Stefan Jungcurt BIOECON-Workshop Venice, Aug. 28, 2003 Non-coordinated Cooperation – A Framework...

Stefan JungcurtBIOECON-Workshop Venice, Aug. 28, 2003

Non-coordinated Cooperation

– A Framework for the Analysis of Decision-making processes in International Regimes and their impacts on International Biodiversity Policy

Stefan JungcurtHumboldt University, Berlin


Objective

A framework to study the development of coordination among overlapping International Agreements and its impact on environmental objectives

– Interactions between international agreements

– Interactions between domestic and international processes of decision-making


Outline

• Overlapping International Agreements on PGRFA Management

• Theories of International Cooperation• International Negotiations as Nested Games• Outlook - Applying the Framework


International Regulation of PGRFA Management

• Provision of PGRFA - Genetic Erosion– Coordination of conservation measures– Responsibilities and obligations for conservation– Distribution of costs - compensation and efficiency

• Use of PGRFA - Plant Breeding– International transfer of PGRFA and related property rights and

entitlements– IP protection of biotechnological innovations

Relation between conservation and use of PGRFA


Supply and Demand-related Agreements

Supply-related agreements Rights of Suppliers

CBD• Conservation and sustainable

use• National sovereignty

ITPGRFA• Multilateral system for access

and benefit sharing

– ITPGRFA was aligned with CBD before adoption

Demand related agreements Rights of Users

TRIPS• Harmonization of IPRsUPOV• Plant variety protectionWIPO• World patent system

– UPOV ‘91 in line with TRIPS

– Agreement between WTI and WIPO on IPRs


Consequences of Uncoordinated Overlap

– “Biopiracy” conflicts - PRs and entitlements are not clear on the international level

– Legislative dilemmas - priorities, uncertainty, coherence – Complex legislation

Overlap causes costs (conflict, complexity, uncertainty) that erode gains from cooperation

Trade off between interdependent objectivesCoordination is a question of efficient international cooperation

Determinants and conditions of coordination among overlapping international agreements


International Agreements as Institutions

• IA supply rules that guide and restrict states’ behavior– Interactions among states (trade, transfers, coalitions etc.)– National activities with external impacts (pollution, global public

goods etc.• Legally binding contracts specifying rules on

– Rights and obligations (substantive aspects)– Rules and agendas for negotiations (procedural aspects)– Declarations on intended future cooperation (symbolic aspects)


Analyzing Coordination

• Relationships and interactions between agreements– Communication– Coordination/cooperation– Coherence

• Relationships and interactions on the national level– Decision making processes– Mandates and Negotiators– Awareness of incoherence and problems– Reflection


Theories of International Cooperation - 1. International Relations Theories (IRT)

• Systemic theory - analysis of the whole system of interactions on a single level of analysis (international, domestic or individual)– International level: States react to incentives by the international

system– Domestic level: Foreign policy of states constitutes the international

system

Dominance of international approaches International regimes are a consequence of cooperation


The Level-of-Analysis Problem

• Domestic characteristics of states are excluded as explanatory factors and treated as constant across states (preferences, decision making, resources)

• But often domestic factors are included in order to explain “residual variance” and empirical anomalies

• Leading to “ad hoc” (intuitive) interpretations rather than explicit theories

No systematic approach to include domestic variables or interactions between different levels


Theories of International Cooperation - 2. Economic Theories (ETIC)

• Study of self-enforcing, re-negotiation proof agreements in the absence of an enforcing authority

• Game theoretical modeling of cooperation• Similar assumptions as regime theory

Cannot account systematically for variances in domestic factors


Different Applications of Game Theory

As metaphor (IRT)• Explorative research and to illustrate descriptive studies• Limited as theory that can be empirically tested

As deductive theory that makes testable predictions (ETIC)• Theoretically sound analysis, for greater richness of explanation• Requires assumptions about fundamental aspects of the game, which

restrict the modifications possible to account for other factors

State of research determines application - metaphor, correspondence, model or theory (Snidal 1985)


Building the Framework - Objectives

• Establish a systematic link between international and domestic explanatory factors

• Include interdependencies among different regimes as international factor

• Provide for adequate applications of game theory


International Negotiations as Two-Level Games (Putnam 1989)

• The statesman is involved in simultaneous games at the domestic and international level– International: negotiation of mutually beneficial agreements– Domestic: Ratification by constituency

• Determinants of the payoffs of the statesman– Political costs and benefits on the domestic level Support of the

constituency– International interests– Preferences of the statesman


Two-level games II

• The statesman’s decision space is restricted– by the solutions the domestic constituency will ratify - win-set

(ratifiable outcomes) – by the win-sets of the opponents (negotiable outcomes)

• Within these constraints the statesman negotiates autonomously

The win-set is the conceptional link between domestic and international decision making procedures


Two-level games III

Determinants of the win-set

– Power, preferences and coalitions among domestic constituents

– Domestic political institutions– Strategies of the negotiator on the international level

Solves level-of-analysis problemApplies Game Theory as metaphorDoes not account for interdependencies among regimes


International Negotiations as Nested Games

• Objective: provide an empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently sub-optimal choices (Tsebelis 1990)

– Apparently sub-optimal choices are cases of disagreement between the actor and the observer

– The observer focuses on one game, while the actor is involved in a whole network of games, therefore the actor makes choices that appear to be sub-optimal (or irrational) to the observer


Nested Games II – Types of NG

Games in Multiple Arenas (GMA) – variable payoffs• The payoffs in the principal arena are contingent on the actors‘

choice in another arena• Contextual factors of a decision

Games in Institutional Design (GID) – variable rules• The rules of the game are contingent on the actors‘ choice in a higher

level game, where a choice between different sets of rules can be made

• Factors of institutional design and institutional change


Nested Games III

• Full theoretical treatment of GMA under conventional assumptions of Game Theory (individual rationality, payoffs, strategies)

• GID can be used to explore the processes and conditions of institutional design using Games as metaphor

The phenomena can be differentiated and analyzed separately, each with the appropriate application of Game Theory


Building the Framework - Propositions

– Interdependencies between different international arenas are exclusively Games in Multiple Arenas Formal rules in International Regimes are fixed or can be changed only by

its members

– The effects of a given win-set are exclusively Games in Multiple Arenas The common win set (overlap) determines the joint payoffs, the relative size

of the win set determines their distribution

– Variations in the size of the win-set can be clearly differentiated as either GMA or GID A game can vary either in rules (actors and strategies) or payoffs, not both


The Framework

Principal Arena

(International CBD, WTO...)

Domestic Arena

(member countries)

Win-Set

Contextual Arena

(International CBD, WTO...)

GMA(A)

GMA (B)

GID (C,D)

A II – Contextual Arena

A I – Principal Arena

L I International

Level

L II Domestic

Level

Prefernces and Coalitions

Political Institutions


Types of Games

Principal Arena

Contextual Arena

Win-Set Rules Payoffs

Games in Multiple international Arenas

(A) International International --- Fixed

P: VaraibleC. Fix./Var.

Two-Level-Games (B)

International Domestic Fixed FixedInt. VariableDom. Var.

Games in international Institutional Design (C) International Domestic Variable

Int. VariableDom. Fixed Fixed

Games in domestic institutional Design (D) Domestic International Variable

Int. FixedDom.Variable Fixed


Applying the Framework

• Characteristics of the Actor– Statesman or Negotiator– Individual or corporate actor– Preferences (Dove, Agent, Hawk)

• Determinants of the win-set– Institutions (ratification procedure, voting rules, party discipline,

autonomy of government...)– Interest Groups (power, influence, coalitions, affectedness)


Summary - Outlook

• Coordination among overlapping agreements on PGRFA management is a question of effective international regulation

• Study of Coordination requires systematically accounting for international and domestic factors

• Nested games framework– Provides conceptual link between international and domestic

factors– Guides adequate application of game-theoretical modeling

• Linking the framework to Political Economic Theory can provide guidance for the selection of variables

Stefan Jungcurt BIOECON-Workshop Venice, Aug. 28, 2003 Non-coordinated Cooperation – A Framework...

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