STATE OF CONNECTICUT LABOR DEPARTMENT ......bonus pay based on their overall evaluation when other...

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT

LABOR DEPARTMENT

CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS

IN THE MATTER OF

DECISION NO. 5080

TOWN OF VERNON

JULY 31, 2019

-and-

LOCAL 818, COUNCIL 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO

Case No. MPP-33,315

A P P E A R A N C E S:

Attorney Edward F. O’Donnell, Jr.

for the Town

Attorney Patricia L. Johnson

for the Union

DECISION AND ORDER

On August 15, 2018, Local 818, Council 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed a

complaint with the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations (the Labor Board), alleging that

the Town of Vernon (the Town) had committed practices prohibited by the Municipal Employee

Relations Act (MERA or the Act) when it refused to implement a tentative collective bargaining

agreement that had been ratified by both parties.

After the requisite preliminary steps had been taken, the matter came before the Labor

Board for a hearing on January 16, 2019. Both parties were represented by counsel, allowed to

present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses and make argument. Both parties

submitted post-hearing briefs on March 15, 2019. Based on the entire record before us, we make

the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and we issue the following order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Town is a municipal employer within the meaning of the Act.

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2. The Union is an employee organization within the meaning of the Act and represents a

bargaining unit consisting of professional employees excluding the town clerk, Public Works

employees, and director of the WPCA.

3. The Union and the Town are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (Ex. 5) with

effective dates of July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2016 that contains the following relevant

provisions:

ARTICLE VIII

VACATIONS

Section 8.0

Each full-time employee, who has completed his/her probationary period covered by this

agreement, shall be entitled to the following vacation with pay . . .

Upon completion of first year of service 10 days (available for use in year 2)

2 years up to but not including 5 years 12 days per year

. . .

ARTICLE IX

LEAVE PROVISIONS

Section 9.0

Effective July 1, 2009, sick leave allowance will be earned by each employee at current

wages, at the rate of one (1) day for each calendar month of service for a total of twelve

(12) days during a calendar year . . .

ARTICLE XX

WAGES

Section 20.1

The Town will increase all bargaining unit wages in the following amounts on the

following dates:

A. Effective and retroactive July 1, 2012, bargaining unit members and bargaining

unit positions will receive a (1%) wage increase to wages as of June 30th, 2012.

. . .

Effective upon signing, current bargaining unit employees shall receive a five hundred

dollar ($500) signing bonus, in a separate check, which shall not become part of their

normal salary.

. . .

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Section 20.6 – Performance Bonus

Employees who are at the top step in their classification shall receive a performance pay

bonus based on their overall evaluation when other employees in this unit normally

receive a step.

An overall evaluation rating of average satisfactory (3-3.99), shall receive a one-half

percent (1/2%) performance pay bonus.

. . .

ARTICLE XXVI

DURATION

Section 26.0

This Agreement will become effective upon its signing and shall remain in effect through

June 30, 2016, and from fiscal year to fiscal year thereafter unless either party notifies the

other by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested no later than one hundred

twenty (120) days before the expiration of the Agreement they wish to negotiate a new

Agreement.

Upon receipt of such notice, the parties shall meet as soon as possible to negotiate such

changes.

. . .

4. On or about January, 2016, the Union sent the Town a letter demanding negotiations for a

successor collective bargaining agreement.

5. On or about May 22, 2016, Union staff representative Lisa McKinnon (McKinnon) and

Town attorney Edward F. O’Donnell, Jr. (O’Donnell) executed written ground rules (Ex. 6) that

state, in relevant part:

The [Town] and [the Union] hereby agree to the following ground rules for the

conduct of collective bargaining negotiations for a successor bargaining agreement . . .

1. . . . The Chief Spokesperson for the Town is [O’Donnell] and for the Union will

be [McKinnon].

. . .

7. All initial proposals and counterproposals shall be made in writing. The parties

shall exchange initial proposals simultaneously. Neither party may submit proposals on

new topics after the third (3rd) negotiations session. Counterproposals may be submitted

at any time.

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8. When tentative agreement is reached on any item, it shall be initialed and dated

by each party. Once a tentative agreement has been reached, it shall not be withdrawn

unless the complete tentative agreement is not reached by the parties or is not ratified by

either the Town or the Union pursuant to Paragraph 9 infra, or by mutual agreement.

9. If tentative agreement is reached on the entire contract, it shall be reduced to

writing and presented for ratification by the Union and thereafter by the Town’s

legislative body . . .

. . .

11. These ground rules may be modified at any time by mutual agreement of the chief

spokespersons.

. . .

6. On June 15, 2016, the Union and the Town commenced negotiations for a successor

agreement and exchanged written proposals. The Union’s initial proposals (Ex. 8) included the

following proposed changes to Sections 20.1 and 20.6 of the 2012-2016 agreement:

ARTICLE VIII

VACATIONS

Section 8.0

Each full-time employee, who has completed his/her probationary period covered by this

agreement, shall be entitled to the following vacation with pay . . .

Upon completion of first year of service 10 days (available for use in year 2)

1 year up to but not including 5 years 12 days per year

. . .

ARTICLE IX

LEAVE PROVISIONS

Section 9.0

Effective July 1, 2009, sick leave allowance will be earned by each employee at current

wages, at the rate of one and a quarter (1 1/4) day for each calendar month of service

for a total of twelve (12) fifteen (15) days during a calendar year . . .

. . .

ARTICLE XX

WAGES

Section 20.1

. . .

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dollar ($500) seven hundred fifty dollar ($750) signing bonus, in a separate check,

which shall not become part of their normal pay.

. . .

Section 20.6 – Performance Bonus

Employees who are at the top step in their classification shall receive a performance pay

bonus pay based on their overall evaluation when other employees in this unit normally

receive a step.

An overall evaluation rating of average satisfactory (3-3.99) 2.0-2.99 shall receive a one-

half percent (1/2%) performance pay bonus pay.

. . .

7. The Town subsequently submitted proposals (Ex. 12) dated August 1, 2016 that state, in

relevant part:

Section 20.6

Delete – Supervises [sic] in same unit. The Town proposes Supervisors should be in a

separate bargaining unit.

8. The Union subsequently submitted counter-proposals dated October 12, 2016 (Ex. 10)

that state, in relevant part:

Section 20.6 – Performance Bonus – Updated 10/11/2016

. . .

Union counter-proposal: Remove all language regarding performance bonus. Replace

with longevity pay.

Recognition for continuous employment for the town shall be as follows, payable in the

second paycheck in December:

5 – 9 years of service $750.00 annually

10 - 14 years of service $1,000.00 annually

15 – 19 years of service $1,250.00 annually

20 – more years of service $1,500.00 annually

. . .

9. During the negotiations and prior to August 18, 2018, the Town rejected the Union’s

proposals to increase the vacation benefit in Section 8.0 and the sick leave benefit in Section 9.0.

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10. During the negotiations and prior to August 18, 2018, the Town rejected the Union’s

proposal that Section 20.1 of the successor agreement provide for a $750.00 signing bonus.

11. During the negotiations and prior to August 18, 2018, the Town stated that if the Union

agreed to exclude supervisors from the existing bargaining unit, the Town would agree to a

$750.00 signing bonus in the successor agreement. The Union rejected this proposal.

12. During the negotiations and prior to August 18, 2018, the parties reached agreement on

certain items, which agreements were reduced to writing, initialed, and dated by each party. The

parties also reached agreement on other items that were not reduced to writing.

13. The parties reached impasse in their negotiations for a successor agreement and

participated in mediation with the assistance of a mediator from the State Board of Mediation

and Arbitration. The mediation was unsuccessful and the matter was submitted to interest

arbitration pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-473c(b).

14. On January 18, 2018, the parties attended an initial arbitration hearing and, after engaging

in off-the-record negotiations with the assistance of the arbitration panel, the parties agreed to the

terms of a successor collective bargaining agreement, subject to ratification by the Union and the

Town’s legislative body, and O’Donnell and McKinnon signed a written document (the tentative

agreement) (Ex. 7) that states:

Tentative Agreement between the [Town] and [the Union]

● 8.4 – Any employee who leaves employment during the initial probationary

period will not be paid out any unused benefit time.

● 9.12 – Update language to existing plan from Hartford Life to CIGNA

● XVII – Jury Duty attendance goes to HR Director/Assistant TA

● HIGHLIGHTED CONSTITUTES TA’D ITEMS

●

● Seniority list on, or about 12/15 each year.

● Evaluation, step/or bonus take place on anniversary for new hires.

● New Hires will accrue vacation on a monthly basis.

● Article 4 – Probation – any employee who is transferred or promoted to another

position will serve a 90 work day probationary period.

Wages

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1.25%, 1.5%, 1.75%

Insurance

12% insurance premium co-share as 1/18/2018

13% 7/1/2018

All other issues are off the table and current contract language remains.

Both parties agree to recommend this tentative agreement to their respective

constituencies.

[signature lines for chief spokespersons and witness]

15. The tentative agreement was subsequently ratified by the Union’s membership and by the

Town’s council.

16. On or about January 29, 2018, the Town filed a petition (Case No. MEE-33,058) with the

Labor Board seeking to remove all supervisors from the bargaining unit. The Union and the

Town subsequently entered into an agreement creating a separate bargaining unit for supervisors.

17. By email (Ex. 13) on May 24, 2018 to McKinnon and Union president Jeremy Whetzel

(Whetzel), assistant Town administrator, Dawn Maselek (Maselek) stated, in relevant part:

Subject: draft contract

As promised. Please review the highlighted changes and let me know if you have any

questions. Thank you.

Attached to Maselek’s email was a draft collective bargaining agreement for the term July 1,

2016 through June 30, 2019, that states, in relevant part:

ARTICLE XX

WAGES

Section 20.1

. . .


dollar ($500) signing bonus, in a separate check, which shall not become part of their

normal salary.

. . .

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18. After Whetzel and Maselek discussed the Town’s proposed redaction of the signing

bonus language in Section 20.1, the Union filed the instant prohibited practice complaint.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. A refusal to comply with a grievance settlement or grievance arbitration award is a

prohibited practice within the meaning of Section 7-470(a)(4) and (6) of the Act.

2. A collective bargaining agreement resolving a pending interest arbitration under Section

7-473c is not a settlement agreement within the meaning of Section 7-470(a)(4) and (6) of the

Act.

3. Absent repudiation, the Labor Board does not have jurisdiction over the mere breach of a

collective bargaining agreement. Unlawful repudiation of a collective bargaining agreement

occurs when an employer takes action based upon an interpretation of a collective bargaining

agreement that is asserted in subjective bad faith and/or is wholly implausible.

4. The Town violated the Act when it refused to implement a valid collective bargaining

agreement.

DISCUSSION

In this case the Union contends that the Town violated Section 7-470(a)(4) and (6)1 of the

Act when it refused to fully implement the parties’ new collective bargaining agreement by

paying employees a five hundred ($500.00) dollar “signing bonus.” Specifically, the Union

alleges that after reaching impasse in their negotiations for a successor agreement and

commencing interest arbitration, the parties tentatively agreed to the terms of a successor

agreement incorporating language from the prior agreement, including a provision for payment

of a certain signing bonus to all unit members. The Union claims that notwithstanding

ratification of the agreement by the parties’ constituents, the Town refuses to pay the signing

bonus and thereby fully implement the successor agreement.

The Town argues that by rejecting a Union proposal during negotiations to increase the

signing bonus, the Town rejected payment of any signing bonus and as such, there was no

agreement to pay the benefit. In the alternative, the Town contends that since the agreement to

pay the bonus in the tentative agreement was not reduced to writing as required by the parties’

ground rules, the Town council never assessed the economic impact of the benefit and as such,

the agreement was not properly ratified. Given the record before us taken as a whole, we find

that the Town repudiated the parties’ new collective bargaining agreement and we order make

whole relief.

1 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 7-470(a)(4) and (6) state, in relevant part:

(a) Municipal employers or their representative or agents are prohibited from . . . (4) refusing to bargain

collectively in good faith with an employee organization which has been designated . . . as the exclusive

representative of employees in an appropriate unit . . . (6) refusing to comply with a grievance settlement . .

.

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At the outset, we address the appropriate standard to apply to this case. While the Union

cities to Section 7-470(a)(6) in its complaint and the Town relies on Naugatuck Board of

Education, Decision No. 3186 (1994), the January 18 tentative agreement was not a “settlement”

under that section of the Act. “ [W]here an agreement is not the result of the settlement of an

actual or intended grievance or an arbitration, the claimed breach of such an agreement is not

within our jurisdiction per § 7-470(a)(6) of the Act. Metropolitan District Commission,

Decision No. 4126 p. 4 (2006) (quoting Town of Stratford, Decision No. 3587 p. 3 (1998)0. See

City of New London, Decision No. 5028 (2018). Since the tentative agreement did not resolve

an actual or intended grievance or prohibited practice complaint2, it was not a settlement3 over

which our review for compliance is plenary.4 As such, the agreement at issue was a collective

bargaining agreement, a violation of which is outside our jurisdiction absent repudiation. Town

of Darien, Decision No. 5051 (2019); City of Bridgeport, Decision No. 5007 (2018); City of

Meriden, Decision No. 2380 (1985).

It is well established that while repudiation of a collective bargaining agreement is a

violation of the Act, the complainant bears a heavy burden of proof.

The repudiation of contract doctrine arises from the principle that the duty

to bargain in good faith is not limited to the negotiations of a formal contract, but

also includes the obligation to carry out the terms of the formal contract in good

faith . . . Repudiation of a collective bargaining agreement is something beyond

mere breach . . . The Labor Board has found that repudiation of a collective

bargaining agreement may occur in three circumstances: 1) where the respondent

has taken an action based upon an interpretation of the contract and that

interpretation is asserted in subjective bad faith by the respondent; 2) where the

respondent has taken an action based upon an interpretation of the contract and

that interpretation is wholly frivolous or implausible; and 3) does not involve an

interpretation of the contract by the respondent nor does the respondent challenge

the complainant’s interpretation of the contract, but rather it seeks to defend its

action on some collateral ground which does not rely on an interpretation of the

contract, e.g., financial hardship or administrative difficulties.

City of New Haven, Decision No. 4936 p. 5 (2016); see also City of Darien, supra; City of New

Haven, Decision No. 5042 (2018); City of Danbury, Decision No. 5013 (2018); State of

2 We have long held that failure to comply with prohibited practice complaint settlements violates the Act. City of

New Haven, Decision No. 4847 (2015); City of Bridgeport, Decision No. 2075-A (1982).

3 Although the tentative agreement settled a pending interest arbitration proceeding, we have recently held that such

proceedings are inherently different than grievance arbitration because the outcome itself “is literally a collective

bargaining agreement.” City of Waterbury, Decision No. 5009, p.5. (2018).

4 We have long held that when a party claims that there has been a refusal to comply with a settlement agreement,

we will interpret the agreement to ascertain what it requires and then determine whether the respondent has

complied with those requirements. If we find that there has not been compliance, we will find a violation of the Act.

See Waterbury Board of Education, Decision No. 4970 (2017); Hartford Board of Education, Decision No. 2683

(1988).

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Connecticut, OPM, Decision No. 4960 (2017); City of Hartford, Decision No. 4736 (2014); City

of Bridgeport, Decision No. 4478 (2010); Ansonia Board of Education, Decision No. 3613

(1998); Hartford Board of Education, Decision No. 2141 (1982).

The Union contends that since the tentative agreement states “[a]ll other issues are off the

table and current contract language remains” after expressly enumerating all specific changes5

from the prior agreement, the parties’ successor agreement incorporates the $500.00 signing

bonus as provided in Section 20.1 of the prior agreement. The Town contends that because it

rejected the Union’s proposal to increase the signing bonus and because the agreement presented

to the Town’s legislative body did not contain signing bonus language, there was no mutual

intent or “meeting of the minds” to afford employees a signing bonus in the new successor

agreement.

Having determined that the Union must prove repudiation and that collateral defense is

not at issue,6 we turn to the burden of proof applicable in this case.

Since the parties offer conflicting interpretations of the agreement, “the Union must prove

that the City's interpretation … is either asserted in bad faith or is wholly implausible.”

City of Bristol, Decision No. 2445 p. 5 (1985). “Conclusions regarding actual or

subjective bad faith must be based on an examination of all the evidence, including

circumstantial evidence existing when a party's claim flies in the face of clear contract

language.” City of New Britain, Decision No. 4600 p. 7 (2012); see also City of Meriden,

Decision No. 4553 (2011); Ansonia Federation of Teachers, Decision No. 2570 (1987);

Bristol Federation of Teachers, Decision No. 1656 (1978). With regard to the second

type of repudiation, if “the employer's conduct may be justified by any plausible

construction or interpretation of the contract ... (i.e., the kind a reputable lawyer might

urge with a straight face) then the claim of repudiation must fail” since “[a]ll that would

remain is a claim for mere breach of contract….” Town of Plainville, Decision No. 1790

p.6 (1979) (Emphasis in original); see also City of Bridgeport, Decision No. 4969 (2017);

City of New Haven, Decision No. 4936 (2016).

City of Danbury, Decision No. 5013, p. 10. (2018).

The Union contends that the Town’s construction of the tentative agreement is neither

reasonable nor plausible. We agree. Accepted principles of contract law govern interpretation of

collective bargaining agreements, Honulik v. Town of Greenwich, 243 Conn. 698, 710 (2009),

and it is well-established that absent ambiguity, mutual intent is found in the words the parties

chose to use.

5 It is undisputed that the signing bonus is not one of the enumerated changes identified in the tentative agreement.

6 As noted above, collateral defense repudiation applies only where the respondent agrees with the complainant’s

interpretation of the contract.

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It suffices to say that we first attempt to ascertain the parties’ intent from the

language they used in their contract, looking at the contract as a whole and giving the

contract’s words their ordinary meaning and one that renders its provisions consistent.

Only if the language in the contract is truly capable of more than one reasonable

interpretation will we look to evidence beyond the contract language for guidance as to

what the parties intended.

S H. Electric, Inc v. Town of Bethel, 312 Conn. 843, 853 (2014) (citations omitted). The signing

bonus provision was in the 2012-2016 agreement, it was not the subject of any of the enumerated

changes set forth as “bullets” in the tentative agreement, and its elimination simply flies in the

face of the “current contract language remains” provision in that agreement. Since we find

neither the tentative agreement nor Section 20.1 of the prior agreement ambiguous in this regard,

we turn to the Town’s defenses.

The Town contends that the tentative agreement, construed in the context of the parties’

recent negotiations as well as the negotiations resulting in the 2012-2016 agreement, does not

reflect a mutual intent or “meeting of the minds” to afford employees the signing bonus at issue.

We do not agree. Even if we found ambiguity sufficient to allow consideration of extra-textual

evidence, we find no support in the record for the Town’s construction of the agreements. No

witness, including the Town’s sole witness,7 testified concerning the negotiations resulting in the

prior agreement and since the parties’ collective bargaining agreements preceding that agreement

were never offered, there is no basis for us to infer that the signing bonus in that agreement was

somehow unique and “an inducement made to bridge a gap between the parties during the

previous set of negotiations” as argued by the Town.8 Nor does the evidence concerning the

parties’ recent negotiations support the Town’s position. While these negotiations included

proposals by both parties9 to increase the signing bonus to $750.00, it is undisputed that those

proposals were rejected and as such, were among the “other issues [that] are off the table”

pursuant to the tentative agreement. We find the claim that by rejecting the Union’s proposal to

increase the signing bonus, the Town rejected any signing bonus, notwithstanding the “current

contract language remains” provision in that agreement, to be a specious argument. The claim

not only defies logic and basic principles of contract interpretation, it would lead to harsh,

absurd, or nonsensical results were it applied to other conditions of employment that were

7 Maselek testified on the Town’s behalf.

8 Town’s brief pp. 3-4.

9Although the Town’s proposal to increase the signing bonus to $750.00 in exchange for removing supervisors from

the existing bargaining unit was not reduced to writing and McKinnon, the Union’s sole witness did not recall the

proposal, we find on the basis of Maselek’s negotiations notes and an admission in the Union’s brief that the offer

was made and rejected. To the extent that the Town’s said proposal was a counter-offer, it is well established that a

counter-offer is considered a rejection of the original offer. Ocean Insurance Co. v. Carrington, 3 Conn. 357, 362-

63 (1820); Al Dente, LLC v. Consiglio, 171 Conn. App. 576, 595 (2017).

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encompassed by the parties’ negotiations.10 In short, we find no support in the record or the law

for the Town’s position that by failing to reach agreement as proposed increases to the signing

bonus in the prior agreement, the parties mutually intended to forgo any such benefit,

notwithstanding unambiguous language to the contrary in their tentative agreement.

Lastly, we address the Town’s argument that the tentative agreement violates paragraph 9

of the parties’ ground rules in that it was not “reduced to writing” prior to being presented to the

Town’s legislative body for ratification. The easy answer is that the tentative agreement was in

fact, reduced to writing, its brevity attributable to its express incorporation of much of the prior

collective bargaining agreement. While we do not know what was actually submitted to the

Town’s legislative body given the record before us, we do know that the Town was required to

submit under Section 7-474(b)11 of the Act and we presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that

Town representatives acting in their official capacities, acted legally and properly in this regard.

See Fonfara v. Reapportionment Commission, 222 Conn. 166, 177 (1992); Brookfield v.

Candlewood Shores Estates, Inc. 201 Conn 1, 7 (1986); Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v.

Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 558, 568 (1973). As such, we presume that the

January 18, 2018 tentative agreement was submitted and considered by the Town’s legislative

body in conjunction with those sections of the prior collective bargaining agreement that that

body had previously reviewed and approved. Given our finding that the tentative agreement

unambiguously provided for the signing bonus at issue, we find that the request for funds

necessary to implement the agreement should have encompassed the signing bonus and as such,

we presume that it did.

Attorney’s fees

In addition to a bargaining order and restoration of the status quo ante, the Union seeks

reimbursement of its attorney’s fees and costs.

10 For example, the Town also rejected the Union’s proposed enhancements to the sick leave and vacation leave

benefits set forth in the prior agreement. We consider wholesale elimination of employee sick leave and vacation

leave to be an unduly harsh, absurd, or nonsensical result in this context.

11 § 7-474 states, in relevant part:

(b) Any agreement reached by the negotiators shall be reduced to writing, . . .a request for funds necessary

to implement such written agreement . . . shall be submitted by the bargaining representative of the

municipality . . to the legislative body which may approve or reject such request as a whole by a majority

vote . . .

(c) Notwithstanding any provision of any general statute . . . to the contrary, the budget-appropriating

authority of any municipal employer shall appropriate whatever funds are required to comply with a

collective bargaining agreement, provided the request called for in subsection (b) of this section has been

approved by the legislative body of such municipal employer . . .

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The Act affords us the authority and discretion to award a prevailing party’s

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs where we conclude that a proffered defense

presents no debatable issue and is wholly frivolous. City of Bridgeport, Decision No.

4478 (2010); Killingly Board of Education, Decision No. 2118 (1982). If a party

only presents defenses that are not reasonably debatable, the other party has been caused

to incur expenses for no valid reason. We must carefully examine each of a respondent’s

defenses to determine whether there is any substance to them. If there is, an award of

attorney’s fees, costs and interest is not warranted. Norwalk Third Taxing District,

Decision No. 3676 (1999) at p. 6-7.

City of Hartford, Decision No. 4549 p. 5 (2011), see also City of New Haven, Decision No.

4974 (2017); Town of East Hartford, Decision No. 4907 (2016); City of Hartford, Decision No.

4736 (2014).

We can find no substance in the Town’s argument that the “current contract language

remains” provision in the tentative agreement somehow excluded the $500.00 signing bonus in

Section 20.1 of the prior agreement. It is fundamental that there is no enforceable agreement

absent a “meeting of the minds”12 and, as the Town notes, “[s]o long as any essential matters are

left open for further considerations the contract is not complete.” Towns’ brief at p. 3 (quoting

St. Bernard School of Montville v. Bank of America, 312 Conn. 811, 830 (2014). The Town

has not articulated a reasonable albeit conflicting construction of the language in the tentative

agreement so as to establish ambiguity in that language, nor has it offered extra-textual evidence

that would support such a construction.

We are particularly troubled by the Town’s claim that the ratification process was

defective as a means to avoid its contractual obligations. As we recently observed in City of

Waterbury, Decision No. 5009 (2018), wrongful failure to implement a new collective

bargaining agreement has long been held a violation of the Act, but claimants in such cases bear

the heavy burden of establishing repudiation. The Act imposes the obligation to submit an

appropriate request for funds to the Town’s legislative body on the Town’s bargaining

representative and we find a defense based on the alleged failure to meet this obligation

particularly inordinate in this context, particularly where no evidence with respect to the request

for funds is offered. Had the Town sought to avoid certain obligations imposed under the prior

agreement or to reach agreement on unresolved matters it believed were essential, it could have

refrained from signing the tentative agreement as written. Had the Town sought to apprise its

legislative body of the economic impact of the new agreement, it could have submitted an

appropriate request for funds. Abeyance in these matters is not, however, a colorable defense to

a claim of wrongful failure to implement a collective bargaining agreement and so we award the

Union its attorney’s fees and costs.

12 See e.g., Brennan v. City of Waterbury, 331 Conn 672, 698-699 (2019); New Haven County Bank v. Mitchell,

15 Conn. 206, 218 (1842).

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ORDER

By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the Connecticut State Board of Labor

Relations by the Municipal Employee Relations Act, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Town of Vernon

I. Cease and desist from failing to implement the tentative agreement signed on

January 18, 2018.

II. Take the following affirmative action, which we find will effectuate the purposes

of the Act.

A. Pay those persons who are or were bargaining unit employees when the

Town’s legislative body ratified the January 18, 2018 tentative agreement a five

hundred ($500) signing bonus, in a separate check, which shall not become part of

their normal salary.

B. Pay to the Union its reasonable fees and costs, including but not limited to,

attorney’s fees associated with processing this complaint and hearing transcript

costs.

C. Post immediately and leave posted for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days

from the date of posting, in a conspicuous place where the employees of the

bargaining unit customarily assemble, a copy of this Decision and Order in its

entirety.

D. Notify the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations at its office in the

Labor Department, 38 Wolcott Hill Road, Wethersfield, Connecticut within thirty

(30) days of the receipt of this Decision and Order of the steps taken by the Town

of Vernon to comply herewith.


Wendella Ault Battey


Acting Chairman

Barbara J. Collins

Barbara J. Collins

Board Member

Susan Meredith

Susan Meredith

Alternate Board Member

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing as mailed postage prepaid this 31st day of

July, 2019 to the following:

Attorney Edward F. O’Donnell, Jr.

Siegel, O’Connor, O’Donnell & Beck P.C. RRR

150 Trumbull Street

Hartford, CT 06103


Council 4, AFSCME RRR

444 East Main Street

New Britain, CT 06051-2055

______________________________

Harry B. Elliott, Jr., General Counsel


STATE OF CONNECTICUT

LABOR DEPARTMENT


IN THE MATTER OF

DECISION NO. 5080-A

TOWN OF VERNON

AUGUST 27, 2019

-and-

LOCAL 818, COUNCIL 4, AFSCME, AFL-CIO

Case No. MPP-33,315

A P P E A R A N C E S:

Attorney Ryan A. O’Donnell

for the Town


for the Union

DECISION AND DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

On July 31, 2019, the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations (the Labor Board)

issued a Decision and Order in the above captioned matter, finding that the Town of Vernon (the

Town) had committed practices prohibited by the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA or

the Act) when it refused to implement a tentative collective bargaining agreement that had been

ratified by both parties. Town of Vernon, Decision No. 5080 (7/31/2019). In its decision, the

Labor Board determined that the Town repudiated a provision providing for payment of a certain

signing bonus.

On August 16, 2019, the Town filed a petition seeking reconsideration pursuant to Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 4-181a.1

1 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-181a states, in relevant part:

(a)(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a party in a contested case may, within fifteen days after the

personal delivery or mailing of the final decision, file with the agency a petition for reconsideration of the

We have reviewed and fully considered the paperwork filed by the Town in this matter

and we deny its petition for reconsideration and hereby incorporate Decision No. 5080 into this

decision in its entirety.

ORDER

By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the Connecticut State Board of Labor

Relations by the Municipal Employee Relations Act, it is hereby

ORDERED that the petition for reconsideration filed herein be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED.




Acting Chairman

Barbara J. Collins

Barbara J. Collins

Board Member

Susan Meredith

Susan Meredith

Alternate Board Member

decision on the ground that: (A) An error of fact or law should be corrected; (B) new evidence has been

discovered which materially affects the merits of the case and which for good reasons was not presented in

the agency proceeding; or (C) other good cause for reconsideration has been shown . . .

CERTIFICIATION

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed postage prepaid this 27th day of

August, 2019 to the following:

Attorney Ryan A. O’Donnell

Siegel, O’Connor, O’Donnell & Beck P.C. RRR

150 Trumbull Street

Hartford, CT 06103


Council 4, AFSCME RRR

444 East Main Street

New Britain, CT 06051-2055

______________________________

Harry B. Elliott, Jr., General Counsel


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