STATE OF MAINE FRANKLIN F. ARBOUR JR. HUMPHREY, J....Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD,...
Transcript of STATE OF MAINE FRANKLIN F. ARBOUR JR. HUMPHREY, J....Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD,...
MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2016ME126Docket: Ken-15-519Argued: June8,2016 Decided: August11,2016Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.
STATEOFMAINEv.
FRANKLINF.ARBOURJR.HUMPHREY,J.
[¶1] Franklin Arbour Jr. appeals from a judgment of conviction for
multiple drug offenses entered by the Superior Court (Kennebec County,
E.Walker, J.) following a jury trial. He contends that (1) the court erredby
denyinghismotiontosuppressevidenceseizedpursuanttoasearchwarrant;
(2)thecourterredbydenyinghismotiontosuppressastatementhemadeto
a police officer before receivingMiranda warnings; and (3) the evidence of
drugquantityattrialwasinsufficienttosupporthisconvictionforaggravated
traffickingofheroin.1Weaffirmthejudgment.
1Weareunpersuadedby,anddonotdiscussfurther,Arbour’sclaimsthattheevidenceattrial
wasotherwiseinsufficienttosupporthisconvictions,thatthecourterroneouslyinstructedthejury,andthatheisentitledtoanewtrialduetoprosecutorialmisconduct.
2
I.BACKGROUND
A. SearchWarrant
[¶2]OnSeptember17,2014,Augustapolicesoughtasearchwarrantto
conductasearchatanapartmentlocatedat58RiverStreetinAugusta.Inthe
affidavit accompanying the request for a searchwarrant,DetectiveEricDos
Santosofferedthefollowingfacts. HehadrecentlyarrestedJohnHowardon
outstanding warrants and for a probation violation. While Howard was
detainedatthecountyjailonaprobationviolationhold,heagreedtoprovide
information regarding stolen tools found in his vehicle and other criminal
activity;thedetectivearrangedtohavetheprobationholdliftedandHoward
released.HowardtoldthedetectivethathehadsoldstolentoolsforArbour;
thatArboursoldstolenmerchandiseoutofhis residenceon the top floorof
58River Street; that Howard had made multiple trips for Arbour from the
apartment to sell or pawn stolen tools in Maine, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts;andthathewouldreceivegasmoneyandheroinfromArbour
inexchangeforsellingthetoolsforhim.Howardalsotoldthedetectivethat
hewould buyheroin fromArbour for his ownuse, and thatArbour usually
had“acoupleofbundles”ofheroin—meaningatleasttwentybagsofheroin—
inhisapartmentatanygiventime.Howardalsodescribedanaircompressor
3
that he had seen at Arbour’s apartment on his most recent visit, which
DetectiveDosSantosnotedmatchedthedescriptionofacompressorthatwas
recentlyreportedstoleninAugusta.Finally,Howardprovidedahand-drawn
mapofArbour’sapartmentandindicatedthatnotonlyweretherestolentools
in the apartment, but there was also a marijuana grow operation in the
adjoining attic. The detective confirmed through a police database that
Howard had sold tools to pawn shops in Maine, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts. The court (Augusta, E. Walker, J.) issued a search warrant
authorizing, inter alia, a search of the apartment and the seizure of heroin,
marijuana,otherscheduleddrugs,andtools.2
B. ExecutionoftheSearchWarrantandArbour’sArrest
[¶3] Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the
evidenceattrialestablishesthefollowingfacts.Statev.Robinson,2016ME24,
¶2,134A.3d828. OnSeptember17,2014,officerswiththeAugustaPolice
Department and the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency executed the search
warrant at the top floor apartment at58River Street,whichwasknownby
policetobetheresidenceofArbourandhisgirlfriend,AngieSousa.Whenlaw
enforcement arrived to execute the warrant, Sousa was the only person
2Theatticwasnotspecificallydescribedinthewarrant,butthisissuewasnotraisedbeforethesuppressioncourtoronappeal.
4
presentintheapartment.Atsomepoint,Arbourshowedupattheapartment
withoutbeingcontactedbylawenforcement3andspokewithDetectiveJason
Cote,whowas in theapartment’sentryarea. ArbourtoldCoteto“goahead
andarrestmenow”andstated thathisgirlfriend,Sousa, “hadnothing todo
withit.”4 CoteplacedArbourunderarrestandnotifiedDosSantos,whowas
searching the attic at the time. Both detectives transported Arbour to the
Augusta Police Department. At the police department and before receiving
Miranda warnings, Arbour made an incriminating statement, which was
recordedbyaninterviewroomcamera.
[¶4] During the search, the police found 114 marijuana plants and
approximately twenty-five pounds of processedmarijuana in the apartment
andtheadjoiningattic.Intheonlyroombeingusedasabedroom,thepolice
foundseveralitemsthatwouldlikelybeusedbyaman,aswellasadebitcard
inArbour’sname, in thenightstandon the left-hand sideof thebed. In the
samearea,thepolicealsofoundathermos,whichcontained,relevanttothis
3EvidencepresentedatthehearingonArbour’smotiontosuppressastatementhelatermade
at thepolicedepartmentestablished that thepoliceallowedSousa to leave theapartmentbeforeArbourshowedup.Sousawaslaterarrestedandchargedwithadrugoffense.
4AtthehearingonArbour’smotiontosuppresshislaterstatement,Cotetestifiedthat,withoutprompting, Arbour told him to “go ahead and arrest me now” and stated, “[my] girlfriend hadnothingtodowiththis.”
5
appeal,1,252packetsofwhatthepolicebelievedtobeheroinandasandwich
bagcontainingwhatappearedtobecocainebase.5
C. Charges
[¶5] On November 14, 2014, a grand jury returned an eight-count
indictmentchargingArbourwiththefollowing:
• Aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (heroin) (Class A),17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(H)(2015);
• Aggravatedtraffickingofscheduleddrugs(heroin)withapriorconviction(ClassA),17-AM.R.S.§1105-A(1)(B)(1)(2015);
• Aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs (cocaine/cocainebase) with a prior conviction (Class A), 17-A M.R.S.§1105-A(1)(B)(1);
• Unlawfultraffickinginscheduleddrugs(cocaine/cocainebase)(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(A)(2015);
• Unlawful trafficking inscheduleddrugs(marijuana)(ClassC),17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(F)(2015);
• Aggravated cultivating of marijuana (Class B), 17-A M.R.S.§1105-D(1)(A)(2)(2015);
• Unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (cocaine base)(ClassB),17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(A)(2)(2014);6and
• Unlawful possession of scheduled drugs (heroin) (Class C),17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(B)(1)(2014).
Arbour pleaded not guilty to all charges at his arraignment on
November25,2014.
5 The thermos also contained approximately 11.7 grams of bk-MDEA (“bath salts”), and the
policefoundstolentoolsthroughouttheapartment.
6 Subsections1107-A(1)(A)and(B)havesincebeenamended. SeeP.L.2015,ch.308,§§1,2;P.L.2015,ch.346,§6(effectiveOct.15,2015).
6
D. MotiontoSuppressEvidenceSeizedfromApartment
[¶6]Arbourmovedtosuppressallevidenceseizedfromtheapartment,
andhelaterfiledasupplementalmotionforaFrankshearingpertainingtothe
searchwarrantaffidavit.SeeFranksv.Delaware,438U.S.154,155-56(1978).
A hearing was held on May 26, 2015, and the court (KennebecCounty,
Murphy,J.)deniedbothmotions.7Initsruling,thecourtfoundthattherewas
a substantialbasis for the findingofprobable cause supporting thewarrant
because (1) the information provided byHoward as related in the affidavit
was very specific; (2) Howard demonstrated a base of knowledge from his
criminalexploitswithArbour;(3)Howard’scredibilitywassupportedbyhis
statementsagainstpenalinterestregardinghisuseandpossessionofheroin;
and(4)hiscredibilitywasfurtherbolsteredbythecorroboratinginformation
regardinghissellingof toolsandhisdescriptionofanaircompressor in the
apartment.
7ThecourtdeniedthemotionforaFrankshearingbecauseitfoundthatthesearchwarrantwas
supported by probable cause evenwithout considering the statement in the affidavit thatwouldhave been the subject of theFranks hearing. See State v. Torrey, 1998ME5, ¶ 4, 704A.2d 397.Arbourdoesnotchallengethisaspectofthecourt’sdecisiononthisappeal.
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E. MotiontoSuppressStatementatPoliceDepartment
[¶7] Arbour also moved to suppress a statement he made in the
interviewroomatthepolicedepartmentbeforereceivingMirandawarnings.
On July 23, 2015, the court held a testimonial hearing on the motion.
DetectivesCoteandDosSantostestified,andthecourtwatchedtheinterview
room video. In an order dated July 24, 2015, the court (Augusta,Fowle, J.)
deniedArbour’smotion.
[¶8]Thecourtfoundthefollowingfacts,whicharesupportedbyrecord
evidence. SeeStatev.Lovett,2015ME7,¶3,109A.3d1135. Atsomepoint
between the timewhenArbourwasarrestedat theapartmentandwhenhe
made the statement in question at the police department, Dos Santos was
informed that Arbour had asked to be arrested upon his arrival at the
apartment.AfterArbourwastakentothepolicedepartment,hewasputinan
interview room. Hewas alone in the room for approximately twominutes,
handcuffedbehindhisback.DetectiveDosSantosenteredtheroomandspent
lessthantwominutes“describingwhathadoccurredthatday,”includingthat
Sousa,Arbour’sgirlfriend,hadbeenarrestedandchargedwithdrugoffenses.
8
Arbourthenstated,“Shehadnothingtodowithit.It’sallme.”8Atthatpoint,
thedetectiveinstructedArbourtonotmakeanyfurtherstatements, finished
explaining what had occurred that day, and then provided him with the
warningsrequiredbyMirandav.Arizona,384U.S.436(1966). AfterArbour
invokedhisrighttoremainsilent,thedetectiveterminatedtheinteraction.
[¶9] Based on its findings, the court concluded that Arbour was not
subjected to custodial interrogation at the time he made his incriminating
statementbecause“theactionsofDetectiveDosSantosinproviding[Arbour]
withasummaryoftheevidenceagainsthim,andinformationastothestatus
ofMs.Sousa,[doesnot]constitut[e]astatementreasonablylikelytoelicitan
incriminatingresponse,norwassuchastatementcalculatedtodoso.”
F. Trial
[¶10]Atwo-daytrialcommencedonAugust24,2015.Thejuryviewed
therelevantportionoftheinterviewroomvideo.Arbourpresentedevidence
tosuggestthatheandSousaweremerelyhousesittingattheapartmentforan
incarceratedfriend,thatmultiplepeoplehadaccesstotheapartment,andthat
hewasnotresponsible for thedrugs. Hemoved fora judgmentofacquittal
8AlthoughthecourtfoundthatArbourhadstated,“Shehadnothingtodowithit,”or“Shehad
nothingtodowiththis,”thevideoappearstoshowthatArbouractuallysaid,“Shehadnothingtodowithanyofit.”Foraccuracy,weusethelatterversionintheremainderofthisopinion.
9
basedoninsufficiencyoftheevidenceatthecloseoftheState’scase-in-chief
and again at the close of trial. The court (Kennebec County, E. Walker,J.)
denied both motions. Six counts went to the jury,9 and the jury returned
verdictsofguiltyonallcounts.Arbourmovedforajudgmentofacquittalora
new trial, and the court denied the motion after a hearing on
October14,2015.ThecourtsentencedArbourtotwenty-fiveyearsinjailon
Count 1, with all but eighteen years suspended, and four years’ probation,
withconcurrentsentencesonallothercharges.Arbourtimelyappealedtous
fromboththeconvictionandhissentence.10
II.DISCUSSION
A. MotiontoSuppressEvidenceSeizedfromApartment
[¶11]Arbourfirstcontendsthatthecourterredbydenyinghismotion
to suppress evidencebecause the affidavit in support of the searchwarrant
did not establish probable cause. Specifically, he argues that the affidavit
“fail[ed]tosetforthsufficientinformationestablishing[Howard]’sveracityor
reliability.”
9 Arbour stipulated to the prior conviction alleged in Counts 2 and3 of the indictment. The
court,withagreementof theparties, consolidatedCounts1 and2of the indictment intoa singlecountandCounts3and4intoasecondcounttosubmittothejury.
10 The Sentence Review Panel denied Arbour’s request for leave to appeal his sentence onDecember17,2015.
10
[¶12] We “reviewdirectly the findingof probable causemadeby the
[judge] who issued the warrant, affording great deference to the issuing
[judge],” State v.Wright, 2006ME 13, ¶ 8, 890 A.2d 703, andwe “draw all
reasonable inferences from the affidavit to support the finding of probable
cause. . .limit[ing]ourinquirytowhetherthereisasubstantialbasisforthe
findingofprobablecauseunderthetotalityofthecircumstancestest,”Statev.
Estabrook,2007ME130,¶5,932A.2d549.Pursuanttothattest,“[p]robable
causeisestablishedwhen,givenallthecircumstancessetforthintheaffidavit
before [the judge], including theveracityandbasisofknowledgeofpersons
supplyinghearsay information, there isa fairprobability thatcontrabandor
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” State v. Rabon,
2007ME 113, ¶ 22, 930 A.2d 268 (quotation marks omitted). “When a
warrant affidavit reports information provided by an informant . . . the
totality-of-the-circumstancesapproachpermitsabalancedassessmentof the
relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability)
attending[the]informant’stip.”Id.¶23(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶13] Aninformant’sassertions,ontheirown,mayestablishprobable
cause if the affidavit demonstrates the informant’s reliability or basis of
knowledge,suchasfirsthandobservationofcontrabandorillegalactivity.See
11
id.¶24;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Taylor,985F.2d3,6(1stCir.1993)(“[T]he
affidavit may disclose an adequate basis for evaluating the informant’s
veracity through the very specificity and detail with which it relates the
informant’s first-handdescriptionoftheplacetobesearchedortheitemsto
beseized.”).Inaddition,aninformant’scredibilityisbolsterediftheaffidavit
containsstatementsagainsthisorherpenalinterest,eveniftheinformantis
from the “criminal milieu.” See Rabon, 2007ME113, ¶28, 930 A.2d 268
(quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Appleton, 297 A.2d 363, 369
(Me.1972). Even without sufficient information about the informant, an
informant’sassertionscanstillsupportprobablecauseiftheaffidavitcontains
“something more,” such as corroboration by outside sources. Rabon,
2007ME113,¶¶29-30,930A.2d268(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶14]Inthiscase,theaffidavit(1)provideddetailedinformationabout
the named informant, Howard, and explained how he had come to directly
observe contraband in the apartment; and (2) noted that Howard had
provided highly specific information, including a hand-drawn map of the
apartment. The affidavit also contained statements by Howard against his
penal interest. Furthermore, the police corroborated Howard’s assertions
thathehadpawnedorsoldtoolsashedescribedandthathehadobserveda
12
possibly stolen air compressor in the apartment. In these ways, this case
differs from Rabon, in which we concluded that the affidavit provided
insufficient information about the informant and that the police had only
corroborated “readily available information” that did not “show that the
tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity,” 2007 ME 113, ¶ 34,
930A.2d 268 (quotation marks omitted); unlike the informant in Rabon,
Howardprovided“insideinformation”aboutcriminalactivityandcontraband
intheapartment.Seeid.(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶15] The fact that the affidavit contains information that Howard’s
criminal history involves convictions for crimes of dishonesty, and that the
policearrangedforHowardtobereleasedfromincarcerationonaprobation
hold before he provided them with information, may be considered when
conducting the “balanced assessment” of the factors supporting or
undercutting the informant’s tip. See id. ¶ 23 (quotation marks omitted).
However, given the information in the affidavit unrelated to Howard,11 and
thedeference thatmust be shown to the judgewho issued thewarrant, see
11 InadditiontorecountingtheinformationprovidedbyHoward,theaffidavitstatedthatDos
SantoshadlookedupArbour’scriminalrecordandfoundthathehadpreviouslybeenconvictedofdrugcrimesanddealing instolenproperty,amongotheroffenses. “Anaffiant’sknowledgeof thetarget’spriorcriminalactivityor recordclearly ismaterial to theprobablecausedetermination.”UnitedStatesv.Taylor,985F.2d3,6(1stCir.1993);seealsoStatev.Gallant,531A.2d1282,1284(Me.1987)(consideringatarget’spriorconvictionfordrugtraffickinginassessingwhethertherewasprobablecauseforasearchwarrant).
13
Wright, 2006ME 13, ¶ 8, 890 A.2d 703, Howard’s criminal history and the
benefithereceivedfromthepolicedonotnegateprobablecause.
[¶16]Weconcludethattherewasasubstantialbasisforthefindingof
probablecausetoissuethesearchwarrantandthatthesuppressioncourtdid
noterrbydenyingArbour’smotiontosuppresstheevidenceseizedfromthe
apartment.12
B. MotiontoSuppressStatementatPoliceDepartment
[¶17]Arbournextcontendsthatthecourterredbydenyinghismotion
tosuppresshisstatementthatSousa“hadnothingtodowithanyofit,it’sall
me,”whichhemade toDosSantosat theAugustaPoliceDepartmentbefore
receiving Miranda warnings. He argues in part that he was subjected to
interrogationatthetimehemadethestatementbecausethedetectiveknew
that, by providing Arbourwith information about the evidence against him
and the charges against Sousa, he was likely to elicit an incriminating
response based on the fact that Arbour had alreadymade an incriminating
statementattheapartment.13
12 Becauseweconcludethattherewasasubstantialbasis forthefindingofprobablecauseto
issuethesearchwarrant,wedonotconsidertheState’salternative“goodfaith”argument.13 ArbourdoesnotdirectlyarguethatthedetectivewastryingtoplayuponArbour’spersonal
relationship with Sousa. Arbour’s contention that the “highly custodial environment” of theinterview roomshould factor intoour analysis in this case isnot supported. SeeRhode Island v.
14
[¶18] We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and “the
ultimate determination ofwhether the statement should be suppressed” de
novo. State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 8, 48 A.3d 769 (quotation marks
omitted).TheStateconcedesthatArbourwasincustodyatthetimehemade
thestatement,andthebasicfactsarenotindispute.Therefore,wemustonly
considerwhetherthecourterredbyconcludingthatArbourwasnotsubject
tointerrogationatthetimehemadethestatementatissue.
[¶19] “Apersonsubject to interrogationwhile inpolicecustodymust
firstbegivenaMirandawarning,otherwisestatementsmadeinthecourseof
the interrogation will not be admissible against that person.” State v.
Holloway, 2000ME 172, ¶ 13, 760 A.2d 223. Interrogation, in this context,
“refersnotonly to expressquestioning,but also to anywordsor actionson
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminatingresponsefromthesuspect.”RhodeIslandv.Innis,446U.S.291,
301(1980).14“Thetestfordeterminingwhetherapoliceofficer’sstatementis
Innis, 446U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (“‘Interrogation,’ as conceptualized in theMiranda opinion,mustreflectameasureofcompulsionaboveandbeyondthatinherentincustodyitself.”).
14 AlthoughDosSantos testifiedat thesuppressionhearingthat it ishispractice to informanarresteeofthechargesandevidenceagainsthimorher,hisstatementstoArbourlikelywerenotcommunications “normally attendant to arrest and custody,” which always fall outside thedefinitionof“interrogation”forpurposesofMiranda,Innis,446U.S.at301,suchas“[b]rief,routine
15
the functional equivalent of interrogation reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminatingresponseisanobjectiveone.”Statev.Smith,612A.2d231,233
(Me.1992). “Officersdonot interrogatea suspect simplybyhoping thathe
will incriminate himself,” and ordinarily, there is no interrogation in the
absenceofdirectquestioningunlessthedefendantissubjectedto“compelling
influences [or] psychological ploys.” Arizona v. Mauro, 481U.S.520, 529
(1987).Theoverridingconsideration“[i]ndecidingwhetherparticularpolice
conduct is interrogation [is] preventing government officials fromusing the
coercivenatureofconfinementtoextractconfessionsthatwouldnotbegiven
inanunrestrainedenvironment.”Id.at529-30.
[¶20] We have specifically recognized that the “Innis definition of
interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all
declaratorystatementsbypoliceofficersconcerningthenatureofthecharges
againstthesuspectandtheevidencerelatingtothosecharges.” Bragg,2012
ME102,¶16,48A.3d769(quotationmarksomitted). InBragg,aftertaking
an intoxilyzer test and being informed that her results were over the legal
limit, the defendant “responded [to the police officer] that she had thought
whensheorderedthesecondmargaritaatdinneritwasprobablyabadidea.” questionsposedtoasuspectduring‘booking’procedures,”Statev.Estes,418A.2d1108,1111(Me.1980)(alterationinoriginal)(quotationmarksomitted).
16
Id.¶6. Weconcludedthattheofficerhadmerelyprovided“amatter-of-fact
communication of the evidence” and that this communication was not the
functional equivalent of interrogation. Id. ¶ 16 (quotationmarks omitted).
Althoughwesuggestedthatourconclusionwasbasedtosomeextentonthe
factthatthedefendantwasentitledtotheintoxilyzertestinformationunder
state law, we also cited with approval other cases reaching broader
conclusions.Id.
[¶21] Forexample,wecitedCaputov.Nelson,455F.3d45,50-51(1st
Cir. 2006), inwhich the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
determinedthatapoliceofficerhadnotengagedinthefunctionalequivalent
of interrogation by using the defendant’s phone in his presence “to relay
informationaboutwhat theofficers foundat [thedefendant]’s residence” to
other officers. Bragg, 2012ME 102, ¶ 16, 48 A.3d 769. In discussing the
limits of Innis’s conception of “interrogation,” the Caputo court approvingly
citedPlazinichv.Lynaugh,843F.2d836,837,839(5thCir.1988),inwhichthe
Fifth Circuit concluded that an officer did not interrogate a defendant by
informinghimthathisco-defendanthadattemptedsuicide.Caputo,455F.3d
at51.InBragg,wealsocitedEasleyv.Frey,433F.3d969,971,974(7thCir.
2006), in which the Seventh Circuit held that an investigator had not
17
“interrogated” a defendant when he told the defendant about evidence
implicatinghiminaprisonmurderandinformedhimthathecouldbesubject
tothedeathpenaltyifconvicted.Bragg,2012ME102,¶16,48A.3d769.The
Easley court noted that there was no evidence that the investigator’s
statementswere“anythingmorethanamatter-of-factcommunicationof the
evidenceagainst[thedefendant]andthepotentialpunishmenthefaced”and
stated, “[W]e do not believe that the provision of information, even if its
weight might move a suspect to speak, amounts to an impermissible
‘psychologicalploy.’”Easley,433F.3dat974(quotationmarksomitted).
[¶22] Taken together, our opinion in Bragg and the cases we cited
approvinglystandforthepropositionthatinformingapersonoftheevidence
againsthim,andofaco-defendant’sstatus,doesnotconstituteinterrogation
in the absence of evidence that the person was subjected to “compelling
influences,”orthatthecommunicationwasa“psychologicalploy,”seeMauro,
481U.S.at529,toelicitanincriminatingresponse.SeeInnis,446U.S.at299
(describing “psychological ploys” as including positing the subject’s guilt,
minimizing the moral seriousness of the crime, and casting blame on the
victimorothers).Inthiscase,thereisnoevidenceofcompellinginfluencesor
that the detective was engaging in a “psychological ploy” to elicit an
18
incriminating statement from Arbour. Rather, the evidence supports the
court’sfindingsthatthedetectivecouldrecallknowingonlythatArbourhad
previouslyaskedtobearrested—notthathehadpreviouslymadeastatement
deflectingresponsibilityfromSousa;thatthedetectiveprovidedArbouronly
“withabriefsummaryastowhathadoccurredandwhatevidencehadbeen
seized”; thatArbour“wasnot invitedtoorencouragedtorespond”; that the
detective stopped Arbour frommaking any further statements; and that he
“quicklyendedanycommunication”withArbouronceheinvokedhisMiranda
rights.WeconcludethatArbourwasnotsubjecttointerrogationatthetime
hemadehisstatementandthereforethatthecourtdidnoterrbydenyinghis
motiontosuppress.15
C. HeroinQuantity
[¶23]Finally,Arbourchallengesthesufficiencyoftheevidenceofdrug
quantity supporting his conviction for aggravated trafficking of heroin.
BecauseArbourstipulatedtoapriordrugconviction, theStatehadtoprove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally or knowingly possessed
15Wenotethat“[a]nyknowledgethepolicemayhavehadconcerningtheunusualsusceptibilityof a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determiningwhetherthepoliceshouldhaveknownthattheirwordsoractionswerereasonablylikelytoelicitan incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8 (emphasis added).However, it would be difficult to conclude that the detective was aware of any “unusualsusceptibility” ofArbour to incriminate himselfmerely basedon the knowledge thatArbourhadaskedtobearrestedattheapartment.
19
“6gramsormoreor270ormoreindividualbags, folds,packages,envelopes
or containers of any kind containing heroin.” 17-A M.R.S. §1105-A(1)(H),
(1)(B)(1);seealso17-AM.R.S.§1103(1-A)(2015)(providingthat“apersonis
guiltyofunlawfultraffickinginascheduleddrugifthepersonintentionallyor
knowingly trafficks inwhat thepersonknowsorbelieves tobea scheduled
drug,which is in fact a scheduled drug”); 17-AM.R.S. §1101(17)(E) (2015)
(defining“traffick”toinclude“possess[ing]2gramsormoreofheroinor90or
more individual bags, folds, packages, envelopes or containers of any kind
containingheroin”).
[¶24] At trial, theStatepresentedevidence that1,252packets seized
from the apartment had the characteristics of heroin packaging and that a
certified chemist confirmed that five randomly chosen packets contained
heroin. The chemist further testified he could make the “common sense
inference” that theotherpacketsalsocontainedheroin,even ifhecouldnot
make a “scientific inference” to that effect. We conclude that this evidence
wassufficientforthejurytofindbeyondareasonabledoubtthat270ormore
of the packets seized from the apartment contained heroin. See State v.
Barnard,2001ME80,¶12,772A.2d852(holdingthateven“[i]ntheabsence
of a chemical analysis, other direct and circumstantial evidence,” including
20
testimonybyanexperienceddrugagent as to theappearanceof substances
believedtobedrugs,“canestablishbeyondareasonabledoubttheidentityof
drugs”).
[¶25]Arbour’ssuggestionthatourrecentdecisioninStatev.Pinkham,
2016ME59,137A.3d203,affectshisconvictionisincorrect.InPinkham,we
vacatedaherointraffickingconvictionwherethedefendantpleadedguiltyto
trafficking“2gramsormoreofheroin”buttheStatedidnotpresentevidence
sufficienttoshowthatthedefendanttrafficked“pure”heroininthatamount.
Pinkham, 2016ME 59, ¶¶ 3, 8, 23, 137A.3d 203. In this case, by contrast,
Arbourwasconvictedoftraffickingheroininaquantityof“6gramsormore
or270ormoreindividualbags,folds,packages,envelopesorcontainersofany
kindcontainingheroin.”BecausetheStatewasnotrequiredtoprovethatthe
packetscontainedacertainamountofpureheroin,Pinkhamdoesnotapply.
Seeid.¶15.
D. Conclusion
[¶26]Fortheforegoingreasons,weaffirmthejudgment.
Theentryis:
Judgmentaffirmed.
21
Onthebriefs:
Luann L. Calcagni, Esq., Augusta, for appellant Franklin F.Arbour,Jr.JanetT.Mills,AttorneyGeneral,andKatieSibley,Asst.Atty.Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appelleeStateofMaine
Atoralargument:
LuannL.Calcagni,Esq.,forappellantFranklinF.Arbour,Jr.KatieSibley,Asst.Atty.Gen.,forappelleeStateofMaine
KennebecCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCR-2014-958FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY