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COU�CIL OF

THE EUROPEA� U�IO�

Brussels, 16 June 2009

10842/09

SCH-EVAL 84

E�FOPOL 166

COMIX 486

�OTE

from: Drafting Group for updating of Schengen catalogue on police cooperation

to: Schengen Evaluation Working Party

Subject : Draft updated Catalogue of Recommendations for the correct application of the

Schengen Acquis and Best practices: Police cooperation

2009

SCHE�GE� CATALOGUE

RECOMME�DATIO�S A�D BEST PRACTICES

POLICE COOPERATIO�

Temporary version – June 2009

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SCHE�GE� CATALOGUE

Recommendations and Best Practices

VOLUME FOUR: POLICE COOPERATIO�

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................3

2008-2009 UPDATE............................................................................................................................4

PART IV : POLICE CO-OPERATION...............................................................................................7

A. General section ..................................................................................................................7

B. Recommendations/Best practices ......................................................................................9

SECTIO� A - GE�ERAL 9

1. Article 39 CISA (Article 4 of SWEI) - Mutual assistance 10

2. Article 46 CISA (Article 7 of SWEI) - Unsolicited communication

of information and co-operation in matters relating to public

order and national security 18

3. Articles 7, 47 and 125 CISA - Liaison officers 20

4. Article 7 CISA - Exchanging information in view of ensuring

effective external border controls and surveillance. 22

SECTIO� B - OPERATIO�AL CO-OPERATIO� 22

5. Article 40 CISA (Cross-border surveillance) 22

6. Article 41 CISA (Cross-border pursuit) 26

7. Organisational structure and strategy 30

9. Training 33

10. �ational Coordination 36

11. Joint patrols 36

12. Radio-communications (Article 44 CISA) SCH/Com-ex (99) 6 37

13. Article 73 CISA - Controlled deliveries 40

*

* *

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I�TRODUCTIO�

1. At its meeting on 28 May 2001, the Council set as an objective for further work by the

Working Party on Schengen Evaluation the identification of "... best practices, particularly

as regards border controls, so that they can serve as examples for those States acceding to

Schengen but also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. These evaluations and the

identification of best practices shall serve as inspiration for the establishment of standards

defining the minimum application of the Schengen acquis (…) in the relevant working

groups" (mandate for the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation) (8881/01 – SCH-EVAL

17, COMIX 371).

On the basis of this mandate, the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation (hereinafter re-

ferred to as “SCH-EVAL WP”) worked out the principles and procedure for drawing up the

Catalogue of recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and best

practices, hereinafter referred to as the Catalogue of recommendations and best practices, or

Catalogue.

The purpose of the Catalogue is to clarify and detail the Schengen acquis and to indicate

recommendations and best practices, in order to provide an example for those States acced-

ing to Schengen and also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. With this in mind the

Catalogue gives a good indication to the future Schengen states and the Candidate countries

for accession to the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the "EU") (at their request) as

to what is expected of them, particularly in practical terms, regarding Schengen. The aim is

not to give an exhaustive definition of the whole of the Schengen acquis but to put forward

recommendations and best practices in the light of the experience gained by the SCH-EVAL

WP in verifying the correct application of the Schengen acquis in several countries as well

as gained by the experts regarding the implementation and application of the new instru-

ments in the field of international cooperation.

The text of the Catalogue does not seek to introduce new requirements but should also make

it possible to draw the Council's attention to the need where appropriate to amend certain

provisions of the Schengen acquis so that the Commission and, where appropriate, the

Schengen states take the recommendations and best practices into account when putting

forward proposals or formal initiatives. This exercise is inter alia the first stage of the proc-

ess of defining minimum standards by the Council.

2. The SCH-EVAL WP adopted the following definitions to conduct this exercise:

Recommendations: non-exhaustive series of measures which should make it possible to es-

tablish a basis for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and for monitoring it.

Best Practices: non-exhaustive set of working methods or model measures which must be

considered as the optimal application of the Schengen acquis, it being understood that sev-

eral best practices are possible for each specific part of Schengen co-operation.

3. In the past, the first volume of the Catalogue, which was handed over to the candidate coun-

tries at the Council of 28 February 2002, dealt with borders, border surveillance, and border

control (first part) and with removal and readmission (second part). The second volume of

the Catalogue that was adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 19 December

2002, deals with the Schengen Information System, notably the application of the SIRENE

Manual. The third volume of the Catalogue deals with issuing of visa and was adopted by

the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 8 March 2003. All those volumes

have been amended during the years 2008-2009 and the new volume concerning the data

protection issues has been drafted.

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4. The fourth volume of the Catalogue deals with the issue of police cooperation and consists

of two main parts: the first one on mutual assistance and information exchange, and the sec-

ond one on operational co-operation. This division acknowledges the fact that information

exchange is the most important element of any co-operation between law enforcement bod-

ies. A short general section describes the basic concepts underlying the recommendations

and best practices. These are presented in tabular form, with recommendations on the left

and best practices on the right, alongside the relevant recommendations. The new chapter

concerning statistics (chapter 8) has been inserted into the updated version of the Catalogue.

2008-2009 UPDATE

5. On 5 June 2008, the JHA Council adopted conclusions on future monitoring of the correct

application of the Schengen acquis in participating States. Herewith, the Council endorsed

activities of the SCH-EVAL WP launched under the Slovenian Presidency with the aim to

render the working methods and activities of the SCH-EVAL WP more efficient and to de-

velop a more integrated approach of Schengen evaluations.

6. The French Presidency started the practical implementation of the Multi-Presidency Pro-

posal for a Schengen Evaluation Programme1 which shall serve as the basis for planning ac-

tivities of the SCH-EVAL WP for the next five-year period.

7. Schengen Catalogues of Recommendations and Best Practices have always presented an

important part of Schengen evaluations. Having in mind that the existing catalogues were

drawn up in years 2002-2003 and the Schengen acquis as well as Schengen practice has in

the meantime undergone a significant development, the SCH-EVAL WP agreed on the need

to update the catalogues, drawing on the best practice identified during visits carried out es-

pecially over the last two years, and to continue updating these catalogues on a regular basis

in the future. Agreement was also reached on the need to elaborate a new catalogue dealing

with the issue of data protection as mentioned above.

8. The SCH-EVAL WP meeting on 17 July 2008 started the process of revi-

sion/update/elaboration of Schengen catalogues by taking the decision to set up special ex-

pert groups dealing with individual catalogues with the aim to present the final draft cata-

logue to the SCH-EVAL WP if possible in November/December 2008.

9. Schengen Catalogue on Police cooperation presents Volume 4 of catalogues and was issued

in June 2003. Since 2003 many changes have come through in the field of the international

police cooperation and several new instruments for enhancing and strengthening cooperation

have come into force.

1 Doc. 6949/3/08 REV 3 SCH-EVAL 11 COMIX 160.

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10. When updating the Schengen police cooperation catalogue, the expert group has taken into

account new instruments, initiatives and practical tools adopted since 2003 in the field of

police cooperation at the level of EU/Schengen. The most important ones are listed as fol-

lows:

- Manual of Good Practices concerning the International Police Cooperation Units at Na-

tional Level (7968/08)

- Schengen police cooperation handbook (10694/07)

- Manual on cross border operations

- Prüm Treaty

- Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the

exchange information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the

European Union ("Swedish Framework Decision")

- Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border co-

operation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime.

- Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision

2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating

terrorism and cross-border crime.

- Council Decision 2008/617/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the improvement of cooperation

between the special intervention units of the Member States of the European Union in

crisis situations

- EUROPOL Convention.

- 2002/187/JHA: Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view

to reinforcing the fight against serious crime.

- Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism.

- Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against

organized crime.

- European Best Practice Guidelines for Police and Customs Cooperation Centers (doc.

13815/08)

- Council Decision 2002/348/JHA of 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection

with football matches with an international dimension,

- Council Resolution of 4 December 2006 concerning an updated handbook with recom-

mendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control

violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international di-

mension, in which at least one Member State is involved,

- Council recommendation of 6 December 2007 concerning a Handbook for police and

security authorities concerning cooperation at major events with an international

dimension

- Manual on information exchange

- Guidelines on the Implementation of Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of

18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange information and intelligence between

law enforcement authorities of the European Union ("Swedish Framework Decision")

11. Another key source for updating the catalogue was the experience gained during the

Schengen evaluation process conducted in the field of police cooperation in years 2003 -

2009. Content of evaluation reports and recommendations of various evaluation committees,

including some examples of best practices, has been of utmost importance and is reflected in

the updated version of the catalogue which furthermore builds upon experiences of Schen-

gen police cooperation practitioners as well as experts participating in Schengen evaluations.

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12. The updated version of the Schengen Police Cooperation Catalogue refers to several ongo-

ing important activities in the field of police cooperation which could not have been fully re-

flected in autumn 2008. Therefore, the current version of the catalogue is submitted after

finalization of the work on the most significant activities in this field and still should be

considered as temporal and non-exhaustive one.

13. In order to facilitate orientation in particular with regards to a number of relevant tools

(manuals, guidelines, handbooks) being prepared at the EU level (mainly on the platform of

Police Cooperation Working Group and Ad Hoc Data Exchange Working Party), a list of

these tools (as announced above in the part 10) is annexed to the updated Catalogue. Their

purpose is to gather all relevant means of cooperation and cross-border activities between

law enforcement authorities of the Member States in order to enhance and strengthen their

effective and efficient collaboration. These tools introduce also the new instruments such as

e.g. the Prüm Decision and the data exchange according to the “Swedish Initiative” Frame-

work Decision.

The use and implementation of these detailed manuals could affect the need of the Member

States of future update and existence of the Schengen Police Cooperation Catalogue.

14. Following the article 10, 12, 13 (see above) the Annex contains the reference on newly pre-

pared Manual on cross-border operations, which is currently under the process of ratifica-

tion. The manual describes different kinds of cross-border operations that are and can be organ-

ised by law enforcement authorities on the basis of different legal instruments. For the purpose

of that manual, "cross-border operations" are understood as law enforcement operations

whereby officers from one Member State (co-)operate on the territory of another Member

State. It aims to provide guidance or at least indications on how to use these various tools,

which ultimately should lead to a more uniform implementation across the EU and the Schen-

gen territory. It should facilitate cooperation among the competent authorities in Member States

by specifying the legal provisions with practical and more detailed guidelines, including identi-

fied best practices. The forms for various cross border activities are enclosed as annexes to the

above mentioned manual.

Within the update of the Catalogue only the reference to the above mentioned Manual was

chosen in order to avoid overlaps and repitition of existing information.

15. The Annex contains also the reference on the existing Manual of Good Practices concerning

the Interational Police Cooperation Units at National Level (7968/08), which was drafted by

the European Police Chiefs Task Force in November 2007 with the main goal to underline

advantages in setting up in each Member States a "one stop shop" unit for international po-

lice cooperation, with a multi-agency organisation. The other main topic addressed in this

manual is the definition of criteria for choosing between various international channels (SI-

RENE, ENU, EIS, NCB, BDL network) or bi-lateral or internal law enforcement offices,

such as the liaison officers network, according to the type of information exchanged or re-

quested. This manual aims to provide guidelines and examples for the above-mentioned

units to maximise their resources, avoid overlaps and make cooperation with other Member

States more efficient, expedient and transparent. In the light of the experience gained

through the third round of mutual evaluation process (in particular the final report on the

evaluation visits of all 25 Member States, doc.13321/2/07 CRIMORG 141 REV 2 EN-

FOPOL 152 ENFOCUSTOM 93), the characteristics of an ideal international unit (or plat-

form) are expressed in this manual.

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16. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the purpose of Schengen catalogues has not changed.

As in preceding years, catalogues continue to present an important tool which gives recom-

mendations and highlights best practices for implementation and correct application of all

provisions of the Schengen acquis and other relevant documents by providing practical ex-

amples and overview of approved practice in order to assist both the Schengen Member

States and candidate states.

17. The Catalogue continues to serve as a reference tool for Schengen evaluations undertaken in

the candidate countries with the aim to verify preparedness for the full application of the

Schengen acquis (first mandate of the SCH-EVAL WP) and in Schengen States to monitor

the correct application of the Schengen acquis by Schengen States (second mandate of the

SCH-EVAL WP).

PART IV : POLICE CO-OPERATIO�

DETAILS OF RECOMME�DATIO�S A�D BEST PRACTICES

A. General section

The list of recommendations and best practices set out hereunder has been updated mainly on the

basis of the outcome of different evaluations carried out after the issuing of the previous version of

the Catalogue over the years 2003-2009 (included).

Because police co-operation takes place in the preserve of national sovereignty, the Schengen Con-

vention merely sets out a set of basic principles. The implementation of these principles (proce-

dures, competent authorities, possible authorisations, channels, etc) underlies national law. Best

practices have therefore to be formulated in a sufficiently abstract manner to cater for these national

specifics. This Catalogue is complementary to a number of handbooks and manual listed in the An-

nex and provides details on the procedures to be complied with.

Catalogue will be also reflected by the �ew Police Cooperation Handbook – compilation of all ex-

isting manuals, best practices or recommendations, which is mainly aimed to set up a user-friendly

tool allowing the officers to find relevant information easily and quickly. The handbook supposed

to be just in an electronic version available in a special software programme, easily accessible and

updated. Project has been launched by the Slovenian Presidency, but has not been finished yet. Next

step would be the process of implementation of this project.

Besides, where police co-operation has been shaped by bilateral agreements best practices stet out

what the practices are in that respect. When entering into a bilateral agreement it should be consid-

ered whether it is more appropriate to establish a direct co-operation between the competent au-

thorities with a view to ensure efficient co-operation.

The implementation of the recommendations and best practices contained in this document shall

take place within the framework of the relevant provisions of the Schengen acquis as well as Euro-

pean instruments resulting from relevant EU working structures, bilateral agreements and national

law, including provisions on the competences under national law, while aiming at ensuring the most

efficient co-operation.

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This catalogue is divided in three main chapters, mutual assistance and information exchange, op-

erational co-operation and structures and training. These sections follow as much as possible the

Schengen Convention. Besides, the new chapters concerning statistics and radio communication

were added.

Police co-operation via the Schengen Information system and SIRENE is not covered in this vol-

ume of the catalogue, as it was part of the second volume of the updated versions (see there).

Definition “Police” used in the Catalogue means all relevant authorities responsible for ensuring

public order and security according to the legislation of each EU Member State.

For the purpose of this Catalogue definition “Police” also means depending on the organizational

structure adopted in each EU MS other police type formations (for example Border Police, Border

Guard etc.) designated according to the national legislation to perform tasks and duties covered by

this Catalogue in the framework of inter - institutional, international and cross - border police coop-

eration.

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B. Recommendations/Best practices

Recommendations Best practices

SECTIO� A - GE�ERAL

1. A common evaluation on an annual ba-

sis of ongoing police co-operation referred

to in this catalogue should be produced.

2. A Central authority responsible for in-

ternational police co-operation should be

set up and designated as the single point

of contact for each Schengen State and for

all the activities concerning international

police cooperation including gathering

and analysing of the statistic data regard-

ing Schengen cooperation instrument, as it

is recognised to be an effective evaluation

and management tool.

The Handbook on cross-border police co-

operation should be updated according to

the provisions of the Schengen Executive

Committee Decision of 16.12.1998 (

SCH/Com/Ex(98) 52= OJ L 239,

29.09.00,p408)

Changes to the Handbook should be noti-

fied immediately to the Council Secre-

tariat.

All offices responsible for international

police co-operation (Europol, SIRENE,

Interpol, etc) should be accessed through a

single point of contact, be integrated

within the same management structure

and located at the same site.

Because there are different units dealing

with different parts of police cooperation

on national level, the accessibility via one

single point of contact is necessary so the

requesting country should not take care of

different competencies and contacts in

requested country. The National Liaison

Office/ Permanent Service/ Integrated Of-

fice/Front Desk/Communication Centre

with 24/7 service for back offices where

all the different police channels are pre-

sent can be considered as a best practice

concerning the handling Schengen re-

quests (including art. 39, 46 CISA) and

ensuring the effective control of informa-

tion exchange.

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1. Article 39 CISA (Article 4 of SWEI) - Mutual assistance 1

3. The Schengen States undertake to en-

sure that their police authorities shall, in

compliance with national law and within

the scope of their powers, assist each

other for the purposes of preventing and

detecting criminal offences.

It is essential for the Central authority to

be informed of all serious and organized

crime police co-operation actions that are

taken throughout the national territory.

4. Central authority is at hand 24/7.

5. National police authorities have perma-

nent and direct access to Central authority.

6. Central authorities constitute an opera-

tional network between themselves to de-

velop practical modalities of their co-

operation and generally improve the qual-

ity of their service.

7. Police units that forward requests to

the Central authority must have adequate

knowledge about the limits their national

law imposes on the legality of the re-

quests for assistance.

8. The Central authority double-checks

the legitimacy of requests.

9. The exchange of information on local

level should not be kept down, but it is

good to ensure, that the Central authority

is informed about the essential (general)

facts in all cases of international coopera-

tion in real time by the local authorities.

Central authority is equipped to forward

and process requests rapidly.

Central authority has a front-desk provid-

ing a 24/7 service for back offices and a

well organised case system of controlling

the distribution of the cases so that no du-

plications may occur.

All officers involved in internal police co-

operation at central level are located at

one site.

The Central authority oversees the for-

warding of the request to the competent

authority or, when letters rogatory are re-

quired, informs the Central authority of

the requesting state of this.

Schengen States shall inform each other

via the central authorities of the way au-

thorisation for use of written information

in criminal proceedings must be obtained.

Schengen States may agree that the po-

lice and/or judicial authorities may

transmit requests for authorization and

the documents resulting from dealing

with such requests by any secure and re-

liable means that allow swift transmis-

sion, provided the transmission provides

a written trace of the document's author

(e.g. telefax, e-mail).

In order to enhance day-to -day co-

operation, the liaison officers of Border

Guards and Customs are seconded to the

Central authority where they have full

access to all relevant databases of their

authorities if necessary 24/7.

The relevant Memorandum of under-

1 Update of the catalogue as concerns the provisions Art. 39 paragraph 1 – 3 and Art. 46 CISA

particularly their parts as far as they relate to exchange of informations and intelligence for

the purpose of conducting criminal investigation or criminal intelligence operations will be

prepared according to the application of the Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA .

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10. Recommendations:

a) The Central authority maintains an

electronic evidence of the requests and

implements an electronic workflow with

its national correspondents. This enables

them to be aware in real time about gen-

eral facts on all cases of international co-

operation dealt so the duplicity on one

hand and loss of information are avoided

(case management system).

b) The conditions for obtaining an infor-

mation or data should be the same as the

national conditions;

11. The mean of communication always

arise from the character of information

transmitted – for some of information the

secure channels must be used (SIRENE,

EUROPOL etc.), the use of open chan-

nels like Internet should be avoided.

12. All officers involved in the interna-

tional police cooperation should have

successfully completed a training course

covering their tasks, which should include

the general knowledge of the Schengen

and EU provisions and other main and

relevant documents of the international

police cooperation.

standing between the Police and Custom

service is an excellent basis for a good

cooperation between these two services.

Professional translators should be present

at central services responsible for police

cooperation, especially at the SI-

RENE/INTERPOL office.

The information that could be exchanged

on the basis of a request for mutual assis-

tance should also address the possibility of

exchange of samples of evidence for iden-

tification or comparison.

Depending on their task for example the

knowledge of Handbook on police coop-

eration, relevant bilateral agreements, re-

admisson provisions, etc. should be cov-

ered by the training course.

13. Requests for assistance are granted

subject to the following conditions:

- requests for assistance and reply

must be exchanged via central au-

thorities

- requests must be authorized by

national law

- requests must be within the scope

of the powers of the authorities

concerned; where the authority

concerned is not empowered to

grant assistance, the request must

be forwarded to the competent au-

thority.

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- activities to be carried out to re-

spond to a request should not be

those that are the exclusive re-

sponsibility of the judicial au-

thorities or require their consent

- implementation of the request

must not involve the application

of coercive measures

- written information may only be

used as evidence with the prior

consent of the judicial authorities

of the requested country

- information exchange must be

admissible under the domestic

law of the requested State.

14. Guedelines on the Implementation of

Council Framework Decision

2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on

simplifying the exchange information and

intelligence between law enforcement au-

thorities of the European Union ("Swedish

Framework Decision")

Improvement of Co-operation between

Central authorities

The Central Authority should be in a posi-

tion to deal with such requests directly, as

far as possible, without referring them to

another agency for enquiry.

15. With a view to fostering co-operation

between the central authorities, the Presi-

dency shall, if necessary, convene meet-

ings of the heads of the central authorities

to be held on a regular basis.

The heads of the central authorities shall

then discuss matters of common interest

and assess the efficiency of the co-

operation. They shall endeavour to pool

their organizations’ knowledge by, for in-

stance, organizing exercises, exchanges

and training courses for their staff.

1.2. Assistance in urgent situations

- In urgent situations, requests for as-

sistance may be addressed directly to

the competent authorities of the coun-

try concerned, who may respond di-

rectly.

Common interpretation of urgency: when

going via channel of the Central authority

would prolong the transmission of the re-

quest to the local authorities and jeopard-

ize the success of the preventative or in-

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DG H E�

- The requesting authority must imme-

diately notify the Central authority of

the requested State of this direct re-

quest.

vestigative action

- police units have access to a complete

and up-to-date list of names and con-

tact details of police units in other

Schengen states they can directly con-

tact in urgent cases ;

- police units will avail themselves of

the minimum necessary equipment to

exchange requests and replies in a

rapid and secure manner.

- Central authorities are responsible for

updating the contact list and informing

the national police units.

In cases of urgency, they will immediately

inform the Central authority of the police

unit they have approached with direct re-

quest for assistance; with the same sense

of urgency they will notify their own Cen-

tral authority of the request they made and

the reply they have received.

- simplification of procedures

16. Use of central systems (SIS) and

structures (SIRENE, Europol) must be

ensured in all relevant cases according to

the existing rules (mandate) and legal

provisions. It must not be substitute by

the communication on local or personal

level.

Criminal investigations, particularly in

urgent situations, can also be accelerated

by simplifying procedures. This is exem-

plified in the arrangements already exist-

ing between some States whereby, at the

instigation of the judicial authorities, the

police authorities cooperate directly by

assisting each other with police inter-

views, searches and the seizure of objects

when a delay could harm the ongoing in-

vestigation.

1.2.3 – Article 4 of SWEI

17. A common technical channel should

be established for the exchange of infor-

mation among the central authorities.

Each Member State has to supply their

own central authorities with all technical

instruments with the aim to satisfy the re-

quest as soon as possible and within the

time limits foreseen by the FWD.

18. Each Member State has to ensure a

The Central authority in charge for the

application of the law should be equipped

in order to process the requests within the

time limits foreseen by the FWD

960/2006 for all those information that

can be obtained from the national data-

bases.

The Central authority will forward the re-

quests to the competent authorities when

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DG H E�

fast connection among the central authori-

ties and other national agencies in charge

for specific matters as public order (e.g.

football), criminal investigation (anti-

drugs enforcements) as well as local po-

lice offices for the all the requests needing

this kind of support.

- reference to manual 7968/08 - doplnit

the requested information can’t be ob-

tained from the national databases.

The Central authority is forwarding the

request to the competent judicial authority

when the requested information is subject

of a penal proceeding or criminal investi-

gation in the requested Country and its

use, in a criminal process, should be au-

thorized; the requesting Country will be

immediately informed in case a rogatory

letter or judicial assistance is required.

The Central authority involves other

agencies in charge for the International

Cooperation (INTERPOL, SIRENE, EU-

ROPOL) when the request is of interest

according with their own tasks.

1.3. Bilateral agreements (art. 39 CISA §4 and 5)

19. Schengen states may conclude bilat-

eral police agreements with all neighbour-

ing countries.

20. Manuals containing specials provi-

sions for police cooperation with neigh-

boring countries should be drafted.

21. Internal border authorities should have

the possibility to conclude cooperating

regulations with their counterparts in or-

der to further detail practical arrange-

ments.

Develop such bilateral agreements so that

they meet the Schengen acquis require-

ments in all respects, in particular with

regards to cross border operations such

as :

• setting up of Joint Police Stations,

Police and Customs Cooperation

Centres, joint patrols

• networking between these bilat-

eral structures

• direct access of the officials in

these centres to their national da-

tabases

• alleviation of the burden on the

Central authority

• maintenance of supervision and

information oversight on national

level.

Positive aspect of efficient cross-border

police cooperation is the possibility of

regional police headquarters to operating

regulation with their counterparts in the

neighbouring countries, containing all

necessary practical information.

A permanent exchange of relevant statis-

tics would constitute the base for a com-

mon risk analysis.

- In multi-border areas: the creation of a

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DG H E�

Crossborder agreements extending the

scope of the Schengen Convention

22. In order to strengthen crossborder po-

lice co-operation in border areas, the

Schengen Convention enables Schengen

states to sign complementary bilateral

agreements. (art. 39 CISA §4 and 5)

23. These bilateral agreements can follow

the same pattern:

- on the one hand, the creation of police

and customs co-operation centres

(PCCC);

- on the other hand, direct co-operation

between police forces and customs

units.

24. The police and customs cooperation

centres/Joint Police Stations (PCCC) are

located on the borders and are composed

of members of the police forces and cus-

toms of the neighbouring countries

multiparty structure gathering all bor-

der actors is given as an example (the

Luxembourg centre is made of ser-

vices from Luxembourg, Belgium,

Germany and France)

Bilateral agreements with neighbouring

countries not only meet the requirement of

the Schengen acquis but even go beyond it

in certain areas.

PCCCs have no operational jurisdiction

but provide assistance and advice to the

units in their cross-border relations.

Establishment of the Police and customs

cooperation centres/Joint Police Station is

not only the effective tool of cooperation

for the contracting parties but other mem-

ber States are the beneficiaries.

LOCATION

Joint Police Stations/Police and Customs

Co-operation centres have to be set up at

internal and external borders. The office

should be set up in the immediate vicinity

of the border processing point.

10842/09 LB/mdc 16

DG H E�

25. Representatives of all relevant authori-

ties responsible for ensuring public order

and security should be present in these

stations/centres. At the internal and exter-

nal borders there should also include rep-

resentatives of border guards, in order to

ensure a complex approach in cross-

border cooperation.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

All authorities represented in the PCCC

can have complete online access to their

national investigation and secure informa-

tion systems. Telephone, fax and Internet

connections with an international dialling

capability are an absolute requirement.

The electronic workflow system is recog-

nised as a very useful tool.

OPERATION

26. The working procedures of Joint Po-

lice Stations/Police and Customs co-

operation have to be largely specified in

advance in the common agreement. The

opening hours and staffing hours have to

be determined according to need.

27. The opening hours should be based on

the principle “the 24H service” (24/7).

STAFF

28. A high standard has to be applied in

the selection of staff. The job description

should include flexibility, and communi-

cation skills.

29. Good practice of foreign languages is

required for officers working in the co-

operation centres.

30. A thorough knowledge of the provi-

sions of the Schengen Convention along

with the bilateral agreement in question is

In case that the parties can not open 24

hour-a-day, they should keep a permanent

contact point.

STAFF

• The staff should be assigned perma-

nently to the Joint Police Sta-

tions/Police and Customs cooperation

centres.

• Staff selection should be based on a

particular training.

• This training should include aspects of

the neighbouring state's legal system

with a special focus on the structures

of its authorities, administration and

police services.

• Particularly for work at internal bor-

10842/09 LB/mdc 17

DG H E�

required so that the border system does

not interfere with the Convention system.

ders, detailed knowledge of EU law is

required.

• In addition, the occupation of the em-

ployees could possibly have conse-

quences in terms of work/residence

permits and even in terms of salaries.

TASKS

31. The range of tasks to be assigned to

Joint Police Stations/Police and Customs

Co-operation is plentiful. The following

are the main tasks:

• Building up and maintaining contacts;

• Finding and exchanging information

between relevant authorities in the

scope of their responsibility

• Drafting joint situation reports

• Providing logistic assistance for joint

operations and joint investigation

teams operating in the area

COMMON TRAINING AND EDUCA-

TIONAL ACTIVITIES

In order to

• ensure the best possible personal

knowledge of the counterparts

• improve the language skills of the

neighbouring country/countries

• become more familiar with the proce-

dures, legal framework and practice of

the neighbouring country/countries

The common short term stages, mentor-

ing, joint exercises and exchange pro-

grammes could be organized regularly (on

regular basis)

In respect of the finding and exchang-

ing of information in support of Police

operations the following should be in-

cluded in the responsibilities of the

relevant agencies.

- Confirming the identity of vehicle

owners;

- Checking home addresses;

- Searching for and investigating per-

sons and objects;

- Examining documents;

- Consulting driving licence databanks;

10842/09 LB/mdc 18

DG H E�

- Telephone subscriber checks;

- Collaboration on international investi-

gations, pursuits and observations;

- Coordinating police activities in re-

spect of international road traffic;

- Processing border-related incidents;

- Collaboration on international ma-

jor incident and contingency plans.

Relationship with Central authority

The Joint Police Stations/Police and Cus-

toms Co-operation should report system-

atically to the Central authority concern-

ing the application of the articles 39,40,41

and 46 of the Schengen Convention

(CISA)

32. PCCCs should have the possibility of

giving answers to the so called “chain

questions” received from other PCCCs,

remaining in the scope of professional re-

sponsibility of the services gathered in the

framework of a given PCCC.

One positive aspect of the cross -border

cooperation is the opportunity to provide

answers in the exceptional and common

situations by the authorities gathered in

PCCC in a given MS to the questions ob-

tained from the other PCCC in which

there are no representatives of a country to

which the question has been addressed.

2. Article 46 CISA (Article 7 of SWEI) - Unsolicited communication of in-

formation and co-operation in matters relating to public order and na-

tional security 1

33. As a general rule the transmission of

information will take place by the inter-

mediary of the designated Central author-

ity

The designated Central authority should

be considered as the first route for the

transmission of information under Article

46 CISA. Even in particularly urgent

cases their experience and structure

should permit the best results for the pre-

vention and detection of crime and main-

tenance of public policy and national se-

curity.

1 Update of the catalogue as concerns the provisions Art. 39 paragraph 1 – 3 and Art. 46 CISA particularly their parts as far as they relate to exchange of informations and intelligence for the purpose of conducting criminal investigation or

criminal intelligence operations will be prepared according to the application of the Council Framework Decision

2006/960/JHA .

10842/09 LB/mdc 19

DG H E�

34. To ensure the information can be

supplied as early as possible and can be

handled in a confidential manner a secure

and reliable means of communications

must be available

A variety of secure and reliable means of

communication should be available be-

tween central authorities for international

police cooperation.

The adoption of a system for validation of

the information is encouraged. Schengen

States will be more able to respond to in-

formation, which is supported by a recog-

nized validation by the transmitting state.

35. When, in urgent cases, the direct

transmission of information takes place

between national units the Central au-

thority must be notified immediately.

36. The information supplied should be

detailed to such an extent that the receiv-

ing state can make a realistic evaluation

of its worth or conduct a risk assessment.

37. When the source of the information is

sensitive or has to be protected, this

should be included in the original mes-

sage.

38. The designated Central authority

must be in a position to act or respond to

the information supplied.

- information shall be exchanged via a

Central authority

- content of information exchange

The central authorities shall supply one

another, requested or not, with informa-

tion if circumstances arise or if sizeable

groups of persons who may pose a threat

to public order (e.g. big public sport or

cultural events) and security or are sus-

pected to have organised serious crime

move through or towards other Schengen

States. The information shall be supplied

at as early a stage as possible. Save as

otherwise provided for under national law,

the exchange of information within the

meaning of this manual may take place

directly between the police services con-

cerned in urgent cases. The Central au-

thority shall be informed as soon as possi-

ble.

10842/09 LB/mdc 20

DG H E�

- Content of the Information: The infor-

mation which Schengen States supply one

another must be dealt with confidentially

and shall be used exclusively for the pur-

pose for which it is provided. The infor-

mation to be provided shall be supplied in

accordance with relevant national legisla-

tion.

- Communication: In order to exchange

information, the Central authority may use

the Liaison Bureaux and, if appropriate,

joint police stations or the contact points

referred to in this catalogue. The follow-

ing means of communication may be used

when exchanging information: telephone,

fax, e-mail, radio communication and

other means of data communication. By

decision of the Executive Committee of

16.12.1998 on the handbook on cross-

border police co-operation "The Schengen

Secretariat shall be responsible for con-

stantly updating the Handbook". To this

end the Schengen States shall keep the

General Secretariat abreast of any

amendments to be made to their national

fact sheets.

The central authorities can use standard-

ized templates, which are available e.g. in

the Police Cooperation Handbook, police

Intranet etc.

2.2. Urgent situations

39. In particularly urgent cases, the ex-

change of information within the

meaning of this Article may take

place directly between the police au-

thorities concerned, unless national

provisions stipulate otherwise. The

Central authority shall be informed

of this as soon as possible.

See observations under 1.2

3. Articles 7, 47 and 125 CISA - Liaison officers

3.1. Liaison officers in other Schengen States

40. At the request of the authorized police

authority of each of the Schengen States,

liaison officers may be sent to other

Schengen States.

41. The task of liaison officers shall be to

Liaison Officers should be posted to the

Central authority.

Co-operation between liaison officers

10842/09 LB/mdc 21

DG H E�

advise, facilitate and assist.

should be encouraged.

Initial contact between the police units

and the liaison officers should be transmit-

ted via the central unit.

42. According to Article 47 CISA, liaison

officers shall not be empowered to exe-

cute autonomously any police measures.

They shall supply information and shall

discharge their duties on the instructions

issued to them by the Schengen State

which they come from and by the Schen-

gen State to which they are seconded. The

host police authority of the Schengen

State is bound to provide for the protec-

tion of liaison officers.

43. The relevant police authority of the

host Schengen State shall determine the

activities of liaison officers and the condi-

tions in which these are carried out.

44. The liaison officers are bound to fol-

low instructions issued by the competent

authorities.

3.2. Co-operation between liaison officers in third countries

45. Schengen states should take advantage

of common use of liaison officers posted

abroad by the law enforcement agencies

of the Member States in line with Art. 3 of

the Council Decision 2003/170/JHA.

Schengen States should inform each other

of their intention to second a liaison offi-

cer to a third state.

The Nordic co-operation in respect of liai-

son officers could serve as an example for

future posts. The annual or bi-annual

meetings of all their liaison officer seem

eneficial.

Concept of having “ad hoc liaison offi-

cers” is a cost- effective practice.

National meetings of all liaison officers

posted abroad to different destination

should be considered to be beneficial.

Selection of destinations for secondment

of liaison officers should follow a thor-

ough assessment and be based on a na-

tional strategy for the posting all types of

liasion officers (police, migration attachés

etc.) abroad in order to avoid overlaps and

to make the best possible use of comple-

mentary functional profiles which have

very different legal foundations and du-

ties.

10842/09 LB/mdc 22

DG H E�

4. Article 7 CISA - Exchanging information in view of ensuring effective ex-

ternal border controls and surveillance.

46. With a view to improving the effec-

tiveness of checks and surveillance at the

external borders, Article 7 CISA provides

for an exchange of all relevant and impor-

tant information relating to such checks,

with the exception of data on named indi-

viduals.

Such information, which may inter alia

concern migration flows, shall be ex-

changed via the Central authorities.

SECTIO� B - OPERATIO�AL CO-OPERATIO�

5. Article 40 CISA (Cross-border surveillance)

5.1. The principle

47. According to article 40 CISA, when a

crime has been committed and when it is

within the framework of their competence,

nationally authorised officers are allowed

to continue the surveillance, which has

started in their own country, across the

border towards another Schengen State

under very strictly defined conditions with

the approval of that state. Cross-border

surveillance is permitted to take place on

all types of border crossings, on land in

the air and at sea.

48. According to the main rule an ap-

proval must be obtained in advance, i.e.

before the border is crossed, to continue

the surveillance into the territory of the

recipient state.

49. When there is a risk of delay the sur-

veillance is allowed to continue across the

border into the territory of the recipient

state without prior approval under certain

conditions.

50. In article 40 CISA the following two

cases are separated:

Normal or Ordinary surveillance (OS) and

Urgent or Emergency surveillance (ES)

51. Hand-written forms are never allowed.

The form for cross-border surveillance

should be filled in as accurately as possi-

ble, especially with information about

weapons, police personnel, vehicles and

technical equipment.

(In the form a special column for informa-

tion about weapons ought to be added as

complementary information. There ought

to be a box where the recipient state can

sign to indicate whether it approves or re-

jects the request.)

Full explanation of the reason justifying

the request should be included on the

form.

There is a need of harmonising in particu-

lar communications, technical equipment

and procedures for police services which

carry out cross-border operations.

The state that is planning the cross-border

surveillance shall inform the recipient

state as soon as possible. The general rule

is that all requests should be sent to the

central national unit.

10842/09 LB/mdc 23

DG H E�

5.2.1. Conditions for normal or ordinary surveillance: (OS)

• A preliminary investigation has

started.

• The individual who is going to be ob-

served must be suspected of complic-

ity in a crime that can be liable to ex-

tradition or

• Art. 40 paragraph 1 of CISA

• Only nationally authorised officers are

allowed to carry out cross-border sur-

veillance.

• The state that received the request

must give its approval of the surveil-

lance (certain conditions can be in-

cluded in the approval).

• The nationally authorised officers who

carry out the surveillance are allowed

to carry service weapons if the recipi-

ent state has not forbidden this, but the

weapons can only be used in self-

defence.

• The Central authority must be able to

forward the request within the state to

the unit responsible for the operation

on a 24/24hr basis.

52. In addition to being authorised, offi-

cers conducting cross border surveillance

should be trained to an appropriate level,

be equipped to a level of self sufficiency

and be fully aware of their powers and

responsibilities pursuant to Article 40

CISA.

The general rule is that all requests should

be sent to the central national unit.

Member states should introduce the

Standing Orders / Cross Border Opera-

tions (Police Cooperation Handbook), dis-

seminated in all relevant languages of

neighbouring countries along with a Brief

guideline on the implementation of

Schengen / Dublin in Switzerland, con-

taining important information for cross-

border police cooperation, can also be

seen as a best practice.

5.2.2. Conditions for urgent or emergency surveillance: (ES)

• Prior approval could not be obtained

because the case was very urgent.

• A criminal investigation must have

started.

• It is suspected that the individual or

other persons than the suspect – if re-

quired by the pending investigation

and if there are reasonable grounds to

assume that the observation will con-

Even in cases of urgent or emergency sur-

veillance the designated Central authority

should still be considered as the first route

for the transmission of requests under Ar-

ticle 40 CISA. Even in particularly urgent

cases their experience and structure

should permit the best results for the pre-

vention and detection of crime and main-

tenance of public policy and national se-

10842/09 LB/mdc 24

DG H E�

tribute to identify or track down the

suspected perpetrator and who are

subject to surveillance are related to

crimes presented in the list mentioned

in article 40 CISA.

• Only nationally authorised officers are

allowed to carry out surveillance.

• The border-crossing is immediately

reported to the Central authority in the

recipient state.

• A request for legal assistance is sub-

mitted without any delay.

53. Particularly in respect of urgent or

emergency surveillance, in addition to be-

ing authorised, officers conducting cross

border surveillance should be trained to an

appropriate level, be equipped to a level of

self sufficiency and be fully aware of their

powers and responsibilities pursuant to

Article 40 CISA.

curity.

5.3. The surveillance must be interrupted:

• At the request of the recipient state.

• If no approval has been obtained from

the recipient state within five hours af-

ter the border was crossed.

5.4.1.

54. For a request to continue cross-border

surveillance from a Schengen State to an-

other it is a general rule that this should be

sent to the central national unit.

55. The Central national unit main role is

to make sure that all available information

on the place where it is assumed that the

surveillance will be conducted will come

to the recipient state in a correct way and

to facilitate contacts between the officers

in charge of the surveillance and the law

enforcement authorities.

In urgent cases a request can be received

from the foreign authority on the tele-

phone, but in that case the information

shall be confirmed in writing as soon as

possible.

The central unit shall have updated tele-

phone numbers of the law enforcement

authorities, which are the closest to the

border.

56. An urgent reply is necessary from the

recipient state as to whether the request is

approved or rejected.

The recipient state replies on the same

form as the one which was sent to it. (See

point1.1 about complementary informa-

tion on the form in question.)

10842/09 LB/mdc 25

DG H E�

5.5. Practical regulations to carry out the surveillance

5.5.1. Before crossing the border

• Even in urgent cases, a request for as-

sistance shall be sent through the cen-

tral authorities in each state.

• In urgent cases a request shall be sent

as soon as possible.

• The submission of a request to cross

the border shall be handled by the

competent authorities in the recipient

state as a request for assistance ac-

cording to article 40.1 CISA. This re-

quest for assistance shall contain all

the information as required by the

Handbook on Police co-operation and

be available at the time of the request.

• An approval of the request must be

given by the recipient state. Certain

conditions can be linked to an ap-

proval.

Information about rules of the respective

country for f police officers executing

cross-border operations on the territory

should be easily available.

Knowledge of rules (including rules of the

other countries) for cross border opera-

tions is regularly promoted via joint train-

ing of neighbouring countries.

5.5.2. Once the border has been crossed.

57. The officer shall be subject to the laws

and regulations in the state where he/she

operates and follow the instructions from

the competent authorities.

• The officers carrying out the surveil-

lance must at all times be able to give

proof of their acting in an official ca-

pacity.

• If the recipient state does not oppose

this explicitly, the officer is allowed to

carry a service weapon, which can

only be used in self-defence.

• It is forbidden to enter domestic

homes and places which are not open

to the public.

• The individual who is subject to sur-

veillance should neither be arrested

nor challenged by the foreign officers

carrying out the surveillance.

• The application shall be submitted to

the central authorities before the sur-

veillance starts. In urgent cases when

the surveillance team crosses the bor-

der, the Central authority shall contact

Definitions in the Schengen States of the

terms self-defence, service weapons and

domicile, can be found in the handbook on

police co-operation.

10842/09 LB/mdc 26

DG H E�

its counterpart.

58. The individual who is subject of a sur-

veillance should neither be arrested nor

challenged by the foreign officers carrying

out the surveillance: the subject can how-

ever be retained and be submitted to a se-

curity search of his person - which is not

equivalent to an arrest - on condition that

the subject has committed or taken part in

the commission of an extraditable offence.

5.5.3. When the surveillance is over

• When the operation is over, this shall

be reported to the authority in the re-

cipient state; the supervising officers

can be instructed to appear in person.

The report shall be written on the form

contained within the Handbook on Po-

lice Co-operation.

• The authorities in the recipient state

can request that the police officers

who are sent will participate in the fol-

low-up of the operation, including in-

vestigations and legal proceedings.

Consideration should be given to hold a

joint de-brief between the agencies in-

volved to ensure lessons are learned.

In addition to a report being prepared by

the surveillance team consideration should

be given to having a report prepared on

the procedures followed by the various

authorising parties involved in the proc-

ess. This will highlight both any proce-

dural difficulties and best practice.

5.5.4. The follow up

59. A standard form for statistics has

been developed to provide reliable, gen-

eral information on how often and how

efficiently a surveillance operation is car-

ried out.

60. This form must be filled in by the

Central authority of the requesting state

as soon as a request for surveillance has

been made, no matter the outcome, (even

if the border is not crossed in the end).

The central national unit shall have statis-

tics regarding reports on article 40 CISA.

All units shall report systematically to the

central national unit.

Later on it can be of interest that the con-

cerned authorities make a joint assessment

on the results of the operation and write a

report on it. Then it is possible to consider

obtained experience and to introduce im-

provements.

6. Article 41 CISA (Cross-border pursuit)

6.1. Principle

61. According to Art. 41 CISA, officers

in pursuit of a person may continue pur-

suing on the territory of a Schengen State

with which their State has a common

border. This option, for which prior au-

Best practices would have it that pursuit

which are today limited to land should be

extended to air and sea, the way it is today

provided for in some bilateral agreements.

10842/09 LB/mdc 27

DG H E�

thorization is not required, is subject to

very strict conditions and precise ar-

rangements.

62. Some of these conditions and ar-

rangements are of a general nature, others

are specific to each country and have

been laid down in unilateral declarations.

According to the Schengen Convention.,

each State is free to choose between two

options concerning the offences which

may give rise to pursuit and is free to re-

strict the powers of the pursuing officers

(whether or not they have the power to

stop and interrogate, restrictions on the

scope and duration of the pursuit).

The Nordic co-operation on cross border

pursuit where officers face no restriction

on location or time could serve as an ex-

ample for the future Schengen procedures.

6.2. Conditions

- Pursuit may only be performed across

the land borders

- Only nationally authorised officers

are allowed to carry out cross-border

pursuits

Pursuits would be more efficient if restric-

tions to only land border could be lifted.

- Conditions linked to the type of of-

fence: each State has the choice be-

tween two options for the type of of-

fences allowing the power of pursuit

to be exercised: either the restrictive

list of offences stipulated in Art.

41(4)(a) CISA or extraditable of-

fences

It would be "best practices" if Schengen

States could apply the same criteria.

- Reference must be made to the na-

tional fact sheets to find out which

option has been chosen by an indi-

vidual State. However, the following

conditions apply in all the States:

= the person concerned must have

been caught in the act of committing

or participating. in one of the offences

= pursuit is also authorized where the

person concerned is under provisional

arrest or serving a custodial sentence.

�ational fact sheets should be both

widely available and widely known

about by operational officers operating

in border areas.

- Conditions for emergency pursuit:

emergency pursuit requires that

= it has not been possible to advise the

requested authorities in advance ow-

ing to particular urgency

10842/09 LB/mdc 28

DG H E�

= or the authorities have been advised

but have not been able to take up the

pursuit in due time themselves

= the pursuing officers consult the au-

thorities of the requested State at the

latest upon crossing the border

= the pursuit ceases at the first request

of the requested State.

6.3. Restrictions on the power of pursuit

63. There are three types of restriction

which may be imposed on the power of

pursuit, which each individual State is

free to choose:

Harmonisation of the restrictions in re-

spect of time and location and the powers

of pursuing officers would help.

Entering restaurants or similar, during

their functioning hours, workplace and its

facilities ought be permitted

- territorial restriction: some Schengen

States authorize pursuit on their entire

territory, others only authorize it on a

certain number of kilometres along

the border.

- time restriction: pursuit may have to

be suspended after a certain amount

of time has lapsed.

Fact sheets available to operational of-

ficers should reflect the specific type of

restriction that applies in the border

area they are policing.

- a restriction on the powers of the

pursuing agents: some Schengen

States authorize them to stop and

interrogate, others do not. This

does not affect the right to make a

citizen’s arrest in the State on the

territory of which the pursuit is

carried out when an offender is

caught in the act.

6.4. Practical arrangements

64. During pursuit:

- It is mandatory to inform the central

authorities of the State on the territory

of which the pursuit is being carried

out at the latest upon crossing the

border. This must be done by contact-

ing

= either the first police authority of

the State concerned

= or one of the liaison authorities

Best practices would be that as soon as the

pursuing officers realise that a border

crossing is possible, they should inform

their central authorities who will then con-

tact their counterpart.

10842/09 LB/mdc 29

DG H E�

designated by the State concerned

- The officer must act in compliance

with the national law of the state in

which he is operating and must fol-

low the instructions of the locally

competent authorities.

- The power to exercise road traffic

prerogatives during pursuit is granted

to the pursuing officers in accordance

with the national law of the State on

the territory of which a pursuit is con-

tinued

- The pursuit must be stopped at the

request of the local authorities.

- The officer must be in possession of

his service credential or badge or war-

rant card and be easily identifiable

(uniform or armband, marked vehicle,

etc.

- The officer may carry his service

weapon; its use is forbidden except in

case of self-defence under the na-

tional law of the requesting state

- Entering homes and places not acces-

sible to the public is forbidden

65. Once pursuit has been concluded:

- The officers involved must appear

before the locally competent authori-

ties to make a report after every pur-

suit, no matter the outcome; if the lo-

cally competent authorities so wish,

the officers must remain available and

provide assistance, if requested, with

the follow-up, investigations and ju-

dicial procedures.

- If the person is arrested and is not a

national of the country where the ar-

rest was made, he must be released

six hours after arrest if no provisional

arrest warrant for extradition is forth-

coming (the hours between midnight

10842/09 LB/mdc 30

DG H E�

and 9 a.m. do not count).

- The persons arrested may only be

subjected to a security search for the

purpose of bringing them before the

local authorities. They may be hand-

cuffed and objects on their person

may be seized.

6.5. Follow-up information

66. A standard form for statistics is at-

tached so as to give the central authorities

reliable, general information on how of-

ten and how efficiently the power of pur-

suit is exercised.

67. This form must be filled in by any

authority having engaged in a pursuit,

whatever the outcome, as soon as the

border is crossed and sent to the Central

authority of the home state.

68. All units should report within 24 hours

to the Central Unit concerning the applica-

tion of article 41 CISA.

69. Central Authorities should record sta-

tistics concerning the application of article

41 CISA.

7. Organisational structure and strategy

70. Each Schengen State should develop a

national plan defining the steps to be

taken in each country to establish an or-

ganisational structure and strategy to sup-

port police co-operation as required by the

Schengen Convention. This national Plan

(“Schengen Action Plan”) should provide

practical operational guidance on how

each state applies the respective Articles

of the Schengen Convention.

71. A Central authority must be set up and

designated as a single point of contact for

each M/S.

72. Central authority must provide 24/7

cover for communications with all M/S

and national authorities.

A joint operational plan could be estab-

lished between neighbouring states in or-

der to agree co-operation and arrange-

ments on a practical level. Plan should be

updated regularly.

Coordination mechanism- “National

Schengen Working Group” could be es-

tablished to coordinate the national pre-

paratory process to enter Schengen.

Central authority should be equipped to

10842/09 LB/mdc 31

DG H E�

73. For utmost efficiency in bilateral

communication, languages familiar to

both parties shall be used.

74. Central authorities should hold a list of

requests for which direct assistance can be

made in urgent situations without involv-

ing judicial authorities.

75. Central authority should compile both

management information and operational

information on Police co-operation.

76. Local police should have permanent

access to Central authority.

77. Central authority should have an in

depth knowledge of national and interna-

tional legislation supporting police co-

operation and act as a centre of excellence

for national services.

78. A thorough knowledge of all relevant

provisions of the Schengen acquis along

with the bilateral agreements is required.

79. Coordination should exist between

Central authority, Joint Police Stations

and Police and Customs Co-operation

Centre.

80. Central authority should be responsi-

ble for maintaining an up to date list of

contact points at international and national

level.

81. The national plan should include pro-

cedures to facilitate operational assistance

and exchange of information between

Central authorities, Joint Police Stations

and Police and Customs Co-operation

Centres in order to fight cross –border

crime.

82. Information should be handled in a

forward and process requests rapidly.

Experts in different fields available 24/24

h.

It is clearly desirable that nationally

authorised officers are knowledgeable in

the most commonly spoken languages

(multi-linguistic approach), both for direct

communication and the ability to manage

documentation in the absence of transla-

tion support.

The standard practice is to exchange

forms in the language of the issuing coun-

try and in English.

This should be a key element in the re-

cruitment process and for the design of

training sessions.

Centralised supervision and instructions

will ensure national standards are met.

No handwritten request.

The information shall be supplied at as

early a stage as possible.

10842/09 LB/mdc 32

DG H E�

confidential and secure manner.

83. Means of communication - telephone,

fax, e-mail, radio-communications and

mobile telephones should all be utilised.

84. Schengen states should agree to adopt

a set of standard forms to be used for all

aspects of police co-operation. These

forms should be designed to simplify pro-

cedures and be included as an annexe to

the Handbook on police co-operation.

Permanent and regular updated training to

improve the knowledge of the staff.

85. Schengen states should jointly develop

operational standards and a legislative

framework to facilitate the use of special-

ist surveillance techniques in cross border

operations.

Central authorities should be in a position

to advise other Schengen States of any

specialist surveillance techniques their

national services may employ.

8. Statistics

86. Reliable and comparable statistics

should be collected and analysed by the

Central authority responsible for interna-

tional co-operation. These statistics should

consider all the activities concerning in-

ternational police cooperation including

gathering and analysing of the data re-

garding Schengen cooperation instru-

ments. As it is recognised to be an effec-

tive evaluation and management tool.

87. The compilation of statistics would, at

a strategic level help to determine the

threat assessment and assist in the prioriti-

It should be borne in mind that informa-

tion exchange on bilateral basis can be of

interest to other countries. Therefore, this

10842/09 LB/mdc 33

DG H E�

sation of resources and effectiveness of

the cooperation on national as well as in-

ternational level. (Staff, operational hours,

planning of joint activities etc.).

88. Statistics:

- should be comparable with other

States.

- should be used for the purpose of ana-

lysing the scope, effectiveness and the

use of the relevant articles.

information should always be transmitted

to the Central authority so that this office

can ensure the broader coordination, man-

agement control and overall strategic

overview of the information exchange.

- Statistics should be used on the na-

tional level for monitoring and evalu-

ating of the capacities of relevant

structures responsible for applying

Schengen tools in order to properly

fulfil its tasks (deadlines, standards,

quality).

- Statistics should cover data concerning

the use of articles 39, 46, 40, 41 CISA

and others activities covered by this

catalogue.

Such statistics would benefit the intelli-

gence led policing approach that is already

practised by the law enforcement agen-

cies.

9. Training

9.1. Basic training

89. Training programmes should be flexi-

ble, taking into account the changes in risk

assessment and the new EU legislation

and instruments which have been imple-

mented.

90. Training programmes should empha-

size on the importance of the practical

education. The officers should participate

in regular education on new Schengen in-

struments and legislation. Schengen topics

should be part of the education of all poli-

ce officers.

91. All police personnel should at least

know that Articles 39 and 46 CISA exists

and where to channel the information.

92. The training of police officers in IT

technology is also an essentials require-

ment that has to be covered in view of the

needs of continuous development of inter-

national cooperation.

Officers within the Central authorities

along with training authorities can organ-

ize training sessions for all operative per-

sonnel. Separate or joint training sessions

can be organized for judicial authorities.

Police and Custom Administration should

work towards a common strategy for

training in Schengen matters. This strat-

egy should also include a follow up train-

ing in order to secure its accuracy with a

view to future changes in legislation or

best practice. New learning technologies

can be promoted (e-learning, Intranet,

CD-ROMs).

Informative posters on Schengen matters

available in all offices.

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DG H E�

93. All officers seconded to the Central

authority depending on their competences

and tasks should have successfully com-

pleted a training course covering their

tasks, which should include for example :

- knowledge of relevant Schengen

and EU provisions;

- in depth knowledge of the hand-

book on police- co-operation;

- basic rules and procedures;

- in depth knowledge of relevant bi-

lateral agreements;

- genuine and forged travel and

identity documents;

- Dublin, and readmission provi-

sions;

- Schengen Information System;

- Europol;

- Judicial co-operation.

All Schengen relevant information should

be available through Police Intranet.

The SIRENE´s stand-by service number

should be duly spread (and available).

A national "quality manual for interna-

tional police cooperation" should be

drafted and published, both on Intranet

and through booklets. It will include

summary information relating to Schen-

gen:

• Legal framework and international

instruments (under national law,

EU, , bilateral agreements on

crime prevention and legal assis-

tance)

• Standard of quality and required

data for request for legal assistance

• The various international channels

• Necessity, appropriateness and

proportionality of the request

• Limits and restrictions to informa-

tion exchange.

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DG H E�

94. With regard to training, the police per-

sonnel which will be actively involved in

the near future with Schengen matters,

requires persistent training on the provi-

sions of the Schengen acquis.The Police

Cooperation Handbook has to be brought

to the attention of all police officers and

should be always available in various

forms, in a full translated version, as a

brief guideline (summarizing the most

relevant provisions) or at the police intra-

net.

9.2. Further training

95. A training programme with regular

training/briefing should be established as

part of working hours.

A training program can be established on

local and central level to ensure a contin-

ued offer of education on issues relevant

to co-operation.

Regular exchange of nationally authorised

officers, common training, at least once a

year.

9.3. Linguistic training

96. All officers should be able to speak a

foreign language useful to their work. All

officers, mainly those working in the Cen-

tral authority and those involved in cross-

border co-operation e.g. at the Police and

Customs Co-operation Centres should

have adequate knowledge of English.

Encourage staff to learn other languages.

Set up language programs for those offi-

cers particularly involved in cross-border

co-operation. e.g. at the Police and Cus-

toms Co-operation Centres if necessary.

9.4. Training for management levels

• Relevant common training on Police

co-operation should be provided by

the European Police College.

• Seminars and workshops may be set

up according to the model adopted by

the Sirene Working Group for the Si-

rene officers.

International experience is an asset.

Exchange programmes between states

should be considered as a means of broad-

ening management experience.

Develop the efficient system “train the

trainers” for the multipliers.

9.5. Inter-agency training

Training on the provisions of the Schen-

gen acquis based on the inter-agency

(joint) training approach at all levels.

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DG H E�

10. �ational Coordination

97. An integrated approach involving all

authorities responsible for tackling cross

border crime is essential to create an effi-

cient national coordination. This coordina-

tion should be implemented at local, re-

gional and central level on the basis of a

specific development of a risk analysis,

intelligence structure and flow data man-

agement.

98. The Central Authority must be able to

solve possible disputes of competence be-

tween the authorities involved in the pecu-

liar field of the internal security safeguard.

99. In case of missions that will have a big

impact in all the territory of the concerned

countries, especially if that will involve a

great number of officers and many means,

the coordination has to be carried out by

the Central Authorities.

100. All the Schengen states must be able

to provide data concerning the situation at

its internal borders.

101. An efficient national co-operation

system is a necessary requirement in order

to allow a better definition of specific

agreements with neighbouring states.

Co-operation between local authorities

and the Central Authority, on the basis of

a specific development of a risk analysis,

intelligence structure and data flow man-

agement, should be implemented.

Encourage the creation of:

- a joint database structure;

- meetings between heads of ser-

vice;

- joint training sessions

Information exchange between competent

authorities is essential in order to prevent

crimes as well as the development of an

appropriate working mechanism based on

good communication channels, local con-

tact points, emergency procedures, etc.

Management systems, used by the ser-

vices, should be able to generate intelli-

gence, by using the results from the field

work and analyse it.

11. Joint patrols

102. Joint patrols if needed should be de-

ployed in border areas on the basis of bi-

lateral agreements with all Member States

neighbouring countries.1

- The agreements mention the setting up

of common patrols ;

- The type of personnel and the competent

administration is also defined ;

1Joint patrols can be also provided on the basis of Art. 17 of the Prum Decision.

10842/09 LB/mdc 37

DG H E�

103. Direct co-operation between units.

Each command level can take all the nec-

essary contacts with its counterpart in or-

der to facilitate the conduct of cross bor-

der investigations, with the exception of

coercion measures. Common activities or

joint patrols may also be organised.

104. The neighbouring states should get

together in order to establish the guide-

lines and the main goals to be imple-

mented on cross-border police co-

operation matters.

- The carrying of firearms, of a uniform,

or of any distinctive sign (armband) is

defined ;

- The agreement is indicating the service

weapons which are authorised;

- The conditions to use firearms and the

rules of intervention are explicitly men-

tioned in the bilateral agreements and

the personnel is properly trained ;

- A training sessions concerning adminis-

trative and criminal law and criminal

procedures used in border areas are set

up.

- Patrols may be conducted as cross-

border surveillance patrols in the execu-

tion of a judicial co-operation request, or

in favour of the administration in charge

of the surveillance of external borders.

- The officers are competent for carrying

out autonomous police measures ;

- The State where the joint team operates

guarantees a protection to the officers of

the other State acting on its territory; it

provides them with the same protection

and assistance as the one it gives its own

officers. All officers are submitted to the

rules of civil and criminal liability in

force on the territory in which they act.

12. Radio-communications (Article 44 CISA) SCH/Com-ex (99) 6

12.1. Short Term Measures

105. Measures should be taken by Schen-

gen States in border areas for the purposes

of cross-border surveillance hot pursuit

and common cross-border cooperation to

facilitate police and customs co-operation

with local solutions :

- installation of telephone, radio;

- exchange of telephone directories;

- exchange of radio equipment ;

- posting liaison officers equipped

with suitable radios ;

- establishing a common contact point

for police and customs services

operating in the same areas .

10842/09 LB/mdc 38

DG H E�

106. Such measures can be part of bilat-

eral agreements for setting up joint police

stations and police and customs co-

operation centres

12.2. Medium Term measures

107. Schengen States shall implement na-

tional digital radiocommunications net-

works for their emergency services, in the

harmonised frequency band of 380 – 400

MHz. (This measure was already imple-

mented in all Schengen countries)

108. The networks shall be based on

TETRA or TETRAPOL systems,and they

shall meet the Schengen technical, opera-

tional and tactical requirements.

109. Interworking measures (Intersystem

interfaces) shall be set up in border areas

to connect the neighbouring networks.

These measures meet at least the follow-

ing requirements :

- between officers of each side of the

border area :

- individual calls ;

- group calls ;

- direct mode ;

- between officers and headquarters

of each side of the border area :

- individual calls ;

- group calls ;

- direct mode ;

- between headquarters of each side

of the border area :

- individual calls ;

- group calls ;

- for special operations : air interface

encrypted voice

- for cross border operations: cross

border surveillance, hot pursuit,

controlled delivery, joint patrols

- for other cross border activities e.g.

joint training

- Three combinations provide the re-

quired interworking level in most

cases :

- overlapping networks providing

normal functionality within a lim-

ited range into the neighbouring

state in question1

- ;

- the use of two-terminal functional-

ities (transponders, extra terminals,

combined mobile installations)

when service is required beyond

overlapping area ;

- simple interconnections between

control rooms;

- interconnections between both net-

works providing cross border indi-

vidual calls and group calls

- In case the preferred solution is not

adequate (e.g. communications for

surveillance units across the total terri-

tory of Schengen States) standard

GSM functionalities may provide so-

lution.

System enabling direct radio-

communication between various law en-

forcement agencies.

1 Under the PCWG was established ad hoc group for radiocomunications.

10842/09 LB/mdc 39

DG H E�

110. Schengen States are encouraged to

reach bilateral agreements the implemen-

tation of which is reported to the Council.

111. Direct radio-communication between

various law enforcement agencies.

12.3 Long Term measures

a) Schengen states should take into ac-

count that law enforcement and public

safety radio communication systems will

need to support and to be able to exchange

high-speed mobile data information.

b) A common standard operating in har-

monised frequency band represents a solu-

tion for mobile broadband data.

c) Voice and all data functionalities (high

and low speed data) should be integrated

in a tightly integrated solution that pro-

vides a migration path including interop-

erability from existing law enforcement

and public safety systems to the new solu-

tion

10842/09 LB/mdc 40

DG H E�

13. Article 73 CISA - Controlled deliveries1

13.1.

�ote: Article 73 CISA was removed; appro-

priate provision is in the Conventi by the

Council in accordance with Article 34 of the

Treaty on European Union, on Mutual

Assistance in Criminal Matters between the

Member States of the European Union, see

Title 1, Art. 2,2 of the Convention

established by the Council in accordance

with Article 34 of the Treaty on European

Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal

Matters between the Member States of the

European Union.

112. Each Schengen State takes measures,

according to its constitution and national

legislation, with a view to allowing con-

trolled deliveries within the illegal trade in

narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances

1. The possibility of controlled deliveries

should be extended to other criminal of-

fences.

2. Decisions are taken in each separate case

to use the controlled delivery as a

method of surveillance after obtaining a

permission from each state that is in-

volved.

3. The state concerned shall be responsible

for leading and monitoring the operation

on its territory and shall have the au-

thorisation to intervene.

Even if the main focus has been on con-

trolled deliveries of narcotic drugs in this

catalogue, it should be noted that similar

operations in most Schengen States are al-

lowed for the control of other goods (cul-

tural goods , weapons, tobacco).

13.2.

113. A controlled delivery can be carried out

in all the Schengen States if permission was

granted in advance. However, the special

conditions and ways of sanction differ be-

tween the Schengen States.

Harmonisation of practices and of legisla-

tion is recommended.

1 In certain Schengen States there is a difference between a "monitored” delivery meaning that

there is no direct control but that the consignment is being followed. A ”controlled” delivery

meaning that an undercover officer takes part in the delivery. In this catalogue the expression

"controlled deliveries" is used in a wide sense.

10842/09 LB/mdc 41

DG H E�

13.3.

114. Due to the fact that the handling of

controlled deliveries is a complicated task,

both from a practical and a legislative point

of view, these cases ought to be handled by

especially appointed national contact points.

In order to facilitate the ways of operating, a

Central Authority should be established con-

sisting of an integrated office where Inter-

pol, Europol, liaison officers and SIRENE

are included.

13.4.

.

Definitions and limitations: In certain

Schengen States there is a difference be-

tween a "monitored” delivery meaning that

there is no direct control but that the con-

signment is being followed. A ”controlled”

delivery meaning that an undercover officer

takes part in the delivery.

In this catalogue the expression "controlled

deliveries" is used in a wide sense.

13.5.

115. Fundamental information that is re-

quired from each Schengen State that car-

ries out a controlled delivery.

• The reason and the background for the

operation;

• Statement of facts justifying the opera-

tion;

• Type of products, quantity;

• Other goods;

• Expected place of entry to the requested

state. When appropriate, information

about the exit from the requested state;

• Expected transportation and route;

• The suspect's identity (name, birth, resi-

dence, citizenship, physical description);

• Indicate who has authorized the opera-

tion;

• Indicate the name of the competent offi-

cer in charge of the operation and the

way of contacting (communication ,

transportation...);

• customs;

• Information about specialist surveillance

techniques;

• The Schengen States should create

documents on the basis of the form

available for article 40 CISA.

10842/09 LB/mdc 42

DG H E�

13.6. The foreign police and other law enforcement agencies' role.

116. Information on how to handle con-

trolled deliveries:

• Nationally authorised officers are per-

mitted to take part in operations con-

cerning controlled deliveries in all

Schengen states, usually when an au-

thorisation has been given.

117. The recipient state normally requests

that its own agencies exercise the final op-

erational control.

• Special techniques may be used pro-

vided that the method is legal in the re-

cipient state.

Law enforcement Agencies involved in con-

trolled deliveries have to exchange an up-

dated list of contact points, telephone num-

bers and details of the technical equipment.

The officers from the law enforcement

agencies taking part in the operation should

know each other personally.

13.7. Partial replacement of the consignment

The advantage of a partial replacement is to

minimise the risks of spreading the con-

signment if the operation fails and at the

same time to leave a sufficient amount of

the consignment in order to prosecute.

13.8. Follow-up

118. It could be of value for the concerned

law enforcement agencies to jointly evaluate

and submit a report on the result of the op-

eration.

Based on the acquired experience it would

then be possible to make actual improve-

ments and at the same time gain knowledge

of each other's legislation, methods and pri-

orities.

___________

10842/09 LB/mdc 43

DG H E�

ANNEX

- Manual of Good Practices concerning the International Police Cooperation Units at National

Level (7968/08)

- Schengen Police Cooperation Handbook (10694/07)

- Prüm Treaty

- Swedish Framework Decision (Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December

2006 on simplifying the exchange information and intelligence between law enforcement au-

thorities of the European Union)

- Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border coopera-

tion, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime

- Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision

2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terror-

ism and cross-border crime

- Council Decision 2008/617/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the improvement of cooperation between

the special intervention units of the Member States of the European Union in crisis situations

- EUROPOL Convention

- 2002/187/JHA: Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to rein-

forcing the fight against serious crime

- Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism

- Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organized

crime.

___________