MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME129Docket: And-17-534Argued: July19,2018Decided: August30,2018 Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREYJJ.Majority:SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,GORMAN,HUMPHREY,JJ. Concurrence/Dissent:HJELM,MEAD,andJABAR,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

DONNAPAGNANIALEXANDER,J.

[¶1] TheState appeals fromanorderof the trialcourt (Androscoggin

County,MGKennedy,J.)suppressingevidenceseizedpursuanttoawarrantless

searchofDonnaPagnani’sjacketandvehicleafterfindingthatthesearchesof

those items and the seizure of the evidencewas not supported by probable

causeandwasinviolationofPagnani’sFourthAmendmentrights.1TheState

contendsthatthesearchofPagnani’sjacketwasalawfulsearchincidenttoher

arrest and that the drug evidence discovered in the jacket supported the

subsequent search for the illegal drugs that were discovered in Pagnani’s

1TheFourthAmendmentoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionprovides,“Therightofthepeopleto

besecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,andeffects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures,shallnotbeviolated.”U.S.Const.amend.IV.

2

vehicle.WevacatethesuppressionorderastotheevidencefoundinPagnani’s

jacket.2WeaffirmthesuppressionorderastotheevidencefoundinPagnani’s

vehicle.

I.PROCEDURALHISTORYANDFACTS

[¶2]InMarch2017,DonnaPagnaniwasindictedbytheAndroscoggin

Countygrand juryandchargedwithunlawful furnishingofscheduleddrugs,

ClassC,17-AM.R.S.§1106(1-A)(A)(2017),unlawfulpossessionofscheduled

drugs,ClassC,17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(B)(1)(2017),unlawfulpossessionof

scheduleddrugs,ClassD,17-AM.R.S.§1107-A(1)(C) (2017),operatingafter

suspension, Class E, 29-AM.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(D) (2017), and one count of

criminalforfeiture,15M.R.S.§5826(2017).

[¶3]Pagnanimovedtosuppresstheevidencefoundduringasearchof

herjacketandhervehicle,arguingthatbothsearcheswereillegalandthatall

evidencediscoveredduringthosesearchesshouldbesuppressed.

[¶4]AsuppressionhearingwasheldonNovember7,2017.TheState

presentedthetestimonyofonewitness:thearrestingofficer.Additionally,the

Stateenteredintoevidencethevideocapturedbythecameramountedinthe

2BecauseweconcludethatthesearchofPagnani’sjacketwasalawfulsearchincidenttoanarrest,

wedonotreachtheState’salternativeargumentthattheofficerhadprobablecausetosearchthejacket.

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officer’scruiser.OnNovember17,2017,thecourtissuedanordercontaining

thefollowingfindings,allofwhicharesupportedbytherecordexceptwhere

specificallynoted.

[¶5] Around noon on January 17, 2017, an Auburn police officer

observed Donna Pagnani driving her vehicle away from the Androscoggin

County Courthouse. The officer was familiar with Pagnani’s “extensive”

criminal history and believed that her driver’s license had recently been

suspended. The officer ran a license check on Pagnani but, by the time he

received the results of that check—which revealed that Pagnani’s driver’s

licensewasundersuspensionandthatshehadapriorconvictionforoperating

aftersuspension(OAS)—Pagnanihaddrivenaway.

[¶6]TheofficerdecidedtowaitforPagnanineartheresidencewherehe

believedshelived.Afterwaitingforabouttwohoursinhisunmarkedpolice

car,theofficerobservedPagnanidrivingtowardherhome. Heactivatedhis

blue lightsand initiateda trafficstopby followingPagnani’svehicle into the

driveway of her residence. As Pagnani got out of her vehicle, the officer

approachedherandinformedherthatherlicensewassuspendedforfailingto

payafine,towhichsherepliedthat itwasnot. Pagnaniprovidedtheofficer

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withherlicense,registrationandinsurancedocumentswhiletryingtocontact

theViolationsBureautoverifythatshehadpaidthefine.

[¶7] The officer then ran another license check and confirmed that

Pagnani’slicensewascurrentlysuspended.WhiletheofficerandPagnaniwere

standinginherdrivewaynexttohervehicle,theofficer,whoknewthatPagnani

hada pendingdrug trafficking case inNewHampshire, askedher about the

status of that case. Pagnani told him that the case had been dropped. The

officer askedPagnani if shehadanydrugsorweaponsonher, towhich she

respondedthatshedidnot.TheofficerthenaskedPagnaniifshewouldconsent

toasearchofhervehicle,andshesaidno.TheofficerthentoldPagnanithat

shewasunderarrestforoperatingaftersuspension.

[¶8]Pagnanididnotwillinglysubmittoarrest.Shecontinuedtotellthe

officer that she had “done nothingwrong” and continued to ask for time to

speakwithsomeoneat theViolationsBureau. Several times theofficer told

Pagnanitoputthephonedown,butshecontinuedtospeakwithsomeoneon

her phone and started to walk away from her vehicle. The officer advised

Pagnaninottomoveawayfromhim,butshewalkedawayfromtheofficerand

towardtheporchofherhome.Onceontheporch,Pagnaniremovedherjacket,

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placeditontheseatofachairontheporch,andsatinthechair.Pagnaniwas

wearingasleevelesstop.Thetemperaturewas34degrees.

[¶9]Theofficercalledforbackup.Whentherespondingofficersarrived,

they helped place Pagnani in handcuffs and put her into the back of the

arrestingofficer’svehicle.Pagnaniaskedwhatshewasbeingarrestedforand

wastoldthatshewasbeingarrestedforOAS.

[¶10]AfterPagnaniwasplacedinhandcuffsbytherespondingofficers,

thearrestingofficerpickedupPagnani’sjacketfromthechairandsearchedit.

Specifically, the officer testified that, as another officer “was walking Ms.

Pagnanitomyvehicle,Ithensearchedthejacketthatshehadtakenoff . . . .”

ThevideooftheincidentshowstheofficersearchingPagnani’s jacketalmost

immediately aftershewashandcuffedandremoved fromtheporch.3 In the

jacket the officer found a small loose rock, which, based on his experience,

training,andeducation,hebelievedwascocainebase.

3Inrulingonthemotiontosuppress,thetrialcourtfoundthatoncePagnani“washandcuffedand

securedinthevehicle,[theofficer]conductedawarrantlesssearchofthejacketshehadremovedandleftontheporch.”(Emphasisadded.)Thisfinding,suggestingamuchlongergapbetweenPagnani’sbeingremovedfromtheporchandthesearchofthejacket,isnotsupportedbytheevidenceintherecordorbyanyreasonableinferencedrawnfromtherecord.SeeStatev.Sasso,2016ME95,¶19,143A.3d124(“Weconsidertheevidence,andreasonableinferencesthatmaybedrawnfromtheevidence, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment to determine if the evidencerationallysupportsthetrialcourt’sdecision.”);seealsoStatev.Cooper,2017ME4,¶2,153A.3d759(“A findingof fact supportingasuppressionorderwillnotbedisturbedonappeal unless clearlyerroneous,thatis,lackinganycompetentevidenceintherecordtosupportit.”).

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[¶11]TheofficerthenattemptedtoopenPagnani’scar,butitwaslocked.

TheofficeraskedoneoftherespondingofficersifPagnanihadthekeystoher

carinherhand,whichshedid.Headvisedtherespondingofficersthathehad

foundcocainebaseinherjacketandwasgoingto“tossthecar.”Theresponding

officersphysicallyremovedthekeysfromPagnani’shands.

[¶12] Theofficerthensearchedthevehicleandfoundasandwichbag

containingfivesmallerbagsofabrownpowder.Theofficerbelievedthatthe

substanceinthebagswasheroin.

[¶13] Based on these findings, the court granted Pagnani’smotion to

suppresstheevidencefoundduringthesearchofherjacketandvehicle.The

State,withtheapprovaloftheAttorneyGeneral,filedatimelynoticeofappeal.

See15M.R.S.§2115-A(1),(5)(2017);M.R.App.P.21(b).

II.LEGALANALYSIS

A. SearchoftheJacketIncidenttoArrest

[¶14] TheStatearguesthat,contrarytothecourt’sdetermination,the

officer’s search of Pagnani’s jacket was a lawful search incident to arrest

becauseshewaswearingthejacketatthetimeshewasplacedunderarrest.

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the factual

findingsmadebythecourtforclearerrorandwereviewissuesoflawandthe

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court’sultimatedeterminationofwhethertheevidenceshouldbesuppressed

denovo.Statev.Prinkleton,2018ME16,¶17,178A.3d474;Statev.Lockhart,

2003ME108,¶15,830A.2d433.

[¶15]TheFourthAmendmentrequiresthatallsearchesbereasonable.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Reasonableness is measured in objective terms by

examining the totalityof thecircumstances.” Statev.Sargent,2009ME125,

¶10,984A.2d831.Reasonablenessgenerallyrequiresawarrantandprobable

cause,butthereareexceptionstothatrequirement,includingwhenasearchis

conductedincidenttoalawfularrest.Rileyv.California,134S.Ct.2473,2482

(2014);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Robinson,414U.S.218,235-36(1973);Statev.

Foy, 662 A.2d 238, 241 (Me. 1995). The first question we must address,

therefore, iswhether the search of Pagnani’s jacketwas proper as a search

“incident”toherarrest. AstheSupremeCourtstatedinRiley, “theextentto

whichofficersmaysearchproperty foundonornear thearrestee”hasbeen

debated for nearly as long as the exception has been recognized. Riley,

134S.Ct.at2482-83.

[¶16] The facts in this case are particularly analogous to those in

Robinson.There,anofficeronpatrolspottedanindividual,Robinson,drivinga

vehicle;theofficerhadreasontobelievethatRobinson’slicensetodrivewas

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suspendedandconfirmedthathislicensetodrivewassuspended;theofficer

conductedatrafficstopandarrestedRobinsonfordrivingwhilesuspended;a

post-arrestsearchofRobinson’scoatledtodiscoveryofapackagecontaining

illegaldrugs.414U.S.at220-23.TheSupremeCourtapprovedthesearchand

seizureoftheillegaldrugsasapropersearchandseizureincidenttoanarrest.

Id.at235-36.

[¶17]InRobinson,theCourtheldthat“[i]tisthefactofthelawfularrest

which establishes the authority to search, andwe hold that in the case of a

lawfulcustodialarrestafullsearchofthepersonisnotonlyanexceptiontothe

warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’

searchunderthatAmendment.” Id.at235. TheCourtfurtherobservedthat

“[h]avinginthecourseofalawfulsearchcomeuponthecrumpledpackageof

cigarettes, [the officer] was entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection

revealed the heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as fruits,

instrumentalities,orcontrabandprobativeofcriminalconduct.”Id.at236.

[¶18] IfPagnanihadbeenwearingher jacketat themomentshewas

handcuffed,therewouldbenoquestionthatthesearchofherjacketwouldhave

beenproperasasearch incident toarrest forwhichnowarrant is required.

Here, however, Pagnaniwaswearing her jacketwhen advised that shewas

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underarrest,butsheremovedherjacketandsatonitbeforeshewastakeninto

physicalcustody.Pagnaniarguesthat,becauseshewasnolongerwearingthe

jacketatthetimeshewashandcuffed,thewarrantlesssearchofherjacketwas

improper.

[¶19] Theholding inRobinson that, incident to a lawful arrest, police

may,without awarrant, search an arrestee’s person and items immediately

associated with the person,4 and seize weapons, items of contraband, or

evidenceofacrimefoundinthesearch,wasreaffirmedinRiley,134S.Ct.at

2482-85. InRiley, theCourtwascalledupon toapply thesearch incident to

arrest doctrine to cell phones. The Court held that cell phones5 believed to

containevidenceofcriminalactivitycouldbeseizedincidenttoalawfularrest,

butqualifiedRobinsontoholdthatasubsequentsearchofthedigitalmemory

ofthecellphonesafterthearrestcouldnotbeconductedwithoutawarrant,or

withoutexigentcircumstancesorapplicationofsomeotherexception to the

warrantrequirement.Id.

4InUnitedStatesv.Chadwick,433U.S.1,15(1977),theCourtclarifiedthatsuchsearchesmust

belimitedto“personalproperty...immediatelyassociatedwiththepersonofthearrestee.”5 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480, involved consolidated appeals in two cases involving subsequent

searchesofthedigitalmemoryofcellphonesfollowingseizureofthecellphonesincidenttolawfularrests.

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[¶20] In explaining its decision in Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483-88, the

SupremeCourt referred to its decision inChimel v. California, 395U.S. 752,

762-63(1969),whereitheldthatoncethepolicearrest,orhaveprobablecause

to arrest, a suspect they do not need a warrant to search for weapons or

evidenceofcriminalactivitythatmightbereadilyconcealedordestroyed.The

Chimel court furtherheld that asearch incident toanarrestcouldextend to

itemsintheimmediateareaandassociatedwithanarrestee.Id.at763.“There

isamplejustification,therefore, forasearchofthearrestee’spersonandthe

area‘withinhisimmediatecontrol’—construingthatphrasetomeanthearea

from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible

evidence.”Id.

[¶21] InconsideringtheeffectofChimelonthecasepresentedtoit in

Riley,theCourtstated:

WefirstconsidereachChimelconcerninturn.Indoingso,wedonot overlook Robinson’s admonition that searches of a personincident to arrest, “while based upon the need to disarm and todiscoverevidence,”arereasonableregardlessof“theprobabilityinaparticulararrestsituationthatweaponsorevidencewouldinfactbefound.” Ratherthanrequiringthe“case-by-caseadjudication”thatRobinsonrejected,weaskinsteadwhetherapplicationofthesearch incident to arrest doctrine to this particular category ofeffectswould“untethertherulefromthejustificationsunderlyingtheChimelexception[.]”

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Riley,134S.Ct.at2485(internalcitationsomitted).Followingthisdirective,

weconcludethatapplyingthesearchincidenttoarrestdoctrinetothesearch

of Pagnini’s jacket would not “untether the rule from the justifications

underlyingtheChimelexception.”Id.Althoughtherewasno“evidence”ofthe

chargedOASthatmighthavebeenconcealedwithinPagnini’sjacket,Robinson

doesnotrequiresuchevidence:

Theauthority tosearchtheperson incident toa lawfulcustodialarrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discoverevidence,doesnotdependonwhatacourtmaylaterdecidewasthe probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons orevidencewouldinfactbefounduponthepersonofthesuspect.Acustodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is areasonableintrusionundertheFourthAmendment;thatintrusionbeinglawful,asearchincidenttothearrestrequiresnoadditionaljustification.Itisthefactofthelawfularrestwhichestablishestheauthority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawfulcustodialarrestafullsearchofthepersonisnotonlyanexceptiontothewarrantrequirementoftheFourthAmendment,butisalsoa“reasonable”searchunderthatAmendment.

Robinson,414U.S.at235.

[¶22]TwoyearsafterRobinsonwasdecided,weobservedthatoncethe

issueissearchofanarea,nottheperson,“[t]hisareawithinwhichasearchis

permitted depends upon the circumstances of each case and does not,

therefore,admitofprecisedelineation.Ithasbeenvariouslydescribedasthe

suspect’s ‘leaping range’ . . . or the area reasonably within the defendant’s

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‘lunge,reachorgrasp.’”Statev.LeBlanc,347A.2d590,595(Me.1975).Acoat

inachairinwhichapersonisseatediswellwithin“leapingrange.”

[¶23]ThepolicehadprobablecausetoarrestPagnaniforOAS.Pagnani

waswearingthejacketwhenshewasadvisedthatshewasunderarrestand

throughoutherinteractionswiththeofficerassheresistedarrest.SeeStatev.

Moulton, 1997ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361 (stating that for purposes of the

FourthAmendment,“seizureofthepersonoccurswhentheofficer,bymeans

ofphysicalforceorshowofauthority,hasinsomewayrestrainedthelibertyof

thecitizensuchthatheisnotfreetowalkaway”).

[¶24]TheofficercontinuedtotellPagnanithatshewasunderarrestand

nottowalkaway,butshedidnotcooperate.AlthoughPagnaniremovedher

jacketbeforebeinghandcuffed,shehadbeentoldshewasunderarrestbefore

sheremovedthejacket,andthejacket,thoughshewasnolongerwearingit,

remained associatedwith her person. Because the jacketwas on Pagnani’s

personatthetimethatshewasadvisedthatshewasunderarrestandremained

associatedwithherperson,evenasshesatonthejacket,seeChimel,395U.S.at

755-56,763,theofficer’ssearchofthejacketwasa lawfulsearchincidentto

arrest.

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B. SearchoftheVehicle

[¶25] The State further argues that the drug evidence discovered in

Pagnani’s jacket supplied a reasonable basis for the officer to search the

passenger compartment of Pagnani’s locked car. See Arizona v. Gant,

556U.S.332, 351 (2009) (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent

occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the

passengercompartmentatthetimeofthesearchoritisreasonabletobelieve

the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”). Based on the trial

court’s findings that the search of Pagnani’s vehicle was not supported by

probablecauseandwasoutsidethescopeofavehiclesearchincidenttoarrest,

thewarrantless searchof thevehiclewasnot justifiedby theevidence. We

affirmthecourt’ssuppressionorderastotheevidencefoundinthevehicle.

Theentryis:

The portion of the suppression ordersuppressing the evidence found in Pagnani’sjacket is vacated. The suppression order isaffirmed in all other respects. The case isremanded for further proceedings consistentwiththisopinion.

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HJELM, J., with whom MEAD and JABAR, JJ., join, concurring in part anddissentinginpart. [¶26] I concur with the portion of the Court’s opinion affirming the

suppression of evidence seized during the warrantless search of Donna

Pagnani’svehicle.ThewarrantlesssearchofPagnani’sjacket,however,cannot

bejustifiedasasearchincidenttoherarrest.Ithereforerespectfullydissent

fromtheCourt’sconclusiontothecontraryandwouldaffirmthesuppression

orderinitsentirety.

[¶27] It is an elemental principle that all searches conducted by law

enforcementofficialsmustbereasonable.U.S.Const.amend.IV.Warrantless

searchesareperseunreasonableabsentoneof“afewspecificallyestablished

andwell-delineatedexceptions”tothewarrantrequirement.Arizonav.Gant,

556U.S.332,338(2009)(quotationmarksomitted);accordStatev.MichaelM.,

2001ME92,¶6,772A.2d1179.Courtsmaynot“lightlydispense[]with”the

“requirementthatasearchwarrantbeobtained.”Chimelv.California,395U.S.

752,762(1969).

[¶28] A search conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest is one

exceptiontothewarrantrequirement.Id.at762-63.Forsuchasearchtobe

lawful, however, it must be confined to accomplish at least one of two

specificallydelineatedpurposesunderlyingthatdoctrine:officersafety—that

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is,searchingforweaponsorinstrumentsthatthearresteemightuseagainstthe

officer or that would allow the arrestee to escape—and preventing the

destruction or concealment of evidence. Id. These justifications define the

physical scope of a permissible search incident to an arrest. As we have

explained,

Theproperscopeofasearchincidenttoarrestextendstotheareawithin the suspect’s immediate physical control, the area fromwhichheorshemightgainpossessionofaweaponordisposableevidence. This areawithinwhichasearch ispermitteddependsuponthecircumstancesofeachcaseanddoesnot,therefore,admitof precise delineation. It has been variously described as thesuspect’s leaping range, or the area reasonably within thedefendant’s lunge, reach or grasp. This Court has held a searchvalidunder theChimeldoctrine if itencompassesanareawithintheconceivablecontrolofthesuspect.

Statev.LeBlanc,347A.2d590,595(Me.1975)(citationsomitted)(quotation

marksomitted).

[¶29]TheSupremeCourthasstatedthat“itisthefactofcustodialarrest

whichgivesrisetotheauthoritytosearch.”UnitedStatesv.Robinson,414U.S.

218,236(1973).Consequently,whenapersonissubjecttoacustodialarrest,

the law enforcement officer may search the area within the arrestee’s

“conceivable control,” an area identified at the time the search itself occurs.

LeBlanc, 347A.2dat595-96;United States v. Lyons, 706F.2d321,330 (D.C.

Cir.1983) (“[A] courtmust ask:was the area in question,at the time itwas

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searched, conceivably accessible to the arrestee . . . .” (emphasis added));cf.

Gant, 556 U.S. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent

occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the

passengercompartmentat the timeof the search....” (emphasisadded)). A

searchbeyondthatareaexceedsthepurposesofapropersearchincidenttoan

arrest and cannot be justified on that basis. As the Supreme Court has

explained,“Ifthereisnopossibilitythatanarresteecouldreachintothearea

that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the

search-incident-to-arrestexceptionareabsent....”Gant,556U.S.at339;see

Statev.York,324A.2d758,762-63(Me.1974)([“T]herationaleunderlyingthe

validity of searches incident to, and contemporaneous with, lawful arrests

stemsfromtheneedtoseizeweaponsandotherthingsontheaccused’sperson

orunderhis immediatecontrolwhichmightbeused toassaultanofficeror

effectanescapeortopreventthedestructionofevidenceofthecrime.”).

[¶30]TheStatebearstheburdenofdemonstratingthatthewarrantless

searchisjustified,seeChimel,395U.S.at762,and,onthisappeal,mustestablish

that the “courtwascompelled tomake findings in its favor.” Statev.Collier,

2013ME44,¶6,66A.3d563.Further,becauseneitherpartyrequestedthat

thecourtissuefindingsoffactandconclusionsoflawbeyondthosecontained

17

initsorder,“we‘inferthatthecourtfoundallthefactsnecessarytosupportits

judgment....’”Statev.Sasso,2016ME95,¶19,143A.3d124(quotingStatev.

Connor,2009ME91,¶9,977A.2d1003);seealsoStatev.Diana,2014ME45,

¶11,89A.3d132(explainingthatwe“willupholdthecourt’sdenialofamotion

tosuppress ifanyreasonableviewof theevidencesupports the trialcourt’s

decision”(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶31] The record fully supports the court’s conclusion that,when the

officerseizedandthensearchedPagnani’sjacketontheporch,thejacketwas

notwithinherconceivablecontrol. Pagnanihadbeenwearingthejacketbut

tosseditonaporchchairwhileshewasonhercellphonewiththeViolations

Bureautotrytogetinformationaboutthematterbeinginvestigated.Abitlater,

shesatdownonthechairwhereshehadputthejacket.Shewasthenplaced

undercustodialarrest. Evenbeforetheofficerinitiatedthesearch,however,

Pagnani was handcuffed with her arms secured behind her, and two other

officers were leading her down the porch stairs away from the jacket and

towardapolicecruiser.OneofthoseofficerswalkedinfrontofPagnaniand

another officer walked behind her—in other words, between her and the

jacket—andheldontooneofhersecuredarmsasshewastakentoandplaced

insideawaitingcruiser.

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[¶32]Inshort,beforethesearchoccurred,Pagnaniwasrestrained,she

wasoutnumberedbypoliceofficers,andshewasbeingledawayfromtheporch

whereshehadleftherjacket.Giventhesecircumstances,itwouldhavebeen

impossibleforPagnanitoreachintoherjackettoobtainaweaponoranescape

instrumentality,ortodestroyorconcealevidence. SeeGant,556U.S.at344

(concluding that the searchwas not authorized as an incident to the arrest

where“fiveofficers...outnumberedthethreearrestees,allofwhomhadbeen

handcuffedandsecuredinseparatepatrolcarsbeforetheofficerssearched[the

arrestee’s] car”); LeBlanc, 347 A.2d at 595-96 (concluding that the area

searchedwaswithinthearrestee’s“conceivablecontrol”wherehewaseightto

tenfeetfromthearea,hewasnothandcuffed,and“thepresenceofthepolice

officers [was not] a sufficiently effective restraint to render the immediate

surroundingareabeyondhiscontrol”).

[¶33]TheCourtobservesthat“[i]fPagnanihadbeenwearingherjacket

atthemomentshewashandcuffed,therewouldbenoquestionthatthesearch

ofherjacketwouldhavebeenproperasasearchincidenttoarrest,forwhich

no warrant is required.” Court’s Opinion ¶ 18. That point persuasively

demonstrateswhythesearchthatwasactuallyconductedwasillegal.Pagnani

was not wearing her jacket—and did not have access it—when the search

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occurred.Rather,theofficersearchedthroughPagnani’sjacketonlyaftershe

had been put in restraints andwas under the physical control of two other

officers.Neitheroftheessentialjustificationsforasearchincidenttoanarrest

remainedatthatpoint,renderingsuchasearchunconstitutional.6

[¶34] The record evidence supports—if it does not compel—the

conclusionthatwhenapoliceofficersearchedthejacketthatPagnanihadleft

behindonaporchchair,shewasnotinapositiontodoanythingwithit.Rather,

thejacketremainedpartofthisencounteronlybecausethesameofficerwho

had staked out her residence for two hours, purportedly to investigate a

suspectedmotorvehicleviolation,searchedthatarticleofclothingwithoutany

6 I recognize that some post-Chimel jurisprudence has provideda degree of tolerance in the

absenceofaclosetemporalrelationshipbetweenanarrestandasearchincidenttothatarrest—anapproachthathasdrawncriticismfromaleadingFourthAmendmentcommentator,whoreferstothose courts’ “questionable assumption that persons arrested and restrained by police arenonetheless possessed of considerable freedom of movement” that would allow the arrestees,despitebeingrestrained,togainaccesstoplaceswhereweaponsanddisposableevidencemightbepresent.SeeWayneR.LaFave,3Search&Seizure:ATreatiseontheFourthAmendment§5.5(a)at286,293n.33(5thed.2012). TheSupremeCourt,however,hascontinuedtoratifyandreaffirmChimel’sarticulationof the limitedcircumstanceswhereasearch incident toarrest isproper,seesupraDissentingOpinion¶¶28-29.Arizonav.Gant,556U.S.332,343(2009);NewYorkv.Belton,453U.S.454,460n.3(1981). Aspartofthatconstruct,Ganthasmadeclearthattheexistenceofthosecircumstancesismeasuredatthetimethesearchisconducted,556U.S.at351,whichtightensthemorecasualtemporalconnectioninwhichsomecourtsindulged.Therefore,IdonothesitatetoinvoketheestablishedprinciplesoriginatinginChimelandratifiedinlaterSupremeCourtopinions.Further,inthiscontext,asstatedabove,seesupraDissentingOpinion¶30,itisimportantto

bearinmindthat,inourappellaterole,weareobligatedtoexaminetherecordandthestateofthelawtodeterminewhetherthereis“anyreasonableviewoftheevidence”thatsupportsthecourt’sorderonthemotiontosuppress.Statev.Diana,2014ME45,¶11,89A.3d132(quotationmarksomitted).GiventheongoingvitalityoftheanalysissetoutinChimel,thisstandardofreviewcanonlylead to the conclusion that the court’s order suppressing evidence obtained from the search ofPagnani’sjacketissupportedbyareasonableassessmentoftheevidence.

20

legal basis. The court committed no error by suppressing the evidence

obtainedthroughthatillegalsearch,justasthecourtcorrectlydeterminedthat

theofficers’searchofhervehiclewasillegal.Iwouldaffirmtheentiretyofthe

suppression order, and therefore I dissent from the portion of the Court’s

opinionvacatingpartofthatorder.7

7Onthisappeal,theStatealsoarguesthattherewasprobablecausetosearchPagnani’sjacket.

This argument was not meaningfully presented below because the clear focus of the State’scontentionwasthatthesearchwasproperlyincidenttoanarrest,whichmakesitunderstandablethatthecourtdidnotmentionanyclaimedindependentprobablecausejustificationforthesearch.See State v.Wheeler, 252 A.2d 455, 458 (Me. 1969) (“It is awell established principle ofMaineappellateprocedureincriminalproceedingsthatquestionsnotproperlyraisedsoastohavebeenconsideredandruleduponbythetrialjudgewillnotbeconsideredandpasseduponforthefirsttimeonappeal.”).EveniftheStatepreservedtheargumentforappellateconsideration,itwouldbeunavailingfor

tworeasons.First,thecourtwasnotcompelledtofindfactsnecessarytosupporttheconclusionthattherewasprobablecausetobelievethatthejacketconstitutedorcontainedevidenceofacrime.SeeStatev.Bilynsky,2007ME107,¶¶16,18-25,932A.2d1169(describingthestandardofreviewofaprobablecausedetermination).Asnotedinthetext,seesupraDissentingOpinion¶30,theCourtmustinferthatthemotioncourtmadethefindingsnecessarytosupportitsultimatedetermination,which,astothisaspectoftheissue,wasthatprobablecausedidnotexist.Therecorddidnotcompelthe court to accept the State’s evidence aboutout-of-statedrug-related criminal history, becausetherewasevidencethattheonlysuchchargewasdismissed,andthecourtwasfullyentitledtorejecttheofficer’sunsupportedtestimonythathebelievedthechargewasstillpending.ThatwouldleavetheStatetoarguethatPagnani’shandlingofthejacketcreatedprobablecause—somethingthat,inmyview,wasnotsufficienttosupportsuchadetermination.SeeStatev.MichaelM.,2001ME92,¶6,772A.2d1179(“Probablecausetosearchexistswhenthereisafairprobabilitythatcontrabandorevidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (alteration omitted) (quotation marksomitted)).

Second,eventheexistenceofprobablecause—whichIsubmitisabsent—wouldbeinsufficient

tomaketheevidenceadmissible,becausetheStatewouldalsoneedtoestablishsomejustificationforthewarrantlessseizureandsearchofthejacket.Seeid.TheStatehasnotevenattemptedtoargueanyexceptionto thewarrantrequirement thatwouldrestsolelyonapredicatedeterminationofprobablecause.

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Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Johanna L. Gauvreau, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellant State of Maine Jason R. Ranger, Esq. (orally), Lewiston, for appellee Donna Pagnani Androscoggin County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2017-141 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY