be

seen as forming an ordered scale on the basis of their use of these four particular

conceptual benchmarks.

There is no denying that Collier and Levitsky’s model of categories of definitions

based on conceptual benchmarks makes it easier to navigate the virtual jungle of defi-

nitions of democracy available today. Another probable benefit of the study – in

addition to the development of the model – is the likelihood that it has put a dampener

on the formation of new definitions of democracy. Put briefly, Collier and Levitsky’s

study not only gives a clear overview of the general trends of the many definitions

already available, it also calls for a stop in the formulation of new definitions that

although accurate, often contribute more to academic confusion than the generation

of new knowledge.

That said, the author of this article asserts that in order to achieve a much more

significant level of clarification, what is needed is not a model for the categorization

of definitions and conceptions of democracy. Rather, a definition of democracy,

which in principle can be applied to all countries in the world, is what is called

for.3 Consequently, the aim of this article is to spark a debate that would hopefully

result in the development of such a definition, by putting forward an idea of what

elements such a universally applicable definition of democracy should entail, and

what it might indeed look like.

Shortcomings and Merits of Existing Definitions

Before entering into the project of formulating a new definition of democracy, it is

essential to take a closer look at the shortcomings and merits of existing definitions.

Due to the existence of such a vast number of definitions, rather than going into detail

216 DEMOCRATIZATION

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with the qualities and flaws of specific definitions, the next few paragraphs aim at

giving a more general overview of the main issues.

Conceptual Stretching and Differentiation

For decades, scholars working on the subjects of democracy and democratization

have been treading a fine line when trying to devise new definitions of democracy.

With the significant increase in the number of democratic states since the late

1970s, the discipline has seen the need for more detailed definitions in order to

capture the variety among democratic regimes. However, at the same time, scholars

have also had to keep in mind the level of applicability of such new definitions. In

other words, while there is very little academic benefit in definitions of democracy

that are too general – and therefore cover most cases – there is also not much to

be gained from definitions that are narrow to the point of excluding most cases.

For then, comparative studies applying such definitions will reach conclusions that

have highly limited implications for the wider field.

Taking into consideration the vast amount of definitions of democracy available

today – and the sheer detail of many of these – it appears that scholars faced with this

dilemma have largely prioritized the ability to produce studies demonstrating

the variety among democratic regimes, over facilitating studies with broader

implications. Or, in other words, it appears that scholars have been seeking to

ensure that the concept of democracy would not become the victim of conceptual

stretching – that is, made vague to the point that it becomes almost useless –

while at the same time seeking to apply the concept in some form to a wide variety

of cases. As a result, the concept of democracy comes across as somewhat of an

ideal type, which can be made applicable to empirical cases by the addition of an

adjective. In the words of Collier and Levitsky, the result has been a proliferation

of alternative conceptual frameworks, including a surprising number of subtypes

involving democracy ‘with adjectives’.4

This article takes the view that the above strategy of creating diminished sub-

types, that is, definitions created in order to categorize regimes that fall short of

meeting the requirements of already existing categories, has to some extent failed

in avoiding conceptual stretching and, moreover, it is also not a viable strategy in

the longer run.5 With regard to the first point, it should be acknowledged that con-

ceptual stretching has been avoided when it comes to the concept of democracy

itself, as scholars are not classifying all countries across the globe as ‘democratic.’

However, at the ‘sub-level’, conceptual stretching continues to take place as

countries are now labelled as semi-democracies, delegative democracies, etc. –

definitions that all have their root in the concept of democracy. In other words,

the use of diminished subtypes does not solve the problem of conceptual stretching,

it simply masks it. Hence, a key feature of a new definition of democracy must be to

avoid conceptual stretching while also ensuring differentiation, but this must be

achieved via devising some new measure rather than using diminished subtypes,

which have a number of weaknesses, and which have also given rise to considerable

confusion.

AN ELEMENTAL DEFINITION 217

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Coverage and Travelling

The concern with avoiding conceptual stretching while at the same time providing a

high degree of differentiation has had implications for the nature of comparative

studies on two inter-related fronts. Firstly, by creating diminished subtypes scholars

have limited themselves significantly as, by nature, these diminished subtypes only

apply to a limited number of cases. Because the method applied in comparative

studies of a non-statistical nature tends to be either the most similar systems design

(MSSD) or the most dissimilar systems design (MDSD), the use of diminished sub-

types has had a particularly damaging effect on the generation of knowledge.6 Put

briefly, because of the existence of hundreds of different diminished subtypes, and

due to their increasing level of detail, fewer and fewer cases are seen as covered

by a particular diminished subtype. This means that comparative studies – regardless

of whether of the MSSD or MDSD type – have smaller and smaller pools of cases

from which to select their samples.

Secondly, because these diminished subtypes are often the result of research

focusing on specific geographic areas – such as e.g., South America and the

Spanish-speaking world – there has been a reluctance to compare across geographic

regions. In a working paper published in August 1996, Munck acknowledges this

problem, stating that

confusion over the concepts that serve to structure and organize comparisons

has led many authors to prematurely reject comparisons between the East

and the South on the mistaken grounds that the democratization process in

Southern European and Latin American is not comparable to the Eastern

European and Soviet/post-Soviet experiences.7

Like Sartori, who in the 1970s was of the opinion that ‘our categories hardly apply’

outside the West, a large proportion of scholars are reluctant to compare across

regions as they find that concepts of democracy do not ‘travel’ well.8 An excellent

illustration of this problem is the tendency to use definitions such as ‘illiberal democ-

racy’, ‘liberalized autocracy’, and ‘competitive authoritarianism’ to describe Middle

Eastern regimes.

While liberalized autocracy and competitive authoritarianism are diminished

subtypes of autocracy/authoritarianism and therefore denote non-democratic

regimes, illiberal democracy is a diminished subtype of democracy and therefore

rather different, adding further to the complexity of how to classify and compare

these regimes. Largely for this reason, I agree with Munck that if new knowledge is

to be accumulated, cross-regional comparative studies are imperative. Consequently,

if a new concept of democracy is to be developed, then one of the key features must

be broad coverage, and thereby, amongst other things, the facilitation of cross-regional

comparative studies.

Neutrality

Another key feature of a new definition of democracy must necessarily be demo-

cratic neutrality. If the definition is to apply to as many cases as possible in order

218 DEMOCRATIZATION

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to facilitate comparative studies of all sizes as well as across regions, it is important

to acknowledge that democracy may develop in some regions of the world – or just

in a few countries even – according to a pattern that is different to that of e.g.,

Western Europe or Latin America.

Collier and Levitsky’s ordinal scale of categories of definitions of democracy as

depicted in Figure 1, is a perfect illustration of how, at present, there is not much

democratic neutrality. In short, there appears to be general agreement that democracy

develops according to the sequence shown in Figure 1.

In other words, first comes elections, then comes respect for basic civil liberties,

then comes an empowered government and, in the end, additional features associated

with established industrial democracy, such as e.g., socioeconomic equality. While

this view of democratization is based on the study of a vast number of cases across

the globe, particularly in Europe and the Americas, scholars should be wary of

simply assuming that democratization will follow this pattern in all cases. Assuming

that democracy develops according to a particular sequence of events may lead to the

exclusion of cases that have indeed got elements of democracy but are simply in the

unfortunate situation that they have developed according to a sequence that is not

recognized.

To illustrate this point, take a regime, X, in which elections are reasonably

competitive, devoid of massive fraud, with broad suffrage, and in which the elected

government has effective power to govern. Such a regime does not fit into any of

the four categories of definitions on Collier and Levitsky’s ordinal scale:

. Regime X exceeds the requirements of ED, since it also possesses the element

of EP.. Regime X falls short of the requirements of PM, because it does not have the

element of BCL. However, Regime X possesses an element (EP) that goes

FIGURE 1

CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY: COLIER AND LEVITSKY’S SCALE

Sources: Figure 1 is derived from David Collier and Steven Levitsky,Democracy with Adjectives: Concep-tual Innovation in Comparative Research, Working Paper 230 (Notre Dame, IN: Helen KelloggInstitute for International Studies, 1996).

AN ELEMENTAL DEFINITION 219

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beyond the elements possessed by the regimes defined by PM, making it differ

further from the regimes described by PM.. Regime X falls short of the requirements of EPM, since it does not have the

element of BCL.. Regime X falls short of the requirements of PCEID, because it does not possess

the elements of BCL and AF.

Regarding the currently used definitions, Regime X would most likely be seen as

belonging to the electoralist category even though it exceeds the criteria for that cat-

egory, or instead belonging to the category of diminished subtype stemming from the

expanded procedural minimum category of definitions that highlight an element of

democracy which the regime is missing or possesses in only weakened form.9

However, since Regime X does not fit neatly in any of the categories – as it either

exceeds or falls short of the requirements of the various definitions – it remains

difficult to place.

If democracy is viewed not as a static concept but as a continuum, which graphi-

cally would correspond to the arrow in Figure 2, then, as illustrated in Figure 3,

Regime X could be located at any point between ED and EPM – excluding

points ED, PM and EPM – depending on the definition chosen. The reason why

Regime X cannot be located at point PM and EPM is obvious since the regime

falls short of the requirements stipulated by the two categories of definitions. In

principle, however, Regime X could be located at point ED, since it does live up

to the requirements of that category of definitions. Placing Regime X in category

ED would not do the country justice, though. Regime X possesses two elements

of democracy and is clearly more democratic than the regimes classified in category

ED, due to the fact that these countries only possess one element of democracy.

Consequently, it would be wrong to classify Regime X as belonging to category

ED as Regime X simply suffers from the unfortunate circumstance that a category

of definitions describing countries possessing those exact two elements has not

been identified.

FIGURE 2

A BIASED VIEW OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

220 DEMOCRATIZATION

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In an effort to ensure that democratization is recognized regardless of the sequence

in which it is achieved, a new definition of democracy must be neutral in its view of

democratization. This, of course, does not mean that the definition is value free –

the decision to assign the three core democratic elements equal value is a very value

laden, highly controversial choice. Hence, by stating that a new definition should be

neutral in its view of democratization, I merely imply that it should ensure there are

no black spots where cases like Regime X in the illustration above are lost.

Illustrating Limbo: The Case of Morocco

For a real life, empirical illustration of how some regimes suffer from the unfortunate

circumstance of possessing a combination of democratic elements for which a con-

ceptual category has not been identified, take the case of contemporary Morocco.

In the early 1990s, Morocco introduced a number of important political reforms,

including the adoption of a new constitution in 1996, and legislation improving the

situation of women and the country’s Berber speaking population. Moreover, in

1997, the country held its first reasonably competitive, free and fair elections

since independence, a success that was not only repeated, but improved, in the sub-

sequent parliamentary elections in 2002. Hence, as of the late 1990s, Morocco

found itself in a situation where it possessed the core democratic element of RCE

as well as AF, meaning that the country’s regime exceeded the criteria of electoralist

definitions of democracy, while still falling short of the requirements of the definitions

belonging to the procedural minimum category of definitions of democracy. Morocco,

like Regime X, suffered from the unfortunate circumstance that if fell between these

two established categories of definitions, leading the Moroccan regime to be defined

as electoralist by those scholars recognizing the obtainment of RCE.

An Elemental Definition of Democracy

Having made the case for some key components of a new model for the study of

democracy, what might such a definition look like in more detail? Acknowledging

FIGURE 3

PLACING A CASE ON THE DEMOCRATIC CONTINUUM

AN ELEMENTAL DEFINITION 221

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that most definitions of democracy available today have been formed around one or

more of the key conceptual benchmarks listed by Collier and Levitsky, and recogniz-

ing that there is near universal agreement that democracy is not a static concept but

can best be described as a continuum, I will take Figure 4 as the starting point for my

suggested version of a new definition of democracy.

While Collier and Levitsky operate with the four key conceptual benchmarks of

RCE, BCL, EP, and AF – or what I will refer to as core elements of democracy – I

suggest assigning less value to the conceptual benchmark AF. The reasoning behind

this modification is that I find that these additional features are exactly that, additional

features. They have a complementary character and should accordingly only be taken

into consideration when they appear together with at least one of RCE, BCL or EP.

A further and more significant change is the approach taken to the study of democ-

racy in general. For the past few decades it appears as if scholars have been highly

preoccupied with creating new definitions and conceptions of democracy in order

to place the world’s regimes in boxes, thereby demonstrating the variation in democ-

racy among the various regimes. In short, there has been a tendency to create new

definitions that incorporate a slight change to already existing ones in cases where

a regime did not fit neatly under any existing definition, enabling in the end the

labelling of that particular regime and regimes like it.

What is being suggested here is that scholars move away from this fascination with

categorization at the level of diminished subtypes. If scholars focus on the core elements

and additional features of democracy listed in bold below the arrow in Figure 3 above,

rather than centring their attention on the categories above the arrow, then, albeit with

some further modifications, it becomes possible to conduct studies that analyze variation

not only in degree, but also in kind – and, moreover, studies that will focus on

generating knowledge rather than simply categorizing regimes.

No Regimes Falling Through the Net

Before moving on to these further modifications, let me demonstrate one of the advan-

tages of such a shift in focus: better coverage. By centring the attention on elements of

democracy rather than categories, the study of democracy becomes much less rigid, as

FIGURE 4

THE DEMOCRATIC CONTINUUM WITH THE KEY CONCEPTUAL BENCHMARKS

222 DEMOCRATIZATION

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such an approach enables scholars to study democracy in regimes that do not fit neatly

into the categories of definitions without having to create diminished subtypes. Rather

than posing the questions of whether a particular regimes belongs to one category of

definitions or another, or which attributes of democracy the regime is missing in order

to identify the diminished subtype that it fits the best, the new definition provides

scholars with a tool for studying these regimes in a more positive light. In the

suggested new definition, the focus is not on the elements of democracy missing or

weakened, but on the elements of democracy present.

By focusing on the elements of democracy that are present, scholars will be better

equipped to acknowledge positive developments, which are much less accentuated by

the current definitions. To illustrate this point, take again the case of Regime X. As

established earlier, Regime X suffered from the fact that it did not fit neatly into

any of the four categories of definitions on Collier and Levitsky’s ordinal scale, as

it provided for the two elements of RCE and EPC. However, by applying the new

elemental definition of democracy and focusing on the elements of democracy

present in Regime X, the case can easily be placed on the democratic continuum as

illustrated in Figure 5. Here Regime X is situated side by side with other regimes

that have two elements of democracy, such as for instance a regime which possesses

the elements of RCE and BCL (the elements defining regimes covered by definitions

belonging to the procedural minimum category). Similarly, the case of Morocco anno

2006, which was referred to in detail above, would be classified as a ‘one plus’

regime, as it has obtained AF in addition to RCE. This it distinguishes the regime

from pure electoralist regimes, which only possess RCE.While this may not seem sig-

nificant to many scholars, to the citizens of Morocco and countries like it, the posses-

sion of AF makes a great deal of difference in practice, as does the international

recognition of this achievement.

FIGURE 5

AN ELEMENTAL DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY

AN ELEMENTAL DEFINITION 223

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As is evident from Figure 5, another novelty of the suggested new definition is the

reality that equal value is assigned to the three core elements of democracy. While, as

stated earlier, there has been a tendency to assume that democracy develops in accord-

ance with a specific set of phases, beginning with holding of reasonably competitive

elections, then moving on to the protection of basic civil liberties, further developing

via the guarantee of a cabinet bestowed with effective power to govern, and finally

attaining additional features associated with established industrial democracy, the

elemental definition illustrated graphically in Figure 5 is much more neutral.

Neutrality: Equal Value of Core Elements and Order of Attainment

The so-called elemental definition of democracy can be said to be neutral in that it

attaches similar value to all three core democratic elements. By counting the number

of core democratic elements present in a particular regime, the element model

awards equal status to a regime that provides for RCE, one that respects and protects

BCL, and a regime in which EP is present. It is important to note here that because

AF is seen as having a strictly complementary nature, a regime that provides for

e.g., RCE and also possesses one or more additional features associated with established

industrial democracy is classified as a ‘one plus’ regime. In a similar vein, a regime that

provides for BCL, EP and AF is classified as a ‘two plus’ regime, while a regime is

classified as ‘three plus’ if it, in addition to AF, has all three core democratic elements.

In other words, although the elemental definition does not operate with categories

based on adjectives, these have not been completely eradicated. Rather, the definition

is based on seven categories that together accommodate all regimes in the world, from

those seen as possessing no elements of democracy to the far left in Figure 5, to those

nearing the democratic ideal type to the very right in the figure. Because democracy is

viewed as a continuum rather than a static concept, it logically follows that a regime

with no elements of democracy is seen as less democratic than a regime with one,

which is in turn considered to be less democratic than a regime with one plus AF,

and so forth – the further one moves up the democratic continuum, the more

democratic the regimes are.

Put differently, this means that a regime that possess none of the core democratic

elements is defined as authoritarian, while regimes having obtained one or more of

these are all defined as democratic, albeit to varying extent. In short, the minimum

criterion for a regime to be classified as democratic is the possession of at least

one of the three core democratic elements, but a regime having obtained only one

core democratic element is of course less democratic than one that has obtained

more, thereby enabling the ranking of – and distinction between – different demo-

cratic regimes. For this reason, but also because in many cases more knowledge

can be generated by analyzing the quality of democracy present, rather than simply

establishing whether democracy is present or not (which is more of a ‘ticking of a

box’ kind of approach), I advocate the labelling of regimes as ‘authoritarian’, ‘one

element’, ‘one plus’, ‘two elements’, and so on, rather than as ‘democratic’ or

‘authoritarian’.

Assigning the three core democratic elements equal value is not only important

when it comes to the issue of coverage, but also with regards to the signal that it

224 DEMOCRATIZATION

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sends regimes that have already democratized and/or aspire to develop democracy

further. As illustrated earlier in the case of Regime X, a number of regimes do not

fit neatly into any of the categories in Collier and Levitsky’s model, hence, the

democratic developments achieved by these regimes are not widely recognized.

The irony is that despite the reality that the definitions of democracy most in use

today are very detailed and therefore highly sensitive, they are only sensitive to devel-

opments that follow the most established pattern, that is, the pattern according to

which democratization took place in Europe and the Americas.

By focusing on the number of core democratic elements present in a regime at a

given point in time, the elemental definition of democracy acknowledges that democ-

racy may develop along a different pattern in some regimes, and that such develop-

ments should be recognized on an equal footing with developments following e.g.

the European pattern. In other words, the elemental definition views democratization

as any movement towards the attainment of more core democratic elements (and AF

in cases where one core element has already been achieved).10 Put graphically, the

elemental definition portrays democratization as a motion up the democratic

continuum as illustrated in Figure 6.

Because the elemental definition views democratization as a movement up the

democratic continuum – no matter whether core element(s) or additional features

are sought, and regardless of which core element(s) – it acknowledges developments

that under existing definitions of democracy and democratization are not recognized

as democratization. A good illustration of this point is how scholars belonging to the

so-called ‘transition school’ typically would not acknowledge the attainment of the

core democratic element of BCL as evidence of democratization, but would put it

down to liberalization.

Mainwaring, for one, defines democratization as a movement towards regime

change, whereas liberalization is seen as an extension of civil liberties within an

authoritarian regime.11 O’Donnell and Schmitter make a similar distinction

between liberalization and democratization. They say that ‘by liberalization we

mean the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals

and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third

parties’. In contrast they define democratization as processes expanding the use of

FIGURE 6

DEMOCRATIZATION

Note: Examples shown here are not exhaustive.

AN ELEMENTAL DEFINITION 225

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the rules and procedures of citizenship, either by applying them to political insti-

tutions previously governed by other principles, to persons not previously included,

or issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation.12

In short, while not escaping ‘West/Latin-centrism’ completely, since the defi-

nitions from which the core elements of democracy are derived spring mainly from

Western including Latin American cases and, of course, from the original concept

of democracy modelled on the Greek city-states, the elemental definition of democ-

racy – by virtue of its focus on core democratic elements present – is much more

neutral in its view of democratization compared to many contemporary definitions

of democracy and democratization, which have the underlying assumption that

democracy develops according to a particular pattern.

A Multi-Purpose Definition

As demonstrated in the sections below, the elemental definition sets itself apart from

other definitions of democracy in that it has broader coverage and is much more

neutral in its view of both democracy and democratization. A third regard in which

this definition differs from its counterparts concerns the level of differentiation.

While most definitions of democracy seek to either delineate what democracy is

and is not, or characterize the extent to which a regime or group of regimes can be

said to be democratic, the elemental definition of democracy is applicable to both

types of studies, that is, research seeking to analyze variation in kind and/or variationin degree. On the one hand, by using the elemental definition it is possible to dis-

tinguish between regimes that are authoritarian – that is, regimes that possess no

elements of democracy – and regimes that can be classified as having one or more

core elements of democracy. On the other hand, by identifying the number of core

democratic elements present in one or more regimes at a given point in time, the

definition can be used to differentiate among regimes that possess elements of

democracy.

Because of the elemental definition’s broad coverage of cases and wide applica-

bility in terms of levels of analysis, it is important to note here that the definition is not

a case of conceptual stretching. The elemental definition does by no means imply that

a regime which possesses only one element of democracy is labelled democratic.

Rather, the argument put forward is that scholars ought to begin referring to

regimes as either (a) possessing no elements of democracy, or (b) one or more

elements of democracy, and then, if desired, differentiate between those regimes

that have acquired one or more core democratic elements according to how many

of these they possess. Finally, scholars could choose to further differentiate

between regimes with e.g., two core democratic elements by focusing on which

particular core elements are present.

If using Sartori’s terminology, the levels of differentiation can be illustrated as in

Table 1.13 At the highest level of abstraction (HL), where Sartori puts definitions with

a scope of cross-area comparisons and of more or less universal applicability, one

finds the two categories of ‘no elements of democracy’ and ‘elements of democracy’.

At the medium level of abstraction (ML), following the elemental definition, scholars

further differentiate between the number of elements present – a range comprising six

226 DEMOCRATIZATION

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categories from one element to three core elements plus additional features. Finally,

at the lowest level of abstraction (LL), one finds categories usually aiming at single-

country case studies, where scholars differentiate between regimes not only according

to the number of core democratic elements achieved, but also according to which

particular elements are present.

As Table 1 illustrates, the elemental definition does indeed enable scholars to

employ a very high level of detail when distinguishing between regimes. However,

in line with the objective of combating the existing academic confusion over what

is actually meant when using the term democracy, I put forward the argument that

level LL on the ladder of abstraction should not be utilized. While using definitions

at level HL serve to distinguish between kinds of regimes, that is, between those that

have elements of democracy and those that do not, and whereas the definitions at level

ML can be used to demonstrate differences in degree of democracy, those at level LL

appear to mainly confuse.

Definitions at level LL do not actually illustrate difference in kind, but rather

attempt to highlight difference in degree. However, while there is a meaningful

scale at level ML, stretching from one core element of democracy to three core

elements of democracy plus additional features, no meaningful scale exists at level

LL. Put differently, how does one determine whether a delegative democracy is

more democratic than a so-called semi-democracy or indeed a facade democracy –

what is the criteria, and who sets these? How does one place delegative democracies,

semi-democracies, facade democracies and the like on the democratic continuum?

Such terms – and such a narrow and often highly contextual focus – serve no

purpose but to illustrate that for example delegative democracies are different from

facade democracies. However, they do not state anything meaningful relating to

the degree of democracy in these countries and how they should be placed in relation

to each other and other regimes on the democratic continuum.

Conclusion: Freedom and Neutrality

This article has attempted to formulate a new definition of democracy. The aim of this

definition – labelled here the elemental definition – is primarily to combat the exist-

ing academic confusion within the field, confusion that has arisen as the result of a

virtual mushrooming of definitions of democracy during the past few decades.

Another of the definition’s objectives is to facilitate broader coverage, making sure

TABLE 1

THE ELEMENTAL DEFINITION AND THE LADDER

OF ABSTRACTION

HL No elements of democracy Element(s) of democracy

ML Number of elements (1 to 3þ)LL Number of elements

and which particular elements

AN ELEMENTAL DEFINITION 227

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that no cases that have elements of democracy slip through the net – that regimes are

acknowledged for the efforts they have made to democratize and that their achieve-

ments are recognized. Relating to the recognition of developments is a third objective

of the elemental definition: neutrality. The elemental definition aspires to be neutral

both in terms of how it rates the three core elements of democracy as of equal value,

and in the way in which it views democratization as a movement towards the attain-

ment of more core elements of democracy and/or additional features associated with

established industrial democracy.

Because the elemental definition operates with three main components, which all

have equal value, and due to the reality that the definition includes only seven possible

regime categories ranging from no elements of democracy to three elements of

democracy plus additional features, the definition succeeds in providing

differentiation while avoiding conceptual stretching, and without the use of dimin-

ished subtypes. In other words, with its seven categories the elemental definition

provides a degree of differentiation and one that exists at a meaningful level. By

applying the element model in comparative studies, scholars are able to place

regimes on the democratic continuum, thereby illustrating variation in kind and/ordegree, as the definition operates with two types of regimes (those with no elements

of democracy and those with one or more), as well as with different levels of

democracy (from one core democratic element to three plus additional features).

The use of only three key components – the three so-called core elements of

democracy – which are more or less universally accepted as such, means that the

elemental definition can be applied to cases right across the world, thereby facilitating

much needed cross-regional comparisons. Moreover, the seven categories of regimes

identified in the model are broad; and democracy is viewed as a continuum rather than

a static concept, and democratization seen as a move towards the attainment of more

core democratic elements and/or additional features. For all these reasons the

elemental definition ensures that all regimes – save for those that are defined as

authoritarian – can be placed on the democratic continuum regardless of how

many elements of democracy they possess, and what these elements are. Put

briefly, the elemental definition of democracy not only facilitates the study of democ-

racy at all levels, whether single-country case studies or large comparative studies, it

also ensures that all the world’s non-authoritarian regimes can be included in such a

study, and that all democratic developments are recognized, regardless of whether

they follow a pattern corresponding to that which is most characteristic of the West

in general and Latin America in particular.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writers would like to thank Dr Gareth Stansfield, Professor Tim Niblock, Dr Dario Castiglione, and DrLiam Anderson for taking the time to comment on the various drafts of this article.

NOTES

1. See, among others, Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Taylor andFrancis, 1976); Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:

228 DEMOCRATIZATION

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Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1986); Scott Mainwaring, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoreti-cal and Comparative Issues’, in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Samuel Valenzuela(eds), Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in ComparativePerspective (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 294–341; SamuelHuntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: Universityof Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens, Capi-talist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell,1992).

2. David Collier and Steven Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Compara-tive Research’, World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1997), pp. 430–51 which draws on the same authors’Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research, Working Paper 230(Notre Dame, IN: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1996).

3. It should be noted that Collier and Levitsky (note 2) never set out to develop a definition that isuniversally applicable. What the two scholars aimed at was the creation of a model that would helpmake sense of the many definitions of democracy in use today.

4. Collier and Levitsky, World Politics (note 2), pp. 430–1.5. In the words of Collier and Levitsky, World Politics (note 2), p. 438, ‘the distinctive feature of dimin-

ished subtypes is that they generally identify specific attributes of democracy that are missing, therebyestablishing the diminished character of the subtype, at the same time that they identify other attributesof democracy that are present’.

6. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Enquiry (London: John Wiley,1970); and Andrew Faure, ‘Some Methodological Problems in Comparative Politics’, Journal ofTheoretical Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1994), pp. 307–22.

7. Gerardo Munck, Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization,Working Paper 228 (Notre Dame, IN: Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1996).

8. Giovanni Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’, The American Political ScienceReview, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1970), p. 1051. See also Michael McFaul, ‘The Fourth Wave of Democracyand Dictatorship’, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (2002), pp. 212–44; Richard Anderson, M. StevenFish, Stephen Hanson and Philip Roeder, Postcommunism and the Theory of Democracy (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and John Higley and Richard Gunther (eds), Elites and Demo-cratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993).

9. In the case of Regime X: BCL. Please note that it is unlikely that Regime X would be described by adefinition from the category of prototypical conceptions of established industrial democracy, since itwould be missing/have a weakened form of two elements compared to other regimes in this category.Regimes described by expanded procedural minimum definitions would most likely be seen as a closermatch.

10. Although an increase in the number of elements of democracy present in a regime is the aim we canassociate with the democratization process, such an increase is not imperative if a regime is to bedescribed as having undergone a process of democratization, since such processes sometimes fail toproduce the desired outcome.

11. Mainwaring (note 1), p. 298.12. O’Donnell and Schmitter (note 1), pp. 7–8.13. Sartori (note 8), pp. 1040–4.

Manuscript accepted for publication July 2007.

Address for correspondence: Lise Storm, Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building,217, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4RD. E-mail: l.storm@ex.ac.uk

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