Stockpile Stewardship Program - Federation of American ...engineers in our nation to meet the...

U.S. Departmentof Energy

30-Day Review

StockpileStewardship

Program

November 23, 1999

U.S. Departmentof Energy

30-Day Review

StockpileStewardship

Program

November 23, 1999

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Table of ContentsStockpile Stewardship Program30-Day Review

Chapter 1 - Purpose of this Review ............................................................................... 1-1

1.1 Statement by Secretary Richardson on Stockpile Stewardship .............................. 1-11.2 Charge to the Senior Technical Advisors from Under Secretary Moniz ................ 1-31.3 Stockpile Stewardship 30-Day Program Review Participants ................................ 1-5

Chapter 2 - Overview of the Stockpile Stewardship Program ................................... 2-1

2.1 Program Goals and Organization ............................................................................. 2-12.1.1 New Business Model ................................................................................. 2-12.1.2 Directed Stockpile Work ............................................................................ 2-32.1.3 Campaigns .................................................................................................. 2-32.1.4 Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities ................................................ 2-7

Chapter 3 - The Requirements Process....................................................................... 3-1

3.1 National Requirements ............................................................................................ 3-13.1.1 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan ............................................................... 3-13.1.2 Nuclear Posture Review ............................................................................ 3-13.1.3 Stockpile Stewardship Program Plan ......................................................... 3-1

3.2 DoD/DOE Relationship ........................................................................................... 3-23.2.1 Nuclear Weapons Council .......................................................................... 3-23.2.2 Nuclear Weapons Council Standing and Safety Committee ...................... 3-33.2.3 Nuclear Weapons Requirements Working Group ...................................... 3-33.2.4 Project Officer Group (POG) .................................................................... 3-33.2.5 Other DOE/DoD Interactions .................................................................... 3-43.2.6 Developing Stockpile Requirements ........................................................... 3-43.2.7 The 6.X Process ......................................................................................... 3-43.2.8 The Stockpile Life Extension Process ....................................................... 3-6

Chapter 4 - Impact of Arms Control Agreements on theStockpile Stewardship Program ....................................................................................... 4-1

4.1 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ............................................................................. 4-14.2 START I/II .............................................................................................................. 4-14.3 START III ................................................................................................................ 4-2

4.3.1 Goals........................................................................................................... 4-24.3.2 Issues.......................................................................................................... 4-24.3.3 Technical Approach .................................................................................... 4-24.3.4 Risks ........................................................................................................... 4-34.3.5 Integration ................................................................................................... 4-3

4.3.5.1 Other Programs/Campaigns ................................................................ 4-34.3.5.2 Sites ..................................................................................................... 4-34.3.5.3 Other Offices, Agencies and Organizations ........................................ 4-3

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Chapter 5 - Accomplishments ......................................................................................... 5-1

5.1 Stockpile Maintenance ............................................................................................ 5-15.2 Stockpile Surveillance: Predicting and Detecting Problems ................................... 5-15.3 Assessment and Certification: Analyzing and Evaluating ...................................... 5-45.4 Design and Manufacturing: Refurbishing and Certifying ....................................... 5-55.5 Simulation & Modeling: Underpinning the Stockpile Stewardship Program .......... 5-75.6 Experimental Facilities: Underpinning the Stockpile Stewardship Program ........... 5-8

Chapter 6 - Stockpile Stewardship Program Challenges–Now and in the Future ...................................................................................................... 6-1

6.1 Personnel Challenges .............................................................................................. 6-16.1.1 The Chiles Commission .............................................................................. 6-1

6.2 Infrastructure Challenges ........................................................................................ 6-26.3 Business Challenges ................................................................................................ 6-6

Chapter 7 - Summary and Findings ................................................................................ 7-1

7.1 Introduction.............................................................................................................. 7-17.2 General and Specific Program Findings .................................................................. 7-3

7.2.1 The Stockpile Stewardship Program structure is on track ......................... 7-37.2.2 Science-based SSP is the right path ........................................................... 7-3

7.2.2.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................... 7-37.2.3 SSP baseline will continuously evolve ........................................................ 7-4

7.2.3.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................... 7-47.2.4 The process for generating program requirements needs attention ........... 7-4

7.2.4.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................... 7-57.2.5 Despite the many accomplishments, the program is under stress ............. 7-5

7.2.5.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................... 7-67.2.6 More work is needed to prioritize the directed stockpile workload ........... 7-7

7.2.6.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................... 7-77.2.7 ‘Metrics of Success’ need to be defined for the DSW program

and each Campaign .................................................................................... 7-77.2.7.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................... 7-7

7.2.8 Additional external review and oversight is needed ................................... 7-87.2.8.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................... 7-8

7.2.9. Increases in programmatic and security requirements have impacted the stability and morale of the work force ................................................. 7-87.2.9.1 Specific Program Findings for Production Plants ................................... 7-87.2.9.2 Specific Program Findings for Laboratories ........................................... 7-9

7.2.10. SLEP production needs for the next decade require stable reinvestment in, and planning for work force and plant modernization. ........7-10

7.2.10.1 Specific Program Findings ....................................................................7-107.2.11 More long-term planning is required for new capital

construction projects ...................................................................................7-10 7.2.11.1 Specific Program Findings ...................................................................7-10

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Appendix A - Listing of all SSP Program Reviews .............................................................. A-1

Appendix B - Recommendations from the Chiles Commission Report ............................... B-1

Appendix C - Bibliography ................................................................................................... C-1

Appendix D - Acronyms....................................................................................................... D-1

Appendix E - Site Descriptions ............................................................................................ E-1

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Purpose of this Review1 1.1. Statement by SecretaryRichardson on Stockpile Stewardship(October 14, 1999)

LAST NIGHT PRESIDENT CLINTONreaffirmed that the United States will continueto observe–as we have since 1992–a policyof not conducting nuclear tests. As Secretaryof Energy one of my most important responsi-bilities is to ensure that the U.S. nuclear stock-pile remains safe, secure and reliable withoutnuclear testing. The U.S. nuclear deterrentremains a supreme national interest of theUnited States.

The Department of Energy, with our na-tional laboratories and production facilities, willcontinue to maintain U.S. nuclear weaponsthrough the Stockpile Stewardship Program.The program rests on developing an unprec-edented set of scientific tools to better under-stand nuclear weapons, on significantlyenhancing our surveillance capabilities, and oncompleting a new manufacturing programneeded to extend the life of our nuclear weap-ons. Through Stockpile Stewardship, the Sec-retaries of Defense and Energy havesuccessfully certified the nuclear stockpile forthe last three years, and we are well along ourway to a fourth certification that the stockpileremains safe and reliable and that nuclear test-ing is not needed at this time.

In order to ensure our continued confi-dence in the structure, progress and accom-plishments of this important program, I havedirected the Under Secretary of Energy, ErnestP. Moniz, to undertake a comprehensive in-

ternal review of the Stockpile StewardshipProgram and to report back to me within 30days. The review will examine the accom-plishments of the program over the last threeyears and the program structure in meetingcurrent and long-term needs for certifying thestockpile. This will form the basis for assess-ing whether the balance between program el-ements supports the national strategy.

In particular we must ensure that we areplacing sufficient attention and resources torecruiting and retaining the best scientists andengineers in our nation to meet the challengeof maintaining our nuclear stockpile withouttesting. We must also review the balance ofactivities at the production facilities and at thenational laboratories to ensure that the prior-ity given to these important tasks is commen-surate with the needs of the program.

For the Stockpile Stewardship Programto be successful the Administration and theCongress must work together to demonstratetheir commitment to the U.S. nuclear deter-rent by providing for sustained and stable fund-ing for the program over the years to come.This will be true whether or not a Test BanTreaty is ratified since the U.S. will inevitablycontinue to rely on the new paradigm for main-taining its weapons in the post-Cold War erawhere we are not building new weapons sys-tems, and where we are dependent on a newset of facilities and scientific resources to meetthis critical challenge.

The importance of a credible nuclear de-terrent to our national security was reaffirmedduring last week’s Senate debate. We at theDepartment of Energy will continue our workto fulfill this important national security mission.

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1.2. Charge to the Senior TechnicalAdvisors from Under Secretary Moniz

ON OCTOBER 14, 1999, the Secretaryof Energy directed me to undertake a com-prehensive internal review of the StockpileStewardship Program and report my findingsto him within 30 days. In order to accomplishthis task I have invited a group of senior mem-bers of the defense and scientific communi-ties to advise me on the structure, balance,and ability of the Stockpile Stewardship Pro-gram to maintain a safe, secure, and reliablenuclear weapons stockpile in the absence ofnuclear testing both now and in the future.

I ask the Senior Technical Advisors toevaluate the program based on issues suchas: the program goals, structure, and organi-zation; the ability of the program to meet DoD/DOE requirements; the health and status ofthe nuclear weapons complex infrastructure,including both facilities and human resources;and the appropriateness of the program re-sources, schedules and integrated plan. Thisinput will be central to the Secretary’s assess-ment of how these factors contribute collec-tively to our level of confidence in the stockpilenow and in the future.

A comprehensive overview of the Stock-pile Stewardship Program will be presentedby the Office of Defense Programs and se-nior staff from the nuclear weapons complexon November 8-9, 1999, at U.S. StrategicCommand. The afternoon of November 9 willbe spent evaluating the program, defining thekey issues, and framing recommended actions.This discussion will shape the Stockpile Stew-ardship Program review presented to the Sec-retary. The report will identify the keyaccomplishments and challenges of the Stock-pile Stewardship Program, the critical senior-level decision points and issues facing theprogram, and the programmatic areas that willrequire additional study in the future.

Ernest J. Moniz

Under SecretaryUnited States Department of Energy

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1.3. Stockpile Stewardship 30-DayProgram Review Participants

Chair

Dr. Ernest J. MonizUnder SecretaryUnited States Department of Energy

Senior Technical Advisors

Dr. John Birely (retired)Los Alamos National Laboratory

Dr. Jay DavisDirectorDefense Threat Reduction AgencyU.S. Department of Defense

Dr. Ted HardebeckChief ScientistU.S. Strategic Command, J-5BU.S. Department of Defense

Dr. Roland Herbst (retired)Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Mr. Gene Ives (retired)Sandia National Laboratories

Dr. Raymond JeanlozProfessorDepartment of Geology and GeophysicsUniversity of California, Berkeley

Mr. Frank MillerPrincipal Deputy Assistant SecretaryOffice of the Secretary of Defense for Strategyand Threat ReductionU. S. Department of Defense

Mr. Robert Peurifoy (retired)Sandia National Laboratories

General Lawrence Welch, USAF (retired)Chief Executive OfficerInstitute for Defense Analysis

DOE Senior Staff

BGen Thomas GiocondaAssistant Secretary for Defense Programs,ActingU. S. Department of Energy

Mr. Robert DeGrassePrincipal Deputy Assistant Secretary forOperationsOffice of Defense ProgramsU. S. Department of Energy

Dr. Maureen McCarthyOffice of the Under SecretaryU. S. Department of Energy

Dr. Robin StaffinOffice of the SecretaryU. S. Department of Energy

Participants

Dr. Gil Weigand

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research,Development and SimulationOffice of Defense ProgramsU.S. Department of Energy

Mr. David Beck

Deputy Assistant Secretary for MilitaryApplication and Stockpile OperationOffice of Defense ProgramsU. S. Department of Energy

Mr. James LandersDeputy Assistant Secretary for Program SupportOffice of Defense ProgramsU. S. Department of Energy

Ms. Karen CleggPresidentAllied Signal, Kansas City Plant

Mr. Robert Van HookPresidentLockheed-Martin Energy Systems, Y-12

Dr. William WeinreichPresidentPantex Plant

Dr. Thomas HunterSenior Vice PresidentSandia National Laboratories

Dr. George MillerAssociate DirectorLawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Dr. Steve YoungerAssociate DirectorLos Alamos National Laboratory

Ms. Kathy CarlsonManagerNevada Operations OfficeU. S. Department of Energy

Mr. Rick GlassManagerAlbuquerque Operations OfficeU. S. Department of Energy

Dr. James TurnerManagerOakland Operations OfficeU. S. Department of Energy

Dr. Jerry FreedmanOffice of Defense ProgramsU.S. Department of Energy

Dr. John HarveyDeputy Assistant SecretaryOffice of the Secretary of Defense for Strategyand Threat ReductionU. S. Department of Defense

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Overview of theStockpile StewardshipProgram2

THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIPPROGRAM (SSP) was established in re-sponse to the FY 1994 National Defense Au-thorization Act (P.L. 103-160), which calledon the Secretary of Energy to “establish astewardship program to ensure the preserva-tion of the core intellectual and technical com-petencies of the United States in nuclearweapons.” In the absence of nuclear testingthe Stockpile Stewardship Program must: 1)support a focused, multifaceted program toincrease the understanding of the enduringstockpile; 2) predict, detect, and evaluatepotential problems due to the aging of thestockpile; 3) refurbish and remanufactureweapons and components, as required; and4) maintain the science and engineering insti-tutions needed to support the nation’s nucleardeterrent, now and in the future. The SSPhas been reviewed extensively since its incep-tion. A list of reviews of the Stockpile Stew-ardship Program is given in Appendix A.

As the civilian steward of the nation’snuclear weapons complex, the Department ofEnergy (DOE) is responsible to the nation forthe safety, security, and reliability of the nucleararsenal. The Department of Defense (DoD)is the military customer for the nuclear stock-pile and partners with the DOE in setting re-quirements and establishing production goals.The Secretary of Energy represents and isobligated to the United States public to ensurethat the nuclear arsenal remains safe, secureand reliable. A key challenge of the StockpileStewardship Program is to balance militaryweapon performance goals against civilian andmilitary surety and safety concerns.

A significant fraction of the nation’snuclear weapon systems are scheduled to un-dergo refurbishment during the next decade.Additional systems will be simultaneously un-dergoing engineering and manufacturing de-

velopment in preparation for refurbishment.The DOE must be able to remanufactureweapon components and continue to certifythem as safe, secure and reliable againstthreats of the 21st century. Two key systems–the W80 and the W76–are a large part of thenation’s nuclear deterrent and the refurbish-ments of these systems will represent a sig-nificant effort to be undertaken during the nextdecade. The W76–as part of the Trident sub-marine weapon system–plays a particularly im-portant role as one of the most survivableelements of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. De-veloping the tools, technologies, and skill-baserequired to refurbish these systems is a majorchallenge of the Stockpile Stewardship Pro-gram. The cost and schedule of these toolsand technologies, and the availability of theproper skills in the work force, must be fac-tored into the development of the requirementsexpressed in the life extension programs ofthese two weapons.

2.1. Program Goals and Organization

THE HIGHEST PRIORITY OF the SSPis to ensure the operational readiness of theU.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The SSPprogram is organized into three focus areas:1) Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), designedto ensure that stockpiled weapons meet mili-tary requirements; 2) Campaigns, designed toprovide the science and engineering capabili-ties needed to meet the ongoing and evolvingDSW requirements; and 3) Infrastructure(Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities,(RTBF)) that is required for stockpile workand computational and experimental researchactivities.

2.1.1. New Business Model

During the last year, DOE’s Office ofDefense Programs (DP) has undertaken amajor shift in program management strategy,which has resulted in significant changes tothe supporting planning, budgeting, and orga-

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nizational structure of the SSP. The change inapproach responds to important drivers that DPpresently faces. These include weapon refur-bishments starting in FY 2006, an agingworkforce in the nuclear weapons complex,and an aging stockpile that must be maintained.It also responds to the need for intensive inter-nal and external review to ensure that the pro-gram will achieve its goals, while preservingthe institutional viability of the laboratories, pro-duction plants, and the test site.

The approach now used by DP to managethe SSP involves developing an understandingof both the fixed and variable costs associatedwith the program. The fixed costs are associ-ated with the physical infrastructure, i.e., thecosts associated with maintaining only the in-frastructure, facilities, capital equipment, con-struction, and other functions that are necessaryto have a viable nuclear weapons complex. DPhas termed fixed costs as Readiness in Tech-nical Base and Facilities.

The variable costs are those that are asso-ciated with the actual work that is performedwithin the nuclear weapons complex. DP hasestablished two categories of variable costs.The first category is Directed Stockpile Work,which are those activities that directly supportthe day-to-day work and activities associatedwith the refurbishment and certification of spe-

The nation’s enduring nuclear weapon stockpile, shown in the accompanying table, contains thirteen systemswithin nine weapon classes. The W84, which is in the inactive stockpile (IS), is also listed. It’s carrier, theground-launched cruise missile, was eliminated by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1988.

Weapon Description Delivery System Laboratories Primary Use Service Date Entered ServiceB61-3/4/10 Non-Strategic

BombF-15, F-16, NATOTornado

LANL & Sandia Air to Surface Air Force, NATO B61-3: 10/79B61-4: 8/79B61-10: 8/90

B61-7/11 Strategic Bomb B-52, B-2 LANL & Sandia Air to Surface Air Force B61-7: 9/85B61-11: 11/97

W62 ICBM Warhead Minuteman IIIICBM

LLNL & Sandia Surface to Surface Air Force 4/70

W76 SLBM Warhead Trident I (C4)Trident II (D5)

LANL & Sandia Underwater toSurface

Navy 11/78

W78 ICBM Warhead Minuteman IIIICBM

LANL & Sandia Surface to Surface Air Force 9/79

W80-0/1 ALCM/ACM/TLAM-N Warhead

SSN AttackSubmarine, B-52

LANL & Sandia Air to SurfaceUnderwater toSurface

NavyAir Force

W80-0: 3/84W80-1: 2/82

B83 Strategic Bomb B52, B-2 LLNL & Sandia Air to Surface Air Force 9/83W87 ICBM Warhead Peacekeeper ICBM LLNL & Sandia Surface to Surface Air Force 7/86W88 SLBM Warhead Trident II (D5) LANL & Sandia Underwater to

SurfaceNavy 6/89

W84 (IS) GLCM No current carrier,removed by INF

LLNL & Sandia Air Force 9/83

cific weapons in the nuclear stockpile. Thesecond category of variable costs is termed“Campaigns,” which are focused science andengineering activities that address critical ca-pabilities, tools, computations and experimentsneeded to achieve weapons stockpile certifi-cation, manufacturing, and refurbishment nowand into the future, in the absence of nucleartesting.

It is important to understand that the fixed-cost portion of the SSP – RTBF – must befunded. No weapons work or other activitiescan take place unless the infrastructure existsand is maintained in the appropriate state ofreadiness. The implementation of this approachof identifying both fixed and variable costs ofthe program provides DP, laboratory and plantmanagers an improved and coordinated toolfor determining the costs associated with man-aging the nuclear weapons complex.

Another business practice introduced thisyear by DP was the establishment of a rigor-ous planning process that clearly lays out pro-grammatic milestones to be achieved withineach element of the SSP. The complete Stock-pile Stewardship Program is now defined by aseries of program plans that have a five-yearplanning horizon, each with an accompanyingannual implementation plan. The five-yearprogram plans describe the goals and objec-

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tives of the program elements, and the annualimplementation plans provide detailed sets ofmilestones that allow for accurate programtracking and oversight.

The combination of identifying the fixedand variable costs associated with the program,and the rigorous planning that has been done,is expected to provide an increased level offocus and integration within the program, anda much greater level of resolution of programactivities. DP management believes that, be-cause of the increased focus, this approachwill significantly improve the laboratories’ andproduction plants’ ability to support, maintain,and build an excellent work force with the skillmix needed to ensure success of the SSP. Thisapproach also is key to sustaining the labora-tories as premier scientific and engineeringinstitutions, supporting the manufacturing ac-tivities necessary to maintain and modernizethe stockpile.

2.1.2. Directed Stockpile Work

The Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) Pro-gram addresses activities that directly supportthe readiness of the enduring nuclear weap-ons stockpile now and for as long into the fu-ture as is required. It focuses on nuclearstockpile life-cycle management, maintains thenuclear deterrent as specified in the NuclearWeapons Stockpile Plan (see Chapter 3), andincludes stockpile-related workload, policyguidance, coordination, and oversight of allactivities that directly support stockpile re-quirements. DSW policy and program guid-ance is formulated within DP and implementedby a team consisting of DP, the national labo-ratories, and the production plants that togethercomprise the nuclear weapons complex.

DSW encompasses a broad range of ac-tivities that focus on the reliability, surety, andperformance of nuclear weapons. These ac-tivities include research, development, and pro-duction associated with: weapon maintenance;surveillance; life extension; assessment andcertification; baselining; dismantlements; de-sign assessments; engineering; and production

readiness across the nuclear weapons com-plex. DSW represents the programmatic foun-dation for setting current weapon systemactivities and implementing future weaponstockpile requirements.

The key DSW program goals are to:

Maintain the readiness of the deployedstockpile.

• Execute the limited life component ex-change program (LLCE);

• Confirm the safety, reliability, and per-formance of deployed weapon sys-tems; and

• Conduct authorized weapon alter-ations, modifications and repairs.

Support nuclear deterrent into the future.

• Refurbish the current stockpile toachieve life extension; and

• Provide the capability to modernizeweapons.

Dispose of retired weapons and associatedcomponents.

• Dismantle retired weapons; and

• Provide for materials and componentdisposition.

2.1.3. Campaigns

Campaigns are technically challenging,multi-year, multi-functional efforts conductedacross the Defense Programs laboratories, theproduction plants, and the Nevada Test Site(NTS). They are designed to develop andmaintain specific critical capabilities that areneeded to sustain a viable nuclear deterrent.The goal of the Campaigns is to provide thecapabilities needed to address current and fu-ture stockpile issues by employing world-classscientists and engineers, and by providing themost advanced scientific and engineering in-frastructure. The Campaigns provide a focusand planning framework that enables the labo-ratories to sustain their scientific preeminence.

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Campaigns have milestones and specific end-dates designed to focus efforts in science andcomputing, applied science and engineering,and production readiness, on well-defineddeliverables related to the stockpile. Currently,there are eighteen Campaigns. It is antici-pated that as these mature and milestones areachieved, new Campaigns will be identifiedand implemented.

Eight Campaigns deal primarily with pro-viding the scientific understanding necessaryto certify the nuclear weapons stockpile in theabsence of nuclear testing and to support thestockpile modernization required for weaponlife extensions.

• Primary Certification Campaign – in-cludes experimental activities that will de-velop and implement the ability to certifyrebuilt and aged primaries to within a statedyield level without nuclear testing. Capa-bilities developed under this Campaign di-rectly support DSW, including the B61,W80, and W76 life extensions, and certifi-cation of the newly-fabricated W88 pit.

End State: Develop the tools required tocertify the performance and safety of anynewly fabricated replacement or aged pri-mary based on hydrodynamics and gener-alized materials descriptions.

• Dynamic Materials Properties Cam-paign – includes efforts to develop phys-ics-based, experimentally-validated dataand models of all stockpile materials at alevel of accuracy commensurate with therequirements of primary and secondarycertification.

End State: Provide complete, accurate andexperimentally-validated models that de-scribe the state and evolution of materialproperties in imploding primaries, with spe-cial emphasis on plutonium.

• Advanced Radiography Campaign –develops technologies for three-dimen-sional imaging of imploding surrogate-ma-terial primaries, with sufficient resolutionto resolve uncertainties in primary perfor-mance.

End State: Provide accurate 3-D imageryof imploding surrogate primaries.

• Secondary Certification and Nuclear-Systems Margins Campaign – includesexperimental and computational activitiesdesigned to determine the minimum pri-mary yield needed to produce a militarilyeffective weapon. The activities in thisCampaign will develop a validated, pre-dictive computational capability for eachsystem in the stockpile, determine the pri-mary radiation emission and energy flow,and determine the performance of nomi-nal, aged, and rebuilt secondaries.

End State: Determine margins andweapon-primary factors necessary to pro-duce a militarily effective weapon.

• Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Ig-nition & High Yield Campaign – includesexperimental activities at the National Ig-nition Facility (NIF) and other facilities thatwill enhance experimental capabilities forstewardship. Material conditions that canbe reached at the NIF, together with thediagnostics available, will also provide en-hanced experimental capability for primarycertification and weapons-relevant mate-rials dynamics measurements.

End State: Achieve ignition implosion byFY 2006.

• Certification in Hostile EnvironmentsCampaign – will validate computationaltools for certification, reevaluate nuclear-weapon hostile environments, develop ra-diation-hardened technologies, anddemonstrate certification technologies onthe W76 life extension program.

End State: Develop certification tools andmicrosystems technologies required toensure that refurbished weapons meetStockpile-to -Target Sequence (STS) hos-tile environment requirements.

• Defense Applications and ModelingCampaign – uses the tools of the Accel-erated Strategic Computing Initiative(ASCI) to provide 3-D, high-fidelity, full-

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system simulation software required forengineering, safety, and performanceanalyses of weapons in the stockpile.

End State: 3-D high-fidelity-physics, full-system simulation capability.

• Weapon System Engineering Certifica-tion Campaign – establishes science-based engineering methods to increaseconfidence in weapons systems throughvalidated simulation models and high fidel-ity experimental tests. This Campaign willvalidate engineering computational mod-els, and will develop a suite of tools to en-able science-based certification of the B61,W80, and W76 as required by the SLEP.

End State: Establish a predictive capabil-ity integrated with fewer, but smarter, ex-periments to assess weapon performancewith science-based certification.

Three engineering Campaigns focus onproviding specific tools, capabilities, and com-ponents necessary to support the maintenance,modernization, refurbishment and continuedcertification of specific weapons systems.These campaigns support both certification andDSW work.

• Enhanced Surety Campaign – developsenhanced surety options, including mod-ern levels of use-denial capabilities thatmay be considered for incorporation inscheduled stockpile refurbishment. ThisCampaign will develop enhanced suretyoptions for the B61, W80, and W76weapon systems in time to support refur-bishment schedules.

End State: Meet modern nuclear safetystandards and upgrade use-denial capa-bilities, in time for scheduled weapon re-furbishments.

• Enhanced Surveillance Campaign –develops the tools needed to predict ordetect the precursors of age-related de-fects before they jeopardize warheadsafety, reliability or performance. Mate-rial, component, system characterization,and predictive modeling and simulation arecentral to this activity. With sufficient lead

time, the necessary redesigns, refurbish-ments, and re-certifications can be madeefficiently and cost effectively within thecapabilities and capacity of a “right-sized”manufacturing complex. The EnhancedSurveillance Campaign develops the tech-nologies and methods, as well as the fun-damental understanding of materialsproperties and weapons science, to im-prove detection and predictive capabilities.These capabilities will be used to developnew estimates for weapon lifetimes.

End State: Provide lifetime assessmentsand the quantitative decision basis for fu-ture life extension programs.

• Advanced Design and Production Tech-nologies (ADAPT) Campaign – is de-signed to accelerate and advance productrealization technologies by developing ca-pabilities to deliver qualified refurbishmentproducts cheaper, better, and quicker. ThisCampaign will develop modeling and simu-lation tools and information managementtechnologies to enable full-scale engineer-ing development with minimal hardwareprototyping, and through totally paperlessprocesses, for monitoring weapon refur-bishment activities.

End State: Provide the capability to de-liver qualified stockpile life extension pro-gram refurbishment products upon demandat one-half cost, one-half the current timeand with zero stockpile defects by 2005.

Seven readiness Campaigns focus on sus-taining the manufacturing base within thenuclear weapons complex. Some manufac-turing processes and capabilities are no longerpractical. Without a viable manufacturing ca-pability, the U.S. nuclear deterrent cannot bemaintained. These campaigns are driven bythe current work required to maintain thestockpile as characterized by the Stockpile LifeExtension Process (SLEP) schedule, and thefact that weapons must remain reliable fordecades beyond the anticipated deploymentperiod established when they originally weremanufactured.

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• Pit Readiness Campaign – will reconsti-tute pit manufacturing within the DOEnuclear weapons complex, including thereestablishment of the technical capabilityto manufacture all war reserve pits for theenduring stockpile at a capacity of 20 pitsper year. These pits will be produced atLANL.

End State: Develop an automated, expand-able, robust manufacturing capability toproduce stockpiled and new-design pits,without underground testing, within 19months of the establishment of a need fora new pit, and with a stockpile life greaterthan the weapon system.

• Secondary Readiness Campaign – willensure future manufacturing capabilities(equipment, people, and processes) are inplace and ready for production of second-aries. This includes the reestablishmentof special materials processing, replace-ment of sunset technologies, developmentof technical work force competencies, andthe development of component certifica-tion/re-certification techniques. This Cam-paign develops, implements, and maintainsthe appropriate capability and capacity toaccomplish Directed Stockpile Work, andresponds to surge production scenarios tomanufacture/remanufacture replacementcomponents for all weapon systems in theactive stockpile.

End State: Develop the capability to de-liver a first production-unit secondary with36 months of receiving a request.

• High Explosives (HE)/Assembly Readi-ness Campaign – is focused on ensuringfuture manufacturing capabilities for high-explosive fabrication and weapon assem-bly.

End State: Develop the capability for HE/assembly readiness by 2008, by providingthe technologies, facilities, and personnelfor high-explosives component manufac-turing, production re-qualification, andweapon assembly/disassembly operationsto support a Phase 6.4 (see Section 3.2.7)cycle time of 19 months.

• Nonnuclear Readiness Campaign – fo-cuses on ensuring that future manufactur-ing capabilities for nonnuclear componentswill be available.

End State: By FY 2006, bring all identifiedproduction vulnerabilities to an acceptablelevel of risk; develop advanced technolo-gies to yield defect-free products at halfthe traditional cost and within 19 monthsafter the need is defined.

• Tritium Readiness Campaign – will pro-vide a source of tritium commensurate withthe Secretary of Energy’s Record of De-cision announced in December 1998. Thisdesignated the Commercial Light WaterReactor (CLWR) as the primary technol-ogy option, with a linear accelerator op-tion to be developed as a backup. Newtritium is needed by approximately FY2005.

End State: By FY 2006 deliver tritium gasat a steady state to the Savannah RiverSite Tritium Loading Facility. Develop anddemonstrate key components of linear ac-celerator and target/blanket technologiesand complete preliminary design of Accel-erator Production of Tritium (APT) Facil-ity.

• Material Readiness Campaign – includesactivities to support the construction of anew Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)storage facility at Y-12. This will result inthe consolidation of long-term HEU mate-rial at a state-of-the-art facility. It also willinvolve planning activities for new nuclearmaterial storage vaults, to provide for long-term storage of national plutonium assets.

End State: Develop by FY 2005 a fully in-tegrated material management system sup-porting strategic material needs with eitherstockpiled material or the capability to pro-duce new material.

• Transportation Readiness Campaign –will provide sufficient transport capacityto meet the requirements of the DOE andthe DoD for safe and secure transporta-tion of nuclear weapons, nuclear compo-

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nents, and other cargoes related to main-tenance of the stockpiled weapons. It willfield improved transportation equipment,and increase personnel training to counterpostulated threats anticipated by the year2010. The capacity will be at a level meet-ing the standards set for TransportationSafeguards Division (TSD) transport se-curity. This is a multi-faceted campaignwith improvements in both personnel andequipment.

End State: Field improved transportationequipment and increase personnel train-ing to counter postulated threats anticipatedby the year 2010; provide safe and securetransport of nuclear weapons and compo-nents.

2.1.4. Readiness In Technical Base andFacilities – Maintaining an appropriateinfrastructure

Readiness refers to maintaining a state ofpreparedness to be able to perform necessaryactivities and functions now and into the fu-ture. In addition to ongoing activities, the SSPmust maintain the capabilities to design, de-velop, test, and produce nuclear weapons inthe future, if so ordered by the President. TheReadiness in Technical Base and Facilitiesportion of the SSP serves all of these func-tions. It contributes in a real and tangible wayto confidence in DOE’s performance of stock-pile stewardship. Readiness is required in threeareas. First, it is essential to have high-qual-ity, motivated people with the correct skills tocarry out stewardship, resolve unanticipatedtechnical issues, and resume design, develop-ment, testing, and production if it becomesnecessary. Second, the proper infrastructuremust exist to support the activities of thesepeople, both from a stewardship perspectiveand from the perspective of resuming weapondevelopment, testing and production. This in-frastructure must be maintained and upgradedas technology evolves. Third, the special ex-perimental and computational facilities neededfor stewardship in the absence of nuclear test-ing must be developed. RTBF is at the heart

of stewardship, and ultimately enables theDOE to be ready to develop, produce, and testnuclear weapons.

The primary goal of RTBF is to ensurethat the infrastructure is in place and availableto conduct the scientific, engineering, andmanufacturing activities of the Stockpile Stew-ardship Program. It also encompasses thoseactivities needed to ensure that the infrastruc-ture – utilities, facilities, equipment – are op-erationally safe, secure and environmentallycompliant within a defined level of readiness.RTBF also addresses safeguards and secu-rity needs, particularly cyber-security, at eachof the sites. The remainder of this subsectionsummarizes RTBF activities related to facili-ties and infrastructure, test readiness, simula-tion infrastructure, and other activities in moredetail. Human resources issues are addressedin Chapter 6.

RTBF activities are directed by DOE Fed-eral personnel at Headquarters, supported bythe Albuquerque, Nevada, Oakland, and OakRidge Operations Offices for contract man-agement, and implemented by contractor per-sonnel at the Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory, Livermore, California; the LosAlamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,New Mexico; the Sandia National Laborato-ries, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Livermore,California, and Tonopah, Nevada; the NevadaTest Site, Las Vegas, Nevada; the PantexPlant, Amarillo, Texas; the Kansas City Plant,Kansas City, Missouri; the Y-12 Plant, OakRidge, Tennessee; and the Savannah RiverSite, Aiken, South Carolina. Site-specific sum-maries of capabilities and ongoing and plannedconstruction of planned major scientific facili-ties are contained in Appendix E.

Facilities and infrastructure. At thethree Defense Programs laboratories and thetest site, this includes operation of existing sci-entific facilities, planning for major new sci-entific facilities, and planning and constructionof smaller facilities necessary to provide amodern, evolving infrastructure. The enor-mity of developing a comprehensive scientificunderstanding of all aspects of nuclear weap-

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ons has led the laboratories to develop a num-ber of facilities that are unique and of a “na-tional scale.” Those presently underconstruction include the Dual-Axis Radio-graphic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT)at the Los Alamos National Laboratory(LANL), and the National Ignition Facility(NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory (LLNL). Considered for construc-tion are the Advanced Hydrodynamics Facil-ity (AHF) at LANL, which would enablehigh-resolution, multiple-axis proton radiogra-phy, and the Microsystems and EngineeringSciences Applications facility (MESA) atSandia, which would provide research, design,and production capabilities for microsystem-based weapon surety options. To prepare forthe large computer systems necessary to meetthe SSP’s simulation objectives, major newcomputer facilities are under construction atboth LLNL and LANL as part of ASCI. Alsoat the three laboratories and the test site, thereis a coordinated, ten-year plan to provide con-tinuous updating of the physical infrastructureby planning, constructing, and eventually op-erating conventional facilities that are neces-sary to sustain a constant infusion of newtechnology into the four institutions.

At the production sites (Pantex Plant,Kansas City Plant, Y-12, Savannah River Site,and certain facilities at LANL and Sandia),facilities infrastructure activities follow a “sci-ence-based” approach that aims to provide aweapon production capability that will enablesuccessful, timely execution of the SLEPschedule. The production facilities, in concertwith the weapon design laboratories, mustconstantly address issues pertaining to facili-ties, technology, personnel, and business prac-tices. Because of the past cost-saving effortsto downsize the nuclear weapons complex inplace rather than build an entirely new, ex-tremely expensive one, significant gaps existin some areas of capability and capacity thatwill have to be overcome to prepare for theSLEP-driven future manufacturing mission.

The science basis for manufacturing pro-cesses must be established to validate thesafety and reliability of produced components

without nuclear testing. Science-based manu-facturing involves increased application of pro-cess modeling and simulation, enhanced datacollection for real-time product and processcharacterization, implementation of process-based quality, the use of modern developmentand production technologies, and the imple-mentation of more effective technical businesspractices for seamless integration across theweapons complex. Examples of resulting ac-tions include the identification of improvedengineered controls, elimination of nonessen-tial hazardous materials, and enhanced inter-and intra-lot quality pedigree. Examples ofthe benefits include shorter product cycletimes, better-characterized products, reducedrisk to the work force, and increased processefficiency.

Maintaining test readiness. Activitiesare conducted at the Nevada Test Site to pre-serve the skills and facilities required to re-sume testing within 24 to 36 months, if sodirected by the President. Key and criticalpositions are identified for the functional ar-eas necessary to safely execute an under-ground nuclear test. Overall readiness issupported by experimental programs con-ducted at the test site. In particular, test readi-ness at NTS is critically dependent on theCampaigns and laboratory-based experimentsthat exercise high-bandwidth recording andadvanced diagnostic development that are notrequired for subcritical experiments.

Simulation and computing infrastruc-ture. Simulation science plays a prominent,underpinning role in the SSP. A significantportion of RTBF focuses on providing the in-frastructure necessary at each of the sites forASCI. Major activities include:

• Acquisition of terascale computer systems;

• Development of problem solving environ-ment software to enable effective use ofmassively parallel computers;

• Development of distance- and distributed-computing software, tools and systems;

• Development of extremely high-bandwidthdata visualization capabilities;

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• Partnerships with universities; and

• “Path forward” activities through whichSSP is partnering with computer vendorsto develop next-generation computer sys-tems.

Other RTBF activities. The final cat-egory of RTBF comprises small but neverthe-less important activities required for overallSSP success. Examples include waste man-agement activities, water treatment, and seis-mic studies. Also included are education andtechnology partnership activities.

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The RequirementsProcess33.1. National Requirements

THE UNITED STATES NUCLEARweapons program remains the cornerstone ofthe nation’s deterrence policy, and must beready to carry out the President’s orders forweapon employment, if necessary. The Stock-pile Stewardship Program was established inresponse to the FY 1994 National DefenseAuthorization Act (P.L. 103-160), which calledon the Secretary of Energy to “establish astewardship program to ensure the preserva-tion of the core intellectual and technical com-petencies of the United States in nuclearweapons.” It is the policy of the United StatesGovernment that the nation’s nuclear deter-rent is to be maintained in the absence of un-derground nuclear testing. The SSP must meetthe requirements for performance, safety, re-liability and security set forth in Public Laws,Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs andNSDDs), the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan(NWSP), the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),and other national security guidance. DOE isalso required by Public Law to provide for tri-tium production (P.L. 104-106 and 106-65),maintain a manufacturing infrastructure ca-pable of meeting the objectives of the NPR(P.L. 104-106), and carry out a program toprovide for the extension of the effective lifeof weapons in the stockpile (P.L. 106-65).

3.1.1. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan

Annually, the President issues the NuclearWeapons Stockpile Plan (NWSP), which isprepared by the Nuclear Weapons Council andforwarded through the Secretaries of Defenseand Energy for approval. This sets the re-quirement to maintain a safe and reliablenuclear weapon stockpile, and specifies forCongress the number of warheads, by type, in

the stockpile. Under the current NWSP (1998),DOE is required to support the stockpile atthe Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (STARTI) level. Should START II enter into force,DOE must continue to maintain the capabilityto return to START I levels under the “leadand hedge” strategy defined in the NPR andthe Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

3.1.2. Nuclear Posture Review

In 1994, DoD conducted the Nuclear Pos-ture Review, which was revalidated by theMay 1997 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review.The NPR assumes in the future there will beno nuclear testing or fissile material produc-tion. The NPR further states that DOE is to:

• Maintain the capability to design, fabricate,and certify new warheads;

• Develop a stockpile surveillance engineer-ing base;

• Demonstrate a capability to re-fabricateand certify weapon types in the enduringstockpile;

• Maintain a nuclear weapons science andtechnology base; and

• Ensure tritium availability.

3.1.3. Stockpile Stewardship ProgramPlan

The DOE Stockpile Stewardship Plan isa corporate-level, multi-year program plan thatembodies DOE’s strategy to ensure high con-fidence in the safety, reliability, performance,and security of the nuclear weapons stock-pile. The Plan responds both to PresidentialDirectives and Public Laws. The StockpileStewardship Plan is prepared annually and issubmitted by the Secretary of Energy to Con-gress by March 15 of each year, as mandatedby the FY 1998 National Defense Authoriza-tion Act (P.L. 105-85, Sect. 3151).

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3.2. DoD/DOE Relationship

THE PRESIDENT IS ULTIMATELYresponsible for executing the nation’s nuclearweapons policy. The DoD and DOE worktogether at many levels to advise the Presi-dent and carry out the policy. The success ofthe Stockpile Stewardship Program dependson a strong partnership between DoD andDOE. This relationship is codified in the 1953memorandum of agreement, as amended, be-tween the Atomic Energy Commission and theDoD, and in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.It is further specified in the 1983 memoran-dum of understanding, which defines dual-agency responsibilities for nuclear weapons.The DoD is responsible for establishing mili-tary requirements, which are incorporated intothe President’s NWSP; developing and operat-ing complete weapon systems; training per-sonnel; and maintenance of nuclear weaponemployment plans. The DOE is responsiblefor conducting nuclear warhead research anddevelopment; producing nuclear warheads;performing stockpile surveillance; producingand managing nuclear materials; dismantlingretired weapons; maintaining critical capabili-ties within the nuclear weapons complex (labo-ratories, production plants, and the test site);conducting sub-critical and other experiments;and advancing simulation capabilities in sup-port of stockpile stewardship.

3.2.1. Nuclear Weapons Council

The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC),established by the FY 1987 National DefenseAuthorization Act, is responsible for coordi-nation and resolution of nuclear weapons is-sues that are of mutual interest to the DOEand DoD. The NWC is a joint DoD-DOEcouncil codified and given specific responsi-bilities by Title 10, United States Code, Sec-tion 179. The NWC is comprised of threemembers: the Undersecretary of Defense forAcquisition, Technology, and Logistics, whoserves as Chairman; the Vice Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a senior repre-

sentative of the DOE selected by the Secre-tary (currently the Under Secretary). TheAssistant to the Secretary of Defense(Nuclear, Chemical and Biological DefensePrograms) serves as Executive Secretary andStaff Director for the Council. The NWC hasone subordinate committee and one workinggroup. NWC’s responsibilities include:

• Preparing the annual Nuclear WeaponsStockpile Memorandum;

• Developing nuclear weapons stockpilesoptions and the costs of such options;

• Coordinating programming and budgetmatters pertaining to nuclear weapons pro-grams between the Department of De-fense and the Department of Energy;

• Identifying various options for cost-effec-tive schedules for nuclear weapons pro-duction;

• Considering safety, security, and controlissues for existing weapons and for pro-posed new weapon program starts;

• Ensuring that adequate consideration isgiven to design, performance, and costtradeoffs for all proposed new nuclearweapons programs;

• Providing broad guidance regarding priori-ties for research on nuclear weapons;

• Coordinating and approving activities con-ducted by the Department of Energy forthe study, development, production, andretirement of nuclear warheads, includingconcept definition studies, feasibility stud-ies, engineering development, hardwarecomponent fabrication, warhead produc-tion, and warhead retirement; and

• Preparing comments on annual proposalsfor budget levels for research on nuclearweapons and transmitting those commentsto the Secretary of Defense and Secre-tary of Energy before the preparation ofannual budget requests by the Secretariesof those departments.

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3.2.2. Nuclear Weapons CouncilStanding and Safety Committee

The Nuclear Weapons Council Standingand Safety Committee (NWCSSC) is the jointsenior executive and flag officer-level com-mittee established to provide advice and as-sistance to the NWC. The NWCSSCcoordinates and ensures completion of all ac-tions destined for the NWC, conducts jointtransactions between the DoD and the DOE,and generally deals with significant nuclearweapons matters that can be resolved with-out being elevated to the NWC. In particular,the NWCSSC acts (on behalf of the NWC)as the point of contact for DoD and DOE onall atomic energy matters that either Depart-ment determines relate to nuclear weaponsresearch, development, production, mainte-nance, or dismantlement, allocation of nuclearmaterial, and nuclear weapon safety matters.The NWCSSC has ten members:

• The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense(Nuclear, Chemical and Biological DefensePrograms), who serves as Chairman;

• The DOE Principal Deputy Assistant Sec-retary for Military Application, who servesas Vice Chairman;

• The DOE Deputy Assistant Secretary forMilitary Application and Stockpile Opera-tions;

• One member representing theUndersecretary of Defense (Policy);

• One member each from the Army, Navy,and Air Force;

• One member from the Joint Staff;

• One member from the United States Stra-tegic Command; and

• One member from the Defense ThreatReduction Agency.

3.2.3. Nuclear Weapons RequirementsWorking Group

The Nuclear Weapons RequirementsWorking Group (NWRWG) enhances the de-liberative decision-making process by creat-ing a forum for additional senior-level attentionto nuclear weapons issues. The NWRWG isa sub-group to the NWCSSC and its purposeis to review, prioritize, and where appropriate,more precisely define high-level DoD nuclearweapons requirements for inclusion in the an-nual NWSP, the DOE Stockpile StewardshipPlan, and other planning documents. Mem-bership of the NWRWG is similar to that ofthe NWCSSC, with the addition of the DeputyAssistant to the Secretary of Defense forNuclear Matters and deletion of the Assistantto the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,Chemical and Biological Defense Programs,and the Army member. The Vice Chair of theNWCSSC, the DOE’s Principal Deputy As-sistant Secretary for Military Application,serves as NWRWG Chairman.

3.2.4. Project Officer Group (POG)

Every nuclear weapon or weapon familyin the stockpile has a Project Officer Group(POG). There is also one POG for each re-tired system and one for use control. The POGis led by the appropriate military Service, andDOE field and laboratory personnel serve asmembers. DOE Headquarters staff are ob-servers to the POGs. The POG is a field-level group that is dedicated to the well-beingof its weapon, including development, modifi-cations and alterations, resolution of signifi-cant findings, deployment, and maintenance.The functions of POGs for nuclear weaponsinclude:

• Coordinating the design, development, test,weapon system integration, evaluation, andother life-cycle activities that are per-formed by the military Services and theDOE on joint DoD-DOE nuclear weap-ons activities;

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• Making technological and interfacetradeoffs that still meet the requirementsand do not significantly change the Mili-tary Characteristics (MCs) or acceptabil-ity of the weapon, exceed program limitsset by the DoD and DOE, or exceed guid-ance provided by the NWC and achievethe best balance between requirements andavailable DoD and DOE resources;

• Notifying the cognizant military Service andthe NWC of interpretations of the MCsas a result of tradeoff decisions, and rec-ommending changes to the MCs to theNWC; and

• Examining issues affecting safety, secu-rity, cost, performance, reliability, or othersignificant matters that may require reso-lution at higher levels in the DoD or DOE,or decisions by the NWC.

3.2.5. Other DOE/DoD Interactions

Due to the vital importance of the nuclearweapons stockpile, there are a number of otherDoD, independent, and joint organizations andgroups that study and recommend improve-ments for stockpile stewardship. Three of noteare:

STRATCOM The mission of the UnitedStates Strategic Command (STRATCOM)is to deter military attack on the UnitedStates and its allies, and should deterrencefail, employ forces so as to achieve na-tional objectives. STRATCOM deploysthe vast majority of U.S. nuclear weap-ons, so close ties with the DOE are es-sential. The Commander in Chief,STRATCOM, annually issues a report andrecommendations on Annual Certification,with the advice on technical issues of hisStrategic Advisory Group.

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety BoardThe Board is responsible for independent,external oversight of all activities in DOE’snuclear weapons complex affectingnuclear health and safety. The Board re-views operations, practices, and occur-

rences at DOE’s defense nuclear facili-ties and makes recommendations to theSecretary of Energy that the Board be-lieves are necessary to properly protectpublic health and safety.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRAis responsible for nuclear weapon supportand operations, on-site inspections, coop-erative threat reduction, technology secu-rity, and defense against chemical andbiological weapons. Close cooperationbetween DOE and DTRA is required innuclear support, operations, and weapon-related personnel training.

3.2.6. Developing StockpileRequirements

DSW activities to maintain the nuclearstockpile are accomplished through several DPvehicles, including the 6.X process, the SLEP,and the Production & Planning Directive(P&PD). Under the broad DSW umbrella,each of these vehicles contributes to the for-mulation and execution of weapon Life Ex-tension Programs (LEPs). The 6.X processprovides a robust system to develop Life Ex-tension Options (LEOs). SLEP organizes theLEOs into discrete units, and allows forworkload planning to balance the laboratoryand plant workload levels over time, consis-tent with the needs of the stockpile, and thecapacities of the laboratories and the produc-tion plants. SLEP culminates with a recom-mendation to DP management in the integratedweapon schedule, and when approved, the in-tegrated weapon schedule is distributed to thefield in the P&PD. Each of these DP ve-hicles are outlined below.

3.2.7. The 6.X Process

In the 1953 memorandum of agreement,the DOE and the DoD established a formalphased acquisition process to authorize thedesign, development, and production of newweapons. The phases in the process reflectthe logical progression of necessary activity,

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and establish milestones to facilitate programmanagement. The weapon life-cycle acquisi-tion phases are:

Phase 1 Concept Development

Phase 2 Program Feasibility Study

Phase 2A Design Definition and CostStudy

Phase 3 Development Engineering

Phase 4 Production Engineering

Phase 5 First Production

Phase 6 Quantity Production andStockpile

Phase 7 Retirement/Storage

Because all enduring stockpile weaponsare currently in Phase 6, an expanded pro-cess within this Phase is used to provide aframework for, and management of, weaponrefurbishment. This process is referred to asthe Phase 6.X process, and it provides a frame-work for DOE to conduct and manage mod-ernization activities for existing weapons. Adetailed work plan for implementing the 6.Xprocess for modernization is being developedby the DOE, with input and coordination fromthe DoD. The proposed work plan still needsto be presented to, and approved by, the NWC.It makes the maximum use of the establishedstructure, flow, and practices from the tradi-tional acquisition process that previous weaponsystems passed through, and applies to the newparadigm of refurbishing existing weapons. Forpurposes of the 6.X process, the enduringstockpile phase is designated Phase 6.0, andis the beginning and end point of the 6.X pro-cess. The individual phases (6.1 through 6.6)follow the sequence of the traditional acquisi-tion process:

Phase 6.0 Quantity Production andStockpile (presence in thestockpile before and afterthe refurbishment project)

Phase 6.1 Concept Assessment

Phase 6.2 Feasibility Study andOption Downselect

Phase 6.2A Design Definition andCost Study

Phase 6.3 Development Engineering

Phase 6.4 Production Engineering

Phase 6.5 First Production

Phase 6.6 Full-scale Refurbishment

Figure 1 illustrates the Phase 6.X majoractivities. Each phase ends with a majorproject decision to go forward into the nextphase, to remain in the present phase, or toreturn to an earlier phase (including a returnto Phase 6.0, which would be not to modifythe weapon).

Phase 6.0 activities are those normal on-going activities that occur on all stockpile sys-tems. These activities may expose issue(s)that warrant development of concept(s) toaddress them. Phase 6.0 activities include:

• Routine maintenance, such as limited lifecomponent exchange, inspections, andtests, done on a recurring basis;

• Stockpile evaluation (also called “surveil-lance”) to evaluate weapon systems fordegradation of reliability, safety, or perfor-mance. The Stockpile Evaluation Programincludes the Significant Finding Investiga-tion (SFI) process for investigating andevaluating any significant anomalies ob-served in stockpiled weapons through sur-veillance;

• Annual certification to review the currenthealth of the stockpile, and state whethera return to underground nuclear testing isrequired; and

• Baselining to assure that weapon systemconfiguration is well understood and docu-mented for reference in the event that fu-ture changes become necessary.

All Product Change Proposals (PCPs) areevaluated by DP for applicability to the Phase6.X process. By default, the following gothrough the Phase 6.X process:

• All Modifications and Alterations (Mods/Alts), except for the Alt 900 Series;

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• Changes to the Stockpile-to-Target Se-quence (STS) that require an alteration ofa weapon; and

• Changes to the Military Characteristics(MCs).

The NWC or its delegates must approveall PCPs, changes to the STS that require achange to a weapon, and changes to the MCs.

3.2.8. The Stockpile Life ExtensionProcess

The proposed Stockpile Life ExtensionProcess schedule is shown in Figure 2. Thisschedule reflects input from the POGs andstill needs formal approval by the NWC. Thecurrent SLEP schedule calls for refurbishmentof the W80, W76 and B61 systems within thenext decade. The SLEP schedule is docu-

Figure 1. Phase 6.X Major Activities

mented in the DOE-issued annual Production& Planning Directive (P&PD), which providesthe authority necessary to implement DP’sresponsibilities in support of the SSP, theNWSP, and the Requirements and PlanningDocument (formerly the Long-Range Plan-ning Assessment (LRPA)). Additionally, theP&PD provides direction and guidance for allmajor stockpile requirements for FYs 2000-2005, and provides planning information forFYs 2006-2025. Phase 6.2/6.2A activities areunderway for the W76 and W80. The resultsof these studies will be presented to the NWCin early 2000. Phase 6.2/2A activity on theB61 (all models) will commence in FY 2000.Production of refurbished W80 and W76 war-heads is scheduled to start in FYs 2006 and2008, respectively. Also shown in the figureare scheduled weapon Limited Life Compo-nent Exchanges (LLCEs), training, surveil-lance, and dismantlements.

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Figure 2. The Stockpile Life Extension Schedule

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Impact of Arms ControlAgreements on theStockpile StewardshipProgram

4SEVERAL ARMS CONTROL AGREE-

MENTS and related national policies directlyimpact the Stockpile Stewardship Program.These include the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, the Presidential moratorium on nuclearunderground testing, the START I and STARTII Treaties, and the possible framework for afuture START III Treaty.

4.1. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BANTREATY (CTBT) will – after it enters intoforce – prohibit “all nuclear weapon testexplosions or other nuclear explosionsanywhere in the world.” It was adopted onSeptember 10, 1996, by the United NationsGeneral Assembly by a vote of 158 to 3, with5 abstentions, after two and one half years ofnegotiation at the 61-nation Conference onDisarmament in Geneva, Switzerland. OnSeptember 24, 1996, the treaty was openedfor signature at the United Nations, andPresident Clinton signed it on behalf of theUnited States. As of September 30, 1999, 155nations had signed the treaty, including the fivethat have nuclear weapons. To enter intoforce, 44 nuclear-capable states must ratifythe treaty. To date, 51 nations have ratifiedthe treaty, including 26 of the required 44. OnOctober 13, 1999, the U.S. Senate rejectedthe CTBT by a vote of 51 to 48, with oneabstention, after three days of hearings. Thatsame day, the President reaffirmed the UnitedStates’ policy to refrain from nuclear testing,stating that “the United States will continue,under my presidency, the policy we haveobserved since 1992 of not conducting nucleartests.”

4.2. START I/II

AT THE MARCH 21, 1997, HelsinkiSummit, President Clinton and RussianPresident Yeltsin underscored their interest infurther nuclear warhead reductions beyondSTART I and II, as well as the need to monitornuclear warhead inventories, nuclear warheaddismantlement, and fissile materials resultingfrom warhead reductions. At the conclusionof the Summit, the Presidents agreed that onceSTART II is ratified by the Russian Duma andenters into force, the United States and Russiawill immediately commence negotiations on aSTART III agreement. In August 1999, theUnited States and Russia commenceddiscussions, but not negotiations, about STARTIII and potential modifications to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to accommodate aU.S. national missile defense deployment.

The impacts of START I and II center onDepartment of Defense strategic forcestructures, and involve the downloading ofICBMs and SLBMs, and the elimination ofsome strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.START I and II affect DOE in terms of thestockpile size and composition, warhead return,transportation schedules, and thedismantlement of excess warheads. UnderSTART I and II, there are no Russian on-siteinspections at DOE facilities. START III willbe the first treaty to significantly impact DOEoperations because of its warhead and fissilematerial transparency components. Impactsresulting from additional reductions in the sizeof the stockpile are not expected to besignificant.

The stockpile workload requirements donot significantly change between START I andII, because the total stockpile size does notappreciably change. Most weapons removedfrom active status under START I will beplaced in the inactive stockpile to meet “leadand hedge” requirements contained in theNPR. These weapons’ limited life

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components will be removed, but the warheadswill still undergo life extensions as defined bythe SLEP schedule. The dismantlementworkload will increase slightly for the fewweapons that will be retired. There is ananticipated small reduction, on average, in theSLEP workload as systems are retired. Therelative timing for refurbishments anddismantlements has yet to be determined, andcapacity at Pantex will need to be sized toaccommodate the simultaneous requirementsof both.

4.3. START III

START III MAY REQUIRE the DOE todismantle excess nuclear warheads resultingfrom a new lower accountable level of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads. It may alsorequire that the DOE prepare, negotiate, andimplement transparency measures at both U.S.and Russian facilities to provide confidencethat dismantlement and destruction of somenumber of nuclear warheads actually takesplace. It is anticipated that START IIIprovisions will be expanded in future follow-on treaties, so potential impacts to DOE andDoD operations must be considered carefully.

Modifications to Pantex operations, equip-ment, and facilities are being examined toensure that potential START III transparencyrequirements can be implemented without ad-verse impact to the SSP and its annualcertification requirements.

The stockpile workload will change underSTART III. The overall reduction in deliverysystem numbers, in addition to a potential ne-gotiated quantity of warhead dismantlements,will increase the dismantlement workload.This dismantlement workload will need to bereconciled with the required SLEP refurbish-ment schedule.

4.3.1. Goals

Helsinki’s START III goals include:

• Establish lower aggregate levels of stra-tegic nuclear warheads in the U.S. andRussia;

• Promote transparency of strategic nuclearwarhead inventories and the destructionof strategic nuclear warheads; and

• Promote irreversibility of reduction in stra-tegic nuclear warhead inventories, includ-ing prevention of a rapid increase in thenumber of warheads.

4.3.2. Issues

• Intrusiveness of the START III regime andits impact on stockpile stewardship, espe-cially at a time of increased SLEP work;

• Protection of classified and sensitive in-formation from being inadvertently re-vealed to Russian on-site inspectors; and

• The potentially unfunded costs of imple-menting the START III regime, whichwould be a requirement above existingstockpile stewardship commitments. Be-cause the implementation details of anySTART III agreement presently are un-determined, the associated budget require-ments are not known. The cost of anySTART III provisions outside of normalDOE operations must be considered asadditional to the current Stockpile Stew-ardship Program budget.

4.3.3. Technical Approach

The START III planning effort at DOEhas been active since the March 1997 HelsinkiJoint Statement. DOE is continuing to evaluatethe impact of potential START III monitoring

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activities at various facilities in the DOEnuclear weapons complex. The nationallaboratories have contributed by assessing therisks to stockpile stewardship, and byparticipating in a number of working groups toprepare DOE for START III discussions.Milestones for START III planning arecontingent on the pace of negotiations.

4.3.4. Risks

By adding a significant requirement tosupport a new arms control regime, DOE’sflexibility for performing weapon operationsat Pantex will likely be reduced. The DOEhas a responsibility to maintain the safety,reliability, and performance of the stockpile,and any provisions that hinder that mission mustbe carefully considered. Any Russianinspection at Pantex will disrupt normal weaponoperations and will require planning andextensive operational and security measuresto ensure that the health of the enduringstockpile is not compromised. DOE will fullysupport any funded initiatives agreed to by theUnited States, but will also work to mitigateany risks by careful planning and implementingprovisions that place support of the stockpileas the highest priority.

4.3.5. Integration

4.3.5.1. Other Programs/Campaigns

Stockpile stewardship activities are likelyto be affected by the provisions of STARTIII, especially if it requires an intrusive regimeat the Pantex Plant. A Russian presence atDOE’s only assembly and disassembly facilitycould fundamentally alter the flow of materialand information through the nuclear weaponscomplex.

Transportation Readiness: Warheads mustbe transported from DoD facilities to thePantex plant for dismantlement. Weapons “inprocess” between the DoD and DOE are notexpected to be monitored under START IIIprovisions.

4.3.5.2. Sites

Because Pantex is DOE’s single facilityfor assembly and disassembly of weapons, itwill likely be the major focus of provisions ofSTART III that affect DOE. Y-12 may beaffected by provisions for monitored storageof fissile material from warheads dismantledunder START III. Expertise from the nationallaboratories and DOE Operations Offices isimportant to ensure provisions of START IIIdo not unacceptably affect stockpilestewardship. It is not expected that thelaboratories or other DOE facilities will bedirectly affected by START III, but it will benecessary to prevail upon the expertise at theDefense Programs laboratories, productionplants, and the DOE Operations Offices toensure that provisions of START III do notaffect unacceptably stockpile stewardshipactivities.

4.3.5.3. Other Offices, Agencies andOrganizations

DOE’s Office of Defense Programs andthe Office of Nonproliferation and NationalSecurity are working together to formulate arecommended DOE position regarding STARTIII. The Office of Fissile Material Dispositionis involved to ensure a smooth handoff of fissilematerial resulting from START IIIdismantlements to organizations focusing onmaterial disposition. Other agenciesrepresented on the National Security Council-led Arms Control Interagency Working Groupare the Department of Defense (Office of theSecretary of Defense and The Joint Staff),the Department of State, and the CentralIntelligence Agency.

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5 Accomplishments

ONE METRIC FOR EVALUATING thesuccess of the SSP is to examine programaccomplishments in the areas of stockpilemaintenance, surveillance, assessment andcertification, design and manufacturing,simulation and modeling, and experimentalfacilities.

5.1. Stockpile Maintenance

THE DOE IS RESPONSIBLE for main-taining the existing stockpile with capabilitiesto design, develop, and produce components.The primary strategy of stockpile maintenanceis to preserve the readiness of the stockpileby meeting directed stockpile requirements bysupplying hardware for limited life componentexchanges (LLCEs), stockpile repairs, stock-pile rebuilds, and by supporting the military byproviding assistance in training, publication ofmanuals, and development of test and handlingequipment. Stockpile maintenance also pro-vides long-range support to the stockpilethrough life extension that includes refurbish-ment and modernization. Life extension ac-tivities include studies to define and establishappropriate alterations or modifications nec-essary to modernize and extend the life of theweapons for an additional 30 years.

Accomplishments in these areas include:

• Developed the Stockpile Life ExtensionProcess.

• Completed three annual certifications ofthe stockpile, which resulted in no require-ment for underground nuclear testing.

• Developed, certified, produced, and fieldedthe B61-11 to replace the B53 bomb.

• Conducted field retrofits to enhance thesurety of the B61 bomb.

• Completed W76 Dual Revalidation.

• Fielded SafeGuard Transporters (SGT) toenhance the security of weapons in ship-ment.

• Began first production of the W76ACORN and Neutron Generators.

• Resumed uranium operations at Y-12Plant.

• Made the first W88 development unit pitat LANL.

• Conducted hi-fidelity flight testing.

• Developed 51 gas generators and 808 tri-tium reservoirs in FY 1999, required tokeep weapons operational.

• Began the 6.2/2A life extension study forthe W76.

• Began the 6.2/2A life extension study forthe W80.

• Achieved first production unit and deliv-ery to DoD of the W87 LEP.

• Began the planning for the 6.2/6.2A lifeextension study for the B61.

5.2. Stockpile Surveillance: Predictingand Detecting Problems

STOCKPILE SURVEILLANCE HASBEEN a major element of the U.S. nuclearweapons program ever since the first weap-ons were put into service. Approximately14,000 weapons have been examined and sub-jected to a variety of nonnuclear experimentsand flight tests since 1958. In cases wherethese nonnuclear tests could not provide con-clusive answers, nuclear tests of stockpilewarheads or warhead components were con-ducted. All of the warhead types in the en-during U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile havehad repairs or retrofits, and several have re-quired repairs to the nuclear explosive pack-age.

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To successfully maintain an aging stock-pile, new surveillance methods and predictivecapabilities are needed so that the full rangeof problems that may arise in the enduringstockpile can be detected. There is also aneed to predict and identify aging-relatedchanges and their potential effects on war-head safety and performance. Some changesmay have little or no effect, whereas otherscould make a major difference. The prohibi-tion against performing nuclear tests has put ahigh premium on the fundamental understand-ing of the properties and response of stockpilematerials. Of particular importance is the de-velopment of advanced capabilities–experi-mental, theoretical and computational–topredict physical properties of matter under theextremely broad range of dynamic conditionsfound in nuclear explosions. These includematerials, radiative, and nuclear properties.These efforts are primarily supported by theEnhanced Surveillance Campaign, the Dy-namic Materials Properties Campaign, and theDefense Applications and Modeling Campaign.

Accomplishments in this area include:

• Pits - The program has established thedominant aging mechanisms for pits andbegun testing old pit materials. The pro-gram has begun fabrication of acceleratedaging alloys, and has also fielded a suite ofdiagnostic tools to test new and agedsamples.

• Canned Subassemblies (CSAs) - The pro-gram has established the principal agingmechanism for CSAs and selected unitsfrom specific weapon types for specialstudy. The work has resulted in CSA typesbeing ranked by potential for corrosion andassessed lifetimes of key components.Work has also established a three-dimen-sional war reserve compatibility model,demonstrated neutron imaging as a supe-rior system for flaw detection, and devel-oped corrosion protection systems.

• High Explosives (HE) - The program hasdemonstrated that main charge high ex-plosives are aging gracefully. It has also

provided recommendations regarding re-use of main charges for the W87 and W76life extension programs. The program hasalso demonstrated that aging does not de-grade safety during impacts in accidentconditions. To support continued monitor-ing of identified signatures of aging, theprogram has developed and delivered sev-eral new HE performance tests to the rou-tine surveillance program.

• Systems - The program has used new min-iaturized instrumentation to characterizekey features during missile flight while pre-serving system fidelity to the greatest ex-tent possible.

• Non-nuclear components - Accomplish-ments in this area center on the charac-terization of components and the fieldingof tests to monitor changes in components.The program has categorized the largenumber of non-nuclear components toidentify those most likely to exhibit agingeffects, those most important to weaponperformance, and those most pervasive inthe stockpile. One example of a new testis an examination tool to rapidly screen animportant component for weld flaws.

• Non-nuclear materials - The program hasdeveloped and implemented a non-destruc-tive method to monitor warhead space(sealed volumes) for signs of organic-chemical degradation. Data from the pro-gram also avoided replacement ofcomponents in fielded units by understand-ing component behavior.

• Fundamental Plutonium High-PressureThermodynamic Properties - The first-principles determination of the high-pres-sure properties of plutonium illustratesfundamental advances in our ability to pre-dict the properties of actinides under con-ditions of relevance to stockpileperformance.

• Hydrogen equation-of-state (EOS) - Equa-tion-of-state experiments on hydrogen iso-topes revealed important behavior at Mbarpressures, highlighting the difficulties with

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theories of matter undergoing strongshocks. For example, gas gun experimentshave succeeded in “metallizing” fluid hy-drogen under shock-loading conditionsabove 1.4 Mbar. The existence of a me-tallic phase of hydrogen confirms a funda-mental prediction made 50 years ago.

• High-Performance Quantum Simulationsof HF-H2O Fluid Mixtures - Detonationof insensitive high explosives (IHE) pro-duces hydrogen-bonded HF and H2O. Theperformance of IHE is sensitive to the pres-ence of these molecules, but there is noexperimental data because of the highlycorrosive nature of these mixtures. Quan-tum-level terascale ASCI calculations tosimulate an equimolar mixture of HF andH2O have been performed to elucidate thestructural and thermal properties of thesemixtures at high pressure and temperature.These simulations revealed structural in-formation at high pressure and tempera-ture, showing the formation of stable F--( H2O)+ complexes.

• Discovery of Polymeric Carbon Dioxide -The existence of extended-solid forms ofmajor detonation products (CO2, N2, C,H2O) at high explosive (HE) detonationconditions provides critical information fordeveloping predictive HE performancemodels. In a breakthrough discovery, ateam of LLNL scientists has synthesizeda new extended-solid form of polymericCO2 under conditions of ultra-high pres-sures and temperature. The CO2 poly-mer–a carbon-based analogue to α-quartz(SiO2)–was also found to be an opticallynon-linear, super-hard material, whichcould lead to new technology innovations.This discovery has led to many scientificpublications in 1999, including in Science,Phys. Rev. Lett., The New York Times,C&E News, and Laser Focus World.

• Laser-Driven Nuclear Physics - As partof the studies related to the National Igni-tion Facility (NIF) and laser-driven radi-ography, observations of nuclear physicsphenomena produced by the interaction of

an extremely powerful laser with matterhave been performed. In particular, mea-surements of the production of 100 MeVelectrons, the fission of nuclei, and the pro-duction of anti-matter have been per-formed.

• Gold Opacity Measurements - Recentopacity experiments on the Nova (LLNL)and Omega (University of Rochester,Laboratory for Laser Energetics) lasershave extended Rosseland mean opacitymeasurements into new areas. Opacitymeasurements of high temperature goldplasmas have resolved large differencesbetween opacity models that affect thedesign and interpretation of a large classof stockpile stewardship experiments onlasers and pulsed power devices. Theexperiments have also proven the tech-niques needed for the high temperatureopacity experiments proposed for the NIF.

• Los Alamos Neutron Science Center(LANSCE) Neutron Total Cross Sections- Measurements of the total cross sectionfor neutrons on 37 different nuclei to anaccuracy of 1% for neutrons in the en-ergy range from 5-600 MeV have beenperformed. These precision measure-ments represent a significant step forwardin the nuclear data needed in the evalua-tion of nuclear cross sections for stockpilecalculations and provided important inputto the design of projects involving spalla-tion neutron sources (APT, etc.). The pro-gram is being expanded to lower neutronenergies interacting with nuclei in the ac-tinide region.

• 1998 American Physical Society Awardfor Excellence in Plasma Physics -Awarded to Peter Celliers, Gilbert Collins,Luiz DaSilva, and Robert Cauble, LLNL.

• 1997 American Physical Society Awardfor Shock Compression Science - Awardedto William Nellis and Arthur Mitchell,LLNL.

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5.3. Assessment and Certification:Analyzing and Evaluating

DATA AND TEST RESULTS must beanalyzed, assessed, and evaluated before con-clusions can be drawn regarding the safetyand reliability of stockpile warheads. A sig-nificant imperative of assessment and certifi-cation is to conduct a program using the besttools available to baseline the existing stock-pile while a number of experienced designerswith nuclear test expertise remain to mentornew designers. This baselining activity is anintegral element of DSW. There are manyareas of warhead operation that cannot beadequately addressed with existing tools andthe current knowledge base of the weaponsscientists and engineers. Of particular con-cern is the assessment challenge posed byheretofore unrecognized problems. The SSPmust support rigorous computational and ex-perimental processes not only to confirm andextend what is known and expected but alsoto close gaps in our current understanding. Thisability to fill in gaps is especially important inthose areas where nuclear testing would havebeen used to bound the margins of our con-cerns in the past.

In the absence of nuclear testing, differ-ent experiments and tools must be relied on toobtain data relevant to nuclear warhead per-formance. However, because these older toolswere designed to complement nuclear testing,they are not, in and of themselves, sufficientin the absence of nuclear testing. A suite ofenhanced capabilities and facilities that will beused to fill in the knowledge gaps and providedata relevant to various stockpile concerns hasbeen identified.

These efforts are principally supported bythe Primary Certification Campaign, the Sec-ondary Certification and Nuclear-SystemsMargins Campaign, the Certification in Hos-tile Environments Campaign, the Weapon Sys-tem Engineering Certification Campaign, theAdvanced Radiography Campaign, and theInertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) Ignition &High Yield Campaign.


• Multi-laboratory radiation-flow experi-ments have been performed on ICF facili-ties, Nova, Omega and Z, confirming thatAGEX experiments coupled with detailedmodeling can meet weapons physics goals.

• The conditional certification of theMC4380 neutron generator to hostile en-vironments without UGT testsdemonstrated the efficacy of a certifica-tion process based on validated modelsplus AGEX experiments, pendingreconfiguration of the Annular Core Re-search Reactor (ACRR).

• Advances in ICF target physics, especiallyhigher efficiency hohlraum-capsule de-signs, are reducing the technical risk inachieving ignition on NIF.

• Equation-of-state experiments on deute-rium at the Nova laser won the Excellencein Plasma Physics Award of the Ameri-can Physical Society. These results im-pact analysis of weapon performance andprovide improvement of anticipated igni-tion experiments at the National IgnitionFacility.

• Developed preliminary models to supportcertification of weapons systems in thenormal flight environment.

• Developed model of mass transport inweapon secondaries, and provided frame-work for long-lived secondary assemblies.

• Developed preliminary computationalbaseline models for some aspects of theW80 nuclear explosive package.

• Developed computational engineeringmodels for structural and thermal analy-ses.

• The first hydrodynamic test was success-fully completed using the first axis of theDARHT facility. The improved radio-graphic performance offered by this facil-ity will be crucial to developing the neededresolution for benchmarking primary codecalculations and assessing system perfor-

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mance re-certification of the existingstockpile or future remanufactured weap-ons.

• With the commissioning of DARHT, re-search leading to the next generation ofadvanced hydrodynamic testing has beendemonstrated through time-resolved imag-ing of weapon parts, proving the applica-bility of proton radiography for primarysimulation and testing.

• A concept for proton radiography, basedin part on improved image focusing tech-niques, has opened a possible route to multi-time, multi-view radiographic images ofdynamic behavior in nuclear weapon con-ditions. The viability of this approach hasbeen demonstrated with dense, static tar-gets at the Alternating Gradient Synchro-tron at Brookhaven National Laboratory,and multi-time images in low-density dy-namic implosions with LANSCE at LosAlamos.

• Conventional hydrodynamic testing hassuccessfully shown that the low-tempera-ture performance of insensitive high ex-plosive (PBX 9502) primaries conformsto design intent. These tests, coupled withthe first-time imaging of HE burn aroundcorners utilizing LANSCE, have greatlyenhanced the capabilities for certifyingweapon performance at extreme condi-tions within the STS.

• Subcritical experiments were successfullyperformed to enhance data for high-pres-sure EOS and ejecta evolution for pluto-nium. First-ever data for the actual EOSof the current weapon-grade plutoniumwere obtained and found to be consistentwith expectations. Ejecta experimentswere performed and demonstrated thecapability to image and quantify the tem-poral and spatial distributions of surfaceejecta. These experiments, combined withthe results of the Materials Dynamics andEnhanced Surveillance Campaigns, willform the basis of new primary simulationsthat more accurately model real materialperformance.

• A series of experiments leading to the per-formance of full-scale systems tests weresuccessfully completed to examine anoma-lous case fracture incidents. Correlationsbetween manufacturing defects and ac-celerated case deformation were accom-plished validating the experimentaltechniques for upcoming full-scale systemtests.

5.4. Design and Manufacturing:Refurbishing and Certifying

WITH AN IMPROVED UNDER-STANDING of the effects of aging on war-head safety and reliability, developed throughthe enhanced surveillance and assessmentefforts, DOE will be able to take a proactiveapproach to refurbishment. The goal is to re-place or fix components through systematicmodernization, before aging-related changesjeopardize warhead safety or reliability. TheDSW Stockpile Life Extension Process (SLEP)provides the framework for research and de-velopment activities and production planningthat will strive to overcome these and otherhurdles facing stockpile stewardship. To com-plicate this effort, some manufacturing pro-cesses and capabilities are no longer practical.Replacement of these processes and capa-bilities is a significant challenge to the mainte-nance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

The six production readiness Campaigns–Pit Readiness, Secondary Readiness, HE/As-sembly Readiness, Nonnuclear Readiness,Tritium Readiness, and Material Readiness–and the ADAPT and Enhanced Surety Cam-paigns are required to sustain themanufacturing base within the nuclear weap-ons complex.


• W87 First SLEP–Successfully met the firstproduction unit milestones and delivery forinitial operational capability, and is continu-ing to provide units to the DoD.

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• Underground Nuclear Test Readiness–During FY 1999, DOE and DoD (ProgramAnalysis and Evaluation) assessed theDOE’s readiness to resume undergroundnuclear testing within the two to three yearperiod directed by the President. The re-view team concluded that readiness is ad-equate, provided that funding does notdecrease. The Nuclear Weapons Council(NWC) accepted the analysis, but re-quested an evaluation of additional testscenarios and the possibility of reducingthe readiness period. This work is under-way.

• Assessed age-induced replacement needsin support of the W80 and W76 6.2 stud-ies.

• Enhanced Surety.

- Designed direct optical initiation andoptically-isolated micro CDU compat-ible with the W76 and W78;

- Initiated the EUCOM PAL Theater Se-cure Recode System;

- Designed and validated infrared sourcesfor sensors and subminiature triggers;

- Fabricated parts for integrated miniaturestrong link;

- Completed W78 slow heat studies;

- Continued installation of B61-3/4/10 Alt339 and 335;

- Resolved 10 items regarding safetystudies and safety assessments;

- Achieved FSED for new security con-cepts in FY 1999;

- Started 6.x studies for W76 and W80;

- Introduced encrypted PAL in the B83-1 Quality Improvement Program;

- Demonstrated micro firing set;

- Initiated the fielding of the B61-11 al-lowing the retirement of the B53-1;

- Developed, certified, and fielded theT1565A to replace the T1565, whichwas not Y2K compliant; and

- Successfully utilized interactive electron-ics procedures on test-bed assembly.

• Advanced Design and Production Tech-nologies (ADAPT).

- Interconnected the distributed nuclearweapons complex via SecureNet;

- Used electronic data capture and net-worked access to acceptance dataacross the design and production com-plex for the W87 LEP;

- Developed and used a model-based ap-proach for product realization oftelemetry systems, nuclear weapon com-ponents, assemblies, and test hardware;

- Developed and applied computer mod-els of sites and processes in planningand resource scheduling;

- Applied virtual prototyping methods toneutron generator design and certifica-tion, and used visualization techniquesto identify unknown weapon perfor-mance issues;

- Completed and deployed new processesto recycle nitric acid used in plutoniumoperations and dispose of HE in an eco-nomical and environmentally acceptablemanner; and

- Demonstrated for the first time in thenuclear weapons complex, a totallypaperless Product Definition Release.

• Pit Readiness.

- Identified all manufacturing processes(~103) needed to produce new W88 pits;

- Deployed all but three of the manufac-turing processes;

- Forty-four processes will require design-agent and production-agent qualificationapproval. Twenty-four plans have beencompleted, and all plans will be com-pleted by January 2000;

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- Manufactured four complete pit devel-opment units, and another one is sched-uled for completion in November 1999;and

- Manufactured twelve process-develop-ment shells.

5.5. Simulation & Modeling:Underpinning the StockpileStewardship Program

COMPUTATIONAL MODELING ANDPREDICTION are integral to every activitywithin the Stockpile Stewardship Program, andunderpin our ability to maintain confidence inthe nuclear deterrent under a no-nuclear-test-ing regime. ASCI provides the leading-edge,high-end simulation capabilities needed to meetweapon assessment and certification require-ments without nuclear testing. To accomplishthis, ASCI integrates the resources of the na-tional laboratories, computer manufacturers,and academia.

Accomplishments in the ASCI Programinclude:

Applications

• See classified ASCI accomplishments inthe compilation of 30-Day ReviewSTRATCOM presentations.

• ASCI simulations have enabled the certi-fication of the MC4380 neutron genera-tor. This is the first radiation-hardenedcomponent to be certified without an un-derground nuclear test.

• Resolved a nuclear test anomaly by usinga 3-D ASCI application code. The calcu-lation required four months on ASCI BlueMountain, and would have required 80years on a Cray-class supercomputer.

• Simulated a nuclear-test diagnostic mea-surement for the first time. The calcula-tion took one day on ASCI Blue Mountain,and would have required 2-3 years on aCray-class supercomputer.

• Simulated re-entry body response to a hos-tile radiation environment. The analysiswas requested by DoD to define a futureSTS test program.

• High-fidelity confinement vessel simula-tion was performed to support the hydro-dynamic experimental program. Thesimulation was run on ASCI Blue Moun-tain using 1 million brick elements to simu-late structural and dynamic response ofthe vessel.

• High-fidelity casting simulations have beendone in parallel using Telluride in supportof the W88 pit rebuild.

• The Eolus project computed simulated ra-diographs of an experiment that reducedbackground signal levels by greater than afactor of 150 for DARHT.

• Current “hero” calculations can do 1,000or more time steps on a billion-cell mesh,creating datasets in the 10-100 terabyterange.

• During CY1998, multiple weapons appli-cations were scaled to run on many thou-sands (>5,000) of processors.

Platforms

• The world’s three most powerful comput-ers are the current ASCI platforms at LosAlamos, Livermore, and Sandia NationalLaboratories.

• Performance of the present day ASCImachines (Blue Pacific at LawrenceLivermore, Blue Mountain at Los Alamos,and Red at Sandia) is between three andfour TeraOPS.

• ASCI Red (SNL) ran the first ever dem-onstration of a sustained TeraOPS capa-bility (1.068 TeraOPS, 1.068x1012

floating-point operations per second) onDecember 4, 1996. This was the first dem-onstration of a sustained TeraOPS capa-bility by a general purpose computersystem.

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• Both ASCI Blue systems were deliveredin the Fall of 1998 (3-5 months ahead ofschedule). Programmatic usage of thisplatform is extremely high and many his-toric scientific calculations (world recordnumber of zones, complexity of calcula-tions, etc.) have been performed.

Physics and Materials Modeling

• A new high-explosive grain-level modelhas been developed and incorporated intoan ASCI application code for assessmentof its utility on stockpile problems.

Verification and Validation

• A baseline survey of software quality as-surance (SQA) practices was completedfor all ASCI code projects at all three labs.

Problem Solving Environments

• New programming methodologies and soft-ware architectures used in ASCI codedevelopment have dramatically decreasedthe time and effort required to parallelizesimulation codes.

Distance- and Distributed-Computing(DisCom2)

• A parallel high-performance network ar-chitecture has been demonstrated and isready for wide area deployment in FY2000.

Visualization and Interactive Environmentfor Weapons Simulation (VIEWS)

• Initial versions of the Data and Visualiza-tion Corridors (DVCs) have been deployedat all three laboratories, and have beenused in support of the neutron generatorcertification and the ASCI applicationsburn-code mileposts.

University Partnerships–University Alli-ances and Institutes

• ASCI has established partnerships withuniversities under the Alliances program.This involves over 400 university research-

ers that are providing valuable expertise inalgorithms development and potential ac-cess to future program personnel.

National Awards received by the ASCI Pro-gram

• 1999 Gordon Bell Prize for high-resolution,3-D simulations of Richtmyer-Meshkovinstability and mixing using the ASCI BluePacific SST supercomputer.

• 1998 VeriBest Superior Systems Award:Reconfigurable Communications Hard-ware Board, SNL.

• 1997 R&D 100 Award: High PerformanceStorage System, a collaboration of LLNL,LANL, ORNL, SNL and IBM Global Gov-ernment Industry.

• 1996 R&D 100 Award: Scalable Asynchro-nous Transfer Mode (ATM) Encryptor,SNL.

• 1996 R&D 100 Award with Giganet fornetwork performance among massivelyparallel computers.

5.6. Experimental Facilities:Underpinning the StockpileStewardship Program

NEW EXPERIMENTAL CAPABILI-TIES WILL be required to achieve certifica-tion in the absence of underground nucleartesting. These include subcritical experiments,as well as advanced experimental facilities toprovide high-resolution data on the stages ofnuclear explosions. The facilities are Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test(DARHT) Facility and the National IgnitionFacility (NIF), which are currently under con-struction, and Atlas, which is in detailed de-sign. Also included is the Short Pulse SpallationSource enhancement to the Los Alamos Neu-tron Science Center (LANSCE), which is anupgrade to an existing facility. In addition, theneed for an Advanced Hydrotest Facility(AHF) is being studied for the future.

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The first axis of DARHT has beenbrought into operation as the lead facility forradiography of dense objects. The second axisof DARHT, to provide two views and fourtime sequenced pictures, is under construction,and is scheduled for completion at the end of FY2002.

Accomplishments include:

• LANSCE–A proof-of-principle demon-stration for proton radiography success-fully culminated in the firing of the jointLos Alamos/UK-AWE experiment named“Billi G.” The dynamics of this first-of-its-kind experiment were captured in a 14-frame series spanning a fewmicroseconds. This demonstration not onlyillustrated the multi-framing capabilities butalso the ability to examine realistic objectsof relevant radiographic density with pro-tons.

• Chemistry and Materials–Orientation Im-aging Microscopy has revealed that theprobabilistic nature of uranium hydride re-actions is significantly controlled by theuranium microstructure. Results indicatethat specific uranium crystallographic ori-entations are most rapidly attacked whenexposed to hydrogen. This work will en-able a correlation between uranium com-ponents that have been subjected to avariety of manufacturing processes result-ing in varied but predictable microstruc-tural conditions and eventual hydridecorrosion susceptibility.

• Subcritical Experiments–Three subcriticalexperiments were successfully conductedduring FY 1999, as planned. Los AlamosNational Laboratory executed Cimarron.Lawrence Livermore National Laboratorycompleted Clarinet and Oboe 1. Oboe isa series of small subcritical experimentsin vessels. All three experiments obtaineddata on the behavior of plutonium subjectedto shock from high explosives.

• High Temperature Hohlraums for Stock-pile Stewardship Program Experiments–Experiments demonstrating the creation ofhigh temperature hohlraums on Nova havevalidated NIF capabilities critical for theStockpile Stewardship Program.

• DARHT–Successfully conducted (No-vember 8, 1999) first hydrodynamic test,marking the operational readiness of thefirst axis of DARHT. The second axis isto be completed in 2002.

• NIF–The NIF conventional facilities, in-cluding target-chamber installation, andpilot optics production are on schedule andmeeting their goals. However, installationof laser equipment has proven more com-plex than anticipated originally, and willtake longer and cost more than planned.

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6 Stockpile StewardshipProgram Challenges -Now and in the Future

THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIPPROGRAM faces many significant challengesas it moves into the future. These challengescenter on making the right decisions for anuncertain future. The SSP’s approach is toensure that production capabilities and capac-ity are in place when needed, to have the sig-nificant experimental and computationalfacilities available in time to annually certifythe stockpile, and in time to impact the SLEPschedule, and to preserve premier science andengineering capabilities to maintain, refurbishand modernize nuclear weapons.

With the new business model of Cam-paigns, DSW, and RTBF, DP is implementingnew methods for addressing a broad range ofstockpile issues. The SSP now has the man-agement tools to redefine the program andmake difficult decisions. For example, DP hasdefined criteria for certifying reliability, design,and production readiness for FY 2005. Es-tablishing these criteria has resulted in tightlycoupled experimental programs and readinessefforts with measurable deliverables. With thenew business model, the program accepts thatmeeting DSW milestones requires limits toexperiments and options. In a similar manner,the program has also addressed the challengeof defining and executing test readiness. Inmost cases, meeting these challenges hasforced the SSP to develop new approachesthat support the program’s commitments bothto directed stockpile work and to sustainingthe science and engineering base needed tomaintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile.

6.1. Personnel Challenges

THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF the SSPdepends on the excellence of the scientists,engineers, and managers at the laboratories,production plants, test site, and at DOE. Pre-serving a cadre of nuclear-weapon-experi-enced personnel within these institutions is oneof the most pressing and crucial challengesDP faces. Unstable funding leading to volun-tary and involuntary separations at the labo-ratories and plants, pressures from increasedsecurity requirements, and a perceived declinein the importance and excitement of nuclearstewardship have contributed to a loss of valu-able skills throughout the nuclear weaponscomplex.

6.1.1. The Chiles Commission

To understand comprehensively the issuessurrounding the personnel challenges, Con-gress directed in Public Law 104-201 the es-tablishment of the Commission on MaintainingU.S. Nuclear Weapons Expertise. This Com-mission, chaired by Admiral H. G. Chiles, Jr.,reported its findings and twelve recommen-dations (Summarized in Appendix C) to Con-gress on March 1, 1999. These findings andrecommendations also were supported by theFoster Panel report.

In response to the Commission’s recom-mendations, DP immediately formed a Steer-ing Group of senior headquarters, field office,and production plant and laboratory represen-tatives to develop a path forward for each ofthe Commission’s twelve recommendations.Admiral Chiles, the Defense Nuclear Facili-ties Safety Board, and the Nuclear WeaponsCouncil have been briefed regarding the path

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forward, and have endorsed DOE’s strategyto address each recommendation. One of themost important recommendations calls for thedevelopment of work force plans for each DPfacility. These site-specific plans address Fed-eral, production plant and laboratory humanresource needs over the next decade to en-sure that the weapon complex has in placequalified scientists, engineers and technicalexperts who can ensure the safety and reli-ability of the enduring stockpile.

Challenge: Maintaining the proper skillmix. Skill mix at the laboratories and the plantsis an issue. Because the Stockpile Steward-ship Program has shifted away from under-ground testing toward a more simulation-basedand aging-analysis-oriented approach, it is nec-essary to shift the skill mix at the laboratoriesaccordingly. Likewise, at the production plants,there will be more emphasis on computer- andnetwork-based design tools and techniques inthe next decade. This may necessitate a shiftin skill mix at the plants. Changing the skillmix at the institutions across the nuclear weap-ons complex will be a major challenge, possi-bly requiring more employment reductions inorder to implement hiring programs that tar-get needed skills and disciplines.

Challenge: Attracting and retaining apremier workforce. Two factors that havesignificantly impacted recruitment and reten-tion are resource constraints combined withincreased programmatic need for maintenanceof the stockpile. This has resulted in feweropportunities to conduct exploratory researchat the laboratories. Another factor that is caus-ing stress in the scientific environment is thenew categorization of some research topicsas “sensitive unclassified technical informa-tion” (SUTI); this may preclude scientists andengineers from publishing their results in theopen literature, or sharing information at tech-nical meetings or conferences. In most in-stances, information that is designated as SUTIwithin the DOE complex is openly publishedby other scientists at non-DOE institutions.

Another workforce issue is the pay freezeimplemented during the early 1990s, which hasresulted in a measurable loss in market posi-

tion for the salaries of scientists and engineers,especially in highly competitive areas such asinformation science and technology. The sci-entific productivity at the laboratories is alsoimpacted by the long lead time needed to pro-cess clearances. In the months following thepublication of the Cox Commission Report, theoverall morale at the laboratories has dimin-ished due to a perceived lack of trust in thenuclear weapons workforce. If unchecked,these and related factors could severely im-pair the laboratories’ ability to attract and re-tain the caliber of scientists and engineersrequired to steward the stockpile into the 21stcentury. DP is addressing many of these is-sues through actions that implement the ChilesCommission recommendations.

6.2. Infrastructure Challenges

BALANCING INVESTMENTS ININFRASTRUCTURE with other importantactivities is a significant challenge. DP facessignificant challenges in the next decade withregard to the facilities and infrastructure neededto preserve the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Plansto develop and implement necessary new fa-cilities, and upgrade the nuclear weapons com-plex infrastructure have been underway by DP,the laboratories, NTS, and the productionplants for the past several years. Theoverarching challenges in this area are 1) tohave production capabilities and capacity inplace when needed; and 2) to have the signifi-cant experimental and computational facilitiesavailable in time to achieve the SLEP sched-ule. Appropriate programmatic support isneeded to certify and refurbish weapons dur-ing the next decade. Many of the necessaryfacilities are now under development at thelaboratories, production plants, and the test site.Construction of others is planned to occur dur-ing the next few years. The remainder of thissubsection covers each of the challenge ar-eas mentioned above. Discussion is combinedfor annual certification and upgrading the stock-pile, because there is significant overlap in theirinfrastructure challenges.

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Challenge: Certifying and refurbishingthe stockpile without underground nucleartesting. In the absence of underground nucleartesting, certification is being achieved throughcombined efforts in stockpile surveillance,stockpile maintenance, nonnuclear experimen-tation and testing, and computational simula-tion, performed by a diverse and skilledworkforce. Certification becomes increasinglymore challenging as both the stockpile and theworkforce, with weapon-design experience,age. The development of new nonnuclearexperimental facilities, simulation capabilities,and processes to evaluate archived data areessential to maintaining high confidence in thesafety, security, reliability, and performance ofthe stockpile. The experimental and compu-tational tools used in the past were designedto complement, not replace, nuclear testing.As a consequence, they are not, in and ofthemselves, sufficient to maintain confidencein the absence of nuclear testing. A suite ofenhanced capabilities and facilities is beingdeveloped to fill in the associated knowledgegaps, and provide data to address and resolvestockpile concerns that have been identified.

During the next decade, it will be neces-sary to refurbish and modernize stockpileweapons, starting with the W80 in FY 2006,and the W76 in FY 2008. These upgrades arenecessary to replace limited-life components,upgrade tritium storage technology, and tomodernize weapon surety features. Becausesignificant changes will be made to theseweapon systems, and underground nucleartests may not be performed, it will be neces-sary to use a significantly different approachfor certification than has been used in the past.This new approach requires that computationalfacilities be available to simulate weapon per-formance with full-fidelity physics in three di-mensions. Also required are facilities toconduct subcritical experiments to verify dy-namic properties of nuclear weapon materi-als. Additional radiographic facilities, bothx-ray and proton, are required along with fa-cilities for developing microsystem-basedsurety options. While some of these facilitiesexist today (e.g., subcritical test facilities) or

are under construction (e.g., DARHT andNIF), others are only in a planning stage (e.g.,MESA and AHF). Because the SLEP callsfor production of refurbished weapons by FY2006, it is essential to continue developmentof facilities that are underway, and transitionfrom planning to developing and constructingthose that are not.

An important focus of the planned up-grades is to increase nuclear weapon surety(safety, reliability, and security), consonant withNSDDs, DoD Directives, and DOE Orders.Surety features in stockpile weapons are basedon 1960s and 1970s technology. Considerableprogress has been made during the past fiveyears that now makes it feasible to incorpo-rate new technologies based on microsystemsdevices and other technologies. These tech-nologies offer the possibility of eliminating allsafety exceptions and security “hot spots” inthe current stockpile. Failure to develop andmature these technologies during the next 3-5years could lead to the re-use of 20- to 30-year-old technology in refurbished weapons,which then would remain in the stockpile forat least thirty years. This is viewed by DP asunacceptable from a safety and security per-spective, and exploration of a wide variety ofoptions for consideration by both DoD andDOE is warranted in the national interest.

Challenge: Dealing with facility legacyand the need for modernization. Depreci-ating production facilities in the late 1980s andearly 1990s was the prudent decision in lightof the decline in production workload and thegeopolitical environment at that time. Unfor-tunately, DP is now faced with the realities ofthose aged and marginally maintained facili-ties. During the past year, the Nuclear Weap-ons Council tasked the Department of DefenseComptroller’s Office of Program Analysis andEvaluation (PA&E) to conduct an independentreview of the nuclear weapon production in-frastructure. PA&E’s initial findings high-lighted the contrast between DOE’s currentand historical rate of reinvestment in facilities(0.8% of replacement value) and the industryand DoD norm (2-4% of replacement value).This has resulted in a large bow wave of de-

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ferred improvements. For example, 70% ofthe facilities at Y12, 80% of the facilities atthe Kansas City Plant, 50% of the facilities atLos Alamos National Laboratory, 40% of thefacilities at Pantex, and 40% of the SavannahRiver tritium facilities are more than 40 yearsold. These facilities were not designed or builtfor today’s missions and operational standards,nor were they designed or constructed to meettoday’s environmental, safety, and health stan-dards. As these facilities continue to age, theirmaintenance and operating costs continue torise.

In addition to maintaining the program-matic and site infrastructure at the productionplants, the SSP is proceeding with a major ini-tiative to “right-size” the manufacturing com-plex to better match changes in the workloadsand budgets with maintenance of core capa-bilities and facilities. This right-sizing is beingconducted consistent with the Stockpile Stew-ardship and Management Programmatic En-vironmental Impact Statement (PEIS), theRecord of Decision for which was signed bythe Secretary of Energy on December 19,1996. The PEIS formally defines the archi-tecture of the weapons complex for the fu-ture. The right-sizing originally was based on“find or fix” scenarios, and current facility plan-ning has been re-scoped accordingly, and isreflected in the implementation of the newbusiness model.

The aim of the production readiness cam-paigns and RTBF is to ensure that the produc-tion facilities are ready and able to deliverdefect-free modernized weapon componentsfor SLEP weapon refurbishments. Before theB61 and W76 SLEP refurbishments can becompleted it may be necessary to re-establishmaterial formulation and fabrication capabili-ties for critical weapon components. Otherfuture SLEPs may require reestablishing theability to synthesize and formulate high explo-sive materials that are no longer available com-mercially. Future SLEPs could introducemicro-machined non-nuclear componentsnever before used in nuclear weapons. All ofthese processes must be established, proven,and certified before any war reserve produc-tion can proceed.

Challenge: Build new, certifiable pitsusing new tools and processes in a newenvironment. When Rocky Flats was closedin 1989, U.S. pit production came to a halt,interrupting the production of war-reserveW88s. Presently, the U.S. is the only nuclearpower that lacks the ability to manufacturepits. The recently released Foster Panel Studynoted the need for more planning for long-termpit production. Although DoD does not re-quire DOE to produce pits per se, it does re-quire DOE to support the stockpile as definedby the NWSP. To do this, DOE performs sur-veillance on weapons, some of which is de-structive, to assure that their performance canbe certified. Because of the increased lon-gevity of weapons remaining in the stockpile,more systems than originally planned will betested destructively. This produces a require-ment to manufacture pits so as not to depletethe required stockpile. The first of the newcertifiable pits will be required for the W88warhead, whose production availability require-ment is the end of FY 2001. Subsequent to theW88, the next pit manufacturing requirementto support the surveillance program will be forthe W87.

In the future it may become necessary tomanufacture large quantities of pits for stock-piled weapons due to unforeseen requirementsthat surface from the surveillance program,or changing national security requirementsimposed by DoD. For the near term, supportto the surveillance program will be met with alimited pit production capability being imple-mented at LANL. Incremental increases tothe pit production capacity at LANL must bebalanced with the need to maintain the pluto-nium research capabilities at the laboratory.The requirements and designs for alarge-scalepit production facility are being evaluated now.

Challenge: Preserving needed skills inthe absence of testing. By PDD, the Presi-dent has stipulated that DOE must be preparedto resume underground nuclear testing within24 to 36 months, if so directed. Presently, NTShas plans that would allow a limited level oftesting to be performed within 12 months ofreceiving a Presidential Directive to conduct

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a test. The ability to resume testing has twoimportant dimensions. First, the necessaryinfrastructure needs to be kept in place, pro-viding required facilities, diagnostics, andequipment. Second, key and essential per-sonnel who possess the expertise required toperform tests, and collect and analyze test data,must be retained. Performance of subcriticalexperiments uses much of the needed equip-ment and infrastructure, and exercises thehuman skills required for this activity. Sub-critical experiments are supported by the Cam-paigns and RTBF, and it is essential thatadequate support for these be sustained. Itwill also be necessary to continue to supportand maintain test facilities that are not usedby subcritical experimentation.

Challenge: Balancing the implementationof programmatic requirements and newsecurity upgrades. During the last year, anumber of security-related issues within thenuclear weapon complex have been surfaced.These include cyber-security, the protectionof classified information and special nuclearmaterials, and the protection of nuclearweapons while being transported from stationto station. At the agency level, a new officereporting to the Secretary was created toconsolidate the management and execution ofall security activities. Ultimate resolution ofthese security-related issues will havesignificant financial, and in some cases,cultural, impacts on the laboratories and plants.

To execute its stockpile stewardship mis-sion, the SSP depends on an information net-work that interconnects its sites. Thisinformation network presents challenging se-curity risks that must be managed carefully toproperly protect Restricted Data. The mostsignificant risk is that introduced by intercon-necting the multiple sites. These interconnec-tions require that previously used securityapproaches, i.e., those based on physical pro-tection of stand-alone systems, are no longeradequate, and must be upgraded to a system-based approach for both physical and elec-tronic security measures. The presence ofthe interconnections also means that the dam-age that can be done by malicious insiders is

greatly increased, and requires electronic safe-guards more capable than any currently in use.

Because of these issues, an intensivestudy of cyber-security recently has been per-formed within DP. It covered the status ofcyber-security and needed upgrades at boththe laboratories and the plants. The studyfound that secure information environmentsacross the complex were outdated and poorlysupported compared to unclassified systems.This situation reduces the efficiency of DOEcontractors in maintaining the stockpile expe-ditiously. The findings of this study are docu-mented in the Information SecurityManagement (ISecM) plan published Novem-ber 15, 1999 for DOE management consider-ation and implementation decisions.

The study recommends a broad range ofimprovements to DP’s computer networks.These begin with creation of an Agency Se-cure Network (ASN) that will provide the func-tionality necessary to conduct the nuclearweapons program, while providing securitycommensurate with the classification levels ofthe information. The ASN will be a single,integrated network to allow better manage-ment, improve security design and implemen-tation, and eliminate redundant efforts. Thereport also recommends upgrades to the un-classified networks that process sensitive in-formation to provide better protection ofsensitive information while ensuring that it issharable with industrial partners who needaccess to it. Finally, it recommends that stan-dards be established for open networks to en-sure the integrity and availability of theinformation that is shared publicly. The studyconcludes that a robust set of cyber-securityrelated upgrades would cost approximately$850 million, and would take four years to com-plete. At present, funds are not identified tocommence the needed upgrades. Aprioritization process will be needed.

As a result of reviews of the managementof classified information during the past fewyears, certain nuclear weapon sigma catego-ries are proposed to be elevated from the Se-cret Restricted Data (SRD) level to the Top

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Secret Restricted Data (TSRD) level. Thiswill require significant physical and adminis-trative changes in the management of infor-mation that falls into the affected categories.More significantly, however, would be the re-quirement to operate the ASCIsupercomputers, the networks that intercon-nect them, and the facilities in which scien-tists and engineers use them at the TSRD level.The cost impacts associated with this changepresently are being analyzed, and are expectedto be very large. The Office of Defense Pro-grams has sent a letter on this “Higher Fences”initiative to DoD to inform them of the issue,and that it will need to be addressed throughthe Nuclear Weapons Council interface.

More stringent procedures are beingimplemented to protect special nuclear mate-rial (SNM), classified hardware, and themanufacturing of classified hardware at thelaboratories and the plants. In some instances,these tighter practices are resulting in entirefacilities being operated as a vault, with ex-tensive physical protection measures beingrequired. The increased level of security alsofrequently requires the restructuring and re-deployment of protective forces, and otherphysical protection measures, all of which driveup security costs.

During the past year, DP’s TransportationSafeguards Division (TSD), which is respon-sible for providing safe, secure and cost-ef-fective transportation for nuclear weapons inDOE custody, received a “marginal” securityrating. DP has developed a “Get Well Plan”to remedy this situation. Upgrades are plannedboth for the transportation fleet and personnelwho execute TSD’s activities. Within the fleet,the older armored tractors and safe securetrailers (SSTs) are being replaced with newermodels, incorporating up-to-date technologies

for protection, communication, and tracking.In the personnel area, training and training fa-cilities are being upgraded to accommodatethe new standards. Additionally, professionalleadership training, analogous to that used bythe military, is being developed and deployed.In aggregate, these activities will allow TSDto counter additional threat scenarios that couldimpact the security of transported weapons.In response, DP executive management hascommitted to increasing funding for the Trans-portation Safeguards Division through aggres-sive budgeting and reprogramming.

6.3. Business Challenges

THE STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIPPROGRAM currently faces several manage-ment challenges. These include: 1) the needfor further integration across the nuclear weap-ons complex to increase efficiency; 2) the needto assess and manage program risk; 3) theneed to assess requirements and producedeliverables within the constrained resources;and 4) the need to improve the managementpractices for the construction of large, techni-cally complex scientific facilities.

Historically, the nuclear weapons complexevolved as a number of sites that were inten-tionally isolated from each other. As a resultthe contractors that manage the laboratoriesand plants have established independent busi-ness practices geared to their specific missionassignments. This has impacted the ability ofthe laboratories and the plants to work effec-tively and efficiently together. New businesspractices are being developed and implementedby DP to increase coordination and integra-tion across the complex.

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7 Summary and Findings

7.1. Introduction

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY isthe civilian agency responsible for providingthe Nation with nuclear weapons and for en-suring that those weapons remain safe, secureand reliable. This stewardship and manage-ment responsibility addresses the supremenational interest of sustaining the nuclear de-terrent. Carrying out the responsibility entailsa complex linked set of activities ranging fromscientific research to detailed surveillance andremanufacturing, while continuously sustain-ing the reliability that underpins our strategicmilitary posture.

In 1992, the United States declared amoratorium on underground nuclear testingand, since 1995, the Administration has pur-sued a zero-yield comprehensive nuclear testban. The President and the Congress havedirected DOE to continue to maintain thesafety, security, and reliability of the enduringstockpile. The DOE is closely partnered withthe Department of Defense (DoD) in this mis-sion. The DOE, in addition to being account-able for maintaining nuclear weapons inaccordance with DoD specifications, has theresponsibility to represent the public’s interestin assuring the safety and security of theseweapons. The generation of requirements andcertification of weapons systems are accom-plished through joint DOE/DoD processes thatwork through the auspices of the NuclearWeapons Council for the Secretaries of De-fense and Energy.

This review of the Stockpile StewardshipProgram provides an opportunity for assess-ing program accomplishments over the lastfew years, for evaluating program directionand goals, and for identifying those investmentsin facilities and people that will best positionthe program to meet both near-term and long-term challenges. The review is carried out inthe context of:

• No testing with nuclear yield

Maintaining the nuclear deterrent withoutnuclear testing has led to a profoundchange in the program structure. In par-ticular, in-depth science-based weaponsurveillance, subsystem experiments, andlarge-scale simulation now play a muchmore prominent role. Fundamentalprogress in understanding of nuclearweapons has been made that is laying thefoundation for a robust program for main-taining weapons of well-tested designs.

• Continuous reliability of weapon sys-tems

Even as the program changes dramati-cally, and new scientific capabilities aredeveloped, the weapon systems that formour deterrent must be maintained reliablyyear in and year out. This is addressedthrough a rigorous annual certification pro-cess, now in its fourth year. This require-ment drives significant work throughoutthe DOE complex, in collaboration withDoD.

• Preparing for the future

The stewardship program must take a longview that extends decades into the future,both in providing the capability toremanufacture certifiable weapon compo-nents and in sustaining the needed scien-tific and human resource base. It mustbe emphasized that the programmatic de-cisions taken years hence about eachweapon system will be based, in large part,on the science and engineering performedby the laboratories. Thus, the weaponslaboratories must remain premier scien-tific organizations, with an appropriate in-frastructure and skill mix. Concomitantly,the laboratories must be viewed as excel-lent places to do science, so that recruit-ment and retention of the best talentcontinues. This is the ultimate basis forsuccessful and sustainable stewardshipunder any technical approach. In addi-tion, viable production facilities are needed

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to meet the manufacturing requirementsof the stockpile refurbishment program.

Accomplishing this stewardship task, in theabsence of underground testing, requires notjust new and innovative technical approaches;it demands a clear articulation of our underly-ing approach to decision making, problem solv-ing, and prioritization. Thus, this reviewaddresses the overall Program organization.

This review is not designed to assess theintricate details of specific program elementsor resource requirements; rather, it is a chanceto take stock and determine if DOE is funda-mentally on the right track and is making theinvestments today needed to be outstandingnuclear stewards tomorrow. Does DOE havethe infrastructure and tools, across the nuclearweapons complex, to meet current goals?Does DOE have the program flexibility re-quired to be responsible stewards in the fu-ture? Does DOE’s decision-makingphilosophy and investment portfolio reflect bothshort-term drivers and long-term needs? DoesDOE have the correct planning process inplace to allow the program to balance appro-priately the workload and resources betweenthe production of deliverables and the invest-ment in science and engineering?

A key challenge of the Stockpile Stew-ardship Program is to balance DoD’s militarydrivers, which result in a targeted set of goalsand schedules, against the set of technical is-sues arising from aging in nuclear weapons.The Program must be fundamentally robustenough to support the evolving production andcertification requirements and sufficiently flex-ible to address unanticipated problems and is-sues. It must also be able to sustain anenvironment that fosters inquiry and problem-solving in both science and engineering. TheDOE has the responsibility to provide the lead-ership required to balance the demand forshort-term deliverables against the need forlong-term institution building. DOE’s decision-

making throughout the Stockpile StewardshipProgram must reflect both objectives.

A significant fraction of the nation’snuclear arsenal is scheduled for refurbishmentover the next decade. Two key systems–theW80 and W76–are a large part of the nation’snuclear deterrent and will comprise the ma-jority of the directed stockpile workload earlyin the new century. The W76–as part of theTrident submarine weapon system–plays aparticularly important role as one of the mostsurvivable elements of the nation’s deterrent.Developing the tools, technologies, skill-base,and production capabilities required to refur-bish and modernize these systems is a majorchallenge of the Stockpile Stewardship Pro-gram. The cost and schedule of these toolsand technologies, and the availability of theproper skill mix in the work force, must befactored into the development of the require-ments expressed in the life extension programsfor these two weapons.

To meet near-term refurbishment goals,the DOE must work closely with the DoD to:1) identify and assess technical drivers andschedules for weapon component replacementand/or certifiable modification; 2) developschedules for production and certification; 3)determine current and projected resource re-quirements; and 4) develop a process forchanging the work plan to accommodate un-expected technical issues. This review is anopportunity to evaluate the current structureof the requirements generation process and torecommend actions to strengthen this processfor the DOE, in partnership with the DoD.

Performing stockpile stewardship withouttesting has been likened to the technical chal-lenge of putting a man on the moon. Need-less to say, with a sustained nationalcommitment over the better part of a decade,America succeeded in that challenge. DOEexpects to succeed as well in stockpile stew-ardship with the same level of national com-

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mitment to the nuclear deterrent and toAmerica’s preeminent scientific and techni-cal enterprise. This review will help defineelements of that commitment.

7.2. General and SpecificProgram Findings

7.2.1. The Stockpile Stewardship Programstructure is on track.

Substantial progress has been made in thedevelopment of the organizational structure andmanagement of the Stockpile StewardshipProgram (SSP). The restructuring of the pro-gram into Directed Stockpile Work (DSW),Campaigns, and Infrastructure–Readiness inTechnical Base and Facilities (RTBF)–is apositive step in the right direction. Programmanagement is on the right track. Continuingwork is needed to address and balance theevolving challenges of maintaining a safe, se-cure, and reliable stockpile, and supporting thescientific, engineering and manufacturing in-stitutions needed to carry out this mission.

7.2.2. Science-based SSP is the right path.

In 1993, President Clinton directed theDOE to develop the SSP to maintain thenation’s nuclear arsenal without testing. Sci-ence-based SSP responds to a supreme na-tional interest, and the program is on track.Substantial progress has been made in the SSPduring the past five years in developing thescientific and technical capabilities to meetprogram goals. Significant accomplishmentsin the directed stockpile work and the simula-tion and experimental science campaigns areproviding important data and analyses that areneeded for the certification of weapon com-ponents. Science-based stockpile stewardshipmoves the nuclear weapons complex from aparadigm based on new weapons design anddevelopment to one focused on life extensionthrough modernization. This approach hasrequired a change in attitude, programmaticdirection, and approach across the weaponscomplex.

Up until 1992, nuclear testing was prima-rily a tool for developing and verifying newweapon design and performance. The ulti-mate challenge for the program today and intothe future is to create and sustain the organi-zation, knowledge base, and tools that will pro-vide a robust scientific foundation forunderstanding weapon performance; this is asignificant change from the historic approach.To date, the SSP is on track to meet this chal-lenge, but more work is required to strengthenthe technical foundations, the physical andhuman infrastructure, and the SSP programplanning process. The true test of the sci-ence-based approach to stockpile stewardshipwill be its ability to recognize and meet a di-verse set of technical challenges well into thefuture.

7.2.2.1. Specific Program Findings

• Several technical areas such as primaryand secondary certification are exceed-ingly challenging science and engineer-ing problems requiring extensiveexperimental and computational efforts.The campaign plans for these effortsare a good comprehensive start. Con-tinuing work is needed to define the cer-tification process and to develop metricsfor success.

• The large-scale experimental and com-putational facilities such as DARHT andASCI, respectively, are already provid-ing important data and analysis capa-bilities that are increasing ourunderstanding of aging and performanceof the stockpile. In particular, the modi-fications leading to the B61-11, the lifeextension of the W87 warhead, and cer-tification of the Sandia-designed neutrongenerator were made possible becauseof scientific advances achieved withthese new capabilities.

• The Directed Stockpile Work has suc-cessfully produced significant quantitiesof weapon alterations, modifications,and limited life component exchangeseach year, most notable of these was

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the fielding of the B61-11 and Alt 342for the W87.

• Production readiness, especially at Y-12, needs more support because manyof these facilities have not been main-tained and need to be restored in a timelymanner to meet refrubishment produc-tion schedules.

• Programs to maintain test readiness areon track and supporting the national re-quirements; however, more long-rangeplanning is needed to ensure that theNevada Test Site will have the infra-structure and intellectual base to main-tain readiness for twenty years or more.Work is currently underway in theNuclear Weapons Council to evaluateoptions for enhancing test readinessthrough consideration of specific test-ing scenarios.

7.2.3. SSP baseline will continuouslyevolve.

The overall development of the science-based stockpile stewardship integratedbaseline continues to be an evolving processthat was started at the inception of the SSP.The work of the last four years should be con-sidered as part of the ongoing effort to “de-velop the SSP baseline.” The program baselinemust: 1) define a realistic assessment of thescope and schedule for the Directed Stock-pile Work; 2) identify scopes, schedules andend-states for each of the Campaigns; 3) buildcontingency and flexibility into both the Di-rected Stockpile Work and the science, engi-neering, and readiness campaigns; and 4)ensure that the facilities (existing and newcapital construction) are scoped and sched-uled to meet program requirements. Thisbaseline will be used as an important manage-ment tool for setting priorities for future workwithin the Office of Defense Programs.


• The SSP needs to refine a resource-bounded systems analysis approach toestablish a solid program baseline; i.e.,

the goals and milestones of the science,engineering, and readiness Campaigns,and the certification and SLEP sched-ules they support, must be commensu-rate with the allotted resources.

• Transformation of aging data into esti-mates of weapon component lifetimesis needed to establish a programbaseline for refurbishment. More willbe needed in the SSP to connect theresults of the research Campaigns withthe development of revised estimates forthe component lifetimes; these lifetimeestimates need to be presented to andcoordinated by the Nuclear WeaponsCouncil.

• Arms control agreements have a directbearing on the workload and schedulesof the SSP. At present, the stockpilemust be maintained to support a STARTI stockpile level. Although the total num-ber of delivery systems would be re-duced if START II were to beimplemented, the Directed StockpileWork for the SSP under START I andSTART II are nearly the same since thetotal of the active and inactive stock-piles remain essentially constant underboth treaties.

• Potential elements under considerationfor a proposed START III treaty couldhave a significant impact on theworkplans for the SSP, especially at thePantex plant. The potential for a moni-tored warhead dismantlement regimeand prescribed dismantlement numbersand timetables will need to be factoredinto the refurbishment schedules andcosts.

7.2.4. The process for generating programrequirements needs attention.

The current DoD/DOE process for gen-erating program requirements has problemson both ends. At present, DOE, the laborato-ries and plants absorb requirements presentedby several elements within the DoD and de-velop workplans and budgets. The resulting

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refurbishment plans and SLEP schedules arepresented to the Nuclear Weapons Council.More work is needed within the Office ofDefense Programs to address both the tech-nical and process issues involved in develop-ing requirements. Program drivers(requirements) must be differentiated from“wish-lists” of activities that should or couldbe done if resources and schedules permit. Alack of prioritization of program drivers at DoDis causing the DOE to accept an expandingset of additional “requirements.” In addition,DOE’s lack of a formal process for assessingmilitary and civilian requirements, developingimplementation plans–with correspondingscopes, schedules and budgets–and prioritiz-ing the workplan has caused significant stressin the SSP.

It was agreed that the DOE should workmore closely with the DoD to generate a morecomprehensive and coordinated process forgenerating, assessing, and implementing re-quirements. There was strong support amongthe Senior Advisors for having both Depart-ments work through the Nuclear WeaponsCouncil–and its Standing & Safety Commit-tee and Requirements Working Group–to de-velop a more defined workplan for prioritizingprogram drivers and developing requirementsfor DoD and DOE. Likewise, a more formalprocess is needed within the SSP to evaluateresource impacts of proposed requirementsfrom the NWC and to establish the programmilestones and goals. This will require a muchmore robust prioritization process and moresenior-level DOE management support. TheSSP program planning and prioritization mustclearly identify scope, schedule, and resourcesfor meeting requirements and, when neces-sary, indicate regrets (schedule relief) and/oradditional resources needed to stay on target.


• A more structured process is needed atDOE to assess the military require-ments. The SSP must be optimized tobalance the drivers for increased mar-gins, minimal changes to the weapon,and the need for enhanced surety fea-

tures. Simply remanufacturing 30-year-old parts may not match the militaryneeds for performance with the publicexpectation for enhanced safety. Inaddition, reproducing vintage technolo-gies is no longer practical at the engi-neering and manufacturing facilities.

• When evaluating surveillance and re-furbishment requirements, the randomsampling approach should be supple-mented so as to focus on aging as a keyphenomenon.

• The “lessons learned” from the W76dual revalidation should be reviewed andused by DoD and DOE, through theNuclear Weapons Council, to developworkplans for future dual revalidationsor baselines.

• In weapon refurbishments (such as thatfor the W80), military logistical options(such as performing refurbishment bytail number) should be considered aspart of overall system optimization. Thismay relieve stress and resource require-ments for the SSP.

• The W62 is not part of the present SLEPschedule, but arms control issues mayforce DOE to keep it in the stockpile.An assessment of options, costs, andschedules for maintaining or dismantlingthis warhead is needed.

• More work is needed by DOE, in coor-dination with DoD, to assess the require-ments and implementation plans for theW76 and W80 LEPs.

• The DoD and DOE should work throughthe Nuclear Weapons Council to evalu-ate potential programmatic impacts fromfuture arms control negotiations.

7.2.5. Despite the many accomplishments,the program is under stress.

In order to meet program goals and mili-tary requirements, the SSP must have an ex-tensive and diverse set of concurrent activitiesin Directed Stockpile Work, science and engi-

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neering Campaigns, readiness Campaigns, andinfrastructure planning and management. Theoverlap in activities needed to meet the W80and W76 LEP schedule, combined with addi-tional requirements assumed by the program,have seriously depleted program contingencyand flexibility. In addition, the original pro-gram plans developed in 1996 did not considerthe production capacity requirements that willbe necessary to meet the stockpile refurbish-ment mission. Changes and upgrades to themanufacturing facilities are needed in orderfor DOE to meet the military’s near-term andlong-term production requirements.

Additional pressures such as increasedsecurity requirements, newly discovered stock-pile issues, and resource limitations have col-lectively forced the program, overall, to be“wound too tight” with too little program flex-ibility or contingencies. This is evident fromthe fact that the Campaign and Directed Stock-pile Work is so tightly intertwined that adjust-ments to specific program milestones orbudgets may result in significant regrets forthe SSP as a whole. Flexibility and contin-gency is needed in both the science and engi-neering programs and the production facilitiesto address these issues. Indicators of stressinclude lowered morale in parts of the workforce and increased difficulty in recruitmentof top scientists and engineers.


• The current requirements generationprocess has resulted in the program ab-sorbing too many drivers as “require-ments.” More assessment, prioritizationand coordination is needed to developviable workplans across the complex.

• A significant source of program stresshas resulted from the yet-to-be-deter-mined consequences of new securityrequirements, including: the implemen-tation of new cyber-security regulations;restrictions/moratoria on foreign visitorsand assignments to the laboratories; theintroduction of polygraph testing; anduncertain impacts of new export con-trol procedures on the scientific com-

munity (e.g., sensitive unclassified tech-nical information). These issues areplacing a significant burden on resourcesthroughout the program and lesseningthe scientific attractiveness of the insti-tutions, thus making recruitment and re-tention more difficult.

• More contingency is needed in the re-sources and program planning of the sci-ence and engineering campaigns to allowthe program to accommodate future un-anticipated requirements and to continueto allow creative scientific enquiry.

• More contingency is needed in the re-sources at the production facilities to en-sure continuity in the workforce andfunctionality and safety of the facilities.

• Maintaining scientific quality through thelaboratory peer review process shouldbe a key objective of the program. Thereis a risk that the program is becomingso integrated that the strength of the in-ter-laboratory peer review process be-tween LANL and LLNL could beweakened.

• Closer cooperation is needed betweenthe Defense Programs laboratories andthe plants on engineering and manufac-turing projects. This may require chang-ing contracting processes to facilitatemore direct exchanges and cost-shar-ing.

• Reductions in resources for programs,such as radiochemistry and nuclearmanufacturing engineering, could leavethe complex without a critical intellec-tual base to meet long-term programgoals.

• The number and complexity of the newexperimental and computational facili-ties under construction is a significantchallenge for the SSP program planningprocess. Issues surrounding the con-struction of NIF have indicated the needfor more rigorous program planning andproject management oversight for thesefacilities.

7-7

7.2.6. More work is needed to prioritize thedirected stockpile workload.

The Office of Defense Programs shoulduse the new DSW management plan to imple-ment a more rigorous process for prioritizingthe work done across the complex. This isparticularly important for the W76 and W80LEP refurbishments. The workplan for theSLEP schedule needs to prioritize the militaryand civilian program drivers into “musts,”“shoulds,” and “coulds.” The workplan mustreflect the cost and schedule for each of theprogram elements and a well-defined set ofoptions for each of the major program activi-ties. This is essential for ensuring that the SLEPschedules proposed to the DoD are feasibleand realistic. Better coordination is neededacross the nuclear weapons complex (DOE,DoD, the laboratories and plants) to assessthe military drivers and develop overall imple-mentation plans for the SSP.


• A set of options and priorities needs tobe defined for the implementation of theW76 and the W80 LEP schedules. Thisshould result in a list of programmatictrigger points requiring senior-level de-cision making.

• Clarification is needed about the mili-tary priorities for setting the workplanfor the W76 and W80 LEP schedule.

• More support is needed for W88 pitproduction capability at LANL in orderto meet requirement for first pit produc-tion in 2001 and certification in 2004.

• The balance of work dedicated to hos-tile environments should be reexamined.

7.2.7. ‘Metrics of Success’ need to be de-fined for the DSW program and each Cam-paign.

Well-defined sets of metrics are neededto set the standards for certifying weapon com-ponents and estimating lifetimes, in the ab-sence of nuclear testing. These standards

must ensure that our current high-level of con-fidence in the stockpile is maintained, in ac-cordance with the necessary military standardsand civilian expectations. This will requirechanging and building upon the traditional ap-proach that relied extensively on the personalexperience of the designers. This also requiresprogram responsibility and accountability toensure that the science programs are bothsupporting scientific inquiry and focusing onthe defined path forward.

Each of the Campaigns have stated “end-states” and the Campaigns have provided astructure within which metrics can be set.Programmatic discipline will be needed to en-sure that the end-states are met according toa well-defined set of metrics. The cautionarymessage, “Better is always the enemy of goodenough,” must be a guide. In addition, obtain-ing more knowledge about the health of spe-cific weapon systems and components shouldnot be confused with loss of confidence in theirreliability and safety. Problems that are de-tected and fixed are measures of programsuccess not program or system failure. It isthe nature and responsibility of the SSP to askquestions about weapons that were neverasked before.


• More analysis is needed to define themeasurements and metrics (precisionand accuracy) required to estimateweapon component lifetimes and per-formance/surety characteristics.

• A well-defined process is needed todevelop the proper balance between in-creasing margins, upgrading surety fea-tures, and minimizing changes to thedesign, during refurbishments.

• Certifying the stockpile without under-ground testing into the future will requirethat the design and integration laborato-ries, and the production plants definespecific metrics for safety, surety andreliability.

7-8

7.2.8. Additional external review and over-sight is needed.

A standing external advisory committee(e.g., Defense Programs Advisory Commit-tee) could provide ongoing insight, assess-ments, and advice on the program structureand effectiveness. Large-scale projects (e.g.,AHF, MESA, NIF, etc.) also need strongerexternal review earlier in the program plan-ning process and more extensive vetting withsenior DOE management.


• The program would benefit from morecontinuity in the external review process.Senior advisory committees, establishedunder the Federal Advisory CommitteeAct, have been used extensively by theDOE. In addition to providing the DOEwith program advice, they also are veryeffective in communicating with orga-nizations outside the Department. TheOffice of Defense Programs, and theDepartment as a whole, should benefitfrom establishing a senior advisory com-mittee that will focus specifically on theStockpile Stewardship Program.

• There was strong support for the pro-posed JASON 2000 Summer Study toevaluate the focus, pace, and appropri-ateness of the current Campaigns.

• An extensive collection of internal andexternal reviews have already been doneon the SSP. The lack of adequate data-base management within the programmakes accessing and utilizing these find-ings very cumbersome. An accessibleelectronic database is needed to improvethe program’s ability to respond to therecommendations made by the manyand varied program review teams.

7.2.9. Increases in programmatic and se-curity requirements have impacted the sta-bility and morale of the work force.

Plants: The plants indicated that mostof their current stresses resulted from contin-

ued budget instability and uncertainty. Em-ployment reductions are planned at most sitesin FY00 and FY01. This will adversely im-pact the plants’ ability to meet both the FY00and FY01 proposed workload. A lack of con-tingency in resources impacts the plants’ abil-ity to recruit and retain the necessary skill mix.Retention of mid-level engineers and scien-tists with 2 to 5 years experience is particu-larly difficult. In addition, retaining andrecruiting managers with 5 to 15 years expe-rience is getting significantly more difficult.Additional resources are needed to provideadequate lead time to recruit and train theneeded work force skill mix to meet capacity(not just capability) requirements. The plantshave developed programs that provide careerpath incentives and merit-based rewards inresponse to the Chiles Commission recommen-dations. Continued implementation of theseprograms will require additional resources.

7.2.9.1. Specific Program Findings forProduction Plants

Workforce issues reported by the plantsinclude:

• Safety concerns resulted in shutdownof enriched uranium operations at theY-12 plant in 1994. Since that time, onlypart of this operation has been restarted.The Department must rapidly return tofull capability to resolve security con-cerns and production needs.

• Lack of approved safety authorizationbasis for operations at Pantex preventsthe contractor from working on four ofthe ten weapons in the enduring stock-pile. Establishing a basis for surveillanceand production of these four systemsshould be a high priority during FY 2000.

• Employment at the Kansas City Planthas dropped from 3790 in FY 1993 to2556 in FY 1999. Additional reductionswould put at risk the engineering andproduction support for surety upgradesto the enduring stockpile.

7-9

• A strong recommendation was madethat DOE needs to permit the contrac-tors at the plants to have the freedom topursue a wide range of personnel incen-tive programs to build and maintain thecritical workforce. This is consistentwith a Chiles Commission recommen-dation that “DOE establish and imple-ment plans […] for replenishing essentialtechnical workforce needs in criticalskill,” across the nuclear weapons com-plex.

Laboratories: The laboratories are suf-fering morale problems due to impacts of newsecurity requirements, budget uncertainty, andreduction (or elimination) of resources to sup-port innovative scientific inquiry. In particular,there have been significant changes in the lastfive to eight years in the ability of the labora-tories to conduct long-term exploratory re-search. It should be noted that many of thekey elements of the present stewardship pro-gram including ASCI, high-powered lasers,proton radiography, and materials modeling,owe their existence to exploratory researchthat was conducted five to ten years earlier.

There is also an urgent need to reestablishthe compact (and trust) between laboratoriesand DOE to address these issues. It is abso-lutely crucial that the scientific excellence atthe laboratories be maintained in order for theSSP to succeed both now and into the future.Recruiting and retention of scientists and en-gineers at the laboratories is being impactedby the perception that the laboratories are of-fering fewer long-term creative and challeng-ing career paths.

More balance is needed at the laborato-ries between the near-term Directed Stock-pile Work programs and scientific researchprograms that contribute to long-term institu-tion building. A stronger program planning pro-cess is needed to ensure that the emphasisplaced on producing deliverables (DirectedStockpile Work) is commensurate with the SSPneed to maintain scientific excellence, an im-perative for sustaining a creative intellectualenvironment. However, it was also noted that

more effort is needed to focus and prioritizethese activities at the laboratories so that theprograms are sustained within the mandatedresources. More insight and managementadvocacy is needed at DOE/DP into labora-tory program planning and budgeting to makethe long-term planning process more effec-tive.

7.2.9.2. Specific Program Findings forLaboratories

Work force issues reported by the labora-tories include:

• Reduction in LDRD (6% down to 4%)in FY00 will impact the breadth andscope of the fundamental/exploratoryscience programs. This could under-mine the scientific appeal of the labora-tories in the short term andscience-based stockpile stewardship inthe longer term.

• At LANL, two top candidates for a Di-vision Director post withdrew from con-sideration citing a decline in the scientificenvironment; several other senior- andjunior-level staff members have left thelaboratory in direct response to the re-cent security changes at the laboratory.Several employees have expressed se-rious concerns about no longer beingtrusted at the laboratory and many haveopted for transfers to unclassified re-search groups.

• LLNL reported significantly more prob-lems recently in recruiting and retainingtop-notch employees due to: 1) securityconstraints (polygraphs, cyber-security,restrictions on foreign nationals, andsensitive unclassified technical informa-tion (SUTI) designations); 2) additionalCongressional constraints (travel restric-tions, LDRD reductions); and 3) institu-tional issues (credibility of LLNLmanagement, viability of future of labo-ratory). The reductions in LDRD willresult in a 20% reduction in postdoctoralappointments.

7-10

• Sandia reported that its image as Em-ployer of Choice has been affected ad-versely by recent downsizing; continuedfunding uncertainties; polygraph testing;and security concerns. The 5-yearDOE complex salary freeze has resultedin loss in market position. Time to pro-cess clearances discourages new hiresand delays productivity. Recent budgetreductions in DP-funded student pro-grams will impact negatively Sandia’sstudent interns program and reduce itsinteractions with academic institutions.

7.2.10. SLEP production needs for the nextdecade require stable reinvestment in, andplanning for, work force and plant modern-ization.

More long-range planning is needed toensure that the plants maintain the physicalstructures and proper skill mix to produce atthe capacity anticipated by the SLEP sched-ule. In general, the basic capability exists atthe plants, but meeting short-term capacitydemands will require more stable funding.Additional resources are needed now for re-capitalization and modernization investmentsto provide plants and laboratory productionfacilities with tools for capacity production inthe near future. More flexibility in funding atthe plants is required to respond to emergingtechnical issues/problems in the DSW andcampaigns.


• The costs, schedules, impacts, and pro-grammatic options for a proposed moni-tored warhead dismantlement at Pantex,under a possible START III Treaty, mustbe evaluated, prioritized and incorpo-rated into the SSP planning process.

• The plants and laboratories have notmade significant investments in produc-tion equipment and facilities during thepast decade. This is impacting the abil-ity of the complex to keep pace withindustry standards for engineering andproduction.

• Traditionally, recapitalization was ac-complished through development andproduction of new weapon systems. Inparticular, Sandia’s reinvestment rate–once among the highest in the complex–has dropped dramatically since the endof the design work; it is now ten timesless than comparable industrial firmssuch as Intel and Hewlett-Packard.

• Some key production areas at Y-12 areoperating in the absence of physicalsafety controls, and thus are relyingheavily on administrative controls andpersonal protective equipment. A con-tinued lack of improvements to the ex-isting facilities at Y-12 could jeopardizethe program’s ability to meet campaignend-states.

7.2.11. More long-term planning is re-quired for new capital constructionprojects.

There was a strong sense that more workis needed in developing the long-term plan forfuture pit production capabilities and capacity.This plan needs to be presented and workedin the NWC within the next year. There wasalso consensus that large-scale SSP projects(e.g. MESA, Atlas, AHF) need better and moretimely vetting with DOE senior-level manage-ment, DoD, and external review bodies.


• An in-depth analysis of short-term pitproduction options may be needed. Inparticular, the plans, budgets and sched-ules for manufacturing 20 pits per yearat LANL may need additional review.The production activities at LANL mustbe balanced to ensure that the scientificresearch done at TA-55 is not adverselyimpacted.

• Long-term conceptual planning isneeded to evaluate options for buildinga large-scale pit production facility. Thisrecommendation was a key element of

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the Panel to Assess the Reliability,Safety, and Security of the United StatesNuclear Stockpile (Foster Panel, No-vember 15, 1999).

• Stronger project management oversightand review in Defense Programs willgreatly help multi-year program plan-ning. A mechanism similar to that em-ployed in the Office of Science is thesuggested pathway.

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A-1

Appendix AListing of All SSP Program Reviews

JASON Reviews:

1. Science Based Stockpile Stewardship(JSR 94-345)

2. Letter report: Vic Reis Stewardship As-sumptions (JSR 94-346)

3. Accelerator Production of Tritium: 1995Review (JSR 95-310) (follow-on to JSR92-310)

4. Nuclear Testing (U) (JSR 95-320) (SRD)

5. Simulation for Stewardship (JSR 96-315)

6. Preliminary Review of Stockpile Steward-ship and Management (JSR 96-320)

7. Subcritical Experiments (JSR 97-300)

8. Signatures of Aging (JSR 97-320)

9. Signatures of Aging Revisited (JSR 98-320)

10. System-Level Flight Tests (JSR 98-310)

11. Remanufacture (JSR 99-300)

12. Primary Performance Margins (U) (JSR99-305) (SRD)

13. Inertial Confinement Fusion Review(Hammer, 1996)

14. Inertial Confinement Fusion Review(Drell, 1994)

15. Enhanced Fidelity Flight Testing, 1998

Congressional Oversight:

1. Commission on Maintaining U.S. NuclearWeapons Expertise, March 1, 1999 (ChilesCommission)

2. Commission for Assessment of the Reli-ability, Safety and Security of the U.S.Deterrent

3. Department of Energy and Department ofDefense Report on Long Range Plan onPit Production to the Committees on ArmedServices of the Senate and House of Rep-resentatives (U), March 5, 1999

GAO Reports:

1. ASCI, June 1999, DOE Needs to ImproveOversight of the $5 Billion Strategic Com-puting Initiative (GAO/RCED-99-195)

2. ASCI, Information Technology: Departmentof Energy Does Not Effectively ManageIt’s Supercomputers (GAO/RCED-98-208)

3. ASCI program implementation of milestonesand budget projections

4. Nuclear Weapons – Key Nuclear Weap-ons Component Issues are Unresolved,November 1998 (classified supplement is-sued in July 1999)

5. DOE: Problems and Progress in ManagingPlutonium, April 17, 1998

6. Nuclear Weapons: Design Reviews ofDOE’s Tritium Extraction Facility, March31, 1998

7. Combating Terrorism: Spending on Govern-ment-Wide Programs Requires BetterManagement and Coordination, December1, 1997

8. Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities of DOE’sLLC Program to meet Operational Needs,March 5, 1997

9. Nuclear Weapons: Improvements Neededto DOE’s Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Sur-veillance Program, July 31, 1996

10. LANL Plutonium Processing Facility

A-2

11. Stockpile Stewardship Management – (on-going) Examining how SSP budget,planning and organizational structure isintegrated to support implementation ofprogram activities and to avoid duplica-tion.

12. Tritium alternatives, selection criteria, costestimates and independent review

Congressional Research Service Studiesand Reports:

1. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive TestBan, updated November 10,1998

2. Nuclear Weapons Production CapabilityIssues, June 1998

3. Nuclear Weapons, Capabilities of DOE’sLimited Life Component Program to MeetOperational Needs, March 1997

4. Nuclear Weapons, Improvements Neededto DOE’s Nuclear Stockpile SurveillanceProgram, July 31, 1996

5. Testimony, Status of DOE’s NuclearStockpile Surveillance Program,March 13, 1996

6. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship:A Comparison of Alternatives, December14,1995

7. Nuclear Deterrence of Non-NuclearThreats: Implications for U.S. Policy, No-vember 29, 1995

8. Nuclear Dilemmas: NonproliferationTreaty, Comprehensive Test Ban, andStockpile Stewardship, December 15,1994

DOE-Sponsored:

1. ATLAS Pulsed Power Facility Review ofPlanned Technical Activities by DP-13,September 1999

2. Secretary of Energy Advisory Board TaskForce Reviewed fusion energy (includinginertial fusion energy) and the role of De-fense Programs (Report issued September1999)

3. “A View of DoD’s Requirements forDOE’s Programs in 2010 - A Strategy forSustained Capability and Flexible Re-sponse; Meeting National SecurityRequirements” (a.k.a. the “2010 Report”)August 1997

4. “The Laboratories’ Contribution to theSSP” (a.k.a. the “Robin Report” January1998

5. ASCI Burn Code Review #1, June 1998

6. ASCI Alliance External Review, October-November 1998

7. ASCI Blue Ribbon Panel Review, Decem-ber 1998-January 1999

8. ASCI DisCom Review, January 1999

9. ASCI Burn Code Review #2, scheduledJune 1999

10. Subcritical Experiment Evaluation Com-mittee (SEEC) has reviewed all subcriticalexperiments to insure that their design willkeep them subcritical when executed.The SEEC also examined other technicalaspects of the subcritical experiment pro-gram and provided assessments to DOE,the laboratories and the Nevada Test Site,which were discussed and evaluated inJuly 1999.

Independent External Reviews (IER):

1. Renovate Existing Roadways at NevadaTest Site (Defense Programs Project No.99-D-108)

2. Model Validation and Systems Certifica-tion Test Center (MVSCTC) at SNL/ALO (Defense Programs Project No. 99-D-106)

3. Central Health Physics Calibration Facil-ity at LANL (Defense Programs ProjectNo. 99-D-105)

4. Protection of Real Property (Roof Recon-struction – Phase II at LLNL) (DefensePrograms Project No. 99-D-104)

A-3

5. Isotope Sciences Facilities at LLNL (De-fense Programs Project No. 99-D-103)

6. Rehabilitation of Maintenance Facility(RMF) at LLNL (DOE 99-D-102)

National Academy of Sciences:

1. Review of ICF, March 1997

DoD Sponsored:

1. USSTRATCOM Strategic AssessmentTeam (SAT) review of SAG studies

- high explosives

- gas transfer systems

- development of metrics for thenuclear stockpile

- nuclear explosive safety studies

2. Joint Advisory Committee on NuclearWeapons Surety (JAC)

- manufacturing study by GeneralWelch

3. DoD Program Analysis & Evaluation is-sues analysis to the Nuclear WeaponsCouncil

- tritium

- pit production

- ASCI

- NIF

- underground nuclear testing within the2-3 years

4. Institute for National Security Studies,National Defense University: “US NuclearPolicy in the 21st Century,” August 1998

A-4


B-1

Appendix BRecommendations from theChiles Commission Report

The Commission on Maintaining UnitedStates Nuclear Weapons Expertise (ChilesCommission) was prescribed by the NationalDefense Authorization Act of FY 1997. TheCongress identified the need for the Commis-sion because of the substantial changes in theenvironment affecting nuclear weapons de-sign, production, and testing since the end ofthe Cold War. In view of these changes, theCommission was tasked with reviewing on-going efforts by the Department of Energy(DOE) to attract scientific, engineering, andtechnical personnel, recommending improve-ments and identifying actions where needed,and developing a plan for recruitment and re-tention within the DOE nuclear weapons com-plex.

The Chiles Commission Report offers 12specific recommendations for action under fourbroad categories: National Commitment; Pro-gram Management; Personnel Policies; andOversight. With respect to National Commit-ment, the Commissioners urged the Congressand the Administration to make a concertedand continuing effort to unequivocally andclearly convey the importance of the nuclearweapons mission to the nuclear weapons com-munity. In the area of Program Management,the Commission recommended measures to

improve communication among the laborato-ries as well as ways to strengthen coordina-tion within the DOE and between agencies.Regarding Personnel Policies, the Commissionissued specific recommendations for improv-ing the Department’s ability to recruit and re-tain the technical talent it will need, now andin the future, to replace the test-experiencednuclear scientists and engineers as they retirefrom the workforce. Finally, the report callsfor reinvigorated Congressional Oversight anda multi-year fiscal commitment to stable fund-ing for the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Following receipt of the Commission Re-port, DP formed a Steering Group of seniorprogram officials from Headquarters, fieldoffices, industrial plants and the weapons labo-ratories to develop a coordinated “Path For-ward” on each of the 12 Commissionrecommendations. The Steering Group de-veloped a coordinated action plan and briefedsenior department officials, Chiles Commis-sion members, the Nuclear Weapons Counciland the Defense Nuclear Facilities SafetyBoard (DNFSB). There is an overall consen-sus that DP’s Path Forward is sound and canachieve the objectives outlined in the Com-mission Report.

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Commission Recommendations

The twelve major Commission Recommendations are organized into four areas:

A. NATIONAL COMMITMENT

1. Reinforce the National Commit-ment and Fortify the Sense ofMission.

B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

2. Complete an Integrated, Long-Term Stockpile Life ExtensionProgram Plan.

3. Strengthen the DOE - Depart-ment of Defense (DoD) Relation-ship.

4. Take Immediate Steps to AchieveGreater Laboratory Coordination.

5. Expedite Improvements and Ef-ficient Use of the Nuclear Weap-ons Production Complex.

6. Establish Clear Lines of author-ity within DOE.

C. PERSONNEL POLICIES

7. Establish and Implement Plans ona Priority Basis for ReplenishingEssential Technical Workforceneeds in Critical skills.

8. Provide Contractors with greatlyexpanded latitude and flexibility inPersonnel Matters.

9. Expand training and career plan-ning programs, which are adaptedto the dramatically changedworkforce environment.

10. Expand the use of former nuclearweapons program employees.

D. OVERSIGHT

11. Create a permanent Defense Pro-grams Advisory Committee.

12. Enhance Congressional Over-sight.

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Appendix CBibliography

1. FY 1994 National Defense AuthorizationAct, Public Law 103-160.

2. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan(NWSP), FY 1998.

3. “Nuclear Posture Review,” Departmentof Defense, January 1995, http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr95/npr_.html.



6. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start.html.

7. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start.html.

8. “Report of the QuadrennialDefense Review,” May 1997,http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/.

9. “An Agreement between the AEC and theDoD for the Development, Production,and Standardization of Atomic Weapons,”March 21, 1953.

10. “A Memorandum of Understanding be-tween the Energy Research andDevelopment Administration and the De-partment of Defense on Nuclear WeaponsDevelopment Liaison Procedures,” Sep-tember 4, 1975.

11. “Memorandum of Understanding betweenthe Department of Defense and the De-partment of Energy on Objectives andResponsibilities for Joint Nuclear WeaponActivities,” January 17, 1983.

12. “Supplement to the 1953 Agreement forthe Development, Production, and Stan-dardization of Atomic Weapons betweenthe Department of Energy and the De-partment of Defense,” September 5, 1984.

13. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law83-703.


15. Title 10, United States Code, ArmedForces, December 1996.

16. “Nuclear Weapons Production and Plan-ning Directive (P&PD) 2000-0,” U.S.Department of Energy, October 1999.

17. “Joint DoD-DOE FY00 Requirements &Planning Document,” Nuclear WeaponCouncil, July 16, 1999.

18. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/ctbtpage/trty_pg.html.

19. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/trea-ties/abmpage.html.

20. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III, U.S.Department of State, in process.


22. “Report to Congress and the Secretaryof Energy, Commission on MaintainingUnited States Nuclear Weapons Exper-tise,” March 1, 1999.

23. “FY 1999 Report to Congress of the Panelto Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Se-curity of the United States NuclearStockpile,” November 8, 1999.

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24. “Final Report of the Select Committee onU.S. National Security and Military/Com-mercial Concerns with the People’sRepublic of China,” U.S. House of Rep-resentatives, January 3, 1999.

25. “Joint Review of DOE’s Stockpile Stew-ardship Program, ManufacturingInfrastructure Overview,” presented to theNuclear Weapons Council Standing andSafety Committee, October 25, 1999.

26. “Final Programmatic Environmental Im-pact Statement for Stockpile Stewardshipand Management,” DOE/EIS-0236, Sep-tember, 1996.

27. “DOE Defense Programs Complex Infor-mation Security Action Plan, Volume I,ISecM, Report of the Integrated Cyber-Security Management Task Force,”October 15, 1999, LA-CP-99-235.

28. “Project Management Plan for DOE De-fense Programs Integrated SecurityManagement Plan (ISecM),” November15, 1999 (draft).

D-1

Appendix DAcronyms

ACM Advanced Cruise Missile

ACRR Annular Core Research Reactor

ADAPT Advanced Design andProduction Technologies

AGEX Above Ground Experiment

AHF Advanced HydrodynamicsFacility

ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile

APT Accelerator Production ofTritium

ASCI Accelerated StrategicComputing Initiative

ASN Agency Secure Network

ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode

AWE Atomic Weapons Establishment

CDU Capacitive Discharge Unit

CLWR Commercial Light-WaterReactor

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DARHT Dual-Axis RadiographicHydrodynamic Test

DNFSB Defense Nuclear FacilitiesSafety Board

DoD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DSW Directed Stockpile Work

DTRA Defense Threat ReductionAgency

DVC Data and Visualization Corridor

EOS Equations of State

EUCOM European Command

GLCM Ground-Launched CruiseMissile

HE High Explosive

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

IBM International Business Machines

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICF Inertial Confinement Fusion

IHE Insensitive High Explosive

INF Intermediate-Range NuclearForces Treaty

IS Inactive Stockpile

LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory

LANSCE Los Alamos Neutron ScienceCenter

LEO Life Extension Option

LEP Life Extension Plan

LLCE Limited Life Component Exchange

LLNL Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory

LRPA Long-Range Planning Assessment

MC Military Characteristics

MESA Microsystems and EngineeringSciences Applications

MLNSC Manuel Lujan Neutron ScatteringCenter

NIF National Ignition Facility

NPR Nuclear Posture Review

NSDD National Security DecisionDirective

NTS Nevada Test Site

NWC Nuclear Weapons Council

NWCSSC Nuclear Weapons CouncilStanding & Safety Committee

NWRWG Nuclear Weapons RequirementsWorking Group

NWSP Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan

ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory

OSD Office of the Secretary ofDefense Programs

D-2

P&PD Production and PlanningDirective

PA&E Office of Program Analysis andEvaluation

PAL Permissive Action Link

PBX Plastic-Bonded Explosive

PCP Product Change Proposal

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PEIS Programmatic EnvironmentalImpact Statement

POG Project Officer Group

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RTBF Readiness in Technical Baseand Facilities

SFI Significant Finding Incident

SGT SafeGuard Transporter

SLBM Submarine-Launched BallisticMissile

SLEP Stockpile Life ExtensionProcess

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

SNM Special Nuclear Material

SRD Secret Restricted Data

SSP Stockpile Stewardship Program

SST Safe Secure Trailers

START Strategic Arms ReductionTreaty

STRATCOM Strategic Command

STS Stockpile-to-Target Sequence

SUTI Sensitive Unclassified TechnicalInformation

TLAM-N Tomahawk Land AttackMissile–Nuclear

TSD Transportation SafeguardsDivision

TSRD Top Secret Restricted Data

UGT Underground Test

UK United Kingdom

USAF United States Air Force

VIEWS Visualization and InteractiveEnvironment for WeaponsSimulation

E-1

Appendix ESite Descriptions

UNIQUE ASSETS – KEY TO DEFENSEPROGRAMS:

Chemistry and Metallurgy ResearchBuilding (CMR)

The CMR Building was completed in theearly 1950s to house research and experimen-tal facilities for analytical chemistry, plutoniumand uranium chemistry, and metallurgy, as wellas some engineering design and support func-tions. In 1960, an addition (Wing 9) wasconstructed to support programs requiring hot-cell facilities. The facility also houses someother materials-related functions, includingsome uranium and other actinide research, fab-rication, and metallography activities, anddestructive and nondestructive analysis.

TA-55 Plutonium Facility

LANL is responsible for the design of thenuclear explosive package in many of the U.S.weapons. In addition, since the end of the ColdWar, LANL now conducts the pit surveillanceprogram and limited pit fabrication using the

TA-55 plutonium R&D facility, due to termi-nation of the nuclear weapons missions at theRocky Flats Plant.

TA-55 provides chemical and metallurgi-cal processes for recovering, purifying, andconverting plutonium and other actinides aswell as providing a number of other capabili-ties in nuclear material handling, and appliedresearch in plutonium and actinide chemistry.(See Processes and Technology section.)

Pit fabrication includes all activities nec-essary to fabricate new pits, to modify theinternal features of existing pits (intrusivemodification), and to recertify or requalify pits.Nonintrusive modification pit reuse, which isan inherent capability of the Pit FabricationFacility, includes the processes and systemsnecessary to make modifications to the exter-nal features of a pit, if necessary, and torecertify the pit for reuse in a weapon. Exist-ing equipment has been retained as much aspossible, but some equipment has been andwill continue to be upgraded.

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Location Los Alamos, NM

Contractor University of California

Established 1942

Area 29.6k Acres

MISSION� Weapons Research & Development

� Stockpile Support

� Pit Manufacturing

� Reconfiguration / Rapid Reactivation

� Other Defense Programs

� Environmental Restoration/Waste Mgmt.

� Nonweapons Work

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Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility(WETF)

WETF is located in Buildings 205 and205A in the southeast section of TA-16 out-side the explosive area. Building 450 (NeutronTube Target Loading, NTTL) is in the finalstages of construction and upon startup willbe included as part of the WETF facility.WETF is in a secured area patrolled by armedguards. Building 205 was specifically designedand built to process tritium safely and to meetuser needs and specifications. Planning forWETF began in 1981 to replace an aging tri-tium-processing facility located at TA-33.Construction began in 1982 and was completedin 1984. WETF began operation in 1989. TheORR for Building 450 is expected to be com-pleted in late FY 2000.

Sigma Complex

The Sigma Building (Building 66) and threeother main buildings [Building 35 (Press Build-ing), Building 141 (Beryllium TechnologyFacility, formerly the Rolling Mill Building), andBuilding 159 (Thorium Storage Building)] makeup the Sigma Complex, which is enclosed bya security fence and to which access is con-trolled by a guard station. The complex, whichencompasses over 200,000 ft2

(60,960 m2),was constructed in increments during the 1950sand 1960s and has been used for a variety ofnuclear materials missions. Building 141 hasbeen refurbished and is expected to be fullyoperational in late FY 2000. Today, the facilityis primarily used for synthesizing materials andfor processing, characterizing, and fabricatingmetallic and ceramic items, including itemsmade of depleted uranium (DU). In the past,Sigma Complex processed all isotopes of ura-nium; therefore, much of the equipment isradioactively contaminated at very low levels.Nonradioactive hazardous materials used in-cluded a number of chemicals and metals suchas beryllium. This facility includes specializedlaboratories, a rolling mill, and a 5,000-ton press

TA-18

TA-18 is referred to as the Los AlamosCritical Experiments Facility (LACEF). It isalso known as Pajarito Laboratory or Pajarito

Site. The TA is a restricted area surroundedby a security fence with several additional lay-ers of security at each of the Kivas. LACEF,which has operated since 1946, is the last gen-eral-purpose nuclear experiments facility in theUS. It supports a variety of programs thatrange from national security programs, suchas the Emergency Response program, Strate-gic Defense Initiative research, and StrategicArms Reduction Treaty verification research,to development of instrumentation for nuclearwaste assay and high-explosives detection.(See Processes and Technology section.)

Los Alamos Neutron Science Center(LANSCE)

LANSCE comprises a high-power, 800-MeV proton linear accelerator (linac); a ProtonStorage Ring (PSR); neutron production tar-gets at the Lujan Center and the WeaponsNeutron Research (WNR) facility; a protonradiography facility; a high-power materialsirradiation area called the Los Alamos Spalla-tion Radiation Effects Facility (LASREF); anisotope production facility (IPF); and a vari-ety of research spectrometers.

With the ability to produce protons andneutrons using the world’s most powerful pro-ton linac, LANSCE is ideal for research inradiography, condensed-matter science andengineering, accelerator science, and nuclearscience. LANSCE uses these research capa-bilities to contribute to the Department ofEnergy (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship Programand to support a National User Program opento scientists from universities, industry, andfederal laboratories. Within LANSCE, DPassumes management, operation, and mainte-nance responsibility for all facilities, except forthe Manual Lujan, Jr. Neutron Scattering Cen-ter (MLNSC). The MLNSC facility isoperated as a National User Facility. Man-agement, operations, and maintenanceresponsibilities at MLNSC are shared by DPand DOE’s Office of Science based upon theirprogrammatic usage.

Balance of Plant:

The Laboratory occupies 43 square miles(111 km2) of land owned by the DOE, which

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is divided into 47 separate, currently activeTechnical Areas (TAs). TA-3 is the main tech-nical area, where almost half of the personnelof the Laboratory are located. TA-0, the town-site, contains leased facilities located on LosAlamos County land. Only one TA—TA-57,the Fenton Hill Site, which lies approximately28 miles (45 km) west of Los Alamos—is non-contiguous. The Laboratory currently consistsof approximately 2,043 structures. Of these,1,835 are buildings, which contain 7.3 millionsquare feet. The other structures consist ofmeteorological towers, water tanks, manholes,small storage sheds, electrical transformers,etc. As explained above, part of the resourcesof the Laboratory are the specialized facilitiesthat have been built and maintained at LosAlamos over the last 50 years. Most of thesefacilities have been designed and built to handlehazardous energy sources.

Facilities & Infrastructure:

Nonnuclear Facilities

The directed fabrication of nonnuclearcomponents associated with the LANL Stock-pile management program included themanufacturing of detonators, detonator simu-lators, pit mockups, beryllium parts,calorimeters, and tritium loading of neutron tubetargets. The missions for these componentswere transferred to LANL as part of the non-nuclear component of the Complex 21Nuclear Weapons Complex ReconfigurationProgram initiated in 1991, and formally imple-mented as part of the construction line itemproject 93-D-123, Complex-21 NonnuclearConsolidation (NNR). The overall NNRproject was initiated to downsize the non-nuclear manufacturing component of thenuclear weapons complex while maintainingneutron generator production capacities at theSTART II level, as predicated by the Bush-Yeltsin agreement announced June 17, 1992.

Nuclear Facilities

Fundamental to current and future nuclearprograms at LANL is the maintenance andaugmentation of the capabilities and facilitiesinfrastructure required to support the completerange of LANL’s existing nuclear responsi-

bilities, which include samples, and componentsfabrication for R&D, pit surveillance, materi-als science and technology development,materials stabilization, pit rebuild and fabrica-tion, neutron source recovery, and othermissions and activities.

LANL is currently planning and activelypursuing upgrades to several nuclear facilities,some of which are decades old. The plannedupgrades will allow the facilities to continue tosupport R&D capabilities needed for ongoingmissions and to continue providing the neces-sary plutonium technologies and capabilitiesessential to the management and refurbish-ment of the stockpile. These maintenance andupgrades are independent of the pit manufac-turing assignment, full implementation of whichwould call for some additional facility modifi-cations or enhancements.

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Build-ing (See “Unique Assets” Section)

This building is approximately 45 years oldand is beyond the expected life cycle. Up-grades will be required for this facility tooperate in a safe, secure, and compliant modefor the next decade. Subsequently plutoniumoperations will require a replacement facility.

TA-55 Plutonium Facility (See “Unique As-sets” Section)

TA-55 is now over 20 years old. Severalof the systems of the building need upgrading,and components approaching the end of theiruseful life need to be replaced. Planning iscontinuing on a Capability Maintenance andImprovement Project (CMIP) to refurbishsafety systems, to make the modifications re-quired to support limited-scale pitmanufacturing, and to maintain the ability tocontinue with present assignments, includingthe non-weapons activities such as the MOXfuel efforts. The near-term part of the CMIPwill focus on the safety infrastructure and thereplacement of safety items such as the air-supply ductwork, the uninterruptable powersupply, the backup electrical generator, and thecontinuous air monitors. In the short term, theLANL small-scale pit manufacturing efforts

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will also benefit from upgrades and improve-ments to the trolley system and to equipmentof facility provisions for operations such asradiography, foundry, metal preparation, ma-chining, assembly, waste management,analytical chemistry, and material control andaccountability.

Design work is in progress on the NuclearMaterials Security and Safeguards UpgradesProject, which will provide an updated and fullyintegrated security control system, associatedalarm systems, and other items for TA-55 aswell as other nuclear materials facilities atLANL.

The TA-55 Fire Loop project involves thereplacement of the Plutonium Facility’s exter-nal water piping that supplies the firesuppression systems inside the buildings. Theproject includes anchoring existing water tanksand installing seismic upgrades to abovegroundlines in the water pump houses.

Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility

Following upgrades scheduled for comple-tion in FY00, the facility will begin lendingsupport to TA-55 special recovery line, whichprocesses tritium-contaminated objects.

Processes and Technology:

The vast majority of all the process equip-ment and process technologies currently in usein the LANL nonnuclear production facilities(Beryllium Technology, High Power Detona-tor, Neutron Tube Target Loading, Pit Support,and Calorimetry facilities) were transferredto LANL under the NNR construction projectand Complex 21 Reconfiguration Program. Assuch, they are either new or have been up-graded to the state-of-the-art standards at thetime they were installed and made operational.

Additional neutron tube target loading ca-pacity and capability to support the START Iproduction requirements have been includedin the Rapid Reactivation Project and will re-flect state-of-the-art technologies and maintaincomplete compatibility with the process equip-ment and technologies installed as a part ofthe NNR project. This additional capacity and

capability is now being designed and fabri-cated, for installation at the existing WETFfacility, TA-16, with WR qualification to becompleted in May 2001.

In addition, processes and technologies atTA-55 provide chemical and metallurgical pro-cesses for recovering, purifying, andconverting plutonium and other actinides intomany compounds and forms. Additional ca-pabilities include the means to safely andsecurely ship, receive, handle, and store nuclearmaterials, as well as manage the wastes andresidues produced by TA-55 operations. A corecapability is basic and applied research in plu-tonium and actinide chemistry. Corecompetencies are maintained in the PlutoniumFacility for each type of plutonium processingactivity. Extensive plutonium recovery pro-cesses are maintained including the ability toconvert the recovered material to plutoniummetal. A separate portion of the facility is dedi-cated to fabricating ceramic-based reactorfuels and to processing 238Pu used in radio-isotope heat sources. In addition, analyticalcapabilities, materials control and accountabilitytechniques, and a substantial R&D base areavailable to support these core capabilities. Asophisticated nuclear materials measurementand accountability system is used at TA-55.The system includes nuclear materials ac-counting, nuclear materials management andmodeling, a measurement support operation,operation of a nondestructive assay labora-tory, nuclear materials packaging and transfer,and nuclear materials storage. All nuclearmaterials that are in process or are storedonsite are monitored to ensure that materialbalances are properly maintained and inven-toried on a real-time basis. Thenuclear-materials-packaging and transfer op-eration receives nuclear material into thefacility and transfers shipments out of the fa-cility. The nuclear materials storage operationprovides a safe storage location for the ac-tinide materials at the Plutonium Facility. ThePlutonium Facility has extensive capabilitiesfor treating, packaging, storing, and transport-ing the radioactive waste produced by TA-55operations. Liquid wastes are converted to

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solids or are piped to the RLWTF at TA-50.Some solid TRU wastes are immobilized incement, others are consolidated in drums orare packaged in waste boxes. Low-levelwastes are also packaged at this facility. Solidwastes of all types are stored at TA-55 untilthey are shipped to Laboratory waste storageor disposal locations, primarily at TA-54.

Processes and technologies at TA-18 pro-vide capabilities in the areas of design,construction, research, development, and ap-plication of critical experiments. In addition tocriticality work, technologies at TA-18 includeteaching and training related to criticality safetyand applications of radiation detection and in-strumentation. The TA-18 complex providesprocesses and technologies to DOE’s nuclearfacilities and nuclear materials programs withcriticality safety support for specific facilityprocess operations and for facility safetyanalysis. Critical assembly experiments areperformed to access the safety and perfor-mance of individual production operations anddevices and to validate the results of calcula-tional methods. Operations, support, andsupervisory personnel throughout DOE re-ceive criticality safety training at the facility.

Workfor ce:

Los Alamos is currently in the process ofhiring and training WR qualified productionstaff to meet projected Pit production workloadand is developing a trained workforce in thenon-nuclear component area.

Construction:

Project 00-D-105, Strategic ComputingComplex, LANL

Mission/Scope/Status:

The SCC will be a three-story structurewith approximately 267,000 gross square feetwhich will house the world’s largest and mostcapable computer (initially 30 TeraOPS, or 30trillion floating point operations per second) ina specially designed 43,500-square-foot com-puter room. This room will be supported byelectrical and mechanical rooms in excess of60,000 square feet.

The facility will provide a dynamic envi-ronment for approximately 300 nuclearweapons designers, computer scientists, codedevelopers, and university and industrial sci-entists and engineers to collaborate to extendthe cutting edge of simulation and modelingdevelopment in support of nuclear weaponsstockpile stewardship requirements. Thesescientists and engineers will work together,with support personnel, in simulation laborato-ries (approximately 200 in classified and 100in unclassified areas). The facility will be lo-cated in Technical Area 3 (TA-3) at the LosAlamos National Laboratory.

A Design/Build contract has been signedfor the construction of the main facility. Aseparate contact to construct the utilities wassigned with the JCINM.

Project 99-D-132 Nuclear Materials Safe-guards and Security Upgrades Project,LANL

The Nuclear Material Safeguard and Se-curity Project (NMSSUP) replaces the existingLos Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)security system, addresses Special NuclearMaterial (SNM) facility requirements, andaddresses malevolent vehicle threats at keynuclear facilities.

Project 99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation,Various Locations

This project will increase the complex’scapability to protect START I (START II withHedge) requirements. Minor facility modifi-cation and additional equipment is required, andtherefore, included under this line item, to in-crease capacity to provide START I (STARTII with Hedge) requirements.

Los Alamos National Laboratory: NeutronTube Target Loading

The LANL subproject consists of design-ing, constructing, and installing a third targetloader within the existing space of theNeutron Tube Target Loading Facility(NTTL)

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Project 95-D-102, CMR UpgradesProject, Los Alamos National Laboratory,Los Alamos, New Mexico

The primary purpose of this project is toupgrade facility systems and infrastructure thathave been in continuous operation for over 40years and are near the end of their useful life.Such upgrading will ensure the continuedsafety of the public and Laboratory employ-ees and increase the operational safety,reliability and security of essential activities.Increased safety, reliability, and security arecritical to the continued operation of theLaboratory’s Stockpile Management Pro-grams and other national defense programs.

Project 97-D-102, Dual-Axis Radio-graphic Hydrotest (DARHT) Facility,LANL


The DARHT Phase 1 machine has beencompleted and is operational. Phase 2 is un-derway.

Included in DARHT Phase 2 is the sec-ond flash x-ray electron beam accelerator,which will be necessary to complete the es-sential dual-axis configuration of the facility.Their sequential acquisition allowed DOE totake advantage of engineering and scientificadvances that have occurred since construc-tion of the first machine. In September 1997,the Department selected the Long-Pulse Lin-ear Induction Accelerator because it presentedthe greatest technological advancement for thelowest cost and least risk for the second ma-chine. It will be capable of providing fourhigh-quality beam pulses over four microsec-onds with each pulse comparable in quality tothe single pulse machine in the first axis. Thelonger Phase 2 machine made it necessary toincrease the size of the west accelerator hallby 1,300 square feet over the original plans.

Project 96-D-103, Atlas, LANL


The Atlas facility will provide enhancedLos Alamos National Laboratory pulsed powerexperimental capability to support high energyabove ground experiments, an essential capa-bility requirement for DOE’s stockpilestewardship program. The scope of work in-cludes:

• Design, procurement, assembly, and instal-lation of the Atlas 45-50 Megampere, 30-36Megajoule capacitor bank with associatedcontrols and power supplies in Buildings125 and 294 at TA-35.

• Modification of approximately 34,000square feet of Building 125 at TA-35 tosupport Special Facilities Equipment (SFE)installation and completion of operationalupgrades to the facility.

• Utilization of existing 1,430 MVA genera-tor in Building 301 at TA-35 for electricalpower.

• Installation of a power storage equipmentarea of 2,600 square feet in Building 294and upgrades to the control room area of1,600 square feet in Building 125 at TA-35; also provides power distribution anddiagnostic cabling to experiments in Build-ing 125.

• Completion of site work and utilities tosupport the use of up to 3 Government-Furnished diagnostic trailers and installationof new dielectric oil storage tank adjacentto Building 125 at TA-35.

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• High Explosives Applications Facility – themost modern facility for HE research inthe world.

• Flash X-ray Facility – this hydrodynamicfacility has been the most capable in theworld. It is now shut down during con-struction of the new Contained FiringFacility that will house the FXR machineand a reinforced firing chamber for con-tainment of debris.

• The Superblock, housing modern facilitiesfor special nuclear materials research andengineering testing. The Plutonium Facil-ity supports a number of DP-fundedresearch efforts.

• The Secure and Open Computing Facili-ties meet the needs of programmatic workand serve as a testbed for development ofhigh performance computer hardware andsoftware.

• The National Ignition Facility, currentlyunder construction, will offer unique ca-pability for investigating fusion burn andthe high temperature and pressure envi-ronments characteristic of nuclearweapons.

Construction:

Project 00-D-103, Terascale SimulationFacility, LLNL


The project provides for the design, engi-neering and construction of the TerascaleSimulation Facility (TSF - Building 453) whichwill be capable of housing the 100TeraOps-class computers required to meet theAccelerated Strategic Computing Initiative(ASCI). The building will encompass approxi-mately 270,000 square feet. The building willcontain a multi-story office tower with an ad-jacent computer center. The TerascaleSimulation Facility (TSF) proposed here isdesigned from inception to enable the verylarge-scale weapons simulations essential toensuring the safety and reliability of America’snuclear stockpile. The timeline for construc-tion is driven by requirements coming fromthe ASCI within the Stockpile StewardshipProgram (SSP). The TSF will manage thecomputers, the networks and the data and vi-sualization capabilities necessary to store andunderstand the data generated by the mostpowerful computing systems in the world.

The TSF project will construct a building(Building 453) of approximately 270,000square feet located adjacent to an existing (but

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Location Livermore, CA

Contractor University of California

Established 1952

Area 1 sq. mile

MISSION� Weapons Research & Development

� Stockpile Support

� Reconfiguration / Rapid Reactivation

� Other Defense Programs

� Environmental Restoration/Waste Mgmt.

� Non-weapons Work

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far less capable) computer facility, Building451, on the LLNL main site. The building willcontain a multi-story office tower with an ad-jacent computer center. The computer centerwill house computer machine rooms totalingapproximately 47,500 square feet. The com-puter machine rooms will be clear span(without impediments) and of an aspect ratiodesigned to minimize the maximum distancebetween computing nodes and switch racks.

The ceiling height will be sufficiently highto assure proper forced air circulation. A raisedaccess floor will be provided in order to allowadequate room for air circulation, cabling, elec-trical, plumbing, and fire/leak detectionequipment.

Project 96-D-105, Contained Firing Fa-cility Addition, LLNL


This project is a 33,370 square foot facil-ity consisting of four related structures withthe purpose of providing increasingly safe andenvironmentally compliant firing of explosivecharges up to a 60-kg limit of energetic highexplosives. This project will be positioned onthe existing firing table site adjacent to B801.The four structures are a structurally reinforcedFiring Chamber, a Support Facility, a Diagnos-tic Equipment Facility, and an Office Module.

The Firing Chamber is designed to con-tain the effects of cased high explosivematerials used in various laboratory experi-ments. The high explosive quantities vary inoperational weight up to approximately 60 kg,or an equivalent TNT design weight of ap-proximately 206.3 pounds. The chamber mustbe protected from shrapnel from explosivecasings. All major structural elements are toremain elastic to permit repetitive chamberusage with no structural damage.

The two-inch floor plate and four-inch anvilplate were fitted into place. Approximately halfof the wall plate has been installed to date.Work on the office module is progressing well.The walls and roof have been completed aswell as the mechanical and electrical rough-in

work. Windows are being specially fabricatedto meet the accidental detonation blast loadcriteria. They are expected to be delivered inDecember.

Project 96-D-111; National Ignition Facil-ity (NIF)


The Project provides for the design, pro-curement, construction, assembly, installation,and acceptance testing of the National Igni-tion Facility (NIF), an experimental inertialconfinement fusion facility intended to achievecontrolled thermonuclear fusion in the labora-tory by imploding a small capsule containing amixture of the hydrogen isotopes, deuteriumand tritium. The NIF is being constructed atthe Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory(LLNL), Livermore, California as determinedby the Record of Decision made on Decem-ber 19, 1996, as a part of the StockpileStewardship and Management ProgrammaticEnvironmental Impact Statement (SSM PEIS).

The mission of the National Inertial Con-finement Fusion (ICF) program is to executehigh energy density physics experiments forthe Stockpile Stewardship program, an impor-tant part of which is the demonstration ofcontrolled thermonuclear fusion in the labora-tory. Technical capabilities provided by theICF program also contribute to other DOEmissions including nuclear weapons effectstesting and the development of inertial fusionpower. As a key element of the StockpileStewardship Program, the NIF is designed toachieve propagating fusion burn and modest(1-10) energy gain within 2-3 years of full op-eration and to conduct high energy densityexperiments, both through fusion ignitions andthrough direct application of the high laserpower. The NIF is one of the most vital facili-ties in the stockpile stewardship program. TheNIF will provide the capability to conduct labo-ratory experiments to address the high energydensity and fusion aspects that are importantto both primaries and secondaries in stockpileweapons.

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Project 90-D-102-01, Site 300 FacilitiesRevitalization, LLNL


This project was initiated to provide newequipment and facilities and to upgrade exist-ing roads and utilities around the LLNL Site300. New facilities included the Central Con-trol Post, the Bunker Support Facility, and theHigh Optic Facility. New equipment includedSpecial Facilities and Standard diagnosticequipment.

A 380-foot section of the Main Site Roadwas converted to a four-lane road, with shoul-ders, to create a new entrance to Site 300. Inaddition, the intersection of the Main Site Roadand the road to the west of firing area wasreconstructed to add additional lanes.

The Site water distribution was upgradedby adding two new 8-inch lines and a new96,000-gallon storage tank.

Project is progressing as scheduled and isexpected to be completed in December 1999.

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In support of nuclear weapon R&D:

• Microelectronics Development Labora-tory.

• Compound Semiconductor ResearchLaboratory.

• Above-ground test facilities (ACRR, SPR,Gamma Radiation Facility, Z-facility, Sat-urn, Hermes).

• Processing & Environmental TechnologyLaboratory.

• Explosive Component Facility.

• ASCI “Red” Terascale Computer.

• Integrated Test Complex.

• Tonopah Test Range.

• Kauai Test Range.

SNL also has the mission to support thefuture development and WR manufacturingof neutron tubes, neutron generators andswitch tubes.

- Building 870 is primarily used for mostof the processing and assembly operationsassociated with SNL’s production missionof neutron generators.

- Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory(located at Pantex)

Balance of Plant:

Balance of plant includes additional sitesupport activities, not covered previously inBuilding 870, necessary for SNL to performits mission functions. These include suchthings as explosive-assembly operations, finalacceptance testing, packaging for shipment,DOE-bonded storage, etc.


Existing production facilities at the SandiaNational Laboratories (SNL) are those prima-rily involved with neutron generator production.These missions were transferred from thePinellas Plant, Largo, Florida as a part thenonnuclear component of the Complex 21Nuclear Weapons Complex ReconfigurationProgram initiated in 1991, and formally imple-mented as part of the construction line itemproject 93-D-123, Complex-21 NonnuclearConsolidation (NNR). The overall NNRproject was initiated to downsize the non-nuclear manufacturing component of thenuclear weapons complex while maintainingneutron generator production capacities at theSTART II level, as predicated by the Bush-Yeltsin agreement announced June 17, 1992.

The existing SNL facilities identified tosupport the neutron generator production mis-sion were appropriately sized and upgraded tomeet all current commercial construction,DOE ES&H, and security codes, orders, andregulations. The SNL NNR project was initi-

Sandia National Laboratories

Location Albuquerque, NM Livermore, CAContractor Lockheed-Martin CorporationEstablished 1948 1956Area 17.61K Acres 410 Acres

MISSION� Weapons Research & Development� Stockpile Support /Weapons Production� Other Defense Programs� Environmental Restoration/Waste Mgmt.� Nonweapons Work

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ated in July 1993and construction was com-pleted in January 1997. The facilities are nowin production operations.

Additional neutron generator productioncapability and capacity is currently being de-signed and constructed within the existing SNLproduction facility complex to support aSTART II stockpile level while protecting thecapability to support a START I level as di-rected by P&PD 97-0. This additionalcapability and capacity requirement is beingrealized through construction line item project99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation Project. Startedin March 1999, this project is scheduled to becompleted in FY 2001. Although not antici-pated in the foreseeable future (through FY2005), there may be some modifications tocurrent neutron generator designs. However,it is not anticipated that any major modifica-tions to existing manufacturing processes orfacilities will be required.


Processes and technologies were trans-ferred from the Pinellas Plant, beginning in1993. The processes and technologies wereupgraded or replaced as required, as a part ofthe NNR construction project. Detailed“Make/Buy” analyses and decisions weremade regarding process equipment and pro-cess technology issues associated with theexisting process equipment residing at thePinellas Plant prior to initiating transfer to SNLin the 1994-1995 time frame. As a result, thevast majority of all the process equipment andprocess technologies currently in use in theSNL neutron generator production facilities arenew or have been upgraded to the state-of-the-art standards at the time they wereinstalled.

Additional neutron generator processequipment being purchased to support theSTART I production requirements have beenincluded in the Rapid Reactivation Project andwill reflect state-of-the-art technologies andmaintain complete compatibility with the pro-cess equipment and technologies installed asa part of the NNR project.

Workfor ce:

SNL is currently in the process of hiringand training WR process qualified productionstaff to meet the projected neutron generatorproduction workload. However, SNL is ex-pressing concern that they are not being ableto hire qualified staff because of operatingbudget constraints. There is a hiring freezeassociated with Stockpile Maintenance, Dis-mantlement/Disposal, and Stockpile Supportfor FY00 due to inadequate resources, with aprediction that the freeze will continue into theforeseeable future. In addition, there are in-sufficient funds to adequately cross-train theexisting technical staff to help compensate forthe hiring freeze. It is important that adequateand timely funds be appropriated to SNL tosupport and maintain their aggressive hiringand training schedule, in support of productiondelivery schedules, stockpile maintenance, thedismantlement/disposal, and stockpile supportprograms.

Construction:

Project 01-D-102, Microsystems and En-gineering Science Applications (MESA)Facility, SNLA


The Microsystems and Engineering Sci-ence Applications (MESA) Facility is proposedto be a new, state-of-the-art capability atSandia National Laboratories to capitalize onthe advances in microsystems to developneeded weapon technologies by FY 2003. Itwill provide essential facilities and capabilitiesto integrate: 1) advanced component and sub-systems design and stewardship; 2)computational simulation and engineering; and3) next generation microsystems developmentand production to enable a safe, secure, reli-able, and affordable nuclear stockpile, now andin the future.

Microsystems devices are microelec-tronic-based chips that embody electronics,micromachines, optoelectronics, and sensors.As a result, these devices can sense, think,act, and communicate. As a result of their

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microscopic feature size, they are extremelyrugged, and because they are based on mi-croelectronics-related technology, they areextremely reliable and inexpensive to fabri-cate. Microsystems devices are expected torevolutionize many technology applicationsduring the next two decades, including improv-ing the surety of the Nation’s nuclear weaponstockpile.

The MESA project includes:

• Construction of a new heavy-lab (cleanroom) and associated tooling to provide anext-generation replacement of Sandia’sCompound Semiconductor ResearchLaboratory (CSRL).

• Re-tooling of the existing Microelectron-ics Development Laboratory (MDL).

• Construction of light laboratories and of-fices/workspaces for weapons designers,computational and engineering scientists,and microsystems technologists to achievethe effective and timely research, design,development, integration, and computa-tional qualification of microsystem-baseddevices, components, and subsystems.

• Under consideration as an FY 2001 newstart.

01-D-101, Distributed Information Sys-tems Laboratory (DISL), SNLL


The Distributed Information SystemsLaboratory (DISL) is a proposed new re-search facility at Sandia National Laboratoriesto develop and implement distributed informa-tion systems for Defense Programs (DP). Itconsolidates at one accessible location all ac-tivities focused on incorporating those systemsto support DP’s Stockpile Stewardship Pro-gram (SSP). Research at DISL willconcentrate on secure networking, high per-formance distributed and distance computing,and visualization and collaboration technolo-gies that do not exist today, yet need

development to help create design and manu-facturing productivity environments for thefuture nuclear weapons complex. The majorobjective of DISL is to bring together thesetechnologies to develop a distributed informa-tion systems architecture that will link thenuclear weapons complex of the future.

• Under consideration as an FY 2001new start.

00-D-107, Joint Computational Engineer-ing Laboratory, SNLA


The Joint Computational EngineeringLaboratory (JCEL) will be a new, state-of-the-art facility at Sandia National Laboratoriesfor research, development, and application ofleading-edge, high-end computational and com-munications technologies. JCEL will provideoffice space and laboratories for 175 peoplein a building with a total of approximately 55,200gross square feet. JCEL will be the center ofSandia’s computational modeling, analysis, anddesign community, and will be constructed inclose proximity to Sandia’s existing computerand communications building, presently occu-pied by part of this community.

Plan, design, and construct a new, three-story building to accommodate a total of about175 people, which will provide classified andunclassified space in close proximity. Theproject will provide computer equipment to:display three-dimensional simulations; supportengineers and scientists from other DOE labs,universities, and the private sector; and pro-vide video conferencing capability. Computerequipment includes: Interactive Multimediaequipment; Virtual Reality/Advanced Visual-ization equipment; high-end 3D graphicworkstations and printers; and design andanalysis workstations. In addition, the projectwill move existing furniture and install somenew furniture. Site landscaping, parking, pe-destrian access improvements, signage, andfencing improvements will be provided.

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Project 96-D-104, Process and Environ-mental Technology Laboratory, SNLA


The Processing and Environmental Tech-nology Laboratory (PETL) is proposed to bea three story office and light lab building witha partial basement containing approximately151,435 gross square feet (79,200 nsf). It willfocus R&D and production support activitiesto address ES&H issues in the nuclear weap-ons complex and at Sandia. The facility willcollocate activities dealing with materials andprocess research, materials support for thestockpile, analytical support for production ofnon-nuclear components, and maintenance anddismantlement of weapons.

The PETL will provide modern laboratoryfacilities and collocate functions that are cur-rently spread throughout Sandia TA I intemporary or substandard space.

The building is approximately 65% com-plete. All precast wall panels and most of thewindows have been installed.

The penthouse is completely enclosed.Design activities for the occupancy of thebuilding have started, including equipmentmove lists and furniture selection and layout.

01-D-126, Weapons Evaluation TestLaboratory (WETL), Sandia NationalLaboratories, Pantex

This facility will provide a laboratory en-vironment capable of supporting the EnhancedSurveillance Program (ESP) through flexibil-ity of floor space configuration, appropriateadjacencies for an optimal work environment,and the mechanical and data infrastructure tobe dependable and efficient in supporting ad-vanced test technologies.

99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation, VariousLocations


Sandia National Laboratories: NeutronGenerators Facilities (NGF)

The SNL subproject consists of rearrang-ing existing space within Building 870,adding additional space to adjacent build-ings, and the procurement of additionalproduction equipment

Project 90-D-102-03, Technology SupportCenter, SNLA


TSC consists of two buildings: 1) Office/Light Lab/Conference Area (O/LL); two-story,99,000 gross square feet (44,000 net squarefeet) concrete framed and concrete masonrystructure with all mechanical and electricalsystems and all site improvements. 2) GammaIrradiation Facility (GIF), a single-story, 12,500gross square feet (10,000 net square feet) steelframe stucco high bay lab with low-bay ancil-lary spaces. The high bay will house threetest cells and an 18-foot-deep pool. The lowbay includes offices, assembly labs and me-chanical and electrical rooms.

When completed, GIF will: 1) Reduce theArea V resident population, thereby reducingthe risk of potential radiation exposure to per-sonnel either during normal operations oraccidentally; 2) provide a permanent facilityto replace substandard facilities; 3) separatethe GIF from the ACRR; 4) modernize andenlarge the GIF; and 5) relocate the low in-tensity cobalt array (LICA) from AREA I tothe GIF.

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• Nuclear Explosion Test Beds.

- Emplacement boreholes (vertical)

- Tunnels (horizontal)

• Test resumption equipment and personnel.

• U1a – subcritical experiment test bed (ex-plosive experiments with Special NuclearMaterials).

• Physical size and remoteness from popu-lated areas. Arial extent of the NTS, whichreduces potential impacts on neighbors–equivalent to the state of Rhode Island–andinfrastructure to support experiments.

• Infrastructure to support nuclear-weaponexperiments.

• DAF – modern assembly/disassembly fa-cility.

• BEEF – Big Explosive Experiment Facil-ity ( high explosive testing ) to 70,000pounds high-explosive equivalent.

• JASPER – Two stage gas gun for actinideseries experiments (Special Nuclear Ma-terial) [under construction].

• Experiment diagnostics for remote fielduse.

• A-1 High Bay, A-1 Expansion Bay and A-17 Twin Towers at North Las VegasComplex.


More than 1,100 support buildings andlaboratories are spread across the Nevada TestSite. The Nevada Test Site is a unique ex-panse of federally controlled land and facilitiesin a remote region of southern Nevada. The1,350 square miles that make up the NevadaTest Site are surrounded by the Nellis Air ForceRange and unpopulated land controlled by theU.S. Bureau of Land Management. The ge-ology, hydrology, meteorology and radiologicalenvironments are well characterized. TheEnvironmental Impact Statement for theNevada Test Site and Off-Site Locations inthe State of Nevada and the associatedRecord of Decision allow for the executionof a variety of complex and unique projectsand experiments while maintaining protectionof the public and the environment.

The U1a Facility is an underground ex-perimental complex at the U.S. Departmentof Energy’s Nevada Test Site. The U1a com-plex supports routine test site activities in whichhigh explosives are detonated to test the readi-ness of equipment, communications,procedures, and personnel.

Location Las Vegas, NV

Contractor Bechtel NV

Established 1950

Area 1,350 sq. miles

MISSION� Test Resumption Readiness

� Subcritical Experiments

� Facilities Diagnostic Support

� DSW Certification Experimental Data

Nevada Test Site

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Test data will help maintain the reliabilityof the nuclear weapons stockpile by allowingscientists to gain more knowledge of the dy-namic properties of aging nuclear materials.Of particular interest is data on the behaviorof plutonium that can be used in computercalculations of nuclear weapon performanceand safety in the absence of actual under-ground nuclear testing.

The complex is located in Area 1 of theNevada Test Site, approximately 90 milesnorthwest of Las Vegas. The complex, con-sisting of horizontal tunnels about one-half milein length mined at the base of a vertical shaftapproximately 960 feet beneath the surface,was mined in the late 1960s for an undergroundnuclear test, which was later canceled. In 1988,the shaft was reopened, and a 1,460-foot hori-zontal tunnel was mined south at the 962-footlevel of the shaft. In 1990, the Ledoux nucleartest was conducted in the tunnel.

The vertical shaft is equipped with a me-chanical hoist for personnel and equipmentaccess while another vertical shaft about 1,000feet away provides cross ventilation, instru-mentation, utility access, and emergencyegress. On the surface, there are several tem-porary buildings and instrumentation trailers.The most distinguishable landmark at the com-plex is the white air building, which was usedfor experiment assembly during Ledoux.

The 100,000-square-foot nuclear explosiveDevice Assembly Facility (DAF) is located inArea 6 of the Department of Energy’s Ne-vada Test Site. Built at a cost of approximately$100 million, the DAF is expected to becomea centerpiece for innovative alternative usesof the test site.

Construction began on the DAF in themid-1980s when nuclear weapons testing wasstill in progress. DAF’s original purpose wasto consolidate all nuclear explosive assemblyfunctions, to provide safe structures for highexplosive and nuclear explosive assembly op-erations, and to provide a state-of-the-artsafeguards and security environment. Nowthat America is no longer conducting under-

ground nuclear weapons tests, the DAF hasthe potential for other uses, including disas-sembly of nuclear weapons retired from theU.S. stockpile.

The DAF has five assembly cells, fourhigh bays, three assembly bays, five stagingbays, a component testing laboratory, two ship-ping and receiving buildings, twodecontamination facilities, three small vaults,an administration building, alarm stations, anentry guard station, and a mechanical and elec-trical support building.

The main facility is covered with a mini-mum of five feet of earth. The major operatingfacilities, assembly cells and bays, the radiog-raphy bays, and the shipping and receivingbuilding have bridge cranes. The five assem-bly cells have rotating polar bridge cranes. TheDAF’s activities will comply with the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act, and all applicablefederal, state, and local regulations. Each as-sembly cell is designed and tested to undergoan explosion from a maximum high explosivedevice without injury to personnel outside ofthe cell. Gravel covers are designed to mini-mize release of nuclear material in the unlikelyevent of an accidental explosion.

The Big Explosives Experimental Facility(BEEF) is a hydrodynamic testing facility, lo-cated at the Department of Energy’s NevadaTest Site in Area 4, about 95 miles northwestof Las Vegas, Nevada.

The need for the BEEF site originatedwhen, due to community encroachment nearthe Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory(LLNL) facility in Livermore, California, DOEwas no longer allowed to perform large highexplosive experiments at the facilities Site 300,Shaped Charge Scaling Project. Thereforelooking at the Nevada Test Site as a locationto continue to perform these large high explo-sive experiments, two earth-covered, two-footthick steel reinforced concrete bunkers, builtto monitor atmospheric tests at Yucca Flat inthe 1950s, were located and found to be ide-ally configured.

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The facility consists of a control bunker, acamera bunker, a gravel firing table, and as-sociated control and diagnostic systems. Thefacility has conducted safely conventionalhigh-explosives experiments using a test bedthat provides sophisticated diagnostics such ashigh-speed optics and x-ray radiography onthe firing table, while operating personnel arepresent in the bunker.

In order to conduct large conventionalhigh-explosive experiments on the site firingtable while operating personnel are present inthe control bunker, it first had to be certifiedas safe. To achieve this, scientists conductedPopover — a series of high explosive (up to7,800 pounds) tests which were detonated 27-feet from the bunker’s buried outer wall.

The test data was used to develop an ef-fects profile that defined the relationship ofthe high-explosive charge size and detonationpoint to blast effects, such as overpressure,bunker wall strain, dynamic response (accel-eration), and noise amplitude. Together theseresults demonstrated that the bunker wouldprovide a safe working environment.

The Big Explosives Experimental Facilitywill play a large role in accumulating data sup-porting stockpile stewardship, along with avariety of new experimental programs, thatwill expand this nation’s non-nuclear experi-ment capabilities. This facility complementsthe U1a complex and other DOEhydrodiagnostic facilities.

From roads to power transmission systems,the Nevada Test Site has a vast infrastructureto support both large and small projects.

Electric

The Nevada Test Site boasts around 265miles of electrical transmission andsubtransmission lines. Test site power loadscurrently are served from two independent 138kV transmission lines. In addition, 20 mega-watts of on-site diesel generation is availablefor emergency backup power. The test sitetransmission system capacity is about 45megawatts.

The Nevada Test Site is located within110 miles of large 500 kV transmission linesat Eldorado Valley, part of the southern Ne-vada hub for several key power transmissioncorridors connecting major load centers andgeneration systems in Utah, California, Ne-vada, and Arizona.

Hydrology and Water

Hydrology

Groundwater movement is one of the mostthoroughly studied aspects of the vast, ariddesert of the Nevada Test Site. Hydrologists,geologists, and other scientific experts haveanalyzed groundwater at the test site since the1970s, and studies continue. The purpose oftheir study is to determine groundwater flowrates and directions, the nature and locationof aquifers, and other information.

Water

The Nevada Test Site is served by a wa-ter system comprising 11 operating wells forpotable water and one for nonpotable water(with pumps, boosters, sumps, reservoirs, andchlorinator water softeners), 27 storage tanks,13 usable construction-water sumps, and sixwater transmission systems (100 miles of sup-ply and distribution lines). The system alsoserves a variety of domestic, construction, andfire-protection water uses. The wells producemore than 6,000 gallons of water per minute,nearly 9 million gallons per day. Inactive wells,if brought on line, could supply an additional2,200 acre-feet per year.

Seismic Monitoring

For more than 30 years, the Nevada TestSite team has operated an extensive seismicnetwork of remote monitoring stations in Utah,California, and Nevada. The network recordsboth earthquakes and nuclear explosions to pro-vide information for treaty verification andnonproliferation studies.

The seismic program includes a permanent13-station geophone network and other portabledata acquisition units. To ensure safety, test sitetechnicians use this system to monitor groundmotion activity immediately after experiments are

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conducted. The geophone network produces in-formation that helps scientist plan re-entryactivities after an underground test involving ex-plosives, and portable equipment allowsresearchers to provide other locations with site-specific seismic and ground motion information.Researchers also operate portable strong-mo-tion seismic stations to measure the effects ofground motion on buildings.

Construction:

Project 99-D-108, Renovate ExistingRoadways, NTS


This project will provide for the renova-tion of 37.0 miles of Mercury Highway fromthe southern boundary of the Nevada Test Site(NTS) to the intersection of Rainier MesaRoad to Area 3. These repairs will consist ofremoving existing debris from pavementcracks, filling cracks with asphalt sealant, in-stalling a stress absorbing membrane, andapplying a new asphaltic-concrete overlay. Inaddition, the 2.3 miles of the Rainier Mesa Roadfrom the intersection of Mercury Highway tothe intersection of road 4-04 in Area 4 will be

reconstructed. Repairs will consist of total re-construction of the roadbed and the applicationof the asphalt pavement. The renovated roadwill have two-inch-thick overlay; the recon-structed road will have three-inch-thick paving.Aggregate shoulders will parallel each side.All required traffic signs, striping, and mark-ers will be included in this project. No buildingsor utilities are included in this project.

Project 96-D-102-03, 138kV Moderniza-tion Substation, NTS


This project will modernize one major sub-station (Frenchman Flat Substation), oneswitching center (Mercury Switching Center),and one tap station (Valley Tap) on the 138kilovolt (kV) transmission system loop at theNevada Test Site (NTS).

It will also provide for the installation of aSCADA fiber-optics communication loop.

The Mercury Switching Center serves asa termination point for the incoming power linefrom Nevada Power Company (NPC).

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UNIQUE ASSETS — KEY TO DEFENSEPROGRAMS:

The Kansas City Plant (KCP) is situatedon approximately 122 acres of the 300-acreBannister Federal Complex located within thecity limits, 12 miles south of downtown Kan-sas City, Missouri. The plant shares the sitewith seven other Federal agencies: FederalAviation Administration, Defense Finance andAccounting Service, National Archives andRecords Administration, General ServicesAdministration (GSA), Internal Revenue Ser-vice, National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration, and the National LogisticsSupport Center.

The majority of the offices and manufac-turing areas are under one roof, with additionaloutbuildings for support operations such astreatment of industrial wastewater, storage ofprocess chemicals, storage of containerizedwaste, and certain other specialized operations.

Manufacturing Facilities and Infrastruc-ture:

The KCP is housed in a 57 year-old build-ing. Currently the plant occupies approximately3 million square feet at this site. The SMRIproject will reduce that to approximately 2.4million square feet. The FY 1998 Maintenance

Study described the overall condition of thefacility as “good.” A backlog of almost $100Min deferred maintenance exists. Additionally,Capital, GPP and Expense Funds are used toaddress aging and deteriorating facilities. Typi-cal projects are roofing replacements, boilerreplacements, structural upgrades, air-handlersreplacement, etc. Total facility related expen-ditures have not kept pace with requirements.A Ten-Year Site Plan will be developed to es-tablish the future facility investment strategyfor the KCP.

Manufacturing Pr ocesses and Technolo-gies:

To assess the short-term (through FY05)status of manufacturing capability and capac-ity, sixteen production areas/departments werecompared to the P&PD/SLEP workload.Some capacity issues exist with six of the six-teen production areas/departments. The sixare Detonator Cable Assembly, Fireset As-sembly, Final Assembly (two areas), CaseAssembly, and ACORN Technology. Theseissues can be resolved by either expandingphysical capacity at minimal cost, or by add-ing additional shifts.

For the long-term, the following MajorTechnical Efforts (MTE) will be pursued inthe Nonnuclear Readiness campaign to close

Kansas City Plant

MISSION� Production, Procurement, & Dismantlement

of NonNuclear Components� Limited Life Components� Retrofits/Modifications� Evaluation/Surveillance� TSD Support� Stockpile Support Center� Work for Others

Location Kansas City, Missouri

Contractor AlliedSignal Corporation

Established 1949

Area 122.1 Acres

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critical gaps between existing capabilities andthe level of performance required in the fu-ture (see table below).

The resources and timelines associatedwith these MTEs are described in the Non-nuclear Production Readiness Program Plan.

Manufacturing Workfor ce:

Staffing levels at KCP will need to be ad-justed to match the workload projected for boththe short and long terms. In general, insuffi-cient funds have been made available tosupport all of the activities identified by theM&O as being necessary to accomplish alldirect and indirect objectives. Like other DPfacilities, the KCP is also concerned about anaging workforce talent pipeline, and skills mix.

Construction:

Project 99-D-127, Stockpile ManagementRestructuring Initiative Kansas CityPlant, Kansas City, Missouri

The Stockpile Management Restructur-ing Initiative will allow the KCP’s infrastructureto be altered and greatly reduced from the

current plant profile, substantially reducingcosts to operate the KCP. The restructuringinitiative consists of changing the existing plantand operational approach in four major aspects:1) physically reducing the size of the facility,2) changing the approach to manufacturingfrom product-based to process-based, 3) re-ducing the support infrastructure appropriatefor the right-sized operation, and 4) further

Project 99-D-125, Replace Boilers andControls, Kansas City Plant Kansas City,Missouri

This project will renovate and upgrade theexisting steam generating facility located atthe West Boilerhouse. This project removesfour 100,000 PPH (Pound per Hour) boilers,boiler control panels and boiler annunciatorpanels, water softeners, polisher, pumps, forceddraft fans, deaerator, piping, controls, and otherexisting ancillary boiler support equipment, andreplaces them with new equipment includingnew microprocessor-based control panels anda boiler control room containing annunciatorpanels and system status indicators, in the samegeneral location.

Goal Major Technical Effort

Reduce production responses for requiredtechnologies to the shortest timepossible (with a goal of 19 months) afterfinal design for all SLEP plans

Electronic Component MiniaturizationGas Transfer Systems Productivity

ImprovementsEngineered Materials Supply Chain

Assurance

Create readiness for unanticipatedemergency hardware replacement

Science Based ManufacturingImplementation

Commercial Components QualificationLean Manufacturing Streamlining

Eliminate existing threats to currentproduction capability

Replace Obsolete TestersModernize Flexible Manufacturing

SystemUpgrade Materials, Analysis, and Testing

SciencesDeploy technologies from the ADAPT

Campaign into production readinessWeaponize Lasers and Electro-opticsDevelop and Characterize Microsystems

Technologies (LiGA)

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Project 99-D-122, Rapid Reactivation,Various Locations


Kansas City Plant: Reservoir Assembliesand Testing

The Kansas City Plant subproject consistsof rearranging existing space in, and add-ing additional space to, the currentReservoir Assembly Facility, and the pro-curement of additional production/processequipment.

Project 97-D-123 Structural Upgrades,Kansas City Plant, Kansas City, Missouri

This project is required to correct struc-tural overstress caused by gravity loads andwill reinforce masonry walls to resist seismicloading within the DOE controlled portion ofthe Bannister Federal Complex to ensure lifesafety.

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UNIQUE ASSETS - KEY TO DEFENSEPROGRAMS:

The Pantex Plant is located in the TexasPanhandle, approximately 17 miles northeastof Amarillo, Texas. The Pantex Plant missionfunctions include the fabrication of chemicalexplosives; development work in support ofthe design laboratories; pit storage; and nuclearweapons assembly, disassembly, testing, qual-ity assurance, repair, retirement, and disposal.The bulk of the Pantex operations are locatedin Zone 4, Zone 11, Zone 12 Nonnuclear andZone 12 Nuclear.

• Zone 4 is used primarily for the storageof pits and nuclear weapons, primarystructures are weapons staging igloos andmagazines.

• Zone 11 is used primarily for Chemicalexplosive operations. It includes activitiessuch as: HE testing, Analytical and chemi-cal laboratories, HE staging, test fire, HEsynthesis, and HE formulation.

• Zone 12 Nonnuclear primarily housesthe production and site support staffs andactivities in support of the stockpile mis-sions.

• Zone 12 Nuclear primarily houses thenuclear and nuclear explosive activitiesthat comprise weapon HE, assembly/dis-

assembly, pit storage, etc.). Primary struc-tures are the weapon assembly/disassembly cells and bays.

Balance of Plant:

Balance of Plant includes additional sitesupport activities, not covered previously in thezones, necessary for Pantex to perform itsmission functions. These include such thingsas: warehousing, water treatment, sewagetreatment, TSD support facilities, etc.


The Pantex Plant was originally con-structed by the U.S. Army as a conventionalbomb plant during the early days of World WarII and was deactivated and vacated after thewar. In 1949 Texas Technological Collegepurchased the full 16,000-acre site for $1 foruse in experimental agriculture. However, in1951 the AEC asked the Army to “recapture”the main plant and 10,000 surrounding acresfor use as a nuclear weapons production fa-cility. Some of the existing facilities are greaterthan 40 years old. The average age of thePantex facilities is 28 years. The older facili-ties were not built for today’s missions,constructed to today’s standards, nor designedto meet today’s environmental, safety, andhealth requirements. As these facilities con-tinue to age, the maintenance and operating

Pantex Plant

MISSION� Dismantlement� Interim Weapon Storage� PIT Storage� Weapons Repair/Modification� Assembly/Disassembly of JTA Units� Stockpile Evaluation and Testing

MISSION�

Dismantlement

�

Interim Weapon Storage

�

PIT Storage�

Weapons Repair/Modification

�

Assembly/Disassembly of JTA Units

�

Stockpile Evaluation and Testing

Location Amarillo, Texas

Contractor Mason & Hanger

Established 1951Area 10.2K Acres

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costs continue to rise and it becomes increas-ingly difficult (and subsequently expensive) tomeet the current ES&H standards. Duringthe peak years of weapons production, a sig-nificant capital investment was made eachyear to upgrade existing facilities and infra-structure. However, since the end of the coldwar in 1989, this capital investment has de-creased significantly causing a growth in themaintenance backlog, faster-than-expecteddeterioration in many areas, and quickly in-creasing operating costs. A backlog of greaterthat $100 million in deferred tasks exist. Thisdoes not include recapitalization and modern-ization capital costs. Capital equipment andGPP budgets for FY 2000 are zero. A factorthat also effects the suitability of existingPantex facilities for nuclear weapons work isthe changes that have taken place with re-gard to nuclear explosive operations. Thetightening of requirements has impacted theoperating efficiency and suitability of facili-ties. For example, the 12-64 bay complex,which at one time was utilized for nuclear ex-plosive operations, is no longer appropriate forsuch activities without an upgrade to make itsuitable for such operations. The change inand addition of new process and operationalrequirements have added more than 40% tothe operating costs in the past 8 years. Pantexhas developed a ten-year site plan to supportstockpile requirements identified in the P&PD.However, with a declining budget and increas-ing mission requirements the decline ofinfrastructure has been predictable.

As Pantex prepares to perform its Stock-pile Stewardship mission into the 21

st century,

it is important to 1) enhance the affordabilityof production operations; 2) ensure that plantoperations and facilities continue to meet cur-rent ES&H standards; 3) optimize themanufacturing complex and configuration con-sistent with current NWC requirements; 4)ensure adequate longevity (e.g. 50 years) forprimary facilities and infrastructure; and 5)provide for safe and secure interim storage ofpits. This can be accomplished by making bothnear-term and long-term investments in Pantexfacilities and infrastructure. In the near-term,investments are needed that would reduce the

maintenance backlog, repair facilities and in-frastructure that place continued productionoperations at risk, and establish needed pro-duction capabilities/capacities not currentlyavailable. For example, Pantex needs to es-tablish the capability to do pit requalificationactivities and has proposed that a portion ofBuilding 12-86 be modified to allow for thecharacterization, refurbishment, and reaccep-tance of pits in support of the stockpile rebuild.In the long-term, investments are needed tomigrate production operations from aging fa-cilities into new facilities having appreciablelongevity and to augment capacity for longterm workload. For example, it may be nec-essary in the long term to provide for morebays and cells to support the productionworkload.

Processes & Technology:

Pantex has met and continues to meet di-rective schedule work, and is meetingever-increasing needs for more detailed ex-amination and documentation. However, anumber of factors threaten the ability of Pantexto perform its future missions in a safe, timely,and cost-effective manner. As with Pantexfacilities and infrastructure, many of the manu-facturing processes and support equipment areaging and in need of repair or replacement.

In examining the health of Pantex’s manu-facturing processes, there are a number of keyissues driving the need for an investment inthese processes. First, there are needs asso-ciated with fulfilling the requirements of theStockpile Life Extension Program. As noted,Pantex has processes that currently do notexist and are needed to support the SLEPschedules. Actions are needed to establishthese processes. An example of this is thepreviously mentioned need for a process torequalify pits in the rebuild process. Secondly,many of the processes in operation today areusing systems and equipment that are aging.It is becoming increasingly difficult to operatethese aging processes in ways that are costeffective, that meet ES&H standards, and thatmeet the process control and quality require-ments of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.For example, one of the milestones of the High

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Explosive Manufacturing and Weapon Assem-bly/Disassembly Campaign Plan is toimplement improvements to the explosive com-ponent fabrication process to reduce costs andincrease component quality. Thirdly, in theabsence of funding to upgrade aging processes,Pantex has not been able to take advantageof new technologies which would improvequality and efficiency, reduce ES&H risks,improve mission flexibility and response time,and align production processes with the de-mands of a science-based StockpileStewardship Program. For example, one ofthe milestones of the High Explosive Manu-facturing and Weapon Assembly/DisassemblyCampaign Plan is to reestablish formulationcapability and increase capacity for variousexplosives by moving from Building 12-19 toBuilding 11-50.

In preparing to support the StockpileStewardship Program, Pantex also needs tomake long-term investments in production pro-cesses and technology. Such investmentswould allow migration into a modern, long last-ing manufacturing complex that is right-sizedfor current and projected requirements. There,production operations would be performed atlower cost, with tighter process control andenhanced quality, and with real time transmis-sion of assembly/disassembly data to the designlabs (needed for modeling and simulation). Forexample, one of the milestones of the HighExplosive Manufacturing and Weapon Assem-bly/Disassembly Campaign Plan is toimplement high-speed data transmission frombays and cells.

Without campaigns, process and technol-ogy improvements will not be achieved.Keeping the enduring stockpile active will re-quire improvements in the detection andprediction of aging effects before adversesafety and reliability impacts occur. Gaps inthe HE manufacturing and weapon assembly/disassembly process capability or capacitymust be validated and filled through reconsti-tution and improvement of processespreviously used, or through the developmentand/or establishment of alternative processesthat meet current design requirements and

standards for quality, safety, and health. Sci-ence basis models must be established for theHE manufacturing and weapon assembly/dis-assembly operations and used to developprocess simulations that drive these operationsand allow flexibility to modify them as neces-sary. For example, one of the milestones ofthe High Explosive Manufacturing and WeaponAssembly/Disassembly Campaign Plan is todevelop 3-D rapid prototype capability for newtooling. Appropriate process data must becollected and transmitted in real time to per-mit weapon performance and lifetimeassessment by the design labs through predic-tive models and simulations in the absence ofnuclear testing. Control of the HE manufac-turing and weapon assembly/disassemblyprocess stability must be improved, monitored,and documented to provide assurance thatremanufactured weapons remain within theperformance envelope previously validatedthrough nuclear testing.

Workfor ce:

Like other sites in the complex, the PantexPlant has an aging workforce. Loss of criti-cal skills presents the most immediate risk tocontinued viability of the HE manufacturingand weapons assembly/disassembly in supportof stockpile stewardship objectives. Revital-ization of the workforce requires the additionof new technical and craft workers with therequisite critical skills. This is significantlyhampered by the inability to fund both experi-enced and new workers simultaneously for aperiod of knowledge transfer. The problem ismade worse by the cyclical demand for work-ers with particular skills, driven in part by themix of materials in each weapon system.These problems will be minimized throughworking with the design agencies to minimizethe material mix, by developing workers whoare multi-skilled, and through the use of reim-bursable complementary work to level theworkload.

The skilled HE manufacturing and weaponassembly/disassembly workforce must be re-vitalized through programs that capture andpreserve historical knowledge, that enrich skills

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with challenging and load leveling, complemen-tary work, and that attract new workers.Through this initiative Pantex will develop arobust, integrated program that has not onlythe proper skill mix but will also include a moreproper blend in workforce age.

Pantex also has responded to the ChilesCommission recommendations with a plan toimprove recruitment and retention in key skillareas. Specific points include:

• Critical skills have been identified.

• A “variable pay” program has been de-veloped with options such as lump-summerit increases, retention bonuses and in-creased base salaries in specialty areas toretain critical skills.

• Enhancement of the Recognition andAwards program.

• Development of recruitment strategies inpartnership with regional universities thattarget critical skill areas.

• Implementation of student work programsfor interns and co-op students.

• Conducting a Benefits Value Study tobenchmark Pantex benefits with similarindustries.

• Formulation of a Retiree Corp Program toallow return of critical skills when needed.

• Development and distribution of a plant-wide employee survey; and joint traininginitiatives where labor and managementlearn together how best to work as a team.

Construction:

Project 99-D-128, Stockpile ManagementRestructuring Initiative Pantex Plant,Amarillo, Texas

The Pantex Plant Stockpile ManagementRestructuring Initiative (SMRI) Project willprovide for the design and construction forvarious relocation and upgrades and for theshutdown of obsolete structures. The projectwill help to reduce the plant footprint by con-solidating functions into fewer and moremodern facilities.

Project 88-D-123 Security Enhancement,Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas

This project will enhance Pantex’s physi-cal protection, detection alarm systems,safeguards of Sensitive Nuclear Materials(SNM), access controls, and security training.

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UNIQUE ASSETS - KEY TO DEFENSEPROGRAMS:

The mission of the SRS Tritium Opera-tions is to provide tritium and non-tritium loadedreservoirs to meet the requirements of theNuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum, toconduct Reservoir Surveillance Operationsand Gas Transfer System testing, and to man-age existing tritium inventories and facilitiesto support the DOE Weapons Complex. It isthe single storage location for bulk quantitiesof tritium by consolidation of tritium operationsfrom other DOE sites.

• Building 232 is primarily used for tritiumextraction, tritium recovery, reservoir lifestorage, weapons materials R&D functiontest facility, and He-3 storage.

• Building 233 is primarily used for tritiumrecycle, tritium loading, tritium unloading,reservoir surveillance operations, and He-3 recovery.

• Building 234 is primarily used for reser-voir finishing, tritium storage, non-tritiumloading, and as shipping/receiving for thetritium operations.

• Building 238 is used primarily for reser-voir reclamation and hydraulic bursttesting.

Balance of Plant:

Balance of plant includes additional sitesupport activities, not covered previously in thespecific buildings, necessary for SRS TritiumOperations to perform its mission functions.These include such things as: office buildingfor site staff, miscellaneous storage, utility sup-port buildings, miscellaneous productionsupport, etc.


SRS was established in 1950 as a nuclearmaterials production site and occupies approxi-mately 198,000 acres south of Aiken, SC. Thecurrent DP mission at SRS is to process tri-tium and conduct tritium recycling and fillingin support of nuclear weapons stockpile re-quirements. For the most part, the SRSfacilities associated with DP tritium operationsare relatively new and in good shape. In late1993, the new Replacement Tritium Facility(RTF), Building 233-H, assumed the tritiumfunctions of Building 234-H. The RTF incor-porates state-of-the-art technology for tritiumstorage, enrichment, and pumping to enhancesafeguards and security and to prevent sig-nificant tritium losses to the environment.

The Complex 21 NonnuclearReconfiguration project resulted in the move-

Savannah River Plant

MISSION� Loading and Unloading of Reservoirs

� Reservoir Surveillance Operations

� Reconfiguration

� Life Storage Program

� Recycle and Recovery of Tritium

Location Aiken, South Carolina

Contractor Westinghouse Electric Corp.

Established 1950 (Tritium Operations in 1962)

Area 13 Acres (Tritium Operations)

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ment of products from the Mound plant toSRS. Actual construction activities associatedwith this project started in FY 1995. The ar-eas renovated to accommodate the transferredproduct lines were appropriately sized andupgraded to meet current commercial con-struction, DOE ES&H, and security codes,orders, and regulations. Additionally, modifi-cations were made to utilities and supportinfrastructure as appropriate.

The Stockpile Management RestructuringInitiative (SMRI), Tritium Facility Moderniza-tion and Consolidation started in FY 1998 willresult in further modernization and consolida-tion of SRS facilities and infrastructure. TheTritium Facility Modernization and Consolida-tion project will relocate several processsystems and equipment and/or process func-tions from Building 232-H into existing buildingswithin the Tritium Complex. High and Mod-erate hazard processes will be located intoBuilding 233-H. Low hazard processes willbe located to the north end of Building 234-H.The Building 233-H and 234-H service sup-port systems will be upgraded toaccommodate the additional loads. Consoli-dation of tritium processing activities intoBuildings 233-H, 249-H, and the newer por-tion of 234-H will improve the safety ofoperations, reduce environmental releases,improve productivity, and reduce future oper-ating costs. The consolidation of operationsinto fewer operating buildings will allow forthe reduction of maintenance, operations, andsupport staffing. The closure of 232-H willfurther reduce the DP operating budget. TheSMRI project also includes work that wastransferred from the Tritium Extraction Facil-ity project. This provides for increases incapacities and flows in the primary separationsystem, process stripper/tritium recovery sys-tem, and glovebox stripper/tritium recoverysystem.

Overall the SRS Tritium Operations fa-cilities and infrastructure are in good shape.It is not anticipated that any major modifica-tion will be required in the foreseeable futurebeyond those that are currently underway.


The SRS Tritium Operations processesand technologies for the most part are in goodshape because of the projects described above.However, additional capacity will need to beestablished in two areas to support futureworkload. The existing function testing sta-tions are at capacity. Because of the need foradditional function tests associated with Acornproduction sampling and life storage, additionalcapacity must be established.

Workfor ce:

Like other sites in the complex, SRS hasan aging workforce. Loss of critical skills pre-sents the most immediate risk to continuedviability of tritium operations in support ofstockpile stewardship objectives. Revitaliza-tion of the workforce requires the addition ofnew technical workers with the requisite criti-cal skills. This is significantly hampered bythe inability to fund both experienced and newworkers simultaneously for a period of knowl-edge transfer.

The skilled Tritium Operations workforcemust be revitalized through programs that cap-ture and preserve historical knowledge, thatenrich skills with challenging and load level-ing, complementary work, and that attract newworkers. Through this initiative SRS will de-velop a robust, integrated program that hasnot only the proper skill mix but will also in-clude a more proper blend in workforce age.

Construction:

Project 98-D-125, Tritium Extraction Fa-cility, Savannah River Site Aiken, SouthCarolina

The TEF will provide steady-state produc-tion capability to the Tritium Recycle Facility(Building 233-H) of as much as 3Kg of tritiumper year, if needed. Final purification of gasescontaining tritium shall be performed in theaugmented process equipment located in theTritium Recycle Facility.

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Project 98-D-123 Stockpile ManagementRestructuring Initiative Tritium FacilityModernization and Consolidation, Savan-nah River Plant, Aiken, South Carolina

The Tritium Facility Modernization andConsolidation project will relocate several pro-cess systems and equipment and/or processfunctions from Buildings 232-H into existingbuildings within the Tritium Facility. High andModerate hazard processes will be relocatedinto Building 233-H; Low Hazard processeswill be relocated to the North end of Building234-H; Building 233-H and 234-H service sup-port systems will be upgraded toaccommodate the additional loads; and theconsolidation of Tritium processing activitiesinto Buildings 233-H and 249-H.

Project 98-D-126, Accelerator Productionof Tritium, Various Locations

This project is designed to demonstratethe integration of high-power operation of theLow Energy Demonstration Accelerator(LEDA) up to 8 MeV; prototyping of key ele-ments of the radio-frequency (RF) powersystem and distribution, beam transport, andbeam diagnostics; prototyping of a completesuperconducting high energy linear accelera-tor unit; development and prototyping of RFand other high energy linear accelerator com-ponents; target/blanket performance andmaterial studies, including measurements ofneutron/proton/tritium data, radiation damageeffects and transport code development; andTritium separation facility studies to determineprocessing efficiencies at plant conditions.

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9201-1 Can shop

9201-5N Depleted Uranium Operations

9203 BeO Research and Development

9204-2 Lithium Operations

9204-2E Assembly/Disassembly Opera-tions

9205 Quality Evaluations/Surveillance

9206 Old Enriched Uranium Operations

9212 Enriched Uranium Operations

9215 Enriched Uranium Machining/roll-ing/forming

9720-5 Warehouse

9995 Analytical Services

9998 Depleted Uranium rolling & Met-allurgy

Balance of Plant:

Balance of Plant includes additional sitesupport activities, not covered previously in thespecific buildings, necessary for Y-12 Opera-tions to perform its mission functions. Theseinclude such things as: office buildings for sitestaff, miscellaneous storage, utility supportbuildings, miscellaneous production support,etc.

Manufacturing Facilities & Infrastruc-ture:

The Y-12 Plant was originally built as partof the World War II Manhattan Project, andover 70% of the existing facilities are greaterthan 40 years old. These facilities were notbuilt for today’s missions, constructed totoday’s standards, nor designed to meettoday’s environmental, safety, and health re-quirements. As these facilities continue to age,the maintenance and operating costs continueto rise and it becomes increasingly difficult(and subsequently expensive) to meet the cur-rent ES&H standards. During the peak yearsof weapons production, a significant capitalinvestment was made each year to upgradeexisting facilities and infrastructure. However,since the end of the Cold War in 1989, thiscapital investment has decreased significantlycausing a growth in the maintenance backlog,faster-than-expected deterioration in manyareas, and quickly increasing operating costs.

As Y-12 prepares to perform its StockpileStewardship mission into the 21

st century, it is

important to 1) enhance the affordability ofproduction operations; 2) ensure that plantoperations and facilities meet current ES&Hstandards; 3) optimize the manufacturing com-plex through the application of six sigmatechniques; and 4) ensure adequate longev-ity (e.g. 50 years) for primary facilities andinfrastructure. This can be accomplished by

Y-12 Plant

MISSIONReceive/Storage Uranium, LithiumCanned Subassemblies (CSA’s) +Manufacture/Rework of Componentsfor Secondaries

� Dismantlement of CSA’s

� Processing Uranium & Lithium intosafe/secure forms for storage

� Stockpile Evaluation/SurveillanceOperations

Location Oak Ridge, TennesseeContractor Lockheed-Martin Energy SystemsEstablished 1947Area 811 Acres

� Other National Security Programs

�

�

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making both near-term and long-term invest-ments in Y-12 facilities and infrastructure.

In the near-term, investments are neededthat would reduce the maintenance backlog,repair facilities and infrastructure that placecontinued production operations at risk, andestablish needed production capabilities/ca-pacities not currently available. Although, thereare current operations underway such as theStockpile Management Restructuring Initiative(SMRI) and Facilities Assurance CapabilityProgram (FCAP) most of these funds are as-sociated with relocation of existing equipmentand safety issues not the re-capitalizationthrough purchase of new items. FCAP is nowsuccessfully nearing completion and SMRI isjust underway.

In the long-term, investments are neededto migrate production operations from agingfacilities into new facilities having appreciablelongevity. Such an investment will allow Y-12to rightsize its manufacturing footprint, shutdown aging facilities, and optimize the plantconfiguration. In FY 1999, a conceptual effortwas begun to determine the timeframe andrequirements for modernization of the Y-12plant. This effort is important in that it will tieinto the on going Site Wide EnvironmentalImpact Statement that is underway and pro-vide a foundation for ensuring the ability toprovide weapon components well into the nextcentury. Preliminary indications are that thesite modernization construction and processqualification could require several billion dol-lars and last several decades.

Manufacturing Pr ocesses & Technology:

Y-12 has met and continues to meet di-rective schedule work, and is meetingever-increasing needs for more detailed ex-amination and documentation. However, anumber of factors threaten the ability of Y-12to perform its future missions in a safe, timely,and cost-effective manner. As with Y-12 fa-cilities and infrastructure, many of themanufacturing processes are aging and in needof repair or replacement. In many cases, keymanufacturing processes have not been oper-ated for more than 10 years and it is

questionable whether they can be restartedeconomically or in compliance with today’sES&H standards. The gaps associated withthe need to potentially restart these past pro-cesses have been identified as part of thecampaigns and steps to remedy the situationproposed. A common example of this is re-lated to special materials processes, which canbe addressed through refurbishment of oldfacilities or through a modernization proposalas outlined in the previous section

In examining the health of Y-12’s manu-facturing processes, there are a number of keyissues driving the need for an investment inthese processes. First, there are significantnear-term needs associated with fulfilling therequirements of the Stockpile Life ExtensionProgram. As noted, Y-12 has a number of pro-cesses that are needed in the near-term tosupport the SLEP schedules that are not cur-rently operable and have not been for manyyears. Actions are needed to upgrade, replace,or restart these processes. These actions rep-resent a significant undertaking needed toensure the reconstitution of these operationsin a manner that is both cost effective andthat meets ES&H standards. Secondly, manyof the processes in operation today are usingsystems and equipment that are aging. It isbecoming increasingly difficult to operate theseaging processes in ways that are cost effec-tive, that meet ES&H standards, and that meetthe process control and quality requirementsof the Stockpile Stewardship program. Thirdly,in the absence of funding to upgrade agingprocesses, Y-12 has not been able to take ad-vantage of new technologies which wouldimprove quality and efficiency, reduce ES&Hrisks, improve mission flexibility and responsetime, and align production processes with thedemands of a science-based Stockpile Stew-ardship Program.

In preparing to support the StockpileStewardship program, Y-12 also needs to makelong-term investments in production processesand technology. Such investments would al-low migration into a modern, long lastingmanufacturing complex that is right-sized forcurrent and projected requirements. There,

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production operations would be performed atlower cost, with tighter process control andenhanced quality, and with real time transmis-sion of manufacturing data to the design labs(needed for modeling and simulation).

Without Campaigns, process and technol-ogy improvements will not be achieved.Keeping the enduring stockpile active will re-quire improvements in the detection andprediction of aging effects before adversesafety and reliability impacts occur. Gaps inthe manufacturing process capability or ca-pacity must be validated and filled throughreconstitution and improvement of processespreviously used, or through the developmentand/or establishment of alternative processesthat meet current design requirements andstandards for quality, safety, and health. Sci-ence basis models must be established forsecondary manufacturing operations and usedto develop process simulations that drive theseoperations and allow flexibility to modify themas necessary. Appropriate process data mustbe collected and transmitted real time to per-mit weapon performance and lifetimeassessment by the design labs through predic-tive models and simulations in the absence ofnuclear testing. Control of manufacturing pro-cess stability must be improved, monitored, anddocumented to provide assurance thatremanufactured weapons remain within theperformance envelope previously validatedthrough nuclear testing. Materials used to buildsecondaries currently in the stockpile must befully characterized and compared to currentproduction. This will guide the determinationas to whether current specifications are ap-propriate and to support a science-basedapproach to manufacturing.

Manufacturing Workfor ce:

Like other sites in the complex, the Y-12Plant has an aging workforce of which 50percent are eligible to retire within four years.Loss of critical skills presents the most imme-diate risk to continued viability of secondarymanufacturing in support of stockpile stew-ardship objectives. Revitalization of theworkforce requires the addition of new tech-nical and craft workers with the requisite

critical skills. This is significantly hamperedby the inability to fund both experienced andnew workers simultaneously for a period ofknowledge transfer. The degrading physicalcondition of the site, as well as continued reli-ance on old technology, noted earlier, make itdifficult to recruit new technical workers andis having a pronounced effect on the ability toretain existing workers. The problem is madeworse by the cyclical demand for workers withparticular skills, driven in part by the mix ofmaterials in each weapon system. Theseproblems will be minimized through workingwith the design agencies to minimize the ma-terial mix, by developing workers who aremulti-skilled, and through the use of reimburs-able complementary work to level theworkload.

The skilled secondary manufacturingworkforce must be revitalized through pro-grams that capture and preserve historicalknowledge, that enrich skills with challengingand load leveling, complementary work, andthat attract new workers. Through this initia-tive Y-12 will develop a robust, integratedprogram.

Construction:

01-D-124, Highly Enriched Uranium Ma-terials Facility, Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge,Tennessee

This project includes one facility with twodistinct areas, the Highly Enriched Uranium(HEU) Materials Area and the Strategic ArmsReduction Treaties (START) Materials Area.The new facility will be state-of-the-art andresult in significant cost savings and featurestorage in an earthen-bermed structure forenhanced security, an automated inventorysystem which minimizes inventory validation,new Safe Secure Trailer (SST) and SafeGuardTransport (SGT) shipping/receiving station, acentral location near HEU processing facili-ties, an underground connector to allow directtie-in to a future Enriched Uranium Opera-tions (EUO) Modernization Facility whichallows a reduced footprint for HEU activities,and a small administrative facility to house thebuilding operators.

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98-D-124, Stockpile Management Re-structuring Initiative Y-12 Consolidation,Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

The primary purpose of this project is tocomplete the overall downsizing of the Y-12manufacturing footprint. This project is partof a long-range consolidation plan that beganin 1992. Along with previously completedprojects and other currently funded consoli-dation projects, SMRI completes theconsolidation of manufacturing operations intoa smaller footprint area.

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