Starbucks. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee

8/13/2019 Starbucks. v. Wolfes Borough Coffee

1/29

12364cv

StarbucksCorp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.

UNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS1

FORTHESECONDCIRCUIT2

3

4

AugustTerm,20125

6

(Argued:January9,2013 Decided:November15,2013)7

8

DocketNo.12364cv9

10

X11

12

STARBUCKSCORPORATION,aWashingtoncorporation,13

STARBUCKSU.S.BRANDSLLC,14

15

PlaintiffsCounterDefendantsAppellants,16

17

v.18

19

WOLFESBOROUGH

COFFEE,

INC.,

a

New

Hampshire20

corporation,d/b/aBLACKBEARMICROROASTERY,21

22

DefendantCounterClaimantAppellee.23

24

X25

26

Before:KATZMANN,ChiefJudge,KEARSEandLOHIER,CircuitJudges.2728

This

is

an

appeal

by

the

plaintiffs

from

a

decision

of

the

United

States29

DistrictCourtfortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork(Swain,J.)followinga30

secondremandfromthisCourt. TheDistrictCourtconcludedthatplaintiffshave31

failedtoprovethatdefendantsuseofitsMisterCharbucksandCharbucks32

BlendmarksislikelytodiluteplaintiffsfamousStarbucksmarks,anddenied33

injunctiverelief. WeholdthattheDistrictCourtdidnotclearlyerrinanyofits34

factualdeterminations,includingitsevaluationofthesixnonexclusivefactors35

bearingonwhetheramarkislikelytocausedilutionbyblurring,enumeratedin36

theFederalTrademarkDilutionActof1995,asamendedbytheTrademark37


2/29

DilutionRevisionActof2006. See15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(B)(i)(vi). Balancing1

thosefactorsdenovo,weagreewiththeDistrictCourtthatplaintiffshavefailed2

todemonstratealikelihoodofdilutionbyblurring. Accordingly,weAFFIRM.34

DAVIDE.SIPIORA,MatthewChristian5Holohan,

Kilpatrick

Townsend

&

Stockton6

LLP,Denver,CO,forPlaintiffsCounter7DefendantsAppellants.8

9

JOHNMARKTURNER,ChristopherCole,10Sheehan,Phinney,Bass+Green,P.A.,11Manchester,NH,forDefendantCounter12ClaimantAppellee.13

14

LOHIER,CircuitJudge:15

StarbucksCorporationandStarbucksU.S.BrandsLLC(together,16

Starbucks)appealfromajudgmentoftheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe17

SouthernDistrictofNewYork(Swain,J.)denyingStarbucksrequestforan18

injunctionpursuanttotheFederalTrademarkDilutionActof1995(FTDA),1519

U.S.C.1125(c),prohibitingWolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,doingbusinessas20

BlackBear

Micro

Roastery

(Black

Bear),

from

using

Black

Bears

Mister21

Charbucks,Mr.Charbucks,andCharbucksBlendmarks(theCharbucks22

Marks). Afterabenchtrialfollowedbyadditionalbriefingfromtheparties23

uponremandfromthisCourt,theDistrictCourtconcludedthatStarbucksfailed24

toprovethattheCharbucksMarksarelikelytodiluteStarbucksfamous25

Starbucksmarks(theStarbucksMarks)anddeniedStarbucksrequestforan26

injunction.27

Onappeal,StarbucksarguesthattheDistrictCourterredinfindingonly28

minimalsimilarityandweakevidenceofactualassociationbetweenthe29

CharbucksMarksandtheStarbucksMarks. Starbucksalsocontendsthatthe30

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DistrictCourterredinbalancingthestatutorydilutionfactorsbygivingno1

weightatalltothreeofthefactorsthestrongdistinctiveness,exclusiveuse,and2

highdegreeofrecognitionoftheStarbucksMarksandplacingundueweighton3

theminimalsimilaritybetweenthemarks.4

Forthefollowingreasons,weconcludethattheDistrictCourtdidnoterr5

initsfactualfindings,and,balancingthestatutoryfactorsdenovo,weagreewith6

theDistrictCourtthatStarbucksfailedtoprovealikelihoodofdilution. We7

thereforeaffirm.8

BACKGROUND9

Weassumefamiliaritywiththeunderlyingfactsandlongprocedural10

historyofthecase,whicharesetforthinourpreviousopinions,StarbucksCorp.11

v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,477F.3d765(2dCir.2007)(StarbucksII),and12

StarbucksCorp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,588F.3d97(2dCir.2009)13

(StarbucksIV). Werecountthemhereonlyasnecessarytoexplainour14

dispositionofthisappeal.115

Asof2005,whenthebenchtrialoccurred,Starbuckshadgrownfroma16

singlecoffeeshopinSeattlein1971toasingularlyprominentglobalpurveyorof17

specialtycoffeeandcoffeeproducts,with8,700retaillocationsworldwideand18

revenuesof$5.3billionforfiscalyear2004. StarbucksU.S.Brandsistheowner,19

andStarbucks

Corporation

a

licensee,

of

at

least

56

valid

United

States

trademark20

registrationsthatincludetheStarbucksMarks. TheStarbucksMarksare21

1ThefollowingfactualrecitationreflectsthepartiespresentationtotheDistrict

Court.

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displayedonsignsandatmultiplelocationsineachStarbucksstore,aswellason1

theStarbuckswebsite.2

Starbuckshasdevotedsubstantialtime,effort,andmoneytoadvertising3

andpromotingtheStarbucksMarks. Fromfiscalyear2000to2003,Starbucks4

spentover$136milliononadvertising,promotion,andrelatedmarketing5

activities,essentiallyallofwhichfeaturedtheStarbucksMarks. Starbucks6

activelypolicestheStarbucksMarks,demandingthatinfringingusesbe7

terminatedand,wherenecessary,commencinglitigation.2 WellbeforeBlackBear8

usedthe

term

Charbucks

as

part

of

any

product

name,

the

Starbucks

Marks9

werefamouswithinthemeaningoftheFTDA. See15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(A).10

BlackBearmanufacturesandsellsroastedcoffeebeansandrelatedgoods11

viamailandinternetorder,atalimitednumberofNewEnglandsupermarkets,12

andatasingleNewHampshireretailoutlet. In1997BlackBeardevelopeda13

coffeeblendnamedCharbucksBlend;itnowsellsadarkroastcoffeecalled14

MisterCharbucksorMr.Charbucks. WhenBlackBearbeganmanufacturing15

coffeeusingtheCharbucksMarks,itwasawareoftheStarbucksMarks. Oneof16

2ThreeweeksafteroralargumentbeforethisCourt,BlackBearmovedforleave

tofileasupplementalstatementconcerninginjunctiverelief. Thestatement

representedthatBlackBearscounselhadlearnedthatStarbuckshadpermitted

anothercoffeeroastertomarketaCharbuckscoffee. BlackBearnotedthatthis

newinformation

would

bear

on

whether

injunctive

relief

should

be

granted,

werewetoreversetheDistrictCourt. Starbucksopposedthemotion,statingthat

theletterindicatingthatStarbuckswouldpermittheotherroastertomarket

Charbuckscoffeewassentinerrorandthat,afterBlackBearfileditsmotion,

Starbuckshadsentaceaseanddesistlettertotheotherroaster. Becausewe

affirmthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourt,wedenyBlackBearsmotionforleave

tofileasmootandacceptthestipulatedfactthatStarbuckspolicesitsmarks.

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thereasonsBlackBearusedthetermCharbuckswasthepublicperceptionthat1

Starbucksroasteditsbeansunusuallydarkly.2

SoonafterBlackBearbegantosellCharbucksBlend,Starbucksdemanded3

thatitceaseusingtheCharbucksMarks. BlackBearneverthelesscontinuedto4

sellcoffeeundertheCharbucksMarks,andin2001Starbucksstartedthisaction5

claiming,amongotherthings,trademarkdilutioninviolationof15U.S.C.6

1125(c),1127.37

TheDistrictCourtheldatwodaybenchtrialinMarch2005. Attrial,two8

mattersof

significance

to

this

appeal

occurred.

First,

Black

Bears

founder,

James9

O.ClarkIII,testifiedthatthenameCharbuckshadpreviouslybeenused10

duringthecoffeewarsinBostonbetweenStarbucksandtheCoffee11

Connection,aBostonbasedcompany.4 Second,Starbucksintroducedthe12

testimonyofWarrenJ.Mitofsky,ascientistinthefieldofconsumerresearchand13

polling. Mitofskyexplainedtheresultsofatelephonesurveyhehadconducted14

ofsixhundredparticipants,designedtoberepresentativeoftheUnitedStates15

3Starbucksalsoassertedclaimsoftrademarkinfringementinviolationof15

U.S.C.1114(1);unfaircompetitioninviolationof15U.S.C.1125(a);trademark

dilutioninviolationofNewYorkGeneralBusinessLaw360l;deceptiveacts

andbusinesspracticesandfalseadvertisinginviolationofNewYorkGeneral

BusinessLaw349,350;andunfaircompetitioninviolationofNewYork

commonlaw. Alloftheseclaimsweredismissedduringthecourseofthissuit

andare

not

the

subject

of

this

appeal.

4TheCoffeeConnectionapparentlynolongerexistsasanindependentcompany.

SeeStarbucksPlanstoAcquireCoffeeConnection,NewYorkTimes(March16,

1994),availableat

http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/16/business/companynewsstarbucksplansto

acquirecoffeeconnection.html.

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population. Thesurveyfoundthatwhenasked,Whatisthefirstthingthat1

comestoyourmindwhenyouhearthenameCharbucks,spelledCHARBU2

CKS?,30.5percentofparticipantsansweredStarbucks,while9percent3

answeredcoffee.5 Whentheparticipantswereasked,Canyounameany4

companyorstorethatyouthinkmightofferaproductcalledCharbucks?,3.15

percentrespondedStarbucks,andanother1.3percentrespondedcoffee6

house.6 Mitofskyconcludedthat[t]henumberoneassociationofthename7

CharbucksinthemindsofconsumersiswiththebrandStarbucks.8

Commentingon

the

scope

of

his

survey,

Mitofsky

also

stated:

[I]f

you

want

to9

knowthereactiontothenameCharbucks,thenthetelephoneisperfectly10

adequate. Ifyouwanttomeasurethereactionorthefamiliaritywithothervisual11

cues,thenitsnottherightmethod. StarbucksIV,588F.3dat104.12

InDecember2005theDistrictCourtruledinfavorofBlackBearand13

dismissedStarbuckscomplaint. SeeStarbucksCorp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,14

Inc.,No.01Civ.5981,2005WL3527126(S.D.N.Y.Dec.23,2005)(StarbucksI).15

TheDistrictCourtdeterminedthattherewasneitheractualdilution,which16

5Othercommonresponsesincludedbarbequeorcharcoal(7.9percent);

restaurantor

grill

(7.5

percent);

meat,

steak,

or

hamburger

(4.6

percent);andmoney(3.9percent).

6Morepopularresponsestothissecondquestionincluded:grocerystore(18.3

percent);discountstore(16.9percent);restaurant(7.0percent);department

store(4.8percent);andhardwarestoreorhomeimprovementstore(3.7

percent).

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wouldestablishaviolationoffederaltrademarklaw,7noralikelihoodof1

dilution,whichwouldestablishaviolationofNewYorktrademarklaw.2

Starbucksappealed. Whiletheappealwaspending,Congresspassedthe3

TrademarkDilutionRevisionActof2006(TDRA),whichamendedtheFTDA4

toclarifythattheownerofafamousmarkseekinganinjunctionneedproveonly5

thatthedefendantsmarkislikelytocausedilution...ofthefamousmark,6

regardlessofthepresenceorabsenceofactualorlikelyconfusion,ofcompetition,7

orofactualeconomicinjury. 15U.S.C.1125(c)(1). TheTDRAfurther8

redefineddilution

by

blurring

as

association

arising

from

the

similarity9

betweenamarkortradenameandafamousmarkthatimpairsthe10

distinctivenessofthefamousmark. Id.1125(c)(2)(B). Thestatuteprovidesthe11

followingdirectiontocourts:12

Indeterminingwhetheramarkortradenameislikely13tocausedilutionbyblurring,thecourtmayconsiderall14relevantfactors,includingthefollowing:15

16

(i)Thedegreeofsimilaritybetweenthemarkor17tradenameandthefamousmark.18

19

(ii)Thedegreeofinherentoracquired20distinctivenessofthefamousmark.21

22

(iii)Theextenttowhichtheownerofthefamous23markisengaginginsubstantiallyexclusiveuseof24themark.25

26

7Atthetime,federallawprovided:Theownerofafamousmarkshallbe

entitled...toaninjunctionagainstanotherpersonscommercialusein

commerceofamarkortradename,ifsuchusebeginsafterthemarkhasbecome

famousandcausesdilutionofthedistinctivequalityofthemark.... 15U.S.C.

1125(c)(1)(1999)(amended2006)(emphasisadded).

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(iv)Thedegreeofrecognitionofthefamous1mark.2

3

(v)Whethertheuserofthemarkortradename4intendedtocreateanassociationwiththefamous5

mark.67

(vi)Anyactualassociationbetweenthemarkor8tradenameandthefamousmark.9

10

Id. Inlightofthischangeinthegoverninglaw,wevacatedthejudgmentofthe11

DistrictCourtandremandedforfurtherproceedings. StarbucksII,477F.3dat12

766.13

Onremand,

after

further

briefing,

the

District

Court

again

ruled

in

Black14

Bearsfavorforsubstantiallythesamereasonssetforthinitsearlieropinion,but15

italsoanalyzedthefederaldilutionclaiminlightoftheTDRA. SeeStarbucks16

Corp.v.WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,559F.Supp.2d472,47579(S.D.N.Y.2008)17

(StarbucksIII). Inparticular,theDistrictCourtconsideredthesixnon18

exclusivefactorslistedinthestatuteandmadethefollowingfindings: (1)the19

markswereminimallysimilar,whichthecourtdeemedalonesufficienttodefeat20

Starbucksclaim;(2)(a)thedistinctivenessoftheStarbucksMarks,(b)the21

exclusivityoftheirusebyStarbucks,and(c)theirhighdegreeofrecognition,all22

weighedinfavorofStarbucks;(3)theintentfactorweighedinBlackBearsfavor23

becauseBlackBearsintenttocreateanassociationwiththeStarbucksMarksdid24

notconstitute

bad

faith;

and

(4)

evidence

from

Mitofskys

survey

was25

insufficienttomaketheactualconfusionfactorweighin[Starbucks]favorto26

anysignificantdegree. Id.at47778(quotationmarksomitted). Balancingall27

sixfactors,theDistrictCourtheldthattherecordwasinsufficientto28

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demonstratetherequisitelikelihoodthattheassociationarisingfromthe1

similarityofthecoretermsislikelytoimpairthedistinctivenessofStarbucks2

mark,andPlaintiffisnotentitledtoinjunctivereliefunderthatstatute. Id.at3

478.4

Starbucksappealedagain,arguingthattheDistrictCourterredinfinding5

thattheCharbucksMarksarenotlikelytodilutetheStarbucksMarks. In6

StarbucksIV,weexaminedtheDistrictCourtsfindingsastothefirst,fifth,and7

sixthfactors,aswellasitsbalancingofthestatutoryfactorsthatbearonthe8

likelihoodof

dilution

by

blurring.

We

held

that

the

District

Court

did

not9

clearlyerrinfindingthattheCharbucksMarkswereminimallysimilartothe10

StarbucksMarks,588F.3dat106,becausethecontextoftheCharbucksMarks11

(onBlackBearspackaging,onitswebsite,andinthephrasesCharbucksBlend12

andMisterCharbucks)differentiatedthemfromthefamousmarks. We13

concluded,however,thattheDistrictCourterredtotheextentitrequired14

substantialsimilaritybetweenthemarks,id.at107,andwesuggestedthatthe15

DistrictCourthadoveremphasizedthesimilarityfactor. Inparticular,westated16

thattheinclusionofthedegreeofsimilarityasonlyoneofsixfactorsinthe17

revisedstatuteindicatesthatevenalowdegreeofsimilaritywouldnot18

categoricallybaradilutionbyblurringclaim. Id.at108.19

Turningto

the

fifth

and

sixth

factorsintent

to

associate

and

actual20

associationweheldthattheDistrictCourthaderredbyrequiringbadfaithto21

findthattheintenttoassociatefactorfavoredStarbucks. Id.at109(quotation22

marksomitted). Notingthesurveyresults,whichdemonstratedsomedegreeof23

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associationbetweenCharbucksandStarbucks,wealsoheldthattheDistrict1

Courterredbyrelyingonevidencesupportingtheabsenceofactualconfusion2

toconcludethattheactualassociationfactordidnotweighinStarbucksfavor3

toanysignificantdegree. Id.(quotationmarksomitted). Theabsenceofactual4

orlikelyconfusion,wereasoned,doesnotbeardirectlyonwhetherdilutionis5

likely. Id.6

Emphasizingthattheanalysisofadilutionbyblurringclaimmust7

ultimatelyfocusonwhetheranassociation,arisingfromthesimilaritybetween8

thesubject

marks,

impairs

the

distinctiveness

of

the

famous

mark,

id.

(quoting9

15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(B)),wevacatedthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtand10

remandedforreconsiderationoftheclaiminlightofourdiscussionsofthefirst,11

fifth,andsixthstatutoryfactors,id.at10910.12

Initsopinionandorderfollowingthatremand,seeStarbucksCorp.v.13

WolfesBoroughCoffee,Inc.,No.01Civ.5981,2011WL6747431(S.D.N.Y.Dec.14

23,2011)(StarbucksV),theDistrictCourtrecognizedthatthesecondthrough15

fifthstatutoryfactors8favoredStarbucks. Id.at*3(citingStarbucksIV,588F.3d16

at10610). Butthecourtagainfoundthatthefirstfactor(thesimilarityofthe17

marks)favoredBlackBearbecausethemarkswereonlyminimallysimilarwhen18

presentedincommercethatis,whentheCharbucksMarksareviewedonthe19

8Forconvenience,werepeatthosefactorshere:(ii)thedistinctivenessofthe

StarbucksMarks;(iii)theexclusivityofStarbucksuseofitsmarks;(iv)thehigh

degreeofrecognitionoftheStarbucksMarks;and(v)BlackBearsintentto

associatetheCharbucksMarkswiththeStarbucksMarks.

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packaging,whichincludesthephrasesCharbucksBlendorMister1

Charbucks. Id.2

Asforthesixthfactor(actualassociation),theDistrictCourtacknowledged3

thattheresultsoftheMitofskysurveyconstituteevidenceofactualassociation,4

id.at*4,butitthensignificantlydiscountedthoseresultsonthegroundthatthe5

surveyinquiredintoassociationsonlywiththeisolatedwordCharbucksand6

failedtopresenttheCharbucksMarksinfullcontext,id. Thecourtalso7

comparedthesurveyresultsinthiscasewiththoseinothercases. Here,itnoted,8

only30.5

percent

of

respondents

associated

Charbucks

with

Starbucks,

while9

inothertradedilutioncases70percentto90percentofsurveyrespondents10

associatedtherelevantmarks. Id. TheDistrictCourtalsocomparedthe3.111

percentofrespondentswhothoughtaproductcalledCharbuckswouldbe12

madebyStarbuckstothe28percentofrespondentswhomadeasimilarorigin13

associationinaNinthCircuittrademarkdilutioncase. Id.(citingJadaToys,Inc.14

v.Mattel,Inc.,518F.3d628,636(9thCir.2008)). Withthebenefitofthese15

comparisons,theDistrictCourtfoundthattheactualassociationfactorweighs16

nomorethanminimallyinStarbucksfavor. Id.17

Inevaluatingthelikelihoodofdilution,theDistrictCourtemphasizedthe18

associationandsimilarityfactors. CitingtheTDRAsdefinitionofdilution19

byblurring

as

association

arising

from

the

similarity

between

a

mark

or

trade20

nameandafamousmarkthatimpairsthedistinctivenessofthefamousmark,21

theDistrictCourtexplainedthat[t]hestatutorylanguageleavesnodoubtthat22

thesetwofactorsareobviouslyimportant. Id.at*5(quoting15U.S.C.23

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1125(c)(2)(B)). Afterbalancingallsixfactors,theDistrictCourtheldthat1

Starbuckshadfailedtomeetitsburdenofshowingthatitwasentitledto2

injunctiverelief:3

[T]heCharbucksmarksareonlyweaklyassociatedwiththe4minimallysimilarStarbucksmarksand,thus,arenotlikelytoimpair5thedistinctivenessofthefamousStarbucksmarks.Inotherwords,6[Starbucks]hasfailedtocarryitsburdenofprovingthat[Black7Bears]useofitsmarks,asevidencedontherecordbeforetheCourt,8islikelytocausedilutionbyblurring.9

10

Id.at*6.11

Onappeal,Starbuckschallengesboththefactualfindingsofminimal12

similarityandweakassociationandtheconclusionthatitfailedtodemonstratea13

likelihoodofdilution.14

DISCUSSION15

A. HistoryofFederalTrademarkDilutionLaw16

Federallawallowstheownerofafamousmarktoenjoinapersonfrom17

usinga

mark

or

trade

name

in

commerce

that

is

likely

to

cause

dilution

by18

blurringordilutionbytarnishmentofthefamousmark. Tiffany(NJ)Inc.v.19

eBayInc.,600F.3d93,11011(2dCir.2010)(quoting15U.S.C.1125(c)(1)).20

Dilutionbyblurringisthewhittlingawayoftheestablishedtrademarksselling21

powerandvaluethroughitsunauthorizedusebyothers. Id.at111(alteration22

andquotationmarksomitted).23

DilutionbyblurringasacauseofactionwaschampionedinitiallybyFrank24

Schechterina1927lawjournalarticle. SeeFrankI.Schechter,TheRationalBasis25

ofTrademarkProtection,40Harv.L.Rev.813(1927). Schechterarguedthata26

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markbothsymbolizesexistinggoodwillandcangenerategoodwill. Id.at8191

(Themarkactuallysellsthegoods. And,selfevidently,themoredistinctivethe2

mark,themoreeffectiveisitssellingpower.). Socalled[t]rademarkpirates,3

Schechterexplained,stoppedshortofinfringingmarksinfavorofusingmarks4

similartowellknownmarksonnoncompetinggoods,suchasKodakbicycles,5

RollsRoyceradiotubes,andBeechNutcigarettes. Id.at825. Schechter6

describedtheinjuryinthesecasesas7

thegradualwhittlingawayordispersionoftheidentity8andholduponthepublicmindofthemarkornameby9

itsuse

upon

non

competing

goods.

The

more10

distinctiveoruniquethemark,thedeeperisitsimpress11uponthepublicconsciousness,andthegreateritsneed12forprotectionagainstvitiationordissociationfromthe13particularproductinconnectionwithwhichithasbeen14used.15

16

Id. Somewhatmorevividlyinlatercongressionaltestimony,Schechterwarned17

thatifyouallowRollsRoycerestaurantsandRollsRoycecafeterias,andRolls18

Roycepants,

and

Rolls

Royce

candy,

in

10

years

you

will

not

have

the

Rolls19

Roycemarkanymore. TradeMarks:HearingsHeldBeforetheH.Comm.on20

Patents,72dCong.15(1932)(statementofFrankI.Schechter),quotedinWalterJ.21

Derenberg,TheProblemofTrademarkDilutionandtheAntidilutionStatutes,4422

Cal.L.Rev.439,449(1956).23

HeedingSchechterswarning,someStatespassedantidilutionstatutes.24

See4J.ThomasMcCarthy,McCarthyonTrademarksandUnfairCompetition25

24:77(4thed.2012)(McCarthy);Derenberg,supra,at45261. Forexample,the26

legislativehistoryofNewYorksantidilutionstatutedisclosedaneedfor27

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legislationtopreventsuchhypotheticalanomaliesasDupontshoes,Buick1

aspirintablets,Schlitzvarnish,Kodakpianos,Bulovagowns,andsoforth.2

MeadDataCent.,Inc.v.ToyotaMotorSales,U.S.A.,Inc.,875F.2d1026,1031(2d3

Cir.1989)(quoting1954N.Y.Legis.Ann.4950). Butthepredictableresultof4

thesedesultoryeffortsbyvariousStatestopassantidilutionlawswasanuneven5

regulatorypatchworkofprotection. SeeS.Rep.No.100515,at7(1988),6

reprintedin1988U.S.C.C.A.N.5577,5583. Congressfirstaddressedthatproblem7

in1996,whenitenactedtheFTDA,whichentitledanyownerofafamousmark8

toan

injunction

against

another

persons

commercial

use

in

commerce

of

a

mark9

ortradename,ifsuchusebeginsafterthemarkhasbecomefamousandcauses10

dilutionofthedistinctivequalityofthemark.... 15U.S.C.1125(c)(1)(1996).911

In2003,however,theSupremeCourtdecidedMoseleyv.VSecret12

Catalogue,Inc.,537U.S.418(2003),whichheldthattheFTDArequiredaplaintiff13

toproveactualdilution,notsimplyalikelihoodofdilution,inorderto14

establishatrademarkdilutionclaim. Id.at433. Inresponse,theInternational15

TrademarkAssociation(INTA),aprimaryadvocatefortheFTDA,supporteda16

congressionalamendmenttoabrogateMoseley. Theproposedamendment,17

9ThelegislativehistoryofafailedearlierversionoftheFTDAstronglysuggests

thatthelawwasspecificallyintendedtocomeintoplaywherethe

unauthorizeduse

by

others,

on

dissimilar

products

for

which

the

trademark

is

notregistered,dilutesthedistinctivenessof[a]famouswork. Sen.Judiciary

Comm.Rep.onS.1883,S.Rep.No.100515,at7(citingexamplesofKodak

pianosandBuickaspirin);seeMcCarthy24:96([T]otheextentthatthe

languageisthesame,theSenateJudiciaryReportof1988provide[s]useful

legislativehistoryforinterpretingthe[FTDA]aswellaspartsofitssuccessor,the

[TDRA]).

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whicheventuallybecametheTDRA,providedthatplaintiffsneedproveonlya1

likelihoodofdilutionand,thus,allowedfamousmarkownerstoprevent2

dilutionatitsincipiencyandnotforcethemtowaituntiltheharmhas3

advancedsofarthat...therecognitionofthemark...ispermanentlyimpaired4

inordertosue. CommitteePrinttoAmendtheFederalTrademarkDilutionAct:5

HearingBeforetheH.Subcomm.onCourts,theInternet,andIntellectual6

PropertyoftheH.Comm.ontheJudiciary,108thCong.10(2004)(20047

Hearing)(statementofJacquelineA.Leimer,INTA);seeMcCarthy24:96. At8

congressionalhearings

in

2004

and

2005,

witnesses

criticized

the

Moseley9

decisionasessentiallysa[ying]youhavegottowaituntilthehorseisgone,and10

thentheonlythingyoucandoisclosethebarndoor. TrademarkDilution11

RevisionActof2005:HearingonH.R.683BeforetheH.Subcomm.onCourts,the12

Internet,andIntellectualPropertyoftheH.Comm.ontheJudiciary,109thCong.13

18(2005)(2005Hearing)(statementofMarkA.Lemley,WilliamH.Neukom14

Prof.ofLaw,StanfordUniv.);seealso2004Hearing,at44,4647(statementof15

DavidC.Stimson,ChiefTrademarkCounsel,EastmanKodakCompany).16

Althoughanumberofwitnessestestifiedatthehearings,thehearing17

statementsofAnneGundelfinger,thenPresidentoftheINTA,areconsidereda18

primarysourceofthelegislativehistoryoftheTDRA. SeeMcCarthy24:96.19

Duringher

testimony,

Gundelfinger

explained

that

the

association

between20

marksneededonlytobelikelytoimpairthedistinctivenessofthefamousmark21

inthemarketplace. 2005Hearing,at12. Gundelfingeralsoproposedalistofsix22

factorsthatwouldgotothequestionofwhetherthefamousmarks23

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distinctivenessinthemarketplacewillbeblurredbythejunioruse. Id.at14.1

Sheexplainedthatcourtswillneedtobalanceallofthesefactors,aswellasany2

othersrelevanttothequestionofblurring,inordertomakeadeterminationasto3

whetherthereisalikelihoodofdilutionbyblurring. Id.4

PresidentBushsignedtheTDRAintolawin2006.5

B. StandardofReview6

Afterabenchtrialonaclaimfortrademarkdilutionbyblurring,wherethe7

districtcourtevaluatesandbalancesthefactorslistedintheTDRA,wereview8

thecourts

determinations

as

to

each

factor

for

clear

error

and

its

balancing

of9

thosefactorsdenovo. SeeTiffany,600F.3dat101;StarbucksIV,588F.3dat105.1010

Accordingly,theDistrictCourtsfactualfindingsregardingeachfactorbearing11

onthelikelihoodoftrademarkdilutionbyblurringwillnotbedisturbedunless12

ontheentireevidence[weare]leftwiththedefiniteandfirmconvictionthata13

mistakehasbeencommitted, UnitedStatesv.Oehne,698F.3d119,121(2dCir.14

2012)(quotationmarksomitted),whilethebalancingofthosefactorsto15

determinethelikelihoodofdilutionisalegalexercisesubjecttodenovoreview.16

10Weemploythesamestandardherethatweuseinthecontextoftrademark

infringement,whereadistrictcourtevaluatesandthenbalancestheeightfactors

setforth

in

Polaroid

Corp.

v.

Polarad

Electronics

Corp.,

287

F.2d

492,

495

(2d

Cir.

1961),todeterminewhetherthereisalikelihoodofconfusion. See,e.g.,Star

Indus.v.Bacardi&Co.,412F.3d373,384(2dCir.2005). Thestatutoryfactors

enumeratedin1125(c)(2)(B)aresimilarinkindtothePolaroidfactors. For

example,bothlistsincludethesimilaritybetweenthetwomarks;strengthof

themarkinPolaroidisakintodistinctivenessin1125;andactualconfusion

inPolaroidmirrorsactualassociationin1125. SeePolaroid,287F.2dat495.

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Todeterminehowtoconductthebalancing,welookfirsttothelanguageofthe1

statute. SeeTownsendv.BenjaminEnters.,Inc.,679F.3d41,48(2dCir.2012).2

Under1125(c)(1),theplaintiffmustshowthedefendantsuseofamark3

...incommercethatislikelytocausedilutionbyblurring...ofthefamous4

mark,regardlessofthepresenceorabsenceofactualorlikelyconfusion,of5

competition,orofactualeconomicinjury. Section1125(c)(2)(B)defines6

dilutionbyblurringasassociationarisingfromthesimilaritybetweenamark7

...andafamousmarkthatimpairsthedistinctivenessofthefamousmark. The8

statutethen

instructs

that,

[i]n

determining

whether

a

mark

...is

likely

to

cause9

dilutionbyblurring,thecourtmayconsiderallrelevantfactors,includingthe10

sixenumeratedfactors.11

Wepreviouslyhavedeclinedtotreatthefactorspertinenttoatrademark12

dilutionanalysisasaninflexible,mechanicaltest,suggestinginsteadthatthe13

importanceofeachfactorwillvarywiththefacts. Nabisco,Inc.v.PFBrands,14

Inc.,191F.3d208,22728(2dCir.1999),abrogatedonothergroundsbyMoseley,15

537U.S.at433. Accordingly,weneednotconsiderallsixstatutoryfactorslisted16

in15U.S.C.1125(c)(2)(B)(i)(vi)ifsomeareirrelevanttotheultimatequestion;17

norarewelimitedtothosesixfactors. SeeLouisVuittonMalletierS.A.v.Haute18

DiggityDog,LLC,507F.3d252,266(4thCir.2007)(Noteveryfactorwillbe19

relevantin

every

case,

and

not

every

blurring

claim

will

require

extensive20

discussionofthefactors.). Instead,weemployacautiousandgradual21

approach,whichfavorsthedevelopmentofanonexclusivelistoftrademark22

dilutionfactorsovertime. Nabisco,191F.3dat217.23

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C. FactualFindings:TheStatutoryFactors1

Onappeal,StarbuckschallengestwooftheDistrictCourtsfindings:(1)2

thatthereisonlyaminimaldegreeofsimilaritybetweentheStarbucksMarks3

andtheCharbucksMarks;and(2)thatStarbucksdemonstratedonlyaweak4

associationbetweenthemarks. TheDistrictCourtdidnotclearlyerrwithregard5

toeitherfinding.6

1. DegreeofSimilarity7

InStarbucksIVweheldthat[w]ithrespecttothefirstfactorthedegree8

ofsimilarity

between

the

marksthe

District

Court

did

not

clearly

err

in

finding9

thattheCharbucksMarkswereminimallysimilartotheStarbucksMarks. 58810

F.3dat106. WehighlightedthedifferencebetweentheStarbucksMarksand11

CharbucksMarkswhenthelatterareplacedinthecontextofBlackBears12

packagingandthewordCharbucksisincorporatedintothephrases13

CharbucksBlendandMisterCharbucks. Id. Thelawofthecaseordinarily14

foreclosesrelitigationofissuesexpresslyorimpliedlydecidedbytheappellate15

court. UnitedStatesv.Quintieri,306F.3d1217,1229(2dCir.2002)(quotation16

marksomitted). Althoughnotbinding,thedoctrinecounselsacourtagainst17

revisitingitspriorrulingsinsubsequentstagesofthesamecaseabsentcogent18

andcompellingreasonssuchasaninterveningchangeofcontrollinglaw,the19

availabilityof

new

evidence,

or

the

need

to

correct

a

clear

error

or

prevent20

manifestinjustice. Aliv.Mukasey,529F.3d478,490(2dCir.2008)(quoting21

UnitedStatesv.Tenzer,213F.3d34,39(2dCir.2000)). Starbucksadvancesno22

compellingreasonforustorevisitourrulingontheissueofsimilarity. Iturges23

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thattheholdinginStarbucksIVappliedonlytoourlikelihoodofconfusion1

analysis,andthattheDistrictCourterredbyconsideringthecontextsinwhich2

consumersencountertheCharbucksMarks.11 Werejectsuchacrabbedviewof3

theholdingandadheretoourpriorrulingthattheDistrictCourtdidnotclearly4

errinfindingminimalsimilarity.5

2. ActualAssociation6

StarbucksnextcontendsthattheDistrictCourtsfindingthatactual7

associationweighsnomorethanminimallyinStarbucksfavor,StarbucksV,8

2011WL

6747431,

at

*4,

was

error

for

two

reasons.

First,

Starbucks

argues,

Black9

Bearsadmittedintenttocreateanassociationthefifthstatutoryfactorraisesa10

presumptionofassociation,oratleastisstrongevidenceofactual11

associationthesixthstatutoryfactor. Second,itarguesthattheDistrictCourt12

improperlydiscountedtheMitofskysurveyevidence,which,inStarbucksview,13

provesahighdegreeofactualassociation. Werejectbotharguments.14

a. IntenttoCreateanAssociation15

Asaninitialmatter,anintenttocreateanassociationisaseparatefactor16

undertheTDRAanddoesnotconstituteperseevidencethattheactual17

associationfactorweighsinfavoroftheownerofthefamousmark.12 Insupport18

11Atoralargument,Starbuckscounselconcededthatourearlierdecisionon

minimalsimilarity

is

the

law

of

the

case.

Oral

Arg.

Tr.

10:15

19.

12BlackBearcontendsthatthisargumentwaswaivedbelow. Wedisagree.

Starbuckssufficientlypreservedtheargument. SeeJointAppx162122

(StarbucksOpeningBriefonSecondRemand)([W]here,ashere,therehasbeen

ajudicialdeterminationofanintenttoassociate,thelogicalconclusionisthat

defendantsintendedresultwasachieved(e.g.,thatactualassociationhas

occurred).).

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ofitsargumenttothecontrary,StarbucksquotesMcCarthystreatise,which1

states,Ifthejunior[user]intendedtocreateanassociation,thelawmayassume2

thatitsucceeded. McCarthy24:119. StarbuckssimilarlyreliesonFederal3

ExpressCorp.v.FederalEspresso,Inc.,201F.3d168(2dCir.2000),adilutioncase4

inwhichwestatedthatthetrieroffactmaywellfindthatthemarksareof5

sufficientsimilaritysothat,inthemindoftheconsumer,thejuniormarkwill6

conjureanassociationwiththesenior,especiallyinlightofthetestimonyof7

[FederalEspressosfounder]thatshechosethenameFederalEspresso,inpart,8

preciselybecause

it

would

call

to

mind

Federal

Express.

Id.

at

177

(quotation9

marksomitted).10

BothFederalEspressoandMcCarthystreatiseacknowledgethe11

importanceoftheintentfactorindetermininglikelihoodofdilution. Thismakes12

sense,asdistrictcourtsmustevaluatewhetherajuniormarkislikelytocause13

associationarisingfromthesimilaritybetweenthemarksthatimpairsthe14

distinctivenessofthefamousmark,15U.S.C.1125(c)(1),(c)(2)(B),andthe15

intenttoassociatemaybeardirectlyonthelikelihoodthatthejuniormarkwill16

causesuchanassociation.17

Thatsaid,weinterpretstatutestogiveeffect,ifpossible,toeveryclause18

andwordandtoavoidstatutoryinterpretationsthatrenderprovisions19

superfluous.

UnitedStates

v.

Al

Kassar,

660

F.3d

108,

12425

(2d

Cir.

2011)20

(quotationmarksomitted). AdoptingStarbuckspresumptionargumentwould21

effectivelymergetheintenttoassociateandtheactualassociationfactors,by22

makingtheformerdeterminativeofthelatter,ratherthantreatingthemas23

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distinctbutrelatedconsiderations. WethereforeconcludethattheDistrictCourt1

didnotclearlyerrinfindingthatClarkstestimonyconcerningtheoriginofthe2

CharbucksMarkswasnotanadmissionofactualassociationandthathis3

intentionswerenotdefinitiveproofofanactualassociationbetweenthemarks.4

b. MitofskySurvey5

NordidtheDistrictCourterrwhenitdiscountedtheMitofskysurvey6

evidencebecausethesurveymeasuredonlyhowrespondentsreactedtothe7

isolatedwordCharbucks,ratherthantotheCharbucksMarksincontext,and8

becausethe

share

of

respondents

who

indicated

an

association

between

the9

markswasrelativelysmall. StarbucksV,2011WL6747431,at*4. Wearriveat10

thisconclusionfortworeasons.11

First,itcohereswithourdecisioninStarbucksIV,inwhichwediscerned12

noclearerrorintheDistrictCourtsconsiderationofcontextincludingthe13

additionofMisterorBlendtoCharbucksandBlackBearspackagingin14

assessingthemarkssimilarity,asconsumersarelikelytoexperiencetheproduct15

onlyinthecontextofthosefullphrasesandBlackBearspackagingorwebsite.16

StarbucksIV,588F.3dat106. InouranalysisofStarbucksinfringementclaim,17

wesimilarlydeterminedthattheDistrictCourtdidnotclearlyerrwhenitfound18

(1)thatthesurveyfailedtodemonstratesignificantactualconfusion,19

[p]articularlyin

light

of

the

fact

that

the

survey

was

administered

by

telephone20

anddidnotpresentthetermCharbucksinthecontextinwhichBlackBearused21

it,id.at117,and(2)thatthesurveyshouldhaveexaminedtheeffectsofa22

hypotheticalcoffeenamedeitherMisterCharbucksorCharbucksBlendon23

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therespondentsimpressionsofStarbuckscoffeeasameasureofdilutionby1

tarnishment,id.at110.2

Second,ourconclusionalsocomportswithourpriorprecedentsandother3

casesunrelatedtoStarbucks. InPlaytexProducts,Inc.v.GeorgiaPacificCorp.,4

390F.3d158(2dCir.2004),acaseinterpretingtheprerevisionFTDA,weheld5

thattheresultsofaconsumersurveyshowinganassociationbetweenthemarks6

MoistOnesandWetOneswereinadmissibleasevidenceofactualdilution7

becausethedefendantsproductwaspresentedandpackagedasQuilted8

NorthernMoist

Ones.

Id.

at

168

(emphasis

added).

District

courts

within

our9

Circuithaveappliedthesamereasoninginevaluatingsurveysinthe10

infringementcontext. See,e.g.,THOIPv.WaltDisneyCo.,690F.Supp.2d218,11

23540(S.D.N.Y.2010);JuicyCouture,Inc.v.LOrealUSA,Inc.,No.04Civ.7203,12

2006WL1012939,at*2527(S.D.N.Y.Apr.19,2006);WEMedia,Inc.v.Gen.Elec.13

Co.,218F.Supp.2d463,474(S.D.N.Y.2002)(Germanesurveyevidenceshould14

makesomeefforttocomparetheimpressionsthemarkshaveonpotential15

customersundermarketplaceconditions.). Inthedilutioncontext,thelanguage16

oftheFTDA,whichrequiresaplaintifftoshowthedefendantsuseofamark17

...incommercethatislikelytocausedilutionbyblurring...,15U.S.C.18

1125(c)(1)(emphasisadded),clarifiesthatthewaythedefendantsmarkisused19

incommerce

is

central

to

the

dilution

inquiry.

As

in

Playtex,

the

District

Court20

waswithinitsrightstoconcludethattheMitofskysurveyhadlimitedprobative21

valuebecausethedefendantsmarkswerenotpresentedtosurveyrespondents22

astheyareactuallypresentedandpackagedincommerce.23

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CitingourdecisioninNabisco,Starbucksneverthelessarguesthat1

consumersarelikelytohearandviewthetermCharbucksoutsidethecontext2

ofBlackBearspackagingandwithoutthefullphrasesMisterCharbucksand3

CharbucksBlend. Nabisco,191F.3dat218(rejectinganargumentunderthe4

prerevisionFTDAthatpackagingmadetwomarksdissimilar,becausemany5

consumerswouldseethemarksoutsideofthepackaging). ButStarbucks6

presentednorecordevidencethatCharbucksiseverreadorheardin7

isolation,13andintheabsenceofsuchevidence,wearenotpersuadedbythe8

argument.

Tothe

contrary,

as

we

noted

in

Starbucks

IV,

it

is

unlikely

that9

Charbuckswillappeartoconsumersoutsidethecontextofitsnormaluse,58810

F.3dat106,anditwasnotclearlyerroneousfortheDistrictCourttofindthat11

theMisterprefixorBlendsuffixlessenedthesimilaritybetweenthe[marks],12

id.at107.13

StarbucksalsochallengestheDistrictCourtsfindingthattheassociation14

betweenCharbucksandStarbuckswasrelativelysmall. Itcontendsthatthe15

Mitofskysurveyinfactprovidedevidenceofsubstantialactualassociation. We16

disagree.17

ItistruethatinresponsetoMitofskysquestionmostprobativeofactual18

associationWhatistheFIRSTTHINGthatcomestoyourmindwhenyouhear19

thename

Charbucks,

spelled

C

H

A

R

B

U

C

K

S?30.5

percent

of20

respondentssaidStarbucks,and9percentsaidcoffee. Bothofthese21

13AlthoughthenameMr.Charbucksispresentedinplaintextonatleastone

pageofBlackBearswebsite, allotherrecordusesoftheCharbucksMarks

situatetheminBlackBearsdistinctcolorscheme,font,andlayout.

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responsessuggestanassociationbetweenCharbucksandtheStarbucksMarks.1

InJadaToys,518F.3dat636,forexample,theNinthCircuitheldthatasurvey2

demonstratedactualassociationbecauseitshowedthat28percentof3

respondentsthoughtJadasproductwasmadebyMattelwhenaskedwhothey4

thoughtproducedtheitem. Here,however,theequivalentquestionin5

Mitofskyssurveywas:Canyounameanycompanyorstorethatyouthink6

mightofferaproductcalledCharbucks?14 Inresponsetothatquestion7

concerningsourceontheMitofskysurvey,however,only3.1percentof8

respondentsanswered

Starbucks

and

1.3

percent

answered

coffee

house.

9

ThesepercentagesarefarbelowthatfortheequivalentquestioninJadaToysand10

failtodemonstrateanythingmorethanminimalactualassociation.15 See11

StarbucksV,2011WL6747431,at*4.12

Ultimately,onthisfactor,weconsideronlywhethertheDistrictCourt13

clearlyerredwhenitfoundthattheMitofskysurveytiltstheactualassociation14

factornomorethanminimallyin[Starbucks]favor. Id. HadtheMitofsky15

14BoththatquestionandthequestiondiscussedinJadaToystestnotmerely

associationbutalsosourceconfusion. Sourceconfusionmaybeprobativeof

association,becausetoconfuseCharbuckswithStarbucks,thewordCharbucks

mustcallStarbuckstomind. SeeNabisco,191F.3dat221(Confusionlessens

distinction.).

15Althoughsomeotherrespondentsgaveanswersconsistentwithanassociation

withStarbucks18.3percentansweredgrocerystore,16.9percentanswered

discountstore,7percentansweredrestaurant,and4.8percentanswered

departmentstoretheseresponsesarealsoconsistentwithotherviewsof

whatCharbuckscouldbe,includingmeatoracharcoalgrillingproduct,as38.5

percentofrespondentssuggested.

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surveypresentedtheCharbucksMarksastheyappearincommerce,wemight1

wellconcludethattheDistrictCourterred. ButthewordCharbuckswas2

presentedoutsideofitsmarketplacecontext,andStarbucks,whichbearsthe3

burdenofproof,seeJadaToys,518F.3dat634,failedtoshowthatthisflawdid4

notmateriallyimpactthesurveyresults. Wethereforeconcludethattherecord5

supportstheDistrictCourtsdecisiontodiscountthesurveyandconsiderthe6

actualassociationfactorasweighingonlyminimallyinStarbucksfavor.7

D. Balancing8

Wenext

balance

the

factors

enumerated

in

1125(c)(2)(B),

along

with

any9

otherfactorsthatbearonalikelihoodofdilution,denovo.16 Inbalancingthese10

factors,weareagainmindfulthatthetestisnotaninflexibleone,andthatthe11

ultimatequestioniswhethertheCharbucksMarksarelikelytocausean12

associationarisingfromtheirsimilaritytotheStarbucksMarks,whichimpairs13

theStarbucksMarkstendencytoidentifythesourceofStarbucksproductsina14

uniqueway.15

WehavealreadyaffirmedtheDistrictCourtsfindingofminimalsimilarity16

betweentheCharbucksMarksandtheStarbucksMarks. Thatfindingweighs17

heavilyinBlackBearsfavor. Certainly,aplaintiffmayshowalikelihoodof18

dilutionnotwithstandingonlyminimalsimilarity. Buthere,minimalsimilarity19

stronglysuggests

a

relatively

low

likelihood

of

an

association

diluting

the

senior20

mark. Thestatuteitselfemphasizesthesimilarityofmarks. See1125(c)(2)(B)21

16Seesupra,PartB(discussingtheapplicablestandardofreview). Atoral

argument,bothpartiesconcededthatwemayconductthisbalancingourselves.

SeeOralArg.Tr.4:2123(Starbucks);OralArg.Tr.14:1922(BlackBear).

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27/29

Althoughthethreefactorsofdistinctiveness,recognition,andexclusivity1

favorStarbucksandbeartosomedegreeonourassessmentofthelikelihoodof2

dilutionbyblurring,themoreimportantfactorsinthecontextofthiscasearethe3

similarityofthemarksandactualassociation. WeagreewiththeDistrictCourt4

thatthedistinctiveness,recognition,andexclusiveuseoftheStarbucksMarksdo5

notovercometheweakevidenceofactualassociationbetweentheCharbucks6

andStarbucksmarks. Tothecontrary,viewedinlightofStarbucksfame,both7

globallyandamongtheMitofskysurveyparticipantsmoreparticularly,thefact8

thatmore

survey

participants

did

not

think

of

Starbucks

upon

hearing9

CharbucksreinforcestheDistrictCourtsfindingthatthemarksareonly10

minimallysimilar,andthereforeunlikelytopromptanassociationthatimpairs11

theStarbucksMarks. Likewise,althoughthedistinctivenessandexclusiveuseof12

theStarbucksMarkshelpStarbucksprovesusceptibilitytodilutionby13

associationarisingfromsimilaritybetweentheCharbucksandStarbucksmarks,14

theydonotdemonstratethatsuchanassociationislikelytoarise,asStarbucks15

neededtoshowtoobtainaninjunction. Accordingly,thesefactorsweighonly16

weaklyinStarbucksfavor.17

Inthiscase,weattributeamoderateamountofsignificancetothefifth18

factor,intenttocreateanassociation. ClarkstestimonyindicatedthatBlackBear19

wascapitalizing

on

an

historic

connection

between

the

word

Charbucks

and20

Starbucks,whicharoseoutofthesocalledcoffeewarsinBoston,21

Massachusetts,seeStarbucksIV,588F.3dat111, andthathemeanttoevokean22

imageofdarkroastedcoffeeofthetypeofferedbyStarbucks,StarbucksV,201123

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WL6747431,at*5. [W]here,ashere,theallegedlydilutingmarkwascreated1

withanintenttoassociatewiththefamousmark,StarbucksIV,588F.3dat109,2

weagreewiththeDistrictCourtthatthisfactorfavorsafindingofalikelihoodof3

dilution,seeStarbucksV,2011WL6747431,at*3,5.4

Thefinal,disputedfactor,actualassociation,ishighlyrelevantto5

likelihoodofassociation. Intheanalogouscontextofdeterminingthelikelihood6

ofconfusionfortrademarkinfringementclaims,wehavenotedthat[t]herecan7

benomorepositiveorsubstantialproofofthelikelihoodofconfusionthanproof8

ofactual

confusion,

even

though

a

showing

of

actual

confusion

is

not

necessary9

toprevailonsuchaclaim. SavinCorp.v.SavinGrp.,391F.3d439,459(2dCir.10

2004)(quotingWorldCarpets,Inc.v.DickLittrellsNewWorldCarpets,438F.2d11

482,489(5thCir.1971)). Thesameprincipleobtainswithrespecttoproofof12

actualassociationindilutionclaims. Andasnoted,theMitofskysurvey13

demonstratedweakactualassociation,atbest.14

Weighingthefactorsabovedenovo,weagreewiththeDistrictCourtthat15

Starbucksdidnotdemonstratealikelihoodofdilutionbyblurring. Ultimately16

whattipsthebalanceinthiscaseisthatStarbucksboretheburdenofshowing17

thatitwasentitledtoinjunctivereliefonthisrecord. BecauseStarbucks18

principalevidenceofassociation,theMitofskysurvey,wasfundamentally19

flawed,and

because

there

was

minimal

similarity

between

the

marks

at

issue,

we20

agreewiththeDistrictCourtthatStarbucksfailedtoshowthatBlackBearsuse21

ofitsCharbucksMarksincommerceislikelytodilutetheStarbucksMarks.22

23

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CONCLUSION1

WehaveconsideredallofStarbuckscontentionsonthisappealandhave2

concludedthattheyarewithoutmerit. Fortheforegoingreasons,weAFFIRM3

thejudgmentoftheDistrictCourt.4

5

6

7

Starbucks. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee

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