Stabilisation the New Orthodoxy

8/6/2019 Stabilisation the New Orthodoxy

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ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES

Counterinsurgency and stabilisation: intervention,doctrine and the new orthodoxy

Captain N W Hine

SEAFORD HOUSE PAPER

2010


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reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any formwithout the prior written consent of the UK Ministry of Defence.The Publication right in these papers vests in the Secretary ofState for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorthern Ireland.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in each of these papers are those of theAuthor and do not necessarily represent those of the UK Ministryof Defence or any other department of Her Britannic MajestysGovernment or those of the Authors employer, nationalgovernment or sponsor. Further, such views should not beconsidered as constituting an official endorsement of factual

accuracy, opinion, conclusion or recommendation of the UKMinistry of Defence or any other department of Her BritannicMajestys Government or those of the Authors employer, nationalgovernment or sponsor.

British Crown Copyright 2010/MODPublished with Permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majestys Stationery Office


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ROYAL COLLEGE OF DEFENCE STUDIES

Counterinsurgency and stabilisation: intervention,

doctrine and the new orthodoxy

Captain N W Hine

Royal Navy

July 2010

British Crown Copyright 2010/MOD

Published with the Permission of the Controller of Her Britannic Majestys Stationery Office


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Executive Summary

In the post-Cold War period, the UK and the US have promoted a view of the

international environment based on a particular set of assumptions about the nature of

the system, the actors within it and hence the nature of conflict. Based on a

distinctive set of western liberal democratic values and a belief that these ideals areuniversally applicable, intervention strategies designed using these assumptions are

flawed. Of concern, these assumptions have been uncritically accepted and are now

legitimised in British and American stabilisation and counterinsurgency doctrine.

Moreover, contemporary doctrinal analysis of why previous insurgencies were

defeated, and a discussion of methodologies, promotes the view of the primacy of soft

approaches like hearts and minds and dismisses the role of the exemplary use of

force in overall success and failure. Policy makers and the military should be wary of

the inherent dangers in being unduly fixated with fighting the present war while

structuring and preparing for the next, and should critically question the fundamental

assumptions underpinning all of this.

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INTRODUCTION

Post 1989, the opportunity to create a new world order existed where

stability and security within the international system could be enhanced through

the promotion of democracy and free markets. Intervention could accelerate

progress and where such political and economic systems did not exist theycould be imposed. This prevailing view is based on a distinctive set of western

values and assumptions and a belief that they are universally applicable.

Particular emphasis is placed on the need to address the challenge presented by

fragile and failing states relying on a singular interpretation of why states fail

and also therefore what the solution to that failure should be: improvements in

governance (scilicetdemocracy), economic development and security. In

implementing this approach, the ability of states to use military hard power to

get others to do what they otherwise would not do through threats or rewards1

in order to achieve their desired outcomes is increasingly constrained by the

influence of the media, legal prohibitions and economic factors. Instead, the use

of soft power, the ability to get desired outcomes because others want what youwant, achieving goals through attraction rather than coercion

2, is more

acceptable to domestic and international opinion.

The post-Cold War liberal intervention experience and frustrations with

perceived failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to a fundamental review of

British and American approaches to these types of operations. The result is the

doctrine of stabilisation, stability operations and a renewed interest in

counterinsurgency as a relevant approach to contemporary conflict, across all

lines of government activity. This doctrine reflects the liberal interventionist

view described above and, specifically drawing upon previous experience,

offers a favoured approach in which the use of force is an enabler for other

desired nation-building activities. Analysis of why previous insurgencies were

defeated, and a discussion of successful methodologies, promotes the view of

the primacy of soft approaches like hearts and minds and dismisses the role of

the exemplary3

use of force. False analogies and dichotomies drawn from the

past serve to reinforce contemporary assumptions about the limitations on the

use of force.

In analysing the conclusions that have been reached in the UK and the US

concerning the characteristics of the international system, the nature of

contemporary conflict, the lessons to be drawn from previous counterinsurgencyexperience and how they have been applied, and in some cases misapplied, will

be examined. By placing counterinsurgency and stabilisation at the heart of

military thinking, conflict- specific solutions are likely to result in changes to

the way the military is employed and to the types of task it will be required to

conduct. If this is the case, the execution of such solutions will require a

different type of military force: one likely to be trained, structured and equipped

in new ways. This may distort budgetary priorities and subsequently, if these

1 R Keohane and J Nye, Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, Foreign Affairs, Vol 77,

No 5, 1998, p 4.2

Idem.3 Serving as a warning or deterrent Oxford English Dictionary Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2003).2


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assumptions are found to be flawed, it will prove very difficult to recover

balanced force structures given future resource challenges. While soft

approaches look attractive in resource and public relations terms, as a solution

to the challenges of contemporary and future conflict, they are questionable.

Before accepting uncritically the new orthodoxy and the concomitant

transformation of the military that the new stabilisation and counterinsurgencydoctrines represent, it will be argued that assumptions about the nature of the

problem and proposed solutions should be subject to challenge.

THE NATURE OF INTERVENTION

It has been argued that the end of the Cold War represented the triumph of

western democratic, free-market and liberal values over a communist ideology

characterised by totalitarian, closed economic systems and repression.

Fukuyama famously declared this to be the end of history: What we are

witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or a passing of a particular

period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point ofmankinds ideological evolution and the universalisation of western liberal

democracy as the final form of human government.4

This victory after nearly

50 years of superpower ideological competition created the opportunity for a

transformation of the international order in the image of the victors.

A new world order liberal intervention and democratic peace

This new world would be created by states with shared values who would

establish an international order where democracy was the primary form of

governance. But in subscribing to this view there were differences: some

argued these developments were too important to be left to evolve; rather, where

they were taking too long they could be expedited, using force if necessary. In

the UK this view was reflected in Tony Blairs 1999 Doctrine of the

International Community. Promoting intervention in the internal affairs of other

states, he argued: We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not.

We cannot refuse to participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We

cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within

other countries if we want to be secure.5

In the US, the rise of the neo-

conservatives saw in the end of the Cold War not only an opportunity to act in

their national security interest, but also a moral imperative to do so. Thus,

democracy was the only acceptable political system, and the free market would

transcend existing social norms and customs in bringing economic growth andstability to the world. As Darwin has argued, after 1989 American power was

used to secure the gains and advance the programme of the new world order. ...

Democratic institutions on the American model, Americas version of the

market economy, and a commercial culture made for mass consumption were

the best guarantees of wealth and stability. To refuse to adopt them was a

hostile act against peace and progress.6

4 Francis Fukuyama, The end of History? in The New Shape of World Politics, (Foreign Affairs

Agenda: Foreign Affairs, New York, 1997), p 2.5

Tony Blair in John Kampfner,Blairs Wars (London: The Free Press, 2003), p 52.6 John Darwin,After Tamerlane. The Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400-2000 (London: PenguinBooks, 2007), p 482.

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Such interpretations of the guarantors of stability in the international

system reflect democratic peace theory7, where it is argued that the most stable

international relationships are those that exist between democracies. Whilst

democratic peace theory does not contend that democratic states are less war-

prone than non-democracies, it suggests that democracies do not tend to go to

war with other democracies. Therefore, the more democracies within theinternational system, the more stable the system is as a whole.

8As a result, a

long-term commitment to the promotion of democracy becomes a security

imperative and a policy driver, a view characterised by US Secretary of

Defense, Robert Gates:

The greatest threats to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states

but from the nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their

people. ... However, time may be the ultimate arbiter of success: time to bring safety and

security to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate

humanitarian needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of

normalcy to life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy

that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability.9

From a UK perspective, the National Security Strategy clearly reflects the links

between the dangers of fragile and failed states and wider global instability. In

particular, it argues that the UK needs to be concerned with state failure because

it causes violent conflict and serious instability and: all violent conflicts are

humanitarian catastrophes, and the UK has a moral responsibility to work with

other countries and the international community to prevent, mediate and

mitigate conflict, as well as contribute to post-conflict stabilisation and peace-

building.10

This position is not without its critics. For example, Realists do not supportthe thesis that international stability relies on the promotion of democratic

values, rather that stability results from the acquisition of power and power

balances between states. The idea that security can be guaranteed by shared

values, understanding and compromise is rejected; instead people are motivated

by self-interest and the pursuit of power, always necessitating a readiness to go

to war.11

Other critics argue that there is no causal link between democracy

and stability. Democracy may fail to satisfy expectations, and peace does not

necessarily bring prosperity and thus stability. In addition, it is argued that

liberalism can distort the existing underpinnings of stability such as traditional

social and political interaction. A more fundamental criticism is that in

contradiction to the desired outcome, the population of states where this type of

intervention occurs may reject the method of their democratic transformation.

As the father of the American Cold War doctrine of containment, George

Kennan, observed: even benevolence, when addressed to a foreign people,

7 C Layne, Kant or Cant: the Myth of Democratic Peace,International Security, Vol 19 (1994), p 5.8Ibid, pp7-8.9 The US Army, US Army Field Manual No. 3-07: Stability Operations, (Headquarters Department of

the Army, October 2008), p vi.10 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent

World, (London: TSO, 2008), p 14.

11 Paul Wilkinson,International Relations. A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2007), p 2.

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represents a form of intervention into their internal affairs and always receives,

at best, a divided reception.12

The state and stability

Descriptors of state stability using such terms as fragile, failing and

weak are prevalent in international relations literature and now permeatemilitary doctrine on counterinsurgency and stabilisation. Rotberg is clear about

the link between fragility and instability in the international system: The rise

and fall of nation-states is not new, but in a modern era when national states

constitute the building blocks of world order, the violent disintegration and

palpable weakness of selected African, Asian, Oceanic and Latin American

states threaten the very foundation of that system.13

Consensus, however, over

the causes of state fragility does not exist. Explanations are often predicated on

a states inability to maintain basic security, i.e. the loss of the states monopoly

on the use of violence, illegitimate forms of governance and a lack of economic

development. However, alternative explanations for fragility encompass a

number of other systemic and structural causes which are not directly related tointernal governance and which may be beyond the ability of external actors to

affect. For example, Rotberg has suggested a number of other factors,

including: intercommunal antagonisms over ideology and religion (e.g.

Bolivia); enduring frailties (e.g. Haiti); geographic and physical constraints (e.g.

East Timor); and other specific issue problems that are symptoms of failure, not

causes, such as arms trafficking, black markets and endemic disease.14

Even if agreement on what causes fragile and failing states existed, it does

not necessarily follow that fragility causes international instability. If the state

is considered to be an artificial construct, i.e. one that enables groups of people

to impose order on their surroundings, where there is clearly no necessity that

politics should be arranged on a territorial basis15, then it should not be

surprising that the creation, growth and break up of such entities is a predictable

part of an evolving international system. Herbst suggests this is the historic

norm and state failure continued throughout most of the twentieth century.16

An alternate view of the international environment is one of a zero-sum game

where a level of instability could be necessary to allow the system to function as

a whole. If one considers the international system as balanced in terms of

power then any gain is offset by a loss elsewhere in the system. It follows that

there may even be acceptable levels of instability necessary for the functioning

of the whole and thus the process of state formation and failure may be a naturalelement of the international order and nothing more than a process of

continuous systemic correction.

The challenge to democracy

12 Daniel Boorstin quoted in A J Birtle, Persuasion and Coercion in Counterinsurgency Warfare,

Military Review, Vol 88, 2008, p 52.13 Robert Rotberg, The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,

in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed by R Rotberg,(Princeton: Princeton University

Press, 2004), p 1.14

Ibid, pp 14-20.15 Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (London: Palgrave, 2001), p 69.16 Jeffrey Herbst, Let Them Fail: State failure in Theory and Practice, in Rotberg,Ibid, p 304.

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These types of interventions challenge the norm of sovereignty, the

cornerstone of inter-state order since the seventeenth century. Notwithstanding

the legal basis of such interventions, democratic peace theory seems to represent

a seductive vision of a more stable international order. Caution is required,

however; critics suggest there are a number of difficulties with reference to

what form democracy should take and the universal applicability of such asystem of governance. This view is well expressed by Luttwak: The

assumption here is that there is only one kind of politics in this world, a politics

in which popular support is important or even decisive, and that such support

can be won by providing better government. Yet the extraordinary persistence

of dictatorships as diverse in style as the regimes of Cuba, Libya, North Korea

and Syria shows that in fact government needs no popular support as long as it

can secure obedience.17

Thus democratic forms of governance may not be the

most effective method for delivering international stability. Owen goes further

by arguing that democracy is not a panacea and permanent peace between

democracies is not possible. He argues that ultimately all states regardless of

their form of governance behave similarly: Liberal states, like all others, mustbase foreign policy on the imperatives of power politics.

18

Hard, soft and smart power

Assuming one supports the view that the promotion of democracy within

the international system is of benefit in terms of stability, the nature and use of

power, and the relative utility of force in particular, becomes prevalent in

security debates. The notion of hard and soft (and even smart19

) power has

been subject to considerable debate, but needs to be considered here as it forms

a fundamental consideration for the employment of military force. Differences

exist on the relative value of powers of attraction and powers of coercion,

whether they are complementary, and the balance between them needed to

achieve desired ends. General Caldwell (Head of the US Army Combined

Arms Centre) in his foreward to Field Manual (FM) 3-07 US Stability

Operations doctrine, suggests that while a balance is necessary, the emphasis is

on soft power, highlights the key areas of governance and economic

development in the assistance to fragile states and limitations on the use of

force: Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our

ability to generate soft power to promote participation in government, spur

economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the

disenfranchised populations of the world. At the heart of this effort is a

comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools ofstatecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian

organizations, and the private sector.20

This change in approach can partly be

explained by the critique of the earlier policies followed under the neo-

conservatives and a perception of failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

17 E Luttwak, Dead end: Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice,Harpers, 2007, p 2.18 J M Owen, How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,International Security, Vol 19, 1994, p

119.19 In short, Americas success will depend upon our developing a deeper understanding of the role of

soft power and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy. That will be

smart power. Joseph Nye Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p147.20 The US Army, US Army Field Manual No. 3-07: Stability Operations, Foreword.

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STRATEGY: ENDS, WAYS AND MEANS AND THE

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

The assumptions which support liberal intervention have not been without

controversy, with debate over the relationship between ends, ways and meanson the one hand and the lack of policy, statecraft or a whole of government

approach on the other. Chin suggests little realistic strategic assessment was in

evidence over the interventions in Iraq or Afghanistan: Because of this failure

at the highest political level, the armed forces have faced the challenge of trying

to reconcile a profound mismatch between resources and commitments and this

has led to the adoption of a strategy and doctrine which are not ideal in terms of

dealing with such a range of asymmetric challenges.21

This failure has

occurred simultaneously with a debate over the utility of hard, soft and smart

power, coercion and strategies for intervention in general.

Ends, ways and meansThe question of how strategy is formed to support liberal interventionism,

and the ends, ways and means debate, is critical to understanding how it is

implemented. In particular the relationship between the desired outcome (i.e.

the ends), the methods of the employment of that strategy, such as the use of

force versus other instruments of power, (i.e. the means), and how these

elements are brought together in a coherent manner (i.e. the ways), needs to be

considered. This debate in relation to stabilisation in contemporary conflict,

sees the ends as improved international security through the stabilisation of

fragile states, the ways concern assisting such states through improvements in

governance, economic development and security, and the means have been

identified as the comprehensive approach.22

Intervention to promote stability seems paradoxical and, even if it can be

justified through subscription to democratic peace theory, does not look the

same when viewed through a non-western prism. If analysis of the problem

results in a questionable set of assumptions concerning the causes of instability,

then potential solutions to the problem are similarly uncertain. It is logical that

solutions to questions of governance, economic development, and security

require the application of all areas of government through a comprehensive

approach, but therein lies the problem of false assumption. If analysis of the

problem is incorrect then any proposed solution must be similarly flawed inparticular the military contribution to stabilisation and the balance between the

military and other elements of power. Furthermore, constituting the means

through the comprehensive approach fails to determine how this will be applied,

at what level (National/Alliance/Coalition/NATO or Host Nation) and whether

indeed this coordinated response has any greater utility than singular

approaches: There is limited empirical data on the effectiveness of

multifunctional approaches to operations ... the perceived need for increased

civil-military coherence and integration is often only based on assumption that

21

W Chin, The United Kingdom and the War of Terror: the Breakdown of National and MilitaryStrategy, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 30, No 1, 2009, p 126.22 JDP 3-40, p 1-15.

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the different actors and strands of activity are both inherently compatible and

more effective when coordinated than when employed individually.23

Implementation through a comprehensive approach?

The construction of strategy is not a military monopoly and herein lies a

further difficulty with this approach to contemporary conflict. A comprehensiveor whole of government approach is predicated on agreement on the strategy

(i.e. the ends, ways and means and who has the lead) and on a common

understanding of how it is to be enacted. If the ends are set, and the ways are

contested then those who control the means become deciders of the overall

strategy as a whole. In this way the elements of government responsible for

promotion of governance, economic development and security (in the UK, the

Foreign Office, Department for International Development and the military)

control the strategy through the measurement of progress. For example, the

American prosecution of the Vietnam conflict became dominated by non-

military thinking by organisations like the RAND Corporation: Instead of

concentrating on military strategy which had become unfashionable after WorldWar II (and, to many, irrelevant in the nuclear era), there was an increased

emphasis on technical, managerial and bureaucratic concerns. Instead of being

experts in the political ends of the United States, we became neophyte political

scientists and systems analysts and were outclassed by the civilian professionals

who dominated national security policy under Secretary of Defense Robert S

McNamara after 1961.24

Thus a comprehensive approach when applied in

Vietnam led to what Summers has called bureaucratic competition and conflict

of self perpetuation/interest25

, an example of where, rather than the desired

complementary outcome, the whole was less than the sum of its parts.

DOCTRINE CLEAR, NEW AND USING THE PAST?

The post-Cold War liberal intervention experience has resulted in

stabilisation doctrine, stability operations and a renewed interest in counter-

insurgency as an approach to contemporary conflict across all lines of

government activity. This doctrine reflects the liberal interventionist views

described in the first section and is based on assumptions about the causes of,

and therefore solutions to, these types of challenges. Drawing directly upon

previous experience, doctrine offers a preferred approach in which the use of

minimum force is an enabler for other stabilisation activities. This paper argues

that in doing so, doctrine is often contradictory, and that it is based on falseassumptions of the nature of the international system, soft power approaches,

the utility of force and the concept of hearts and minds.26

So whats new?

23 R Engell, Between reluctance and the necessity: the utility of military force in humanitarian and

development operations, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol 19 No 3, 2008, p 404.24 Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War(California: Presidio Press,

1982), p 44.25Ibid, p77.26 The term hearts and minds can be considered as hearts is about winning the emotional support of

the people and minds understanding that the people as pursuing their rational self-interest. In PDixon, Hearts and Minds? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,Journal of Strategic

Studies, Vol 32, No 3, 2009, p 363.

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There has been a plethora of new doctrine written concerning the issues of

contemporary conflict, counterinsurgency, stabilisation and stability operations

in the last decade. In particular the following publications: Joint Doctrine

Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: the Military Contribution; British

Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency; The UK

Approach to Stabilisation: Stabilisation Unit Guidance Note; US Army FieldManual No. 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication:

Counterinsurgency Field Manual; US Army Field Manual No. 3-07: Stability

Operations and the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide, have all been

issued or revised. Doctrine tends to be reviewed and rewritten during periods of

soul-searching and reflects contemporary policy prescriptions. Reflecting

lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, the current crop is no different.

Fundamental to considering the utility of current doctrine is the question of

whether it has been written to support a set of circumstances that are unlikely to

be repeated. As General Caldwell has put it: Americas future abroad is

unlikely to resemble Afghanistan or Iraq, where we grapple with the burden of

nation-building under fire. Instead, we will work through and with thecommunity of nations to defeat insurgency, assist fragile states, and provide

vital humanitarian aid to the suffering.27

Is it clear enough?

In examining the composition of the international system, stability and

governance, JDP 3-40 provides a good example of how this thinking sets the

underlying assumptions, on which all else is based. It links international

stability, security and the process of stabilisation through the application of a

comprehensive approach, all conducted in the national interest:

The rules-based international system relies on stability. Security is the foundation onwhich stability is built. ... At the heart of the contest for security may be a bloody

insurgency. ... For real, long-term success, you must address the root causes of the

instability, and that requires an approach that combines economic, governance and security

measures; a comprehensive approach. Stabilisation is the process that supports states

which are entering, enduring or emerging from conflict in order to: prevent or reduce

violence; protect the population and key infrastructure; promote political processes and

governance structures which lead to a political settlement that institutionalises non-violent

contests for power; and prepares for sustainable social and economic development. Its

ultimate purpose is to strengthen an existing political order, or to reshape it, to become

more acceptable to the nations population and more consistent with the UKs strategicinterests. ... Instead, it may be a consequence of intervention for other reasons of national

interest. ... It will therefore be a necessary and implicit act of most interventions,

particularly in fragile or failed states.28

Thus stabilisation is the process which promotes economic development,

security and governance measures, which leads to security which provides

stability. So the doctrine is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal. Or is it?

Consider the following extract from JDP 3-40 and the proposition that:

Degradation in any one of these elements of a stable state may lead to erosion

of the others. This in turn creates a web of poor governance, economic

breakdown and insecurity that stimulates and exacerbates conflict. This may

cause, or be caused by, a collapse in the political settlement that regulates key

27 US Army FM 3-07, Foreword.28 JDP 3-40, p xv.

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societal and state relationships. Despite huge contextual variations and every

situation is different there may be a downward spiral of state fragility.29

It

seems therefore that there is certainty over a right to intervene, but a lack of

conviction over the underlying assumptions that underpin the problem (and as

will be shown later in the doctrinal use of analogy) and therefore of how the

solution might be framed.

This analytical certainty also features in the American approach and

supports the notions of insecurity resulting from state failure and the need to

promote democracy to counter insurgency. In particular it is prescriptive over

the reasons for, and the impact of, state failure, the links to insurgency and

global security:

Insurgency will be a large and growing element of the security challenges faced by the

United States in the 21st century. ... The strains created by globalization, by the collapse of

weak state structures, by demographic, environmental, and economic pressures, by theease of cooperation among insurgent groups and criminals, and by the appearance of

destructive radical ideologies, all augur a period in which free and moderate governance is

at risk. And in todays world, state failure can quickly become not merely a misfortune for

local communities, but a threat to global security.30

Doctrine is similarly unambiguous over the solution to the problems outlined

above in that the promotion of democracy and the creation of wealth are seen as

central: The most effective long-term measure for conflict prevention and

resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development. Effective

democracies generally resolve disputes through peaceful means, either

bilaterally or through other regional states or international institutions.31

But

contradictions occur over whether the promotion of democracy is the key, or

can actually make the situation worse, or whether pragmatism should prevailand any form of legitimate governance will suffice: Governance is the

process, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function;

effective, legitimate governance ensures that these are transparent, accountable

and involve public participation. Democratization, while often an end state

condition in planning, does not ensure these outcomes. In societies already

divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize

factions.32

There are further fundamental inconsistencies in the doctrine if the liberal

assumptions underpinning its conclusions are viewed from a realist perspective.

British and American doctrines are specific when suggesting that national

interest is the prime driver for intervention; thus it may alternatively be said that

the promotion of liberal democratic values is rather the means by which national

interest and security is safeguarded and not an end in itself. The primacy of

national interest is clearly demonstrated in JDP 3-40: Our contribution to

29 JDP 3-40, p 1-8. [Emphasis added].30 United States Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, US Government

Counterinsurgency Guide, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009, Preface.31 US Army FM 3-07, pp 1-11 - 12.32 US Army FM 3-07, p 2-11.

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stabilisation may vary, but will always be determined byUKs strategic

interests, obligations and national security imperatives.33

The use of force and the role of the military

Turning to the use of force, the concept of security and the role of the

military in counterinsurgency doctrine, there is no debate about the need forsecurity

34in contemporary conflict; rather the debate concerns how to achieve it

and whether it is in enabling or definitive function in stabilisation or stability

operations. British doctrine is quite specific that the role of the military is to

provide the security environment for all else that follows: The need for security

in stabilisation is non-discretionary. That is not to say that a secure

environment is an end in its own right, but without security nothing else can

function.35

This is a view echoed in the US: While the provision of security is

a necessary activity in COIN [counterinsurgency], it will not defeat an

insurgency on its own. In counterinsurgency, military forces are, in a sense, an

enabling system for civil administration; their role is to afford sufficient

protection and stability to allow the government to work safely with itspopulation, for economic revival, political reconciliation and external non-

government assistance to be effective.36

Further, contemporary doctrine is

clear on the use of force: Military force is but one element required for the

delivery of security and stabilisation.37 The role of the military within this is

even more clearly outlined:

The primary role of the military is to provide sufficient security for the people and control

over the operating environment. Security cannot be achieved solely through the presence

of military forces, or just by killing or capturing adversaries. Unlike in general war, the

objective is not the defeat or destruction of the enemy, but neutralisation of a threat to

stable society. Neutralisation can take many forms, but isolation of the adversary is

attractive as it makes him irrelevant through loss of legitimacy and erodes his popular

support.38

An alternative view on the use of force

In considering the role of the military, the dominant view in contemporary

doctrine and misuse of historical analogy suggests that minimum force is the

customary and preferred approach: the manual [US FM 3-24] also emphasizes

the value of using the minimum necessary force rather than the maximum force

permissible.39

Luttwak however, uses a wider historical lens to analyse the

role of force in successful counterinsurgency strategies. He suggests that the

exemplary, not the minimum use of force, was decisive in such conflicts:

Perfectly ordinary regular armed forces, with no counterinsurgency doctrine or

training whatsoever, have in the past regularly defeated insurgents, by using a

number of well proven methods. ... The simple starting point is that the

insurgents are not the only ones who can intimidate or terrorize civilians. ...

33 JDP 3-40, pp 2-3.34 In JDP 3-40 to describe the combination of human and national security.35 JDP 3-40, pp xvi-xvii.36 USG Counterinsurgency Guide, p 15.37 JDP 3-40, p 4-29.38 JDP 3-40 p 4-30.39

The US Army and Marine Corps, US Army Field Manual No. 3-24 and Marine Corps WarfightingPublication No. 3-33.5: Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

2007), p xxvii.11


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Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any specialized

counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out terrorize the

insurgents, so that the fear ofreprisals outweighs the desire to help the

insurgents or their threats.40

History can provide more recent examples to

support the view that the exemplary use of force has delivered success. Writing

of his experiences in Algeria in the 1950s, Galula had a similar view on thenature of the use of force, predicated on the provision of security to the

populous, on the basis of rational choice: Which side gives the best protection,

which one threatens the most, which one is likely to win, these are the criteria

governing the populations stand.41

Hearts and minds and the soft approach

The doctrines interpretation of the use of soft power, and particularly the

importance of winning hearts and minds, represents the primacy of the

population centric over the coercive approach. Whilst the very real and

significant debate over the nature and importance of influence, the effect of

words and deeds as a holistic approach, is beyond the scope of this paper, itscentrality to British and American doctrine should be noted for the implications

it has on the role of the use of force and its subordinate nature. The very term

hearts and minds is a seductive, much vaunted but less well understood phrase

than might at first seem apparent. There is a tendency to attribute all non-

kinetic approaches to the phrase credited to Templer (who incidentally is

reported to have said in 1968 that nauseating phrase I think I invented42

) and

therefore to apply the principles improperly: Just as search and destroy are not

always in harmony, nor are hearts and minds. In other contexts, heart and mind

are often pitted against each other - strong emotions versus cool calculation,

appeals to values and symbols versus appeals to the intellect.43

Contemporary

critiques of the pre-eminence of this approach suggest that in drawing together

the notions of minimum force and hearts and minds there is a danger of

conflating the two; population centric approaches inevitably offer the

opportunity for practitioners to do so. As Larsdotter has argued: Considering

the modest amount of systematic research on the subject, the importance given

to the notions of consent, hearts and minds and minimum force in these

operations seems to be somewhat exaggerated.44

MYTH AND THE REAL LESSONS FROM HISTORY

Nagl is clear that efforts to generalise from the specific are fraught withdanger: Is it enough to detect laws? Generalization and extrapolation from

such a limited basis must rely to some extent on intuition, which may or may

not be correct. Then there is the pitfall of dogmatism inherent in any efforts at

abstraction, for we are not studying a specific counter Revolutionary war, but

40 Luttwak, op cit, pp 6-7.41 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praeger Security

International, 2006), p 8.42 Dixon, op cit, p 363.43 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379 (London: The

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), p 84.44 K Larsdotter, Exploring the utility of armed force in peace operations: German and Britishapproaches in northern Afghanistan, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol 19 No 3, 2008, p 354.

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the problem in general; what may seem relevant in a majority of cases may not

be so in others where particular factors have affected the events in a decisive

way.45

Analysis of why previous insurgencies were defeated and a discussion

of counterinsurgency methodologies promote the view of the primacy of soft

approaches like hearts and minds and dismiss the role of the exemplary use of

force in overall success and failure. Using false analogies and dichotomiesdrawn from the past serves to reinforce current assumptions about the

limitations on the use of force.

The danger in selective analogy

The national interpretation of history is reflected in a nations strategic

culture which is reinforced when viewed through the lens of contemporary

assumptions. In seeking to substantiate the assumptions and offer solutions, it

should be no surprise that doctrine uses analogies and examples that support

them. As Nagl has suggested, a fundamental question relates to whether general

observations are relevant or valuable. It is clear that the use of historical

analogy should be carefully considered. Margaret MacMillan has argued, Thepast can be used for almost anything you want to do in the present. We abuse it

when we create lies about the past or write histories that show only one

perspective.46

Selective analogy should not be a substitute for full engagement

with all the debates surrounding the conflicts or a lack of understanding of the

historiography of the conflict. Greenhill and Staniland emphasise this point:

numerous studies employ the lessons of particular cases of success and failure

- most frequently, Malaya and Vietnam, respectively - to advance a set of all-

purpose success generating best practices and quagmire inducing pitfalls.47

This danger is apparent in contemporary doctrine as Hack has argued: FM3-

24s lessons from Malaya are not so much deduced by analysis of the

Emergency, as projected backwards onto it in order to justify preferred

contemporary policies.48

Has the nature of counterinsurgency changed?

So what of the nature of counterinsurgency today? If the nature of

counterinsurgency is shifting to reflect changes in the international order, then

significant doubt over the applicability of lessons from the past can be raised.

Kiszley warned that: all counter insurgencies are sui generis of their own

kind making problematic the transfer of lessons from one to another.49 The

Australian counterinsurgency authority Kilkullen has written extensively on the

challenges of contemporary counterinsurgency operations and it is worthexamining here some of the key points as they have implications for the utility

of historical examples. Firstly, counterinsurgency depends on the type and

nature of the insurgency itself50

, and that there is no single or fixed

methodology for dealing with them. Secondly, no useful historical analogy

45 John Nagl in Galula, op cit, p xiv.46 Margaret MacMillan, The Uses and Abuses of History (London: Profile Books, 2009), p xiii.47 K Greenhill and P Staniland, Ten Ways to Lose at Counter-Insurgency, Civil Wars, Vol 9, No 4,

2007, p 402.48 K Hack, The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,Journal of Strategic Studies,

Vol 32, No 3, 2009, p 396.49 J Kiszley, Learning About Counter-Insurgency,RUSI Journal, Vol 151, 2006, p 19.50 D Kilcullen, Counter-insurgencyRedux. Survival, Vol 48, 2006-7, p 112.

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exists for contemporary counterinsurgency because the classical political drivers

no longer apply. Contemporary insurgents do not necessarily have conventional

political or territorial aims, and contemporary doctrine may not accurately

reflect an understanding of the changed nature of the insurgent, their objectives

and the realisation that they may not be satisfied by any means available to

western nations. If this is so, it has particular relevance for doctrine which mayinappropriately cite history:

Classical counter-insurgency theory posits an insurgent challenger to a functioning (thoughoften fragile) state. The insurgent challenges the status quo; the counter-insurgent seeks to

reinforce the state and so defeat the internal threat. This applies to some modern

insurgencies Thailand, Sri Lanka and Colombia are examples. But in other cases,

insurgency today follows state failure, and is not directed at taking over a functioning body

politic, but at dismembering or scavenging its carcass, or contesting an ungoverned

space. Chechnya, Somalia and East Timor are examples.51

Thirdly, there could be fundamental differences which put the whole foundation

of contemporary doctrine at risk, for example if insurgency is subject to theforces of globalisation, where the trans-national character of modern

insurgency is also new52

, the state is no longer the geographical boundary for

insurgency, and makes nation-building a questionable solution. Fourthly, there

are questions over the role of military force in contemporary doctrine. If

counterinsurgency is now described ... as a variant of war and in war the

military dominates and the objective is the decisive defeat of the enemy. Why

should counterinsurgency operations be any different?53

With the US recently

elevating counterinsurgency to the same level of warfare as offensive and

defensive operations54

, where the use of force has primacy in the context of

achieving victory, why is that option so firmly marginalised in

counterinsurgency doctrine? The areas of debate on the nature, aims and typesof insurgency mean there are as many differences raised here as there are

similarities. This begs the question of the applicability of using specific

historical examples to support current thinking.

Minimum or exemplary use of force?

The use of force has long been disputed in the historiography of

counterinsurgency operations with often opposing conclusions drawn from

history.55

This is not a uniquely British problem when considering Kenya and

Malaya. The US in Vietnam and the Philippines, and France in Algeria have

drawn similar conclusions in support of contemporary analysis of what

constitutes a successful counterinsurgency strategy. As has been described

earlier, there is little debate over the requirement for the use of force in such

campaigns: the question becomes one of the level and type of force employed.

In the case of Malaya, the common understanding is that the campaign was won

through Templers implementation of the Briggs Plan.56

The popular view is

51Idem.52Ibid,p 114.53 S Metz, New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency, Parameters,

2007-8, p 22.54 US Army FM 3-07 p vi.55

See Mokaitis and Thornton on the minimum use of force; Ashley Jackson and Bennett on theexemplary use of force, see bibliography.56 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p 56.

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that the initial stages of the campaign (1947-50) were unsuccessful and that the

adoption of a military solution had not worked. Rather it was the

implementation ofa series of non-military activities articulated later by Sir

Robert Thompson57

that are credited with success. Thompsons five principles

included: a clear political aim, operations in accordance with the law, an overall

plan, priority to defeating political subversion and securing base areas first.58

Under Templers unitary command, the coordination of the efforts of the civil

administration with those of the security forces has gained acceptance as the

comprehensive approach.59

This interpretation on the use of force fails to

recognise the successes of the military in the early years which set the

conditions for future development and in particular pays scant attention to other

factors which may be seen as unacceptable today such as, forced resettlement,

repressive measures against the population, detention and, significantly,

coercive military operations.

Operations to suppress the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya are similarly

striking in the adoption of a coercive solution, and any use of this campaign as acontrasting analogy on the utility of force is unsurprisingly absent from

doctrine. In this case the use of minimum force to break the insurgency before a

political settlement could be reached, often cited as the UK way in

counterinsurgency, did not apply: [Operations in] Kenya made it clear that the

policy of minimum force had no purchase. ... In addition, by April 1956 over

1,000 had been executed by the British. By the end of 1954, there were 77,000

Kikuyu in detention and over 1 million had been resettled.60

Nor was this a uniquely British practice. In Algeria, between 1957 and

1961 the French employed similar resettlement tactics known asRegroupement

within the wider Quadrillage approach61 . Offensive and coercive military

operations were the at the centre of French actions: Within a few weeks, [of the

Battle of Algiers] France destroyed NLFs political and military structures,

dismantled its bomb network and killed or neutralised 1,827fellaghas

(outlaws), including 253 killers and approximately 200 terrorists.62

The

Americans also used exemplary force in Vietnam. As Birtle has suggested, the

punitive and coercive nature of military operations and their key role in success

was nothing new to the US, it was just something that had been forgotten, a

useful warning for today: Americans rediscovered in Vietnam what their

forebears had learned in the War of the Rebellion and the Philippine war ....

until the security forces could protect people from insurgent intimidation and

57 Permanent Secretary for Defence for Malaya and Head of the British International Advisory Mission,

Vietnam 1961-65.58 Robert ThompsonDefeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam

(London: Chatto & Windus, 1966), pp 50-58 and JDP 3-40 p 2-8.59 JDP 3-40 p 2-8 and BAFM Vol 1 Pt 10, 2009, CS5-1.60 H Strachan, British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq,RUSI Journal, Vol 152, 2007, p 10.61 The system ofquadrillage was one of the more common methods of population control. It was not

the only method employed by the French military who also practiced regroupementor resettlement.

Started in mid-1957, and carried out continuously until 1961, over two million Muslims would be re-

located. In J M Norton, The French-Algerian War and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency: a Comparison

(Unpublished Masters thesis, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 2007), p 41.62 Lt Col P Francois, Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: a French Point of View,Military Review,Vol 88, 2008, p 66.

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control, little of significance could be expected from political programs

designed to wean the population from the insurgency.63

Military failure was

not the reason for strategic defeat in Algeria and Vietnam.

Hearts and minds myth or reality?

The much vaunted contemporary view suggests that the use of soft powerapproaches to appeal to populations is the way forward; however, Benest

proposes a different analysis: Bluntly put, coercion was the reality hearts

and minds the myth.64

When the campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Algeria and

Vietnam are examined a similar problem emerges with the uncritical and

unrepresentative assertion that hearts and minds were decisive. Markel, Hack

and Greenhill and Staniland have all been critical of the efficacy of this

approach and the argument that it was central to success in any of these

campaigns: While we would like to believe that winning hearts and minds is

both important and effective, these examples suggest that the effect is neither

essential nor decisive.65

Hack, in particular, argues that the Malayan

Emergency was broken between 1950 and 1952 and this happened with apopulation control and security approach to the fore, at a time when winning

hearts and minds, dynamic leadership, and efficient learning were in their early

stages.66

Pointing out the danger of false dichotomies, Greenhill and Staniland

argue: Even the much vaunted hearts and minds strategy employed in the

archetypal Malayan success was counterbalanced by the judicious, but relatively

common, employment oftargeted coercion, something that is often forgotten in

discussions of the case.67

Bennett is similarly dismissive of this approach in Kenya, preferring to

emphasise the effectiveness of the use of exemplary force: the hearts and minds

efforts pursued by the British Army have been seen in a far too rosy perspective

and that measures such as villagization68 were usually unpleasant. In fact,

civilian support was gained as often through applying exemplary force, in the

form of collective punishment, atrocity and torture, as it was through social

reforms.69

In examining the Algerian insurgency, it is possible to go even

further and suggest that hearts and minds was not even a consideration.

Lessons from Indo-China had led the French military to clearly specify their

approach to the conflict with no mention of hearts and minds through these five

key principles: isolation of the insurgents from the population; providing

security to the population; executing effective targeting of insurgent forces and

63 Birtle, op cit, p 50.64 David Benest, Aden to Northern Ireland, 1966-76, in Big Wars and Small Wars, ed by H Strachan,

(London: Routledge, 2006), p 118.65 Lt Col W Markel, Draining the Swamp: the British Strategy of Population Control, Parameters,

36/1 Spring 2006, p 44.66 Hack,Ibid, p 384.67 Greenhill and Staniland, op cit, p 404.68 The forced repatriation of civilians from their homes to new villages created by the state to remove

the ability of the insurgents to draw support or intimidate the population and to provide security and

protection in a more efficient manner by concentration of forces. In H Bennett, The Mau Mau

Emergency as Part of the British Armys Post-War Counter-Insurgency Experience,Defence &Security Analysis, Vol 23, No 2, 2007, p 147.69Ibid, p 143.

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leadership; establishing French political legitimacy and effective indigenous

political and military forces; and establishing a robust intelligence capability.70

THE DANGERS OF THE NEW ORTHODOXY

Starting from a set of distinct assumptions together with the selective use ofideas and examples, can lead to ill-founded policy, which in turn prejudices the

debate over ends, ways and means. In contrast, there are differing perspectives

on the international system, competing views of why states fail, debates over the

value of liberal intervention and nation-building and how this directly

contributes to national and international security and variance over the use of

hard and soft power and the utility of the use of force and not least in the value

of realising a comprehensive approach and the ability to do so.

Notwithstanding these differences, the articulation of this in doctrine has

transferred this from the intellectual abstract to the practical and, through

codification; the British and American approaches have gained legitimacy. This

is dangerous in a number of ways.

False assumptions and flawed solutions

Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine has been produced as a result of

considerable inter-agency and cross-government discussion, and as a

consequence can be commended for this achievement alone. However, to date

this new doctrine has gone largely unchallenged by practitioners. In articulating

the new doctrine, British and American authors are keen to emphasise that this

is not prescriptive, and yet by the very nature of proposing particular

assumptions the doctrine is precisely that. The premise that liberal democracy

is a good thing, which can be applied globally, that where it exists it results in

greater stability and that therefore it is in national interest to preserve or even

impose this view, is flawed. Absent from doctrine is an acknowledgement of

different perspectives: democracy may not guarantee peace or stability, may not

be welcomed or be universally transferable as a form of governance, or a

recognition that there are states in which stability can be enhanced by strong and

autocratic leadership. The dangers of such false assumptions are highlighted by

Lord Hurd: You may call your standards universal, but they will never be

universally applicable. ... We cannot force other countries into democracy, free

speech, free trade or good government.71

Regardless of whether this approach and policy is intellectually or morallydefensible, it falls down in its application. The construction of strategy and the

ends, ways and means debate must be reflective of all three in the triumvirate;

the ends alone, whilst in principle uncontested, are insufficient to drive

favourable outcomes in such diverse and complex environments. In particular,

the understanding of the art of the necessary vice the art of the possible needs

to be addressed. As General Maxwell Taylor put it: It is common practice for

officials to define the foreign policy goals in the broad generalities of peace,

prosperity, cooperation, and goodwill unimpeachable as ideals, but of little

70 L DiMarco, Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War,

Parameters, Vol 36, 2006, p 68.71 Douglas Hurd, Choose Your Weapons.The British Foreign Secretary 200 Years of Argument,Success and Failure, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010), pp 368-9.

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use in determining the specific objective we are likely to pursue and the time,

place, and intensity of our efforts.72

The new orthodoxy

Over time, what is currently new becomes the norm and the norm becomes

convention. As former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for StabilityOperations, Celeste Ward, has warned:

Counterinsurgency doctrine is on the verge of becoming an unquestioned orthodoxy, a far-reaching remedy for America's security challenges. But this would be a serious mistake.

Not all future wars will involve insurgencies. Not even all internal conflicts in unstable

states - which can feature civil wars, resource battles or simple lawlessness - include

insurgencies ... Clearly some of these capabilities are needed, but like many useful

concepts that gain currency in Washington, counterinsurgency risks being taken too far,

distracting us from other threats, challenges and strategic debates.73

The view persists that a comprehensive approach will produce an effect that is

greater than the sum of the individual parts. In resource terms, this means thatby adopting such approaches, nations are arguably able to spread costs across

departments, thus creating a bigger bang for your buck. This may suit

political requirements where protracted conflict and long-term military

occupation is prohibitive in terms of blood and treasure. But efficiency is not

the same as agility or flexibility, and an equally logical conclusion could be the

need for early solutions through decisive, overwhelming coercive action, rather

than nation-building in our own image.74

Ward argues that unless we first

understand what it is we are trying to achieve, the means to achieve it cannot be

properly applied: If counterinsurgency is merely a more palatable stand-in for

nation-building, that politically freighted but strategically more illuminating

term, then our terminology may be obscuring the true extent of our predicament.... Too often in Washington the discovery of a hammer makes everything look

like a nail.75

Further critiques of current doctrine include the criticism that it represents

no more than sophisticated public relations: The hearts and minds description

of the British approach to counterinsurgency may be useful in public relations

terms but it undermines the theory as a guide to operations because it can be

interpreted in such divergent ways.76

If current counterinsurgency and

stabilisation doctrine is really about nation-building, surely subjects like

Security Sector Reform and conflict resolution would be more prevalent,

whereas JDP 3-40 could be interpreted to reveal little more than occupation

theories when statements over the national interest are at the forefront. This

doctrine is written by the military (albeit with other departmental input) to

support a pan-government approach, emphasising non-military activities over

military ones, and yet it does not seem to reflect the reality of the conduct of

current operations: in particular, kinetic approaches taken in Afghanistan (and

72 General M Talyor in William Flavin, Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,

Parameters, Vol 32, 2003, p 97.73 C Ward, Countering the Militarys Latest Fad: Counterinsurgency RAND Commentary,

http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/05/17/WP.html, accessed 2 March 2010.74

R Stewart, The Irresistible Illusion,London Review of Books, Vol 31 No 13, 2009, pp 3-6.75 Ward, op cit.76 Dixon, op cit, p 356.

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ongoing in Iraq) or the much quoted Petraeus guidance77

where the use of

hard power elements such as financial inducements and the considerable

levels of detention are at the fore: In Iraq, 160,000 people have been through

the detention process.78

Resource and implications for the militaryIt is possible that contemporary stabilisation and counterinsurgency

doctrine will be quickly consigned to Staff College libraries as the political and

economic costs of involvement in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are

considered too high and because it is questionable that this type of operation

will be the dominant future scenario. Strategy is concerned with the ends, ways

and means within given resource constraints, the cost that a nation is prepared to

pay. The costs of such operations may thus be no longer affordable, and in a

desire to make such approaches appear more efficient (and therefore less

costly), the danger is that the panacea of a soft power approach will lead to a

misunderstanding of both how to win in counter insurgency and the future needs

of military forces. Downes has argued that, even when a soft approach isemployed, the cost is significant: Analysts often points to the pacification of

Malaya by British forces in the 1950s as a model for how to win the guerrilla

war humanely. ... Still, suppressing the rebellion took hundreds of thousands of

security personnel 10 years to accomplish. Even in the most promising of

circumstances, therefore, low-violence counterinsurgency strategies are very

expensive and time consuming.79

Some detractors in the US (see Ward above) have already highlighted the

dangers of allowing counterinsurgency doctrine to become all-pervasive, but the

danger is more pressing in the UK. The difficulty lies in concerns that are

raised when undertaking the present conflict and forecasting for the next one: in

particular, when considering future military structures, equipments and

processes through the lens of the interpretation of current imperatives, pre-

occupations and self-interests. The idea that counterinsurgency will define all

military operations for the future is a strategic miscalculation of the worst kind,

which will distort resource debates beyond all proportion. In addressing current

issues, the Americans have already recognised that this type of operation will

mean changes to their armed forces: COIN often involves a wider range of

tasks and capabilities than are required in conventional conflict. Armed Forces

that optimized for major combat operations will usually require specific training

(and perhaps even structural reorganization) to meet the unique requirements ofCOIN.80

The dangers are evident. Galula was clear that the ability to fight

conventional war and contemporary conflict necessitated different force

structures.81

American forces post-Vietnam underwent a dramatic restructuring

to support this new type of conflict a restructuring that took the US military

77 General D Petraeus, Multi-National Force Iraq Commanders Counterinsurgency Guidance,

Military Review, Vol 88, 2008, pp 2-4. It would be too simplistic to view the Petraeus Doctrine as a

rejection of coercive in favour of soft approaches.78 J B Brown, Detention Operations, Behavior Modification and Counterinsurgency,Military Review,

2009, p 40.79 A Downes, Draining the Sea By Filling the Graves; Investigating the Effectiveness of

Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy, Civil Wars, Vol 9, No 4, 2007, pp 440-441.80 USG Counterinsurgency Guide, p 16.81 Galula, op cit, p 21.

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20 years and significant investment in the 1980/90s to reverse. Such

restructuring to support current operations would lead to a very different future

military force in the UK, one which arguably would be irreversible given the

current level of resources a situation that is only likely to worsen in the short

term.

Implications for the use of force

For the military, counterinsurgency was historically about defeat

management, in the sense that a political compromise was the ultimate solution;

the military were to hold the security ring until a political settlement emerged.

This discrete role for the use of military force is at odds with a longer-term

military involvement in nation-building. This also has implications for the role

of the military in relation to the other instruments of power. British and

American doctrine may articulate a comprehensive approach, but this is not

always what happens in practice: If these other instruments of national power

dont show up, cant stay or arent effective, the buck then passes back to

military forces. In the aftermath of combat operations, the Army repeatedly hasfound itself holding the dripping bag of manure. This leaves the military in a

quandary about the limits of its role.82

Consider the view that it is the application of force that has decisive effect.

Larsdotter, in a recent examination of the differing approaches taken in

Afghanistan by British and German forces, demonstrated that the UK approach

of the use of minimum force and hearts and minds was not as effective as the

German approach which was distinctly more kinetic in nature: ...it might be the

case that the entire idea of winning hearts and minds and establishing local

consent by minimum force is overrated. If nothing else ... it might be a good

idea to be careful before accepting the minimum force approach without any

further consideration.83 This is not new. Gray has argued convincingly that

history sees the military solution to this type of conflict repeated again and

again: Whether wars are great or small, regular or irregular, ancient or modern,

they all have deadly combat in common. Military force must have a political

purpose, but coercion is the method it is trained to apply in pursuit of that

purpose. Coercion includes intimidation, but its mailed fist is designed to kill

people and break things. It is surprising how many people, not excluding

soldiers, choose to ignore this defining characteristic of military power.84

The dangers inherent in uncritical acceptanceIf military forces are structured to fight contemporary conflict at the

expense of conventional warfare then there is a serious danger that the latter will

be unachievable, both operationally and in terms of resource. Similarly, if the

demands of conventional and unconventional war fighting each have their own

constraints, by inference the same applies to the militarys ability to conduct

specific military tasks whilst simultaneously trying to perform both military and

civilian roles. The military are simply not organised, trained or adept at

policing functions, let alone establishing governance structures or managing a

national economy. The dangers in going blindly down this route in the midst of

82

US Army FM 3-24, p xxxi.83 Larsdotter, op cit, pp 366-367.84 Colin Gray, Fighting Talk. Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy, (Potomac Books, 2009), p 32.

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a Defence Review are evident in terms of an appreciation of future challenges.

In a similar vein, Gray questions whether it was possible to predict the conflicts

in Iraq and Afghanistan and warns: A defence review worthy of the name has

to avoid the presentist fallacy of providing answers only to present day

questions, when the latter are all but certain to have but a short half life. The

challenge to British defence planning is to be able to cope well enough with theworld that we know today, while investing in military insurance as widely as we

dare, with prudence, for a moving tomorrow about which we are massively

ignorant.85

CONCLUSION

A new post Cold War world order, where stability and security within the

international system could be fashioned, led to intervention to support the

promotion of democracy and free market economies in fragile states. Rejecting

the idea that state failure might just be the norm, western interventions have

attempted to advance democracy through addressing the causes of instabilityresulting from state fragility: governance, economic development and security.

The levers of hard and soft power available to states to do this are applied to

further the cause with the emphasis on soft approaches as a result of historical

analysis and lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. This policy of liberal

intervention is enacted through the application of strategy and specifically

through the coordination of the ends, ways and means. But if the ends are set

i.e. the promotion of good governance (democracy), economic development and

security, it is the ways and means that are open to debate and challenge, in

particular whether hard or soft approaches should have primacy.

This led to the creation of new doctrine for stabilisation and

counterinsurgency in this image, predicated on the promotion of governance,

economic development and security. This solution is not without its detractors

and is subject to considerable debate, none of which, however, is found in

doctrine. This debate coupled with inconsistencies in British and American

approaches and questions of the role of the military and the use of force, means

that care should be taken when looking at the historical evidence used to support

the assumptions an uncontested view of the diagnosis of the problem and the

cure. It is impossible to draw analogies from history that help understand the

general nature of insurgency: each insurgency is different and therefore

historical specificity is of limited value. In addition, the range of explanationsfor success and failure in countering insurgency in the past are not necessarily

reflected in contemporary doctrine. Does historical analysis provide a blueprint

for future counterinsurgency operations or a series of historical analogies which

support the minimum use of force and the publicly acceptable concept of hearts

and minds, and is therefore a palliative for the uncomfortable reality of

intervention? Historical analogy may be useful when it is inclusive, critically

analysed and considered within its own historiography that outlines the range of

debates that explain success and failure. The danger in not doing so leads to a

false orthodoxy.

85 C Gray, Britains National Security: Compulsion and Discretion.RUSI Journal, Vol 153, 2008, p

17.

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The view that democracy and economic free markets equates to stability,

systems which can be imposed using power (mainly soft) to bring about, or

accelerate, the new world order has significant implications. This will require a

different type of military force of the type that is currently not envisaged.

Putting counterinsurgency at the heart of military thinking may distort futureresource debates to an extent that may be very difficult to recover from,

especially if the international environment changes and contemporary

challenges are replaced by new ones. Whilst soft approaches look attractive in

resource and public relations terms, are they the most efficient way to deal with

contemporary conflict? The point is not proven, and no amount of new and

extensive doctrine will change the fact that operational solutions to strategic

problems are likely to prove insufficient. Given the unpopular nature of such

conflicts domestically and internationally, their cost and uncertain outcomes,

this new doctrine should be left to gather dust on the shelf.

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Caldwell, William B

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