MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2017ME202Docket: Aro-16-188Argued: February8,2017Decided: October5,2017Panel: SAUFLEY,C.J.,andALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.

STATEOFMAINEv.

ANDREWJ.LEGASSIEHUMPHREY,J.

[¶1] Inthisappeal,weaddresstheintersectionofthedigitalworldof

socialmediaandourcriminalstatutesandrulesofevidence.

[¶2] The victims of the charges at issue here are five teenage girls,

designatedinthetrialcourt’sorderasVictimsA,B,C,D,andE.1Atthetimeof

theallegedoffenses,thevictimsrangedinagefromfourteentoseventeenyears

old. Each victim received from the defendant explicit digital images,which

wereadmittedinevidenceasState’sExhibits2,5,6,and7,anddigitalmessages.

The trial court found that the defendant confessed to creating those digital

imagesandsendingthembysocialmediatomanyyounggirls, includingthe

1 The trial court order indicates that the defendant was originally charged with committing

offensesagainsteightteenagegirls.Thetrialcourtenteredconvictionsregardingonlyfivevictims,andthoseconvictionsareatissueinthisappeal.

2

victims.Thereisnoevidenceofanyin-personcontactthatformedthebasisof

theallegedcrimes.

[¶3] We must decide if the crime of indecent conduct (Class E),

17-AM.R.S.§854(1)(B)(2016),canbecommittedsolelythroughtheelectronic

transmissionofimagesofone’sgenitals.WemustalsodecideifM.R.Evid.1002,

requiring introductionoforiginalwritings,recordingsorphotographs,when

available, requires the exclusion of the victims’ testimony about digital

messagesthattheyreceivedfromthedefendant.

[¶4]AndrewJ.Legassieappealsfromajudgmentofconvictionofthree

counts of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.

§ 152(1)(C) (2016); 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2014), one count of sexual

exploitation of a minor (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A),2 one count of

attemptedsexualabuseofaminor(ClassE),17-AM.R.S.§152(1)(E)(2016);

17-AM.R.S.§254(1)(A)(2016),andfivecountsofindecentconduct(ClassE),

17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B), following a bench trial in the Superior Court

2Title17-AM.R.S.§282(1)(A)(2014)hassincebeenamendedto,amongotherthings,lowerthe

age atwhich a target of the exploitation ceases to be a “minor” for purposes of the statute fromeighteen,see17-AM.R.S.§281(2)(2016);17-AM.R.S.§282(1)(A)(2014),tosixteen.SeeP.L.2015,ch. 394, § 1 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 17-AM.R.S. § 282(1)(A) (2016)). The criminalconductoccurredbeforetheeffectivedateoftheamendment,andthusthepriorversion,17-AM.R.S.§282(1)(A)(2014),whichimportedthedefinitionof“minor”from17-AM.R.S.§281(2)asapersonundereighteen,applied.

3

(AroostookCounty,Hunter, J.). Forthereasonssetforthbelow,weaffirmin

partandvacateinpartandremandforfurtherproceedings.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶5] InDecember2013, Legassie addedVictimAas a “friend”on the

social media platform Facebook and began sending her messages through

FacebookMessenger.3 At that time, Legassiewas twenty-one years old and

VictimAwasfifteen.Legassiepurportedtoknowherfromworkingasareferee

forherhighschool team’sbasketballgames. Inthebeginning, themessages

concernedbasketball,butLegassiegraduallysteeredtheconversationtoward

sex.HebeganbycomplimentingVictimAonherappearance,movedtoasking

whethershehadeverhadsex,andthenprogressedtoimplyingandeventually

statingexplicitlythattheyshouldhavesex.Hestatedinseveralmessagesthat

theyshouldmeet.LegassieaskedVictimAforpicturesofherself,askingherto

putonajersey“andhavenothingelseone[sic]andsendmeapic”and“letme

see them legss [sic] and behind.” Legassie later sent Victim A a picture of

himself in his bedroom exposing his genitals. A computer printout of the

3 FacebookMessengeristhemessagingapplicationassociatedwiththeFacebooksocialmedia

platform.Theformatofthemessagesisanalogoustoatextmessage.

4

FacebookmessagesexchangedbetweenLegassieandVictimAwasproduced

andadmittedinevidence.4

[¶6]Legassiealsoaddedfifteen-year-oldVictimBasaFacebookfriend

and sent her messages. Legassie’s messages advanced to sexual topics;

LegassieaskedVictimBfor“nakedpictures”ofherselfandtoldherhewanted

tohavesexwithher.Legassiesentherthesamepictureofhimselfexposinghis

genitals.AfterVictimBreceivedthenudepictureofLegassie,sheremovedhim

asafriendonFacebookanddeletedthemessagesthattheyhadexchanged.

[¶7]LegassiecontinuedasimilarpatternofbehavioronFacebookwith

otherteenagegirlsduringthesameperiod.Legassieaddedseventeen-year-old

Victim C as a friend on Facebook and sent her four nude photos of himself

throughFacebookMessenger.Headdedfourteen-year-oldVictimDasafriend,

senthermessagesaskingforpicturesandeventuallyforsex,andsentherthe

samenudephotos.LegassiealsoaddedVictimEasafriend,senthermessages,

andaskedherfornudephotos,andshesenthimtwophotos:oneofherbreasts

andoneofhergenitals.VictimEwassixteenatthetime.AfterVictimEsent

photos of herself, Legassie sent her three of the nude photos of himself,

includingthephotoofhimexposinghisgenitalsinhisbedroom.

4Othervictimstestifiedaboutthemessagesfrommemory.TheStatedidnotobtainoriginalsor

copiesofthemessagesLegassieexchangedwiththeothervictims.

5

[¶8] On July11, 2014, the State chargedLegassie by indictmentwith

seven counts of attempted sexual exploitation of aminor (Counts 1-7), one

countofattemptedsexualabuseofaminor(Count8),twelvecountsofindecent

conduct(Counts9-18,26,28),sevencountsofviolatingaconditionofrelease

(Counts19-25),andtwocountsofsexualexploitationofaminor(Counts27

and29).

[¶9]ThecourtheldabenchtrialonOctober13,2015.Duringthetrial,

Legassie objected to testimony by each victim about the content of the

FacebookmessagesonthebasisthattheevidencecontravenedM.R.Evid.1002,

the“RequirementoftheOriginal”rule,alsoreferredtoasthe“bestevidence”

rule. In amemorandum submitted after trial, Legassie also argued that the

evidence of photographs was insufficient to support his convictions for

indecent conduct because the statute requires that the exposure of genitals

occurinthephysicalpresenceofanother.

[¶10] In a written decision dated February 25, 2016, the court

determined that the best evidence rule did not apply because the specific

contentofthemessageswasnotmaterialtothecharges;rather,thecourtfound

thattheState’sproofreliedon“thegeneralimport”ofwhatLegassiewanted

from the victims and what he sent to them. The court further found that

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Legassieexposedhisgenitalswhileinaprivateplace,tookapicture,andsent

thatpicturetothevictimswiththeintentthattheyseehisgenitals.Itconcluded

thathewasthereforeguiltyoftheindecentconductcharges.Thecourtnoted

thattheindecentconductstatute’splainlanguagedoesnot“restrictorlimitthe

mannerinwhich[indecentconduct]canbecommitted.”Thecourtthusfound

Legassieguiltyofthreecountsofattemptedsexualexploitationofaminor,one

countofsexualexploitationofaminor,onecountofattemptedsexualabuseof

aminor, and five countsof indecent conduct. The court foundLegassienot

guiltyoftheremainingcountschargedintheindictment.

[¶11]OnMarch24,2016,thecourtsentencedLegassietothefollowing:

• fouryears,allbutninemonthsandonedaysuspendedwiththreeyearsofprobation,onCount27;

• thirtydaysonCount26,ninetydaysonCount6,andthirtydaysonCount 12, to be served concurrently with each other andconsecutivetotheothersentences;

• sixtydaysonCount1,thirtydaysonCount8,andthirtydaysonCount 9, to be served concurrently with each other andconsecutivelytoCounts26,6,and12;

• sixtydaysonCount2andthirtydaysonCount10,concurrentwitheachotherandconsecutivetotheothersentences;and

• thirtydaysonCount11,tobeservedconsecutivelywiththeothersentences.

7

Followingtheentryofthejudgment,Legassietimelyappealed.See15M.R.S.

§2115(2016);M.R.App.P.2.

II.DISCUSSION

A. IndecentConduct

[¶12]Legassiearguesthatthecourterredininterpretingtheindecent

conductstatute,17-AM.R.S.§854.Thestatutoryprovisionpursuanttowhich

Legassiewasconvictedprovidesthat“[a]personisguiltyofindecentconduct

if...[i]naprivateplace,theactorexposestheactor’sgenitalswiththeintent

that the actor be seen from a public place or from another private place.”

17-AM.R.S.§854(1)(B).

[¶13]Theinterpretationof17-AM.R.S.§854isaquestionoflawthatwe

reviewdenovo.Statev.Pinkham,2016ME59,¶14,137A.3d203.Wefirst

looktothestatutorylanguagetodiscerntheLegislature’sintent.Id.“Welook

to legislativehistoryandotherextraneousaids in interpretationofastatute

onlywhenwehavedeterminedthatthestatuteisambiguous.”Carrierv.Sec’y

ofState,2012ME142,¶12,60A.3d1241(quotationmarksomitted).“Astatute

is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). “[W]e must construe a statute to preserve its

constitutionality,ortoavoidanunconstitutionalapplicationofthestatute,ifat

8

allpossible.”Naderv.Me.DemocraticParty,2012ME57,¶19,41A.3d551.In

the context of criminal statutes, our interpretation is also “guided by two

interrelatedrulesofstatutoryconstruction:theruleoflenity,andtheruleof

strict construction . . . . Pursuant to each of these rules, any ambiguity left

unresolved by a strict construction of the statute must be resolved in the

defendant’sfavor.”Statev.Lowden,2014ME29,¶15,87A.3d694(citations

omitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶14]Title17-AM.R.S.§854providesinrelevantpart:

1.Apersonisguiltyofindecentconductif:

A.Inapublicplace:

(1) The actor engages in a sexual act, as defined insection251.ViolationofthissubparagraphisaClassEcrime;

(2) Theactorknowingly exposes the actor’s genitalsunder circumstances that in fact are likely to causeaffront or alarm. Violation of this subparagraph is aClassEcrime;

....

B. Inaprivateplace, theactorexposes theactor’sgenitalswiththeintentthattheactorbeseenfromapublicplaceorfromanotherprivateplace.ViolationofthisparagraphisaClassEcrime;C. In aprivateplace, the actor exposes the actor’s genitalswiththeintentthattheactorbeseenbyanotherpersoninthatprivateplaceundercircumstancesthattheactorknows

9

are likely to cause affront or alarm. Violation of thisparagraphisaClassEcrime....

[¶15]Legassiearguesthattoprovethathisconductmetthestatutory

definitionofindecentconduct,theStatemustprovethatheexposedhimselfin

thephysicalpresenceofthevictim.Legassiethereforecontendsthatproofthat

he merely transmitted a digital photograph of himself to the victims in a

Facebookmessageislegallyinsufficienttosupporttheconvictions.

[¶16] Although “expose[]” and “see[]” could, construed very broadly,

applytoLegassie’sconduct,anarrowerconstructionofthosesametermscould

beinterpretedtofalloutsidethescopeofthestatute.Thetermsareundefined.

TheLegislatureneitherexpresslyextended thestatute tocoveranexposure

depictedinaphotographandlaterseenbythevictim,norspecificallyrestricted

its scope to an in-person exposure. Because different reasonable

interpretationsofthestatutebothdoanddonotcoverLegassie’sconduct,we

concludethatthestatuteisambiguousandthuslooktolegislativehistoryand

otherextraneousaidstodiscerntheLegislature’sintent.SeeCarrier,2012ME

142,¶12,60A.3d1241.Becausewemustconstruesection854(1)(B)inthe

contextoftheentirestatutoryscheme,seeCarrv.Bd.ofTrs.,643A.2d372,375

(Me. 1994), and legislative intent relevant to themeaning of “expose[]” and

“see[]”mayberevealedbyreferencetotheamendmentstoothersubsections

10

thatcontainthesameterms,weconsiderthelegislativehistoryofsection854

asawhole.

[¶17] Indecency statutes can be traced to the common law criminal

offenseof“publicindecency.”SeeBarnesv.GlenTheatre,Inc.,501U.S.560,568

(1991) (“Public indecency statutes such as the one before us reflect moral

disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public

places.”).“Indecentexposure”hasbeendefinedspecificallybyreferencetothe

publicnatureoftheact.SeeIndecentExposure,Black’sLawDictionary(10thed.

2014)(“Anoffensivedisplayofone’sbodyinpublic,esp.ofthegenitals;specif.,

thecrimeofdeliberatelyshowingone’ssexorgansinaplacewherethisaction

is likely tooffendpeople.”). Consistentwith the foregoing,Maine’s indecent

conductstatutehashistoricallybeenemployedtoprosecutein-personpublic

exposures. See State v. Robbins, 666 A.2d 85, 86 (Me. 1995); State v. Long,

577A.2d765,765(Me.1990);Statev.Works,537A.2d221,221-22(Me.1988);

Statev.Smith,437A.2d639,640-41(Me.1981).

[¶18] In 1995, the Legislature changed the title of the offense from

“public indecency” to “indecent conduct”andaddedsubsection (C). See P.L.

1995, ch. 72, § 2 (effective Sept. 29, 1995). Section 854(1)(C) provides, in

relevantpart,thatapersoncommitsindecentconductif“[i]naprivateplace,

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theactorexposestheactor’sgenitalswiththeintentthattheactorbeseenby

anotherpersoninthatprivateplaceundercircumstancesthattheactorknows

arelikelytocauseaffrontoralarm.”17-AM.R.S.§854(1)(C).TheLegislature

therebyextendedthereachofthestatutefromexposuresbyanactorvisibleto

the outside domain—from a public place or another private place—to

exposures in theprivatedomainwhere theactorandthevictimwere in the

sameprivateplace.Legislativetestimonybytherepresentativewhoproposed

the1995amendmentsuggeststhattheLegislatureintendedtocriminalizean

in-personexposurethatwouldotherwiseescapeprosecutionbecausetheactor

andthevictimwereinthesameprivateplace. SeeAnActtoProhibitPrivate

Indecency:HearingonL.D.179BeforetheJ.StandingComm.onCriminalJustice,

117thLegis.(1995)(testimonyofRep.WilliamF.Reed).Thelegislativerecord

furtherindicatesthatthe“affrontoralarm”requirementwasincludedtoavoid

criminalizing consensual private exposures. See id. (testimony of Marty

McIntyre,MaineCoalitionAgainstSexualAssault).

[¶19] Except forminorrevisionsnotrelevanthere, section854(1)(B)

has remained unchanged since its initial enactment. Compare P.L. 1975,

ch. 499, § 1 (effective Mar. 1, 1976), with 17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B). The

legislative history contains no affirmative indication that the Legislature

12

contemplatedorintendedthattheindecentconductstatutecouldbeusedto

prosecuteanindividualfordistributinganudephotograph.

[¶20] The Legislature has, however, specifically criminalized the

dissemination of obscene photographs to minors—a Class C offense that

appearsmoredirectlyapplicabletoLegassie’sconductandweighsagainstthe

State’sproposedinterpretation.See17M.R.S.§2911(1)(C),(D)(2016);seealso

Statev.Ray,1999ME167,¶7,741A.2d455(statingthatundefinedstatutory

terms must be construed “consistent with the overall statutory context”

(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶21]WealsonotethattheState’sinterpretationofsection854(1)(B),

whichcouldsubjecttocriminalliabilityanyindividualseenexposinghisorher

genitals by another in person or in a photograph, would present serious

constitutional problems because section 854(1)(B) contains no “affront or

alarm” requirement.5 The State’s construction of section 854(1)(B) could

thereforenotonlycriminalizeprivatebehaviorbetweenconsentingadults,but

also subject to prosecution individuals who appear in photographs, which

5Althoughindecencystatuteshavegenerallywithstoodconstitutionalchallenges,thosestatutes

includeelementsthatconsiderstateofmindorconsent—generallythatthedefendant’sexposurecauseoffense,annoyance,oralarm.SeeStatev.Whitaker,793P.2d116,118(Ariz.Ct.App.1990);Peoplev.Randall,711P.2d689,691-93(Colo.1985)(enbanc);Statev.Bauer,337N.W.2d209,210(Iowa1983);Statev.Bergen,677A.2d145,146(N.H.1996);Commonwealthv.Allsup,392A.2d1309,1312(Pa.1978);Statev.Knight,285S.E.2d401,404(W.Va.1981).Suchprovisionshavebeenheldtoremedyconstitutionalinfirmities.See,e.g.,Whitaker,793P.2dat120.

13

could burden well-established free speech and due process rights. See

Lawrencev.Texas,539U.S.558,578(2003)(recognizingtwoconsentingadults’

due process right to engage in homosexual acts in their private lives and

striking down a criminal sodomy statute);Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874

(1997) (“In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it

perfectly clear that [s]exualexpressionwhich is indecentbutnotobscene is

protectedbytheFirstAmendment.”(alterationinoriginal)(citationomitted)

(quotation marks omitted));Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.8 (1973)

(“[T]heStateshavegreaterpowertoregulatenonverbal,physicalconductthan

tosuppressdepictionsordescriptionsofthesamebehavior.”).

[¶22]Ultimately,becauseweconcludethatthestatutedoesnotapplyto

Legassie’s conduct, it is unnecessary to speculate about the variousways in

whichanindividualcouldcommitthecrimeofindecentconduct. Wesimply

conclude,consideringtheambiguouslegislativehistory,therulesoflenityand

strictconstructionapplicabletocriminalstatutes,andourobligationtoavoid,

ifpossible,anunconstitutionalinterpretationofastatute,thatasreprehensible

asLegassie’sbehaviorwas,section854(1)(B)cannotbestretchedtomeetthe

facts of this case.6 We hold that a digital photograph transmitted over the

6 WhetherLegassiecouldhavelegitimatelybeenchargedwithdisorderlyconduct,17-AM.R.S.

§501-A(2016),ordisseminatingobscenematerialstoaminor,17M.R.S.§2911(2016),isnotbefore

14

internetislegallyinsufficienttoconstitutean“exposure”pursuanttosection

854(1)(B)andaccordinglyvacatetheconvictionsforCounts9,10,11,12,and

26.Weremandforentryofajudgmentofacquittalastothosecounts.

B. BestEvidenceRule

[¶23]Legassiealsoarguesthatthecourterredinallowingthevictimsto

testifyfrommemoryaboutthedigitalmessageshesentthemoverFacebook

Messenger.7HearguesthattheStateshouldhaveintroducedthemessagesin

evidence if available, and the failure todosocontravened thebestevidence

rule,renderingthevictims’testimonyinadmissible.

[¶24]Thetrialcourtconcludedthatthebestevidenceruledidnotapply

tothemessagesbecausetheStatewasnotrequiredtoprovethespecificwords

orcontentofthemessages,butratherthe“tone,”“type,”and“generalimport”

ofLegassie’scommunicationswiththevictims.Wedisagreeandbeginwithan

analysisof thebestevidencerule,andthenweconsider the implications for

eachoftheremainingconvictionsatissue.

us. The State represented at oral argument that Legassie was not charged with visual sexualaggressionagainstaminorbecausethevictimswerefourteenyearsofageorolder.See17-AM.R.S.§256(2016).

7Inlightofourconclusionvacatingtheindecentconductconvictions,ouranalysishereislimited

to the remaining convictions for attempted sexual exploitation of a minor (Counts 1, 2, and 6),attemptedsexualabuseofaminor(Count8),andsexualexploitationofaminor(Count27)involvingVictimA,VictimB,VictimD,andVictimE.

15

[¶25]“Anoriginalwriting. . . isrequiredinordertoproveitscontent

unlesstheserulesorastatuteprovidesotherwise.”M.R.Evid.1002.

An “original” of a writing or recording means the writing orrecordingitselforanycounterpartintendedtohavethesameeffectbythepersonwhoexecutedorissuedit.Forelectronicallystoredinformation, “original” means any printout—or other outputreadablebysight—ifitaccuratelyreflectstheinformation.

M.R.Evid.1001(d).

[¶26]Therearethustworequirementsfortheruletoapply:first,that

theevidencesoughttobeprovedisa“writing”and,second,thatthecontents

ofthatwritingareatissue.SeeM.R.Evid.1002,1004(d)(statingthattherule

doesnotapplywherethewriting“isnotcloselyrelatedtoacontrollingissue”).

Thecontentisat issueif“thepartyseekingtoproveafactistryingtoprove

whataparticularwriting,recordingorphotographsaysorshows.”3Francis

Wharton,Wharton’sCriminalEvidence§15:4(BarbaraE.Bergmanetal.eds.,

15th ed. 2016). “Whether the content is at issue is determined on a

case-by-casebasis.”Lorrainev.MarkelAm.Ins.Co.,241F.R.D.534,578(D.Md.

2007) (interpreting the similarly-worded best evidence rule of the Federal

RulesofEvidence,Fed.R.Evid.1002).

[¶27]Thejustificationforthebestevidenceruleisthatit“lessensthe

probability of inaccuracy through human or mechanical error and that it

16

promotespreventionoffraud.”Field&Murray,MaineEvidence§1002.1at562

(6thed.2007);seealsoDaltonv.Commonwealth,769S.E.2d698,703(Va.Ct.

App.2015)(“Asalegaltermofart,thebestevidencerulerequiresthatwhere

thecontentsofawritingaredesiredtobeproved,thewritingitselfmustbe

producedoritsabsencesufficientlyaccountedforbeforeotherevidenceofits

contentscanbeadmitted.”(quotationmarksomitted)).

[¶28] The best evidence rule applies not only to documents that are

required to be in writing, such as a will, but also applies to acts with

independent significance voluntarily performed in a writing—for example,

when the claim or matter sought to be proved occurred solely in writing.

See M.R. Evid. 1002 advisers’ note to 1976 amend. (“Many situations arise

wherethepartieschoosetoperformtheeventinwritingalthoughthelawdoes

notrequireit.Forexample,acontractmaybemadeoranoticegiveninwriting.

Herealsotheoriginalmustbeproducedoraccountedfor.”).

[¶29] Therulehasexceptions thatrelieveapartyof theobligation to

producetheoriginalwritingtoproveitscontent.SeeM.R.Evid.1004.“[T]he

originalisnotrequiredifit:(1)waslostordestroyed,absentbadfaith;(2)is

unobtainable;(3)isinthecontrolofthepartyagainstwhomthedocumentis

offered; or (4) relates to a collateral matter.” LDC Gen. Contr. v. LeBlanc,

17

2006ME106,¶7,907A.2d802.Wereviewthecourt’sapplicationofthebest

evidence rule for an abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 8. We conclude that the

Facebookmessageswere“writings,”thattheStatesoughttoprovethecontent

ofthosemessages,andthatthemessagesreceivedbytheVictimsconstituted

“originals.”

1. TheMessagesAre“Writings”

[¶30]Themessagesclearlyfitwithinthebroaddefinitionofa“writing.”8

SeeM.R.Evid.1001(a)(“A‘writing’consistsofletters,words,numbers,ortheir

equivalent set down in any form.”); M.R. Evid. 1001 advisers’ note to 1976

amend. (“[T]he rule includes sophisticated methods of data compilation,

storage,andretrieval.”);2McCormickonEvidence§233&n.9(7thed.2016)

8 Amajority of state and federal courts, applying similarly-worded versions of the rule, have

concluded that electronically-transmitted communications such as emails or text messagesconstitutewritingsandthatwhenapartyseekstoproveattrialwhatthecommunicationsaid,theoriginaloracopymustbeproducedoraccountedforbeforesecondaryevidencemaybeadmitted.SeeUnitedStatesv.Harry,927F.Supp.2d1185,1194-99,1227(D.N.M.2013)(holdingthatthebestevidenceruleappliedtotextmessagessentbythedefendanttoawitnesscontainingadmissionsthathecommittedanassaultthepreviousnight),modifiedonothergroundsbyNo.CR10-1915JB,2013U.S.Dist.LEXIS74272(D.N.M.May13,2013);Rodriguezv.State,449S.W.3d306,311-13(Ark.Ct.App.2014)(concludingthatapictureofatextmessage,wheretherewasevidencefromthevictimthat themessagehadbeendeletedand testimony fromacellular representative that theoriginalmessagecontentswerenotstoredbythecompany,compliedwiththerule);Statev.Espiritu,176P.3d885,892-93(Haw.2008)(holdingthatthreateningtextmessagessentbythedefendanttothevictimwereawriting,butallowingtestimonyastotheircontentbecauseevidencesupportedtheconclusionthatthemessageswereunavailable);Laughnerv.State,769N.E.2d1147,1159(Ind.Ct.App.2002)(holdingthatthebestevidenceruleappliedtomessagessentinaninternetchatroomsupportingachargeforattemptedchildsolicitation),abrogatedonothergroundsbyFajardov.State,859N.E.2d1201, 1206 n.9 (Ind. 2007) (superseded by statute, Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 (2007)); Dalton v.Commonwealth, 769 S.E.2d 698, 703-04 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that the best evidence ruleappliedtoatextmessagearrangingadrugtransaction).

18

(statingthat“writing”isbroadlydefinedtoincludedigitalevidencesuchastext

messages).

2. TheContentoftheMessages

[¶31] In this case, the nature of Legassie’s conduct and the evidence

adducedattrialleadustotheinescapableconclusionthattheStatesoughtto

provethecontentofthemessages.Legassieisallegedtohavecommittedthe

crimeswithwhichhewaschargedentirelythroughthewordscommunicated

inthemessages;itwasthereforeonlybyprovingthecontentofthemessages

that the State could prove that Legassie “[k]nowing or intending that the

conduct will be photographed . . . intentionally or knowingly employ[ed],

solicit[ed], entice[d],persuade[d],use[d]orcompel[led]anotherperson,not

that person’s spouse, who is in fact a minor, to engage in sexually explicit

conduct.”17-AM.R.S.§282(1)(A);cf.Laughnerv.State,769N.E.2d1147,1159

(Ind.Ct.App.2002)(holdingthatthebestevidenceruleappliedtomessages

sent in an internet chat room supporting a charge for attempted child

solicitation).9

[¶32] At trial, although the State did not have to prove that Legassie

employedanyparticularlegallyoperativewordstoproveeachelementofthe

9 Laughner was abrogated on other grounds by Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 n.9

(Ind.2007).Fajardowasitselflatersupersededbystatute,Ind.Code§35-34-1-5.

19

offenses, the evidence supporting the convictions—the victims’ testimony—

derivedentirelyfromthevictims’knowledgeandrecollectionofthecontentof

the messages. Cf. 3 Francis Wharton, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 15:4

(illustrating that thebestevidenceruledoesnotbar testimonybyawitness

about facts set forth in a writing if the witness has independent personal

knowledgeofthosefactsthatisnotderivedfromareviewofthewriting).In

otherwords,withoutdescribingtheverycontentofthemessagesLegassiesent,

thevictimswouldnothavebeenabletotestifyaboutwhathecommunicatedto

theminthemessages.

3. TheMessagesare“Originals”

[¶33]Eachofthemessagesthatthevictimsreceivedisan“original”as

set forth inM.R. Evid. 1001(d) in two respects. First, eachmessage was a

“counterpartintendedtohavethesameeffectby”theauthor,Legassie. M.R.

Evid.1001(d).Second,becauseeachmessageconstituted“electronicallystored

information,”theruletreats“anyprintout”ofsuchdataasan“original,”solong

as the content of the printout “accurately reflects the information.” Id.

(emphasisadded);seealsoBankofAm.v.Barr,2010ME124,¶21&n.4,9A.3d

816 (concluding that electronically-stored records created by a bank and

20

printed out by a third-party contractor met the definition of an “original”

pursuanttoRule1001).10

[¶34]Dependingonthecontentsoughttobeprovedandthenatureof

thewriting,multiple“originals”canbeat issueinasinglecase. SeeLeBlanc,

2006ME106,¶9,907A.2d802(concludingthatbothan“original”creditcard

billandannotatedcopiesofthebillconstitutedan“original”becausebothwere

sought tobeproved). The fact thatLegassie created themessagesdoesnot

mean that themessages created and perhaps stored in Legassie’s Facebook

account are the only “originals.” As stated in Maine’s leading treatise on

evidence,“[t]henatureofanoriginalinthesenseusedinthebestevidencerule

may be very different from the ordinary lay usage. The layperson calls the

paper first produced in chronological succession the original and later

reproductionsofthepapercopiesorduplicates.Undertherule,thechronology

is not decisive. An original is thedocument the contents ofwhich are to be

proved.”Field&Murray,MaineEvidence§1001.1at559(emphasisadded).

[¶35] The focus of the State’s proof, as elicited from the victims’

testimony, was what Legassie communicated through written text in the

10Accordingly,becauseLegassiedoesnotdisputetheaccuracyoftheprintoutofmessagesthat

VictimAreceivedfromLegassiethatwereadmittedasExhibit1,theprintoutwasan“original”forthepurposesoftherule.

21

messagesthatthevictimsreceivedthroughFacebook.Althoughitisaccurate

tostatethatthemessagesoriginatedfromLegassie’sFacebookaccount,once

themessagesweresent,two“originals”weregeneratedsimultaneously—one

retrievablefromthesender’sFacebookaccountandoneretrievablefromthe

recipient’saccount.11 At thetimethat themessagesweresentandreceived,

theywouldhavebeenelectronicallystoredandaccessibleonanydevicewith

aninternetconnectionwithaccesstoeitherLegassie’sorthevictims’Facebook

accounts.

[¶36] An “original writing” is simply a shorthand term for the best

evidence to prove the contents of awriting,when, as here, the contents are

beingchallengedorquestioned.Attrial,theStateofferedthetestimonyofthe

victims’recollectionofthecontentofthemessagesthatthevictimsreceivedto

establish that Legassie “intentionally or knowingly employ[ed], solicit[ed],

entice[d], persuade[d], use[d] or compel[led]” them “to engage in sexually

explicitconduct.”17-AM.R.S.§282(1)(A).Thevictims’testimony,recounted

11 A number of courts have concluded that an electronic communication received from an

opposingpartyisnotmerelyacopyorduplicate,butratherconstitutesan“original”untoitself.SeeGrecov.VelvetCactus,LLC,No.13-3514,2014U.S.Dist.LEXIS87778,at*8(E.D.La.June27,2014)(treating email printouts that reproduced text messages exchanged between the parties as an“original”forpurposesoftherule);Espiritu,176P.3dat892(holdingthattextmessagesreceivedbyavictimthatweresentbythedefendantconstitutedan“original”);Laughner,769N.E.2dat1159(concludingthatinternetchatroommessagesreceivedbyanundercoverpoliceofficerposingasachild, which were copied into a word processing document and printed, constituted “original”writings).

22

in their recollections nearly two years after Legassie sent and the victims

receivedandreadthemessages,wasclearlynotthebestevidencetoprovetheir

content.

[¶37] BecauseLegassie’smessages constitutedwritingsand theState

soughttoprovetheircontent,theStatewasrequiredtointroducetheoriginal

messagesifavailable,or,inthealternative,makeashowingthatthemessages

couldnotbeobtainedbeforeofferingsecondaryevidenceintheformofwitness

testimony.SeeM.R.Evid.1004.

4. ExceptiontotheRule:M.R.Evid.1004(c)

[¶38] An original writing is not required to prove its content where

“[t]he party againstwhom the originalwould be offered had control of the

original;was at that timeput onnotice, by pleadings or otherwise, that the

originalwouldbeasubjectofproofatthetrialorhearing;andfailstoproduce

it at the trial or hearing.” M.R. Evid. 1004(c). We have appliedM.R. Evid.

1004(c)wherethe“original”writingisinthephysicalcontrolofthepartythat

lodges an objection based on the best evidence rule to secondary evidence

regardingthewriting’scontent.SeeGraybarElec.Co.v.Sawyer,485A.2d1384,

1387 (Me. 1985). In Sawyer, the defendant objected to the admission of a

carboncopyofaletterthattheplaintiffhadpurportedlysenttothedefendant.

23

See id. We concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admittingacarboncopyoftheletterbecausethe“original”letterwassentto

thedefendant,andassumingthathereceivedit,thedefendanthadcontrolof

theonlyoriginal,warrantingapplicationoftheRule1004(c)exception,which

allowed the content of the letter to be proved by the carbon copy. Id. at

1387-88.

[¶39] “All preliminary matters which must be established to make

secondaryevidenceadmissible[pursuanttoRule1004]arequestionsoffact

for the[trial]court . . . .” Statev.Lewis,373A.2d603,611(Me.1977). The

burdenofprooftoestablishthataRule1004exceptionappliesisontheparty

seekingtoprovethecontentoftheoriginal,here,theState.SeeBarrowsv.IRS,

231B.R.446,450(D.N.H.1998). TheStatethushadtheburdentoestablish

that(1)Legassiehad“controloftheoriginal,”andthat(2)hewasplacedon

notice “by pleadings or otherwise” that the State would seek to prove the

contentoftheoriginalattrial.SeeM.R.Evid.1004(c).

[¶40]Rule1004(c)doesnotapplyinthiscaseasamatteroffactandlaw,

forseveralreasons.First,thetrialcourtdidnotmakethenecessaryfindings

forthatexceptiontoapply,andevenifthosefindingsweremade,theywould

lackrecordsupport.Additionally,unlikeinSawyer,Legassiewasnotincontrol

24

oftheonly“original.”SeeSawyer,485A.2dat1387.TheStatesoughttoprove

thecontentofthemessagesthatthevictimsreceivedfromLegassie,andthose

messages alsomeet the definition of an “original.” SeeM.R. Evid. 1001(d).

ConsistentwiththeplainlanguageoftheMaineRulesofEvidence,theStatewas

requiredtoproducetheoriginalmessagesordemonstrateanexceptiontothe

bestevidenceruletobeabletotrytoprovethecontentofthemessagesthrough

the victims’ testimony. Finally, given the burden of proof and discovery in

criminal cases, and the constitutional protections against self-incrimination,

Legassie was not obligated to produce his messages before asserting an

objectionbasedonthebestevidencerule.

[¶41]Insum,theStatesoughttoprovethecontentofthemessagesthat

the victims received. Those messages constituted “originals,” see M.R.

Evid.1001(d),thatwerenotinLegassie’s“control.”

5. ApplicationtoVictimA,VictimB,VictimD,andVictimE12

[¶42]ThebestevidenceruleappliestotheFacebookmessages,butthe

consequenceswithrespecttoeachconvictionvary.TheStateintroduced,and

thecourtadmitted,aprintoutfromVictimA’scomputerofthemessagesthat

12Wedonotanalyzethetrialcourt’sapplicationofthebestevidenceruleastoVictimCbecause

theonlyconvictioninvolvingmessagesLegassiesenttoherwasforindecentconduct(Count11).Seesupran.7.

25

Victim A exchanged with Legassie. At trial, Legassie used the messages to

cross-examine and impeach Victim A’s testimony. Legassie argues that the

State was required to produce the “original” messages from his device or

Facebookaccount,andthatVictimAshouldnothavebeenpermittedtotestify

aboutthecontentofthemessages.Aswehavealreadydiscussed,themessage

on Victim A’s device is an “original” of the content of themessage that she

received. To the extent that Legassie argues that the printout is not an

“original”andthetrialcourtshouldnothaveadmittedit,therewasnoerror

becauseLegassiedoesnotdisputetheaccuracyofthecontentoftheprintoutof

themessages. SeeStatev.Degen,552A.2d2,4(Me.1988)(holdingthatthe

admissionoftestimonythatviolatedthebestevidencerulewasharmlesserror

becausethedefendantdidnotallegethatthephotocopiednotessummarizing

testresultswereinaccurate).Incontrast,withrespecttotheothervictims,the

messageswerenotproducedandadmittedinevidence,andLegassiedisputes

theircontents.

[¶43] AstoVictimB,althoughthecourtultimatelyconcludedthatthe

ruledidnotapply, thecourtalso foundthatthemessageswereno longer in

existence or available and stated that Victim B’s testimony was admissible

26

pursuanttoM.R.Evid.1004.13Becausetherewascompetentrecordevidence

tosupporttheconclusionthatthemessagesmettheexceptionforwritingsthat

are “lost or destroyed,” see M.R. Evid. 1004(a), the court did not abuse its

discretioninpermittingVictimBtotestifyaboutthecontentofthemessages.

SeeStatev.Robinson,2015ME77,¶23,118A.3d242(“Oncetherequirements

ofM.R.Evid.1004 [are]met, any typeof secondaryevidence,nototherwise

inadmissible, becomes admissible.” (alteration in original) (quotationmarks

omitted));Statev.Young,560A.2d1095,1096-97(Me.1989)(affirmingatrial

court’s admission of testimony about the contents of love letters sent by

defendant to victim because the evidence met the M.R. Evid. 1004(a)

exception).

[¶44] The court’s admission of Victim A’s messages and Victim B’s

testimony complied with M.R. Evid. 1002 and 1004. There was therefore

sufficientcompetentevidenceforthecourttofindLegassieguiltyofCounts1,

2,and8.

[¶45] We reach a different conclusion as to Victims D and E. Each

testified frommemory about the content of themessages that she received

13Thecourtstated“[i]ntheeventonemightconcludethatthe‘bestevidencerule’wasimplicated,

thecourt issatisfiedthatthe ‘secondbestevidence’ofcontentthat[VictimB]providedwouldbeadmissiblepursuanttoM.R.Evid.1004.”

27

fromLegassie.Legassiemadeatimelyobjectionunderthebestevidencerule

in each instance, and the trial court overruled the objections. Unlike with

VictimA,printoutsofLegassie’smessagesreceivedbyVictimsDandEwerenot

producedoradmittedinevidence,andunlikewithVictimB,thecourtdidnot

expressly find that those messages were “lost or destroyed.” See M.R.

Evid.1004(a).Thetrialcourtinsteadconcludedthattheruledidnotapplyat

all, andmade no preliminary factual findings that would excuse the State’s

failure to introduce themessagesandpermit theuseofsecondaryevidence.

SeeM.R.Evid.1004(a);Lewis,373A.2dat611(“Allpreliminarymatterswhich

mustbeestablishedtomakesecondaryevidenceadmissible[pursuanttoRule

1004]arequestionsoffactforthe[trial]court....”).

[¶46]Asageneralrule,where,ashere,neitherpartyrequestedfurther

findingsoffact,wewillassumethatthetrialcourtmadeanyfindingsnecessary

to support the judgment, provided that the findings are supported by

competentrecordevidence.SeeM.R.U.Crim.P.23(c);Statev.Brown,2017ME

59¶17,158A.3d501. Thecircumstancesof thiscase,however,preventus

from assuming that such findings were made as to the availability of the

messagesreceivedbyVictimsDandE.Becausethecourtexpresslyconcluded

thatthebestevidenceruledidnotapply,whichwouldnecessarilyincludeany

28

exceptionunderM.R.Evid.1004,wecanonlyassumethatthecourtchosenot

toconsider,andthuswouldnothavemade,anyfindingsthatthemessagessent

byLegassietoVictimsDandEwerelost,destroyedorotherwiseunavailable.

SeeM.R.Evid.1004(a); cfSpanglerv.Memel,498P.2d1055,1063n.10 (Cal.

1972)(“Sincewehaveconcludedthatsection580b[oftheCaliforniaCodeof

CivilProcedure]doesnotapply,weneednotconsiderpossibleexceptionstoits

applicability.”);Pa.Mfrs.Indem.Co.v.AirPower,Inc.,No.1:13CV217,2014U.S.

Dist.LEXIS52343,at*25(M.D.N.C.Apr.16,2014)(“Becausethe...ruledoes

notapplyinthiscase,theCourtneednotconsiderwhetherthe...exceptionto

the...ruleapplies.”).

[¶47]EveniftheapplicationofRule23(c)isappropriateherebecausea

requestforfurtherfindingswasnotmade,aclosereviewoftherecordreveals

that there is insufficient evidence to support an express or implied finding,

pursuanttoM.R.Evid.1004(a),thatthemessagesVictimDallegedlyreceived

fromLegassiewerelostordestroyed.BecausethetestimonyofVictimDwas

the only direct evidence that Legassie committed the offenses of sexual

exploitation of a minor and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, and

because that testimonywas admitted in contravention of the best evidence

rule, the State failed in its proof. We accordingly vacate the remaining

29

conviction involving Victim D, attempted sexual exploitation of a minor

(Count6)andremandforentryofajudgmentofacquittalastothatconviction.

SeeStatev.Sudsbury,2016ME25,¶5,132A.3d863;Statev.Howes,432A.2d

419,425-26(Me.1981).

[¶48] Incontrast, there issomeevidence in therecord thatmaybear

upontheavailabilityofthemessagessenttoVictimE.14However,becausethe

courtaffirmativelydetermined that thebestevidenceruledidnotapply,we

cannot speculate whether, had it applied the Rule, the court would have

permittedtheuseofsecondaryevidenceorwhetheritwouldhavereacheda

differentdecisionastothechargeofsexualexploitationofaminor(Count27).

Accordingly, we vacate the remaining conviction on that charge involving

Victim E and remand to the trial court to review the record in this case to

determinewhether, applying the best evidence rule,M.R. Evid. 1001, 1002,

1004,theStatemetitsburdentoprovethatLegassiecommittedthatoffense.

C. Sentencing

[¶49]BecausewevacatetheconvictionsonCounts6,9,10,11,12,and

26andremandforentryofajudgmentofacquittalonthosecounts,andalso

14 Thatevidence included testimony thatVictimE, assistedbya lawenforcementofficer,had

attemptedandfailedtorecoverhermessageswithLegassiefromhercellphone,andthatVictimEdiscoveredthatLegassiehadblockedheraccesstohismessages.

30

vacate the conviction on Count 27 and remand for the court to review the

record and determinewhether the Statemet its burden as to the charge in

Count 27, we also remand this case with instructions for the trial court to

determine whether those convictions may have influenced the court’s

sentencing as to Counts 1, 2, and 8. If so, we further direct the court to

resentence Legassie “after a new sentencing proceeding at which both

[Legassie]andtheStatemaybeheard.” Statev.Lacourse,2017ME75,¶17,

159A.3d847(quotationmarksomitted).

Theentryis:

JudgmentaffirmedastoCounts3,4,5,7,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,28,and29.JudgmentvacatedastoCounts6,9,10,11,12, 26 and 27. The matter is remanded withinstructionsto(i)enterajudgmentofacquittalastoCounts6,9,10,11,12and26;(ii)enterajudgmentastoCount27afterreviewingthetrialrecord applying the best evidence rule todeterminewhether theStatemet itsburdenofproofastotheoffensechargedinCount27;and(iii) reconsider the sentence and, ifwarranted,resentence defendant on Counts 1, 2, and 8consistentlywiththisopinion.

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AlanF.Harding,Esq.(orally),HardingsLawOffice,PresqueIsle,forappellantAndrewJ.LegassieJames Mitchell, Assistant District Attorney (orally), Prosecutorial District 8,Caribou,forappelleeStateofMaineAroostookCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCR-2014-190FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY