Statutory ConstructionDefinitionThe process of determining what a particular statute means so that a court may apply it accurately.Statutory ConstructionWhen considering a statute, a court will apply rules of construction only when the language contained in the statute is ambiguous. Under the "plain-meaning" rule, if the intention of the legislature is "so apparent from the face of the statutethat there can be no question as to its meaning, there is no need for the court to apply canons of construction" (Overseas Education Ass'n v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 876 F.2d 960 [D.C. Cir. 1989]). Thus, before evenconsidering what canons to apply, the court must first determine whether the statute in question is ambiguous. Courts have generally held that a statute is ambiguous when reasonably well-informed persons could understand the languagein either of two or more senses (State ex rel. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 128 N.W.2d 425 [1964]).

LawA body of rules of conduct of binding legal  force and effect, prescribed, recognized, and enforced by controlling authority.In U.S. law, the word law refers to any rule that if broken subjects a party to criminal punishment or civil liability. Laws in the United States are made by federal, state, and local legislatures, judges, the president, state governors, andadministrative agencies.Law in the United States is a mosaic of statutes, treaties, case law, Administrative Agency regulations, executive orders, and local laws. U.S. law can be bewildering because the laws of the various jurisdictions—federal, state, andlocal—are sometimes in conflict. Moreover, U.S. law is not static. New laws are regularly introduced, old laws are repealed, and existing laws are modified, so the precise definition of a particular law may be different in the future fromwhat it is today.

StatuteAn act of a  legislature  that declares, proscribes, or commands something; a specific  law, expressed  in writing.A statute is a written law passed by a legislature on the state or federal level. Statutes set forth general propositions of law that courts apply to specific situations. A statute may forbid a certain act, direct a certain act, make adeclaration, or set forth governmental mechanisms to aid society.A statute begins as a bill proposed or sponsored by a legislator. If the bill survives the legislative committee process and is approved by both houses of the legislature, the bill becomes law when it is signed by the executive officer (thepresident on the federal level or the governor on the state level). When a bill becomes law, the various provisions in the bill are called statutes. The term statute signifies the elevation of a bill from legislative proposal to law. State andfederal statutes are compiled in statutory codes that group the statutes by subject. These codes are published in book form and are available at law libraries.Lawmaking powers are vested chiefly in elected officials in the legislative branch. The vesting of the chief lawmaking power in elected lawmakers is the foundation of a representative democracy. Aside from the federal and stateconstitutions, statutes passed by elected lawmakers are the first laws to consult in finding the law that applies to a case.The power of statutes over other forms of laws is not complete, however. Under the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions, federal and state governments are comprised of a system of checks and balances among the legislative,executive, and judicial branches. As the system of checks and balances plays out, the executive and judicial branches have the opportunity to fashion laws within certain limits. The Executive Branch may possess certain lawmakingpowers under the federal or state constitutions, and the judiciary has the power to review statutes to determine whether they are valid under those constitutions. When a court strikes down a statute, it in effect creates a law of its own thatapplies to the general public.

Laws created through judicial opinion stand in contradistinction to laws created in statutes. Case law has the same legally binding effect as statutory law, but there are important distinctions between statutes and case law. Case law iswritten by judges, not by elected lawmakers, and it is written in response to a specific case before the court. A judicial opinion may be used as precedent for similar cases, however. This means that the judicial opinion in the case willguide the result in similar cases. In this sense a judicial opinion can constitute the law on certain issues within a particular jurisdiction. Courts can establish law in this way when no statute exists to govern a case, or when the courtinterprets a statute.For example, if an appeals court holds that witness testimony on memory recovered through therapy is not admissible at trial, that decision will become the rule for similar cases within the appeals court's jurisdiction. The decision willremain law until the court reverses itself or is reversed by a higher court, or until the state or federal legislature passes a statute that overrides the judicial decision. If the courts strike down a statute and the legislature passes a similarstatute, the courts may have an opportunity to declare the new statute unconstitutional. This cycle can be repeated over and over if legislatures continually test the constitutional limits on their lawmaking powers.Judicial opinions also provide legal authority in cases that are not covered by statute. Legislatures have not passed statutes that govern every conceivable dispute. Furthermore, the language contained in statutes does not cover everypossible situation. Statutes may be written in broad terms, and judicial opinions must interpret the language of relevant statutes according to the facts of the case at hand. Regulations passed by administrative agencies also fill instatutory gaps, and courts occasionally are called on to interpret regulations as well as statutes.Courts tend to follow a few general rules in determining the meaning or scope of a statute. If a statute does not provide satisfactory definitions of ambiguous terms, courts must interpret the words or phrases according to ordinary rules ofgrammar and dictionary definitions. If a word or phrase is technical or legal, it is interpreted within the context of the statute. For example, the term interest can refer to a monetary charge or ownership of property. If the term interestappears in the context of a statute on real estate ownership, a court will construe the word to mean property ownership. Previous interpretations of similar statutes are also helpful in determining a statute's meaning.Statutes are not static and irreversible. A statute may be changed or repealed by the lawmaking body that enacted it, or it may be overturned by a court. A statute may lapse, or terminate, under the terms of the statute itself or underlegislative rules that automatically terminate statutes unless they are reapproved before a certain amount of time has passed.Although most legal disputes are covered at least in part by statutes, TORT  and contract disputes are exceptions, in that they are largely governed by case law. Criminal Law, patent law, tax law, Property Law, and Bankruptcy law areamong the areas of law that are covered first and foremost by statute.

STATUTEA law established by an act of the legislature.Under the U.S. and state constitutions, statutes are considered the primary source of law in the U.S. -- that is, legislatures make the law (statutes) and courts interpret the law (cases).Most state statutes are organized by subject matter and published in books referred to as codes. Typically, a state has a family or civil code (where the divorce laws are usually contained), a criminal code (where incest, bigamy and domestic violence laws are often found), welfare code (which contains laws related to public benefits), probate code (where laws about wills, trusts and probate proceedings are collected) and many other codes dealing with a wide variety of topics. Federal statutes are organized into subject matter titles within the United States Code (for example, Title 18 for crimes and Title 11 for bankruptcy).The written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms prescribed in the Constitution; an act of the legislature.This word is used in contradistinction to the common law. Statutes acquire their force from the time of their passage unless otherwise provided.

It is a general rule that when the provision of a statute is general, everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by the common law and when a power is given by statute, everything necessary for making it effectual is given by implication.Statutes are of several kinds; namely, Public or private.1. Public statutes are those of which the judges will take notice without pleading; as, those which concern all officers in general; acts concerning trade in general or any specific trade; acts concerning all persons generally.2. Private acts, are those of which the judges wiil not take notice without pleading; such as concern only a particular species, or person; as, acts relating to any particular place, or to several particular places, or to one or several particular counties. Private statutes may be rendered public by being so declared by the legislature. Declaratory or remedial. 1. A declaratory statute is one which is passed in order to put an end to a doubt as to what the common law is, and which declares what it is, and has ever been. 2. Remedial statutes are those which are made to supply such defects, and abridge such superfluities in the common law as may have been discovered. These remedial statutes are themselves divided into enlarging statutes, by which the common law is made more comprehensive and extended than it was before; and into restraining statutes, by which it is narrowed down to that which is just and proper. The term remedial statute is also applied to those acts which give the party injured a remedy, and in some respects those statutes are penal.Temporary or perpetual. 1. A temporary statute is one which is limited in its duration at the time of its enactment. It continues in force until the time of its limitation has expired, unless sooner repealed. 2. A perpetual statute is one for the continuance of which there is no limited time, although it be not expressly declared to be so. If, however, a statute which did not itself contain any limitation, is to be governed by another which is temporary only, the former will also be temporary and dependent upon the existence of the latter.Affirmative or negative. 1. An affirmative statute is one which is enacted in affirmative terms; such a statute does not take away the common law. If, for example, a statute without negative words, declares that when certain requisites shall have been complied with, deeds shall, have in evidence a certain effect, this does not prevent their being used in evidence, though the requisites have not been complied with, in the same manner as they might have been before the statute was passed. 2. A negative statute is one expressed in negative terms, and so controls the common law, that it has no force in opposition to the statute. Penal statutes are those which order or prohibit a thing under a certain penalty.Among the civilians, the term statute is generally applied to all sorts of laws and regulations; every provision of law which ordains, permits, or prohibits anything is a statute without considering from what source it arises. Sometimes the word is used in contradistinction to the imperial Roman law, which, by way of eminence, civilians call the common law. They divide statutes into three classes, personal, real and mixed.Personal statutes are those which have principally for their object the person, and treat of property only incidentally; such are those which regard birth, legitimacy, freedom, the fight of instituting suits, majority as to age, incapacity to contract, to make a will, to plead in person, and the like. A personal statute is universal in its operation, and in force everywhere.Real statutes are those which have principally for their object, property, and which do not speak of persons, except in relation to property; such are those which concern the disposition, which one may make of his property either alive or by testament. A real statute, unlike a personal one, is confined in its operation to the country of its origin.Mixed statutes are those which concern at once both persons and property. But in this sense almost all statutes are mixed, there being scarcely any law relative to persons, which does not at the same time relate to things.

AmbiguityUncertainty or doubtfulness of  the meaning of  language.

When language is capable of being understood in more than one way by a reasonable person, ambiguity exists. It is not the use of peculiar words or of common words used in a peculiar sense. Words are ambiguous when theirsignificance is unclear to persons with competent knowledge and skill to understand them.There are two categories of ambiguity: latent and patent. Latent ambiguity exists when the language used is clear and intelligible so that it suggests one meaning but some extrinsic fact or evidence creates a need for interpretation or achoice among two or more possible meanings. In a classic case, Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864), a contract was made to sell 125 bales of cotton that were to arrive on a ship called Peerless that sailed fromBombay, India. Unknown to the parties to the contract, two ships of the same name were to arrive from the same port during different months of the same year. This extraneous fact necessitated the interpretation of an otherwise clearand definite term of the contract. In such cases, extrinsic or Parol Evidence may be admitted to explain what was meant or to identify the property referred to in the writing.A patent ambiguity is one that appears on the face of a document or writing because uncertain or obscure language has been used.In the law of contracts, ambiguity means more than that the language has more than one meaning upon which reasonable persons could differ. It means that after a court has applied rules of interpretation, such as the PLAIN MEANING,course of dealing, Course of Performance, or Trade Usage rules to the unclear terms, the court still cannot say with certainty what meaning was intended by the parties to the contract. When this occurs, the court will admit as evidenceextraneous proof of prior or contemporaneous agreements to determine the meaning of the ambiguous language. Parol evidence may be used to explain the meaning of a writing as long as its use does not vary the terms of the writing. Ifthere is no such evidence, the court may hear evidence of the subjective intention or understanding of the parties to clarify the ambiguity.Sometimes, courts decide the meaning of ambiguous language on the basis of who was responsible or at fault for the ambiguity. When only one party knew or should have known of the ambiguity, the unsuspecting party's subjectiveknowledge of the meaning will control. If both parties knew or should have known of the uncertainty, the court will look to the subjective understanding of both. The ambiguity no longer exists if the parties agree upon its meaning. If theparties disagree and the ambiguous provisions are material, no contract is formed because of lack of mutual assent.Courts frequently interpret an ambiguous contract term against the interests of the party who prepared the contract and created the ambiguity. This is common in cases of adhesion contracts and insurance contracts. A drafter of adocument should not benefit at the expense of an innocent party because the drafter was careless in drafting the agreement.In Constitutional Law, statutes that contain ambiguous language are VOID FOR VAGUENESS. The language of such laws is considered so obscure and uncertain that a reasonable person cannot determine from a reading what the law purportsto command or prohibit. This statutory ambiguity deprives a person of the notice requirement of Due Process of Law, and, therefore, renders the statute unconstitutional.What is AMBIGUITY?Doubtfulness; doubleness of meaning; indistinctness or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. Ninrlle v. State Bank, 13 Neb. 245, 13 N. W. 275; Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts (I'a.) 89; Kraner v. Ilalsey, 82 Cal. 209, 22 Pac. 1137; Ward v. Epsy, 6 Humph. (Tenn.) 447. An ambiguity may be either latent or patent. It is the former, where the language employed Is clear and intelligible and suggests but a single meaning, but some extrinsic fact or extraneous evidence creates a necessity for interpretation or a choice among two or more possible meanings. But a patent ambiguity is that which appears on the face of the instrument, and arises from the defective, obscure, or insensible language used. Carter v. Holman, 60 Mo. 504; Brown v. Guice, 46 Miss. 302; Stokeley v. Gordon, 8 Md. 505; Chambers

v. Iiingstaff, 09 Ala. 140; Hawkins v. Garland, 76 Va. 152, 44 Am. Rep. 158; Hand v. Hoffman, 8 N. J. Law, 71; Ives v. Kimball, 1 Mich. 313; Palmer v. Albee, 50 Iowa, 431; Petrie v. Hamilton College, 158 N. Y. 458, 53 N. E. 216. Synonyms. Ambiguity of language is to be distinguished from unintelligibility and inaccuracy, for words cannot be said to be ambiguous unless their signification seems doubtful and uncertain to persons of competent skill and knowledge to understand them. Story, Contr. 272. The term "ambiguity" does not include mere inaccuracy, or such uncertainty as arises from the use of peculiar words, or of common words in a peculiar sense. Wig. Wills, 174.

Law Dictionary: What is AMBIGUITY? definition of AMBIGUITY (Black's Law Dictionary) 

InterpretationThe art or process of determining the  intended meaning of a written document,  such as a constitution, statute, contract, deed, or will.The interpretation of written documents is fundamental to the process and Practice of Law. Interpretation takes place whenever the meaning of a legal document must be determined. Lawyers and judges search for meaning using variousinterpretive approaches and rules of construction. In constitutional and statutory law, legal interpretation can be a contentious issue.Legal interpretation may be based on a literal reading of a document. For example, when JOHN DOE signs a will that names his wife, Jane Doe, as his Personal Representative, his intent to name her the administrator of his estate can bedetermined solely from the specific language used in the will. There is no need to consider the surrounding facts and circumstances that went into his choice.When the intended meaning of the words in a document is obscure and conjecture is needed to determine the sense in which they have been used, mixed interpretation occurs. In such a case, the words express an individual's intent onlywhen they are correctly comprehended. If John Doe refers only to "my wife" in his will, a probate court will have to determine who his wife was at the time of his death. How a lawyer or judge ascertains intent when words are unclear istypically governed by rules of construction. For example, the general definition of a word will govern interpretation, unless through custom, usage, or legal precedent a special meaning has been attached to the term.When a court interprets a statute, it is guided by rules of statutory construction. Judges are to first attempt to find the "plain meaning" of a law, based solely on the words of the statute. If the statute itself is not clear, a court then maylook to extrinsic evidence, in this case Legislative History, to help interpret what the legislature meant when it enacted the statute. It is now common practice for statutes to contain "interpretation clauses," which include definitions ofkey words that occur frequently in the laws. These clauses are intended to promote the PLAIN MEANING of the law and to restrict courts from finding their own meaning.Concern over whether courts apply strict or liberal methods of interpretation has generated the most controversy at the constitutional level. How the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the Constitution has been widely debated since the 1960s.Critics of the Warren Court, of the 1950s and 1960s, charged that the Court had usurped the lawmaking function by liberally interpreting constitutional provisions.This criticism led to Jurisprudence of "original intent," a philosophy that calls on the Supreme Court and other judges to seek the plain meaning of the Constitution. If plain textual meaning is lacking, the justices should attempt todetermine the original intentions of the Framers. Those who advocate an Original Intent method of interpretation also emphasize the need for the justices to respect history, tradition, and legal precedent.

Opponents of original intent jurisprudence argue that discerning the intent of the Framers is impossible on many issues. Even if the original intent is knowable, some opponents believe that this intent should not govern contemporarydecision making on constitutional issues. In their view the Constitution is a living document that should be interpreted according to the times. This interpretive philosophy would permit justices to read the Constitution as a dynamicdocument, with contemporary values assisting in the search for meaning.What is INTERPRETATION?The art or process of discovering and expounding the intended signification of the language used iu a statute, will, contract, or any other written document, that is, the meaning which the author designed it to convey to others. People v. Com’rs of Taxes, 95 N. Y. 559; Rome v. Knox, 14 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 272; Ming v. Pratt, 22 Mont. 202, 56 Pac. 279; Tallman v. Tallman, 3 Misc. Rep. 465, 23 N. Y. Supp. 734. The discovery and representation of the true meaning of any signs used to convey ideas. Lieb. Herm. “Construction” is a term of wider scope than “interpretation ;” for, while the hitter is concerned only with ascertaining the sense and meaning of the subject-matter, the former may also be directed to explaining the legal effects and consequences of the instrument in question. Hence interpretation precedes construction, but stops at the written text. Close interpretation (interpretatio restricto) is adopted if just reasons, connected with the formation and character of the text, induce us to take the words in their narrowest meaning. This species of interpretation has generally been called “literal,” but the term is inadmissible. Lieb. Herm. 54. Extensive interpretation (interpretatio extensiva, called, also, “liberal interpretation”) adopts a more comprehensive signification of the word. Id. 58. Extravagant interpretation (interpretatio excedens) is that which substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the true one. It is therefore not genuine interpretation. Id. 59. Free or unrestricted interpretation (interpretatio soluta) proceeds simply on the general principles of Interpretation in good faith, not bound by any specific or superior principle. Id. 59. Limited or restricted interpretation (interpretatio limitata) is when we are influenced by other principles than the strictly hermeneutic ones. Id. 60. Predestined interpretation (interpretatio predestinata) takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived views or desires. This includes artful interpretation, (interpretatio vafcr.) by which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one he knows to have been intended. Id. 00. It is said to be either “legal,” which rests on the same authority as the law itself, or “doctrinal,” which rests upon its intrinsic reasonableness. Legal interpretation may be either “authentic,” when it is expressly provided by the legislator, or “usual,” when it is derived from unwritten practice. Doctrinal interpretation may turn on the meaning of words and sentences, when it is called “grammatical,” or on the intention of the legislator, when it is described as “logical.” When logical interpretation stretches the words of a statute to cover its obvious meaning, it is called “extensive;” when, on the other hand, it avoids giving full meaning to the words, in order not to go beyond the intention of the legislator, it is called “restrictive.” Holl. Jur. 344. As to strict and liberal interpretation, see CONSTRUCTION. In the civil law, authentic interpretation of laws is that given by the legislator himself, which is obligatory on the courts. Customary interpretation (also called “usual”) is that which arises from successive or concurrent decisions of the court on the same subject-matter, having regard to the spirit of the law, jurisprudence, usages, and equity; as distinguished from “authentic” interpretation, which is that given by the legislator himself. Houston v. Robertson, 2 Tex. 26.

Law Dictionary: What is INTERPRETATION? definition of INTERPRETATION (Black's Law Dictionary) ConstructionThe process by which the meaning of an ambiguous provision of a statute, written document, or oral agreement  is determined.A judge usually makes a construction of an unclear term in a document at issue in a case that involves a dispute as to its legal significance. The judge examines the circumstances surrounding the provision, laws, other writings, verbalagreements dealing with the same subject matter, and the probable purpose of the unclear phrase in order to conclude the proper meaning of such words. Once the judge has done so, the court will enforce the words as construed.However, for language that is plain and clear, there cannot be a construction.When ambiguous language is given its exact and technical meaning, and no other equitable considerations or reasonable implications are made, there has been a strict or literal construction of the unclear term.A liberal or equitable construction permits a term to be reasonably and fairly evaluated so as to implement the object and purpose for which the document is designed. This does not mean that the words will be strained beyond theirnatural or customary meanings.A rule of construction is a principle that either governs the effect of the ascertained intention of a document or agreement containing an ambiguous term or establishes what a court should do if the intention is neither express nor implied.Aregular pattern of decisions concerning the application of a particular provision of a statute is a rule of construction that governs how the text is to be applied in similar cases.The constitutionality of an ambiguous statute is a Question of Law and a matter of construction within the province of the court. The meaning of the language of the statute must be determined in light of its objectives, purposes, andpractical effect as a whole. If a statute is so ambiguous that a judge cannot make a reasonable construction of its disputed provisions, and a reasonable person could not determine from reading it what the law orders or prohibits, it is VOIDFOR VAGUENESS because it violates the guarantee of Due Process of Law.Some states have codified terms that had in the past been subject to repeated judicial construction. The need for court proceedings to determine the real meaning of some terms has been eliminated by enactment of statutes that givespecific meanings—such as specifying that "calendar day" means a twenty-four hour period starting on midnight of one date and ending midnight of the next day.

Legal HermeneuticsThe question of how best to determine the meaning of a given text (legal or otherwise) has always been the chief concern of the general field of inquiry known as hermeneutics. Legal hermeneutics is rooted in philosophical hermeneutics and takes as its subject matter the nature of legal meaning. Legal hermeneutics asks the following sorts of questions: How do we come to decide what a given law means? Who makes that decision? What are the criteria for making that decision? What should be the criteria? Are the criteria that we use for deciding what a given law means good criteria? Are they necessary criteria? Are they sufficient? In whose service do our interpretive criteria operate? How were these criteria chosen and by whom? Within what sociopolitical, sociocultural, and sociohistorical contexts were these criteria generated? Are the criteria we have used in the past to ascertain the meaning of a given law the criteria we should still use today? Why or why not? What personal or political goals do the meanings of laws serve? How can we come up with better meanings of laws? On what basis can one meaning of a given law be justifiably prioritized over another? Through an interrogation into these meta-interpretive questions, legal hermeneutics serves the critical role of helping the interpreter of laws reach a higher level of self-reflexivity

about the interpretive process. From a legal hermeneutical point of view, it is primarily through this heightened transparency about the process of interpretation that better meaning assessments are generated.Some distinctive features of legal hermeneutics are (1) it is rooted in philosophical hermeneutics; (2) within the schema of mainstream philosophies of law, it is most closely conceptually related to legal interpretivism; (3) it shares an antifoundationalist sensibility with many alternative theories of law; and (4) within jurisprudence proper (legal theory), its primary substantive focus is on the debate in constitutional theory between the interpretive methods of originalism and non-originalism.4. Legal Hermeneutics in Jurisprudence ProperThe primary focus of contemporary legal hermeneutics is the debate in constitutional theory between the interpretive methods of originalism and non-originalism.  Originalism is the view, generally, that the meaning of the constitution is to be found by determining the original intent of the Framers, understood to be most prudently found in the text of the constitution itself (Scalia and Garner 2012; Calabresi 2007; Monaghan 2004). By contrast, non-originalism is the view, generally, that the constitution is a living, breathing document meant more as a set of guidelines for future lawmakers than as a strict rulebook demanding literal compliance (Cross 2013; Balkin 2011; Goodwin 2010).  For clarification purposes, it should be noted that the divide between originalism and non-originalism is akin to the divide between epistemological foundationalism and antifoundationalism.Within the debate between originalists and non-originalists, clearly all legal hermeneutists are necessarily non-originalists, since by the basic tenets of legal hermeneutics, original intent cannot be ascertained. But, what separates the legal hermeneutist from the average non-originalist is a high degree of respect for the text of the constitution as an interpretive starting point, together with a call to heightened self-reflexivity regarding the degree to which one’s own pre-judgments, and the pre-judgments of previous interpreters, may be affecting the interpretive process. By the same token, just as the legal interpretivist is constrained by the principles of legal practice in the interpretive process, the legal hermeneutist is similarly constrained by the spirit of the text. Finally, while the goal of the average non-originalist is a definitive interpretation of the text, however at odds with the original intent of the Framers, the legal hermeneutist has the more modest goal of deconstructing the mosaic of considerations that went into previous interpretations in an effort to examine each tile of the mosaic, one by one, more in the service of understanding the text/law within a given context than in the service of producing anything on the order of a definitive interpretation for posterity.Another way of thinking about legal hermeneutics, however, is to see it as neither originalist nor non-originalist, but orthogonal to the originalist/antioriginalist continuum. In other words, it is consistent with the themes of legal hermeneutics that it rejects the originalist/antioriginalist continuum itself as wrong-headed and unproductive. Indeed, legal hermeneutics rejects interpretive method altogether in favor of a call to an increased level of self-reflexivity on the part of the interpreter, a call that is meant to actively and consciously engage the interpreter in the interpretive process in a way that neither originalism nor non-originalism demands.On the contemporary scene, George Taylor’s work in legal hermeneutics follows Ricoeur’s in philosophical hermeneutics. In his “Hermeneutics and Critique in Legal Practice,” Taylor argues that Ricoeur’s approach to hermeneutics gets it right when it attempts to mediate the difference between

understanding and explanation (Taylor 2000: 1101 et seq.).  Understanding, on this view, is obtained through hermeneutic methods, but explanation is obtained through science.  Ricoeur, according to Taylor, sees the interpretive enterprise as containing both elements. The way Taylor sees it, Ricoeur’s emphasis on the narrative nature of meaning acknowledges the roles of both understanding and explanation in a successful interpretation (Taylor 2000: 1123). The usefulness of legal hermeneutics, for Taylor, is that it correctly identifies and brings to the forefront that there is explanation or fact in understanding or interpretation, and there is understanding or interpretation in explanation or fact, shedding a kind of glaring light on all understandings that might deny this reality. The goals of originalism , on this view, are simply impossible to reach.. . .Drawing themes and seeking overlap between the various contemporary legal hermeneutists, a legal hermeneutical approach to constitutional theory can be understood as a call to the interpreter of the constitution to take into conscious consideration the following factors when engaged in constitutional interpretation: (1) the identity of the interpreter, of previous interpreters, and the original author, (2) the sociohistorical context in which the text was written and in which the interpretation is taking place, (3) the political climate at the time the text was written and in which the interpretation is taking place, (4) the extent to which the meaning of words and concepts relevant to the interpretation have changed or have not changed over time, (5) the particularity of experience of those affected by a given law, (6) the extent to which that experience is acknowledged or unacknowledged by previous interpretations, (7) the relationship between who the interpreter is, who the interpreter takes herself to be, and the kinds of interpretive choices the interpreter makes, (8) the necessary truth that original meaning is an illusion and cannot be ascertained, and (9) the extent to which one’s own pre-judgments enter into one’s attempt at ascertaining meaning. This final aspect adds a level of self-reflexivity to the interpretive enterprise that is understood to significantly improve the quality of the interpretation. In other words, from the vantage point of legal hermeneutics, the more that assumptions customarily unacknowledged in mainstream legal theory are excavated and examined, the greater the degree of legitimacy of the interpretation.5. ConclusionLegal hermeneutics is an approach to legal texts that understands that the legal text is always historically embedded and contextually informed so that it is impossible to understand the law simply as a product of reason and argument. Instead, meaning in the law takes place according practical, material, and context-dependent factors such as power, social relations, and other contingent considerations. As Gerald Bruns has put it:Legal hermeneutics is what occurs in the give-and-take—the dialogue—between meaning and history. The historicality of the law means that its meaning is always supplemented whenever the law is understood. This understanding is always situated, always an answer to some unique question that needs deciding, and so is different from the understanding of the law in its original meaning, say, the understanding a legal historian would have in figuring the law in terms of the situation in which it was originally handed down. The historicality of the law means that its meaning is always supplemented whenever it is understood or interpreted. Supplementation always takes the form of self-understanding; that is, it is generated by the way we understand ourselves—how we see and judge ourselves—in light of the law. But, this self-

understanding throws its light on the law in turn, allowing us to grasp the original meaning of the law in a new way. The present gives the past its point. (Bruns 1992)This seems to mean, at a minimum, that every Supreme Court decision is an interpretation, which directly undermines all originalist approaches to constitutional theory.The claim that every Supreme Court decision is an act of interpretation, however, is not a claim about the indeterminacy of meaning itself but a more modest claim about the impossibility of ascertaining original meaning. The difference between these two positions is subtle but important. While for the non-originalist, the possibility of authoritative meaning is an illusion, for the legal hermeneutist more and less authoritative meanings are possible and are a function of the interpreter’s taking conscious account of several key factors that inform and shape the interpretive process. Taking conscious account of each of these factors when attempting to interpret a given legal text lends to the interpretative process a sort of legitimacy and authority, the possibility of which most non-originalist positions deny.Legal hermeneutics, then, can be understood as an anti-method in constitutional theory. As Gregory Leyh has identified, “[H]ermeneutics neither supplies a method for correctly reading texts nor underwrites an authoritative interpretation of any given text, legal or otherwise” (Leyh 1992: xvii). Instead, “the activity of questioning and adopting a suspicious attitude toward authority is at the heart of hermeneutical discourse. Hermeneutics involves confronting the aporias that face us, and it attempts to undermine, at least in partial ways, the calm assurances transmitted by the received views and legal orthodoxies” (Leyh 1992: Ibid.). Arguably, any approach to legal hermeneutics that rejects its distinctively critical enterprise, then, misses the point of legal hermeneutics entirely. As an approach to legal interpretation, it is necessarily, following Heidegger and Gadamer, a complete rejection of the gods of both truth and method in favor of a call to the interpreter of laws to cast an incisive and self-reflexive gaze on all that is called mainstream legal orthodoxy.

Legal hermeneutics studies the interpretation and meaning of written law. By way of contrast with the related discipline of forensic rhetoric, the study of oral argumentation and persuasion in court, legal hermeneutics is best defined as a textual discipline which dates back to the classical codifications of Greek and Roman law. While the term hermeneutics is derived from the messenger god Hermes and is used by Aristotle as the title of a work concerned with the logic of interpretation, Peri hermeneias, legal hermeneutics really only developed with the growth and medieval reception of Roman law. The Roman legal tradition was pre-eminently a tradition of ius scriptum or written law, of codes and codifications. The custody, interpretation and transmission of the great texts of Roman law gave rise to an exemplary discipline of hermeneutics. Its task was that of preserving, collating, translating and applying the archaic, foreign (Latin) and fragmentary texts of the legal tradition to contemporary and vernacular circumstances far removed in time and space from the original contexts of the written law. In later eras and particularly in periods of crisis or renewal of the legal tradition, the problems of text, interpretation and meaning in law have led to the revival of the concerns and traditions of legal hermeneutics.

What is 'exegesis'?

Exegesis, as indicated by its etymology, is the act of critically interpreting a text in an attempt to"draw the meaning out" of the text. (This is in contrast to what has come to be know as eisegesis, where one reads his own meaning into the text.)