8/14/2019 State Department IG 'Message Agreement' Memo on Survey of Visa Operatons

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUMTO: IG Mr. Clark Kent ErvinTHRU: OIG/ISP Robert PetersonFROM: OIG/ISP/CE Charles A. AndersonSUBJECT: Message Agreement on the Survey of Visa OperationsJOB CODE: 02ISP3069DATE: October 1,2002This memorandum is prepared for use as background information for our briefing sessionwith you tomorrow, Wednesday October 2,2002.Purpose and ObjectivesIn response to a request from Congress, ISP/CE undertook a survey of visa issuancepolicies at posts abroad. Specifically, we looked at travel agent referral programs(TARPs) and procedures involving personal appearances waivers (PAWs). The surveywas expanded to include executive oversight, officer training and orientations, the VisasViper program and inter-agency cooperation in the visa function. To conduct this studyquestionnaires were sent to all visa issuing posts. Based on the responses and otherstatistical information, a number of posts were selected for on-site visits by inspectionteams. To date, on-site reviews have been conducted at 12posts. Later this month 15additional posts will be surveyed as follows:1. Islamabad, Abu Dhabi and Doha: Joint OIG team headed by Chuck Anderson2. Manila, Jakarta, Singapore, KL and Dhaka: Joint OIG team headed by Doug Ellice3. Riyadh, Jeddah, Kuwait, and Paris: One inspector team: Bob Mustain4. Ankara, Istanbul, and London: One inspector team: Bert KriegDivision of these posts into four trips will make it possible to return 3 of the 4 inspectorsback to Washington by October 23rd. In this way, preparation of the final report canbegin early enough to allow completion by end of November, and editing, publication,and delivery to the Hill before the end of December as requested by Senator Grassley.

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While the on-site surveys are completed, Marlene Schwartz and her assistants willcomplete the analysis of the 180+ responses to our unclassified cabled questionnaire.There are about 40posts that have TARPs in operation now. Wewill carry out a closeanalysis of these 40 programs (with follow up cables requesting additional data if needed)to determine just what types of control systems are applied, and whether apparentvulnerabilities exist and how they might be eliminated by improved management andcontrol.Principal FindingsAt this half waypoint in the survey, wehave reached several preliminary conclusions.First, consular officers abroad aredoing a good job of screening applicants given theresource limitationsunder which they work. Second, there are significant lapses inoversight of the process, creating vulnerabilities. The visa process is not in disarray, butwith the increased focus on security, changes mustbe made in how visas are issued andadditional resources must be found to achieve these changes. What follows is a list of thefindings to date.

Executive oversight and Junior OfficersOversight of the visa function by post management is often weak, sometimes almostnonexistent. In too many cases inexperienced junior consular officers are left alone todetermine visa policy and manage the visa function at small embassies. The consularfunction is too often a part time responsibility and given too little weight. Consularrotational positions are receiving much criticism in the field. Supervisors claim that oneyear in a visa function is most often not enough to allow for job training. Postmanagement is found to be too anxious to use multi-hatted officers for non-consularduties.

The current HR policy regarding the assignment of junior officers to do consular work atcritical threat posts should be reviewed. Currently, the primary factor determining thegrade level of consular positions is size of post and volume of workload. More weightneeds to be given to the complexity and (especially) the security threat of the visafunction at each post. In the wake of 9/11, the Department needs to consider upgradingthe level of consular positions to ensure that more experienced consular officers arepresent to manage visa sections, even if they are the sole consular officer at post.First tour officers should not be assigned to a one officer consular postparticularlythose where there is a critical terrorist threat.

Personal appearance waiversPersonal appearance waivers (PAWS) are generally well thought out and in many casesvery restrictive. PAWs aregenerally established to facilitate post operations andmaximize the use of resources to scrutinize those cases most likely to present problemsincluding security risks. Some posts, however, view these policies backwards, specifyingwhich cases to interview and not which to exempt. Posts with significant visa fraud and

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security issues and corresponding high refusal rates have the most restrictive policies,often interviewing all applicants.Travel agent referral programs

TARPs are not, although some Hill staffers seem to think so, visa waiver programs.There aremany posts which report that they attempted to organize TARPs only to dropthe idea due to fraud problems. The 40 or so posts that dohave TARPs claim that theyhelp to manage the workflow, decrease the number of applicants and in some cases,when remote data entry is used, reduce the time spent by employees in basic data entryfunctions. We have found the best TARPs are carefully organized and constantlymonitored. Making the continual monitoring of TARPs a control function to be includedin the COM's annual certification process must be enforced by OIG inspectors.Dismantling of TARPs as has been advocated by some in Congress. The increasedresources needed to interview every applicant are huge and will bementioned in thereport, based on estimates furnished by the 40 TARP posts. Althoughwe found thatposts need to have flexibility in structuring the visa process, the Bureau of ConsularAffairs should carefully monitor the any changes made to previously agreed uponprocedures.

Visa interviewsThe visa interview cannot be viewed as interrogation that will expose the potentialterrorists, but improvements are needed to make the most of the interview process. Allvisa officers must be assured adequate training and guidance in identifying applicantswho are security threats. The flurry of instructions to the field in recent months havecaused confusion among some officers. Consular instructions governing the visa processshould be reviewed and reissued in a comprehensive and unclassified form so that theyare easily used and readily accessible.

Visas ViperThe teams found the Visa Viper program to be very useful in developing information tobe made available to consular officers in visa adjudications. But it's application is veryuneven. Not all posts have a well-managed, aggressive program. In many missions notall agencies are well briefed on Visas Viper and do not participate fully, if at all.Contributing to the weaknesses of the program is the lack of clear guidance and feedbackfrom Washington to all participating agencies. It is unclear how information is process inWashington and posts do not always receive sufficient feedback or see the results of theirsubmissions in a timely manner.The collection of overt data for submission to INR/TIPOFF for CLASS entries needs toreviewed and upgraded. The increased use of FIBIS material should be reviewed and therole of political/econ sections in this process must be reconsidered. The role of the RSOin stepped up efforts at law enforcement liaison should also be revisited.

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Language skillsMany posts which process significant numbers of applicants who speak Arabic, Farsi andother languages spoken in South Asia and the Middle East lack officers with the languageskills necessary to conduct interviews or read documents. Some posts lack even FSNinterpreters. This deficiency makes the adjudication process more difficult and raises thepossibility of missing vital information.Officers assigned to consular positions at posts in the Middle East and South Asia shouldreceive appropriate language training. Posts outside the region that process significantvolumes of applicants from these regions (e.g., Germany, UK) should have languagedesignated positions in the consular section.